Assessing the Strategic Impact of Service Culture on ...

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<strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong>
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> on
Counterinsurgency Operations
Case: United States Marine Corps
JEANNIE L. JOHNSON
Submitted to
Pr<strong>of</strong>essor D. B. G. Heuser
and Pr<strong>of</strong>essor C. S. Gray
University <strong>of</strong> Reading
April 2013
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Table <strong>of</strong> Contents
CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 5
Purpose and Scope .................................................................................................................................... 5
Case Selection and Research Question ..................................................................................................... 5
Literature Review: Locating Cultural Topography within <strong>the</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> Paradigm .................... 12
Three Generations <strong>of</strong> Scholarship ....................................................................................................... 17
Refining <strong>the</strong> Paradigm for Practice ..................................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................................................... 28
CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 28
Cultural Mapping Exercise ...................................................................................................................... 32
Step 1: Identify an Issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Interest ..................................................................................... 32
Step 2: Select an Actor for Focused Study .......................................................................................... 34
Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences ..................................................................................... 35
Step 4: Employ Four Research Perspectives: Identity, Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens ........... 36
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs) ...................................................................................... 46
Step 6: Map CCFs Across Cultural Influences ...................................................................................... 47
Step 7: Assess Results ......................................................................................................................... 48
CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................................................... 49
AMERICAN PUBLIC AND MILITARY CULTURE ......................................................................................................... 49
Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences ......................................................................................... 49
American National <strong>Culture</strong>.................................................................................................................. 50
U.S. Military <strong>Culture</strong> ............................................................................................................................ 58
CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................................................................... 64
MARINE CORPS CULTURE: IDENTITY AND ROLE CONCEPTION ................................................................................. 64
Step 4: Employ Research Perspectives: Identity .................................................................................... 66
Identity ................................................................................................................................................ 67
Role Conception .................................................................................................................................. 85
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................................................... 96
MARINE CORPS CULTURE: NORMS, VALUES, AND PERCEPTUAL LENS ....................................................................... 96
Step 4: Employ Research Perspectives: Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens ....................................... 96
Norms and Values ............................................................................................................................... 98
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Perceptual Lens ................................................................................................................................. 133
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 139
CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................................................................... 140
LESSONS LEARNED, LOST, AND CULTURAL BLINDSPOTS: MARINES AS AMERICANS .................................................... 140
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors ................................................................................................... 140
Step 6: Mapping Critical Cultural Factors Across Cultural Influences .................................................. 140
The Banana Wars .............................................................................................................................. 141
Intervening Years .............................................................................................................................. 151
Vietnam: The CAP Program ............................................................................................................... 151
Mapping Critical Cultural Factors .......................................................................................................... 155
American <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps .......................................................................................... 155
CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................................................................... 187
LESSONS LEARNED, LOST, AND CULTURAL BLINDSPOTS: MARINES AS MILITARY MEN .............................................. 187
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors ................................................................................................... 187
Step 6: Mapping Critical Cultural Factors Across Cultural Influences .................................................. 187
Military <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps ............................................................................................. 187
CHAPTER 8 ................................................................................................................................................... 208
CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSES ...................................................................................................................... 208
Step 7: Assess Results ........................................................................................................................... 208
“Shaping”: The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Multilayered <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> on Counterinsurgency Practice................. 208
“Being Shaped”: The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Counterinsurgency Practice on Marine <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> ................ 215
Why Marines Could Love Counterinsurgency…and Why They Don’t ............................................... 217
APPENDIX A: ................................................................................................................................................ 220
U.S. ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE CULTURES ................................................................................................... 220
Continuing Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences – Sister <strong>Service</strong>s ......................................... 220
Air Force <strong>Culture</strong> ............................................................................................................................... 221
Army <strong>Culture</strong> ..................................................................................................................................... 231
Navy <strong>Culture</strong> ...................................................................................................................................... 239
APPENDIX B: ................................................................................................................................................. 253
USMC RECRUITMENT POSTERS ....................................................................................................................... 253
APPENDIX C: ................................................................................................................................................. 266
U.S. MARINE CORPS SYMBOL AND SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................................................... 266
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APPENDIX D: ................................................................................................................................................ 267
MARINE CORPS NARRATIVES ........................................................................................................................... 267
Fighter Identity & Ethos ........................................................................................................................ 267
Message to <strong>the</strong> American Public .......................................................................................................... 268
Marine Pride ......................................................................................................................................... 269
Pride: Battle Specific ........................................................................................................................ 271
Pride: Extended to Associated O<strong>the</strong>rs ............................................................................................. 271
Bro<strong>the</strong>rhood and Honor to Marines Who Have Come Before ............................................................. 272
Marine Bravado .................................................................................................................................... 272
Marine Norms & Values ........................................................................................................................ 273
Mixed Messages .................................................................................................................................... 273
APPENDIX E: ................................................................................................................................................. 274
COMMANDANT SPEECHES: 1916-1975............................................................................................................ 274
APPENDIX F: ................................................................................................................................................. 302
USMC DOCTRINE – SMALL WARS MANUAL AND WARFIGHTING .......................................................................... 302
SMALL WARS MANUAL .............................................................................................................................. 303
Identity/Role ..................................................................................................................................... 303
Values ................................................................................................................................................ 303
Norms ................................................................................................................................................ 308
Perceptual Lens ................................................................................................................................. 327
Warfighting ........................................................................................................................................... 337
Identity/Role ..................................................................................................................................... 337
Values ................................................................................................................................................ 337
Norms ................................................................................................................................................ 339
Perceptual Lens ................................................................................................................................. 342
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope
Cultural scholarship <strong>of</strong> security phenomena is in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> finding sound footing in both academy
and <strong>the</strong> halls <strong>of</strong> policy practice. Although many may agree that “culture matters” it remains to devise a
methodology which renders cultural insight <strong>of</strong> an operationally relevant and “actionable” nature. This
<strong>the</strong>sis aims to provide such a methodology, one designed to capture strategically relevant cultural data
and employ <strong>the</strong>m in ways that refine forecasting ability and <strong>of</strong>fer meaningful improvements to strategic
planning. The resultant methodology must be both defensible to <strong>the</strong> academy and useful to <strong>the</strong>
practitioner.
Thus, <strong>the</strong> ambitions <strong>of</strong> this <strong>the</strong>sis will be tw<strong>of</strong>old: first, to locate <strong>the</strong> proposed methodology: Cultural
Topography within <strong>the</strong> strategic culture literature and elucidate <strong>the</strong> practical and <strong>the</strong>oretical principles
upon which it is founded; and second, to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> step by step mechanisms <strong>of</strong> its research
design: <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping Exercise by examining a security issue which begs investigation from both
an academic and strategic perspective. Although a number <strong>of</strong> issues reach this threshold, <strong>the</strong> one
selected for investigation here takes an introspective bent: <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> service culture, specifically
that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States’ Marine Corps, on counterinsurgency operations. An explanation <strong>of</strong> this
selection follows.
Case Selection and Research Question
Both <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> political science and <strong>the</strong> subdiscipline <strong>of</strong> strategic studies have tended to examine
security issues through means o<strong>the</strong>r than a serious study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> military culture. Military
historian Williamson Murray points out:
History, with its grim landscape <strong>of</strong> defeated armies and shattered nations, would certainly
suggest that military culture matters. But how and why that is so is not entirely clear.
Unfortunately, historians have done little work on <strong>the</strong> subject, focusing for <strong>the</strong> most part on
more immediate factors such as leadership, doctrine, or training to explain victory or defeat.
Even works specifically examining military effectiveness and innovation tend to discuss military
culture as a tangential issue. Yet military culture may be <strong>the</strong> most important factor not only in
military effectiveness, but also in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> military innovation, which is essential to
preparing military organizations for <strong>the</strong> next war. 1
Academic underappreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> military culture on current security operations and
preparation toward <strong>the</strong> next set, is not only unfortunate for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> academy and <strong>the</strong> aims
1 Williamson Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” in John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman eds., America <strong>the</strong>
Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002):
134.
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<strong>of</strong> sound scholarship, it is also dangerous to <strong>the</strong> extent that policy makers and strategists rely on
scholarly study <strong>of</strong> strategic phenomena in order to improve performance. The admonition toward
scrupulous introspection is at least as old as Sun Tzu:
And so in <strong>the</strong> military—
Knowing <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r and knowing oneself,
In one hundred battles no danger.
Not knowing <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r and knowing oneself,
One victory for one loss.
Not knowing <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r and not knowing oneself,
In every battle certain defeat. 2
Most <strong>of</strong> those who recite <strong>the</strong> “know thyself and know thy enemy” catechism today do so with <strong>the</strong>
second half <strong>of</strong> Sun Tzu’s admonition in mind. A few, including Colin Gray, recognize chronic deficits <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> first order. Gray insists that any would-be strategist must know his enemy, certainly, but must also
know himself --recognizing his domestic strategic domain as a distinctive community with component
parts that may champion divergent service cultures: “When one begins to take seriously <strong>the</strong> proposition
that soldiers, sailors, and air persons (inter alia) may have worldviews sufficiently distinctive as arguably
to merit description as cultural, insight should be gained on some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> endemic problems in combined
arms and joint warfare.” 3 He is joined by strategic historian Beatrice Heuser who points out that
[i]n addition to <strong>the</strong> competition between rivaling ministers, interservice rivalry in societies with
armies and navies may well have existed in some modest form for centuries. All <strong>of</strong> this, taken
toge<strong>the</strong>r under <strong>the</strong> heading <strong>of</strong> bureaucratic politics, has become ever more pronounced and is
crucial to any understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> configuration and equipment <strong>of</strong> armed forces, [and may well
risk] leaving…Strategy, let alone any grand strategic concept, well behind. 4
Disparate service cultures provide obvious challenges for joint strategy, but even when deployed
individually may pose challenges for operation types for which <strong>the</strong>y are not a good fit. The warfare
action <strong>of</strong> concern here, counterinsurgency, may be particularly problematic for most service cultures.
August Ruhle von Lilienstern, penning small wars doctrine as early as 1817, noted challenges found in
exceptionally acute form in unconventional war: “What may also have contributed to giving Small War
so little acceptance…is <strong>the</strong> fact that is some respects it is more difficult to wage than Major War, as it
2 Of <strong>the</strong> several worthy translations <strong>of</strong> Sun Tzu’s work that exist, this one was selected based on <strong>the</strong> efforts <strong>of</strong> its
authors to preserve <strong>the</strong> rhythm and structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> original Chinese. The Denma Translation Group, The Art <strong>of</strong>
War: A New Translation, (Boston: Shambhala, 2001): 12. A more typical translation reads “If you know <strong>the</strong> enemy
and know yourself, you need not fear <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not <strong>the</strong> enemy, for
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in
every battle.” Sun Tzu Wu, The Art <strong>of</strong> War, trans. Lionel Giles, (Harrisburg, PA: The Military <strong>Service</strong> Publishing
Company, 1949): 51.
3 Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, forthcoming: 199.
4 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 493.
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requires many actions and habits <strong>of</strong> war, a multitude <strong>of</strong> educated and adept <strong>of</strong>ficers, an organization <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> armed forces fit for this form <strong>of</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> war, and an exceptional degree <strong>of</strong> physical, intellectual
and moral education <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> troops used in it.” 5
The United States manages to compound <strong>the</strong> challenges already inherent in this type <strong>of</strong> warfare by
insisting on doing it—and in grand form: <strong>of</strong>ten combining an enemy-centric approach with a large scale
population-centric “nation-building” approach—but refusing to prepare for it. The United States
military has a well documented history <strong>of</strong> turning its back on <strong>the</strong> full range <strong>of</strong> its counterinsurgency
lessons in favor <strong>of</strong> preparation for conventional warfare. As stated by <strong>the</strong> authors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Stability
Operations Field Manual 3-07, “[F]rom our colonial roots, when Congress appointed military
commissioners to negotiate peace treaties and land purchases with Native American tribes, to our
contemporary experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our most enduring tradition has been an inability or
unwillingness to institutionalize <strong>the</strong> lessons <strong>of</strong> those experiences.” 6 O<strong>the</strong>rs have called our self imposed
amnesia as regards low intensity conflict and its attendant stability operations a “tradition <strong>of</strong>
forgetting.” 7
One ramification <strong>of</strong> this chronic amnesia is an unnecessary relearning process each time a new round <strong>of</strong>
counterinsurgency—with its attendant stability operations—occurs. Despite a lengthy history <strong>of</strong> fighting
counterinsurgencies and ample opportunity to produce doctrine and refine training, <strong>the</strong> U.S. military has
instead found itself reinventing lessons learned, rehearsing many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mistakes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past, and relying
on instinct ra<strong>the</strong>r than appropriately tailored training each time it steps back into <strong>the</strong> small wars arena.
For strategic culture scholars <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> formal doctrine, advanced training, or detailed thought given to
counterinsurgency planning stages means that <strong>the</strong>se episodes present a possible rich case for displaying
what is left: organizational instinct -- <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> service culture on security operations.
In considering <strong>the</strong> possible role <strong>of</strong> service culture in shaping counterinsurgency practices <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps presents a particularly compelling case for study. From an academic standpoint this
<strong>the</strong>sis seeks to remedy a longstanding gap in <strong>the</strong> U.S. service culture literature. Carl Builder, author <strong>of</strong>
The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, pr<strong>of</strong>iled <strong>the</strong> characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy and Air Force but did not deign to
include <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps in what is widely considered to be <strong>the</strong> seminal work on U.S. service cultures. 8
5 Italics added. August Rühle von Lilienstern: Handbuch für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum
Gebrauch im Felde, Vol I. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1817), in Beatrice Heuser trs & ed: The Strategy Makers (Santa
Barbara,CA: ABC Clio/Praeger, 2010): 178.
6 William B. Caldwell and Steven M. Leonard, “Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting <strong>the</strong> Engine <strong>of</strong>
Change,” Military Review, July-August 2008: 7. Yates notes that at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small War era (pre-1940) <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps made an effort to capture lessons learned in <strong>the</strong> Small War Manual. “At <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual’s
publication, however, <strong>the</strong> Marines put it on <strong>the</strong> shelf and hoped it would remain <strong>the</strong>re, as <strong>the</strong> Corps, like <strong>the</strong> Army,
turned its attention back to fighting large conventional wars.” Lawrence A. Yates, “The US Military’s Experience in
Stability Operations, 1789-2005,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006): 11
7 James Jay Carafano, “Post-Conflict and <strong>Culture</strong>: Changing America’s Military for 21 st Century Missions,” Heritage
Lectures, No. 810, Delivered October 22, 2003, published November 20, 2003, found at
www.heritage.org/nationalsecurity/hl810.cfm: 3.
8 Carl H. Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989).
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Builder lumped <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps in with <strong>the</strong> Coast Guard and explained ra<strong>the</strong>r dismissively his omission
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two:
[The Marine Corps and Coast Guard] certainly have distinctive, even colorful, institutional
personalities. However, nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps nor <strong>the</strong> Coast Guard enters <strong>the</strong> defense
planning arena as an independent institutional actor with a significant voice in <strong>the</strong> national
approach to strategy or military force planning. 9
On <strong>the</strong> 2011 anniversary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ birthday, Frank H<strong>of</strong>fman, a prolific writer on Marine Corps
culture and a Marine 10 himself stepped to fill a portion <strong>of</strong> Builder’s gap by way <strong>of</strong> a short article. He
<strong>of</strong>fered a note <strong>of</strong> forgiveness to <strong>the</strong> now deceased Builder for characterizing <strong>the</strong> Corps as an institution
with limited strategic voice, (and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>of</strong> insufficient stature to be included in his volume), since at
<strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> Builder’s writing “only one Marine General had ever served in a senior position in <strong>the</strong> Joint
Warfighting community.” A primary aim <strong>of</strong> H<strong>of</strong>fman’s piece was to ensure that readers be disabused <strong>of</strong>
any such “limited voice” notion as regards <strong>the</strong> modern Corps. H<strong>of</strong>fman noted that since Builder penned
his pages Marines have served as Chairman and Vice Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Joint Chiefs <strong>of</strong> Staff, and at least
“seven Marine Generals have served as <strong>the</strong> Commander <strong>of</strong> five different Joint combatant commands.” 11
H<strong>of</strong>fman <strong>the</strong>n proceeds to fill <strong>the</strong> length <strong>of</strong> a paragraph with examples <strong>of</strong> Marines in military-wide
senior leadership positions and documented instances <strong>of</strong> impact on strategic policy wrought by
members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. If ever Builder’s weak defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ omission were defensible, it
is not so now. The increasingly strategic role played by this “colorful” institution requires a more careful
examination <strong>of</strong> its attributes alongside sister services than H<strong>of</strong>fman’s short article was able to provide.
From a strategic standpoint, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps presents a particularly intriguing paradox. As an
institution, <strong>the</strong> Corps’ has a long relationship with counterinsurgency: a history, more extensive by far
than with conventional combat. Not only has history afforded this traditionally ship-borne service lots
<strong>of</strong> practice, <strong>the</strong> activities and attitudes required for successful counterinsurgency seem, on <strong>the</strong> surface,
to be a good fit with Marine Corps culture. The Marine Corps is <strong>the</strong> singular U.S. institution to have
codified doctrine on small wars in advance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21 st century: <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual and is an
institution currently in possession <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficer corps and enlisted ranks with ten years hard won refined
counterinsurgency experience. Forward looking surveys conducted by <strong>the</strong> Marines’ own advertising
agency, J. Walter Thompson indicate that <strong>the</strong> youth pool from which future Marine recruits will be
drawn are eager to engage in <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> multiple tasks modern counterinsurgency <strong>of</strong>fers: going after
“bad guys” while building schools and roads for local villagers. 12 Perhaps most importantly, whe<strong>the</strong>r one
9 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 9.
10 Throughout this work references to “Marine” will be capitalized, this in deference to Marine culture as
documented by Edwin H. Simmons, Brig. General (Ret) USMC and Director Emeritus, Marine Corps History and
Museums: “Marines believe in <strong>the</strong>ir Corps. They also believe that <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> best. They insist that <strong>the</strong> ‘M’ in
‘Marine’ be capitalized. The highest accolade <strong>the</strong>y can bestow on a member <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r service is ‘He would make
a good Marine.’” foreword in Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret.), A Fellowship <strong>of</strong> Valor: The Battle History <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> United States Marines, (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
11 Frank G. H<strong>of</strong>fman, “The Marine Mask <strong>of</strong> War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, November 10, 2011: 1.
12 PowerPoint presentation supplied to <strong>the</strong> author by J. Walter Thompson Senior Advertising Executive Randy
Shepard, 11/03/2011.
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consults historic pattern 13 or current trends it is clear that <strong>the</strong> country <strong>the</strong>y serve: <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong>
America will be fighting a counterinsurgency again. And again. 14
Despite all, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps has turned its back on counterinsurgency pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and announced
a return to “amphibious roots.” 15 What is it about counterinsurgency practice that is repellent to <strong>the</strong>
American military—even to that service which might be most primed to execute it effectively? Does this
overarching aversion prohibit <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps from being able to engage in sound practices? Do
consistent patterns <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency practice (in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> doctrine) manifest <strong>the</strong>mselves
across time? To what end?
The two primary research questions derived from this set are <strong>the</strong>se:
To what extent has Marine Corps’ culture shaped, and been shaped by, counterinsurgency practice?
What does that tell us about <strong>the</strong> form engagement will likely take in future counterinsurgency
conflict?
The “shaping” dialectic at <strong>the</strong> center <strong>of</strong> this question set may be examined by a systematic dissecting <strong>of</strong>
strategic cultural outcomes for a service culture engaged in a set <strong>of</strong> similar security operations across
time. These may be cast into two major categories: Lessons Recognized and Cultural Blindspots and
<strong>the</strong>n fur<strong>the</strong>r divided into four key subfields. Lessons Recognized comprise <strong>the</strong> acknowledged “best
practices” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day, practices that its seasoned authors may have learned through adverse experience
and believe would bear good fruit in future scenarios if codified into doctrine and implemented in
training. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se may require a norms shift in internal service culture. Recognizing that a norms
shift need occur, however, remains a far cry from achieving it. Therefore this category must be
subdivided into two fur<strong>the</strong>r: lessons learned and lessons lost.
Those approaches which came to light as best practices and were accepted and internalized into service
culture may be properly termed Lessons Learned. These may or may not have been codified into formal
doctrine; persistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> practice (or mindset) through informal mechanisms is enough to merit <strong>the</strong>
lessons learned category.
Recognizing that a practice ought to be pursued but failing to internalize it into long term practice
represents <strong>the</strong> second category: Lessons Lost. These recommendations may have, at some point,
merited <strong>the</strong> recognition required for inclusion in formal doctrine but are largely ignored or
13 Acknowledged in <strong>the</strong> first pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s new Field Manual on Stability Operations FM 3-07 (Headquarters,
Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, October 2008) and detailed in <strong>the</strong> following sources: Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong>
Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002); Lawrence A. Yates, “The
US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15, (Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006); John M. Collins, America’s Small Wars: Lessons for <strong>the</strong>
Future, (McLean VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1991).
14 The U.S. Marines’ own Vision and Strategy 2025 reflects this assumption. This document may be accessed at
http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/cmc/Documents/MCVS2025%2030%20June.pdf.
15 See “An Interview with James F. Amos,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 64, Vol. 1, 2012: 12-17; “An Interview with
James T. Conway,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 59, Vol. 4, 2010: 8-13; Arthur P. Brill Jr., “Out Call With <strong>the</strong>
Commandant,” Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, Sept 2010, 93, 9: 20-25.
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dysfunctionally implemented in future endeavors given <strong>the</strong> resistant counterweight <strong>of</strong> national or
organizational cultural preferences.
The second major category <strong>of</strong> concern is Cultural Blindspots. These come in negative and positive form.
Negative blindspots are those cultural malpractices or misperceptions which persisted unaddressed
across episodes for lack <strong>of</strong> recognition that <strong>the</strong>y pose a problem. These are <strong>the</strong> most thorny <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
counterproductive set, very <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> most deeply imbedded, and without seismic culture shift <strong>the</strong> least
likely to be eradicated. These blindspots are <strong>of</strong> potentially enormous strategic significance. Cultural
blindspots may cause warfighting institutions to disregard or underweigh <strong>the</strong> negative backlash
produced by aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own behavior. They may result in <strong>the</strong> prioritizing <strong>of</strong> some efforts over
o<strong>the</strong>rs (i.e. civic action over providing security) in ways that are a mismatch for <strong>the</strong> local security
environment. Cultural blindspots may mean employing a skewed measuring stick in assessing “success,”
or simply asking <strong>the</strong> wrong questions about an adversary.
A primary objective in casting a wide range <strong>of</strong> cultural data against particular episodes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> security
behavior in question is to highlight precisely <strong>the</strong>se sorts <strong>of</strong> blindspots. By bringing blindspots to
conscious attention, especially those that have become a pattern over time, a strategist may have hope
<strong>of</strong> ameliorating some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se within a service, or conversely, assigning a service with a better cultural fit
to complete <strong>the</strong> task in question.
The cultural data unear<strong>the</strong>d, including those portions unconscious to group members, need not be
viewed as solely an exercise in avoiding pitfalls. It may also unearth strengths and opportunities:
natural assets within a service culture which are, typically, a fair or even superb fit for a particular
security task. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se may comprise <strong>the</strong> positive sort <strong>of</strong> cultural blindspots: those practiced on
accident, in some cases make-do deviations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> moment, which may be recognized by outsiders
(usually with a tall dose <strong>of</strong> hindsight) as smart practices. These remain blindspots for <strong>the</strong> service
culture—lessons unrecognized and not carried forward—typically due to strong cultural preferences or
habituation toward an alternative course <strong>of</strong> action.
The time frame and specific episodes appropriate for an evaluation <strong>of</strong> Lessons Recognized (both Learned
and Lost) and Cultural Blindspots (both positive and negative) should comprise, at a minimum: a
formative encounter with <strong>the</strong> security operation in question, evidence (written or o<strong>the</strong>rwise) <strong>of</strong> lessons
recognized throughout <strong>the</strong> encounter, a period <strong>of</strong> reflection in which <strong>the</strong> institution has <strong>the</strong> option to
implement or reject recognized lessons, and finally a repeated encounter with <strong>the</strong> security operation in
question which exhibits, through behavior, which lessons were internalized (through formal or informal
mechanisms) and which rejected. Multiple encounters also <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong> opportunity to observe persistent
blindspots—those practices which have unrecognized positive or negative effect and are unconsciously
applied in <strong>the</strong> next round.
Given <strong>the</strong>se requirements, an evaluation <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps service culture and its interplay with
counterinsurgency operations is most appropriately begun at <strong>the</strong> beginning—with <strong>the</strong> Marines’ first solo
forays into counterinsurgency battlespace. Often termed <strong>the</strong> “Banana Wars” <strong>the</strong> Marine engagement in
Haiti (1915-1934), intervention in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic (1916-1924), and active suppression <strong>of</strong> rebels
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in Nicaragua from 1927-1933 each provide a window into <strong>the</strong> Corps’ learning curve in advance <strong>of</strong> any
counterinsurgency doctrine. They also serve as <strong>the</strong> trifold template from which Marines drew “best
practices,” published in <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>of</strong>ficial journal <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Gazette, and codified in <strong>the</strong> Small Wars
Manual. Even better, <strong>the</strong>y <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong>se benefits in triplicate. Despite <strong>the</strong>ir proximity in time and location
<strong>the</strong> interventions in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean unfolded with surprisingly limited crossover in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> best
practices or lessons learned 16 and thus <strong>of</strong>fer evidence <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps instinct (ra<strong>the</strong>r than doctrine or
training) across three discrete formative encounters. This fortunate, for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> research,
historical happenstance adds an additional layer <strong>of</strong> robustness to <strong>the</strong> findings. Lessons Recognized, in
this case, were far more difficult to dismiss than lessons that may have been derived from a single
counterinsurgency engagement. The Corps <strong>of</strong>ten, very painfully, learned <strong>the</strong> same lesson three times in
a row. If, after learning <strong>the</strong> hard reality <strong>of</strong> this lesson three times, and <strong>the</strong>n codifying <strong>the</strong> resultant
wisdom into doctrine, <strong>the</strong> Corps still failed to put it into practice for <strong>the</strong> next round, one must assume
that something beyond a purely rational approach to security practice is at work.
The “next round” for <strong>the</strong> Corps came in <strong>the</strong> thick <strong>of</strong> Vietnam. While most Marine “strategy” was
dictated to <strong>the</strong>m by Army command in this war, a few <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps’ most obstinate carved out for
<strong>the</strong>mselves space to run a Marine-only counterinsurgency experiment. The Combined Action Program
(CAP) in Vietnam was <strong>the</strong> result. Although <strong>the</strong> program was relatively small, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 80,000 Marines
deployed in Vietnam at its peak only some 2,500 resided in <strong>the</strong> CAPs, 17 <strong>the</strong> contrast it provides with
concurrent “big Army” behavior provides a particularly rich source <strong>of</strong> Marine-specific cultural data and a
test case for lessons, and blindspots, carried over.
Careful pattern analysis, without regard for <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> culture, can provide a similar, but superficial
data set on behavior trends over time. The depth provided by <strong>the</strong> comprehensive cultural research
conducted here, however, arms a strategist with something beyond simple observations <strong>of</strong> tracked and
recorded behavior. A Cultural Topography approach not only recognizes patterns <strong>of</strong> behavior—<strong>the</strong>
“what,”—it is better able to <strong>of</strong>fer evidence <strong>of</strong> underlying factors – <strong>the</strong> “why.” Such analysis is key for
strategic projection, for isolating sub-optimal practices that have deep roots in core values or beliefs
systems and are unlikely to give way to even <strong>the</strong> best intended training, or, conversely, aspects <strong>of</strong>
service culture that are under stress and may portend shift. Understanding <strong>the</strong> “why” undergirding
behavior and <strong>the</strong> internal values and norms which <strong>of</strong>ten compete and collide in forging <strong>the</strong> practices
which emerge on <strong>the</strong> surface supplies a strategic planner with <strong>the</strong> data necessary to more accurately
project Marine Corps behavior and attitudes into future iterations (a promising avenue for follow-on
work), including this century’s engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In order to begin <strong>the</strong> proposed research task <strong>the</strong> central methodology in question: Cultural Topography
must first be located and defended along <strong>the</strong>oretical lines. The remainder <strong>of</strong> this chapter will review <strong>the</strong>
16
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Colorado:
Westview Press, 2001).
17
Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994): 177; Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in
Vietnam, (New York, NY: Praegar, 1989): 123.
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strategic culture literature—its genesis and development over <strong>the</strong> years—and conclude with a few
observations <strong>of</strong> best practices which formed <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> Cultural Topography methodology.
Literature Review: Locating Cultural Topography within <strong>the</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>
Paradigm
The idea that warring groups <strong>of</strong>ten behave according to distinctive practices is not a new one. Classical
writers took note <strong>of</strong> particular “ways <strong>of</strong> war” practiced by Scythians, Persians, Huns, Saracens, and Turks
among o<strong>the</strong>rs. 18 Theories which draw linkages between <strong>the</strong> peculiarities <strong>of</strong> a particular ethno-national
group and its resultant way <strong>of</strong> war are not novel to this century, or <strong>the</strong> last one. Beatrice Heuser points
out that Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Guibert, writing in 1772, <strong>the</strong>orized on <strong>the</strong> nexus between a society’s
values and way <strong>of</strong> war and Welsh mercenary Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd leaned on <strong>the</strong>, by <strong>the</strong>n, usual
examples from classic antiquity as well as his own experience doing battle for three different sovereigns:
one French, one Austrian, and one Russian to make claims about marked differences in warfare
between one polity type and ano<strong>the</strong>r. Clausewitz himself, as well as his student Martin van Creveld,
“brought to our attention again in <strong>the</strong> late twentieth century, that different cultures perceive war
differently.” 19
So it may be with some ignorance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past that most strategic culture literature has accepted <strong>the</strong> late
1970s as <strong>the</strong> concept’s starting point. In fairness, it was at this date juncture that <strong>the</strong> term “strategic
culture” was coined by Jack Snyder and defined as:
[T]he sum total <strong>of</strong> ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns <strong>of</strong> habitual behavior
that members <strong>of</strong> a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation
with each o<strong>the</strong>r with regard to nuclear strategy. 20
Despite <strong>the</strong> multiplication <strong>of</strong> definitions that have emerged since Snyder’s writing , a slight adjustment
to his nuclear-oriented original definition manages to capture <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> most strategic culture
literature today:
The sum total <strong>of</strong> ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns <strong>of</strong> habitual behavior that
members <strong>of</strong> a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation with
each o<strong>the</strong>r with regard to national security.
Snyder was part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first generation <strong>of</strong> strategic culture <strong>the</strong>orists who devised this concept as a
supplement, or amelioration to <strong>the</strong> shortcomings <strong>of</strong> realism 21 and neorealism as explanations for
18
Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 19.
19
Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 19.
20
Jack Snyder, The Soviet <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 1977), 8.
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happenings within <strong>the</strong> international system. 22 Snyder’s peer, Ken Booth championed Snyder’s concept
<strong>of</strong> strategic culture to a greater degree than Snyder did himself, insisting that neorealism’s rational actor
model 23 and use <strong>of</strong> game <strong>the</strong>ory were “unhistorical approaches.” 24 At a baseline, Booth and o<strong>the</strong>r first
generation scholars rejected <strong>the</strong> “black box” <strong>the</strong>ory espoused by neorealism: that <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> states
on <strong>the</strong> world stage is universally rational and could be predicted according to commonly understood
survival patterns in a world <strong>of</strong> anarchy. 25 Neorealists argue that limited “successful” strategies in a
world structured by anarchy force states into predictable pathways irrespective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir diverse cultural,
historical, or ideological characters. States (and by assumption <strong>the</strong>ir internal security communities) in
similar security contexts will behave similarly because reason leads <strong>the</strong>m to do so.
Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appeal <strong>of</strong> realism and neorealism is <strong>the</strong> simple formula structure that allows everyman to
become a quick expert in international relations. Chris Twomey’s work is representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> realist
approach. He claims a ra<strong>the</strong>r straightforward cause and effect formula that negates <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> culture
on battle tactics:
Tactics and strategies that disadvantage will have great and direct costs in blood and treasure. A
policy selected for predominantly cultural reasons in ei<strong>the</strong>r case will be proven wrong by <strong>the</strong>
material realities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict. In battle, <strong>the</strong> ideational factors face clear-cut evidence from
<strong>the</strong> adversary and <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> conflict. 26
<strong>Strategic</strong> culturalists argue that this line <strong>of</strong> argument presumes a clarity in battle that is simply not
consistent with reality. Given <strong>the</strong> complexity <strong>of</strong> strategy and its engagement 27 <strong>the</strong> feedback loop on any
particular maneuver is far from “clear-cut.” Strategy makers have a wide repertoire <strong>of</strong> battlespace
contingencies from which to choose when assigning blame for defeat. Given strong cultural
predispositions, institutions which generate policy are perfectly capable <strong>of</strong> ignoring evidence that
contradicts pre-set beliefs about best practices or indicts preferred tactics for failures on <strong>the</strong> battlefield.
Of Vietnam, Colin Gray, also a first generation <strong>the</strong>orist, has said, “[American strategic] culture simply did
21
Championed by Hans J. Morgenthau. See Morgenthau, “Six Principles <strong>of</strong> Political Realism,” in Robert J. Art and
Robert Jervis eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 8 th ed, (New York: Pearson,
2007):7-14.
22
Contributions on this point from second and third generation critics may be found in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed.,
The <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996);
and John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore eds., Neorealism Versus <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004).
23
A quintessential example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rational actor paradigm is provided in John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and <strong>the</strong>
Struggle for Power,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and
Contemporary Issues, 8 th ed, (New York: Pearson, 2007): 50-60.
24
Ken Booth, “The Concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> Affirmed,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> Power: The United States <strong>of</strong> America and
<strong>the</strong> USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 123.
25
See Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Anarchich Structure <strong>of</strong> World Politics,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis eds.,
International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 8 th ed, (New York: Pearson, 2007): 29-49.
26
Christopher P. Twomey, “Lacunae in <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> in International Security,” Contemporary Security Policy
Vol. 29, No. 2 (August 2008): 352.
27
See Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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not register <strong>the</strong> unwanted Vietnam experience. <strong>Culture</strong>s, including strategic cultures, are capable <strong>of</strong>
ignoring what <strong>the</strong>y wish to ignore.” 28 John Nagl explains <strong>the</strong> prism through which <strong>the</strong> military interprets
historical events by employing a quote attributed to Lieutenant General Theodore G. Stroup, “The
Army’s culture is its personality. It reflects <strong>the</strong> Army’s values, philosophy, norms and unwritten rules.
Our culture has a powerful effect because our common underlying assumptions guide behavior and <strong>the</strong>
way <strong>the</strong> Army processes information as an organization.” 29
Jack Snyder claims that it is precisely, (and only), this sort <strong>of</strong> bureaucratic habit, or organizational reflex,
that he was attempting to capture when he first coined <strong>the</strong> phrase “strategic culture.” In his words,
“once a distinctive approach to strategy takes hold, it tends to persist despite changes in <strong>the</strong>
circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes <strong>of</strong> socialization and institutionalization and through
<strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> strategic concepts in legitimating <strong>the</strong>se social arrangements.” 30 This “cultural inertia” is
perhaps most striking when <strong>the</strong> evidence seems objectively clear that organizational beliefs or habits are
out <strong>of</strong> step with battlefield realities. This is demonstrated by way <strong>of</strong> case study by Elizabeth Kier. She
examines <strong>the</strong> French defense posture after World War I and finds in it substantial evidence <strong>of</strong> cultural
inertia. The French mentality prior to World War I cast conscript armies as incapable <strong>of</strong> waging
<strong>of</strong>fensive war:
The French army’s belief that conscript forces could not undertake <strong>of</strong>fensive actions prevented
<strong>the</strong>m from believing – despite intelligence reports – that <strong>the</strong> Germans would attack with <strong>the</strong>
forces that <strong>the</strong>y did. Because <strong>the</strong>y could not imagine short-term conscripts leading <strong>of</strong>fensive
operations, <strong>the</strong>y dismissed intelligence reports showing that <strong>the</strong> Germans would use “young
troops” in <strong>the</strong> front lines. This caused <strong>the</strong> French army to underestimate <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
German <strong>of</strong>fensive by 20 corps. 31
Most remarkable about this is, despite being proved wrong, <strong>the</strong> French maintained <strong>the</strong>ir attitudes
toward conscripts into <strong>the</strong> future. During <strong>the</strong> inter war years, <strong>the</strong> political left won France’s internal
debate on <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military, restricting its ranks to one-year conscriptions. Given this
restriction, <strong>the</strong> French military elite resigned <strong>the</strong>mselves to a defense posture. Kier explains <strong>the</strong>
establishment <strong>of</strong> a defense posture as a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> continuing (albeit disproved) organizational
mindset concerning <strong>the</strong> capabilities <strong>of</strong> conscripts: “O<strong>the</strong>r militaries would not [necessarily] respond
similarly; constrained within an organization that has powerful assimilating mechanisms, <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer
corps “sees” only certain doctrinal options.” 32
28
Colin S. Gray, “British and American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s,” paper prepared for <strong>the</strong> Jamestown Symposium 2007:
Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years <strong>of</strong> Transatlantic Engagement, 18-19 April, 2007: 47.
29
Cited in John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
(Chicago IL: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press, 2005): 6.
30
Jack Snyder, “The Concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Caveat Emptor,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> Power: The United States <strong>of</strong>
America and <strong>the</strong> USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 4.
31
Elizabeth Kier, “<strong>Culture</strong> and Military Doctrine: France Between <strong>the</strong> Wars,” International Security, Vol 19, No. 4
(Spring 1995): 82.
32 Kier, “<strong>Culture</strong> and Military Doctrine,” 68.
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The logic that nations construct <strong>the</strong>ir military doctrine according to best practices and best fit based on
objective analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adversarial environment is deeply appealing, nearly to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> becoming a
truism within realist circles. It also means that one need not be an expert in <strong>the</strong> social or cultural
nuances <strong>of</strong> an organization or polity in order to predict its behavior: welcome news to analysts and
policymakers possessing American ahistoric and ethnocentric tendencies. Given that much <strong>of</strong> what we
know as “strategic studies” has been centered on American concerns and funded by American dollars,
this tendency has been amplified across <strong>the</strong> strategic field:
[T]he relentlessly American character <strong>of</strong> modern and contemporary strategic studies all but
mandates that we do a poor job <strong>of</strong> understanding o<strong>the</strong>r cultures and traditions. Even if we only
want to kill opponents, as opposed to bending <strong>the</strong>ir will by persuasion, a lack <strong>of</strong> understanding
is apt to be a major handicap. Most polities in <strong>the</strong> world have strategic narratives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own
that are different from <strong>the</strong> American-centered view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. 33
If <strong>the</strong> dangers are not sufficiently clear, Booth works hard to point <strong>the</strong>m out. Forging his premise during
<strong>the</strong> Cold War, Booth insisted “There have been and are distinctively American and Soviet ways <strong>of</strong>
thinking and behaving” and <strong>the</strong>se “are not explicable simply in terms <strong>of</strong> rational actor models,
comparative advantage, technological imperatives and so on.” 34 Colin Gray’s comments on <strong>the</strong> subject
are a touch more colorful. Acknowledging that <strong>the</strong> cultural approach is certainly experiencing some
growing pains, he maintains that, “The sins <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> would-be cultural <strong>the</strong>orists pale by comparison with
<strong>the</strong> nonsense we know as neorealism…<strong>the</strong> neorealist proposition that strategic history, past, present,
and future, can be explained strictly by reference to <strong>the</strong> relations among political entities, with no
regard paid to <strong>the</strong>ir domestic processes, is, frankly, preposterous.” 35
Not all strategic culture scholars are as dismissive as Gray in <strong>the</strong>ir assessments <strong>of</strong> neorealism’s virtues,
and even Gray is careful to preserve a place for realpolitik and <strong>the</strong> original tenets <strong>of</strong> realism. He notes
that his version <strong>of</strong> strategic culture is not at odds with <strong>the</strong> idea that actors are rationally in pursuit <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>ir ends. It is neorealism’s assumptions about <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> those ends, and <strong>of</strong> what is “rational”
behavior that strategic culture takes to task. Actors in all forms: individuals, sub national groups, non
state actors, or national polities, are likely “rational” in <strong>the</strong> sense that <strong>the</strong>y pursue <strong>the</strong>ir own interests
ra<strong>the</strong>r than someone else’s. Rationality, however, is culturally encoded. The factors included in a cost
benefit analysis for one actor, and <strong>the</strong> values assigned to those variables, may be quite different from
one to ano<strong>the</strong>r. Tactics included in <strong>the</strong> strategic arsenal <strong>of</strong> one actor may not be acceptable or even
considered by ano<strong>the</strong>r. Motives for beginning wars, incentives for ending <strong>the</strong>m, and identities which
determine how one fights are <strong>of</strong>ten culturally derived. In order to understand <strong>the</strong> rational calculus <strong>of</strong>
33 Colin S. Gray and Jeannie L. Johnson, “The Practice <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” in Strategy in <strong>the</strong> Contemporary Word 3 rd
Edition, eds. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010),
384.
34 Booth, “The Concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> Affirmed,” 123.
35 Colin Gray, “Out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Wilderness: Prime Time for <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass
Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. Jeannie L. Johnson,
Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 227.
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actors within an organization, we must understand <strong>the</strong> identities, mindsets, traditions and habits which
provide context.
Theo Farrell points out that “fighting spirit” is <strong>of</strong>ten tied to organizational identity. Success in military
outcomes is heavily shaped by what military forces believe is possible and which roles <strong>the</strong>y believe <strong>the</strong>y
should be playing, “<strong>Culture</strong>, as both pr<strong>of</strong>essional norms and national traditions, shapes preference
formation by military organizations by telling organizational members who <strong>the</strong>y are and what is
possible, and <strong>the</strong>reby suggesting what <strong>the</strong>y should do. In this way, culture explains why military
organizations choose <strong>the</strong> structures and strategies <strong>the</strong>y do, and thus how states generate military
power.” 36
Appropriate application <strong>of</strong> military power is filtered through established organizational mindsets. Kier
notes, “The culture <strong>of</strong> an organization shapes its members’ perceptions and affects what <strong>the</strong>y notice and
how <strong>the</strong>y interpret it: it screens out some parts <strong>of</strong> reality while magnifying o<strong>the</strong>rs.” 37 Focusing more
narrowly on <strong>the</strong> military mindset Beatrice Heuser writes:
Historical experiences <strong>of</strong> wars, especially traumatic ones, determine <strong>the</strong> subsequent
preoccupation <strong>of</strong> survivors. Decisions made about war are a function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> structures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
societies that wage <strong>the</strong> wars, and decision-makers’ ideas and views are conditioned by <strong>the</strong>
mindset particular to <strong>the</strong>ir culture. War aims are dictated by <strong>the</strong> concepts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>of</strong>
society, <strong>of</strong> friend and foe, and <strong>of</strong> notions <strong>of</strong> what one can achieve through military manpower
and technology. 38
Frames <strong>of</strong> reference, or “mindsets” are not static, cemented or unchangeable. But <strong>the</strong>y can be slow to
change and have demonstrated potential for significant impact on strategic policy.
Identities and mindsets form <strong>the</strong> foundation for habits which may present <strong>the</strong> most robust challenge to
realism’s assumptions <strong>of</strong> rational calculus. Humans may not, in fact, weigh each decision separately and
project its long term consequences as most writing on foreign policy assumes, but may rely on habit as
<strong>the</strong> locus <strong>of</strong> behavior. 39 Ann Swidler argues that “<strong>Culture</strong> in this sense is more like a style or a set <strong>of</strong>
skills and habits than a set <strong>of</strong> preferences or wants...[a]ction is not determined by one’s values. Ra<strong>the</strong>r
action and values are organized to take advantage <strong>of</strong> cultural competences.” 40 Valerie Hudson’s work
complements this notion. She argues that cultural habits in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> “foreign policy action
templates” are a far better potential predictor <strong>of</strong> state action than variables as elusive as beliefs or
36
Theo Farrell, “<strong>Culture</strong> and Military Power,” Review <strong>of</strong> International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jul. 1998): 416.
37
Kier, “<strong>Culture</strong> and Military Doctrine,” 69.
38
Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 24.
39 nd
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology, 2
Edition, (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1995, 2001): 91.
40 Ann Swidler, “<strong>Culture</strong> in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April
1986): 275.
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values: “What culture provides its members is a repertoire or palette <strong>of</strong> adaptive responses from which
members build <strong>of</strong>f-<strong>the</strong>-shelf strategies <strong>of</strong> action. What matters for an analysis <strong>of</strong> behavior is not <strong>the</strong>
whole <strong>of</strong> culture, but ra<strong>the</strong>r “chunks” <strong>of</strong> pre-fabricated cultural response.” 41 Even if habitual solutions
are somewhat suboptimal, <strong>the</strong>y may be less “expensive” in terms <strong>of</strong> time and energy costs than pausing
before each decision to carefully weigh options. This approach to rationality goes some distance in
explaining “cultural inertia” or bureaucratic practices that seem to have little fit with external context. 42
Enduring traditions, tied to preferred ways <strong>of</strong> war, are difficult to give up. The notion that those closest
to <strong>the</strong> strategic environment know <strong>the</strong>ir situation best and will <strong>the</strong>refore pursue best practices, is simply
not upheld by historical evidence. 43 Sometimes habit trumps rational cost/benefit analysis. Kerry
Longhurst argues that Germany’s commitment to conscription forces makes little sense in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong>
changed strategic realities. Its persistence is better explained as “path dependency” – a label she uses to
describe <strong>the</strong> cultural inertia <strong>of</strong> policies which made sense at one point in time but, due to heavy initial
investment (both intellectual and material), tend to bias <strong>the</strong>ir makers toward continued investment,
even after that path becomes insensible due to changed strategic realities. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> challenges to
conscription in Germany, “a taboo surrounded <strong>the</strong> issue, where questioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> status quo was
viewed as almost heretical.” 44 The result is that Germany continues to defend <strong>the</strong> institution <strong>of</strong>
conscriptions despite <strong>the</strong> nearly universal trend amongst its European partners towards a pr<strong>of</strong>essional
volunteer army, despite fiscal disadvantages, pressure to facilitate deployability and interoperability in
<strong>the</strong> EU and NATO contexts, and <strong>the</strong> realities surrounding <strong>the</strong> Bundeswehr’s increasing role in out-<strong>of</strong>area
deployments. 45 Examining an organization’s beliefs, habits and values is part <strong>of</strong> making sense <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> doctrinal choices and operational practices pursued by any well instituted military culture.
Three Generations <strong>of</strong> Scholarship
Very few attempts have been made to categorize <strong>the</strong> wide swath <strong>of</strong> strategic culture scholarship, but
nearly all <strong>of</strong> those attempts begin by paying homage to <strong>the</strong> three “generations” assembled by Alastair
Iain Johnston. 46 Johnston presents <strong>the</strong>se as developing chronologically, however, given <strong>the</strong> resurgent
interest in cultural analysis, recent scholarship has found place within all three categories.
41
Valerie Hudson, “Cultural Expectations <strong>of</strong> One’s Own and O<strong>the</strong>r Nations’ Foreign Policy Action Templates,”
Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec. 1999) : 768.
42
Alastair Iain Johnston approaches <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> historical inertia from a slightly different angle. His explanation
focuses on <strong>the</strong> durability <strong>of</strong> heuristics. Early, formative experiences craft interpretive lenses that are slow to
change, “lagging behind changes in ‘objective’ conditions.” Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and
Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1.
43
Kevin Avruch, <strong>Culture</strong> and Conflict Resolution (Washington DC: United States Institute <strong>of</strong> Peace Press, 2006), 20.
44
Kerry Longhurst, “Why Aren’t <strong>the</strong> Germans Debating <strong>the</strong> Draft? Path Dependency and <strong>the</strong> Persistence <strong>of</strong>
Conscription,” German Politics Vol. 12 Issue 2 (Aug 2003): 157.
45
Longhurst, “Why Aren’t <strong>the</strong> Germans Debating <strong>the</strong> Draft?,” 147-165.
46
Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995): 1-22.
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First Generation
The first generation, within which Snyder, Booth and Gray established notions <strong>of</strong> strategic culture,
tended also to reflect <strong>the</strong>ir key policy interest: <strong>the</strong> diverse nuclear strategy styles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States
and Soviet Union. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contributors during this generation were policy analysts ra<strong>the</strong>r than
international relations <strong>the</strong>orists, and <strong>the</strong>ir work reflects that bias. Their concerns focused on refining
American forecasts <strong>of</strong> Soviet strategy and making American policymakers aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own strategic
vulnerabilities. Given this aim, most contributors, especially Gray, were dismissive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical
tautologies <strong>the</strong>ir work was generating. During this era and since, Johnston has taken Gray to task for his
neglect <strong>of</strong> a falsifiable, positivist approach to strategic culture. 47 He criticizes Gray’s thick-description
“culture as context” 48 approach for blending both cause and effect – rendering impossible its submission
to positivist testing methods. Gray sympathizes with <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discipline as concerns scientific
testing and recognizes <strong>the</strong> yearning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> positivist school for parsimony and linear equations, but
insists that, inconvenient as it may be, strategic culture is, in fact, cause and effect, beliefs and action.
Although anthropologists have definitional debates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own—by <strong>the</strong> early 1950s anthropology’s
own scholars were arguing between more than 150 definitions <strong>of</strong> culture—<strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se
definitions would side with Gray. Pr<strong>of</strong>essional anthropologists would look askance at any attempt to
separate out as independent variable an influence so organically connected to <strong>the</strong> human species as
“culture.” 49 Isolating it as beliefs or action will only ever yield part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> puzzle. The complex security
strategies we hope to explain are “expressed in behavior by people and institutions that both have
internalized strategic culture and in part construct, interpret, and amend that culture.” 50 Wishing that
strategic culture operated differently will simply lead us to “a definition driven by <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>orybuilding
ra<strong>the</strong>r than by <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject, [one which] is unusually likely to lead scholars
astray.” 51
47
The crux <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Johnston/Gray debate is found in <strong>the</strong> following pieces: Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong>
<strong>Culture</strong> and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995): 7-13; Colin S. Gray,
“<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> as Context: The First Generation <strong>of</strong> Theory Strikes Back,” Review <strong>of</strong> International Studies 25
(1999): 49-69; Alastair Iain Johnston, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray,” Review <strong>of</strong> International
Studies 25 (1999): 519-23; Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 129-136; Stuart
Poore, “What is <strong>the</strong> Context? A Reply to <strong>the</strong> Gray-Johnston Debate on <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” Review <strong>of</strong> International
Studies Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr. 2003): 279-284.
48
In this Johnston is also taking on one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most celebrated voices in anthropology, Clifford Geertz, who
captured <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> this argument in 1973, “[C]ulture is not a power, something to which social events,
behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which <strong>the</strong>y can be
intelligibly—that is, thickly—described.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s, (New York: Basic Books,
1973): 14.
49
This concept is captured perhaps nowhere more pr<strong>of</strong>oundly than in Clifford Geertz’s claim that “<strong>the</strong>re is no such
thing as human nature independent <strong>of</strong> culture.” Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s, (New York: Basic
Books, 1973), 49. For a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> definitions, see: A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, <strong>Culture</strong>: A Critical Review
<strong>of</strong> Concepts and Definitions (Papers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Peabody Museum <strong>of</strong> American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol. 47,
Harvard University, 1952).
50
Colin S. Gray, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> as Context: The First Generation <strong>of</strong> Theory Strikes Back,” Review <strong>of</strong>
International Studies 25 (1999): 50.
51
Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 133.
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Michael Desch argues alongside Johnston that <strong>the</strong> mark <strong>of</strong> a <strong>the</strong>ory is that it is testable and
generalizable. He goes on to criticize <strong>the</strong> strategic culture approach for its lack <strong>of</strong> systematic variables:
<strong>the</strong> building blocks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory. “Without systematic variables, <strong>the</strong>re is no prediction. Prediction…is
central to <strong>the</strong> social scientific enterprise not only for <strong>the</strong>oretical reasons (we need <strong>the</strong>ories to make
predictions in order to test <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ories), but also for policy analysis (<strong>the</strong>ories that do not make clear
predictions are <strong>of</strong> little use to policymakers).” 52 Desch may be right on <strong>the</strong> first point. As Ken Booth has
pointed out, strategic culture will likely “remain an art ra<strong>the</strong>r than a science; like most important
dimensions <strong>of</strong> international politics, its explication will never be amenable to quantification.” 53 But
Desch’s assumption that because it doesn’t meet <strong>the</strong> standards <strong>of</strong> positivist “<strong>the</strong>ory” strategic culture
analysis is <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>of</strong> little use to policymakers is categorically wrong.
Desch himself admits that strategic culture may play an important role in explaining <strong>the</strong> lag time
between external changes and adjustments in state behavior to those new realities. He also concedes
that research along strategic culture lines will likely shed light on “deviant” state behavior (behavior
outside <strong>of</strong> what realism/neorealism would predict). 54 If strategic culture were useful for only <strong>the</strong>se two
scenarios Desch would have already proved its utility. Both are central to <strong>the</strong> national security
forecasting that policymakers pursue. How can one know in advance which states or o<strong>the</strong>r political
entities will act in ways “deviant” from realist predictions without knowing something about <strong>the</strong>
influences particular to <strong>the</strong>ir internal calculus? These sorts <strong>of</strong> “surprises” are precisely what intelligence
analysts are in <strong>the</strong> business <strong>of</strong> trying to avoid. History is <strong>of</strong>ten made in short bursts. Wars are won or
lost, regimes toppled, weapons acquired, and economies sunk or bullish, all <strong>of</strong>ten within <strong>the</strong> small space
<strong>of</strong> years one might justifiably call “lag time.”
Our current state building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are a case in point. It would be hard for a
realist to argue that democracy and capitalism have not been demonstrated globally as <strong>the</strong> most proven
road to building a strong powerbase as a nation. As <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory goes, given <strong>the</strong> opportunity, rational
actors within any regime ought to jump at <strong>the</strong> chance to turn <strong>the</strong>se ideologies into practice in <strong>the</strong>ir own
countries. This was certainly <strong>the</strong> Bush administration’s assumption going in. 55 The lag time for such an
enterprise, however, was massively underestimated and has tested <strong>the</strong> short te<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> American
patience. The history that will be written about <strong>the</strong>se two spots on <strong>the</strong> globe will be <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong>
cultural lag time, or “deviant” behavior (if <strong>the</strong>se areas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world refuse to accede to democratic or
capitalist ideals at all), and will forge <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> those regions and <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> U.S. foreign
policy for <strong>the</strong> near future.
52
Michael Desch, “<strong>Culture</strong> Clash: <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>the</strong> Importance <strong>of</strong> Ideas in Security Studies,” International Security, Vol.
23, No. 1 (Summer 1998): 153.
53
Ken Booth, “The Concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> Affirmed,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> Power: The United States <strong>of</strong> America and
<strong>the</strong> USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 125.
54
Desch, “<strong>Culture</strong> Clash,” 169.
55 th
Edward Rhodes, “America’s Crusade” in Global Politics in a Changing World: A Reader, 4 ed, eds. Richard W.
Mansbach and Edward Rhodes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co., 2009), 116-128.
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So Desch is right and wrong. <strong>Strategic</strong> culture, if we accept Colin Gray’s approach, is not positivist
<strong>the</strong>ory. This does not dismiss it from a seat at <strong>the</strong> academic table, however. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong>ory,
strategic culture can serve as a form <strong>of</strong> analysis, a research program, an approach that insists that
cultural variables be included in <strong>the</strong> assessments that scholars <strong>of</strong> strategic studies pursue: explaining,
predicting and prescribing strategy. 56 In return, strategic culture’s advocates hope to produce studies
which will refine our understanding <strong>of</strong> strategic history and <strong>of</strong>fer practitioners insight into enhancing
strategic prowess.
No serious scholar <strong>of</strong> strategic culture argues that <strong>the</strong> strategic culture component <strong>of</strong> security policy is
<strong>the</strong> primary, let alone only, predictive element <strong>of</strong> outcome. Readily acknowledged in <strong>the</strong> field is that
strategy is a heavily contested enterprise in which a number <strong>of</strong> weighty players collide. Strategy, and
security policy generally, is <strong>the</strong> negotiated result <strong>of</strong> elite (usually civilian) agendas processed through
national culture, <strong>the</strong> national policy process, and security related organizational cultures, constrained by
material capabilities, and inhibited or advanced by external actors. The “strategic culture” portion <strong>of</strong>
this formula is simply: <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> organizational and national cultures on strategy.
Second Generation
The second generation <strong>of</strong> scholars attempted to serve two masters. Their scholarship recognizes that a
strategic culture does exist, but saw it employed in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> realism. This approach emerged in <strong>the</strong>
mid 1980s and relegated strategic culture to an instrumental role. This “instrumental” notion <strong>of</strong>
strategic culture was founded on <strong>the</strong> assumption that “dominant elites can escape from, or rise above,
strategic-cultural constraints that <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>mselves manipulate.” 57 Leaders may do this on purpose, or
because <strong>the</strong>y are driven by unconscious, deep-seated motivations which look an awfully lot like
realpolitik. Ei<strong>the</strong>r way, this notion <strong>of</strong> strategic culture relegates it to window dressing, and allows it to fit
beautifully within <strong>the</strong> foundational paradigm <strong>of</strong> realism.
Morgenthau addresses both <strong>the</strong> manipulative and unconscious use <strong>of</strong> phenomena akin to strategic
culture in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> realist aims: On <strong>the</strong> manipulative front, “Statesmen, especially under
contemporary conditions, may well make a habit <strong>of</strong> presenting <strong>the</strong>ir foreign policies in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain popular support for <strong>the</strong>m.” Regarding its
unconscious use: “The human mind in its day-by-day operations cannot bear to look <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>of</strong> politics
straight in <strong>the</strong> face. It must disguise, distort, belittle, and embellish <strong>the</strong> truth…For only by deceiving
himself about <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> politics and <strong>the</strong> role he plays on <strong>the</strong> political scene is man able to live
contentedly as a political animal with himself and his fellow men.” 58
56
A longer discussion <strong>of</strong> this issue may be found in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore eds., Neorealism
Versus <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2004), 238-241.
57
Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995): 18.
58
Hans J. Morgenthau, “Six Principles <strong>of</strong> Political Realism,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis eds., International
Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 8 th Edition, (New York: Pearson Longman): 9, 14.
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Second generation <strong>the</strong>orists, however, have exaggerated <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> leaders to manipulate cultural
narratives at will. Implicit in <strong>the</strong>ir work is <strong>the</strong> assumption that strategic culture is only wrapping paper in
<strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> elites packaging <strong>the</strong>ir preferred agenda. The multiple (and sometimes contradictory)
national narratives that exist within any complex society represent nothing more than a buffet <strong>of</strong>
choices for <strong>the</strong> would-be manipulator. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than being influenced and constrained by culture, elites
wield it for <strong>the</strong>ir own ends. This argument is not entirely without merit. Leaders who know <strong>the</strong>ir
audience well and are skilled in pushing cultural buttons are certainly in a position to march national
emotion to <strong>the</strong>ir own tune. Powerful cultural narratives are not without a life <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own, however.
Once invoked, <strong>the</strong>y form boundaries around action. A leader may succeed in getting popular consent
for a grand strategy by casting it in a common cultural frame, but <strong>the</strong>n will be beholden to standards
and outcomes <strong>the</strong> common frame defines. Contravention <strong>of</strong> those will get him in trouble and may, in
fact, cost him his political life.
Greg Giles and Charles Ben-Dor illuminate <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> political persuasion when cultural norms and
values are on <strong>the</strong> line in <strong>the</strong>ir respective work on strategic culture in Israel. Judaic tradition transfers <strong>the</strong>
sin <strong>of</strong> war to <strong>the</strong> party that initiates it. Thus, <strong>the</strong> distinction between wars forced upon <strong>the</strong> state (i.e.
war <strong>of</strong> necessity) and wars selected (i.e. war by choice) is <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>ound ethical importance. The Judaic
moral code casts <strong>the</strong> former as “just” or obligatory wars which require <strong>the</strong> full participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
citizenry. The second are “optional” wars, <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>of</strong> a preventive nature, and must be prosecuted in far
more circumscribed ways which, if incurring significant loss <strong>of</strong> life, must be defended to <strong>the</strong> public. 59
The 1982 invasion <strong>of</strong> Lebanon put Israeli norms to <strong>the</strong> test. All prior wars had been cast as obligatory
wars. The political and military leaders at <strong>the</strong> time tried various tactics at framing <strong>the</strong> 1982
confrontation in <strong>the</strong> same way:
In contrast to all prior wars, <strong>the</strong> 1982 invasion <strong>of</strong> Lebanon was deemed [by <strong>the</strong> public] to
be a “war by choice” and consequently at odds with traditional Jewish definitions <strong>of</strong> a
just and legal war. This triggered a national debate that deepened <strong>the</strong> questioning <strong>of</strong>
fundamental beliefs and assumptions at <strong>the</strong> core <strong>of</strong> Israeli strategic culture. 60
Political and military leaders at <strong>the</strong> time tried unsuccessfully to justify <strong>the</strong> conflict as a
no-choice war. Their subsequent efforts to change <strong>the</strong> well-understood national
political terminology <strong>of</strong> conflict (by introducing <strong>the</strong> phrase “war by choice”) likewise
failed, and as <strong>the</strong> goals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operation expanded, and Israeli casualties mounted, initial
public support for <strong>the</strong> war dissipated. 61
59
Charles Ben-Dor, “War and Peace: Jewish Tradition and <strong>the</strong> Conduct <strong>of</strong> War,” Israeli Defense Forces Journal, vol.
3, no. 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 47-50.
60
Giles, “Continuity and Change in Israel’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 102
61
Giles, “Continuity and Change in Israel’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 105-106.
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The public, based on a shared notion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> just war concept, pushed back. In this sense, strategic
culture, as a generations-based phenomenon, has a life <strong>of</strong> its own. It is not endlessly manipulable by <strong>the</strong>
political elites <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day.
Third Generation
Johnston congratulates <strong>the</strong> third generation <strong>of</strong> scholarship for being <strong>the</strong> most responsible and <strong>the</strong> most
positivist in nature. Their case studies take in far more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> globe and emphasize cases where
“structural definitions <strong>of</strong> interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice.” 62 Much <strong>of</strong> this generation
<strong>of</strong> scholarship incorporates some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> basic tenets <strong>of</strong> constructivism. 63 Shared notions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong>
identity in crafting state and organizational choices form an easy marriage between constructivist and
strategic culture thinking. What Johnston regards as <strong>the</strong> shining achievement <strong>of</strong> third generation
scholarship, may in fact be its most fundamental flaw. This generation <strong>of</strong> literature has predominantly
focused on beliefs, ra<strong>the</strong>r than behavior, in forging <strong>the</strong>ir definitions <strong>of</strong> strategic culture. This artificial
division renders results more amenable to testing. 64 Valid as this effort may be for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
academy, it is insupportable from a practitioner’s view.
In <strong>the</strong> final analysis a practitioner cares more about how organizations and nations behave than any
o<strong>the</strong>r aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural package. The most useful process <strong>of</strong> discovery for forecasting purposes is
identifying patterns <strong>of</strong> behavior and <strong>the</strong> circumstances that give rise to <strong>the</strong>m. Habits, as discussed
earlier, are part <strong>of</strong> strategic culture and may act as defaults in place <strong>of</strong> rational calculus. Of this
tendency in militaries, John M. Collins aptly applies a quote attributed to Marshal Maurice de Saxe over
250 years ago, “…in default <strong>of</strong> knowing what should be done, <strong>the</strong>y do what <strong>the</strong>y know.” 65 It is precisely
<strong>the</strong>se sorts <strong>of</strong> organizational reflexes that matter a great deal in assessing <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> future military
endeavors, strengths within our own ranks, and vulnerabilities <strong>of</strong> adversaries. The utility <strong>of</strong> cultural
research is deeply limited when it draws a line eclipsing behavior.
The three generations <strong>of</strong> strategic culturalists have grown beyond Johnston’s initial categories and today
lean in diverse directions: some seeing strategic culture as a necessary supplement to realism, o<strong>the</strong>rs
building on constructivism’s identity-based approach to global relations, and still o<strong>the</strong>rs who eschew
current international relations <strong>the</strong>ory altoge<strong>the</strong>r and see strategic culture as a means for researching
<strong>the</strong> idiosyncratic details <strong>of</strong> a particular polity in order to provide rich “thick description” for those
62
Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995): 18-19.
63
The basic tenets <strong>of</strong> constructivism may be found in Alexander Wendt, “Anarachy Is What States Make <strong>of</strong> It,” in
eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 8 th Edition,
(New York: Pearson Longman, 2007): 61-68.
64
Some <strong>of</strong> this work is quite good, and useful. See Anja Dalgarrd-Nielsen, “The Test <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Germany,
Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes,” Security Dialogue 36 (2005): 339-359.
65
John M. Collins, America’s Small Wars: Lessons for <strong>the</strong> Future, (Washington: Brassey’s (US) Inc., 1991):85.
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seeking understanding. 66 Some continue with big picture national-level cultural approaches while
o<strong>the</strong>rs focus in on sub levels, emphasizing military, political, or bureaucratic culture. 67
A thread that runs through much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent scholarship is a renewed emphasis on <strong>the</strong> dynamism and
complexity <strong>of</strong> culture, a topic which naturally prompts questions about <strong>the</strong> causes <strong>of</strong> cultural shift over
time. Positions on this topic range <strong>the</strong> spectrum from Patrick Porter’s portrayal <strong>of</strong> culture as menus <strong>of</strong>
choice – undergoing constant morphing on <strong>the</strong> battlefield 68 to Colin Gray’s insistence that “a
community does not choose its strategic culture…When attitudes, assumptions, habits <strong>of</strong> mind, and
behaviors are sufficiently established and enduring to merit description as cultural, <strong>the</strong>y are not easily
amended, let alone overturned, by acts <strong>of</strong> will.” 69 A preponderance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> literature focuses on strong
external shock as <strong>the</strong> primary impetus for change, 70 ei<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> battlefield defeat, 71 or
exposure to extreme logical fallacy. 72 O<strong>the</strong>r, less dramatic forces <strong>of</strong> change have remained somewhat
underexplored. Ra<strong>the</strong>r prominent exceptions are Theo Farrell’s The Norms <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Beliefs and
Modern Conflict which examines status seeking amongst pr<strong>of</strong>essional peers as a source <strong>of</strong> change within
66 John Glenn provides a useful taxonomy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se approaches in his article, “Realism versus <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>:
Competition and Collaboration?” International Studies Review 11 (2009).
67 For example: Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources <strong>of</strong> Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol 37, No. 4 (Dec 1993); Yitzhak Klein, “Theory <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” Comparative
Strategy 10, no. 1 (1991); Elizabeth Kier; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting <strong>the</strong> “Failure” <strong>of</strong>
Internationalism,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997); Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’:
Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong>
<strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2006: 475-503.
68 Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (London: Hurst & Co, 2009).
69 Colin Gray, “British and American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s,” Paper prepared for Jamestown Symposium 2007:
Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years <strong>of</strong> Transatlantic Engagement,” 18-19 April, 2007: 37. See also Colin S.
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Can <strong>the</strong> American Way <strong>of</strong> War Adapt?” a <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies
Institute monograph, March 2006, found at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=650.
70 Thomas Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in The <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
317-356; Thomas Berger, <strong>Culture</strong>s <strong>of</strong> Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jeffrey W. Legro, “Whence American Internationalism,” International
Organization 54, no. 2 (2000). Theo Farrell agrees that external shocks are one likely source <strong>of</strong> change but argues
that “norms entrepreneurs” must be present and prepared to take advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mood for change in order for
lasting shifts in doctrine to occur. Farrell, The Norms <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (London: Lynne
Rienner, 2005), 12-15.
71 Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s too general judgment that “[l]osers imitate winners almost by reflex” is qualified by
Eisenstadt and Pollack’s examination <strong>of</strong> Egypt, Syria and Iraq’s reaction to defeat in 1967. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than mimicking
<strong>the</strong> Israeli victor, all three turned to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union for advice and arms in order to reform <strong>the</strong>ir military
strategies. Schivelbusch, The <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (London: Granta
Books, 2001), 33; Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Armies <strong>of</strong> Snow and Armies <strong>of</strong> Sand: The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong>
Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn, 2001): 549-578.
72 Dalgaard-Nielsen argues that <strong>the</strong> left wing in Germany was shocked out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “never again war” stance by
exposure to <strong>the</strong> horrors <strong>of</strong> inaction wreaked upon Srebrenica. They reframed Germany’s responsibility as not
simply opposing war, but also to stopping aggression against unarmed civilians, using force if necessary. Dalgarrd-
Nielsen, “The Test <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes,” Security Dialogue Vol. 36
(2005): 347.
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modern militaries, 73 and Terry Terriff’s examination <strong>of</strong> attempts at peacetime organizational change
within <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps. 74
Despite <strong>the</strong>ir differences in focus, authors pursuing strategic culture studies stand on a common
platform in defining cultural influence as only one factor among many which determine policy. It is
understandable that observers to <strong>the</strong> resurgence <strong>of</strong> strategic culture as an academic and policy
emphasis may have misinterpreted passion for <strong>the</strong> subject for an insistence on primacy. This is simply
not <strong>the</strong> case. The perhaps exaggerated attention on strategic culture as an influence on policy
represents <strong>the</strong> effort required to get culture a seat at <strong>the</strong> analytic table. Given <strong>the</strong> positivist prejudices
against culture research (it is too complex and not quantifiable!) and <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> work required in
doing it right, a ra<strong>the</strong>r energetic case needed to be made on culture’s behalf; not only that this element
<strong>of</strong> security policy is indeed critical to accurate analysis, but also that it has been systematically
understudied.
Refining <strong>the</strong> Paradigm for Practice
Perhaps in <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> a fourth generation <strong>of</strong> scholarship, this <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong>fers fur<strong>the</strong>r refinement to <strong>the</strong>
strategic culture concept. A simplistic point <strong>of</strong> clarification not yet made in <strong>the</strong> literature is that <strong>the</strong>
label “strategic culture” is used to denote both an extant phenomenon within a state, and <strong>the</strong> way to
study it. In <strong>the</strong> first instance <strong>the</strong> term captures <strong>the</strong> idea that just as states have a “political culture,” and
a “national culture,” <strong>the</strong>y also have a “strategic culture.” The second means for employing this label
applies to <strong>the</strong> type <strong>of</strong> analysis which takes into account a state’s strategic culture when explaining or
predicting security policy. In this case one would speak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “strategic culture” approach to
interpreting or predicting international events versus a “neorealist” or “constructivist” approach to
explaining state behavior.
In order to employ <strong>the</strong> strategic culture approach, it would be useful to establish some common
understanding <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> “strategic culture” <strong>of</strong> a state entails. As <strong>the</strong> previous discussion indicates,
identifying <strong>the</strong> particular ingredients <strong>of</strong> this phenomenon has proved a contentious task. David Haglund
does not see this as particularly problematic. In his essay, “What Good Is <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>?,” he
compares <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> strategic culture to equally amorphous and contested concepts like “power,”
and “wealth.” Despite eluding precise definition <strong>the</strong>se none<strong>the</strong>less remain essential components <strong>of</strong>
understanding security policy. Wrangling over definition appears to be a ra<strong>the</strong>r normal part <strong>of</strong> a
concept’s growth in any discipline. “Thus, if strategic culture is to follow <strong>the</strong> normal trajectory <strong>of</strong>
political concepts…<strong>the</strong>n we can expect not only that debates about its meaning will be ceaseless, but
that it will be prone, as are all concepts, to expansion.” 75 Haglund appears to be right on both accounts.
73 Farrell, The Norms <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner 2005).
74 Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2006: 478.
75 David Haglund, “What Good Is <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>?,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction:
Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M.
Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 16.
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Snyder’s original, narrow focus on <strong>the</strong> “national strategic community” as <strong>the</strong> keeper <strong>of</strong> strategic culture
and “nuclear strategy” as its aim have been widened ra<strong>the</strong>r dramatically by scholars since. Today, some
definitions stretch <strong>the</strong> entire spectrum <strong>of</strong> actors and issues relevant to security policy. By way <strong>of</strong>
example, a group <strong>of</strong> scholars (myself included) tasked by <strong>the</strong> Defense Threat Reduction Agency to create
a comprehensive strategic culture curriculum did so employing <strong>the</strong> following definition:
<strong>Strategic</strong> culture is that set <strong>of</strong> shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes <strong>of</strong> behavior, derived from
common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective
identity and relationships to o<strong>the</strong>r groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means
for achieving security objectives. 76
Reflecting on that definition and <strong>the</strong> scholarship that has emerged since, it is clear that <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
strategic culture approach has weakened in nearly direct proportion to its definitional expansion. 77 As
has been effectively argued by Christopher Twomey, security studies that attempt to draw predictive
power from <strong>the</strong> amorphous and <strong>of</strong>ten internally contradictory substance we call “culture” <strong>of</strong>ten suffer
follies <strong>of</strong> overgeneralization and static analysis, and reach, as a consequence, questionable conclusions
about <strong>the</strong> sources <strong>of</strong> security policy. 78 After years <strong>of</strong> writing on <strong>the</strong> subject, first generation scholar
Colin Gray does not disagree. His recent work on strategy and culture argues that scholarship which
attempts grand pr<strong>of</strong>iles <strong>of</strong>ten sweeps “away complexity in <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> an elegant and potent
economy and simplicity that usually pays too high a price for its virtues.” 79
Tools which limit, bound, and target cultural research are in order. The first bit <strong>of</strong> territory to be claimed
is conceptual. While <strong>the</strong> expansion <strong>of</strong> strategic culture analysis to all areas <strong>of</strong> state activity which affect
security may satisfy yearnings for a comprehensive security picture, <strong>the</strong>se need be curtailed if <strong>the</strong> label
“strategic culture” is to maintain any modicum <strong>of</strong> integrity. Cultural analysis <strong>of</strong> economic decisions,
political debates, education policy, or gender equality may be useful in <strong>the</strong>ir own sphere and may even
have defensible links to national security, but need <strong>the</strong>ir own label. The “strategic,” in strategic culture
must have “some powder trail to kinetic things.” 80
A survey <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> literature as well as experience practicing <strong>the</strong> strategic culture approach in <strong>the</strong>
forecasting world <strong>of</strong> defense and intelligence analysis, has led to a few conclusions about best practice.
76 Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen eds., <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass
Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
77 For a thorough review <strong>of</strong> strategic culture’s <strong>the</strong>oretical history, please see Alastair Iain Johnston’s discussion on
<strong>the</strong> three generations <strong>of</strong> strategic culture literature in Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Grand
Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4-31; also Jeffrey S. Lantis, “<strong>Strategic</strong>
<strong>Culture</strong>: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction: Culturally
Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and
Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 33-52.
78 Christopher P. Twomey, “Lacunae in <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> in International Security,” Contemporary Security
Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (August 2008): 338-357.
79 Colin S. Gray, Perspectives in Strategy, forthcoming: 196.
80 Personal correspondence with Colin Gray, September 2008.
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The most overriding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se is that policy targeted examinations <strong>of</strong> strategic culture tend to be <strong>of</strong> more
use than sweeping pr<strong>of</strong>iles. This is true for a number <strong>of</strong> reasons. First, “strategic culture” should rarely
be referenced in <strong>the</strong> singular for any particular regime. There is not, typically, one internal variety.
Walter Russell Mead identifies four distinct narratives within U.S. strategic culture and posits that our
various foreign policies are formed from <strong>the</strong> “collisions and debates” <strong>the</strong>y inspire. 81 The idea <strong>of</strong>
composite cultures is not restricted to analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S., <strong>of</strong> course. Authors writing on <strong>the</strong> UK, France
and Germany 82 , China 83 , India 84 , and Iran 85 , to name a few, all note <strong>the</strong> internal conflict <strong>of</strong> competing
security narratives within <strong>the</strong>se regimes. Oliver M. Lee points out that that this does not render
strategic cultures irrational or dysfunctional. Lee argues, ra<strong>the</strong>r, that a “nation’s political culture is <strong>the</strong>
sum <strong>of</strong> many major subcultures…[which] makes possible <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> coalitions <strong>of</strong> subcultures,
coalitions competing with each o<strong>the</strong>r to become and/or remain <strong>the</strong> dominant one.” 86
Secondly, <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> culture likely to have most impact on policy: organizational, national, tribal, ethnic,
or regional, may shift considerably depending on <strong>the</strong> particular policy issue in question. Most work, to
date, privileges elite culture (usually at <strong>the</strong> organizational level) regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue at hand, arguing
with Dalgarrd-Nielsen that while public opinion may influence which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various narratives within a
policy compete for prominence, “it is arguably <strong>the</strong> elite – owing to its role as gatekeeper, its expert
knowledge and its privileged access to means <strong>of</strong> communication – that ultimately decides which way
security policy goes.” 87 This logic breaks down when one is assessing strategic culture within <strong>the</strong> context
<strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency and stability operations. Given <strong>the</strong> pivotal role <strong>of</strong> local popular opinion and
reaction to policy in this type <strong>of</strong> military engagement, understanding public culture, <strong>the</strong> cultures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
distinctive services, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> insurgent group(s), and significant sub-state groups becomes paramount. The
level <strong>of</strong> culture studied, and specific actor selected, should be intimately tied to <strong>the</strong> policy issue in
question.
Third, strategic cultures, like <strong>the</strong>ir national counterparts, are periodically reinvented human creations.
They do change. Therefore, any tool devised to track strategic culture must employ questions that
81
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed <strong>the</strong> World (New York:
The Century Foundation, 2001), xvii.
82
Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and <strong>the</strong> FRG (London: Macmillan
Press, 1998); Anja Dalgarrd-Nielsen, “The Test <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes,”
Security Dialogue 36 (2005): 339-359.
83
Huiyun Feng, “A Dragon on Defense: Explaining China’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong>
Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. Jeannie L.
Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 171-188.
84
Rodney W. Jones, “India’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Omniscient Paternalism,” in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and
Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds.
Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 117-136.
85
Afshin Molavi, The Soul <strong>of</strong> Iran: A Nation’s Journey to Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002).
86
Oliver M. Lee, “The Geopolitics <strong>of</strong> American’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27 Issue 3, 2008:
269.
87 Dalgarrd-Nielsen, “The Test <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 342.
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assume culture as somewhat moving target and look for areas where we might expect <strong>the</strong> next round <strong>of</strong>
change.
It is this core <strong>of</strong> assumptions that form <strong>the</strong> bedrock <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Topography methodology and its
attendant Mapping Exercise explained in <strong>the</strong> next chapter. In <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> demonstrating <strong>the</strong> prescribed
methodology, Chapter 3 examines two key cultural influences on members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps:
American national culture and U.S. military culture. Appendix A supplements this survey by <strong>of</strong>fering a
look at <strong>the</strong> distinctive sub-cultures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine’s sister services. Chapters 4 and 5 target <strong>the</strong>
culture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps specifically by employing four research devices to unearth and organize
cultural data: Identity, Norms, Values and Perceptual Lens. Chapters 6 and 7 combine this cultural data
with pattern analysis conducted across <strong>the</strong> “Banana Wars” episodes and through <strong>the</strong> Vietnam era and
examine cultural outcomes in <strong>the</strong> categories devised: Lessons Recognized (subdivided into Lessons
Learned and Lessons Lost) as well as positive and negative Cultural Blindspots. Chapter 8 assesses <strong>the</strong>
results—<strong>the</strong> extent to which Marine culture has shaped and been shaped by counterinsurgency
practice—and how those patterns inform strategic projections for <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> America’s Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks in
future counterinsurgency endeavors.
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CHAPTER 2
CULTURAL TOPOGRAPHY
Cultural Topography and its attendant research method – <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping Exercise—were
designed by this author in partnership with a senior manager within <strong>the</strong> U.S. intelligence community. 88
The Cultural Topography method was forged within <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategic culture paradigm, but
narrowed and sharpened to fit <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> foreign policy practitioners. U.S. intelligence analysis,
including foreign policy, security, and political analysis has suffered from <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> cultural inquiry and
discovery endemic to American life. The Cultural Topography framework was designed to remedy, in
some part, this debilitating analytic deficiency. To clarify terms: an amplified understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
“cultural topography” <strong>of</strong> a particular region or actor set is <strong>the</strong> desired end state to which this approach
aspires. The Cultural Mapping Exercise is <strong>the</strong> method for achieving it:
[The Cultural Mapping Exercise] is designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play
on issues <strong>of</strong> intelligence interest and to distinguish <strong>the</strong> degree to which those factors
influence decision making and outcomes. Mapping exercises done across time, spanning
multiple issues, and on diverse groups within a society may aid in understanding that
society’s “Cultural Topography.” 89
The version employed here is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> our repeated application and refinement <strong>of</strong> this method over
<strong>the</strong> last six years. This approach has proven a useful and illuminating tool for intelligence analysts. It is
being exercised here for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategist: ra<strong>the</strong>r than studying alien cultures, its lens is
being trained on our own. A strategist interested in ascertaining “fitness” for counterinsurgency within
his ranks would employ this method in its most robust form: conducting individual Cultural Mapping
Exercises across service cultures (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) bounded to <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong>
counterinsurgency practice and assessed across time. The pooled result would deliver a textured
“topography” <strong>of</strong> service orientations-- common ground, areas <strong>of</strong> likely push back, individual strengths,
and potentially debilitating cleavages-- within his strategic community on this issue. This <strong>the</strong>sis
represents one iteration <strong>of</strong> that process: <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps.
Strategists may use <strong>the</strong> insight derived from this process for a variety <strong>of</strong> purposes: assessing likely
resistance to norms changes, improving messaging strategies, smoothing inter-service tensions, or as
guidance toward <strong>the</strong> immediate task <strong>of</strong> matching security organizations to <strong>the</strong> operational set for which
<strong>the</strong>y are best suited. When Cultural Topography results indicate that a strong match is not possible, <strong>the</strong>
strategist may at <strong>the</strong> very least be apprised <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> friction he is likely to encounter when <strong>the</strong>
organization is placed in an uncomfortable service culture fit. Sometimes <strong>the</strong> key finding from a Cultural
88 The Cultural Topography method, including <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping Exercise was designed with Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett
during his tenure as <strong>the</strong> Near East South Asia Office Director at <strong>the</strong> Central Intelligence Agency. See Jeannie L.
Johnson and Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett, “Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence,” Studies in
Intelligence, Vol 55 No 2, June 2011, Center for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> Intelligence.
89 Johnson and Berrett, “Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence,” 2.
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Mapping exercise is that <strong>the</strong> organizational culture in question has no clear script for <strong>the</strong> issue selected.
If discovered early, this undetermined cultural space may be used advantageously by strategic planners
in forging inter-service consensus on best practices; if discovered late—when operations are already
underway—it may be flagged by planners as an area <strong>of</strong> uncertainty, likely characterized by diverse
performance.
Two defenses might be made for <strong>the</strong> particular design <strong>of</strong> this methodology, one practical and one
academic; each is parent to <strong>the</strong> eventual product. The design is inspired by methods and research
practices proven useful within political, social, and anthropological inquiry and is tempered by <strong>the</strong>
operational realities likely faced by <strong>the</strong> practioners <strong>of</strong> foreign and security policy. A base ontological
description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> culture this methodology assumes is requisite here. Along with Colin Gray,
Clifford Geertz, and <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> anthropological scholars, this <strong>the</strong>sis argues that culture is not a
reified force, an independent variable which can be extracted from <strong>the</strong> intrinsic and extrinsic dialectic
between agent and structure and tested for universally valid causal influence. Due to its comprehensive
nature--existing both inside and outside <strong>the</strong> individual 90 --its uneven distribution across members <strong>of</strong> a
group or society, 91 and <strong>the</strong> supreme role played by human will, articulating cultural influence is
necessarily done on a case by case basis.
A tempting characterization <strong>of</strong> cultures, or groups worth studying, is captured by Paula Holmes-Eber and
Barak A. Salmoni in <strong>the</strong> Operational <strong>Culture</strong> manual constructed for <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps:
Although people are, by nature, variable and unpredictable, <strong>the</strong>y still need to work with
o<strong>the</strong>rs in social and cultural groups. These groups--and <strong>the</strong>ir associated beliefs and
structures--are organized according to logical, understandable principles that every
person living in <strong>the</strong> culture must understand, at least intuitively, in order to get along
with each o<strong>the</strong>r. With some basic study, [o<strong>the</strong>rs] can also recognize and understand
<strong>the</strong>se principles and apply that understanding to <strong>the</strong>ir operations. 92
Were all organizational cultures to operate with this level cohesion, one might be tempted to combine
<strong>the</strong> accumulated scholarly evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> organizational culture on security behavior and
forge <strong>the</strong>se findings into a general <strong>the</strong>ory. A quest for <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> this sort is understandable. Theory
building is <strong>the</strong> core competency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political science discipline. The unorthodox position this <strong>the</strong>sis
will take is that general <strong>the</strong>ory building <strong>of</strong> this sort, when dealing with <strong>the</strong> essence “culture,” is also
indefensible.
It is typically institutions in possession <strong>of</strong> strong organizational cultures, ones which manifest an easily
discernible (or easily defended) influence on behavior that are selected by academic researchers in
making a case for <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> culture. If, however, our Cultural Mapping research tool is to be
employed for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> strategymaking ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong>ory building <strong>the</strong>n it must be a tool which
90
Kevin Avruch, <strong>Culture</strong> and Conflict Resolution (Washington DC: United States Institute <strong>of</strong> Peace Press, 1998): 13.
91
Avruch, <strong>Culture</strong> and Conflict Resolution, 18.
92
Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational <strong>Culture</strong> for <strong>the</strong> Warfighter: Principles and Applications,
(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 13.
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can analyze <strong>the</strong> disposition <strong>of</strong> weakly held cultures: enhancing understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> somewhat loose
ties that bind <strong>the</strong>m and improving meaningfully upon our ability to project <strong>the</strong>ir members’ likely
reaction to external phenomena. Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping technique is to identify
both those issues or policy moves which may cause a group to coalesce and fortify core identity, as well
as those that may cause a group to fracture and engage in disparate action.
If this <strong>the</strong>sis were to find that <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps organizational culture exceeds that <strong>of</strong> its
formal doctrine, historic experience, or prospects <strong>of</strong> future warfare in calibrating Marine Corps decisions
on core competencies, that finding would likely be traced to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is an
institution in possession <strong>of</strong> an intense, well established, and viscerally defended sense <strong>of</strong> self. The
nascent “<strong>the</strong>ory” emerging from this single investigation would be: organizational culture exerts more
influence on <strong>the</strong> selection <strong>of</strong> core service competencies than does formal doctrine, frequency <strong>of</strong>
engagement with warfare types, or rationally derived notions <strong>of</strong> likely future warfare. This attempt at
<strong>the</strong>oretical generalization, defensible though it may be for this case, is unlikely to hold true for <strong>the</strong>
recently established Iraqi National Guard – an organization which has yet to define itself concretely, find
its organizational “feet”, and continues to undergo attempts from various allied advisors to shape and fit
it for <strong>the</strong> future. It is not only new organizations that would suffer a poor fit with this “<strong>the</strong>ory;” <strong>the</strong>
same “weak culture” phenomenon might also be found in longstanding organizations experiencing
cultural shifts due to significant influxes <strong>of</strong> new populations, a consistent battering upon old norms, a
pr<strong>of</strong>ound external shock, or imposition <strong>of</strong> a novel context for which <strong>the</strong>ir extant culture provides very
little direction. 93 In short, a strategist may be facing any variation along <strong>the</strong> spectrum <strong>of</strong> “cohesive” to
“weakly devised” cultures within <strong>the</strong> security institutions he oversees. These base ontological
assumptions—that cultures are not created in equal strength, that cultures continue to morph at <strong>the</strong>
hands <strong>of</strong> agents who live within <strong>the</strong>m, and that <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> culture on behavior is best captured within
a particular context and moment in time, unveil <strong>the</strong> illusory nature <strong>of</strong> general <strong>the</strong>ory where cultural
impact is concerned.
The Cultural Mapping method, <strong>the</strong>refore, does not assume cohesiveness. Instead it probes a range <strong>of</strong>
possibilities. How solid is group identity? How cohesive on this issue? Which strand <strong>of</strong> group identity
may recent events have brought to <strong>the</strong> fore? Would pressure on this issue increase cohesion or
threaten fracturing? Does <strong>the</strong> group have a comfortable script for action in situations like <strong>the</strong>se?
Imbedded in this question set is a distinctive penchant toward inductive ra<strong>the</strong>r than deductive
processing. Employing von Wright’s capsulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inductive approach, <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping
method seeks to explain “why things which happened were to be expected,” and <strong>the</strong>n project
probabilities for future iterations. 94 A deductive model which seeks causal connections – why an event
must have happened—is ana<strong>the</strong>ma to <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> cultural influence. Cultural influence, no matter
how pronounced, cannot displace human will. This, in combination with culture’s constantly evolving
nature, leaves little room for “musts” <strong>of</strong> any sort.
93 Even if <strong>the</strong> warfighting situation is not historically novel, if lessons learned have not been institutionalized and
trained, what shouldn’t be new is experienced as such by <strong>the</strong> forces who fight it.
94 Georg Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971): 14.
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Thus, <strong>the</strong> pursuit <strong>of</strong> cultural research must be essentially hermeneutical – <strong>the</strong> art <strong>of</strong> interpretation 95 –
ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> scientific pursuit <strong>of</strong> natural laws. An interpretivist ra<strong>the</strong>r than positivist epistemology
provides a sounder fit for <strong>the</strong> research process. Perhaps more so than any o<strong>the</strong>r human phenomenon,
culture manifests that “human actions... are fundamentally different from <strong>the</strong> phenomena <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natural
sciences, for <strong>the</strong>y are constituted by <strong>the</strong> ideas and self-understandings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social actors <strong>the</strong>mselves.”
The result drives a wedge between positivist and interpretive approaches: “In <strong>the</strong> natural sciences we
are free to create categories, define concepts, or group events in any way we please, so long as it helps
us to advance our explanatory aims. In <strong>the</strong> social sciences we do not enjoy such freedom, for <strong>the</strong> human
actions we would explain are intentional, which is to say that <strong>the</strong>ir very existence depends on <strong>the</strong> ideas
that <strong>the</strong> actors <strong>the</strong>mselves have.” 96
If <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> scientific inquiry, <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> positivism, is to explain why, given <strong>the</strong> circumstances,
something “had to occur – to show that nothing else could have occurred under <strong>the</strong>se conditions” 97
<strong>the</strong>n any variation on strategic culture research will certainly fail. An interpretive model “insists that
laws and generalizations are not necessary to an understanding <strong>of</strong> human actions,” advocating that
researchers pursue “a process <strong>of</strong> interpretation in which <strong>the</strong> meanings <strong>of</strong> an action are uncovered by
analyzing <strong>the</strong> action in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> agent’s particular situation and in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conventions, practices,
and rules <strong>of</strong> his society.” 98 The interpretive process speaks directly to <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping method,
although its aims – to clarify meaning and intention in order to more successfully communicate and
understand one ano<strong>the</strong>r 99 – comprise only one part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> a strategist. Two <strong>of</strong> several
interrelated jobs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory as delineated by Glaser and Strauss round out <strong>the</strong> amplified aims <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Cultural Mapping method: “to guide and provide a style for research on particular areas <strong>of</strong> behavior,”
and to supply insights “useable in practical applications,” <strong>the</strong>reby facilitating a practitioner’s
“understanding and some control <strong>of</strong> situations.” 100
The insights derived from <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping method aim for practical utility: namely to supply <strong>the</strong>
strategist with a range <strong>of</strong> probable behaviors in order to enhance efforts at planning, creating doctrine,
manipulating <strong>the</strong> context in which security policy is forged, and possibly highlighting strategic
deficiencies that need be addressed. It is this set <strong>of</strong> practical tasks which bound and steer <strong>the</strong> academic
ambitions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> methodology outlined below.
95 Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, 30.
96 J. Donald Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” in Fred I. Greenstein and
Nelson W. Polsby eds., Political Science: Scope and Theory, Handbook <strong>of</strong> Political Science Vol. 1 (Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975): 132-133.
97 Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 135.
98 Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 155.
99 Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 155.
100 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery <strong>of</strong> Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research,
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967): 3.
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Cultural Mapping Exercise
Step 1: Identify an Issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Interest
The first injunction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping method – to select an issue <strong>of</strong> strategic interest (see Figure
2.1), may seem a bit banal or obvious. It is not. In fact, in practice, honing an appropriate question
around which cultural research will be conducted is <strong>of</strong>ten a formidable hurdle. 101 Anthropological
research typically identifies a group to be studied as <strong>the</strong> first order <strong>of</strong> business and most cultural
enthusiasts find this a natural starting point. Our insistence that <strong>the</strong> security issue <strong>of</strong> concern be
identified first, and cultural research be built around it, is born <strong>of</strong> hard experience. 102 As noted in <strong>the</strong>
opening chapter, any culture <strong>of</strong> substantial size or complexity possesses internal contradictions, multiple
narratives, and sometimes an evolutionary history stretching over centuries. <strong>Assessing</strong> which aspects <strong>of</strong>
that cultural heritage matter now, for this particular context, on this particular issue, requires first, a
clear delineation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategic problem at hand. Cultural pr<strong>of</strong>iles built without <strong>the</strong> framing <strong>of</strong> a
particular security question are <strong>of</strong> limited utility to
operational planners.
A researcher need not remain married to <strong>the</strong> initial
issue generated. As she wades into <strong>the</strong> data
collected she made find that her framing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
initial strategic issue needs narrowing (or
widening). She may find that a far more
compelling question emerges. Looping back to
refine and restructure <strong>the</strong> initial problem set is not
only welcome, it is recommended. This
“hermeneutical circle” entails “movement back
and forth between <strong>the</strong> particular and <strong>the</strong> general,
as <strong>the</strong> meaning and significance <strong>of</strong> specific actions,
practices, texts, etc., are judged in relation to a
conception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole, and our ideas about <strong>the</strong>
whole are corrected and amplified by testing <strong>the</strong>m
against <strong>the</strong> ‘parts.’” 103
32
Textbox 2.1
Core Components
Cultural Mapping Exercise
Step 1: Identify an Issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Interest
Step 2: Select an Actor for Focused Study
Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences
Step 4: Employ Four Research Perspectives:
Identify, Norms, Values and Perceptual Lens
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs)
Step 6: Map CCFs Across Cultural Influences
Step 7: Assess Results
101
Based on experience with scores <strong>of</strong> intelligence and military analysts initiating Cultural Topography projects
during training.
102
This author participated in a multi-year engagement which solicited strategic culture pr<strong>of</strong>iles from regional
experts in an attempt to better understand cultural inclinations surrounding weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction
acquisition and possible use. The primary take-away from this venture was a need to significantly reduce <strong>the</strong> scope
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inquiry in order to yield cultural data applicable to contemporary scenarios. Continued practice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “issue
first” approach has resulted in some striking success within <strong>the</strong> intelligence field. See Jeannie l. Johnson and
Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett, “Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 55 No
2, June 2011, Center for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> Intelligence.
103
Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 172.

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The hermeneutical process falls largely within <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> grounded <strong>the</strong>ory, a method <strong>of</strong> extracting
<strong>the</strong>ory from data by allowing immersion in <strong>the</strong> data to unearth patterns and trends worthy <strong>of</strong> study. 104
This approach helps ameliorate a core complaint ethnographer Rob Johnston issued to <strong>the</strong> U.S.
intelligence community as regards <strong>the</strong> ethnocentric nature <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> our analytic processes:
[An] analyst, while accounting successfully for an adversary’s capability, may misjudge
that adversary’s intention, not because <strong>of</strong> what is cognitively available, but because <strong>of</strong>
what is cognitively absent. The failure to determine an adversary’s intention may simply
be <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> missing information or, just as likely, it may be <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> missing
hypo<strong>the</strong>ses or mental models about an adversary’s potential behavior. 105
A strategist is equally susceptible prey to miscalculations about an adversary’s intentions. More subtle,
perhaps, is <strong>the</strong> possible misinformation generated by members <strong>of</strong> his own strategic community. The
organizational culture an institution projects, and may indeed believe it possesses, may be divorced in
critical ways from behaviors pursued on <strong>the</strong> ground. More useful than taking institutional
proclamations at face value is an attempt to set aside (to <strong>the</strong> extent possible) a priori notions regarding
<strong>the</strong> relevant organizational culture and allow immersion in multisource cultural data collected over an
extended period <strong>of</strong> time to illuminate consistent patterns <strong>of</strong> thinking and behavior. As <strong>the</strong>se trends
emerge, <strong>the</strong> strategist may find that his initial question rates as only moderately useful and will loop
back to deepen or narrow his question frame for more robust results.
The subject matter <strong>of</strong> this <strong>the</strong>sis underwent just such a journey. The topic initially selected for
consideration was <strong>the</strong> character and success <strong>of</strong> stability operations—those non-kinetic, state-building
tasks <strong>of</strong>ten wrapped into counterinsurgency operations—when performed by <strong>the</strong> military. Stability
operations had captured <strong>the</strong> conscious attention <strong>of</strong> U.S. defense planners and <strong>the</strong> result was
unprecedented and exclusive treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subject in doctrinal form: Joint Doctrine JP 3-0, <strong>the</strong>
Army’s new Stability Operations Field Manual (FM 3-07). 106 This seemed to beg investigation. As
researched progressed, however, it became increasingly clear that segregating stability operations from
<strong>the</strong> larger realm <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency operations would be an artificial distinction performed by <strong>the</strong>
author and not a defensible match with practice as it was performed by Marines across <strong>the</strong>ir history <strong>of</strong>
small war endeavors. Perhaps more importantly, historical research revealed intriguing misfires
between <strong>the</strong> strategic intentions <strong>of</strong> nation-building efforts pursued by Marines alongside kinetic activity,
and actual results. The interplay <strong>of</strong> Marine efforts on both fronts—captured in <strong>the</strong> far more inclusive
subject <strong>of</strong> comprehensive counterinsurgency—provides a more compelling story than treating ei<strong>the</strong>r in
exclusion.
104
Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery <strong>of</strong> Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research,
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967).
105
Rob Johnston, Analytic <strong>Culture</strong> in <strong>the</strong> US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, (Washington DC:
Center for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> Intelligence, 2005): 8.
106
Field Manual on Stability Operations FM 3-07 (Headquarters, Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, October 2008): vi.
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Step 2: Select an Actor for Focused Study
It is <strong>the</strong> problem set that wields primacy for <strong>the</strong> strategist; which actor need be scrutinized in order to
effectively address <strong>the</strong> problem set is <strong>the</strong> second order <strong>of</strong> business. As noted in <strong>the</strong> general description
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Topography methodology, <strong>the</strong> mapping process is meant to be repeated--using <strong>the</strong> same
issue as locus--across different relevant actors and across time in order to form a full picture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
“cultural topography” <strong>of</strong> a strategic community.
The issue selected for focused study inspires, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>the</strong> assemblage <strong>of</strong> relevant actors. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se
will be selected for targeted study. The choice results from any number <strong>of</strong> needs. The strategist may
assess that <strong>the</strong> selected organization or grouping is a “wild card” in need <strong>of</strong> scrutiny, or an organization
that has long been understood in one vein and is being asked to switch to ano<strong>the</strong>r (a repeated
occurrence for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps). In <strong>the</strong> wider scope <strong>of</strong> strategy <strong>the</strong> would-be researcher may be
focusing on any number <strong>of</strong> adversarial actors affecting <strong>the</strong> security problem at hand. Sound intelligence
practice advises assumption checks on even <strong>the</strong> most dearly held notions about longstanding
adversaries; <strong>the</strong> same logic ought to be applied to an understanding <strong>of</strong> one’s own internal
organizations.
The looping process outlined above applies to actor selection as well. An actor selected at <strong>the</strong> outset
may be benched in favor <strong>of</strong> one which looms larger in importance as <strong>the</strong> research progresses.
Alternatively, <strong>the</strong> same actor may be retained, but disaggregated into component parts, each <strong>of</strong> which
need be treated individually. Researchers reared on a positivist skill set need to be reminded: <strong>the</strong>
objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping method is not to “test” a particular hypo<strong>the</strong>sis, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to serve <strong>the</strong>
needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategist by unearthing policy-relevant cultural data on a security issue <strong>of</strong> interest. If
reforming <strong>the</strong> security question or actor set enhances utility, do it.
The first round <strong>of</strong> this <strong>the</strong>sis work selected <strong>the</strong> “U.S. military” for examination from among <strong>the</strong> various
actors within <strong>the</strong> larger American strategic community. This approach fit well with <strong>the</strong> literature. Much
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work (nearly all) on strategic culture is focused at <strong>the</strong> national level, assuming some cultural
constants across its security community. This assumption can be valid, as <strong>the</strong> previous chapter has
demonstrated, but a more probing look at American military history revealed some ra<strong>the</strong>r striking
differences in counterinsurgency practice between <strong>the</strong> two ground forces who wage it: <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army
and U.S. Marines. The case study which illuminates <strong>the</strong> contrasts best is <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Program
in Vietnam. Spearheaded by <strong>the</strong> Marines, this program cohabitated Vietnam with an Army effort
pursuing nearly opposite strategy and tactics. As America’s “First to Fight” force, Marines are <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong>
first in and <strong>the</strong>refore first to capitalize on or lose <strong>the</strong> “golden hour” <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency operations.
Historically, <strong>the</strong>y have had occasion to be <strong>the</strong> sole U.S. force prosecuting a counterinsurgency operation.
Due to its critical initial role, historic small wars identity, sometimes innovative counterinsurgency
practices, perplexing current posture (a return to amphibious roots), and understudied status within <strong>the</strong>
nascent scholarship on American service cultures, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps surfaced as <strong>the</strong> most
compelling case for focused study.
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Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences
In <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> Kevin Avruch’s pithy “for any individual, culture always comes in <strong>the</strong> plural,” 107 Step 3
engages <strong>the</strong> researcher in an expansive look at <strong>the</strong> various cultural influences which may weigh in on
decision-making for members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> actor set selected. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se take typical form.
Anthropological literature is replete with <strong>the</strong> demonstrated influences <strong>of</strong> national, ethnic, religious,
socio-economic, generational, and gendered cultures on actor behavior. Some influences are less
conventional. For instance, one enterprising young scholar investigated <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> cultural norms
cultivated in <strong>the</strong> fora <strong>of</strong> social media as accelerants to <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> radicalization. 108 Those employing
<strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping tool are encouraged to research widely and unconventionally for cultural
influences which may be providing context for actor behavior.
The various influences amassed in this step represent <strong>the</strong> spectrum <strong>of</strong> possible sources that feed into
<strong>the</strong> multiple strands <strong>of</strong> identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens that shape actor behavior. As a
researcher begins to investigate common practices and attitudes exhibited by <strong>the</strong> selected actor set
when faced with <strong>the</strong> security issue under consideration (Step 4), <strong>the</strong>se may be linked back to <strong>the</strong> various
influences assembled here. Behavior on one aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> security question need not be linked to <strong>the</strong>
same cultural influence as a separate aspect. For instance, <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> individual Marines to connect
positively with Vietnamese villagers during <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program may have had
less to do with <strong>the</strong>ir institutional Marine Corps training and more to do with family culture, religious
culture, or socio-economic class. Conversely, <strong>the</strong> ability to conduct effective night patrols may have had
very little to do with <strong>the</strong> cultures new recruits brought with <strong>the</strong>m to boot camp and much to do with
norms instilled during infantry training at Parris Island. Both modes <strong>of</strong> behavior—good relations with
villagers and effective prosecution <strong>of</strong> night patrols—were necessary to success in <strong>the</strong> CAP program, but
stemmed from diverse cultural roots.
It is a very regular feature <strong>of</strong> human behavior to move between cultural “layers” when determining
codes for action. Which norms are deemed appropriate may be determined by situational context 109 --a
person behaves differently as a student in <strong>the</strong> classroom than a student at a party--or role 110 --a Drill
Instructor (DI) at Parris Island behaves differently in his role as DI (lots <strong>of</strong> yelling) than in his role as base
sergeant major (much less yelling) even if both put him in contact with <strong>the</strong> same Marines. It is this
movement between contextually driven normative sets that make <strong>the</strong> issue-dependent nature <strong>of</strong>
cultural research so critical. In order to identify <strong>the</strong> operational cultural layer 111 for any particular
activity, it must be assumed that actors are free to move about and within <strong>the</strong> many and varied cultural
influences <strong>the</strong>y ingest and that <strong>the</strong> cultural influence which appears most pronounced in day to day
interactions may not be <strong>the</strong> layer that is inspiring behavior on this issue. A generous amassment <strong>of</strong>
107
Kevin Avruch, <strong>Culture</strong> and Conflict Resolution, United States Institute <strong>of</strong> Peace Press: Washington D.C., (1998):
15.
108
Michael Burnham, “Anonymity Catalyzes Radicalization Among Internet Community,” paper prepared for PS:
4890 <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, Utah State University with <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Intelligence Institute, May 2011.
109
Edward T. Hall, Beyond <strong>Culture</strong>, (New York: Anchor Books, 1977, 1989): 99-100.
110
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology, 2nd
Edition, (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1995, 2001): 51.
111 A thank you to David Newcomb for coining this phrase.
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possible influences in <strong>the</strong> first place (<strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> Step 3) will aid in discovering which cultural influences
are shaping <strong>the</strong> behaviors <strong>of</strong> concern.
Chapter 3 and Appendix A represent a survey <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sort recommended here. Assembled <strong>the</strong>re are <strong>the</strong>
conclusions scholars have come to as regards <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> American national culture, U.S. military
culture, and <strong>the</strong> various sister service cultures surrounding <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. This is <strong>the</strong> cultural milieu
in which Marine Corps organizational culture – depicted in Chapters 4 and 5—resides. These chapters
<strong>of</strong>fer a blend <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural data amassment required in Step 3 with <strong>the</strong> categorical analysis suggested
in Step 4.
Step 4: Employ Four Research Perspectives: Identity, Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens
Selecting <strong>the</strong> above four categories as steering mechanisms for investigating cultural data strikes a halfway
point with <strong>the</strong> practices advocated within grounded <strong>the</strong>ory. Glaser and Strauss have, over <strong>the</strong>
years, diverged on how exactly <strong>the</strong>oretical principle should be extracted from <strong>the</strong> sociological data
collected 112 but continue to agree that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical categories used for analysis ought to be
“discovered” from within <strong>the</strong> data <strong>of</strong> social research. 113 Recognizing that those who employ <strong>the</strong> Cultural
Mapping method may have little or no anthropological or sociological academic training, it seems
prudent and helpful to provide a starting platform for cultural investigation. Four key categories have
been selected: Identity, Norms, Values and Perceptual Lens. These four represent common <strong>the</strong>mes
around which much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural literature swirls. This is so because each is a powerful cultural locus
and represents a reoccurring common ground experienced by members <strong>of</strong> actor sets. Those employing
<strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping method are invited to employ <strong>the</strong>se as a starting point, and, as <strong>the</strong>ir research
progresses, subdivide <strong>the</strong>se or incorporate new categories as <strong>the</strong> data may inspire.
The central task in employing <strong>the</strong>se four categories as a guide to research is interpretive or “humanist.”
The categories are meant to stimulate research questions which “identif[y] and analyz[e] traditions <strong>of</strong>
discourse and action and articulat[e] <strong>the</strong> fundamental ideas and ‘constitutive meanings’ that provide
unity or coherence to a particular society or form <strong>of</strong> Iife.” 114 For <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping
exercise <strong>the</strong> four key categories are defined as:
Identity: The character traits this group assigns to itself, <strong>the</strong> reputation it pursues, and individual roles
and statuses it designates to members.
Norms: Accepted and expected modes <strong>of</strong> behavior.
Values: Material or ideational goods that are honored or confer increased status to members.
Perceptual Lens: The filter through which this group determines “facts” about <strong>the</strong> world and about
specific o<strong>the</strong>rs.
112
See Grounded Theory Online for an explanation <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong> two have diverged
http://www.grounded<strong>the</strong>oryonline.com/.
113
Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery <strong>of</strong> Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research,
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967): 3.
114
Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 155.
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Identity
Tailored to <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> service cultures, <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> “identity” also comprises “role conception.” It is
a group’s self-assessment – its own view <strong>of</strong> group character, strengths and weakness, and its intended
strategic role, now and in <strong>the</strong> future. In sharp contrast to <strong>the</strong> assumption posited by neorealism – that
actors proceed based on <strong>the</strong>ir relative position in global power configurations and will respond similarly
to similar external stimuli – <strong>the</strong> strategic culture approach argues that actors have diverse goals based
on a normative understanding <strong>of</strong> who <strong>the</strong>y are, and <strong>the</strong> role <strong>the</strong>y should be playing. 115
<strong>Service</strong> cultures possess distinct identities sought after and defended by <strong>the</strong> human agents who claim
<strong>the</strong>m. <strong>Service</strong>s do not just provide occupations; <strong>the</strong>y provide particular personas and identities to those
who rate membership:
People join <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, not “<strong>the</strong> military” in <strong>the</strong> abstract…They
join because <strong>the</strong>y identify—or want to identify—with a service’s values and its culture. It is
<strong>the</strong>refore not surprising that two decades after <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Goldwater-Nichols Act, which
sought to promote jointness, an <strong>of</strong>ficer’s service affiliation remains <strong>the</strong> most important
determinant <strong>of</strong> his views, more than rank, age or combat experience. 116
Carl Builder agrees and argues that <strong>the</strong> personal identity “goods” derived are an inhibiting factor for
organizational change: “Many who choose a particular military institution and dedicate <strong>the</strong>ir lives to it
make <strong>the</strong>ir choice because <strong>the</strong>re is something about <strong>the</strong> service – who it is or what it is about – that
appeals to <strong>the</strong>m. They see something in that service attractive or admirable and make an implicit
contract with that service to serve in exchange for <strong>the</strong> associative benefit <strong>the</strong>y perceive.” That pre-set
expectation and self-selection is part <strong>of</strong> what keeps organizational culture refreshed and sustained from
one generation to <strong>the</strong> next: “If impending changes in <strong>the</strong>ir service <strong>the</strong>n threaten that which <strong>the</strong>y found
attractive, <strong>the</strong>y will exert a restoring or stabilizing pressure. With tens or hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> such
implicit contracts outstanding, <strong>the</strong> potential for voluntarily changing <strong>the</strong> institution is very small.” 117 If
successful change to <strong>the</strong> institution comes, it must be within an acceptable identity package. 118 At <strong>the</strong>
end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day all bright strategic ideas, from whatever source, will be lost on a service that finds <strong>the</strong>m
ana<strong>the</strong>ma to its own orientation.
Jim Smith notes that <strong>the</strong> same cultural bonding that gives an organization its sense <strong>of</strong> mission, identity,
and commitment can inspire unproductive responses to mission rivals or nontraditional mission sets.
115
Writing in a constructivist vein Theo Farrell makes <strong>the</strong> same argument, The Norms <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Beliefs and
Modern Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 1. For an interpretivist explanation see Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong>
Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 180.
116
Thomas G. Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” in Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner
and Jeffrey A. Larsen eds. <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into
Comparative National Security Policymaking, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 76.
117
Carl Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1989): 39.
118
For an example <strong>of</strong> successful organizational change via savvy manipulation <strong>of</strong> organizational identity see Terry
Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> in <strong>the</strong> US Marine Corps,” Defence
Studies, Vol. 6, No.2 (June 2006).
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Should territory be intruded upon or role conceptions come under threat, service organizations will push
back. “[O]rganizations fight hardest when <strong>the</strong>y feel that <strong>the</strong>ir core mission is being challenged. The
organization will favor policies that promoted <strong>the</strong> core mission, it will fight for autonomy in performing
that core mission, and it will seek to defeat any challenges to those functions that it associates with its
core.” Perhaps most importantly, “[i]t will be largely indifferent to functions it sees as peripheral to its
core, even if those functions are part <strong>of</strong> its assigned purpose…[I]t will try to push out, or reject
accepting, non-core missions as possible detractions from its core focus.” 119
Identifying identity strands within a military institution may clarify why some tasks are pursued with
enthusiasm and o<strong>the</strong>rs left to neglect. This <strong>the</strong>sis will examine <strong>the</strong> tenets <strong>of</strong> preferred Marine Corps
identity and role conception and how <strong>the</strong>se impact upon preparedness for, and <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong>,
counterinsurgency operations.
Norms
The term “norms” encompasses a wide variety <strong>of</strong> cultural practice. Authors from a variety <strong>of</strong> disciplines
have struggled with <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> norms as it seems to embody both a set <strong>of</strong> practices and also <strong>the</strong>
world <strong>of</strong> beliefs that inform those practices. Theo Farrell focuses on <strong>the</strong> beliefs side when he defines his
use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term: “Norms are intersubjective beliefs about <strong>the</strong> social and natural world that define
actors, <strong>the</strong>ir situations, and <strong>the</strong> possibilities <strong>of</strong> action”. 120 Peter Katzenstein, in his seminal volume The
<strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> National Security, favors a slightly more behavior-oriented approach: “Collective expectations
for <strong>the</strong> proper behavior <strong>of</strong> actors with a given identity.” 121 The definition employed here captures both.
Norms are accepted, expected, and preferred modes <strong>of</strong> behavior. Implicit in this definition is an
assumption that beliefs <strong>of</strong> varying strength and quality inform <strong>the</strong>se norms. Both are subject for
consideration.
In his defining essay on military culture James Burk points out that although military and service cultural
elements are, in <strong>the</strong> main, born <strong>of</strong> an aspiration toward warfighting, and <strong>of</strong>ten influence when and what
sort <strong>of</strong> wars are fought, this genesis does not render <strong>the</strong>m inherently instrumental. Military traditions
will not always serve to “fit” a service or branch for fighting war effectively. 122 Beatrice Heuser sums up
<strong>the</strong> general tendencies <strong>of</strong> military establishments as regards preferred norms <strong>of</strong> behavior. The proclivity
<strong>of</strong> armed forces is to fight wars “not in ways that are most appropriate to reach <strong>the</strong> desired end state
with regard to <strong>the</strong> adversary. Given any say in <strong>the</strong> matter, <strong>the</strong>y prefer to fight <strong>the</strong> wars <strong>the</strong>y have
prepared for, for which <strong>the</strong>y have acquired equipment, for which <strong>the</strong>y have configured and which <strong>the</strong>y
119 st
James M. Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion: Building and Air and Space Force for <strong>the</strong> 21 Century, INSS
Occasional Paper 19, Air Force Planning Series, (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security
Studies, June 1998): 8. Accessed on 24 May 2012 at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usafa/ocp19.pdf
120
Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait <strong>of</strong> a Research Program”, International Studies Review,
(2002) p.49
121
Peter Katzenstein, ed., The <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia
University Press: New York (1996) p. 5
122
James Burk, “Military <strong>Culture</strong>,” Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume 2, (San Diego, CA:
Academic Press, 1999): 448.
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want to play out in reality.” 123 This does not mean that services asked to enact battlefield practices
contrary to <strong>the</strong>ir preferred tactics will refuse; but it may mean that those service members tend to view
<strong>the</strong> battlefield through a lens which focuses on opportunities to engage in preferred practices at <strong>the</strong>
expense <strong>of</strong> more effective, but less familiar tactics.
The patterns <strong>of</strong> concern here are a service’s “default settings” associated with particular modes <strong>of</strong>
warfare. These organizational cultural traits <strong>of</strong>ten take a beating when applied to <strong>the</strong> battlefront,
especially in those conflicts for which <strong>the</strong>y are not a good fit, but—as cultural inertia would have it—
may reappear in surprisingly robust form in <strong>the</strong> next go-round. The battlefield, and wars generally,
<strong>of</strong>fer an opportunity for <strong>the</strong> rational cleansing <strong>of</strong> unfit practices, but services are perfectly capable <strong>of</strong>
ignoring <strong>the</strong> diagnoses. As John Nagl so usefully noted in his rigorous study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army in <strong>the</strong>
Vietnam context:
Even under <strong>the</strong> pressures for change presented by an ongoing military conflict, a strong
organizational culture can prohibit learning <strong>the</strong> lessons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present and can even prevent <strong>the</strong>
organization’s acknowledging that its current policies are anything o<strong>the</strong>r than completely
successful. 124
Sometimes <strong>the</strong> norms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general public intervene to shape or inhibit military action. Greg Giles
explores <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> national norms on security policy in a number <strong>of</strong> places in his work on Israel. One
particularly poignant example focuses on <strong>the</strong> Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) conclusions about engagement
in <strong>the</strong> 1987 Intifada:
Eventually, <strong>the</strong> IDF command publicly acknowledged that it could not engage in <strong>the</strong>
types <strong>of</strong> operations needed to eliminate <strong>the</strong> Intifada without violating societal norms. In
essence, IDF Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff Dan Shomron declared that <strong>the</strong>re was no acceptable military
solution to <strong>the</strong> uprising and that it had to be resolved politically. 125
Whe<strong>the</strong>r stemming from a national or service culture source, Kevin Avruch supplies a useful caution
concerning <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> norms:
[C]ultural representations – images and encodements, schemas and models – are
internalized by individuals. They are not internalized equally or all at <strong>the</strong> same level,
however. Some are internalized very superficially and are <strong>the</strong> equivalent <strong>of</strong> cultural
clichés. O<strong>the</strong>rs are deeply internalized and invested with emotion or affect. 126
123
Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 494.
124
John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, (Chicago:
University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press, 2002, 2005): 217.
125
Gregory Giles, “Continuity and Change in Israel’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>” in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass
Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. Jeannie L. Johnson,
Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 109.
126
Kevin Avruch, <strong>Culture</strong> and Conflict Resolution, United States Institute <strong>of</strong> Peace Press: Washington D.C., (1998) p.
19
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It is here that values (a passive or intrinsic aspect <strong>of</strong> culture) run considerable overlap with norms
(active, expressed aspects <strong>of</strong> culture). Norms which are deeply rooted to specific values exist at <strong>the</strong>
“internalization” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “compliance” level <strong>of</strong> behavior. One might think <strong>of</strong> cultural practices as
falling along a spectrum. At <strong>the</strong> far end are norms informed by dearly held, hardwired beliefs. These
norms are internalized and will persist without supervision and despite more “logical”
recommendations. At <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r end are those practices that are widely observed socially, but fit
Avruch’s notion <strong>of</strong> “cultural clichés.” These may be forced practices passed down by those in authority –
complied with by underlings but quickly abandoned as soon as <strong>the</strong> supervising power is removed, or
may be something as simple as habit carried forward by social inertia, long severed from its original
raison d’etre, or any sincere belief system.
Mariano Grondona marks a useful differentiation between intrinsic and instrumental values. The first
are “those we uphold regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> benefits or costs” and are synonymous with “internalization.”
Those he deems “instrumental” are pursued because <strong>the</strong>y yield direct benefit to <strong>the</strong> actor. The salience
<strong>of</strong> Grondona’s point for our purposes is that <strong>the</strong> attractiveness <strong>of</strong> norms attached to intrinsic values for
members <strong>of</strong> a particular target group is “inexhaustible” since <strong>the</strong> norms are valued for <strong>the</strong>ir own sake
ra<strong>the</strong>r than as a means to an end. Instrumental norms are pursued only until <strong>the</strong> end is accomplished;
<strong>the</strong>y are far less deeply rooted, existing primarily at <strong>the</strong> “compliance” level. 127 Understanding <strong>the</strong>
difference allows strategists to discern between those norms that are likely to shift easily if members <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> organization are presented with a “better way” to pursue warfighting ends. Instrumental norms will
yield to such logic. Intrinsic norms, however, are valued for <strong>the</strong>ir own sake ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> ends <strong>the</strong>y
achieve and will thus are positioned to wea<strong>the</strong>r substantial winds <strong>of</strong> change. When a norm achieves
both instrumental utility (a proven track record for achieving strategic ends) and intrinsic value (it fulfills
emotional or moral needs created by <strong>the</strong> group) it may be regarded as particularly robust. 128
This <strong>the</strong>sis will examine <strong>the</strong> norms Marines brought with <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong>ir counterinsurgency task, both
those born <strong>of</strong> service culture and those inspired at <strong>the</strong> national level. The ensuing analysis will study
how those norms fared: whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y were recognized as a good fit and embedded in doctrine and
training; recognized as an inferior practice and altered for better (lessons learned); or recognized as an
inferior practice but unaltered due cultural preferences unwilling to give way (lessons lost).
Values
The notion <strong>of</strong> “values” pr<strong>of</strong>fered here takes two forms. The first comprises character traits or material
goods which elevate one’s status in <strong>the</strong> relevant society. Secondly are those memes in a society that are
powerfully loaded with positive emotion. These may be motivators which seem superficial—but are
highly valued—such as “fun,” or complex constructs like “fairness.”
127 Mariano Grondona, “A Cultural Typology <strong>of</strong> Economic Development,” in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P.
Huntington eds., <strong>Culture</strong> Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, (New York: Basic Books, 2000):45
128 Jeffrey W. Legro <strong>of</strong>fers up additional mechanisms for measuring norm strength. See Cooperation Under Fire:
Anglo-German Restraint during World War II, Cornell Univ. Press: New York (1995); Legro, “Which Norms Matter?
Revisiting <strong>the</strong> ‘Failure’ <strong>of</strong> Internationalism”, International Organization 51, No.1 (1997) pp. 31-63. Paul Kowert and
Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity and Their limits”, in Katzenstein, ed., The <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> National Security, pp. 451-497.
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Values, <strong>the</strong>refore, might be best understood as highly prized features <strong>of</strong> a society, whe<strong>the</strong>r those are
earth underfoot or notions <strong>of</strong> national honor. David Kilcullen’s examination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Taliban’s recruitment
and use <strong>of</strong> local villagers in its force structure provides an interesting look at <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> local values on
our engagements <strong>the</strong>re. In addition to <strong>the</strong> systematic recruitment and intimidation <strong>of</strong> locals into <strong>the</strong>ir
fighting branches, <strong>the</strong> Taliban <strong>of</strong>ten benefit from historic and cultural values that are part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Afghan
context. Kilcullen cites an example <strong>of</strong> locals flocking from as far as five kilometers away to fight with <strong>the</strong>
Taliban against an American patrol. The locals <strong>the</strong>mselves had no love <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Taliban, nor political reason
to get involved. Most expressed favorable opinions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Americans in <strong>the</strong> area. Their reason for
taking up arms to join in <strong>the</strong> fight? “[W]hen <strong>the</strong> battle was right <strong>the</strong>re in front <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m, how could <strong>the</strong>y
not join in? Did we understand just how boring it was to be a teenager in a valley in central
Afghanistan? This was <strong>the</strong> most exciting thing that had happened in <strong>the</strong>ir valley in years. It would have
shamed <strong>the</strong>m to stand by and wait it out, <strong>the</strong>y said.” 129
Whe<strong>the</strong>r one shows up to a fight may be values driven but so too is treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adversary once <strong>the</strong>
fight ensues. Deeply held prejudices and pervasive racism may lead one society to value <strong>the</strong> humans <strong>of</strong>
ano<strong>the</strong>r at a significantly degraded level and <strong>the</strong>reby reduce <strong>the</strong> threshold for inhuman treatment.
Beatrice Heuser warns twenty-first century readers who may congratulate <strong>the</strong>ir society on moving
beyond this disturbing devaluation <strong>of</strong> human life that “<strong>the</strong> continuity <strong>of</strong> this pattern <strong>of</strong> thought whereby
operational restraints on war [do] not apply to certain ‘o<strong>the</strong>rs’ runs uninterrupted from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong>
present.” 130
The weapons selected for use are a fur<strong>the</strong>r value laden category. 131 John Lynn traces <strong>the</strong> marriage <strong>of</strong>
weapons choice and cultural values as far back as <strong>the</strong> Greek Hoplites. Though one was far more likely to
lose life and limb wielding a spear than bow, <strong>the</strong> bow was considered cowardly and Greek conventions
on war mandated that its use be limited. 132 Jeffrey Legro argues that <strong>the</strong> value-laden nature <strong>of</strong> weapons
assessment has not changed much since <strong>the</strong> Hellenic era:
<strong>Culture</strong> shapes how organizations understand <strong>the</strong>ir environment: it acts as a heuristic
filter for perception and calculation much <strong>the</strong> same way a <strong>the</strong>oretical paradigm shapes
intellectual thought or a schema structures individual cognition. <strong>Culture</strong> also has
material consequences. Collective beliefs dictate which capabilities are perceived as
better and are worthy <strong>of</strong> support. Organizations will channel resources to weapons
suited to culture. Those weapons will appear more feasible than those that are
129
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 40-41.
130
Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 72.
131
For an interesting look at nuclear choices see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and <strong>the</strong> FRG: Nuclear
Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear
Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and <strong>the</strong> FRG (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).
132
John A. Lynn, Battle: A History <strong>of</strong> Combat and <strong>Culture</strong> From Ancient Greece to Modern America, Revised and
Updated Edition, (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 5-7.
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incompatible with culture and that are subsequently deprived <strong>of</strong> funding and
attention. 133
Proposed changes to military or o<strong>the</strong>r structures that run counter to core value sets are unlikely to meet
with success. The norms te<strong>the</strong>red to those values will be instinctively defended, whe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong>
actor is consciously aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principled foundation upon which <strong>the</strong>y rest. “Traditional beliefs and
behaviors frequently are more than merely habitual; <strong>the</strong>ir persistence is likely to be recorded in, and
possibly policed by, an ethical code that expresses cultural attitudes towards right and wrong that may
well reflect assumptions long unchallenged and <strong>the</strong>refore unexamined.” 134
The values <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ holds dear may be amplified or, conversely, threatened by irregular
warfare. Distilling <strong>the</strong> most relevant value variables will require an examination <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps
pr<strong>of</strong>essed values as well as those found at <strong>the</strong> grassroots level in symbols, ritual, icons, and legends.
What sorts <strong>of</strong> warfare do Marines deem honorable? Does counterinsurgency fit this bill? Are hero
stories told <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency episodes? What actions or characteristics are valued in <strong>the</strong> tale? Are
<strong>the</strong>se sufficient to inspire competency in counterinsurgency warfare, or do competing and more
privileged values come under threat should <strong>the</strong> Corps move this direction? The results <strong>of</strong> this
assessment will <strong>of</strong>fer strategists some idea <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps trajectory and <strong>of</strong> irregular practices that are
likely to find a sound fit in Devil Dog quarters.
Perceptual Lens
Every individual, every society, employs filters in order to impose meaning and to interpret events – a
perceptual lens. Beliefs (accurate or misinformed) and experiences or <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> experience, color <strong>the</strong>
way <strong>the</strong> world is viewed. As is widely understood, behavior is based on <strong>the</strong> perception <strong>of</strong> reality, not
reality itself. Perceptions <strong>of</strong> “fact,” <strong>of</strong> our own histories, <strong>of</strong> our image abroad, <strong>of</strong> what motivates o<strong>the</strong>rs,
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capabilities <strong>of</strong> our leadership and our national resources, and o<strong>the</strong>r security-related ideas, all play
a strong role in forming what each regime believes to be rational foreign policy.
Alastair lain Johnston sums it quite nicely: “Ahistorical or ‘objective’ variables such as technology,
capabilities, levels <strong>of</strong> threat, and organizational structures are all <strong>of</strong> secondary importance: it is <strong>the</strong>
interpretive lens <strong>of</strong> strategic culture that gives meaning to <strong>the</strong>se variables.” 135 The concept is important
enough to have been included in Snyder’s first explanation <strong>of</strong> strategic culture:
It is useful to look at <strong>the</strong> Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique “strategic
culture.” Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode <strong>of</strong> strategic thinking.
As a result <strong>of</strong> this socialization process, a set <strong>of</strong> general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral
patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state <strong>of</strong> semi-permanence that
places <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> “culture” ra<strong>the</strong>r than mere “policy.” Of course, attitudes may
133
Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting <strong>the</strong> "Failure" <strong>of</strong> Internationalism," International
Organization Vol. 51, No.1 (Winter 1997): 36.
134
Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2013):
unpublished manuscript: 211.
135
Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995): 1.
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changes as a result <strong>of</strong> changes in technology and <strong>the</strong> international environment.
However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>y are seen through
<strong>the</strong> perceptual lens provided by <strong>the</strong> strategic culture. 136
There are a number <strong>of</strong> ways that a perceptual lens colors thinking and influences behavior. The first is
cognitive processes:
The human mind simply cannot encompass <strong>the</strong> full complexity <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> events and
stimuli which press upon it from even its own immediate, everyday environment, much
less a radically expanded international environment. It must <strong>the</strong>refore have a means <strong>of</strong>
efficiently screening, sorting, coding, and storing sensory data ... Mindsets, <strong>the</strong>n, are ... a
means <strong>of</strong> simplifying <strong>the</strong> environment and bringing to each new experience or event a
pre-established frame <strong>of</strong> reference for understanding it. 137
Mindsets imbued with strong biases regarding what is possible in foreign policy and what <strong>the</strong>refore
ought to be achieved can <strong>of</strong>ten outlive repeated experiences which seem to falsify those notions.
Foundational mindsets about how <strong>the</strong> world works, <strong>the</strong> forces that control it, and what humans are
meant to do about it are called a “cosmology.” 138 Beatrice Heuser <strong>of</strong>fers a cosmological explanation to
<strong>the</strong> mysterious dearth <strong>of</strong> strategic writing or analysis <strong>of</strong> warfare practices during <strong>the</strong> Middle Ages
despite ample practice <strong>of</strong> warfare itself:
One – and perhaps <strong>the</strong> most conclusive – reason [for <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> writing on warfare] is that it
was widely thought that God decided <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> war, and man only had a limited ability to
influence it, mainly by following a cause that was just in <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lord, preferably
combined with an upright Iifestyle... With such an independent variable overriding all o<strong>the</strong>r
factors in war, what was <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> speculating much about <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs? 139
In o<strong>the</strong>r work Heuser captures <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> French cosmology as it pertains to <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear
acquisitions. Heuser posits that <strong>the</strong> French obtaining <strong>of</strong> nuclear capability was based on “politicophilosophical
beliefs and historical lessons” and in near utter disregard to any notions <strong>of</strong> enemy. De
Gaulle was typecast into <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> warrior-king – validated by <strong>the</strong> French perception that stability was
most readily obtained in eras <strong>of</strong> singularly wielded strong arm rule. His reign, in <strong>the</strong> French mind,
acquired a touch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> divine when it was anointed “apocalyptic force” in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a nuclear trident.
France claimed her entitled throne in <strong>the</strong> halls <strong>of</strong> Olympus when “Jupiter” – <strong>the</strong> nuclear command post
in <strong>the</strong> Elysian Palace – became operational. For France, nuclear acquisition was not about <strong>the</strong> potential
to destroy an enemy but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> fulfillment <strong>of</strong> a socio-religious cosmology which placed her in a
properly immortal role. In fact, Heuser argues, <strong>the</strong>re was strong objection in France to ever deploying a
136 Snyder, 1977: v.
137 Glen Fisher, Mindsets: The Role <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Perception in International Relations, 2nd Edition, (Yarmouth,
Maine: Intercultural Press, 1997): 22-23.
138 Roger M. Keesing and Andrew J. Stra<strong>the</strong>rn, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, 3rd Edition,
(Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers; 1998): 505
139 Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 52.
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nuclear weapon. It was not an instrument <strong>of</strong> war, but <strong>the</strong> instrument which prevents war by virtue <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> ability to wipe entire mortal societies from <strong>the</strong> planet. 140 The cosmology France espoused, its affect
on attitudes toward nuclear acquisition and a national nuclear role, stands in stark contrast to <strong>the</strong>
worldviews <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> its European neighbors (most notably Germany) and <strong>the</strong>ir consequent nuclear
paths. The meaning that cosmologies provide – explanations about how <strong>the</strong> world works and one’s
proper role in it – can have dramatic effect in “rational” security decisionmaking.
Perceptions <strong>of</strong> self add ano<strong>the</strong>r layer to perceptual lens. Given that remembered history is <strong>the</strong>
operative history, one must assess how <strong>the</strong> group in question characterizes and perceives its own
past. 141 Colin Gray notes that while “objective realities certainly matter, <strong>the</strong>re are assumed realities and
narratives that people choose to believe.” He goes fur<strong>the</strong>r,
Knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objective historical facts <strong>of</strong> a society’s past cannot yield reliable understanding
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> narrative <strong>of</strong> historical interpretation dominant in that society, but it should provide some
helpful grasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> menu <strong>of</strong> candidate evidence from which local interpreters must make <strong>the</strong>ir
selection. For example, even if a society prefers to tell itself lies about its past, none<strong>the</strong>less it
can be enlightening to appreciate just what is being denied and to speculate why. 142
When unpacking “remembered history” it may be useful to ask: Which events are highlighted? Which
omitted? What does this group’s history tell <strong>the</strong>m about “dangerous” behaviors?
Perhaps one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most fascinating studies <strong>of</strong> perceptual lens is in <strong>the</strong> area most would contest as
uncontestable: determinations <strong>of</strong> victory and defeat. Victor Hanson is nearly lyrical in his portrayal <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> bloody exactness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battlefield, “There is an inherent truth in battle. It is hard to disguise <strong>the</strong>
verdict <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battlefield, and nearly impossible to explain away <strong>the</strong> dead, or to suggest that abject
defeat is somehow victory.” 143 He is wrong.
Victory and defeat are human perceptions which may or may not coincide with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
battlefield. Societal myths, national ambitions, or historically inherited criteria may define for a military
or a society <strong>the</strong> standards <strong>of</strong> victory and what entails defeat. Two examples may serve as illustration.
The first, <strong>the</strong> Yom Kippur War, demonstrates that material outcomes – <strong>the</strong> territorial, technological and
casualty-based victories measured by outsiders – may not, in fact, be <strong>the</strong> primary determinants <strong>of</strong>
triumph in <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant contenders. The second examines <strong>the</strong> price paid by NATO analysts
for ignoring Serbian notions <strong>of</strong> victory in <strong>the</strong> 1999 bombing campaign over Kosovo.
Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney elucidate <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> polities perceiving victory in defeat
and vice versa by examining a number <strong>of</strong> case studies in which an objective observer would have come
140
Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and <strong>the</strong> FRG (London: Macmillan
Press, 1998): 75-84.
141
Glen Fisher, Mindsets: The Role <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Perception in International Relations, 2nd Edition, (Yarmouth,
Maine: Intercultural Press, 1997): 4.
142
Colin S. Gray, Perspectives in Strategy, forthcoming: 180.
143
Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and <strong>Culture</strong>: Landmark Battles in <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> Western Power (New York: Anchor
Books, 2001), 7.
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to an opposite conclusion than <strong>the</strong> adversaries did <strong>the</strong>mselves. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong> Yom Kippur War, was
a substantial military victory for Israel over Egypt and Syria by any material standard. Israel took out
Arab tanks, aircraft, and troops in nearly 5 to 1 ratios, and demonstrated that its tactical skills were far
superior to those <strong>of</strong> its adversaries. It held more territory than it had ever commanded by <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> war. Despite all <strong>of</strong> this, <strong>the</strong> war was seen in Israel as a distressing defeat, “a failure [just] short <strong>of</strong> a
catastrophe” and became <strong>the</strong> source <strong>of</strong> “enormous disillusionment” in <strong>the</strong> country. 144 The success <strong>of</strong>
Arab forces in surprising Israel’s military establishment, and achieving initial victories, was a near fatal
blow to <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s entire security apparatus. In sharp contrast, despite material
losses, Sadat was able to claim “<strong>the</strong> most glorious days in our history” for Egypt. 145 He had restored Arab
honor by achieving <strong>the</strong> impossible: a surprise attack which involved crossing <strong>the</strong> Suez Canal and
establishing a beachhead on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side, losing only 208 soldiers in <strong>the</strong> process. Egypt’s bold move
had replaced <strong>the</strong> shame <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1967 loss with a firm belief that Arab states were “capable <strong>of</strong> fighting,
capable <strong>of</strong> victory.” 146 In this case, it was not <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war that defined victory, but <strong>the</strong> beginning.
Not material consequences, but perceptions.
The 1999 bombing campaign <strong>of</strong> Serbia supplies ano<strong>the</strong>r example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> significant consequences <strong>of</strong>
national perceptions <strong>of</strong> success in battle. US military planners vastly underestimated <strong>the</strong> projected
duration and expense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1999 engagement due, in part, to an information gap concerning Serbian
myths <strong>of</strong> victory and defeat. These myths were not terribly difficult to uncover, but <strong>the</strong>y were not
analyzed systematically nor written persuasively into intelligence. The basic message <strong>of</strong> such a study
would have been this: Serbian “victory” need not be an objective material victory, it may also be
achieved by standing up to a far more powerful adversary, and losing... in style.
Historical evidence for this pattern abounds. Serbia’s national holiday is not a celebration <strong>of</strong> a past
battlefield victory, but <strong>of</strong> a glorious defeat in 1389 at <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ottoman Turks. Serbs celebrate
<strong>the</strong> valor <strong>of</strong> national hero Prince Lazar who received a heavenly visitation on <strong>the</strong> eve <strong>of</strong> battle and was
told that unless he surrendered he faced certain defeat <strong>the</strong> next day. Given <strong>the</strong> choice, Lazar declared
that it was better to die in battle than to live in shame. 147 He did precisely that, and became cemented
in Serbian legend. This tale permeates Serbian society. It is taught to youngsters in school and is
represented in homes and <strong>of</strong>fices in <strong>the</strong> renowned painting Kosovo Girl. The message <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> myth for
Serbs is that victory may be found in standing up to a hegemonic bully when <strong>the</strong> world expects you to
fold. This may go a good distance in explaining why Serbs exited <strong>the</strong>ir homes wearing targets on <strong>the</strong>ir
heads during a week <strong>of</strong> US bombing. 148
144
Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions <strong>of</strong> Victory and Defeat in International
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 176-177, 164-168.
145
Johnson and Tierney, Failing to Win, 170.
146
Johnson and Tierney, Failing to Win, 171, 193-194.
147
Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and <strong>the</strong> Destruction <strong>of</strong> Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000),
39-47.
148
Tom Walker, “Living with <strong>the</strong> bombs: Belgrades’ message to NATO: blast us if you will,” The Gazette (Montreal,
Quebec), (April 11, 1999): News, A6; David Williams, “Unbowed: Runners in Belgrade yesterday, Race jogs Serb
fervor; Marathon runners in Belgrade show <strong>the</strong>ir defiance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war…and torrential rain,” Mail on Sunday, April
18, 1999: p. 8.
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Without insight into adversary culture <strong>the</strong> threats one issues “may not even be considered threats, or ...
may be considered challenges to be confronted, thus having <strong>the</strong> exact opposite effect <strong>of</strong> that
desired.” 149 While it would be difficult to argue that <strong>the</strong> United States did not achieve <strong>the</strong> upper hand in
1999, its cultural blinders meant that victory was achieved at far higher cost than projected. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than
a war <strong>of</strong> a short few days, NATO found itself spending more weapons and treasure than it in its
organizational history over <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> seventy-eight. 150
The cosmological perceptions held by <strong>the</strong> American polity as regards what is possible and right-headed
in <strong>the</strong> foreign policy arena will have significant impact on <strong>the</strong> types <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency tasks U.S.
Marines are asked to pursue. Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ own perceptual lens is in line with general
American notions will likely determine <strong>the</strong>ir enthusiasm for and energy applied to <strong>the</strong> venture.
Perceptions about specific o<strong>the</strong>rs—specifically <strong>the</strong> capabilities and motives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indigenous
populations with whom Marines work in counterinsurgency tasks, or those indigenous insurgents whom
<strong>the</strong>y pursue, will shape <strong>the</strong> approach to <strong>the</strong>se two populations. Finally, how counterinsurgency
operations are perceived within Marine Corps’ “remembered” history, may <strong>of</strong>fer some insight into <strong>the</strong>
perceptions held by contemporary Marines today.
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs)
Researching Identity, Norms, Values and Perceptual Lens (and any o<strong>the</strong>r category <strong>of</strong> cultural features
which may arise from <strong>the</strong> data) represents <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> research effort required by <strong>the</strong> Mapping
Exercise. Those undergoing this process are encouraged to retain data, no matter how peripheral it may
seem initially, in order to allow for culture-specific (and typically <strong>of</strong>f-<strong>the</strong>-radar for an ethnocentrically
bound analyst) patterns to emerge. Repeated iterations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping process have indicated
that <strong>of</strong>ten this “peripheral” or initially “curious” material contributes in meaningful ways to analysis by
<strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mapping exercise.
Step 5 is <strong>the</strong> stage at which <strong>the</strong> enormous mass <strong>of</strong> data assembled through research in Step 4 is honed
down to manageable, and actionable form. Step 5 is, in some ways, <strong>the</strong> most painful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various
processes because it means setting aside much <strong>of</strong> interest in favor <strong>of</strong> cultural data that is relevant for
<strong>the</strong> strategy question. To aid this process, we <strong>of</strong>fer a three part litmus test that each cultural attribute
must pass in order to be included in <strong>the</strong> written product supplied to <strong>the</strong> strategist. Each cultural factor
one wishes to include must exhibit:
1. Relevance for <strong>the</strong> issue selected.
2. Robustness:
How well established?
How widely shared amongst members <strong>of</strong> this group?
149 Jeannie l. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen, "Introduction" in <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong>
Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. Jeannie L.
Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 6.
150 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. Q'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000), vii-viii.
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To what extent is opinion or behavior that is inconsistent with this aspect <strong>of</strong> identity,
norms, values, or perceptual lens rewarded or punished internally by o<strong>the</strong>r members <strong>of</strong>
this group?
3. A likelihood that this cultural factor will provoke a Response (cooperative or conflictual) when
<strong>the</strong> strategist engages this group on this issue.
Those that meet <strong>the</strong> above litmus test may be assessed as “critical cultural factors” and comprise <strong>the</strong>
body <strong>of</strong> cultural data that will be written into a final assessment. The links between <strong>the</strong>se and behavior
are not established as causal (if x is present, <strong>the</strong> agent must perform y). The aim here is to identify
probabilities and to do so through a well-defended “practical inference:” an attempt to unearth <strong>the</strong>
intentions behind examined actions, explain why <strong>the</strong> agent performed it, and illuminate “at least part <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action.” 151 Chapters 6 and 7 provide this process by tracking <strong>the</strong> mutual impact <strong>of</strong>
Marine Corps culture and counterinsurgency operations on one ano<strong>the</strong>r across <strong>the</strong> historic episodes
identified.
Step 6: Map CCFs Across Cultural Influences
Once a body <strong>of</strong> critical cultural factors is isolated, it is useful to identify from which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various
cultural influences identified in Step 3 <strong>the</strong>se stem. Is this cultural factor a trait that is shared across a
nation, an ethnic group, or a generation? Or is it bound within <strong>the</strong> particular ethos <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> organization
under study? The supposition here is that <strong>the</strong> more cohesive <strong>the</strong> organizational culture <strong>the</strong> more likely
<strong>the</strong> CCFs will stem from <strong>the</strong> internal culture purposefully cultivated by that organization. Organizations
which have recently experienced demographic surges, reorganization or restructuring, or a pr<strong>of</strong>ound
external shock may be subject to a wider variety <strong>of</strong> cultural influences on behavior.
This portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exercise allows <strong>the</strong> strategist to assess which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> behaviors deemed
“advantageous” to <strong>the</strong> security policy in question stem from peculiarities within <strong>the</strong> service organization
itself, and which are simply products <strong>of</strong> being reared within a particular nation, ethnic group, region, or
o<strong>the</strong>r cultural setting. If <strong>the</strong> advantageous cultural traits are absent from organizational culture proper
but do not run counter to it and can be emphasized during training in ways genuinely internalized by
new recruits (<strong>the</strong> principal purpose <strong>of</strong> boot camp), <strong>the</strong>n an organizational gap has been filled. When
short term training is unlikely to prove sufficient in instilling <strong>the</strong> desired traits (perhaps <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong>
product <strong>of</strong> a deep seated worldview or value set particular to a socio-economic class or region <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
country) <strong>the</strong>n strategists will have to become far more serious about screening applicants for key
counterinsurgency positions. 152
151 Moon, “The Logic <strong>of</strong> Political Inquiry: A Syn<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> Opposed Perspectives,” 166.
152 Mark Moyar dedicates an entire book to this topic as concerns competent counterinsurgency leadership at
company and squad levels: Mark Moyar, A Question <strong>of</strong> Command: Counterinsurgency from <strong>the</strong> Civil War to Iraq,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
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The Cultural Mapping method also holds promise for improving efforts toward jointness. When <strong>the</strong>
exercise is repeated across services Step 6 supplies to <strong>the</strong> strategist a keen sense <strong>of</strong> where cultural
overlap may occur--within which contexts <strong>the</strong> services are likely to cooperate quite nicely and in which
contexts <strong>the</strong>ir distinctive service cultures will cause rifts. Applied to combined contexts – with allies and
regional partners, <strong>the</strong> same utility applies.
Step 7: Assess Results
Researchers must bear in mind <strong>the</strong> uncomfortable fact that any “cultural analysis is intrinsically
incomplete.” 153 The “soundness” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> insights derived from this method is assessed by <strong>the</strong>ir ability to
be fur<strong>the</strong>r validated ra<strong>the</strong>r than undermined by <strong>the</strong> continued consumption <strong>of</strong> data. 154 In <strong>the</strong> real world
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategist <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>of</strong>ten a sharper test: direct application to <strong>the</strong> field. The cultural inferences
generated will be put into operational play and will prove insightful or fall flat (assessed in Chapter 8).
One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> beauties <strong>of</strong> creating forecasting mechanisms for <strong>the</strong> policy sphere is that one typically does
not need to wait <strong>the</strong> length <strong>of</strong> a career to see if <strong>the</strong> method on <strong>of</strong>fer is valid and useful. The “pro<strong>of</strong>,” so
to speak, is typically measured in ra<strong>the</strong>r immediate time frames.
Upon this premise, <strong>the</strong> following chapters attempt to <strong>of</strong>fer some measure <strong>of</strong> utility to <strong>the</strong> strategist on
one targeted front: what cultural analysis has to tell us about <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ relationship with
counterinsurgency and likely practice in <strong>the</strong> future. Having selected <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> concern:
counterinsurgency, and <strong>the</strong> actor designated for targeted focus: <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, we
turn to Step 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping Exercise: Assembling <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> cultural influences likely at
work on members <strong>of</strong> this group with respect to this issue. Two overarching cultures will be examined in
<strong>the</strong> next chapter: American pubic culture and American military culture. Three o<strong>the</strong>rs are provided in
Appendix A by way <strong>of</strong> updated survey <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major U.S. sister services: Army, Navy, and Air
Force.
153 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s, (New York: Basic Books, 1973): 29.
154 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery <strong>of</strong> Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research,
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967).
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CHAPTER 3
AMERICAN PUBLIC AND MILITARY CULTURE
Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences
Before one can properly assess <strong>the</strong> cultural distinctions <strong>of</strong> any particular actor set, it is incumbent to
assess <strong>the</strong> context in which <strong>the</strong>y reside. Those cultural influences from which members derive identity,
norms, values, and perceptual lens are very likely shared in some form across actor sets within <strong>the</strong>
region or pr<strong>of</strong>essional discipline. Those cultural traits which are not shared, but are largely unique to
<strong>the</strong> actor in question, are posed in starker relief when seen against <strong>the</strong> cultural backdrop common to
peers. This chapter will amass and examine a range <strong>of</strong> cultural influences at <strong>the</strong> national and American
military level likely at play on members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps. Appendix A provides <strong>the</strong>
same for each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ sister services in order to highlight communion and contrast with Marine
cultural predilections. These two efforts are provided in <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> illuminating <strong>the</strong> process required in
Step 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Topography methodology. Much excellent work has been done within <strong>the</strong>se
fields: American culture, American military culture, and <strong>the</strong> cultural orientations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy, and
Air Force. The purpose <strong>of</strong> this chapter and <strong>the</strong> attendant appendix is to assess this extant research data
within <strong>the</strong> framework suggested within <strong>the</strong> Cultural Topography methodology and, in doing so, to
provide <strong>the</strong> necessary analytical backdrop for <strong>the</strong> primary research findings on Marine Corps culture
which will follow.
Each Marine recruit has been molded by national, regional, ethnic, religious, and various organizational
cultures before crossing <strong>the</strong> threshold at Quantico and carry many <strong>of</strong> those norms and values with <strong>the</strong>m
throughout <strong>the</strong>ir military careers. Commenting on our small war subject matter in particular, Sam
Sarkesian makes what is perhaps an obvious, but none<strong>the</strong>less critical point: counterinsurgency strategy
is constrained by American public norms. This is not only an unconscious, natural process, it is also an
overt expectation. “[T]he American people expect <strong>the</strong>ir military men to behave in general accord with
<strong>the</strong> norms <strong>of</strong> society. Thus, society’s values must be reflected in military pr<strong>of</strong>essional ethics and
behavior, even on <strong>the</strong> battlefield.” Sarkesian is careful to point out that this general rule may be bent
upon occasion – sometimes for expediency and sometimes because, where counterinsurgencies are
concerned, “<strong>the</strong> conflict touches such a small segment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American people,” that <strong>the</strong>y simply fail to
notice. 155
It must be noted that despite <strong>the</strong> heavy cultural interconnectedness between a nation and <strong>the</strong> military
that serves it, <strong>the</strong> military sees as part <strong>of</strong> its purpose as <strong>the</strong> crafting <strong>of</strong> new men and new women – an
honorable warrior breed more fit to engage <strong>the</strong> business <strong>of</strong> warfighting than <strong>the</strong>ir civilian counterparts.
This process, by design, includes a breaking down <strong>of</strong> former civilian identities and habits and a
transformative rebuilding <strong>of</strong> a capable military class in its place. The Marine Corps prides itself on a
transformation more complete than that <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services. The result may be a distinctive
155 Sam C. Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for <strong>the</strong> Future,
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984): 9-10.
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subculture that runs counter to some aspects <strong>of</strong> national culture, even <strong>the</strong> strategic culture preferred by
<strong>the</strong> public as a whole. 156
Which “level” <strong>of</strong> culture—national, general military, or specific service culture—is most influential in
inspiring particular aspects <strong>of</strong> Marine behavior during counterinsurgency operations may become
apparent as <strong>the</strong> particulars <strong>of</strong> each counterinsurgency operation are unear<strong>the</strong>d. In order to recognize
<strong>the</strong> cultural influence or “level” from which <strong>the</strong>se behaviors are likely drawn, <strong>the</strong> researcher must
become somewhat acquainted with <strong>the</strong> inputs each level provides. This is <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> Step 3:
immersing oneself in <strong>the</strong> diverse sources <strong>of</strong> cultural influence at play on <strong>the</strong> actor selected in Step 2: <strong>the</strong>
United States Marine Corps. An exhaustive compilation <strong>of</strong> external cultural influences would require far
more pages than this <strong>the</strong>sis can provide. A reasonable honing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se includes examination <strong>of</strong> three
key levels: American national culture, American military culture at large, and <strong>the</strong> distinctive cultures <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Marine’s sister services: <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy, and Air Force. 157 This chapter will examine <strong>the</strong> first two.
American National <strong>Culture</strong>
The U.S. military is its own cultural incubator, individual services even more so, but its occupants are
drawn from an already heavily encultured national population, one reared in a democratic setting which
prizes individual worth, justice, and fair play, 158 and celebrates <strong>the</strong> American exceptionalism captured
within <strong>the</strong> American dream -- individualism, equal opportunity, and <strong>the</strong> right to pursue happiness. 159
These fairly laudable American traits come packaged with o<strong>the</strong>rs; some that have potential to serve well
in strategic encounters and o<strong>the</strong>rs not.
Despite a pr<strong>of</strong>oundly martial past, Americans continue to perceive war <strong>of</strong> any type as extraordinary. 160
If troops are “sent across an ocean [its American] society expects it to do something important…[War]
has to be completed as rapidly as possible, so that a condition <strong>of</strong> peace and normalcy can be
restored.” 161 This tendency gives some credence to Oliver Lee’s claim that <strong>the</strong> United States is
156
Oliver M. Lee, “The Geopolitics <strong>of</strong> American’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27 Issue 3, 2008:
273-278.
157
In Appendix A.
158
Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars, 14-15.
159
Hellmut Lotz, “Myth and NAFTA: The Use <strong>of</strong> Core Values in U.S. Politics,” in Valerie Hudson ed., <strong>Culture</strong> and
Foreign Policy, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997): 81.
160
Thomas G. Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” in Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner
and Jeffrey A. Larsen eds. <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into
Comparative National Security Policymaking, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 71; Phillip S. Meilinger,
“American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46, 3 rd Quarter 2007: 81; Williamson Murray,
“An Anglo-American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>?,” prepared for The ACT/ODU Jamestown Symposium, Democracies in
Partnership: 400 Years <strong>of</strong> Transatlantic Engagement (Norfolk VA: HQ, Allied Command Transformation, 2008):
157.
161
Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Can <strong>the</strong> American Way <strong>of</strong> War Adapt?,” <strong>Strategic</strong>
Studies Institute monograph, March 2006: 41, available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=650.
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essentially isolationist. 162 He posits that her forays abroad have been <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a subculture <strong>of</strong> elite
interventionists successfully rallying <strong>the</strong> American public around international crises which <strong>the</strong> elite have
ei<strong>the</strong>r “provoked or misrepresented.” 163 Nudging Americans out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir isolationist tendencies seems to
require a play to moral superiority. 164 Americans cannot conscience engaging war-level force for
practical causes only. 165 The moral overlay is typically defining in terms <strong>of</strong> a crusade <strong>of</strong> good against
evil, 166 rendering, in Huntington’s words, <strong>the</strong> ideologically liberal American an “extremist on <strong>the</strong> subject
<strong>of</strong> war: he ei<strong>the</strong>r embraces war wholeheartedly or rejects it completely.” 167 In ano<strong>the</strong>r version <strong>of</strong>
extremes Kincade characterizes American foreign policy as a dichotomy <strong>of</strong> ignoring and <strong>the</strong>n reacting
strongly to foreign challenges. 168
The American perspective on lives lost in battle follows suit and is a more complicated question than its
typical treatment would suggest. Certainly <strong>the</strong>re is an expectation amongst Americans today that <strong>the</strong>
sophistication <strong>of</strong> technology available will diminish casualty rates in any war. The United States, after
all, has “a long tradition <strong>of</strong> fighting wars with machinery ra<strong>the</strong>r than blood.” 169 It is important to point
out, however, that this expectation extends beyond casualty rates for Americans proper. Americans
expect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves (and o<strong>the</strong>rs) low casualty rates <strong>of</strong> non-combatant on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side as well. 170
That said, <strong>the</strong> general topic <strong>of</strong> casualty aversion is easily exaggerated. Jeffrey Record <strong>of</strong>fers a more
accurate accounting when he qualifies that “Americans are averse to risking American lives when vital
national interests are not at stake.” 171 Thomas Mahnken agrees and adds fur<strong>the</strong>r that military
leadership and civilian decisionmakers are <strong>of</strong>ten more casualty adverse than <strong>the</strong> American public. 172
Current attitudes, 173 admittedly far more sensitive to casualties than those <strong>of</strong> 1945, may be less
reflective <strong>of</strong> casualty aversion in absolute terms and more reflective <strong>of</strong> an aversion to spilling blood and
162
USAF Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger agrees that isolationism has been America’s historic tendency but argues that
this “paradigm has been irrevocably shattered—<strong>the</strong> days <strong>of</strong> U.S. isolationism are gone.” Meilinger, “American
Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” 84.
163
Lee, “The Geopolitics <strong>of</strong> American’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 267.
164
For a discussion on <strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American moral superiority complex see Lee, “The Geopolitics <strong>of</strong> American’s
<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 276.
165
Murray, “An Anglo-American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>?,” 152.
166
Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 71; and Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution <strong>of</strong> Strategy:
Thinking War from Antiquity to <strong>the</strong> Present, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 456-7
167
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and <strong>the</strong> State, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press <strong>of</strong> Harvard University Press,
1957): 151.
168 William Kincade, “American National Style and <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in Carl G. Jacobsen ed., <strong>Strategic</strong> Power
USA/USSR, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 11.
169 Phillip S. Meilinger, Book Review, “The Icarus Syndrome: The Role <strong>of</strong> Air Power Theory in <strong>the</strong> Evolution and
Fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Air Force,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 22, Issue 1, (Fall 1995): 142.
170 Meilinger, “American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” 80, 83.
171 Jeffrey Record, “The American War <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” prepared for
<strong>the</strong> CATO Institute, September 1, 2006, Policy Analysis No. 577: 1. Accessed on November 23, 2001 at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640.
172 Mahnken claims, rightly, that military leadership and civilian decisionmakers are more casualty adverse than <strong>the</strong>
American public. Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 75.
173 For an excellent assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> casualty aversion attitudes in <strong>the</strong> American public over <strong>the</strong> last
five decades see John A. Gentry, “Norms as Weapons <strong>of</strong> War,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 11-
30, March 2010.
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treasure for small, complex wars <strong>of</strong> uncertain purpose. When engaged in an existential conflict which
requires a nation at war ra<strong>the</strong>r than a distantly deployed pr<strong>of</strong>essional military at war, one might see a
far different approach to casualty rates from <strong>the</strong> American public.
Jeffrey Record argues that <strong>the</strong>re are two key weaknesses in American culture where waging successful
counterinsurgency is concerned. The first is “<strong>the</strong> American tendency to separate war and politics 174 —to
view military victory as an end in itself, ignoring war’s function as an instrument <strong>of</strong> policy.” The second
is a flat out aversion to counterinsurgency. 175 Aversion to counterinsurgency 176 has historically led to
denial. The event <strong>of</strong> Vietnam, for instance, was perceived as an aberration, and like o<strong>the</strong>r
counterrevolutionary conflicts “outside <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> American political-military policy.” 177
Unfortunately for both civilians and soldiers, Americans cannot avoid <strong>the</strong> counterinsurgency
condundrum by
simply refusing to believe that <strong>the</strong>y will again send soldiers into obscure corners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world to
fight for limited political objectives against a hostile non-European power. If <strong>the</strong>y are sincere in
this disbelief, <strong>the</strong>y must accept <strong>the</strong> consequences for American foreign policy…The choice, <strong>the</strong>n,
is between being ready to fight well when it is necessary to fight and fighting badly. 178
A number <strong>of</strong> factors may explain Americans adversion to, and, at least initial incompetence within
counterinsurgency settings. One which nearly insures costly and repeated mistakes, is “a cultivated
ignorance <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r nations,” 179 combined with a debilitating ahistoricism. 180 Edward C. Stewart and
174
This <strong>the</strong>me is also developed by Robert M. Cassidy who contrasts <strong>the</strong> civil-military disconnect in <strong>the</strong> American
armed forces with <strong>the</strong> integrated civil-military approach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> British, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss: British and
American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After <strong>the</strong> Cold War, (Westport, Conneticut: Praeger, 2004).
175
Jeffrey Record, “The American War <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” prepared for
<strong>the</strong> CATO Institute, September 1, 2006, Policy Analysis No. 577: 3. Accessed on November 23, 2001 at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640.
176
In fairness to those uniformed adherents to <strong>the</strong> counterinsurgency-aversion school, James Warren points out
that many are aware <strong>of</strong> U.S. counterinsurgency successes, yet “exhibit an enduring skepticism about recent
American decision-makers’ ability to discern where, when and how to use military force effectively. Deeply
worried about ‘mission creep’ and <strong>the</strong> pursuit <strong>of</strong> l<strong>of</strong>ty generalities such as ‘<strong>the</strong> expansion <strong>of</strong> democracy and
freedom’ in places with long histories <strong>of</strong> intractable ethnic and religious conflict, <strong>the</strong>y recoil from <strong>the</strong> deployment
<strong>of</strong> ground forces far more than <strong>the</strong>y do <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> air or sea-launched cruise missiles.” History has given <strong>the</strong>m
good reason to believe that many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir political masters will lack an informed foundation on <strong>the</strong> risks, possible
humiliation, and o<strong>the</strong>r large scale costs <strong>of</strong> small war intervention. James Warren, “Small Wars and Military
<strong>Culture</strong>,” <strong>Culture</strong> and Society, Sept/Oct 1999, Vol. 36, Issue 6: 59.
177
Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars, 4.
178
Eliot Cohen, “Constraints on America’s Conduct <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Autumn
1984): 181.
179
William Kincade, “American National Style and <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in Carl G. Jacobsen ed., <strong>Strategic</strong> Power
USA/USSR, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 13; Edward C. Stewart and Milton Bennett, American Cultural
Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, Revised Edition, (Boston: Intercultural Press, 1991): 11.
180
Murray, “An Anglo-American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>?,” 157. Interestingly, Murray beats <strong>the</strong> British about <strong>the</strong> ears for
<strong>the</strong> same anti-historic failings. In ano<strong>the</strong>r work he claims that this trait is nearly universal: “[T]here are few military
organizations that possess a culture that encourages <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> even <strong>the</strong> recent past with any thoroughness.”
Williamson Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” in John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman eds., America <strong>the</strong>
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Milton J. Bennett, authors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seminal classic American Cultural Patterns point out that Americans
know little <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r lands, tending toward biases in favor <strong>of</strong> mutual similarity and gross
oversimplifications. 181 The result is an ethnocentric tendency toward viewing o<strong>the</strong>rs as
“underdeveloped Americans” 182 and remaining ra<strong>the</strong>r oblivious to local variation in beliefs and practices.
Samuel Huntington argued in 1957 that American indifference to international affairs was a natural
repercussion <strong>of</strong> American style liberalism which had deeply and homogenously rooted itself in <strong>the</strong>
American nation. Liberalism, American style, had not cultivated any coherent philosophy as regards
foreign affairs, leaving Americans only domestic solutions for international problems. 183 Oliver Lee
argues that this trend has continued, undiminished, in <strong>the</strong> decades since Huntington wrote. American
insularity is a repercussion <strong>of</strong> an “extraordinary degree <strong>of</strong> individualism” in American culture which
compels <strong>the</strong> American people to focus “<strong>the</strong>ir concerns and energies upon advancing <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
individual and his or her family and perhaps <strong>the</strong>ir local community, and to some extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
nationwide community, but [demonstrate] little interest in or concern about <strong>the</strong> wide world
beyond…” 184 This knowledge gap about <strong>the</strong> outside world, however, does not inhibit Americans from
possessing strong opinions about it. 185 Unsurprisingly, this <strong>of</strong>ten leads to <strong>of</strong>fensive behavior, born more
<strong>of</strong> ignorance than malice. 186
American leadership is not held to a different standard. Civilian policymakers and elected <strong>of</strong>ficials are
rarely punished for manifesting a limited sense <strong>of</strong> history or analytic capability. 187 Premium is placed on
experience based 188 common sense 189 and forward looking ambition. Revered American icon Henry
Ford is reported to have said, “History is more or less bunk. It's tradition. We don't want tradition. We
want to live in <strong>the</strong> present and <strong>the</strong> only history that is worth a tinker's dam is <strong>the</strong> history we made
today.” 190 This dismissive ahistoricism permeates <strong>the</strong> American general public and <strong>the</strong> institutions
which serve it. Historical disregard includes not only <strong>the</strong> past lived within o<strong>the</strong>r lands, but also
America’s own:
The deep lack <strong>of</strong> interest in <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> American foreign policy is not confined to high
<strong>of</strong>ficials. The overwhelming majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir talented and hardworking colleagues in think
Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002):
140.
181
Edward C. Stewart and Milton J. Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Boston,
London: Intercultural Press, 1991): 11
182
Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language, (New York: Premier Books: 1959, 1963) : 9.
183
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and <strong>the</strong> State, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press <strong>of</strong> Harvard University Press,
1957): 149.
184 Lee, “The Geopolitics <strong>of</strong> American’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 276.
185
Lotz, “Myth and NAFTA,” 84.
186
Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language, (New York: Premier Books: 1959, 1963) : 9.
187
Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars, xii.
188
Edward C. Stewart and Milton J. Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Boston,
London: Intercultural Press, 1991): 158.
189 Lotz, “Myth and NAFTA,” 80.
190 Henry Ford interview in <strong>the</strong> Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1916. The Quotations Page, accessed 17 May 2012 at
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/24950.html
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tanks, universities, <strong>the</strong> national media, and government departments that are concerned with
developing, carrying out, reporting, and reflecting on <strong>the</strong> foreign policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States do
not know very much about <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> American foreign policy before World War II, do not
particularly want to learn more than <strong>the</strong>y already know, and cannot think what practical
purpose a deeper knowledge <strong>of</strong> American foreign policy history might serve. 191
A number <strong>of</strong> explanations exist as to why <strong>the</strong> U.S., despite its global power status and consistent reach
into o<strong>the</strong>r lands, maintains an acultural and ahistoric predisposition. In part it may be <strong>the</strong> newness <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> nation itself which has inspired a valuing <strong>of</strong> novelty over tradition 192 and “progress” over history.
Visitors to <strong>the</strong> U.S. are <strong>of</strong>ten presented with “change” in local environments as markers <strong>of</strong> positive
progress. 193 This supports <strong>the</strong> American view <strong>of</strong> humans as problem solvers—agents <strong>of</strong> change—
preferably planning toward <strong>the</strong> “foreseeable future.” 194 The future is foreseeable because as linear
thinkers dedicated to causal chains, Americans tend to see <strong>the</strong> world as a set <strong>of</strong> isolated, solvable
problems ra<strong>the</strong>r than a complex web <strong>of</strong> historic relationships:
The concept <strong>of</strong> a simple cause connected with effect in a lineal chain encourages an action
orientation and streng<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>the</strong> expectation <strong>of</strong> being able to control <strong>the</strong> world. In contrast, if
events are understood to be determined by multiple causes and contingencies, as in <strong>the</strong> Chinese
conception, <strong>the</strong> planning <strong>of</strong> actions and controlling <strong>of</strong> events are beyond human capabilities. 195
This problem solving approach, combined with a heavy emphasis on efficiency, 196 means that
Americans are repelled by time consuming or socio-historically complex diagnoses <strong>of</strong> problem sets and
may be more likely than o<strong>the</strong>rs to fall prey to single solution concepts. 197 Americans possess a near
obsessive regard for deadlines as a means for increasing efficiency and accelerating progress, 198 and
expect <strong>the</strong> same veneration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir arbitrary temporal constructions from o<strong>the</strong>rs. While likely a boon
on <strong>the</strong> production line, <strong>the</strong> American captivation with controllable, efficient, streamlined solutions
191 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed <strong>the</strong> World, (New York:
The Century Foundation, 2001): 7
192 Lotz, “Myth and NAFTA,” 79.
193 Edward C. Stewart and Milton J. Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Boston,
London: Intercultural Press, 1991): 142-43.
194 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 36. On Americans as problem solvers see also William
Kincade, “American National Style and <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in Carl G. Jacobsen ed., <strong>Strategic</strong> Power USA/USSR, (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 12-13.
195 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 69.
196 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 30-31.
197 For examples <strong>of</strong> this within <strong>the</strong> U.S. defense community see Colin S. Gray, “Out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Wilderness: Prime Time
for <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen eds. <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and
Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 224.
198 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 74.
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produces an impatient public who demands “quick, conclusive results” in warfare 199 --<strong>the</strong> precise
opposite <strong>of</strong> typical fare in counterinsurgency.
Some years ago a Russian student in one <strong>of</strong> my university classrooms stood to give a comparison
presentation on Russian and American culture. She started by saying “Americans are not human
beings…” This captured immediate attention. “Americans,” she went on, “are human do-ings. They
don’t know how to be.” Stewart and Bennett agree. Americans are incessantly on <strong>the</strong> move; “[D]oing is
<strong>the</strong> dominant form <strong>of</strong> activity for Americans.” This American “bias for action,” to borrow Marine
parlance, means trial and error is acceptable as a learning method, 200 overreaction is more easily
forgiven than inaction, and heroes are likely to be action oriented. Patience, restraint, and caution in
<strong>the</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> kinetic effects do not come naturally to Americans.
Not only is deliberate action <strong>the</strong> preferred state <strong>of</strong> activity, it is also <strong>the</strong> basis for identity. For Americans
“one is what one does.” 201 This is manifest in <strong>the</strong> American salutation. After a brief introduction <strong>of</strong>
names an American will typically size up her new companion by asking, “So what do you do?” Because
status is dispensed in American society on an individual basis, and according to an achievement
measuring stick, Americans are prone make mistakes abroad when <strong>the</strong>ir achievement orientation
underrates <strong>the</strong> influence <strong>of</strong> non-productive individuals who wield significant influence in ascriptive,
relationship-based societies.
The American penchant to do is harnessed to a nearly unsinkable optimism that it can be done. “[I]t is
quintessentially American to be optimistic and to believe that all problems can be solved, if not today,
<strong>the</strong>n tomorrow, and most probably by technology.” 202 America’s optimism informs its expectations
about economy, politics, and foreign relations. Expectations for success permeate U.S. national security
documents. 203 “Holding to an optimistic public culture characterized by <strong>the</strong> belief that problems can
always be solved, <strong>the</strong> American way in war is not easily discouraged or deflected once it is exercised
with serious intent to succeed,” fur<strong>the</strong>r, “The problem-solving faith, <strong>the</strong> penchant for <strong>the</strong> engineering
fix, has <strong>the</strong> inevitable consequence <strong>of</strong> leading U.S. policy, including its use <strong>of</strong> armed force, to attempt
<strong>the</strong> impossible.” 204 Failure is explained by insufficiencies in resources or human will, not as a result <strong>of</strong>
attempting <strong>the</strong> impossible:
Through effort one will achieve one’s ambitions. No goal is too remote, no obstacle too difficult
for <strong>the</strong> individual who has <strong>the</strong> determination to expend <strong>the</strong> effort. Hard work is rewarded by
success. The converse also holds--failure means <strong>the</strong> individual did not try hard enough, is lazy,
or is worthless. These harsh evaluations may be moderated by assumptions <strong>of</strong> bad luck.
199 Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 44.
200 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 69, 155.
201 Italics added. Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 76.
202 Colin S. Gray, “British and American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s,” Paper prepared for <strong>the</strong> Jamestown Symposium:
Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years <strong>of</strong> Transatlantic Engagement, 18-19 April 2007: 45.
203 Major Russell A. Moore, USMC, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>—How it Affects <strong>Strategic</strong> ‘Outputs’,” Marine Corps College,
Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1998.
204 Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 33.
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Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>y remain vital American values and shed light on <strong>the</strong> frustrations <strong>of</strong> Americans
abroad who try to initiate action and attain goals with people who are oriented to <strong>the</strong> past or
present. 205
Stubborn optimism may go some distance in explaining <strong>the</strong> scope and measure <strong>of</strong> America’s state
building efforts abroad. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than owning up to a clear eyed recognition that its policies are an
attempt to change cultural patterns at a fundamental level, Americans euphemize <strong>the</strong>ir efforts through
verbiage like “progress,” “democratization,” and “westernization” and tend to believe sincerely that
education and training combined with sufficient resources will produce desired, and lasting, changes.
Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett provides an accounting as a senior observer in <strong>the</strong> Oval Office:
As I witnessed <strong>the</strong>se decisionmakers in action…I came to conclude that <strong>the</strong> “inertia <strong>of</strong> culture”
was <strong>of</strong>ten underrated in <strong>the</strong>ir assessments <strong>of</strong> opportunities and obstacles… I also came to
conclude…that America’s cultural view features <strong>the</strong> notion that Americans can achieve anything,
anywhere—including going to <strong>the</strong> moon—if <strong>the</strong>y just invest enough resources.
This notion is understandable but perhaps hazardous. America’s remarkable history <strong>of</strong>
achievement includes being <strong>the</strong> first nation actually to go to <strong>the</strong> moon, but <strong>the</strong> we-can-doanything
part <strong>of</strong> American self-identity also leads some to argue still that US failures in Vietnam
were not <strong>the</strong> consequence <strong>of</strong> a poorly managed investment; <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>the</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong>
investing too little. How many resources and over what period would have been sufficient to
strike “success”—particularly if success would have required changes in Vietnam at <strong>the</strong> cultural
level? I have rarely seen American policymakers ask “Will our desired foreign policy outcome
require change over <strong>the</strong>re at <strong>the</strong> cultural level? Over what period and with what resources is
such cultural change achievable?” 206
Thomas Mahnken claims a heritage for America’s ambitious nation building missions. “The impulse to
transform <strong>the</strong> international system in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> liberal democratic ideals forms a strand that runs
throughout American history.” 207 Colin Gray agrees. Even in wartime America “is not content, indeed
culturally it cannot be content, simply to discipline wrongdoers. Instead, <strong>the</strong> United States must seek to
remake in some variant <strong>of</strong> its own image those parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world where its soldiers’ boots crush <strong>the</strong>
dust.” 208 This <strong>of</strong>ten results in a tension between irrepressible messianic urges and unrealistic impatience
205 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 75.
206 Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett, introductory note in Jeannie L. Johnson and Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett, “Cultural Topography: A
New Research Tool for Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 55 No 2, June 2011, Center for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong>
Intelligence.
207 Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 71. Phillip Meilinger notes this trend as it applies to
Mexico in 1847, Cuba and <strong>the</strong> Philippines in 1898, Europe in 1918, Germany and Japan after WWII, as well as
Korean, Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan. Meilinger, “American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” 81. Theo Farrell
takes <strong>the</strong> supposition <strong>of</strong> democratizing as a general U.S. foreign policy trend to task in his review article “America’s
Misguided Mission,” International Affairs, 76, 3 (2000).
208 Colin S. Gray, “British and American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s,” Paper prepared for <strong>the</strong> Jamestown Symposium:
Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years <strong>of</strong> Transatlantic Engagement, 18-19 April 2007: 41.
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with <strong>the</strong> task and resource set it might comprise. “Despite <strong>the</strong> unique social, economic and political
context <strong>of</strong> each U.S. nation-building exercise, certain types <strong>of</strong> challenges that American policy makers
face are almost universally encountered. Domestic political opposition will almost always seek to
constrain troop levels, hasten <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> occupation, and limit appropriations <strong>of</strong> development
assistance to target countries.” 209
The withdrawal process is <strong>of</strong>ten accelerated if Americans perceive that <strong>the</strong> indigenous population that
<strong>the</strong>y are “helping” does not like <strong>the</strong>m. The pronounced American desire to be liked means that
Americans have a hard time implementing policies that have an unpopular phase. Americans tend to
believe that common people around <strong>the</strong> world are naturally disposed to like <strong>the</strong>m, and become
disillusioned when <strong>the</strong>y perceive <strong>the</strong>y are “not wanted,” or deeply resentful if <strong>the</strong> “beneficiary”
population seems ungrateful. 210
The analysis <strong>of</strong> American culture thus far may pose a striking resemblance to what one might assume <strong>of</strong>
U.S. military culture as well. For all <strong>the</strong> similarities that may be drawn between American culture
generally and <strong>the</strong> manifestations <strong>of</strong> it found in <strong>the</strong> armed services, a British military observer made, at
least for this American, a surprising claim about <strong>the</strong> gulf between American public and military culture.
In speaking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army he says:
The U.S. Army’s habits and customs, whilst in some respects very obviously products <strong>of</strong>
American society, are also strikingly distinct, much more so than most militaries, to <strong>the</strong> extent
that some individuals almost seem like military caricatures, so great is <strong>the</strong>ir intent on banishing
all traces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civilian within. U.S. Army soldiers are not citizen soldiers: <strong>the</strong>y are
unquestionably American in origin, but equally unquestionably divorced from <strong>the</strong>ir roots. 211
Eliot Cohen points out that one aspect <strong>of</strong> American society its military members must reject is its
overarching aversion to limited war. Cohen insists that, in order to succeed, <strong>the</strong> military must reconcile
its craving for popular support as “at once understandable and unacceptable for a country that must
fight small wars.” 212 It may be <strong>the</strong> case, however, that in embracing limited war <strong>the</strong> military would not
be rejecting American public culture only, it would be rejecting <strong>the</strong> core preferences <strong>of</strong> its own culture
as well. American “roots” may not be so rooted out after all.
209 Minxin Pei, Samia Amin, and Seth Garz, “Building Nations: The American Experience,” in Francis Fukuyama ed.,
Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006): 68. See
also Lee, “The Geopolitics <strong>of</strong> American’s <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” 280.
210 Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 108.
211 Brigadier Nigel R.F. Alywin-Foster, British Army, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,”
Military Review, November-December 2005: 35. Thomas Ricks notes <strong>the</strong> same disdain for, and attempts at
complete divorcement from civilian culture in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps: Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York,
NY: Scribner, 2007). An energetic defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> culture gap between U.S. military and civilian society is provided
by John Hillen, “Must U.S. Military <strong>Culture</strong> Reform?,” Orbis, Winter 1999, Vol. 43, Issue 1.
212 Eliot Cohen, “Constraints on America’s Conduct <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Autumn
1984): 168.
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U.S. Military <strong>Culture</strong>
Robert Cassidy’s definition <strong>of</strong> military culture is a worthy place to start a discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> topic:
[M]ilitary strategic culture is a set <strong>of</strong> beliefs, attitudes and values within <strong>the</strong> military
establishment that shape collective (shared) preferences <strong>of</strong> how and when military means
should be used to accomplish strategic aims. It is derived or developed as a result <strong>of</strong> historical
experience, geography, and political culture.” 213
Although an intuitive claim, historical experience appears to be far from determinative in shaping
aptitude and preferences in military culture. The U.S. has a long record <strong>of</strong> experience in
counterinsurgency and chooses to ignore most <strong>of</strong> it in favor <strong>of</strong> its infrequent, but highly popular past
engagements in conventional conflicts. Andrew Johnston asks some provocative questions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
American military culture literature: “[T]o focus on <strong>the</strong> American experience <strong>of</strong> total war as culturally
formative does not suggest why that experience was determining, while <strong>the</strong> equally long American
tradition <strong>of</strong> limited interventions was not. Why does <strong>the</strong> American military learn certain lessons from
history but not o<strong>the</strong>rs? More disturbing, how does <strong>the</strong> relentless retelling <strong>of</strong> this cultural narrative
about American use <strong>of</strong> force construct our identity and limit our options?” 214
In answering Johnston’s question it may be tempting to assert that it is victorious wars which settle
firmly into military psyche and are stitched toge<strong>the</strong>r form <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> preferred memory. William
Kincade argues as much in his chapter on American national style and strategic culture. Core to his
claim is <strong>the</strong> assumption that “[c]ultures tend to be formed by <strong>the</strong> images <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir triumphs and
successes more than by <strong>the</strong>ir failures or departures from national ideals.” 215 This intuitively plausible
assertion may have some merit but cannot bear <strong>the</strong> full weight <strong>of</strong> explanation where selective memory
is concerned. The American Army’s historic experience is instructive. As Robert Cassidy notes, despite
its admirable victory in <strong>the</strong> Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902), <strong>the</strong> Army “virtually erased” this
experience from its institutional memory and was bereft its lessons learned in <strong>the</strong> run up to <strong>the</strong> Vietnam
War. 216
More likely institutional selective memory is driven by an identity mechanism which fixates on those
conflicts which edify a preferred identity; whe<strong>the</strong>r this identity is a good fit with one’s threat
environment or not. “Because mission identity is an important part <strong>of</strong> a military’s self-concept, military
organizations will seek to promote core missions and to defeat any challenges to core-mission functions.
Even if o<strong>the</strong>r missions are assigned, if <strong>the</strong> organization perceives <strong>the</strong>m as peripheral to its core mission,
<strong>the</strong>n it will reject <strong>the</strong>m as possible distractions from its core focus.” 217 Cassidy notes that even while <strong>the</strong>
213
Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After
<strong>the</strong> Cold War, (Westport, Conneticut: Praeger, 2004): 7.
214
Andrew M. Johnston, “Does American Have a <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>?,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> Conflict Studies, Vol 18, No. 2,
Fall 1998, available at http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/FALL98/johnston.htm (accessed 20 March 2012).
215
William Kincade, “American National Style and <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in Carl G. Jacobsen ed., <strong>Strategic</strong> Power
USA/USSR, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 12.
216
Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After
<strong>the</strong> Cold War, (Westport, Conneticut: Praeger, 2004): 84.
217 Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss, 6.
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American Army was engaged in frontier fighting it failed to cultivate doctrine, training, or any level <strong>of</strong>
pr<strong>of</strong>essional literature on how to effectively engage <strong>the</strong> adversary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day—Indians it deemed
“master[s] <strong>of</strong> guerrilla warfare.” 218 Battle with various native tribes never registered as genuine Army
business. 219
The youthful American forces yearned for a different identity – a conventional pr<strong>of</strong>ile that would place
<strong>the</strong>m on peer status with European forces. 220 It was by this mark that <strong>the</strong>y measured <strong>the</strong>ir status:
potential success in future gentlemen’s battles, not present success in internal guerrilla wars. Thus,
Deborah Avant claims, <strong>the</strong> military used <strong>the</strong> advantage <strong>of</strong> relative isolation from Congressional oversight
to develop along its preferred identity lines: a force prepared for Prussian style big war based on classic
military principles. Any use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army for policing-like duties was considered “beneath <strong>the</strong> soldiers’
vocation.” 221 Once identity notions <strong>of</strong> this sort take hold, <strong>the</strong>y are very difficult to eradicate, even in
situations <strong>of</strong> pressing need. As Robert Cassidy notes:
Military culture can generally be defined as <strong>the</strong> embedded beliefs and attitudes within a military
organization that shape that organization’s preference on when and how <strong>the</strong> military instrument
should be used. Because <strong>the</strong>se institutional beliefs sometimes tend to value certain roles and
marginalize o<strong>the</strong>rs, military culture can impede innovation in ways <strong>of</strong> warfare that lie outside
that organization’s valued, or core, roles (italics added). 222
In order to understand how <strong>the</strong> norms and values embedded within America’s conventional force
impact upon its ability to wage counterinsurgency, it is useful to take a closer look at <strong>the</strong> collection <strong>of</strong>
preferences that combine to form America’s preferred way <strong>of</strong> war. The bulk <strong>of</strong> current literature
typifies American strategic norms as favoring wars <strong>of</strong> annihilation, against conventional enemies, 223
218 Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss, 93.
219 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
(Chicago, IL: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press, 2002, 2005): 44.
220 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 46.
221 Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources <strong>of</strong> Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol 37, No. 4 (Dec 1993): 415.
222 Robert M. Cassidy, “Back to <strong>the</strong> Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and O<strong>the</strong>r Small
Wars,” in Colonel Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected
Bibliography, (Quantico, Marine Corps University Press, 2008): 14. See also Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong>
Matter?,” 134.
223 Robert Cassidy notes that as late as 2002, “<strong>the</strong> National Training Center (NTC), <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army’s premier desert
collective training opportunity, still focused exclusively on conventional battles with linear boundaries and phase
lines.” He later cites a RAND study which asserts that <strong>the</strong> “small wars <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army engaged in during <strong>the</strong> Cold
War [ ] may have only streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> big-war preference.” Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and <strong>the</strong>
Global War on Terror: Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Irregular War, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008): 103,
115. James Kurth, writing on <strong>the</strong> U.S. engagement in Iraq, notes <strong>the</strong> persistence <strong>of</strong> this notion, “Central to <strong>the</strong>
classical American way <strong>of</strong> war and its recapitulation in <strong>the</strong> Weinberger/Powell Doctrine was <strong>the</strong> idea that when <strong>the</strong>
United States goes to war, it should do so as a nation defending its vital interests against ano<strong>the</strong>r nation, and when
<strong>the</strong> U.S. Army goes to war, it should do so as an army fighting ano<strong>the</strong>r army. Wars to advance peripheral, imperial
interests and wars against insurgent forces were violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American way <strong>of</strong> war.” James Kurth, “Iraq:
Losing <strong>the</strong> American Way,” The American Conservative, March 15, 2004. Online. Available
http://www.amconmag.com/2004_03_15/feature.html (accessed 20 March 2012).
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accomplished in short time frames, and by employing sophisticated technology 224 ra<strong>the</strong>r than
sophisticated strategy (or any strategy at all). 225 The notion <strong>of</strong> annihilation as <strong>the</strong> preferred way <strong>of</strong>
American war was chronicled and launched into <strong>the</strong> popular consciousness by Russell F. Weigley. 226
Victor Davis Hanson concurred, and defined it as “head-to-head battle that destroys <strong>the</strong> enemy.” 227
Brian Linn, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, has challenged this characterization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American way <strong>of</strong> war, pointing to
<strong>the</strong> vast amount <strong>of</strong> experience that <strong>the</strong> U.S. military has had with attritional, limited wars. 228 As noted in
<strong>the</strong> prior section, this logic is flawed. Thomas Mahnken provides <strong>the</strong> necessary correction by
acknowleging U.S. historic experience with small wars, but maintaining that a military pr<strong>of</strong>ession’s
strategic culture is founded on its preferences and aspirations far more than actual practice. 229 In this,
Antulio Echevarria would argue that <strong>the</strong> American preference remains “’taking down’ an opponent
quickly,” ra<strong>the</strong>r than engaging in <strong>the</strong> lengthy, complex, and political experience <strong>of</strong> attritional, limited
wars.” 230 Colin Gray emphasizes <strong>the</strong> American short-term mentality: “The mindset needed to combat
an enemy who is playing a long game is not one that comes naturally to <strong>the</strong> American soldier or, for that
matter, to <strong>the</strong> American public.” Conventional war, in <strong>the</strong> American mind, is successful in short time
frames by combining “lavish firepower” 231 , “mobility, and an aggressive hunt for <strong>the</strong> main body <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
foe.” 232
The American partiality for “conventional” extends not just to <strong>the</strong> preferred mode <strong>of</strong> destroying <strong>the</strong>
enemy forces, but to a perceived division <strong>of</strong> labor available in conventional contexts. The American
224
Gray, “British and American <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>s,” 49; Theo Farrell, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and American Empire,” SAIS
Review vol. XXV no. 2 (Summer – Fall 2005): 8; Lawrence Sondhaus, <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Ways <strong>of</strong> War, (London:
Routledge, 2006): 60-61; Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcultures,” 74; Sarkesian, America’s
Forgotten Wars, 5.
225
Numerous American culture <strong>the</strong>orists have made this argument but perhaps none so convincingly as Colin S.
Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), p.33; and
in “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Can <strong>the</strong> American Way <strong>of</strong> War Adapt?” a <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies
Institute monograph, March 2006, found at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=650.
226
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way <strong>of</strong> War: A History <strong>of</strong> United States Military Strategy and Policy,
(Bloomington IA: Indiana University Press, 1973).
227
Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and <strong>Culture</strong>, (New York: Anchor Books, 2001):22. Both Hanson and Antulio J.
Echevarria II acknowledge that a preference for annihilation is shared across a number <strong>of</strong> western nations. It is not
an attribute attributable to <strong>the</strong> U.S. alone. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward An American Way <strong>of</strong> War, <strong>Strategic</strong>
Studies Institute monograph, March 2004: 2, available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=374
228
Brian M Linn and Russell F. Weigley, “The American Way <strong>of</strong> War Revisited,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> Military History, Vol
66, No. 2 (Apr. 2002), pp. 501-533. Max Boot adds meat to this argument in his volume The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace:
Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).
229
Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcultures,” 73.
230
Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward An American Way <strong>of</strong> War, <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies Institute monograph, March 2004:
16, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=374
231
Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcultures,” 74. Also Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong>
Strategy.” 11, Major Russell A. Moore counters this notion in a <strong>the</strong>sis prepared for <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps.
His assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n current National Security doctrine revealed an emphasis on precision ra<strong>the</strong>r than mass
firepower: Major Russell A. Moore, USMC, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>—How it Affects <strong>Strategic</strong> ‘Outputs’,” Marine Corps
College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1998.
232
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 11.
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military machine yearns to focus on <strong>the</strong> waging <strong>of</strong> war, on delivering expert warfare, ra<strong>the</strong>r than shaping
its activities toward political consequences: building an advantageous peace. 233 Whe<strong>the</strong>r true or not,
American military pr<strong>of</strong>essionals see conventional conflicts as arenas which allow for military and
political experts to operate successfully within <strong>the</strong>ir separate spheres to a much higher degree than do
unconventional engagements. When forced into limited war contexts Echevarria argues that <strong>the</strong>
bifurcation between American diplomatic, political centers and military sources <strong>of</strong> power leads to an
“American way <strong>of</strong> war [which] tends to shy away from thinking about <strong>the</strong> complicated process <strong>of</strong> turning
military triumphs, whe<strong>the</strong>r on <strong>the</strong> scale <strong>of</strong> major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic
successes.” The result is an American armed force which is geared to “fight wars as if <strong>the</strong>y were battles
and, thus, confuses <strong>the</strong> winning <strong>of</strong> campaigns or small-scale actions with <strong>the</strong> winning <strong>of</strong> wars.” 234
The successful coordination <strong>of</strong> military might in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> political aims is <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> strategy.
“Unfortunately, American understanding <strong>of</strong> strategy, and sound practice <strong>of</strong> it, is almost desperately rare.
<strong>Strategic</strong> thinking and behavior worthy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> name are endangered activities in this country.” 235
<strong>Strategic</strong> dysfunction may stem, in part, from <strong>the</strong> decentralized nature <strong>of</strong> America’s foreign policy and
security machinery. 236 It may also stem from a preference for technological over strategic
sophistication. Williamson Murray cautions: “The greatest danger for <strong>the</strong> United States in <strong>the</strong> coming
century is that <strong>the</strong> American military will possess self-satisfied, intellectually stagnant cultures that
believe <strong>the</strong>y have found <strong>the</strong> technological lodestone.” 237 Ra<strong>the</strong>r than strategic excellence, military
expertise Yankee style boasts strengths <strong>of</strong> largess, 238 technical superiority, 239 and logistical dominance. 240
These may enjoy full play in a conventional arena but be rendered problematic in a counterinsurgency
context where “irregular enemies pose problems <strong>of</strong> a kind where technology typically <strong>of</strong>fers few real
advantages.” 241 Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and relies heavily on special skills, “for
example, human intelligence, civil affairs, police, public health, foreign language, foreign force training,
[and] psychological warfare” 242 that do not fall within America’s big war competencies. The American
233
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 30.
234
Echevarria II, Toward An American Way <strong>of</strong> War, 7, 10.
235
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 3-4.
236
Stephen L. Melton, “Conceptualizing Victory Anew: Revisiting U.S. Law, Doctrine, and Policy for War and Its
Aftermath,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1 st Quarter, 2011.
237
Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” 151.
238
Meilinger, “American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” 81.
239
Jeffrey Record, “The American War <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” prepared for
<strong>the</strong> CATO Institute, September 1, 2006, Policy Analysis No. 577: 5. Accessed on November 23, 2001 at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640.
240
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 46. Williamson Murray calls this “projecting military
power” and credits Britain with <strong>the</strong> same superior capability. Williamson Murray, “An Anglo-American <strong>Strategic</strong>
<strong>Culture</strong>?,” prepared for The ACT/ODU Jamestown Symposium, Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years <strong>of</strong>
Transatlantic Engagement (Norfolk VA: HQ, Allied Command Transformation, 2008): 152.
241
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 36.
242
Jeffrey Record, “The American War <strong>of</strong> War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” prepared for
<strong>the</strong> CATO Institute, September 1, 2006, Policy Analysis No. 577: 6. Accessed on November 23, 2001 at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640.
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valuing <strong>of</strong> technical expertise over regional cultural or linguistic depth means “[<strong>the</strong>] American
pr<strong>of</strong>iciency at imparting technical skills is matched only by American insensitivity to local conditions.” 243
<strong>Strategic</strong> insensitivity is not confined to locals on <strong>the</strong> ground, it extends to relations with allies and even
a proper evaluation <strong>of</strong> oneself. Gray warns: “For a state that now accepts, indeed insists upon, a global
mandate to act as sheriff, [a] lack <strong>of</strong> cultural empathy, including a lack <strong>of</strong> sufficiently critical selfknowledge,
is most serious.” 244 Murray agrees. Writing in advance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. miring in Iraq and
Afghanistan he notes: “Above all, <strong>the</strong> [U.S.] services need to practice some pr<strong>of</strong>ound introspection, for
unless <strong>the</strong>y understand <strong>the</strong>mselves and how different <strong>the</strong>ir world views are from those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country’s
opponents in <strong>the</strong> next century, <strong>the</strong> United States is headed for a major crack-up that could prove even
more disastrous than <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War.” 245
Naiveté on both home and foreign fronts very likely explains <strong>the</strong> American dearth <strong>of</strong> what Eliot Cohen
cryptically characterizes as “skills <strong>of</strong> manipulation.” Cohen notes, rightfully, that military and political
problems are <strong>of</strong>ten intertwined in small wars. Skills <strong>of</strong> manipulation are needed on this front as well as
in <strong>the</strong> backrooms <strong>of</strong> waging coalition warfare. He claims <strong>the</strong> skills <strong>of</strong> this type are scarce, and “in some
measure ana<strong>the</strong>ma to <strong>the</strong> American military.” 246 William Kincade sees this as a natural outgrowth <strong>of</strong>
American national culture:
Americans remain suspicious <strong>of</strong> international politics and diplomacy. The belief persists that <strong>the</strong>
USA cannot play <strong>the</strong> game in <strong>the</strong> cynical manner <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs nations and that Americans are <strong>of</strong>ten
cheated at <strong>the</strong> bargaining table. Impatient with <strong>the</strong> complexity or ambiguity <strong>of</strong> international
diplomacy and <strong>the</strong> amoral compromises it <strong>of</strong>ten produces, Americans tend to prefer “bargaining
from strength” or a radical, principled style <strong>of</strong> diplomacy where <strong>the</strong> USA holds <strong>the</strong> high cards or
high moral ground. 247
This approach has traditionally worked well for <strong>the</strong> American polity. Walter Russell Mead unabashedly
defends American style foreign policy and insists that it be considered in an instructive ra<strong>the</strong>r than
critical light. Speaking as an American he insists: “We don’t just draw lucky cards;” it may also be <strong>the</strong>
case that “we play <strong>the</strong> game well. Over two hundred years we have developed our own unique style,
243
Eliot Cohen, “Constraints on America’s Conduct <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Autumn
1984): 169. Colin Gray would add that <strong>the</strong> insensitivity in question extends to ahistoricism as well: “Unfortunately,
<strong>the</strong> first and truest love <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. defense community is with technology, not with history,” resulting in a
“defense community led by <strong>the</strong> historically disrespectful and ill-educated, [which] is all but condemned to find
itself surprised by events for which some historical understanding could have prepared <strong>the</strong>m.” Gray, “Irregular
Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 32.
244
Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy,” 34.
245
Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” 151.
246
Eliot Cohen, “Constraints on America’s Conduct <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Autumn
1984): 170.
247
William Kincade, “American National Style and <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” in Carl G. Jacobsen ed., <strong>Strategic</strong> Power
USA/USSR, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 27..
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which suits us. Certainly it has enabled us to become <strong>the</strong> richest and most powerful nation in <strong>the</strong>
history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.” 248
Mead’s point is taken, and with such a weighty combination <strong>of</strong> factors against its success, <strong>the</strong> most
remarkable historical bit may be that <strong>the</strong> United States has waged counterinsurgency at all, or has ever
been good at it. The fact that this is so provokes a bit <strong>of</strong> mystery. To that point, Robert Cassidy’s
historical study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. peacekeeping and counterinsurgency experience reveals a distressing
competency reversal, a historic degradation in capabilities: “America as a fledgling state started <strong>of</strong>f
doing unconventional operations well but as it moved toward and achieved great power status, it
started doing <strong>the</strong>se operations poorly.” 249 Cassidy expresses some frustration at <strong>the</strong> small war
competencies that were jettisoned in favor <strong>of</strong> l<strong>of</strong>tier conventional aspirations: “It is somewhat ironic,
revealing, and disquieting that an institution with more history and experience fighting irregular
conflicts <strong>of</strong> limited intensity than total wars without limits, would have its core culture so pr<strong>of</strong>oundly
influenced by Sherman, Upton, and <strong>the</strong> World War II experience.” 250
John Nagl <strong>of</strong>fers some rationale for this phenomenon by voicing a sentiment shared by many across <strong>the</strong>
armed services. He acknowledges a trade<strong>of</strong>f. Developing small wars expertise may degrade
conventional readiness. In his revised preface to <strong>the</strong> counterinsurgency classic Learning to Eat Soup
with a Knife, Nagl notes that when he wrote his book he “underestimated <strong>the</strong> challenge <strong>of</strong> adapting an
army for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> defeating an insurgency while simultaneously maintaining <strong>the</strong> army’s ability to
fight a conventional war.” 251 Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> trade<strong>of</strong>f is genuine or not, it is certainly perceived as such
among those in uniform. The extent to which Marines share <strong>the</strong>se sentiments will be examined across
<strong>the</strong> next two chapters.
248
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed <strong>the</strong> World, (New York: A
Century Foundation Book published by Alfred A. Knopf, 2001): 28.
249
Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After
<strong>the</strong> Cold War, (Westport, Conneticut: Praeger, 2004): 36.
250 Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss, 98.
251 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, xiv
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CHAPTER 4
MARINE CORPS CULTURE: IDENTITY AND ROLE CONCEPTION
Chapter 3 provides a look at some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most pronounced cultural influences a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps experiences before and after entry into <strong>the</strong> society <strong>of</strong> American Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks. American public
culture and military culture make up a significant portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> larger cultural landscape within which
<strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps resides. Marine Corps culture is seen more clearly—those aspects that
are somewhat unique to this service, and those cultural predispositions widely shared—when viewed in
this larger context. The purpose <strong>of</strong> this chapter and <strong>the</strong> next will be to identify those cultural
characteristics that are quintessentially Marine. As pointed out by Colin Gray, national cultural
influences do not always supersede those imposed at <strong>the</strong> service level: “It can be that even if military
cultures and sub-cultures bear unmistakably particular national or o<strong>the</strong>r community hallmarks, <strong>the</strong>
attitudes, beliefs, and preferred behaviors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir human agents owe more to <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
specific military instrument than to cultural authority <strong>of</strong> a national kind.” 252 Given <strong>the</strong> mass <strong>of</strong> cultural
data required to fulfill <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> Step 4, an examination <strong>of</strong> Marine identity, norms, values, and
perceptual lens will be divided across two chapters. This chapter will deal with Marine identity and role
conception. Chapter 5 will continue this process by focusing on Marine norms, values, and perceptual
lens.
The aim <strong>of</strong> investigation in Step 4 is not solely an intellectual description <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps culture aimed
at <strong>the</strong> mind, it is also a best effort at emotive transference—conveying felt culture in <strong>the</strong> ways it is
imbedded in Marine fiber. The style <strong>of</strong> prose, inclusion <strong>of</strong> sometimes grammar-hostile direct quotes,
and wisps <strong>of</strong> Marine legend woven throughout are designed to achieve this end. Were culture an
artifact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mind only, it would certainly be a far more rational and predictable enterprise.
Although a contemporary observer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps today might see Marines as a world apart from
<strong>the</strong>ir soldier, sailor, or airmen contemporaries, it has not always been so. A review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discourse
penned by Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers in <strong>the</strong>ir earliest published journals 253 reveals a service struggling between two
service identities: Army and Navy, and still searching for ground <strong>of</strong> its own. Marines in <strong>the</strong> first decades
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century most <strong>of</strong>ten referred to <strong>the</strong>mselves as “soldiers” (a label that even well meaning
civilians will be reprimanded for applying to <strong>the</strong>m today) and confessed that although <strong>the</strong>y bunked on
ships, <strong>the</strong>y had far more in common with a French infantryman than a sailor. 254 Marines speak in a
lexicon born <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy (doors are “hatches,” walls are “bulkheads,” beds are “racks,”), but early on
drew manuals, doctrine, rank structure, and training from <strong>the</strong> Army. Thus, <strong>the</strong> historic influence <strong>of</strong>
252
Colin S. Gray, Perspectives in Strategy, forthcoming: 198. In fairness, <strong>the</strong>re are also distinctive subcultures
within each service. For a look at an interesting parsing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se see Don M. Snider, “An Uninformed Debate on
Military <strong>Culture</strong>,” Orbis, Winter 1999, Volume 43, Issue 1: 11-26.
253
The Marine Corps Gazette was begun in March 1916 as a publication for <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer corps. Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, begun
in November 1921, is aimed at <strong>the</strong> enlisted ranks.
254
Anonymous, “The Epic <strong>of</strong> Dixmude,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1917): 85.
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<strong>the</strong>se two sister services (much more so than <strong>the</strong> Air Force) cannot be dismissed in <strong>the</strong> formative
evolution <strong>of</strong> today’s Marine Corps. “Marines fight like soldiers, talk like sailors, and think like both.” 255
As noted in <strong>the</strong> first chapter, <strong>the</strong> primary contribution this <strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong>fers is methodological: a systematic
process for assessing <strong>the</strong> likely role culture has played, and may continue to play, in particular strategy
scenarios. A loose pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> Marine culture as it stands today is captured in <strong>the</strong> categories that follow.
This collection represents Step 4 in <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping Method: <strong>the</strong> data ga<strong>the</strong>ring phase. Cultural
data are unear<strong>the</strong>d and <strong>the</strong>n organized according to <strong>the</strong> four suggested research veins: Identity, Values,
Norms, and Perceptual Lens. Several cultural traits are examined within more than one category. This
occurs by design and aids in examining particularly important or pronounced traits from several vantage
points. Not all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural data assembled at this stage will prove relevant in <strong>the</strong> examination <strong>of</strong>
counterinsurgency practices that will follow. As is mentioned in <strong>the</strong> explanation to Step 4, given <strong>the</strong>
interpretive nature <strong>of</strong> this process <strong>the</strong> cultural data amassed is necessarily large in stature and ra<strong>the</strong>r
comprehensive in nature. Only as we begin to marry subject matter (in this case counterinsurgency) to
cultural attributes do <strong>the</strong> patterns emerge that will prove most relevant to this <strong>the</strong>sis.
Step 4 is an inductive, interpretive enterprise. Evidence, as it multiplies, drives <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong>
generalizations and <strong>the</strong>ory. This means that evidence, no matter how peripheral or irrelevant it may
seem in initial research stages, should not be jettisoned until a much fuller, more comprehensive base <strong>of</strong>
cultural mores, identity strands, narratives, habits, and world views is amassed. Evidence initially set
aside as peripheral may move to center stage as research progresses. The cultural blinders or pre-set
biases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> researcher may inhibit recognition <strong>of</strong> culturally salient patterns until reoccurrence makes
<strong>the</strong>m obvious. This chapter attempts, in best form, to stay true to this principle. The cultural data
collected ranges widely. Some will become ra<strong>the</strong>r obviously relevant when retroactively applied to
historic episodes <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency, some will not. Predetermining which is which before assembling
a healthy mass <strong>of</strong> diverse cultural variables is a form <strong>of</strong> prejudgment that carries heavy risk <strong>of</strong> biaspreferencing
based on one’s own cultural disposition.
Although <strong>the</strong> methodology is applied here toward “knowing oneself” in clearer terms, <strong>the</strong> hurdles
inhibiting an evaluation <strong>of</strong> “alien” or “foreign” societies are not entirely absent an evaluation <strong>of</strong> one’s
own. Civilian appointees within <strong>the</strong> U.S. security apparatus may be called on to wield its security
institutions in situations <strong>of</strong> strategic significance within a short time <strong>of</strong> taking <strong>of</strong>fice. Their challenges in
getting to know service cultures with which <strong>the</strong>y may have had only peripheral contact may not be as
different as <strong>the</strong>y would like from those <strong>of</strong> a newcomer treading foreign land. To complicate <strong>the</strong> mix,
even were service branches eager to make <strong>the</strong>mselves known, <strong>the</strong> package <strong>the</strong>y present is a master
narrative, <strong>of</strong>ten an iconic image <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> service strives to be: a role <strong>the</strong>y plan to pursue and refine
into <strong>the</strong> future. Much <strong>of</strong> what is most important to know about a service, <strong>the</strong> service members may not
consciously know about <strong>the</strong>mselves.
255 Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
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Step 4: Employ Research Perspectives: Identity
The methods pursued for cultural research are nearly alien to <strong>the</strong> realm <strong>of</strong> political science and <strong>the</strong>
discipline <strong>of</strong> strategic studies as a whole. Often times analysts, intelligence experts, or strategic planners
who agree that understanding a group’s identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens matter in making
sense <strong>of</strong> and projecting its members’ behavior are at a loss when asked to discover what <strong>the</strong>y are.
Heads dedicated to politics and strategy have not always thought about how one captures data
illuminating <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> such phenomena as identity, values, norms, and perceptual lens. Tools
from <strong>the</strong> anthropological discipline in concert with those supplied by successful foreign service <strong>of</strong>ficers,
sociologists, psychologists, journalists, and media watchers provide wide ranging instruments for <strong>the</strong>
task. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se include: tracking and analyzing institutional images and narratives about self over
time; examining material culture and <strong>the</strong> meaning it has for members; tracking <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> key
leadership speeches; assessing <strong>the</strong> values celebrated in hero legends and highlighting, where possible,
when and why <strong>the</strong>se have changed over time; identifying key rituals and <strong>the</strong> values <strong>the</strong>y celebrate;
testing knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> culture against <strong>the</strong> humor produced within it; paying keen attention to those
actions and habits <strong>of</strong> character rewarded with status and those derided; sifting through internal jargon:
what comprises an “insult”? compliment? how does <strong>the</strong> lexicon reflect institutional values?; and
absorbing as much as one can via participant observation.
The following attributes <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps culture assembled here include contributions from a few key
works, both academic and journalistic, Marine “classics,” published memoires on boot camp by both
drill instructors and <strong>the</strong> recruits who became Marines, oral histories, 256 systematically reviewed
submissions from <strong>the</strong> two primary Marine Corps publications: Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck and <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Gazette during periods <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency engagement (1916-1934, <strong>the</strong>n 1965-1972), a close read <strong>of</strong>
key Commandant speeches submitted to <strong>the</strong> Gazette or Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck across <strong>the</strong> time frame <strong>of</strong> concern
(1916-1975), a survey <strong>of</strong> Marine recruitment posters from 1913-1974 (see Appendix B) 257 and television
commercials from 1970-2003 258 , visits to local recruiting <strong>of</strong>fices, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps museum, <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps historical division, and a wider net cast in <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> Geertzian “thick description” that includes
documentaries, Marine blogs, cartoons, YouTube videos, and scores <strong>of</strong> conversations with Marines, both
<strong>of</strong>ficers and enlisted across <strong>the</strong> Corps. 259
Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work done on Marine culture is by Marines for Marines. Tom Ricks is perhaps <strong>the</strong> best
known outsider to have conducted a systematic survey <strong>of</strong> culture within <strong>the</strong> Corps. He defines service
256
Contemporary oral histories (45) were transcribed and supplied in hard copy from <strong>the</strong> Library <strong>of</strong> Congress
Veterans History Project through <strong>the</strong> American Folklife Center, Washington DC. Vietnam-era oral histories (100+)
were supplied in audio form through <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection, Marine
Corps Archives and Special Collections, Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
257
A special thanks to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps Historic Division and <strong>the</strong> National Museum <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps for
allowing photographs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own exhaustive supply <strong>of</strong> recruitment posters, and an additional thanks for <strong>the</strong>ir
careful documentation <strong>of</strong> accurate dates and use.
258
Comprehensive collection provided to <strong>the</strong> author by J. Walter Thompson, longstanding USMC advertising
agency.
259
The author has had <strong>the</strong> opportunity to work with Marines in a training capacity within its MCIA (Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity) branch, Information Operations branch (MCIOC), and Center for Advanced Operation <strong>Culture</strong>
Learning (CAOCL) <strong>of</strong>fice, as well as a variety <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>fices and branches on Quantico (2009-present).
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“culture” in succinct fashion: how <strong>the</strong>y treat each o<strong>the</strong>r and how <strong>the</strong>y fight. 260 He, in <strong>the</strong> same spirit as
this <strong>the</strong>sis, notes Carl Builder’s omission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps in his classic work on service cultures.
According to Ricks, Builder thought better <strong>of</strong> it by 1994 and <strong>of</strong>fered a lecture on Marine Corps culture at
<strong>the</strong> Army War College:
In that analysis he described <strong>the</strong> Marines as consistently standing apart from <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy
and Air Force. He saw <strong>the</strong> three larger services as obsessed with self-measurement: The Navy
with <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> its ships, <strong>the</strong> Army with <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> its troops, <strong>the</strong> Air Force with <strong>the</strong>
performance capabilities and number <strong>of</strong> its aircraft. The Marines, by contrast, were not so
much concerned with size as with <strong>the</strong>ir culture—that is, <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> an independent
identity and <strong>the</strong> capability <strong>of</strong> being self-sufficient, “taking more pride in who <strong>the</strong>y are than what
<strong>the</strong>y own.” 261
Ricks agrees: “The Air Force has its planes, <strong>the</strong> Navy its ships, <strong>the</strong> Army its obsessively written and
obeyed ‘doctrine’ that dictates how to act. <strong>Culture</strong>—that is, <strong>the</strong> values and assumptions that shape its
members—is all <strong>the</strong> Marines have. It is what holds <strong>the</strong>m toge<strong>the</strong>r… Theirs is <strong>the</strong> richest culture:
formalistic, insular, elitist, with a deep anchor in <strong>the</strong>ir own history and mythology.” 262 Marines, in a
measure significantly above <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services, recognize <strong>the</strong> essential nature <strong>of</strong> fostering allegiance to
<strong>the</strong>ir own traditions and history and have made it a part <strong>of</strong> doctrine: “These traditions give <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps its spirit,” and “[a]s our traditions, our institutions, and even our eccentricities—like live corral—
develop and toughen, so <strong>the</strong> Corps itself develops and toughens.” 263
Identity
The most obvious place to capture cultural data is during <strong>the</strong> times and in <strong>the</strong> places where it is
transferred from one generation <strong>of</strong> a cultural group to <strong>the</strong> next. <strong>Culture</strong> is learned, shared, behavior
and as such it must be transferred to new members. For <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps this identity indoctrination
starts well in advance <strong>of</strong> boot camp. Recruitment posters, Hollywood films portraying Marine heroes (or
brutes!), Marine legends that permeate <strong>the</strong> national consciousness, family ties to former Marines, and
exposure to Marine material culture (i.e. bumper stickers, t-shirts, decals, tattoos) is all part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> presetting
<strong>of</strong> American notions about what it is to be a Marine. The distinctiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps, in this
century, is fairly well established. “While Americans normally refer to members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Service</strong>s as
being in <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy, or Air Force, when referring to a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, <strong>the</strong>y state that
<strong>the</strong> person is a Marine.” 264
260
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 185.
261
Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, 188-189. Note: The Army War College does not have record <strong>of</strong> this event nor a
transcript <strong>of</strong> Builder’s speech (this is not totally unusual per <strong>the</strong>ir operating procedures). Rick’s accounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
lecture appears to be <strong>the</strong> only published record <strong>of</strong> it.
262
Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, 19.
263 th
Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Handbook for Marine NCOs, 4 Edition, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1996): 72.
264
Italics and bold in original. Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC,
“Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack
(author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point) website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
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Those identity narratives that are consciously cultivated by <strong>the</strong> Corps, specifically recruitment posters
and commercials, capture <strong>the</strong> narrative <strong>the</strong> Corps intends to send, <strong>the</strong> image it means to cultivate and
<strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> young person it hopes to draw in. A systematic review <strong>of</strong> Marine advertising since <strong>the</strong> early
years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century reveals a set <strong>of</strong> mixed narratives—some <strong>of</strong> which would be quite
ana<strong>the</strong>ma to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps <strong>of</strong> today—threaded toge<strong>the</strong>r with a few constant <strong>the</strong>mes. In order to
understand how surprising some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se narratives might be to today’s U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
recruiters it might be useful to paint a clear portrait <strong>of</strong> a standard visit to a recruiter’s <strong>of</strong>fice in <strong>the</strong>
contemporary setting.
The “transformation” <strong>of</strong> a civilian into a Marine takes place over a series <strong>of</strong> stages—an art form <strong>the</strong>
Corps has consciously and studiously cultivated over <strong>the</strong> years. In <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> Commandant Charles
Krulak: “Our Corps’ survival depends upon <strong>the</strong> transformation.” 265 Popular images that draw a civilian to
a Marine recruiter’s door are only reinforced by <strong>the</strong> exchange that happens once he walks in. It is made
clear to any new walk-in that joining <strong>the</strong> Corps is a privilege. The Marine behind <strong>the</strong> desk isn’t
interested in “recruiting.” It is <strong>the</strong> civilian who is being measured in <strong>the</strong> exchange, not <strong>the</strong> Corps. 266
Interested parties stepping into <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice in search <strong>of</strong> scholarships, a stable livelihood or travel are
invited to step out, and visit <strong>the</strong> Army’s <strong>of</strong>fice next door. 267 One Marine recounts:
I was thinking about going in to <strong>the</strong> Army because <strong>the</strong>y <strong>of</strong>fered more money for college. I first
went into <strong>the</strong> Marine recruiters <strong>of</strong>fice and asked what <strong>the</strong>y could give me. They told me I
should be happy just to join <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. He also told me that if all I wanted was money
for college I should get out <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>fice and go join <strong>the</strong> Army. I left and wondered why <strong>the</strong>y did
that. Shortly after, I returned to <strong>the</strong> Marine recruiter’s <strong>of</strong>fice and asked him if I could join <strong>the</strong>
Marines. 268
Recruiters (a misnomer as far as <strong>the</strong>y are concerned) are looking for a particular type <strong>of</strong> young person:
one who emphasizes <strong>the</strong> “intangible” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “tangible” rewards <strong>of</strong> joining. Recruiters make <strong>the</strong>ir
own assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> young person in front <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m, sometimes as soon as he or she walks in <strong>the</strong>
door, but <strong>the</strong>y add evidence to <strong>the</strong>ir initial impression, both for <strong>the</strong>mselves and for <strong>the</strong> potential recruit,
by throwing a collection <strong>of</strong> eleven plastic “tags” on <strong>the</strong> table. Each is inscribed with a different attribute:
Pride <strong>of</strong> Belonging; Courage, Poise and Self Confidence; Challenge; Leadership and Management Skills;
Self Reliant, Self Direction, Self Discipline; Physical Fitness; Pr<strong>of</strong>essional Development; Financial Security,
Advancements and Benefits; Educational Opportunities; Technical Skills; Travel and Adventure. The
civilian youth is asked to select five which are most important to him from <strong>the</strong> stack. Recruiters are
looking for those young people who lean toward <strong>the</strong> “intangibles”: challenge, leadership, self reliance,
etc., reflecting an attributes orientation: becoming a Marine, ra<strong>the</strong>r than a benefits orientation: what
265
Sustaining <strong>the</strong> Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps MCRP 6-11D): unpaginated introduction.
266 st
James B. Woulfe, Into <strong>the</strong> Crucible: Making Marines for <strong>the</strong> 21 Century, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998): 11-
12.
267
Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2011): x.
268
Punctuation omissions in original. Oral History File AFC 2001/001/46366 MS01, Veterans History Project,
American Folklife Center, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
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will I get from <strong>the</strong> Marines? The investigators who select in favor <strong>of</strong> “intangibles,” have a high school
degree, lack tattoos in visible spaces (forearms, neck, face), and appear able to perform at <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Marines’ fitness standard, are encouraged to apply. Recruiters today must own <strong>the</strong>ir
recommendations. They will write to and keep track <strong>of</strong> a recruit all through his boot camp training. A
failure at boot camp is a black mark on <strong>the</strong> recruiter’s record. 269
Prospective applicants note that <strong>the</strong>ir experience in a Marine <strong>of</strong>fice is very different than those <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
branches <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military. Marine recruiters do not talk about money or jobs or career ladders or
educational benefits. Instead, an investigative young person might be accosted with <strong>the</strong> question: “Tell
me why YOU think YOU have what it takes to be a Marine?” In some <strong>of</strong>fices a list hangs above a
recruiter’s computer warning that <strong>the</strong> individuals named below are not to be allowed into “Our Beloved
Corps.” They have, in some way, shown <strong>the</strong>mselves unworthy to join this coveted bro<strong>the</strong>rhood but act
as a pest, trying one recruiter after ano<strong>the</strong>r.
Marine recruiters recognize that <strong>the</strong>ir modern image is that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elite, <strong>the</strong> toughest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> branches,
and <strong>the</strong>y flex this to full effect. Gallup polling taken from 2001-2011 indicates that across <strong>the</strong> first
decade <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21 st century <strong>the</strong> American public consistently viewed <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps as its most
prestigious branch. 270 It must be noted, however, that this trend stands in sharp contrast to previous
eras. In a national opinion survey conducted just prior to Pearl Harbor (November 1941) <strong>the</strong> Marines’
recruitment pool—young men—and <strong>the</strong>ir parents ranked <strong>the</strong> Corps as <strong>the</strong> least attractive American
military service due to its members’ “rowdiness and hard living.” 271
Marines have learned to use <strong>the</strong>ir hard-core reputation to advantage. Their perception is that kids
drawn to <strong>the</strong>ir door want to be pushed, want to be yelled at by a fearsome Drill Instructor (DI), and want
to get mud on <strong>the</strong>ir boots. One might make this assertion solely based on <strong>the</strong> self-selection that occurs
in response to Marine Corps ads. The Corps went a bit fur<strong>the</strong>r, however, and in 1994 hired a team <strong>of</strong>
psychologists to tell <strong>the</strong>m what kids <strong>of</strong> Generation X “wanted.” Their conclusions: “Generation X does
not want to be babied. These young Americans are looking for a real challenge. They desperately want
to be part <strong>of</strong> a winning team; <strong>the</strong>y crave <strong>the</strong> stature associated with being one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best.” 272 Oral
histories (now transcribed) <strong>of</strong> contemporary era Marines seem to confirm this. When asked why <strong>the</strong>y
picked <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps typical answers include: “’Cause it was <strong>the</strong> hardest one;” “I was always
269
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2006). 174-75.
270
The Gallup question reads: Just <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> top <strong>of</strong> your head, which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> five branches <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> armed forces in this
country would you say is <strong>the</strong> most prestigious and has <strong>the</strong> most status in our society today? [ROTATED: <strong>the</strong> Air
Force, <strong>the</strong> Army, <strong>the</strong> Marines, <strong>the</strong> Navy, or <strong>the</strong> Coast Guard?]) Polling taken in 2001 indicated that 36% <strong>of</strong>
Americans rated <strong>the</strong> Marines <strong>the</strong> most prestigious branch with <strong>the</strong> Air Force coming in second at 32%. By 2004 <strong>the</strong>
Marines had widened this gap considerably, coming in at 39% with <strong>the</strong> Air Force falling to 28%. This trend has
continued over America’s counterinsurgency years until in 2011 <strong>the</strong> Army displaced Air Force for second place with
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps climbing still higher: Air Force 15%, Army 22%, Marine Corps 46% (Navy 8%, Coast Guard 2%).
Data retrieved 23 November 2012 at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/148127/americans-army-marines-importantdefense.aspx.
271
Aaron B. O’Connell, Underdogs, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012): 1.
272
Sustaining <strong>the</strong> Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps MCRP 6-11D): 19.
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interested in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, like <strong>the</strong> difficulty <strong>of</strong> it, <strong>of</strong> course I wanted to do <strong>the</strong> hardest…which
would be <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps;” “I wanted to go to <strong>the</strong> toughest training;” “[I]t was definitely a challenge
and that’s exactly what I was looking for;” “I picked <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps because <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> best. I don’t
just say that because I am a Marine. We back it up. The Marine Corps is <strong>the</strong> hardest branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
service, and <strong>the</strong> Proudest. I always had an interest in <strong>the</strong> military. But when it came down to it, if I was
going to be in any branch, I didn’t want to know that <strong>the</strong>re was someone out <strong>the</strong>re in ano<strong>the</strong>r service
that is working harder than me.” 273
Half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> walk-ins who are coming to <strong>the</strong> Marine <strong>of</strong>fice have already decided that <strong>the</strong>y want to join <strong>the</strong>
infantry. This hard-hitting, frontline image is <strong>the</strong> one <strong>the</strong> modern Corps projects and <strong>the</strong> one most
tightly associated in <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> those who want to join. Today’s Marines join <strong>the</strong> Marines because
<strong>the</strong>y want to be “forged” into hard steel, 274 <strong>the</strong>y want a challenge, and <strong>the</strong>y want to be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
“best.” It is becoming a Marine, above all, that is <strong>the</strong> lure.
Against that modern portrait flow historic narratives and images <strong>of</strong> a sometimes very different sort. A
quick look at <strong>the</strong> recruitment posters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> early Banana Wars era 1913-1916 reveals a Marine Corps
whose selling tag is “good pay, foreign travel, and congenial
Figure 4.1
employment;” (see Figure 4.1) <strong>the</strong> very “tangibles” <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps deigns to disdain today. This is not yet <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps that
can exist on its brand. Poster images in <strong>the</strong> pre-World War I era
depict Marines rushing to “colonial” duty in tropic scenes. Two
<strong>the</strong>mes dear to a modern audience and already emergent here are
“first!” and “fighting!” Marine posters brag: “First to Hoist Old
Glory on Foreign Soil,” and hold out a carrot to those <strong>of</strong> a
pugnacious sort: “For Fighting…Join <strong>the</strong> Marines.”
Longstanding as <strong>the</strong>y are, “first!” and “fighting” remain two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
most salient <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps today. While “First to Fight!” is
still a quintessentially Marine slogan (and title <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps’ most
recommended book, authored by Marine leadership legend Victor
“Brute” Krulak) 275 twenty-first century Marines are more likely to
use slightly different parlance, casting <strong>the</strong>ir role in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation’s 911 force 276 —<strong>the</strong> service <strong>the</strong>
nation calls when in immediate, dire need. “Combat readiness” is an essential feature <strong>of</strong> this Marine
273 Oral History Files AFC 2001/001/43420 MS02; AFC 2001/001/72369 MS01; AFC 2001/001/71698 MS02; AFC
2001/001/50169 MS02; and AFC 2001/001/53039 MS01 respectively, Veterans History Project, American Folklife
Center, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
274 A direct reference to <strong>the</strong> 1984 television commercial in which raw steel is forged into a Marine blade – a classic
saber wielded in expert fashion by a chiseled Marine in dress blues; <strong>of</strong>fered as metaphor for <strong>the</strong> transformation a
young man would undergo through Corps tutelage.
275 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984, 1999). This book appears on every
level (<strong>of</strong>ficer through enlisted) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USMC Commandant’s required reading list.
276 A reference to <strong>the</strong> U.S. emergency phone number: 911, not a reference to <strong>the</strong> terrorist event <strong>of</strong> 9/11.
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Corps role. 277 Given <strong>the</strong> significant overlap in Marine Corps function with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services, readiness,
or immediate preparation for action, provides a distinguishing trait, one essential to modern security,
and one over which <strong>the</strong> Corps can claim institutional primacy.
Looking from 1913 forward, World War I marks a dramatic shift in Marine Corps identity and
recruitment calls. Unsurprisingly, posters are loaded with scenes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war front. Perhaps more
surprisingly, many <strong>of</strong> those Marines depicted are aboard ship. Although Marines <strong>of</strong> this era were
already claiming far more in common with an infantryman than a sailor, 278 <strong>the</strong> Corps was reluctant to
give up its naval image. Most posters <strong>of</strong> this era bridge <strong>the</strong> gap between services by touting Marines as
“Soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea.” As noted above, unlike <strong>the</strong>ir predecessors, Marines <strong>of</strong> today recoil (and retort!)
when mistakenly called “soldier,” 279 but nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y nor <strong>the</strong>ir predecessors ever called <strong>the</strong>mselves
“sailor.” This, despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Corps’ primary departmental affiliation lays with <strong>the</strong> Navy. The
explanation is partly bound up with Marine origins as agents <strong>of</strong> order aboard ship whose primary task
was keeping potentially unruly sailors from engaging in mutiny or any o<strong>the</strong>r nefarious deeds. To call
oneself a “sailor” would be to stoop to <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> those once policed. Even today, sailors far more than
soldiers are <strong>the</strong> butt <strong>of</strong> Marine jokes when <strong>the</strong> ire is directed at o<strong>the</strong>r services. 280 The second, and
perhaps more compelling explanation is that <strong>the</strong> Marine occupation is soldiering. Their resistance to <strong>the</strong>
term today is not genuinely definitional, it roots in <strong>the</strong> instinctive need to forge an identity separate
from <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army.
The identity tension <strong>of</strong> a service inhabiting a somewhat shifting middle ground between formidable
sister services has not disappeared in <strong>the</strong> modern era. Turn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century worries about
where exactly <strong>the</strong> Corps fit 281 could be blueprint for discussions <strong>of</strong> a similar sort, both within and outside
<strong>the</strong> Corps, across its institutional history and into <strong>the</strong> modern day. When asked with which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two
services <strong>the</strong>y most identify, today’s Marines will, with nearly knee-jerk instinct, respond “<strong>the</strong> Navy.”
Marines tend to be very competitive with <strong>the</strong> Navy (“Yes, we are Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy, <strong>the</strong> Men’s
Department” 282 ) but are far more resistant to being seen as “a second land army,” a resistance which
borders on paranoia. 283 As noted earlier, <strong>the</strong>ir nautical heritage, and acceptance <strong>of</strong> it, is reflected in
277
Frank G. H<strong>of</strong>fman, “The Marine Mask <strong>of</strong> War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, November 10, 2011:
2-3, found 25 January 2012 at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.h<strong>of</strong>fman.marines.pdf.
278
Colonel John A. Lejeune, later to be Commandant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps (1920-1929) wrote with definitive clarity:
“Let us forget that we are, first <strong>of</strong> all, infantrymen, and have inherited <strong>the</strong> glorious traditions <strong>of</strong> that arm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
service.” Lejeune, “The Mobile Defense <strong>of</strong> Advance Bases by <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March
1916): 18. This <strong>the</strong>me is represented across multiple Gazette articles <strong>of</strong> this era.
279
Marines will accept <strong>the</strong> traditional “soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea” label if applied by a person versed enough in <strong>the</strong> history
to understand <strong>the</strong> heritage and era from whence it sprang, or from internal voices who are specifically referencing
<strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> soldiering.
280
Unless <strong>the</strong> issue is “toughness,” in which case it is <strong>the</strong> Air Force that is <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> ridicule.
281
Classic amongst <strong>the</strong>se pieces is Maj. John H. Russell, USMC, “A Plea for a Mission and Doctrine,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (June 1916) which sparked a discussion in <strong>the</strong> Corps which lasted, in <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gazette, for <strong>the</strong>
better part <strong>of</strong> a year.
282
A well worn jab one can purchase via bumper sticker. See “Marine Bravado” section <strong>of</strong> Appendix D: Marine
Narratives.
283
Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Be All <strong>the</strong> Army Can’t—or Won’t—Be,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 2010): 10. The
paranoia surrounding this issue was only amplified by a Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Robert M. Gates speech to Marines in
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language. In addition to calling a floor a “deck,” a window a “port,” and <strong>the</strong>ir duffel a “sea bag” 284 signs
at Quantico, well away from <strong>the</strong> ocean front, read WELCOME ABOARD; 285 this despite <strong>the</strong> fact that an
increasing number <strong>of</strong> today’s Marines will never set foot on <strong>the</strong> deck <strong>of</strong> a ship. 286 In sharp contrast,
those same Marines will spend <strong>the</strong>ir service career performing tasks nearly identical those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army
(but quicker! better!). Their instinctive institutional reach to <strong>the</strong> Navy, <strong>the</strong>refore, has less to do with
competence at sea (Marines perform almost no ship-related functions while transiting with sailors) and
significantly more to do with a pr<strong>of</strong>ound, near obsessive, attachment to <strong>the</strong> distinctive role which
brought <strong>the</strong>m glory and institutional claim as an essential distinctive service: amphibious assault.
Figure 4.2
Before those heady days, however, <strong>the</strong> Corps was to make a
name for itself in ra<strong>the</strong>r Army-like duty, albeit with flare. At <strong>the</strong>
breakout <strong>of</strong> World War I <strong>the</strong> Corps advertised, at least for <strong>the</strong>
moment, a change from “<strong>the</strong> Old Campaign Hat” to “<strong>the</strong> Modern
Helmet” (see Figure 4.2). It is without difficulty that one
understands <strong>the</strong> bitterness <strong>of</strong> eager, young recruits who signed
up under that slogan to do battle with <strong>the</strong> Huns and found
<strong>the</strong>mselves shipped to <strong>the</strong> tropics instead. Being first into battle:
“First to Fight in France for Freedom,” and relishing <strong>the</strong> fight: “If
You Want to FIGHT! Join <strong>the</strong> Marines” continue as <strong>the</strong>mes
through this era. And fight <strong>the</strong>y did.
USMC Commandant at <strong>the</strong> time, Major General George Barnett,
understood instinctively that despite a naval heritage his Marines
must be involved in <strong>the</strong> groundfighting in France. In testimony
before <strong>the</strong> House Committee on Naval Affairs he made a case for
significantly increased personnel among Marine ranks, a boosting <strong>of</strong> 11,569 men to naval duty, so that
<strong>the</strong> ground brigade <strong>of</strong> 11,000 men could “and should remain on duty in France”:
[I]n my opinion, it is absolutely essential for <strong>the</strong> morale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps that this should be done, as
I do not believe it is possible to maintain its present properly high pr<strong>of</strong>essional standard and
August 2010 in which he stated explicitly that “<strong>the</strong> Marines do not want to be, nor does America need, ano<strong>the</strong>r
land army.” See http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1498&41498=20100813. The same
<strong>the</strong>me is evident in <strong>the</strong> most recent edition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Operating Concepts (June 2010) in which general
<strong>of</strong>ficers felt compelled to put in print: “Often mischaracterized as land forces, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is actually part <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Naval <strong>Service</strong>—soldiers from <strong>the</strong> sea…As such, Marine Corps forces are primarily designed to be employed,
supported, and sustained at and from <strong>the</strong> sea.” Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral
Access…Winning Small Wars, Third Edition, (June 2010) accessed November 2012 at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf.
284
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007):38, 62; Maj. Richard Spooner, A Marine
Anthology, (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2010):340.
285
Nathanial Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
7.
286
Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Robert M. Gates, George P. Shultz Lecture, San Francisco, California, Thursday, August 12,
2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1498&41498=20100813
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morale without at least an adequate part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps taking an active part at <strong>the</strong> front in <strong>the</strong>
greatest war known to history. 287
Their “active part” was to become Marine Corps legend in <strong>the</strong> bloody fields <strong>of</strong> Belleau Wood. The June
1918 eponymous battle boasts its own shrine within <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Museum and “is known by all
who have worn <strong>the</strong> uniform <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps as <strong>the</strong> battle that established <strong>the</strong> base identity for
Marines to this day.” 288 Hard-charging hero figures like Dan Daly made <strong>the</strong>ir mark tearing across enemy
lines and into legend: “Come on, you sons <strong>of</strong> bitches! Do you want to live forever?” 289 More important
than heroic legend, however, (<strong>the</strong> concurrently fought Banana Wars supplied its share <strong>of</strong> hero
adventure stories after all) was <strong>the</strong> acclaim won for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps institution. Craig Cameron marks
Belleau Wood as <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ “rite <strong>of</strong> passage to maturity”:
A respected foe had granted recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> [M]arines’ institutional distinctiveness that
perforce made <strong>the</strong>m a representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, separate from <strong>the</strong> Army. Never
before had <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps been so clearly set apart from o<strong>the</strong>r American soldiers, and to this
day, [M]arines take great pride in <strong>the</strong> sobriquet “devil dogs” (Teufelhunden) bestowed on <strong>the</strong>m
in <strong>the</strong>ir first major battle. 290
Affectionately and <strong>of</strong>ten applied, <strong>the</strong> nickname “Devil Dog” reigns supreme as <strong>the</strong> first bit <strong>of</strong> history
Marines are required to learn and memorize from <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Guidebook <strong>of</strong> Essential
Subjects (known to Marines simply as Knowledge). Of “Devil Dog” it reads:
The term ‘Devil Dog’ came into use during World War I, and is said to have originated as follows:
During interrogation, a captured German soldier as asked his opinion <strong>of</strong> U.S. Marines in <strong>the</strong>
bitter fighting in Belleau Wood during June, 1918. He replied that <strong>the</strong> Marines fought like teufel
hunden, legendary wild, devil dogs that at one time roamed <strong>the</strong> forest <strong>of</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn Germany. 291
Gravely disappointing to Marines, not only is this an improper rendering <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> German (it should read
Teufelshunde) <strong>the</strong>re seems to be no evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Teufelhunden story in any form in German
records. 292 This bit <strong>of</strong> revealed history, however, seems to have failed to penetrate Marine affection for
<strong>the</strong> term. Marine newborns are <strong>of</strong>ten referenced as “devil pups” and Corps enthusiasts continue
reproducing <strong>the</strong> vintage Teufelhunden poster (see Appendix B) and its modern variation on decals,
c<strong>of</strong>fee mugs, t-shirts, tattoos, and nearly every o<strong>the</strong>r printable surface. Incidentally, <strong>the</strong> nickname
“Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck”—stemming from <strong>the</strong> era in which black lea<strong>the</strong>r stock collars were worn—is also included
287 “Excerpts from <strong>the</strong> Statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Major General Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, before <strong>the</strong> Committee on
Naval Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> House <strong>of</strong> Representatives on <strong>the</strong> Estimates for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps on January 23, 1918,” Marine
Corps Gazette, (March 1918): 67.
288 SSgt Rudy R. Frame, Jr., “The Battle <strong>of</strong> Belleau Wood,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 2012): 20.
289 T.R. Fehrenbach, U.S. Marines in Action: Two Hundred Years <strong>of</strong> Guts and Glory, (New York, NY: e-reads Book,
1962, 2003): 63.
290 Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 24.
291 Bold in original. United States Marine Corps, United States Marine Guidebook <strong>of</strong> Essential Subjects, (Arlington,
VA: Marine Corps Institute, 1983): p. 2-1.
292 Brig Gen, USMC(R) Edwin Howard Simmons, The United States Marines: A History, 4 th Edition, (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2003): 100.
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in Knowledge as a term <strong>of</strong> affection bantered about by Marines. Jarhead, however, is noticeably absent.
Marines are less inclined toward this term which stems from disputed origins, <strong>the</strong> most popular <strong>of</strong> which
is as a reference to Marines’ “high and tight” haircuts.
The early years <strong>of</strong> World War I represent a stronger effort than had been previously applied at branding
awareness for <strong>the</strong> Corps. One poster boasts <strong>the</strong> Eagle, Globe, and Anchor and says simply: “This device
on hat or helmet means U.S. Marines.” A study <strong>of</strong> material culture including symbols, uniform, favored
images, weapons <strong>of</strong> choice, and any host <strong>of</strong> related effects dear to <strong>the</strong> group under study may yield
important insights into identity and <strong>the</strong> narratives that carry it to <strong>the</strong> next generation. The <strong>of</strong>ficial
description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Eagle, Globe and Anchor emblem as found in <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Guidebook <strong>of</strong>
Essential Subjects reads as follows:
The emblem…<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eagle, globe, and anchor. The globe and
anchor signify worldwide service and sea traditions. The spread eagle is a symbol <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation
itself. The emblem was adopted by Brigadier General Jacob Zeilin, 7 th Commandant, in 1868. 293
Far more colorful, and indicative <strong>of</strong> Marine culture, is <strong>the</strong> Marine-favored explanation penned by an
unknown poet and posted to blogs wherever Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks assemble:
We stole <strong>the</strong> eagle from <strong>the</strong> Air Force, <strong>the</strong> anchor from <strong>the</strong> Navy, and <strong>the</strong> rope from <strong>the</strong> Army.
On <strong>the</strong> 7th day, while God rested, we over-ran his perimeter and stole <strong>the</strong> globe, and we've
been running <strong>the</strong> show ever since. 294
The cockiness manifest in this rollicking depiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps’ emblem is signature Devil Dog fare.
Some in <strong>the</strong> modern Corps’ term <strong>the</strong>ir brethren a “pack <strong>of</strong> alpha males,” 295 --self selected based on <strong>the</strong>ir
exposure to <strong>the</strong> idyllic Marine image. Male virility is explicitly tied to <strong>the</strong> warrior image in most Marine
advertising across time. 296 What <strong>the</strong> Corps is <strong>of</strong>fering is a raw, brazen, male toughness. Starting in <strong>the</strong>
mid 1990s <strong>the</strong> Corps made this image explicit in <strong>the</strong>ir broadcast advertising. Brawny young men running
gauntlets <strong>of</strong> deadly devices in ancient tombs, or slaying something very close to Tolkien’s Balrog in front
<strong>of</strong> a Roman-like stadium <strong>of</strong> thousands, or playing <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> an action hero in what could be a trailer for
293
United States Marine Guidebook <strong>of</strong> Essential Subjects, (Arlington VA: United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps
Institute, 1983):2-6.
294
This particular variation accessed on 29 October 2012 at http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/marine-corpsknowledge-t1721.html.
The full poem and image depiction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eagle, globe, and anchor may be found in
Appendix C.
295
Each <strong>of</strong> whom believe “he’s <strong>the</strong> toughest guy in <strong>the</strong> room.” Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a
Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005): 144.
296
It is important to note an exception: in <strong>the</strong> post-Vietnam malaise, specifically <strong>the</strong> years 1972-75, Marines were
forced by <strong>the</strong> intensity <strong>of</strong> public mood to downplay <strong>the</strong>ir warrior spirit. Commercials <strong>of</strong> this era would come as a
shock to most in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps today. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than focusing on tip-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-spear infantry prowess <strong>the</strong> broadcast
ads encouraged recruitment via technical in-<strong>the</strong>-rear career opportunities. One particularly lightweight ad
attempts to convince females to join via a slim, nails-painted, cosmetically inclined young woman who cheerfully
announces: The Marine Corps – <strong>the</strong> Career Corps! Ads through <strong>the</strong> mid 1970s and early 1980s experimented with
dual images—one reflecting military life in <strong>the</strong> “field”: coming-<strong>of</strong>-age men running around in “cammies,” driving
tanks, and blowing things up, alongside ads <strong>of</strong> a much tamer sort: lone athletes at <strong>the</strong> top <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir game,
demonstrating physical skill with a voiceover calling out: “Go for <strong>the</strong> top. Try out for <strong>the</strong> Varsity.”
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a summer blockbuster, are each rewarded at <strong>the</strong> successful culmination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir impossible feats with
<strong>the</strong> ultimate honor: physical transformation into a full fledged Marine in dress blues. Although many
within <strong>the</strong> Corps now mock <strong>the</strong> “slay <strong>the</strong> dragon” advertising that drew <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> recruiter’s door
(especially after experiencing <strong>the</strong> repetitive “field days”—cleaning every surface in sight—<strong>of</strong> genuine
Marine Corps life), <strong>the</strong>y are also admitting that <strong>the</strong> image, on <strong>the</strong>ir eighteen year old minds, was
effective. Of <strong>the</strong> recruits he studied Ricks notes “Many…come…seeking a new identity…<strong>the</strong>
straightforward and simple definition <strong>of</strong> manhood <strong>of</strong>fered by <strong>the</strong> Marines.” 297 Nathaniel Fick, in his
insightful memoire, notes that this mentality explains his reach to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer corps as well: “I wanted
something…transformative. Something that might kill me—or leave me better, stronger, more
capable.” 298
A favorite Devil Dog “truth,”—ra<strong>the</strong>r difficult to test—is that U.S. Marine Corps boot camp is <strong>the</strong>
“toughest recruit training in <strong>the</strong> world.” Some excerpts drawn from Larry Smith’s collection <strong>of</strong> Drill
Instructor (DI) oral histories include: “[A]fter a while you’d take pride in training in misery…;” “If you
don’t get discipline in boot camp, it’s too late to get it in combat. It’s technique and discipline. The
more we sweat in peacetime, <strong>the</strong> less we bleed in war. No Marine ever died in his own sweat;” “By
emphasizing tradition, unit cohesiveness, harder discipline, being harder on <strong>the</strong>m physically and
psychologically, we’re able to mold <strong>the</strong>m quicker;” Of <strong>the</strong>ir training methods, “A lot <strong>of</strong> people thought
we were extremists but, yeah, we have to be, because we’re gonna be <strong>the</strong> guys who are killing <strong>the</strong> bad
guys.” 299
Extremist methods came under serious scrutiny after <strong>the</strong> 1956 Ribbon Creek incident in which six
Marines drowned in a late night punitive march through a river. Methods up to that era “had grown
seriously out <strong>of</strong> hand” including “’thumping,’ punching recruits in <strong>the</strong> stomach, burning recruits with
cigarettes, forcing <strong>the</strong>m to eat <strong>the</strong> butts, stacking <strong>the</strong>m in trash bins, and making <strong>the</strong>m run a ‘belt line,’
which was a gauntlet <strong>of</strong> belt-swinging fellow recruits.” 300 Of <strong>the</strong> changes that descended on boot camp
training methods post-Ribbon Creek, including new kinder, gentler boot camp standards which
encourage DIs to train by example and persuasion and to do so without using pr<strong>of</strong>anity, one DI mused:
“[T]hey say this is <strong>the</strong> roughest boot camp <strong>the</strong>re is. Well, I’ll be honest with you: It’s not really that
rough. I’ve seen o<strong>the</strong>r boot camps in <strong>the</strong> Army that are a little bit more intense in certain areas than we
are, but we have that mystique, that thing that says you’re a Marine.” 301
Allan Millet has compiled, to date, <strong>the</strong> most exhaustive published history on <strong>the</strong> Corps and notes that
<strong>the</strong> Marine elitist image began early on, founded in <strong>the</strong> concept that every Marine is a volunteer. Elitist
notions fostered across <strong>the</strong> early years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century were based in <strong>the</strong> Marine mind on
military appearance (an attribute still conspicuously emphasized today), strict obedience to orders, and
297
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 44.
298
Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
4.
299
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2006): 27, 51, 103, 86.
300 Smith, The Few and The Proud, 112.
301 Smith, The Few and The Proud, 91.
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disciplined behavior. These were burnished in an effort to differentiate Marines from <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers and
sailors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Navy. 302 Interestingly, Millet’s own account does not seem to bear out
“strict obedience to orders” as an attribute <strong>of</strong> behavior for <strong>the</strong> same time period. This is not entirely
unusual. Discrepancies in identity standards and actual behavior are not uncommon within culture
groups but can provoke defensive reactions from <strong>the</strong> group in question when deviations from <strong>the</strong>
identity ideal are raised to public view. The ideal, even in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> contrary evidence in behavior, is
held up as reality.
Cameron claims that <strong>the</strong> higher standards Marines hold <strong>the</strong>mselves to started out as an abstract
concept, a standard <strong>of</strong> behavior “so high that it was intended to compensate for <strong>the</strong> [M]arines’ sense <strong>of</strong>
inferiority” suffered by <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial grounding between <strong>the</strong> Army and Navy services in <strong>the</strong>
interwar years. 303 Cameron may be right about standards, but Marine bravado and sense <strong>of</strong> elitism
easily pre-dates <strong>the</strong> interwar identity crises 304 and has only gained momentum in its move forward in
history.
A detailed study <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps boot camp unlocks some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mystery as regards this institution’s
intensive bro<strong>the</strong>rhood and esprit de corps. For <strong>the</strong> recruit, boot camp itself is less about military training
and more about “earning” <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> Marine. For <strong>the</strong> Drill Instructors (DIs) responsible for <strong>the</strong>m, it is
about “making Marines.” The Marine handbook on Sustaining <strong>the</strong> Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps
MCRP 6-11D) reminds mentors that “Our Corps does two things for America: we make Marines and we
win our nation’s battles.” 305 Victor Krulak <strong>of</strong> First to Fight fame sees “making Marines” as an
expectation <strong>of</strong>, and obligation to, <strong>the</strong> nation: “The third thing [<strong>the</strong> American people] believe about <strong>the</strong>
Marines is that our Corps is downright good for <strong>the</strong> manhood <strong>of</strong> our country; that <strong>the</strong> Marines are
masters <strong>of</strong> a form <strong>of</strong> unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable
citizens—citizens into whose hands <strong>the</strong> nation’s affairs may safely be entrusted.” 306
“Making Marines” at this stage is more form than function. Civilian identity is being stripped and
replaced with Marine posture, reflexes, priorities, and attitude. Disciplined courtesy, strict codes <strong>of</strong>
appearance, tightly orchestrated movement, and respectful language are drilled into recruits as Marine
codes <strong>of</strong> conduct. “Marine Corps basic training is more a matter <strong>of</strong> cultural indoctrination than <strong>of</strong>
teaching soldiering, which comes later, at combat training or, for <strong>the</strong> real grunts, at infantry school.
Before <strong>the</strong>y can learn to fight, <strong>the</strong>y must learn to be Marines.” 307 The harshest punitive measures are
not meted out for failures <strong>of</strong> martial skill but ra<strong>the</strong>r for breaches <strong>of</strong> Marine cultural protocol. 308 The
302
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: This History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, The Revised and Expanded
Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): xvii.
303
Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 36.
304
Sergeant Clarence B. Procter <strong>of</strong>fers self-congratulatory prose typical <strong>of</strong> Gazette articles in <strong>the</strong> 1913-1918 era
when he “modestly” defends <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n contemporary recruiting slogans used by <strong>the</strong> Corps: “Recruiting – Past,
Present and Future,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1918): 33.
305
Sustaining <strong>the</strong> Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps MCRP 6-11D): unpaginated introduction.
306
Krulak, First to Fight, xv.
307
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 37.
308
Aaron O’Connell, Underdogs, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012): 35-36.
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Corps is overt about this core feature <strong>of</strong> initial training. In its seminal doctrine: Warfighting, Corps
general <strong>of</strong>ficers state: “All <strong>of</strong>ficers and enlisted Marines undergo similar entry-level training which is, in
effect, a socialization process. This training provides all Marines a common experience, a proud
heritage, a set <strong>of</strong> values, and a common bond <strong>of</strong> comradeship. It is <strong>the</strong> essential first step in <strong>the</strong> making
<strong>of</strong> a Marine.” 309
Essential to that transformation is <strong>the</strong> stripping <strong>of</strong> individuality in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> team. When “boots” first
arrive at Parris Island <strong>the</strong>y are positioned on yellow footprints so closely aligned that “newcomers can’t
be seen as individuals. Standing nearly heel to toe in <strong>the</strong> dark night <strong>the</strong>ir faces are hardly visible, and
<strong>the</strong>ir bodies become one mass. The effect is intentional: Marine Corps culture is <strong>the</strong> culture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
group, made up <strong>of</strong> members who are anonymous.” 310 Nathaniel Fick notes that <strong>of</strong>ficers are socialized
<strong>the</strong> same way. Being called an “individual” is a pr<strong>of</strong>ound insult, spat out as if it were a “synonym for
child molester.” 311 In both enlisted and <strong>of</strong>ficer training it is repeatedly emphasized to would-be Marines
that <strong>the</strong>y have left a culture <strong>of</strong> self gratification, <strong>the</strong> “me” society, for one <strong>of</strong> self discipline and a focus
on <strong>the</strong> group. Drill serves <strong>the</strong> same function, to build unit cohesion and discipline. 312
Enlisted recruits are required to adopt a submissive posture by addressing <strong>the</strong>mselves in low-ranking
third person (“This recruit requests permission to…). Only if <strong>the</strong>y successfully endure <strong>the</strong> physical and
mental tests imposed upon <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>y will have <strong>the</strong> privilege <strong>of</strong> calling <strong>the</strong>mselves “Marines.” Slips <strong>of</strong>
address are harshly reprimanded. E.B. Sledge remembers his World War II era DI booming, “Your soul
may belong to Jesus, but your ass belongs to <strong>the</strong> Marines. You people are recruits. You’re not Marines.
You may not have what it takes to be Marines.” 313 Young men and women who successfully run this
gauntlet are preconditioned by Marine Corps advertising (Maybe you can be one <strong>of</strong> us!) 314 and <strong>the</strong>ir
American sense <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps elitism for <strong>the</strong> emotional peak <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transformative moment. In 1976
<strong>the</strong> Gazette selected an essay amongst <strong>the</strong> many submitted to “represent what we believe many
Marines feel on <strong>the</strong> 201 st anniversary” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. In it GySgt John H. L<strong>of</strong>land III captures Marine
sentiments at <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> boot camp:
My esprit de corps, superciliousness, if you prefer, began at ‘boot camp,’ or Marine recruit
training. There I was treated with contempt, marched a thousand miles, put through a million
drilled acts <strong>of</strong> obedience, taunted with <strong>the</strong> fact that I volunteered, taught to take aim on a
309
Warfighting, MCDP 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997): 59.
310
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 29.
311
Nathanial Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
12.
312
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 40, 43, 88.; GySgt William Price, Devil Dog
Diary: A Day-by-Day Account <strong>of</strong> U.S. Marine Corps Basic Training, (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, Inc, 2008).; Larry
Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2006); Richard Stack, Warriors, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975); James B. Woulfe, Into <strong>the</strong>
Crucible: Making Marines for <strong>the</strong> 21 st Century, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998); The Marines, PBS Documentary,
(2007).
313
Sledge, With <strong>the</strong> Old Breed, : 8.
314
This Marine Corps slogan ran consistently through advertising <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s through <strong>the</strong> early 1990s.
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twelve inch diameter target five hundred yards away—and hit it. Then at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong> this it
was hesitatingly admitted that I just might make a Marine. To say I was seething with pride at
<strong>the</strong> successful accomplishment <strong>of</strong> ‘boot camp’ would be an understatement. 315
Becoming part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps includes embracing, and being able to reproduce, Marine Corps history.
James Burk notes that “[a] diffuse but still important, influence on military culture is <strong>the</strong> collective
memory or imagination <strong>of</strong> past war that is widely shared among members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military and is
frequently relied on as a normative guide for behavior in <strong>the</strong> present.” He cautions, “[C]ollective
memories are not histories, characterized by concern for detail and accuracy; <strong>the</strong>y are symbolic
constructions condensing events to communicate <strong>the</strong>ir essential meaning simply and powerfully.” 316
Although T. R. Fehrenbach’s U.S. Marines in Action admits to being less fact and more fable, he makes
some ra<strong>the</strong>r good points about <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> studying legend in order to understand culture: “The story
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first century <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marines is as much composed <strong>of</strong> legend as <strong>of</strong> fact. To say this is
to do <strong>the</strong> Corps no disservice, for legend is as important to a fighting organization as ever any
fact…Legends give <strong>the</strong>m a code to live by, a standard to measure up to.” 317 Terry Terriff agrees: “The
history <strong>of</strong> a military organization, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> organization itself or <strong>of</strong> specific historical individual
members, furnishes <strong>the</strong> primary source material that informs understandings <strong>of</strong> self-identity. The
narratives that constitute cultural identity, however, are not always composed solely <strong>of</strong> history per se,
for <strong>the</strong>y may mix historical fact with <strong>the</strong> apocryphal and <strong>the</strong> mythical.” 318
Marines take this to heart. Their “history” is <strong>the</strong>ir religion. 319 History is not only taught in <strong>the</strong> classroom,
it is woven into <strong>the</strong> discourse and formal construction <strong>of</strong> all recruit training. For instance, each major
requirement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Crucible”—<strong>the</strong> brutal culmination event <strong>of</strong> recruit training—is dedicated to, and
framed around, a well known Marine Corps Medal <strong>of</strong> Honor winner. 320 Marines <strong>of</strong> all ranks are
consciously aware that member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Corps know and promote both service and unit history 321 in a
depth that shames <strong>the</strong>ir sister services. 322 Some are even ra<strong>the</strong>r clear as to why:
315 L<strong>of</strong>land, “I am a Marine!,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1976): 23. See also GySgt William Price, Devil Dog
Diary, (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, Inc, 2008): 188-194; Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership
Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2011):x.
316 James Burk, “Military <strong>Culture</strong>,” Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume 2, (San Diego, CA:
Academic Press, 1999): 457.
317
T. R. Fehrenbach, U.S. Marines in Action: Two Hundred Years <strong>of</strong> Guts and Glory, (New York, NY: An [e-reads]
Book, original copyright 1962, e-reads publication 2003): 1.
318
Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> in <strong>the</strong> US Marine Corps,”
Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2006): 217.
319 Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
72. Aaron O’Connell provides an interesting discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> similarities between Marine Corps culture and
religious orders, noting, among o<strong>the</strong>r features, that members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps draw regularly on <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong>
religion, practice extreme discipline, engage in rituals, and cultivate a pr<strong>of</strong>ound connection to <strong>the</strong> spiritual where
Marine “ancestors” reside. O’Connell, Underdogs: 5-8.
320 James B. Woulfe, Into <strong>the</strong> Crucible: Making Marines for <strong>the</strong> 21 st Century, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998):
foreword by Lt. General Victor Krulak, ix.
321 The U.S. Marine Corps has a staff within <strong>the</strong> Historical Division devoted entirely to researching and relaying unit
histories. Marines entering a unit learn its heritage, heroes, battle glories and salt stories early on. Marines sealed
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During [<strong>the</strong> boot camp] process, we all acquired a number <strong>of</strong> illusions, all valuable. We all firmly
believed that in its history, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps had never failed at anything, and that upon our
shoulders rested <strong>the</strong> awesome responsibility <strong>of</strong> upholding <strong>the</strong> most spectacular military
tradition known to man. This overall esprit de corps may suffer in translation over <strong>the</strong> years, but
<strong>the</strong> basic concept remains <strong>the</strong> same: for all <strong>of</strong> us in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, attitude is a weapon. 323
New recruits are bound to this legacy during <strong>the</strong>ir training in boot camp and forever <strong>the</strong>rafter. Marine
heroes are set up as mentors <strong>of</strong> sorts – men continually watching <strong>the</strong>ir Corps from beyond <strong>the</strong> grave.
Woe betide any newly minted Marine who lets <strong>the</strong>m down. 324 Writing in 1944, Colonel Charles A. Wynn
tried to capture <strong>the</strong> mythical transformation from recruit to Marine and <strong>the</strong> uncanny ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Corps that takes place in <strong>the</strong> souls <strong>of</strong> young men in such a short period <strong>of</strong> time. Part <strong>of</strong> this is a “gifting”
<strong>of</strong> history, legends, places gone, bandits fought, and valor won from one generation to <strong>the</strong> next:
The newcomers can only ride with <strong>the</strong> tide, and every last one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m is proud to do just that.
The newcomer who has never visited any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> places which are second homes to <strong>the</strong>
oldtimers, never<strong>the</strong>less partake <strong>of</strong> those places. They are his vicariously. The oldtimer presents
<strong>the</strong>m to him when he enters <strong>the</strong> Corps and he, <strong>the</strong> newcomer, instantly enjoys a feeling <strong>of</strong>
ownership, <strong>of</strong> sharing…
I’ve even heard an eighteen-year-old private first class, begin a lecture to a platoon <strong>of</strong> recruits
with, “In all my long career in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps…” And have been amazed to see <strong>the</strong> platoon,
sometimes containing men twice as old as <strong>the</strong> instructor, “take it” without batting an eye. I
don’t encourage lying, but in his own mind that lecturer was not lying. When he said, “my long
career in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” he simply meant <strong>the</strong> very thing I am trying to analyze: his career
was as long as that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oldest timer, because he shared, from <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> enlistment, <strong>the</strong>
entire tradition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps with every oldtimer in it, including <strong>the</strong> honored dead and <strong>the</strong>
gloriously living.
By inducting a “rookie” into <strong>the</strong> Marine “family”:
[T]he oldtime drill master can…convince <strong>the</strong> rookie that he is an integral member <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong>
those units in which <strong>the</strong> preceding one is contained, right up to and including <strong>the</strong> Corps itself, to
such an extent that <strong>the</strong> rookie, almost from <strong>the</strong> beginning, regards <strong>the</strong> Corps as his personal
property, for whose honor he will fight anybody else to <strong>the</strong> death. 325
Tom Ricks validates that this trend continues in Marine boot camps today. Drill Instructors (DIs) make
first person ownership references <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>the</strong> recruit is aspiring to, using phrases like: “my bus,” “my
to <strong>the</strong>ir unit via this heritage speak in condescending tones about Army equivalents who know nothing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unit
heritage to which <strong>the</strong>y belong.
322 Maj Ben Connable, USMC, “<strong>Culture</strong> Warriors: Marine Corps Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and Adaption to Cultural
Terrain,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/4-connable.pdf, accessed 29
August 2011: 4.
323 GySgt John H. L<strong>of</strong>land III, “I am a Marine!,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1976): 23
324 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 88.
325 Colonel Charles A. Wynn, USMC, “A Marine is Different,” Marine Corps Gazette (May 1944): 14-15.
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island” (for Parris Island), and “my Corps.” 326 Once he owns <strong>the</strong> Corps, and <strong>the</strong> Corps owns him, a young
Marine draws “inspiration to face danger, and reassurance that death in battle isn’t consignment to
oblivion. His buddies and all future Marines will keep <strong>the</strong> faith.” 327
For all its attention to history, <strong>the</strong> Corps has been selective in <strong>the</strong> history exploited and learned. Despite
<strong>the</strong>ir long history with small wars, <strong>the</strong> Corps <strong>of</strong> today focuses almost exclusively on heroic acts in
conventional conflicts. Before Belleau Wood or Mount Suribachi, Marines successfully wrested pride
from <strong>the</strong>ir small war exploits. In 1917 The Marine Corps Gazette ran a piece entitled “The Marines Have
Landed” which lauded <strong>the</strong> Corps as “…a veteran body <strong>of</strong> seasoned <strong>of</strong>ficers and men to whom <strong>the</strong> seizing
<strong>of</strong> coast towns, <strong>the</strong> razing <strong>of</strong> supposedly impregnable native strongholds, and <strong>the</strong> secrets <strong>of</strong> bush
fighting and street fighting in tropical countries became an open book.” 328 For <strong>the</strong> modern Corps,
however, any valor won in those conflicts is trumped by <strong>the</strong> legends <strong>of</strong> conventional war.
This may, in part, be explained in terms o<strong>the</strong>r than preferred modes <strong>of</strong> warfare. The premium here may
be <strong>the</strong> opportunity provided by conventional conflicts for favorable comparison vis a vis <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
armed forces. For instance, although World War I and <strong>the</strong> so called Banana Wars were prosecuted
simultaneously, one might explain <strong>the</strong> dearth <strong>of</strong> attention paid to <strong>the</strong> Marines who fought in <strong>the</strong>
sou<strong>the</strong>rn hemisphere as being, in part, a result <strong>of</strong> having no Army <strong>the</strong>re to compare <strong>the</strong>mselves to. In
“The Great War” <strong>the</strong> Corps fought with and beside o<strong>the</strong>r armies, enabling comparisons <strong>of</strong> fighting spirit
and valor. Within American ranks “<strong>the</strong>re was…a fierce rivalry between <strong>the</strong> Marines and <strong>the</strong> infantry”
and fortune smiled on <strong>the</strong> Marines—<strong>of</strong>fering <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> opportunity to demonstrate <strong>the</strong>ir training,
discipline, and skill in an epic battle which “lifted [<strong>the</strong>m] briefly from <strong>the</strong> anonymity <strong>of</strong> [<strong>the</strong>] war.” 329
Belleau Wood heroics outshone, in disproportionately reported measure, <strong>the</strong> efforts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Army
brethren in <strong>the</strong> press back home.
If Belleau Wood provided <strong>the</strong> Corps with happy notoriety, World War II was “<strong>the</strong> conflict that did more
than any o<strong>the</strong>r to elevate <strong>the</strong> Corps from a naval police force into a legitimate fighting force that could
stand as an alternative to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army.” 330 The iconic symbol <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stuff Marines are made <strong>of</strong> is <strong>the</strong>
Iwo Jima flag raising. Iwo Jima has been referenced as <strong>the</strong> “signature battle” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps 331 and is
commemorated in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial Marine Corps monument as well as <strong>the</strong> physical pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps Museum. Marines relish <strong>the</strong> idea that <strong>the</strong>ir lifting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flag is <strong>the</strong> most recognized and most
reproduced image in <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> photography. 332 As proud moments for <strong>the</strong> Corps go, <strong>the</strong> lodestar is
326 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 64.
327 Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
72.
328 Maj. Frank E. Evans, U.S.M.C., “The Marines Have Landed,” Marine Corps Gazette, Sep 1917; 2, 3; archived in
ProQuest Direct Complete pg. 213.
329 Capt. John W. Thomason Jr., “The Marine Brigade,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1928), in Lt. Col.
Charles P. Neimeyer, USMC (Ret) ed., On <strong>the</strong> Corps: USMC Wisdom from <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, Marine Corps
Gazette, and Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008): 33.
330 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 37.
331 Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): xx.
332 James Bradley, Flags <strong>of</strong> Our Fa<strong>the</strong>rs, (New York: Bantam Books, 2000): 3.
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Iwo Jima. One Sergeant Major quipped that, for a Marine, a trip to Mount Suribachi “would be like a
Muslim going to Mecca.” 333
A paradoxical side-effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps’ entry and heroic action in World War II, was a loss, or at least
significant lull, in respect towards many <strong>of</strong> its saltier traditions. Historian Colonel R. D. Heinl claims,
“World War II…dislocated <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps.” This due to “<strong>the</strong> twenty-five fold expansion, short-cut
wartime training, and…massive infusion <strong>of</strong> non-pr<strong>of</strong>essionals;” but perhaps most importantly <strong>the</strong>
“[u]nification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces—levelling, [sic] standardizing, bureaucratic, relentless, hostile to
<strong>Service</strong> pride and traditions—[which] had as an unvoiced but deadly real tenet <strong>the</strong> mongrelization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
<strong>Service</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> humbling <strong>of</strong> elite units and <strong>the</strong> elite spirit.” Marine traditions did suffer during this era and
much <strong>of</strong> its historical education was dropped from its schoolhouses. 334 From this perspective one might
argue that it is remarkable that Marine Corps culture has remained intact and streng<strong>the</strong>ned despite its
experiences in <strong>the</strong> two great wars ra<strong>the</strong>r than because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m.
The general notion <strong>of</strong> Marine elitism, however, did not seem to suffer in <strong>the</strong> aftermath <strong>of</strong> World War II,
and was about to receive a significant boost in Korea. The 1950 “Frozen Chosin” Reservoir episode
supplies <strong>the</strong> closest thing to a scientifically controlled experiment that warfare ever likely allows – and
one in which <strong>the</strong> Marines clearly outperformed <strong>the</strong> Army. Millet, who typically restrains his prose to an
academic tone when writing on <strong>the</strong> Marines, could not resist a panegyric for those Marines who held
<strong>the</strong> line in sub-zero temperatures in Korea:
Ravaged by <strong>the</strong> cold…<strong>the</strong> Marines fought with unmatched ferocity and determination. Some <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> individual and small-unit heroics matched Greek and Nordic legends—except that <strong>the</strong>y really
happened.
Of <strong>the</strong> Marines necessary retreat, a “retrograde movement,” he writes:
General Smith correctly called <strong>the</strong> operation “an attack in ano<strong>the</strong>r direction” in tactical terms,
but for <strong>the</strong> UNC, with <strong>the</strong> Eighth Army reeling back in eastern North Korea, <strong>the</strong> campaign was
part <strong>of</strong> a major strategic defeat. For <strong>the</strong> Marines, <strong>the</strong> campaign was a victory, for <strong>the</strong> march out
from <strong>the</strong> Chosin saved X Corps and virtually destroyed seven PLA divisions. The 1 st Division did
so against heavy odds and at center stage for world military and press observers. 335
333
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): 271.
334
Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., “The Marine and His Traditions,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1964): 23-25.
335
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: This History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, The Revised and Expanded
Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 493. For additional accounts see Edwin Howard Simmons
Brigadier General USMCR, The United States Marines: A History, 4 th Edition, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2003):195-210; T.R. Fehrenbach, U.S. Marines in Action: Two Hundred Years <strong>of</strong> Guts and Glory, (New York, NY: ereads
Book, 1962, 2003): 155-165; and Craig M. Cameron, who writes “Like Guadalcanal, enough has been written
on <strong>the</strong> legend <strong>of</strong> ‘frozen Chosin’ that fact and fantasy have tended to merge.” Cameron, American Samurai,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 228-230.
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At a cost <strong>of</strong> almost seven thousand casualties (about half from critical frostbite), <strong>the</strong> 1 st Marine
Division had polished <strong>the</strong> Corps’s reputation for valor and skill at a time when Army divisions <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Eighth Army appeared infected with defeatism. 336
It didn’t hurt <strong>the</strong> Marine ego any that <strong>the</strong> Army’s own General Douglas MacArthur reported: “I have just
returned from visiting <strong>the</strong> Marines at <strong>the</strong> front, and <strong>the</strong>re is not a finer fighting organization in <strong>the</strong>
world.” 337 Marine experiences in conventional war only reinforced for <strong>the</strong> Marines, and for <strong>the</strong>
American public, what Marines had long suspected:
Here's health to you and to our Corps
Which we are proud to serve;
In many a strife we've fought for life
And never lost our nerve.
If <strong>the</strong> Army and <strong>the</strong> Navy
Ever look on Heaven's scenes,
They will find <strong>the</strong> streets are guarded
By United States Marines. 338
Even after <strong>the</strong> malaise imposed by <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War 339 Krulak would claim: “Woven through [<strong>the</strong>
Marine] sense <strong>of</strong> belonging, like a steel thread, is an elitist spirit. Marines are convinced that, being few
in number, 340 <strong>the</strong>y are selective, better, and above all, different.” 341 Aaron O’Connell, writing on Marine
Corps culture, sees this concept as foundational: “At <strong>the</strong> root <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ ideas about <strong>the</strong>mselves
were narratives <strong>of</strong> exceptionalism—an ideology that made <strong>the</strong>m feel separate from and superior to
everyone else, both soldiers and civilians. This exceptionalism, with its attendant sentiments <strong>of</strong>
insularity and mistrust <strong>of</strong> outsiders, was <strong>the</strong> first principle <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps culture.” 342 In a valiant
continuation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “first principle”, Marines openly celebrate <strong>the</strong>ir unprecedented global role and
336
Millet: 495.
337
A Marine “favorite,” this citation appears nearly anywhere collections <strong>of</strong> Marine quotes are assembled,
including doctrinal texts: see Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Handbook for Marine NCOs, 4 th Edition,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996): 8.
338
Third verse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Hymn. Known as <strong>the</strong> oldest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. military an<strong>the</strong>ms (it was in familiar usage by
<strong>the</strong> mid-1800s), its precise origination date and author are unknown. It was formalized as <strong>the</strong> Marine an<strong>the</strong>m in
1929. Marion F. Sturkey, Warrior <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines, (Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International,
2010): 61-62. A complete set <strong>of</strong> lyrics may be found in Sturkey’s work or on <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial Marine Corps public site:
http://www.marines.com/history-heritage/traditions.
339
Of that period Col Gary Anderson USMC (Ret) recounts: “When <strong>the</strong> last U.S. Marine departed from Saigon in <strong>the</strong>
1975 evacuation operation from Vietnam, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps was perhaps at its lowest point since <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Civil War. Drugs were rampant, racial unrest swept <strong>the</strong> barracks, and readiness was at a 20 th century low point.”
Anderson, “Biography <strong>of</strong> an Icon,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Novemeber 2012): 84.
340
Shakespeare’s Henry V reference is a favorite among Marines: “We few, we happy few, we band <strong>of</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rs…”
It is referenced in colloquial terms, on blog postings, and even in <strong>of</strong>ficial publications. See also Sustaining <strong>the</strong>
Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps MCRP 6-11D) : 1.
341
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 155.
342
Aaron O’Connell, Underdogs: The Making <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Modern Marine Corps, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2012): 4.
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elite stature. They see <strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong> world’s premier Marine Corps force (emulated since <strong>the</strong> WWII
days by any who can manage it), an institution unique not just within <strong>the</strong> U.S. defense structure, but
across every foreign clime and wet space. 343
And at what are <strong>the</strong>y exceptional, superior, “better”? Above all: Fighting. In his 1944 attempt to
analyze what makes <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps so special, what force binds its bro<strong>the</strong>rhood, inspires its esprit de
corps, Colonel Charles A. Wynn writes:
It is something deep down inside <strong>the</strong> soul <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps which I have <strong>of</strong>ten tried to analyze. It
isn’t because <strong>the</strong> Marines have served in every corner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world; <strong>the</strong> Navy has done that. So
has <strong>the</strong> Army. It isn’t because <strong>the</strong> Marines have won many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> greatest battles; some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
greatest battles fought by our forces have not used a single Marine. But ask a man why he
enlisted in <strong>the</strong> Corps and his answer is always <strong>the</strong> same: “It’s <strong>the</strong> best fighting force in <strong>the</strong>
world.” 344
GySgt L<strong>of</strong>land <strong>of</strong>fers prose equally lyrical: “Some may refer to it as moral superiority. I call it esprit de
corps. I know in my own mind that I am among <strong>the</strong> best fighting men in <strong>the</strong> world. I harbor firmly <strong>the</strong>
belief that <strong>the</strong>re are none better. I don’t believe I’ll ever lose, because I don’t know <strong>of</strong> anyone good
enough to beat me. For <strong>the</strong> past two hundred yards I’ve done it, and I’ll continue to do it, because I
think I can.” 345
Marines were unabashed in turn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century advertising about <strong>the</strong>ir sheer enjoyment <strong>of</strong>
fighting and Marines continue that <strong>the</strong>me (in a fashion congruent with modern sensibilities) today. 346 A
ra<strong>the</strong>r unusual (for <strong>the</strong> Marines) Corps ad campaign surfaced in <strong>the</strong> 1970s claiming “Nobody likes to
fight…but somebody has got to know how.” Nathaniel Fick claims, unsurprisingly, that “[i]t was dropped
because Marines did like to fight and aspiring Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers wanted to fight.” 347 Marines see
<strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong> premier <strong>of</strong>fensive force, —not an occupation force (despite a long occupation duty
history)—driven by “an unyielding conviction that <strong>the</strong>y exist to fight.” 348 Craig Cameron, with his aptly
titled book, summarized <strong>the</strong> Marine fighting ethic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World War II years. Focusing on <strong>the</strong> dialectic
between institutional identity and <strong>the</strong> increasing awe <strong>of</strong> its domestic American public Cameron
characterizes <strong>the</strong> result: “[M]arines regarded <strong>the</strong>mselves as warrior representatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir country, a
kind <strong>of</strong> American samurai class.” 349 Marines are made to “locate, close with, and kill <strong>the</strong> enemy.” 350
343 th
Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Handbook for Marine NCOs, 4 Edition, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1996):8-9.
344
Colonel Charles A. Wynn, USMC, “A Marine is Different,” Marine Corps Gazette (May 1944): 13.
345
L<strong>of</strong>land, “I am a Marine!,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1976): 23.
346
Less “congruent with modern sensibilities” are <strong>the</strong> fight oriented bumper stickers sold in Marine shops. These
portray a rawer form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fighting ethic within contemporary Marine Corps culture. See subsection: “Fighter
Identity & Ethos” in Appendix D: Marine Narratives.
347
Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
2005):33.
348
Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2011):xi.
349
Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 30.
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It provokes a wry smile to note that in Krulak’s seminal text First to Fight, he begins his description <strong>of</strong>
Marines with a first chapter titled “The Thinkers” and <strong>the</strong>n proceeds to fill those pages with warrior tales
<strong>of</strong> superb fighting skills. Fighting valor is a focus all through <strong>the</strong> book, although <strong>the</strong> specific label “The
Fighters” is reserved for <strong>the</strong> final section. 351 Even in an era <strong>of</strong> population-centric and civic-action heavy
counterinsurgency campaigns Carlton W. Kent, <strong>the</strong> Sergeant Major in 2008, struck an honest note in an
interview to Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck magazine. He stated simply that all Marines need to get into combat. Marines
“get bored” when not in combat. When deployed <strong>the</strong>y expect to “engage <strong>the</strong> enemy.” 352 They are
warriors. 353 Warriors fight. Although versatile and committed to “doing windows,” when <strong>the</strong> mission
requires significant down-time and involves limited combat or an excess <strong>of</strong> civic action projects, Marines
are in danger <strong>of</strong> restless behavior. 354
The Marine Corps is built around <strong>the</strong> infantry. Only <strong>the</strong> Marines among U.S. defense institutions has
bestowed its name on <strong>the</strong> enlisted ranks. The Army’s men are <strong>of</strong>ficers and soldiers, <strong>the</strong> Navy has
<strong>of</strong>ficers and sailors, <strong>the</strong> Air Force is populated by <strong>of</strong>ficers and airmen, but <strong>the</strong> Marines are <strong>of</strong>ficers and
Marines. The Marine orientation is “on <strong>the</strong> embattled man on <strong>the</strong> front lines.” 355 The listing <strong>of</strong> Marine
Corps heroes—<strong>the</strong> “legends” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps—is a listing <strong>of</strong> non-commissioned <strong>of</strong>ficers (NCOs) and
subordinates. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se men went on to become commissioned <strong>of</strong>ficers, but most <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong>ir
legends were made in enlisted ranks. 356 The two preferred nicknames: Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck and Devil Dog are
celebrations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> man at <strong>the</strong> tip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spear – <strong>the</strong> infantryman, <strong>the</strong> grunt.
Commandant Charles Krulak echoes Commandants <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past in calling <strong>the</strong> infantry “our most precious
asset.” 357 This valuation is internalized and assumed by grunts <strong>the</strong>mselves. More derisive than any
o<strong>the</strong>r label within <strong>the</strong> Corps is POG: People O<strong>the</strong>r than Grunts – <strong>the</strong> guys in <strong>the</strong> rear. No o<strong>the</strong>r group
suffers more than POGs at <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> biting Marine humor: not sailors, not <strong>of</strong>ficers. 358 A 1920
350
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): xix.
351
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999).
352 th
R.R. Keene and Sara Wirtala Bock, “An Exclusive Interview with <strong>the</strong> 16 Sergeant Major <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,”
Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck November 2008 Vol XCI, No. 11, accessed on 09/01/2011 at http://www.lea<strong>the</strong>rneckmagazinedigital.com/lea<strong>the</strong>rneckmagazine-share/200811?sub_id=ClMmlQcULsN7W#pg2
353
A self imposed identity: “Our warrior ethos is and will continue to be <strong>the</strong> Corps' hallmark.” Commandant
Michael W. Hagee, “A Message from <strong>the</strong> Commandant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Nov 2004):
12.
354
When asked what Marines do with <strong>the</strong>ir down-time, one Recon Marine—a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elite, and one who
loves his Corps—responded with wry warning: “Marines are, like, dumb. Like, really, really dumb. I mean, like,
<strong>the</strong>y’re intelligent, but <strong>the</strong>y’re also, like, dumb, like if you leave <strong>the</strong>m in a room <strong>the</strong>y’ll figure a way how to blow
<strong>the</strong> room up with nothing in <strong>the</strong> room except for <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong> room.” Veterans History Project, file AFC
2001/001/78228 MS02.
355
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 19, 192.
356 th
For a sampling see Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Handbook for Marine NCOs, 4 Edition, (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996): 3-4.
357
Sustaining <strong>the</strong> Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps MCRP 6-11D): unpaginated introduction.
358
A significant percentage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> widely popular Marine-based comic strip Terminal Lance (found at
http://terminallance.com/) is dedicated to taking punches at POGs. For typical YouTube fare see POGs v. Grunts:
http://terminallance.com/forum/index.php?topic=6962.0
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Gazette article highlighted <strong>the</strong> concern that some within <strong>the</strong> Corps had <strong>the</strong> feeling that even aviators
were “not real Marines.” 359 Divisions <strong>of</strong> this sort continue as reflected by <strong>the</strong> historical fact that <strong>the</strong> vast
majority <strong>of</strong> Commandant appointments have favored infantry over all o<strong>the</strong>r specialties. The current
Commandant, General James F. Amos, is <strong>the</strong> first Naval Aviator to hold <strong>the</strong> Marines’ premier post. Still,
<strong>the</strong> attitude persists. “For many [in <strong>the</strong> Corps] <strong>the</strong>re is infantry, and <strong>the</strong>n everything else.” 360 Even
<strong>of</strong>ficers are told that <strong>the</strong>y are “only support.” A Marine mess hall ritual emphasizes leadership support
as well as <strong>the</strong> essential nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lowest ranks: privates eat first, <strong>of</strong>ficers eat last. 361
Fur<strong>the</strong>r homage to grunt level Marines may be experienced walking <strong>the</strong> chambers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Museum. The museum is very clearly a celebration <strong>of</strong> front line men. 362 Not equipment, or institutions,
or armor—Marines; Marines in <strong>the</strong> messy, grueling tasks <strong>of</strong> fighting war. In a bow to those men, every
Marine depicted in mannequin form in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps museum has been individually crafted based
on a real person—a genuine Marine. Living Marines’ faces stare back at onlookers who come to see
what <strong>the</strong> Corps is about. It is about fighting men.
Role Conception
Role might be considered <strong>the</strong> first amongst norms or, alternatively, <strong>the</strong> flagpole for identity. Role may,
as a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, function both ways—serving as a bridge <strong>of</strong> sorts connecting <strong>the</strong> two cultural realms.
The Marine Corps case makes clear that role conception is a key aspect <strong>of</strong> identity, but is not <strong>the</strong> only,
nor perhaps even primary feature. Who we are can remain a somewhat distinctive space from what we
do. The Marine Corps’ story is one <strong>of</strong> a ra<strong>the</strong>r consistent identity—elitist and Fight! oriented—stretched
across episodes <strong>of</strong> significant role shift. Even <strong>the</strong> truncated historical era evaluated here: <strong>the</strong> Banana
War years 1915-1934 through <strong>the</strong> Vietnam era 1965-1972, is rife with significant role flux within <strong>the</strong>
Corps.
The first Commandant to set a mark in <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gazette 363 for Marine Corps role identity was <strong>the</strong>
highly popular and articulate John A. Lejeune: “But let us not forget <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> our existence, which is
to make and keep <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps a great fighting machine—<strong>the</strong> greatest on earth, bar none.” 364 It
was he who cast <strong>the</strong> Marines as a legion <strong>of</strong> hardened combat veterans “grown grey in war with very few
intervals <strong>of</strong> peace” 365 – and immortalized this image by weaving it into Order 47 (see Appendix E), read
359 Maj. Alfred A. Cunningham, USMC, “Value <strong>of</strong> Aviation to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (September
1920) in Lt. Col. Charles P. Neimeyer, USMC (Ret) ed., On <strong>the</strong> Corps: USMC Wisdom from <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck,
Marine Corps Gazette, and Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008): 99.
360 Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational <strong>Culture</strong> for <strong>the</strong> Warfighter, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps
University, 2008): 280.
361 Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
2005):23, 180.
362 And a few women.
363 Analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Identity, Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens elements which surfaced across an exhaustive
accounting <strong>of</strong> Commandant speeches published in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Gazette (even after Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck became
available Commandants did not have speeches published <strong>the</strong>re) from 1916-1975 may be found in Appendix E.
364 Major General John A. Lejeune, Commandant, “Preparation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1922).
365 Major General John A. Lejeune, Commandant, “A Brief History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(March 1923): 19.
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every year on <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps birthday. Clear in Lejeune’s mind, however, was that his Marine fighters
were doing so as “part and parcel <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> naval service.” The heroic land duty performed in World War I
was exceptional—<strong>the</strong> Marines’ key roles remained within <strong>the</strong> traditional Navy sphere. In addition to
protecting Navy yards, Lejeune’s twenties-era Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks acted as guards for American legations in
foreign countries, landing forces to “protect American lives, rights and interests,” forces <strong>of</strong> occupation
to “restore order and to maintain peace and tranquility in disturbed countries,” administrators in
garrison, as detachments for “service on board <strong>the</strong> vessels <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Fleet” and in aviation, and as
“[e]xpeditionary forces for service with <strong>the</strong> Fleet in war.” 366
Commandant Ben Fuller assumed command <strong>of</strong> a Corps emerging from nearly two decades <strong>of</strong> small wars
conflict. 367 His tenure was largely captured by a roles tug-<strong>of</strong>-war between those in <strong>the</strong> Corps advocating
for fur<strong>the</strong>r developing small wars competency and those championing a more amphibious role: landing
operations and <strong>the</strong> securing <strong>of</strong> advanced bases. Felt strongly within <strong>the</strong> Corps was <strong>the</strong> need to
differentiate <strong>the</strong>mselves from <strong>the</strong> Army and to carve out distinctive space. 368 Fuller’s speeches reflect,
but do not reconcile, <strong>the</strong> doctrinal tension between <strong>the</strong>se two distinctive roles. He opens his primary
contribution to <strong>the</strong> Gazette with an impassioned attachment to expertise on <strong>the</strong> seas: “Cut <strong>the</strong>
ancestral knot that binds us to <strong>the</strong> waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oceans, seas, bays, gulfs, rivers, lakes and o<strong>the</strong>r wet
spots and with <strong>the</strong> same motion you cut <strong>the</strong> throat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps,” and to <strong>the</strong> Navy: “Do not let <strong>the</strong>
Naval-Mind <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps be changed to any o<strong>the</strong>r type <strong>of</strong> mind, that will leave only a memory, a history,
<strong>of</strong> our grand and glorious Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ocean” while at <strong>the</strong> same time heralding <strong>the</strong> essential role played
in small wars: “Major wars, beginning with <strong>the</strong> Revolution and ending with <strong>the</strong> World War, have proved
<strong>the</strong> splendid usefulness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps to <strong>the</strong> Nation. But <strong>the</strong> magnificent record <strong>of</strong> constructive
achievements, and successes in minor wars, during a period <strong>of</strong> over one and a half centuries has
conclusively proved that <strong>the</strong> Corps is a necessary part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Government.” The bridge
between <strong>the</strong>se two banks is a claim to “versatility”: “We know what our job was yesterday and we are
struggling faithfully to do our work today, but who knows what it will be tomorrow? Probably
something new and unique. It may be anything. Our job is intricate—diffused. It requires versatility.” 369
It was Fuller’s successor, John H. Russell, who tipped <strong>the</strong> scales in favor <strong>of</strong> landing operations and
amphibious doctrine. A longtime “fervent” amphibious war advocate, 370 Russell stepped into <strong>the</strong>
commandancy at a decisive moment in <strong>the</strong> Corps’ history and threw his support behind <strong>the</strong> nascent
Fleet Marine Force. 371 Russell’s advocacy for <strong>the</strong> amphibious camp is somewhat surprising in light <strong>of</strong> his
366
Major General John A. Lejeune, Commandant, “The United States Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(December 1923): 249-254.
367
Commandant Wendall C. Neville succeeded Lejeune but died 16 months into his Commandancy without leaving
his mark on <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Gazette.
368
For a detailed history <strong>of</strong> this internal conflict see Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’
Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).
369
Major General Ben H. Fuller, Commandant, “The Mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(November 1930).
370
David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and <strong>the</strong> Making <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Modern Marine Corps, 1936-
1943, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011): 40.
371 See Bickel pp. 205-227.
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own Corps service which involved time spent in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic and over a decade in Haiti,
including as High Commissioner for eight years. 372 Not a surprise, however, is his dedication to forging
doctrine for <strong>the</strong> Corps. Russell had, as an eighteen years younger major, made a formal “Plea for a
Mission and Doctrine,” 373 now considered one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seminal pieces <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps doctrinal history. A
year prior to assuming <strong>the</strong> commandancy, Russell laid a rhetorical foundation for <strong>the</strong> doctrine to come.
Through <strong>the</strong> device <strong>of</strong> a fictional conversation between General X <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps and Admiral Y <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Navy, Russell performs a bit <strong>of</strong> stage setting: General X points out that <strong>the</strong> Marines’ “main job” is to
“maintain expeditionary forces to seize advanced Bases and perform o<strong>the</strong>r land operations for <strong>the</strong>
Fleet.” Admiral Y concurs but points out that “you have not sold <strong>the</strong> idea one hundred per cent to <strong>the</strong>
Navy or to your own Corps.” 374 The remainder <strong>of</strong> Russell’s piece is dedicated to doing just that. As
Commandant (a short two and half years given <strong>the</strong> Corps’ mandatory retirement age) 375 Russell swung
his weight behind <strong>the</strong> Fleet Marine Force; but not without a bow to <strong>the</strong> bushwhackers. During his
tenure doctrine was codified in both camps: <strong>the</strong> “Tentative Landing Operations Manual” and “Tentative
Manual for Defense <strong>of</strong> Advanced Bases” on <strong>the</strong> amphibious side as well as “The Manual <strong>of</strong> Small Wars”
for veterans <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bush. 376 Only one doctrinal emphasis, however, survived more than a handful <strong>of</strong>
years in Marine Corps schoolhouses. 377
Painful as it must have been for <strong>the</strong> Corps’ small warriors, next-in-line Commandant Thomas Holcomb’s
wholesale emphasis on amphibious landings in <strong>the</strong> run up to World War II can only be viewed in
hindsight as prescient. Both internal and external winds <strong>of</strong> change were blowing <strong>the</strong> amphibious
direction for <strong>the</strong> Corps, not least <strong>of</strong> which was a looming threat from Japan. 378 Holcomb biographer
David Ulbrich claims that Holcomb was selected for Commandant over several more senior, more
obvious choices because “[h]e fit a particular political pr<strong>of</strong>ile inside <strong>the</strong> Corps that placed him in <strong>the</strong>
ascendant clique. Holcomb favored <strong>the</strong> new dual mission <strong>of</strong> amphibious assault and base defense over
<strong>the</strong> outmoded mission <strong>of</strong> constabulary security in small wars.” 379 The substance <strong>of</strong> Holcomb’s speeches
throughout his Commandant era constructs a narrative around this <strong>the</strong>me. According to Holcomb, not
only were Marines amphibious by birth, <strong>the</strong>y have worked since <strong>the</strong>ir infancy to refine a distinctive
amphibious expertise. As “first out” <strong>the</strong>ir mission is to pave <strong>the</strong> way for <strong>the</strong> Army. Writing in <strong>the</strong> thick
<strong>of</strong> World War II he declares:
372 “Major General John H. Russell, U.S.M.C.” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1936); Hans Schmidt, The United
States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971): 95-221.
373 Major John H. Russell, “A Plea for a Mission and Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1916).
374 Brigadier-General John H. Russell, “A New Naval Policy,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1933): 13.
Capitalization represented here as in original.
375 David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and <strong>the</strong> Making <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Modern Marine Corps, 1936-
1943, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011): 38.
376 Manual titles are represented here as Russell wrote <strong>the</strong>m in his capstone contribution to <strong>the</strong> Gazette upon
retirement. John H. Russell, “Final Report <strong>of</strong> Major General Commandant,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November
1936).
377 Bickel: 220-224.
378 Holcomb’s education at <strong>the</strong> Naval War College focused on Japan as most plausible enemy number-one. Ulbrich:
32.
379 David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and <strong>the</strong> Making <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Modern Marine Corps, 1936-
1943, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011): 40.
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In <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> this war, on a scale which <strong>the</strong> world has never before seen, it is possible to lose
sight <strong>of</strong> what your particular job is—<strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ job really is. The Marine Corps’
primary function is to prepare <strong>the</strong> way for o<strong>the</strong>r troops. Ours is an amphibious operation…For
that purpose we have trained for over a hundred and sixty-seven years. We are today, I believe,
<strong>the</strong> most pr<strong>of</strong>icient amphibious military body in <strong>the</strong> world, and I say this with due modesty. 380
Holcomb’s Corps valued excellence in amphibious operations for its wartime utility, certainly, but far
more importantly for <strong>the</strong> Corps, amphibious expertise <strong>of</strong>fered distinction. Craig Cameron, writing <strong>of</strong>
that era, describes this mission set as <strong>the</strong> “great gift” to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, fulfilling <strong>the</strong>ir ultimate
craving for “a single, great mission” and a distinctive role—one essential to national security—which
would set <strong>the</strong>m apart from <strong>the</strong> Army and Navy. “[A]mphibious assault made a sort <strong>of</strong> elite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire
Marine Corps.” 381 Holcomb was forthright about this status. Speaking in 1943, he points out that
Marine Corps training in “<strong>the</strong> most exhaustive research <strong>of</strong> landing operations…throughout <strong>the</strong> world’s
written military history” provides Marines with an education which
does not make us better Army <strong>of</strong>ficers than <strong>the</strong> best Army <strong>of</strong>ficers or better Naval <strong>of</strong>ficers than
<strong>the</strong> best Navy <strong>of</strong>ficers. They can run <strong>the</strong> Army far better than we can. They can run <strong>the</strong> Navy far
better than we can. But by <strong>the</strong> same token, because <strong>of</strong> our specialized training, we can run
amphibious and landing operations better than <strong>the</strong>y can. With our tradition, experience, and
our training, <strong>the</strong>y could run amphibious operations as effectively as we can, but <strong>the</strong>y do not
spend <strong>the</strong>ir lives in this specialization. We do. 382
Holcomb encourages Marines to take exceptional pride in <strong>the</strong>ir expertise since “[l]anding operations
are, <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>the</strong> most difficult <strong>of</strong> all military maneuvers.” The successful prosecution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se
operations, in his view, laid <strong>the</strong> foundation for <strong>the</strong> Marine brand <strong>of</strong> esprit de corps. 383 A newly minted
Marine subjected to Holcomb’s version <strong>of</strong> history would see it as an unbroken path <strong>of</strong> preparation for
amphibious assault:
The U.S. Marine Corps always has had a predilection for this kind <strong>of</strong> amphibious fighting…For
nearly one hundred and seventy years, Marines have been specializing in amphibious warfare,
and I believe <strong>the</strong> Corps has fought more continuously than any o<strong>the</strong>r service. We conducted
landing operations during <strong>the</strong> Civil War, and again during <strong>the</strong> Spanish-American War. The
Marines landed at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. They landed in Haiti, and Nicaragua, and at o<strong>the</strong>r
places in Latin America and <strong>the</strong> Caribbean. They landed in China at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boxer
380
Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, “First to Fight,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1943):
16.
381
Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 36-38.
382
Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, “First to Fight,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1943):
16.
383
Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant, “Marines in War and Peace,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(December 1943): 4.
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Rebellion. Always, when trouble required <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> United States forces, <strong>the</strong> Marines
were first on <strong>the</strong> scene. 384
It is interesting that in this rendition <strong>of</strong> history it is <strong>the</strong> landing at <strong>the</strong> various beaches <strong>of</strong> Hispaniola that
is <strong>the</strong> important bit ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> nineteen plus years spent <strong>the</strong>re. Small wars, as a role and as a key
aspect <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps identity, were, by <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> Holcomb’s tenure, effectively washed from <strong>the</strong>
scene.
Unabashed amphibious pride continues under Vandegrift, appointed to <strong>the</strong> Commandancy in 1944:
“From our do-or-die beginning we have developed a great amphibious machine, <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> which has
amazed <strong>the</strong> warring world.” Enemies would do well to take note: “[W]e threw overwhelming forces
against both <strong>of</strong> our enemies almost simultaneously in amphibious attacks on opposite sides <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> earth,
and we moved in for both fights with utter confidence. There can remain no doubt anywhere, least <strong>of</strong>
all in Germany and Japan, as to who now calls <strong>the</strong> amphibious tune and wields <strong>the</strong> weapons <strong>of</strong> decisive
might.” 385 Given <strong>the</strong> swagger <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se lines it is somewhat <strong>of</strong> a shock that <strong>the</strong> Corps’ next battlefront
was domestic – against an Army General Staff bent on pursuing objectives which threatened <strong>the</strong> survival
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps, including eclipsing it from participating in <strong>the</strong> above touted expertise: amphibious
operations! 386 The fight for <strong>the</strong> Corps’ life began under Vandegrift whose tenure saw <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> 1947 National Security Act which forged a statutory role and mission for <strong>the</strong> Corps:
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces <strong>of</strong>
combined arms, toge<strong>the</strong>r with supporting air components, for service with <strong>the</strong> fleet in <strong>the</strong>
seizure or defense <strong>of</strong> advanced naval bases and for <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> such land operations as may
be essential to <strong>the</strong> prosecution <strong>of</strong> a naval campaign. 387
Pleased as <strong>the</strong> Marines were with <strong>the</strong>ir new statutory protection, <strong>the</strong> law did not assure that <strong>the</strong> Corps
would be provided <strong>the</strong> budgetary and organizational strength to do <strong>the</strong>ir job. Given <strong>the</strong> unhappiness <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Army with <strong>the</strong> National Security legislation, <strong>the</strong> Corps recognized it as essential to shore up
organizational assurances via a second piece <strong>of</strong> legislation. It is <strong>the</strong>refore no surprise that Commandant
Clifton Cates (1948-1951) spent his pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Gazette continuing <strong>the</strong> fight for <strong>the</strong>
organization’s life. His summary plea to Congress was <strong>the</strong> warrior’s call: “The Marine Corps asks
nothing for itself except <strong>the</strong> right to fight again in <strong>the</strong> wars <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States.” 388
384
Holcomb, “Marines in War and Peace,”: 4.
385
Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, “Amphibious Miracle <strong>of</strong> Our Time,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(October 1944): 3.
386
In Krulak’s accounting this was born from an Army determination to “eliminate forever its deficiencies in
amphibious matters and its dependency on Marines for amphibious expertise.” Krulak: 18.
387
Krulak: 51. See also James D. Hittle, “The Marine Corps and <strong>the</strong> National Security Act,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(October 1947), accessed on 19 December 2012 at http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/marine-corps-andnational-security-act.;
388
“Summary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Position,” (Essential Elements <strong>of</strong> Testimony <strong>of</strong> General Clifton B. Cates,
Commandant U.S. Marine Corps, Before <strong>the</strong> House Armed <strong>Service</strong>s Committee, 17 October 1949), Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1949): 17.
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It was Cates’ successor, Lemuel Shepherd, who saw legislative victory for <strong>the</strong> Corps in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> Public
Law 416, signed by President Truman in June <strong>of</strong> 1952. It provided <strong>the</strong> Corps’ with a minimum <strong>of</strong> three
combat divisions and three aircraft wings and mandated a place for <strong>the</strong> Commandant at <strong>the</strong> Joint Chiefs’
table when issues <strong>of</strong> direct concern to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps were being discussed. 389 Shepherd’s
contribution to <strong>the</strong> Gazette, penned one year prior to his commandancy, recognizes a lesson from <strong>the</strong>
Marines’ painful political battle. Central as <strong>the</strong>ir unprecedented contribution to amphibious assault is in
Marine minds, it seems to have found little anchor in <strong>the</strong> public imagination:
In <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American people whom <strong>the</strong>y serve, <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marines is
reflected essentially as a procession <strong>of</strong> noteworthy deeds by individuals and small groups. While
this is not inaccurate as a characterization <strong>of</strong> Marines, ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>ir part in history is
concerned, <strong>the</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r—albeit less colorful—aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir accomplishments which would
appear in <strong>the</strong> long analysis to deserve an even more prominent place in American historic
annals. This is <strong>the</strong> effort <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, conducted over <strong>the</strong> past four decades, to
rationalize <strong>the</strong> amphibious operation in terms <strong>of</strong> modern arms and modern operational
concepts. 390
The Corps continued to hold to amphibious assault as mission central, but began to dress up <strong>the</strong>ir role in
o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>mes as well, resurrecting Fuller’s “versatility” and <strong>the</strong> longstanding virtue <strong>of</strong> “readiness.” In
describing to <strong>the</strong> House Armed <strong>Service</strong>s Committee where <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps stood and where it was
headed Commandant Shoup reasserted focus on <strong>the</strong> fighting man and his willingness to depart to any
place and clime: “The purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps is to provide combat forces <strong>of</strong> willing and able Marines,
prepared to fight whenever and wherever required.” He did not, however, abandon expertise in <strong>the</strong>
amphibious role: “I believe that <strong>the</strong> Navy-Marine Corps sea-air-ground team <strong>of</strong> today has perfected <strong>the</strong>
art <strong>of</strong> amphibious assault to a degree unknown before.” 391
Greene presides as Commandant when Marines land as combat forces in Vietnam. A year later he
describes that event, as well as an additional landing in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic, to <strong>the</strong> Joint Committee
on Armed <strong>Service</strong>s and Appropriations in <strong>the</strong> Senate Greene as examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines performing
<strong>the</strong>ir “classic role” <strong>of</strong> “an amphibious landing on a foreign shore in support <strong>of</strong> National policy, as
directed by <strong>the</strong> President.” Greene points out that near simultaneous landings on dual shores “revalidates
and emphasizes <strong>the</strong> requirement to continue to maintain <strong>the</strong> most modern amphibious
capability in both <strong>the</strong> Atlantic and <strong>the</strong> Pacific.” Amphibious capability is first in <strong>the</strong> limelight, but Greene
cannot avoid buttressing <strong>the</strong> Corps’ versatility credentials when describing <strong>the</strong>ir current task set:
patrolling and civic action in <strong>the</strong> hamlets <strong>of</strong> Vietnam. Willingness to be versatile is apparent.
Enthusiasm is not. Despite <strong>the</strong> fact that Marines are waging a ground war in Indochina, research and
development dollars remain “limited largely to those matters which fall within our statutory
389 Krulak: 58. For detailed accountings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political machinations that led to this moment see Krulak: 17-58 and
Aaron B. O’Connell, Underdogs, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012):98-147.
390 Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., “Passing in Review,” Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1951): 62.
391 “Corps Standing Tall; Ready, Willing, Able,” Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1961): 1.
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responsibility—that is, <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> doctrine, tactics, techniques and equipment employed
by a landing force in amphibious operations.” Greene’s speech to <strong>the</strong> Senate concludes with an
emphasis on combat readiness—<strong>the</strong> ability to “mount out on short notice and fight.” As a more direct
companion to effective amphibious operations, “readiness” is given special attention as a distinctive role
for <strong>the</strong> Corps: “This degree <strong>of</strong> readiness is a priceless commodity, without parallel by any o<strong>the</strong>r
nation.” 392
Leonard Chapman (1968-1971), who oversees <strong>the</strong> thick <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War and its near conclusion,
continues emphasis on Greene’s two favored parts. Despite <strong>the</strong> role Marines are playing—years-long
ground forces alongside <strong>the</strong> Army—Chapman holds fast to “readiness” and to “amphibious” as Marine
Corps’ hallmarks. In a seminal “State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps” piece penned in 1969 Chapman reminds his Marines
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “true” calling:
Despite <strong>the</strong> heavy impact <strong>of</strong> our Vietnam commitment on <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, we have
managed with certain personnel and logistic restrictions to maintain our readiness to meet
o<strong>the</strong>r commitments which could arise. As part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy/Marine Corps team, we never lose
sight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> responsibilities inherent in our role as this nation’s force in readiness for <strong>the</strong>
projection <strong>of</strong> seapower ashore or such o<strong>the</strong>r duties as our country may require.
Congressional legislation established our primary mission: to prepare for and execute landing
force operations as part <strong>of</strong> an amphibious task force. 393
One might defensibly ask how well prepared an institution defined in terms <strong>of</strong> immediate, short burst
combat readiness via advanced landing operations might be to engage in complex, land based
counterinsurgency operations. Small wars are thick in Marine heritage but had been experienced in
nearly ad hoc episode with each round, never codified into doctrine until after <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars, and
shelved to oblivion nearly immediately afterwards. In a particularly ironic twist, history records that
Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers going into Vietnam were schooled not by <strong>the</strong>ir own Small Wars Manual resuscitated, or
own anti-guerrilla history, but by <strong>the</strong> Army doctrine <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency in vogue in <strong>the</strong> run up to
Vietnam. The Marine Corps was so far divorced from its own small wars heritage that <strong>the</strong> Small Wars
Manual was left under dust in favor <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1962 fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2, Operations Against
Guerrilla Forces, all borrowings from U.S. Army doctrine. Michael Peterson points out that this historic
irony is all <strong>the</strong> more painful since <strong>the</strong> Army’s doctrine was a less useful fit for <strong>the</strong> Vietnam <strong>the</strong>ater than
<strong>the</strong> Marines’ doctrine would have been. The Army doctrine focused on experiences fighting partisan
irregulars attached to external forces ra<strong>the</strong>r than home grown insurgents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>the</strong> Marines had
faced. Theirs would have been a much closer parallel to <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese adversary. 394
392 General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., “Commandant’s Report,” Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1966): 21, 22, 25, 27.
393 General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., “State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1969): 30.
394 Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 18.
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Robert E. Cushman, <strong>the</strong> Commandant slotted with <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> putting <strong>the</strong> Corps back toge<strong>the</strong>r after <strong>the</strong>
Vietnam War, represented <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps before <strong>the</strong> Senate Armed <strong>Service</strong>s Committee with new
enthusiasm toward <strong>the</strong> versatility role alongside <strong>the</strong> previous two <strong>of</strong>ferings. In short sum, he cast <strong>the</strong>
Corps as “<strong>the</strong> Nation’s versatile amphibious force-in-readiness.” Versatility for Cushman meant a
Marine Corps “organized, equipped, trained, and readied to cover <strong>the</strong> widest possible spectrum <strong>of</strong> crisis
situations.” 395 In defending <strong>the</strong> notion that Marines can act as both a sea based force or “in sustained
operations ashore” Cushman’s 21st century counterpart, James T. Conway maintained <strong>the</strong> versatility
<strong>the</strong>me in much <strong>the</strong> same way. Using “adaptability” ra<strong>the</strong>r than versatility as <strong>the</strong> rhetorical calling card
his Vision and Strategy for 2025 pledges “We can adapt quickly with unparalleled speed across an
extraordinary range <strong>of</strong> military operations.” 396 Marines have come to openly claim <strong>the</strong> versatility role.
They are <strong>the</strong> Nation’s jack-<strong>of</strong>-all-trades. In <strong>the</strong>ir parlance, Marines “do windows”—<strong>the</strong> full range <strong>of</strong>
military force tasks outside <strong>of</strong> traditional warfighting. 397 Though not apparent in Cushman’s speech, (he
is addressing <strong>the</strong> purse controlling Congress after all), one constant remains. Marines are willing to “do
windows” but are not always particularly enthusiastic about it. Marines readily claim <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong>
versatility, and embrace it as an identity marker, but enjoying doing some “windows” far more than
o<strong>the</strong>rs.
The traditional centerpiece—amphibious assault—has morphed a bit and has added a companion in its
transition to <strong>the</strong> present. Very <strong>of</strong>ten termed “expeditionary” ra<strong>the</strong>r than “amphibious” in <strong>the</strong> rhetoric
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current force, <strong>the</strong> operational core <strong>of</strong> today’s Marines remains determinedly fixed to <strong>the</strong>ir deeply
anchored identity as “soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea.” Given <strong>the</strong> fifty year drift from <strong>the</strong> forces’ most recent
amphibious assault, verbiage capturing this part <strong>of</strong> role acknowledges a much wider scope <strong>of</strong> sea-based
tasks. As an “Expeditionary Naval Force” <strong>the</strong> Corps is “organized, trained, and equipped to conduct
naval campaigns and operate on and from naval platforms, or to fight in protracted campaigns
ashore.” 398 Marines “assure littoral access” through both s<strong>of</strong>t and hard power projection. 399 The
Marines’ formal literature acknowledges that references to amphibious “assault” need to be morphed
to <strong>the</strong> far more inclusive amphibious “operations.” In addition, <strong>the</strong> past counterinsurgency-rife decade
has forced <strong>the</strong> Marines to add (again!) a place for counterinsurgency competency alongside its
adventures on <strong>the</strong> sea:
Often thought <strong>of</strong> exclusively as an amphibious assault force, <strong>the</strong> period 1942-1945 was <strong>the</strong> only
time in our history that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps was organized, trained, and equipped for that one
mission and did only one mission: amphibious assault. During <strong>the</strong> subsequent Cold War <strong>the</strong>
395 General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Commandant, “Walking Tall,” Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1975): 19.
396 General James T. Conway’s Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, Quantico, (June 2008): 8.
397 The “do windows” reference is well understood and used with frequency within Marine Corps circles. Capt.
Chris Seiple does a particularly nice job <strong>of</strong> capturing <strong>the</strong> many “o<strong>the</strong>r than war” tasks “doing windows” comprises:
“Window Into an Age <strong>of</strong> Windows: The U.S. Military and <strong>the</strong> NGOs,” Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1999): 63.
398 General James T. Conway’s Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, Quantico, (June 2008): 8.
399 Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Third Edition, (June 2010): 1. Accessed at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf
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Marine Corps was optimized for sea-based crisis response. Amphibious operations—<strong>of</strong> all
types—remain a Marine Corps forte but not exclusively so. For <strong>the</strong> last 65 years, 400 Marines
have operated from <strong>the</strong> sea as part <strong>of</strong> a naval team and conducted o<strong>the</strong>r sustained operations—
principally referred to as “small wars.” 401
“Force-in-readiness” has changed least for <strong>the</strong> Corps across <strong>the</strong> decades. The Marine’s most current
Vision and Strategy document maintains a core obligation to “[r]espond swiftly, with little or no
warning, to emerging crises;” to “[m]aximize speed and freedom <strong>of</strong> action through seabasing;” and to
maintain “high standards <strong>of</strong> readiness across <strong>the</strong> force.” 402 The Marines’ third edition Operating
Concepts sings much <strong>the</strong> same tune. It lists “Responsiveness” alongside “Naval Character” and “Military
Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism” as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three key characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21 st Century Marine Corps and defines
“responsiveness” as a state <strong>of</strong> “ever-ready” to rapidly engage a well prepared force. 403 General Amos
who, as Assistant Commandant, scripted Conway’s Vision and Strategy 2025, became steward <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps himself in October 2010 and has branded <strong>the</strong> Corps <strong>the</strong> nation’s “expeditionary crisis
response force.” 404
The determined pledge <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps leadership to achieve this tripartite package—
versatility/adaptability, amphibious/expeditionary, and edge-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-seat combat readiness—must
engage <strong>the</strong> hard reality that, for any force, nei<strong>the</strong>r budgets nor personnel numbers allow for highly
trained specialties across <strong>the</strong> full spectrum <strong>of</strong> conflict types. Marines aspire to be jack-<strong>of</strong>-all-conflicttrades
but even <strong>the</strong>y must chose over which types to be “master.” As recently as December 2012
Lieutenant Colonel Frank H<strong>of</strong>fman congregated <strong>the</strong> most pronounced doctrinal factions within <strong>the</strong> Corps
into four camps. The first, which he labels <strong>the</strong> Small Wars School, is reminiscent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same in <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s. The modern camp argues that
Iraq and Afghanistan represent far more than a passing blip in <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong>
conflict…[M]assed formations comprised <strong>of</strong> traditional arms and large-scale conflict between
conventional powers are no longer a realistic planning scenario.
[T]he most likely challenges and greatest risks are posed by failing states, ungoverned
territories, transnational threats, and radical versions <strong>of</strong> Islam.
400
For no obvious reason <strong>the</strong> 65 year reference completely eclipses <strong>the</strong> Corps’ nineteen years <strong>of</strong> Caribbean based
small wars experience prior to 1945.
401
Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Third Edition, (June 2010): 2. Italics included in original. Accessed at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf
402
General James T. Conway’s Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, Quantico, (June 2008): 5, 8.
403
Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Third Edition, (June 2010): 8. Accessed at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf.
See also Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Handbook for Marine NCOs, 4 th Edition, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1996): 9.
404 st
Col. William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret), “An Interview with James F. Amos,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 64, (1
quarter 2012): 12-17.
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An essential assumption <strong>of</strong> this doctrinal posture is that irregular warfare is “not only different and <strong>of</strong>
greater priority, but also that it cannot be successfully conducted by general purpose forces that only
marginally prepare for it.” 405 Adherents demand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir bro<strong>the</strong>rs that <strong>the</strong>y move on from Iwo Jima
envy and <strong>the</strong> notion that <strong>the</strong> Corps’ mission continues to be built upon <strong>the</strong> Pacific experience.
The second camp—Traditionalists—are so named because <strong>the</strong>y represent <strong>the</strong> doctrinal position most
intermeshed with Corps culture. Traditionalists remain focused on fighting and winning large scale
interstate war and insist that “<strong>the</strong> Corps’ raison d’être is founded in its amphibious capability, and that
its force structure, equipment, and training must be focused on projecting power ‘from <strong>the</strong> sea’.”
Traditionalists are not unaware that <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> Marine effort in <strong>the</strong> last 50 years has been spent in
small wars fashion, <strong>the</strong>y simply believe “that such scenarios are not amenable to military intervention
and that <strong>the</strong>se contingencies should not be <strong>the</strong> focus for American strategy or its military.” The future
conflicts worth fighting, <strong>the</strong>y argue, will be conventional in nature. 406
The third school, “Full Spectrum Operations,” is <strong>the</strong> doctrinal form <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day amongst a critical mass <strong>of</strong>
American ground force commanders (Army included). 407 This school is willing to accept that no one
specialty may be optimized in an effort to train and supply for <strong>the</strong> full range <strong>of</strong> conflict contingencies,
but argue that an effort toward muticapable flexibility is as good as it gets. Commandant Conway’s
“medium weight” force concept, “being heavy enough to sustain expeditionary warfare and light
enough to facilitate rapid deployment” 408 falls along <strong>the</strong>se lines. This school takes Marine Corps
versatility at its word and hedges risk by investing in <strong>the</strong> quality, education, and mental agility <strong>of</strong> forces.
Finally, <strong>the</strong>re are those who advocate a Division <strong>of</strong> Labor in which some forces train, are equipped, and
are organized into force designs specifically targeting irregular warfare while <strong>the</strong> larger part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> force
maintains focus on conventional training and armaments. In this, <strong>the</strong> Division <strong>of</strong> Labor adherents reject
<strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> hubris demonstrated by some members <strong>of</strong> Corps leadership in <strong>the</strong> pre-9/11 era: “We
generally know how to do [evacuations <strong>of</strong> noncombatants], nation-building, counterinsurgency, and
several o<strong>the</strong>r peripheral operations associated with [Operations O<strong>the</strong>r Than War].” 409 They agree with
<strong>the</strong> small wars camp that “regular and conventional warfare are markedly different modes <strong>of</strong> warfare”
405 st
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Frank G. H<strong>of</strong>fman, “Posturing <strong>the</strong> Corps for <strong>the</strong> 21 Century,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(December 2012): 28.
406 st
H<strong>of</strong>fman, “Posturing <strong>the</strong> Corps for <strong>the</strong> 21 Century”: 29. It is not military chiefs, however, but civilian masters
who determine which fights <strong>the</strong> nation fights—a point which seems to be missing from <strong>the</strong> Traditionalist’s
analysis.
407
H<strong>of</strong>fman cites <strong>the</strong> tone and substance <strong>of</strong> Army’s Field Manual 3-0 Operations as evidence and notes that many
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tenets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Full Spectrum School may also be found in Commandant General James T. Conway’s Marine
Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, (June 2008).
408
General James T. Conway, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, Quantico, (June 2008): 5; seconded by Commandant Amos: Col. William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret), “An
Interview with James F. Amos,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 64, (1 st quarter 2012): 15.
409
Colonel Gary W. Anderson, “Campaign Planning for Operations O<strong>the</strong>r Than War,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(February 1996): 45.
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and <strong>the</strong>refore must be trained toward in genuinely distinctive ways. In addition to placing priority on
preventative mechanisms including stability operations, Division <strong>of</strong> Labor advocates would mandate
highly specialized training for irregular scenarios in order to avoid being <strong>the</strong> jack-<strong>of</strong>-trades who is master
<strong>of</strong> none. 410
If historic pattern and organizational culture are sound indicators, <strong>the</strong> Corps will tumble about in this
irregular-versus-regular discussion but will inexorably move toward a role distinction emphasizing
conventional competence launched from <strong>the</strong> sea. In <strong>the</strong> meantime, <strong>the</strong> Corps is maintaining that <strong>the</strong>irs
is a domain void <strong>of</strong> domain. Marines live in <strong>the</strong> “seams”:
The Army, Navy, and Air Force enjoy <strong>the</strong> clarity <strong>of</strong> focusing on <strong>the</strong> domains <strong>of</strong> land, maritime,
and air. Their ties to <strong>the</strong>se domains have naturally led to <strong>the</strong>ir individual and distinctive
cultures, philosophies, and doctrines….
Where domain-optimized forces have experienced friction is at <strong>the</strong> seams between <strong>the</strong> domains
and in responding to sudden changes from <strong>the</strong> expected character <strong>of</strong> conflict. Unlike <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
<strong>Service</strong>s, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps has not relied on a single geographic domain to ensure our place in
national defense and service to <strong>the</strong> Nation. This distinction has at time been an institutional
vulnerability that has led to attempts to reduce or eliminate <strong>the</strong> Corps based on perceived
redundancy. It has, however, also been a source <strong>of</strong> great strength that has fueled competitive
innovation, strategic and operational foresight, and <strong>the</strong> ability to view <strong>the</strong> battlespace “where
four map sheets intersect” with a perspective not tied to single cultural or domain bias. The
Marine Corps has repeatedly demonstrated its institutional and operational adaptability by
effectively bridging <strong>the</strong> nation’s most critical seams between domains. 411
General Amos as Commandant provides a slightly more defined approach in public speeches: “We
Marines don’t really have a domain—we have a lane, and that lane is crisis response. I told my fellow
<strong>Service</strong> chiefs, I’m not interested in poaching on your domain at all. But ours is a lane that cuts across all
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se domains. If <strong>the</strong>re is some duplication, I think it’s not only affordable, it’s necessary.” 412
Grounding <strong>the</strong> Corps’ sense <strong>of</strong> self through its ra<strong>the</strong>r turbulent search for a “lane” in <strong>the</strong> “seams” has
been a set <strong>of</strong> commonly founded and consciously cultivated norms and ritualized values. Marines know
who <strong>the</strong>y are—how Marines look, how <strong>the</strong>y behave, and what <strong>the</strong>y believe—even if <strong>the</strong> role <strong>the</strong>y
perform remains a consistently open question.
410 H<strong>of</strong>fman (2012): 30.
411 Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Third Edition, (June 2010): 3. Accessed at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf.
Col.
412 William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret), “An Interview with James F. Amos,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 64, (1 st quarter
2012): 15.
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CHAPTER 5
MARINE CORPS CULTURE: NORMS, VALUES, AND PERCEPTUAL LENS
Step 4: Employ Research Perspectives: Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens
Commandant speeches, training manuals, <strong>of</strong>ficial histories, and doctrinal texts are all rich repositories <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> values, norms, and beliefs <strong>of</strong>ficially pursued by organizational leadership. In order to determine
which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se are genuinely internalized by members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> organization, which believed, cherished,
and acted upon with <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> regularity that comprises “culture”—<strong>of</strong>ficial texts must be matched
against grassroots narratives—those celebrated and voluntarily passed from one cultural generation to
<strong>the</strong> next. Grassroots narratives may come in various forms including oral histories, poetry, humor,
slogans 413 , and legend. Oral histories and legends provide a particularly rich source <strong>of</strong> data since each
typically <strong>of</strong>fers <strong>the</strong> additional benefit <strong>of</strong> providing context, insight into <strong>the</strong> “why” behind genuinely
admired cultural values or ritualized practices, and <strong>of</strong>fers multiples for comparison if one’s organization
has been around for 237 years.
Marines do not shy from opportunities to talk about <strong>the</strong>ir Corps and <strong>the</strong> life it provides. The result is a
rich supply <strong>of</strong> oral histories and an extant Corps willing to be interviewed. Forty-five contemporary oral
histories were provided through <strong>the</strong> Veterans History Project sponsored by <strong>the</strong> American Folklife Center
within <strong>the</strong> Library <strong>of</strong> Congress (Washington DC). This collection <strong>of</strong> oral histories captures <strong>the</strong> military
experiences <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps veterans <strong>of</strong> Iraq and Afghanistan. These men and women are <strong>of</strong> diverse
regional (U.S.) origins, rank, time in <strong>the</strong> Corps, and military specialties. A second set <strong>of</strong> oral histories
recorded in audio form and in real time before departure from Vietnam (1966-1968) were provided by
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections division and subsequently transcribed for ease <strong>of</strong>
comparative analysis.
For all its ubiquity, Marine Corps legend is surprisingly difficult to pin down. One might expect to find it
in <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gazette or Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, but a search reveals limited <strong>of</strong>ferings. The stories “everyone
knows” are <strong>of</strong>ten not in print. Marine leadership is not naïve to essential importance <strong>of</strong> legend to <strong>the</strong>
fighting spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps, in fact, <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> legend in <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gazette is likely evidence to
<strong>the</strong> contrary. Putting legend in print may, in fact, put it in danger. A service journal would require <strong>of</strong>
itself a responsible level <strong>of</strong> research to validate historic au<strong>the</strong>nticity. This research may result in
significant downgrades <strong>of</strong> some ra<strong>the</strong>r cherished institutional “memories.” Much smarter is to keep <strong>the</strong>
legends as oral history, passed down in classrooms, from mentor to boot, and within units by word <strong>of</strong>
mouth.
Those who act as oral history repositories within a societal band may be labeled in enthnographic terms:
“key informants.” Most ethnography does not rely on large n survey techniques, but unearths <strong>the</strong> basic
threads <strong>of</strong> an interwoven culture through conversations with key interlocutors. These are members <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> culture who know a lot about <strong>the</strong> particular aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> culture in which you are interested, are
413 For a collection <strong>of</strong> Marine slogans as narrative see Appendix D.
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highly articulate, and are willing to share <strong>the</strong>ir knowledge. 414 Major Rick Spooner represents a classic
key informant where Marine legend is concerned. A veteran <strong>of</strong> WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, Spooner
dedicated his life to <strong>the</strong> Corps and has done <strong>the</strong> same with his retirement. His restaurant, <strong>the</strong> Globe and
Laurel, is considered a cultural icon for <strong>the</strong> Corps. Military memorabilia cover <strong>the</strong> walls and ceilings.
Most importantly, Spooner himself remains a hub <strong>of</strong> oral history. He is <strong>of</strong>t solicited as a speaker and is
revered as <strong>the</strong> man in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> full repertoire <strong>of</strong> Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck yarns. A testament to his cultural
credentials is <strong>the</strong> fact that any on Quantico who want to introduce a newcomer to <strong>the</strong>ir culture
immediately suggest lunch at <strong>the</strong> Globe and Laurel. 415 In 2010, Spooner relented to significant peer
pressure and put his “mostly fiction” version <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps legends into a book. His work weaves
stories stretching from <strong>the</strong> Banana War years through <strong>the</strong> last days <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pacific campaign. The <strong>the</strong>mes
are not all glory days. If anything, Spooner’s primary <strong>the</strong>me is a love for <strong>the</strong> Corps despite <strong>the</strong>
absurdities and ironies and sometimes blood-soaked life it <strong>of</strong>fers. 416 For <strong>the</strong> outsider, probably <strong>the</strong> most
surprising aspect <strong>of</strong> Spooner’s collection is its emphasis on <strong>the</strong> upsidedownness <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps life.
The wrong people get promoted, slick do-nothings or screw-ups get medals, and men <strong>of</strong> genuine talent
and warrior skill <strong>of</strong>ten end up on <strong>the</strong> wrong side <strong>of</strong> luck. The redeeming <strong>the</strong>me, however, is that
"bro<strong>the</strong>rs" know what is going on, even if <strong>the</strong> Marine "machine" does not, and that is what matters. The
critical massing <strong>of</strong> norms, values, and beliefs about self and o<strong>the</strong>rs across <strong>the</strong>se legends is remarkably
consistent when a similar exercise is applied to contemporary oral histories. The narratives <strong>the</strong>y <strong>of</strong>fer
are captured in <strong>the</strong> sections below.
The Cultural Topography methodology is designed to be, above all else, useful to <strong>the</strong> strategist or
analyst employing it. Analysts who have applied this research design to good effect have allowed <strong>the</strong>
flex built into its frame to help <strong>the</strong>m assemble and analyze cultural data in <strong>the</strong> way most useful to <strong>the</strong>ir
particular intelligence question. Some researchers have done this by keeping <strong>the</strong> four primary research
categories discreet (I, N, V, & PL), looking for overlap and redundancy <strong>of</strong> particular cultural <strong>the</strong>mes in
order to signal robustness. O<strong>the</strong>rs have intermeshed two or more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> categories in order to assess
<strong>the</strong> impact one has upon <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, for instance, <strong>the</strong> connection <strong>of</strong> norms to a particular value, or <strong>the</strong>
impact a strong identity strand has on perception <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. For illustrative purposes, <strong>the</strong> combined
approach will be demonstrated here. The category below will examine <strong>the</strong> anchoring <strong>of</strong> norms to values
in order to examine <strong>the</strong> value context in which norms derive meaning and <strong>the</strong> significance <strong>the</strong>se hold for
members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. The aim is to shed light on those norms likely to change, (or not), if recognized
as counterproductive to small wars practices, and conversely, to determine which <strong>of</strong> those useful to
counterinsurgency practice are anchored in ways likely to carry <strong>the</strong>m into <strong>the</strong> next irregular arena.
414
H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Third Edition,
(Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002) : 187.
415
A fur<strong>the</strong>r testament is <strong>the</strong> cameo on Spooner that O’Connell provides as opening material in <strong>the</strong> first chapter <strong>of</strong>
Underdogs, his recently published book on <strong>the</strong> Corps. O’Connell describes <strong>the</strong> Globe and Laurel as “part
restaurant, part museum, and part Marine Corps shrine.” Aaron B. O’Connell, Underdogs, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2012): 24-26.
416
Maj. Richard Spooner, USMC(R), A Marine Anthology: In <strong>the</strong> Spirit <strong>of</strong> Semper Fidelis, (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips
Publications, 2010): ix.
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Norms and Values
Carl Builder labeled a service’s key value its “Altar for Worship”—that which a service reveres or
cherishes as an ideal. For <strong>the</strong> Navy it is tradition and independence at sea, for <strong>the</strong> Air Force technology,
and for <strong>the</strong> Army: service to <strong>the</strong> nation. 417 This <strong>the</strong>sis steps to fill Builder’s USMC gap. For <strong>the</strong> Corps, it
is <strong>the</strong> Corps. 418 Everything Marines do revolves around protecting and burnishing <strong>the</strong> essence, heritage,
public persona, and future place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. Marines unapologetically reference “Our beloved Corps.”
Beloved. Marines make mention <strong>of</strong> fighting for country; but Marines fight for Marines. They fight for
bro<strong>the</strong>rs and <strong>the</strong> Corps. Although likely unconscious, <strong>the</strong> Drill Instructor’s creed makes <strong>the</strong> hierarchy <strong>of</strong>
Corps over country somewhat overt:
These recruits are entrusted to my care. I will train <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong> my ability. I will develop
<strong>the</strong>m into smartly disciplined, physically fit, basically trained Marines, thoroughly indoctrinated
in love <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps and country. I will demand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m, and demonstrate by my own personal
example, <strong>the</strong> highest standards <strong>of</strong> personal conduct, morality and pr<strong>of</strong>essional skill. 419
The following sentiment, expressed by Sergeant Major Clint Kreuser, echoes <strong>the</strong> feelings <strong>of</strong> fellow
Marines who sat on <strong>the</strong> “bench” outside <strong>of</strong> combat in Iraq and Afghanistan: “Every Marine wants to go
over <strong>the</strong>re; that’s where <strong>the</strong> fight is; that’s where our Marines are.” 420 Even if <strong>the</strong> “cause” behind an
engagement is nebulous and efforts seem to be dysfunctional or failing, Marines go, or go again to <strong>the</strong>
fight because o<strong>the</strong>r Marines are <strong>the</strong>re. This sentiment crosses generations. A Vietnam era vet stated
for <strong>the</strong> record: “In combat I fought for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. I didn’t fight for this country or our flag. That
wasn’t due to any lack <strong>of</strong> patriotism, but because country and flag were too remote 10,000 miles away.
A fighting man, when successful, needs something closer. Marines have it. Our Corps is our country.” 421
A seeming switch in perspective occurs when Marines are speaking to “civvies” (civilians) about <strong>the</strong>ir
service. In <strong>the</strong>se conversations Marines appear to privilege service to country. The pattern <strong>of</strong>
discourse, however, continues to tie back to fellow Marines. Marines are making a demand <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
American public to respect <strong>the</strong> sacrifice bro<strong>the</strong>rs have made in <strong>the</strong>ir name. Typical <strong>of</strong> this prose is Major
Rick Wells:
[P]eople that you know have lost <strong>the</strong>ir lives…You realize that…what we hold dear or what we
should hold dear in this country, <strong>the</strong> liberty and <strong>the</strong> ideas that we hold dear…--that is not
417
Builder: 18-20.
418
Retired USMC LtCol Frank H<strong>of</strong>fman, who also stepped to fill this gap, agrees for <strong>the</strong> most part with this
assessment. His words are slightly less direct: “Marines remain identified as Marines for life: ‘once a Marine,
always a Marine’ is more than an expression <strong>of</strong> respect, it’s a form <strong>of</strong> worship <strong>of</strong> service and a genuine recognition
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> arduous process <strong>of</strong> becoming a Marine.” H<strong>of</strong>fman also adds teamwork and subordination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual
to <strong>the</strong> common good, combat readiness, and expeditionary ethos as altars <strong>of</strong> worship for Marines. Frank G.
H<strong>of</strong>fman, “The Marine Mask <strong>of</strong> War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, November 10, 2011. Accessed at
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.h<strong>of</strong>fman.marines.pdf.
419
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): 253. Italics added.
420
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): 270.
421
L<strong>of</strong>land, “I am a Marine!,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1976): 23.
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automatic and it needs to be enforced and <strong>the</strong> military is a big part <strong>of</strong> that enforcement.” (Later)
“I think that’s one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> worst things that someone could do is take time for granted, family for
granted, living in a free country for granted, being able to go to school for granted. These things
aren’t given. 422
This perspective tends to spill over into resentment for what Marines perceive as naïve or <strong>of</strong>fensively
ignorant public notions about <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> war in preserving freedom. Marines see <strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong>
quiet, underappreciated guarantors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “good life” swirling around <strong>the</strong>m. Sgt. Jeremy D. Lima
captures <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten irritated stance <strong>of</strong> a returned-home Devil Dog:
I don’t think war is fun or glorious or anything like that but, I am willing to do it again, in fact I
want to do it again. I think <strong>the</strong> military services are absolutely necessary especially with <strong>the</strong>
world is today (sic). It seems that everyone (kids, parents, etc.) think that <strong>the</strong> military is <strong>the</strong> last
resort and <strong>the</strong>se kids are too good for <strong>the</strong> military, but in reality, if someone thinks that way,
<strong>the</strong>y must think <strong>the</strong>y are too good for freedom. Everyone likes to do <strong>the</strong>ir own thing whe<strong>the</strong>r
that is playing sports, playing music, read books or spend time with family and friends, but no
one is willing to defend that, <strong>the</strong>y just take it for granted. 423
A surprising number <strong>of</strong> bumper-sticker borne narratives capture <strong>the</strong> Marines’ resentful attitude toward
<strong>the</strong> American public. 424 Marines fight for Marines but <strong>the</strong>y do expect <strong>the</strong> nation to be grateful for it.
Bro<strong>the</strong>rhood
The Marine’s “mystical bro<strong>the</strong>rhood” 425 is woven through by an enviable esprit de corps lived, treasured,
and valued by Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks who guard it with a zealous loyalty. Major General Commandant John
Lejeune framed esprit de corps as both obligation and treasure: “[New recruits] received from [<strong>the</strong>
Corps] <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> practical knowledge and experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> old-time Marine, and <strong>the</strong> marvelous
esprit de corps which has been handed down from generation to generation.” 426 Later, “Every <strong>of</strong>ficer
and every man should have it. Each one <strong>of</strong> us should use all his strength to add to it. It is a sacred thing.
It is our priceless heritage from <strong>the</strong> past. It has come to us from <strong>the</strong> heroic dead.” 427 Lejeune’s <strong>the</strong>mes
have been carried forward across <strong>the</strong> last hundred years <strong>of</strong> published Commandant speeches. From
Commandant Amos: “Throughout <strong>the</strong> storied history <strong>of</strong> our Corps certain unimpeachable images stand
forth as unparalleled in capturing <strong>the</strong> tradition and ethos <strong>of</strong> what it means to be a United States Marine.
422
Oral history file AFC 2001/001/74501 MS01, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library <strong>of</strong>
Congress (Washington DC).
423
Oral history file AFC 2001/001/53039 MS01, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library <strong>of</strong>
Congress (Washington DC).
424
See subsection “Message to <strong>the</strong> American Public” in Appendix D.
425
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 156.
426
John A. Lejeune, “It’s in Their Blood,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1921): 415.
427
John A. Lejeune, “Preparation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1922): 55.
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Now we celebrate <strong>the</strong> 235th birthday <strong>of</strong> our Corps and recall <strong>the</strong> thoughts, reflections, and esprit that
epitomize all Marines.” 428
Interestingly enough, <strong>the</strong> felt presence <strong>of</strong> esprit de corps, based on a common foundation <strong>of</strong> heritage
has not always existed in <strong>the</strong> robust form it takes today. In a September 1921 submission to <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps Gazette, First Lieutenant Sidney J. Handsley laments <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> formal mechanisms for learning
<strong>the</strong> traditions, symbols and history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. His argument for remedying this deficit is <strong>the</strong>
establishment <strong>of</strong> a more robust esprit de corps – one which would remove “that utter sense <strong>of</strong>
loneliness” by binding fellow Marines toge<strong>the</strong>r within <strong>the</strong> heritage <strong>of</strong> “meaning” ensconced in <strong>the</strong>ir
hymn, symbols, and rituals, “The meaning which, too <strong>of</strong>ten, he only learns by chance.” 429
Over time <strong>the</strong> Corps refined—well beyond its sister services—<strong>the</strong> art form <strong>of</strong> consciously cultivating
esprit de corps and mooring it to a common sense <strong>of</strong> history, heritage, and symbols. This effort was
vitalized by a recognition that a strong esprit de corps is a fighting asset. 430 In <strong>the</strong> thick <strong>of</strong> World War II
Commandant Thomas Holcomb reminded his force: “As every Marine knows, <strong>the</strong> preparation for
service is not limited to <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> technical skills. There is also <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> an esprit
de corps to assure that our men’s native and acquired fighting skills will be vitalized by an indomitable
determination to win, against any odds.” 431 Vietnam-era Commandant Wallace Greene acknowledged
much <strong>the</strong> same: “It is this spirit that has enabled us to bear adversity without complaint and to win
victories over seemingly impossible odds…” 432
Major Jason Spitaletta, a student <strong>of</strong> psychology within <strong>the</strong> Corps, points out that Marines today are
biased to receive esprit de corps because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rhood reputation <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps projects.
Recruits go in looking for it, presume that it will happen, and it does. 433 Marine recruiting posters boast
that “orphans” arrived at Parris Island and a family emerges. 434 The bro<strong>the</strong>rhood feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps
was made yet more famous by Medal <strong>of</strong> Honor recipient Dakota Meyers who, in a nationally televised
interview, explained his medal-winning defiance <strong>of</strong> orders in order to pursue an attempted rescue <strong>of</strong>
team members: “We are taught obedience to orders, but I can tell you what we are taught more
importantly, is <strong>the</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rhood.” 435 Meyers is not alone in his heroics in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rhood.
428
James F. Amos, “A Message from <strong>the</strong> Commandant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November
2010): 8.
429
First Lieutenant Sidney J. Handsley, U.S.M.C., “Esprit de Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette Sep 1921; 6, 3; (digital
archives) ProQuest Direct Complete: 311, 310.
430
O’Connell asserts: “Few military organizations think <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir culture as a form <strong>of</strong> power; <strong>the</strong> Marines do so
explicitly, protect it zealously, and deploy it <strong>of</strong>fensively.” O’Connell, Underdogs: 19.
431 th
Commandant Thomas Holcomb, “Our 168 Anniversary: A Message from <strong>the</strong> Commandant” Marine Corps
Gazette, (November 1943): 5.
432
General Commandant Wallace M. Greene, Jr. “Special Message From New CMC,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(January 1964): 1.
433
Major Jason Spitaletta, USMC, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 25, 2011).
434
These findings coincide with Rick’s tracking <strong>of</strong> recruits from boot camp through <strong>the</strong> inevitable disappointments
<strong>of</strong> post boot camp life. Despite letdowns in o<strong>the</strong>r areas, Ricks finds <strong>the</strong> “bro<strong>the</strong>rhood” good still intact. Thomas E.
Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 249.
435
Interview The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, October 24, 2012, accessed on 8 December 2012:
http://www.<strong>the</strong>dailyshow.com/watch/wed-october-24-2012/exclusive---dakota-meyer-extended-interview-pt--1.
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Jorje Cruz, a staff sergeant and Recon Marine, won <strong>the</strong> Navy Cross for retrieving his bro<strong>the</strong>rs: “…I
didn’t—I couldn’t see myself, even if it meant dying, leaving those guys behind. …[T]hose are <strong>the</strong> guys
that were…, to me <strong>the</strong>y were, like, my big bro<strong>the</strong>rs because <strong>the</strong>y taught me everything.” After returning
to civilian life: “[Y]ou never find that comradery (sic) again.” 436
Although new recruits are certainly biased to receive this bro<strong>the</strong>rhood “good” and Corps’ propaganda
usefully reinforces it, <strong>the</strong> near universal consistency <strong>of</strong> strong, very <strong>of</strong>ten verbalized, emotive
attachment to <strong>the</strong> Corps bro<strong>the</strong>rhood—from all Devil Dog ranks and stations—and across grassroots
narrative forms, indicates that <strong>the</strong> “bro<strong>the</strong>rhood” within this insular military society is <strong>the</strong> genuine
article. “We value <strong>the</strong> relationships with one ano<strong>the</strong>r more so than anything else.” 437
The Marines’ strong bro<strong>the</strong>rhood exists in spite <strong>of</strong>, ra<strong>the</strong>r than due to an amelioration <strong>of</strong>, anti-female
and racist tendencies within <strong>the</strong> Corps. Both groups have been consigned historically to second class
status and limited in access to power. 438 It is not unusual for male Marines to voice <strong>the</strong> attitude that
<strong>the</strong> Corps “is no place for females.” Despite this, many women make strong claims <strong>of</strong> equanimity for
<strong>the</strong>mselves. 439 Of <strong>the</strong> 45 contemporary oral histories reviewed, 3 were female (6% -- an
overrepresentation by nearly triple <strong>the</strong> actual percentage <strong>of</strong> women in <strong>the</strong> force). None <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three
mentioned second class citizenship issues and all three verbalized strong ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps and <strong>of</strong>
experiencing positive camaraderie. “They call Marines… ‘The Few and <strong>the</strong> Proud’. They call us females
<strong>the</strong> ‘Fewer, and <strong>the</strong> Prouder….I love <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps!” 440
Marines acknowledge that <strong>the</strong>y crack racist jokes and make ethnicity an open target for energetically
hurled insults. Their refrain is that this isn’t racism, it is pro<strong>of</strong> that: “being a Marine transcends any
o<strong>the</strong>r form <strong>of</strong> identity, to include those associated with gender or race.” 441 Randy Shepard, Director <strong>of</strong>
Strategy over <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps advertising account for <strong>the</strong> last 22 years would qualify that point. He
believes <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps has a serious recruiting problem when it comes to diversity because “<strong>the</strong>
culture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is white, sou<strong>the</strong>rn, and protestant.” 442 Although Marines have convinced
<strong>the</strong>mselves that <strong>the</strong>re is little harm done with racist jibes within ranks, uninhibited racism caused
Marines to provoke enemies out <strong>of</strong> civilian populations in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean during <strong>the</strong>ir early endeavors
<strong>the</strong>re and would certainly provoke <strong>the</strong> same reaction from any future population who might be subject
to such derogations.
No matter <strong>the</strong>ir color or gender, in near complete accord contemporary Marines who have left <strong>the</strong>
service declare that what <strong>the</strong>y miss most is “o<strong>the</strong>r Marines.” Marines tend to see <strong>the</strong>mselves as a
436
Oral history file AFC 2001/ 001/78228 MS02, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress Veterans History Project, American Folklife
Center, Washington DC.
437
Jason Spitaletta, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 25, 2011).
438
Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, Operational <strong>Culture</strong> for <strong>the</strong> Warfighter: 280.
439
See chapters 18-22 on female Marine stories in Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill
Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006).
440
Oral History file AFC 2001/001/49712 MS02 [1] Veterans History Project, see also AFC 2001/001/73183 MS01
and AFC 2001/001/37518 MS01.
441
Cooling and Turner: 8.
442
Randy Shepard, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (November 2, 2011).
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breed that can be little understood by outsiders both in terms <strong>of</strong> behavior and bond. Their norms are
out <strong>of</strong> sync with civilian society: “Then o<strong>the</strong>r places we had fight clubs…and you see Marines out <strong>the</strong>re
just knocking it out and fighting each o<strong>the</strong>r. And <strong>the</strong>n when <strong>the</strong>y were done <strong>the</strong>y were, like, beer it is
and <strong>the</strong>y would drink down, like, a 30-rack <strong>of</strong> beer and laugh about it. I mean, a different breed <strong>of</strong>
animal, a Marine is;” 443 The bonds forged can only be framed in terms <strong>of</strong> familial, or something
stronger: “They’re like bro<strong>the</strong>rs and sisters…you go through so much toge<strong>the</strong>r that you couldn’t go
through…with your own blood, so <strong>the</strong>y almost become your own blood just through experience so it’s
hard not to talk to <strong>the</strong>m…. I talk to <strong>the</strong>m as <strong>of</strong>ten as I can and though it is hard to keep in touch with
everybody, <strong>the</strong>re are a few that you’ll never forget that will almost be part <strong>of</strong> you forever,…;” 444 “It’s
more like bro<strong>the</strong>rhood than friendship over <strong>the</strong>re, you know, you’re watching each o<strong>the</strong>r’s backs, you
know, putting your lives in each o<strong>the</strong>r’s hands;” 445 “We became a band <strong>of</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rs as <strong>the</strong>y call it, it truly
is;” 446 Admiration for peers and superiors bears a striking contrast to what might be found in corporate
civilian society:
[My fellow <strong>of</strong>ficers and Marines] were extraordinary. Of course you don’t get along with
everyone, but…it’s being around people that appreciate <strong>the</strong> core values that you hold dear. You
know <strong>the</strong> core values in Marine Corps are honor, courage, and commitment….So when you’re
around people that have those and hold those core values dear, I mean, it’s extraordinary and
it’s an extraordinary culture. It’s a culture…within an American culture that appreciates it so
much, and <strong>the</strong> individuals that participate in that are, I mean, <strong>the</strong>y are heroes. 447
The “o<strong>the</strong>r Marines” valued are contemporary buddies, but <strong>the</strong>se are connected in spirit and ritual to
Marines who have come before. Homage to Corps’ heritage and heroes is ritualized in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
birthday celebration on <strong>the</strong> tenth day <strong>of</strong> every November. On this day <strong>the</strong> Commandant sends out a
birthday message that reminds troops <strong>of</strong> Marines long gone (but not forgotten! 448 ) to whom <strong>the</strong>y owe a
future <strong>of</strong> honor. Typical <strong>of</strong> birthday prose is Commandant Randolph Pate in 1956: “We must strive
constantly to add luster to <strong>the</strong> glorious record <strong>of</strong> those Marines who have gone before us. Only by so
doing can we prove ourselves worthy <strong>of</strong> our heritage. Only thus can we proudly bear <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> United
States Marines.” 449 John A. Lejeune originated <strong>the</strong> tradition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> birthday ball (which Marines must
“voluntarily” attend) as well as Marine Corps Order 47 which lauds <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps and is read
annually. Commandant Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd formalized <strong>the</strong> cake cutting ritual. 450 The first piece <strong>of</strong>
cake, cut with a Mameluke sword to celebrate warrior heritage, goes to a guest <strong>of</strong> honor, <strong>the</strong> second to
443 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/78228 MS02, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
444 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/72364 MS01, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
445 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/73137 MS01, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
446 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/52380 MS02, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
447 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/74501 MS01, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress.
448 Spooner captures <strong>the</strong> Marine ethic <strong>of</strong> keeping <strong>the</strong>ir dead alive through one squad leader’s consistent refrain:
“No one is really dead until he is forgotten.” His reminder is tw<strong>of</strong>old: it is <strong>the</strong> obligation <strong>of</strong> every Marine to inspire
vibrant remembrance <strong>of</strong> those that have fallen, and consequently, no Devil Dog need fear death in <strong>the</strong> Corps.
Spooner: 241.
449 Commandant Randolph McC. Pate, “Commandant’s Birthday Message” Marine Corps Gazette, (November
1956): 98.
450 Marion F. Sturkey, Warrior <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines: 21.
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<strong>the</strong> oldest Marine present, and <strong>the</strong> third (or a remainder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second piece) goes to <strong>the</strong> youngest
Marine present—signifying <strong>the</strong> bond between <strong>the</strong> two generations, <strong>the</strong> passing down <strong>of</strong> heritage.
Marines take <strong>the</strong>ir Corps’ birthday seriously and will cobble toge<strong>the</strong>r a cake no matter <strong>the</strong>ir situation,
including in combat zones. It is a ritual performed on <strong>the</strong> same day all around <strong>the</strong> world—Marines in
<strong>the</strong> modern era are fond <strong>of</strong> demonstrating inventive ways to celebrate <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps birthday with
something resembling “cake” in even <strong>the</strong> most austere field conditions—and from which <strong>the</strong>y derive
strength, a reminder <strong>of</strong> heritage, and bro<strong>the</strong>rhood.
Rituals such as <strong>the</strong> birthday ball and cake cutting ceremony reinforce a primary <strong>the</strong>me running
throughout Spooner's legend collection: <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is a family. O’Connell describes <strong>the</strong> Corps in
<strong>the</strong> same terms. The Marine Corps provides “a connection to a larger family that reaches across time
and space. This was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principal benefits <strong>of</strong> membership in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps: a broad and deep
sense <strong>of</strong> kinship that encompassed all Marines, past and present, living and dead.” 451 It's members
protect each o<strong>the</strong>r internally and out. Even <strong>the</strong> worst <strong>of</strong> Marines are defended from outsiders. This may
mean defending physical life or personal reputation. To save a lieutenant whom <strong>the</strong>y detest Spooner’s
“fictional” platoons risk life and limb: “In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, he was down and for all <strong>the</strong>ir disgust, <strong>the</strong> men <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Third Platoon had to save him. He may be <strong>the</strong> lieutenant <strong>the</strong>y most wanted to see marooned on a
desert island, but he was a Marine.” 452 The reputations <strong>of</strong> individual Marines are protected in order to
protect <strong>the</strong> reputation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps as a whole. Protection <strong>of</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rs, and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps, is laudable and
without question this demonstration <strong>of</strong> fierce internal loyalty contributes to <strong>the</strong> strong bonds <strong>of</strong>
bro<strong>the</strong>rhood which remain <strong>the</strong> most attractive, and reliable, feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. In counterinsurgency
scenarios, however, especially those <strong>of</strong> extended duration involving state-building efforts, bro<strong>the</strong>rhood
ties <strong>of</strong> this intensity threaten to undermine evenhanded jurisprudence on behalf <strong>of</strong> locals when Marines
violate local norms, legal practices, or are abusive in <strong>the</strong>ir treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native population. Internal
strengths such as bro<strong>the</strong>rhood may inadvertently produce negative externalities that may not be
remedied without a concurrent reduction in strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> primary good.
The Corps as an institution and <strong>the</strong> bro<strong>the</strong>rhood it affords are <strong>the</strong> most sainted values on <strong>the</strong> USMC
Altar <strong>of</strong> Worship, but <strong>the</strong> Corps has no shortage <strong>of</strong> additional “values.” The Marine Corps values values.
They are overt about it. They advertise values, drill values, preach values. The three that reign supreme
are Courage, Honor, and Commitment. 453 Recruits repeat <strong>the</strong>se three times daily in boot camp: “Honor.
Courage. Commitment. Kill, kill. Marine Corps!” 454 and Marines are indoctrinated to see <strong>the</strong>mselves as
<strong>the</strong> bastions <strong>of</strong> a long forgotten conservative America, <strong>the</strong> still standing sentries <strong>of</strong> this noble value
tripartite. The leadership values <strong>of</strong>ficers must memorize, drill and recite is much longer: bearing,
courage, decisiveness, dependability, endurance, enthusiasm, initiative, integrity, judgment, justice,
knowledge, loyalty, tact, and unselfishness (not to be left out, <strong>of</strong>ficers retain <strong>the</strong> “Kill!” chorus, however,
which is belted out by candidates at full volume as a response to such banal commands as taking one’s
451 O’Connell, Underdogs, 40.
452 Spooner, A Marine Anthology, 266.
453 Marine Corps Values and Leadership: User’s Guide for Discussion Leaders, (Marine Corps University, 1996).
454 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 62.
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seat). 455 Courage, Honor, and Commitment have pride <strong>of</strong> place as mantra but in directives from
leadership to <strong>the</strong> Corps <strong>the</strong>se are not <strong>the</strong> values that Commandants spend most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir time discussing
in detail. “Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism” and “Discipline” absorb far more speech and directive time than do courage,
honor, and commitment.
Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and Discipline
Marines see <strong>the</strong>mselves as <strong>the</strong> “consummate pr<strong>of</strong>essional.” 456 The Corps’ seminal doctrinal text,
Warfighting (known amongst Marines as MCDP-1), defines pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism as being “true experts in <strong>the</strong>
conduct <strong>of</strong> war,” achieved by “intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to
<strong>the</strong> lowest levels.” 457 No o<strong>the</strong>r attribute is more highly regarded nor more repeated as praise in
Spooner’s legends. “Savage is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best-damned Marines I’ve ever known. With a handful <strong>of</strong> men
like him, you could storm <strong>the</strong> gates <strong>of</strong> hell and overrun <strong>the</strong> Devil’s brigade. He’s a pr<strong>of</strong>essional, through
and through;” 458 Spooner’s use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term captures <strong>the</strong> same spirit as <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial definition, as does
Fick’s experience as a Force Reconnaissance Marine. For “recon” Marines (<strong>the</strong> most elite branch), being
called “hard” is “<strong>the</strong> greatest compliment one could pay to ano<strong>the</strong>r.” Fick explains, “Hardness wasn’t
toughness, nor was it courage, although both were part <strong>of</strong> it. Hardness was <strong>the</strong> ability to face an
overwhelming situation with aplomb, smile calmly at it, and <strong>the</strong>n triumph through sheer pr<strong>of</strong>essional
pride.” 459 The same combat-valor orientation to “pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism” appears in this admiring account <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> turn-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-century Corps which claimed Marine legend Smedley Butler:
But <strong>the</strong>re was this Marine Corps. A small, go-to-hell outfit <strong>of</strong> 2,900 troops, its 77 <strong>of</strong>ficers were
mostly Civil War veterans, tall, straight, bearded pr<strong>of</strong>essionals who dressed <strong>the</strong>ir pride in gaudy
blue uniforms, carried Mameluke hilt swords, fed <strong>the</strong>ir thirst with chewing tobacco, <strong>the</strong>ir fatigue
with drinking whiskey, cursed with <strong>the</strong> metric vigor <strong>of</strong> Kipling, drilled <strong>the</strong>ir troops night and day,
knew everything <strong>the</strong>re was to know about <strong>the</strong>ir three weapons, <strong>the</strong> Lee straight-pull 6mm rifle,
<strong>the</strong> Gatling gun and <strong>the</strong> Hotchkiss revolving canon. Weird, unorthodox, demanding men, <strong>the</strong>y
fought like hell and <strong>the</strong>y won. To be accepted by <strong>the</strong>m, to be admitted to this small band <strong>of</strong>
bro<strong>the</strong>rs…well, here was something intensely personal, something proud and glorious and
exciting that no amount <strong>of</strong> fatigue and pain and death could diminish, here was a place where
you could sometimes find <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>of</strong> truth, and this was what Capt. Butler chose to do with
his life. 460
These images strike a sharp contrast with expanded notions <strong>of</strong> “pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism” practiced in <strong>the</strong>
modern era Corps. This century’s Devil Dog warriors continue to see coolness under fire as central—
455
Nathanial Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
18
456
Marine Corps Values and Leadership: User’s Guide for Discussion Leaders, (Marine Corps University, 1996): 4-1
(<strong>of</strong>ficial pagination system).
457
Warfighting, MCDP 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997): 56 italics in original, 57.
458
Spooner: 64,
459
Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
2005):145.
460
Robert B. Asprey, “The Court-Martial <strong>of</strong> Smedley Butler,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1959): 30.
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“Our Marines performed under pressure. That’s what Marines do.” 461 --but on base are expected to
exhibit “pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism” through a set <strong>of</strong> what might seem anachronistic civilities. 462 Strict protocols
regarding saluting, verbal salutations, body language, and tidiness form interesting social rigidities
actively practiced within <strong>the</strong> Corps’ ranked bro<strong>the</strong>rhood. In this, Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks present one <strong>of</strong> many
paradoxes. When on base <strong>the</strong>y are more courteous, conscious <strong>of</strong> protocol, and obsessive about
uniformed appearance than <strong>the</strong>ir sister services, but when deployed downrange take pride in acquiring
more dirt, smell, and muck than most humans could stand—and banter in language that makes civilized
ears burn. One <strong>of</strong> Spooner’s legendary teams called <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong> “Raggedy Assed Marines” with
more than a touch <strong>of</strong> pride in <strong>the</strong>ir “salty” combat worn-and-torn appearance. 463 This image resides
alongside a contradictory, near fanatic ethos to keep <strong>the</strong>ir persons and uniforms clean. E.B. Sledge, in
his memoires <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> World War II years, notes that being physically filthy
bo<strong>the</strong>red almost everyone I knew. Even <strong>the</strong> hardiest Marine typically kept his rifle and his
person clean. His language and his mind might need a good bit <strong>of</strong> cleaning up but not his
weapon, his uniform, or his person. We had this philosophy drilled into us in boot camp, and
many times at Camp Elliot I had to pass personal inspection, to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> clean fingernails,
before being passed as fit to go on liberty. To be anything less than neat and sharp was
considered a negative reflection on <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps and was not tolerated. 464
A favorite quote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps which neatly captures <strong>the</strong>se dueling set <strong>of</strong> values is purported to have
been said by Eleanor Roosevelt during a visit to Quantico in 1945: “The Marines I have seen around <strong>the</strong>
world have <strong>the</strong> cleanest bodies, <strong>the</strong> filthiest minds, <strong>the</strong> highest morale, and <strong>the</strong> lowest morals <strong>of</strong> any
group <strong>of</strong> animals I have ever seen. Thank God for <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps!” 465
The aspect <strong>of</strong> “pr<strong>of</strong>essional” most important in any particular moment seems to be driven by context 466
and <strong>the</strong> era in which one resides. Almost no mention is made <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism in Commandant
speeches until <strong>the</strong> 1970s when resuscitating certain aspects <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism post-Vietnam became
paramount to <strong>the</strong> Corps’ image. Commandant Chapman took up <strong>the</strong> baton <strong>of</strong> “pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism” during
his tenure and used it to beat a steady drum into his final year:
In my view, a principal ingredient to our success was <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines who
were on <strong>the</strong> rolls when <strong>the</strong> war started. That pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism was made up <strong>of</strong> many things, but
461 Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library <strong>of</strong> Congress (Washington DC) file AFC
2001/001/53039 MS01.
462 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 92-93.
463 Spooner, A Marine Anthology, 302-303.
464 E. B. Sledge, With <strong>the</strong> Old Breed, (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1981): 92.
465 See an iteration on Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck’s website: http://www.lea<strong>the</strong>rneck.com/forums/showthread.php?1647-
Eleanor-Roosevelt-s-quote. Accessed on 7 November 2012.
466 The ability <strong>of</strong> Marines to acquire muck, or allow one’s blouse to come untucked, will rest largely on <strong>the</strong>
disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> closest Sergeant Major. The “classic” portrayal <strong>of</strong> an overzealous Sergeant Major enforcing dress
standards in a combat-heavy arena (Iraq) is found in Generation Kill, an HBO series based on <strong>the</strong> book <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same
title by Evan Wright (and validated by a second accounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same events in Nathanial Fick’s, One Bullet
Away). This pseudo documentary series is widely regarded amongst members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps as <strong>the</strong> most true-to-life
film <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m ever made.
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it was grounded in <strong>the</strong> belief that high standards in performance and discipline are vital to
battlefield successes—high standards not just in military pr<strong>of</strong>iciency and physical fitness, but in
military appearance, in military courtesy, and in <strong>the</strong> cleanliness and squared-away appearance
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area where we live, work, and train, all a reflection <strong>of</strong> individual and group discipline. The
true pr<strong>of</strong>essional is aware that <strong>the</strong>se standards are not ends in <strong>the</strong>mselves, that in fact, <strong>the</strong>y are
<strong>the</strong> means by which we breed pride, and that pride, in turn, builds <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> discipline that is
essential to victory in combat with minimum casualties. 467
Chapman was <strong>the</strong> first Commandant to give priority attention to military appearance in <strong>the</strong> Gazette, but
was certainly not first to note it as a hallmark <strong>of</strong> Marines. Pride in military appearance stretches back to
<strong>the</strong> Marines’ earliest days. 468 The subject was addressed in <strong>the</strong> very first editions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Gazette. A Captain Frank E. Evans began his treatise on <strong>the</strong> signature Mameluke sword with <strong>the</strong>
following passages:
The Marine Corps has been notably free from slavish imitation or hasty adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> customs
and traditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sister services. In no department has it more tenaciously held to its own
distinctive attributes than in its uniform and equipment…. This independence <strong>of</strong> spirit has had
much to do with <strong>the</strong> sturdy esprit de corps and its steady growth, and <strong>the</strong> fostering <strong>of</strong> a purpose
that <strong>the</strong> customs and traditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps are not to be lightly discarded. 469
Marines are enamored <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own dress blue uniform and are fairly certain that all o<strong>the</strong>rs feel likewise.
The Corps uses <strong>the</strong> advantage <strong>of</strong> handsomest-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-services regalia to full effect in television
advertising. Nearly every commercial advertisement ends with <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> a squared away Marine in
sharp-as-a-tack dress blues. Superficial as <strong>the</strong> draw may be, it works. Sergeant Jose Robert Reyes is not
<strong>the</strong> only young recruit to go starry eyed over Marine dress-ups: “[O]ne day I was in <strong>the</strong> cafeteria and…I
saw this..staff sergeant and…he just walked in <strong>the</strong>re with his uniform and he even had a sword and he
just looked bad ass and I was like wow I wanna look like that.” 470 Spooner confesses <strong>the</strong> same. As a
shoeshine boy he “fell in love with <strong>the</strong> Corps <strong>the</strong> first time he ever saw a Marine.” Marine appearance
was <strong>the</strong> key draw to service: “Always in dress blues, marching down <strong>the</strong> street, looking tall and squared
away, and never letting me shine <strong>the</strong>ir shoes…always referring me to <strong>the</strong> sailors…The Marines were too
proud to let a kid shine <strong>the</strong>ir shoes. And I thought, ‘Wow, <strong>the</strong>y’re special, <strong>the</strong>y’re different, <strong>the</strong>y’re
wonderful!’” 471
467
Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, “A Letter from <strong>the</strong> CMC,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1970): 16.
468
Millet notes as early as 1863 a reputation for “military efficiency, discipline, and appearance.” Millet: 97.
469
Evans, “The Sword <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1916): 268.
470
Oral history file AFC 2001/001/68026 MS01, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library <strong>of</strong>
Congress.
471
O’Connell, Underdogs, 25. Spooner follows through by adding admiring accounts <strong>of</strong> Marine appearance in his
legends collection: “When Beck finished pressing his trousers <strong>the</strong>y had knife blade creases. In fact his creases
were so sharp you had to be careful not to get cut on <strong>the</strong>m. His shoes were spit shined to such a glossy finish <strong>the</strong>
reflection would hurt your eyes and his brass glistened with a magnificence that would make any seagoing Marine
envious.” Spooner, A Marine Anthology, 196-197.
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Effective as Marine dress is in courting <strong>the</strong> vanity cravings <strong>of</strong> America’s youth, <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong>
appearance runs a level deeper. Of <strong>the</strong> voices extolling Marine Corps spit and shine, Commandant
Chapman is most overt about function:
All <strong>of</strong> this dressing up has a purpose: to enhance our pr<strong>of</strong>essional image within ourselves.
Pr<strong>of</strong>essional service to <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States is our goal in everything we do; from <strong>the</strong>
way we think to <strong>the</strong> way we act; and from <strong>the</strong> way we know our pr<strong>of</strong>ession to <strong>the</strong> way we
look. 472
A “squared away” appearance has become, for Marines, synonymous with pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and
discipline. Great care is taken with keeping all aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> uniform sharp: chevrons are touched up
with black marker when <strong>the</strong>y begin to show wear, trousers are bloused over boots in a regulated
fashion, no tattoos below <strong>the</strong> shirt sleeves, “covers” (hats) have sharper angles than those <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
forces, and “high and tight” haircuts are signature Marine. The basic thinking is “sloppiness begets
sloppiness” and small inattentions will lead to larger ones. 473 Marine leadership is venerated, in part,
because <strong>the</strong>ir uniforms are crisper than recruits can seem to achieve. One contemporary Marine recalls
<strong>the</strong> larger-than-life image <strong>of</strong> his DIs—listing <strong>the</strong>ir appearance credentials first:
So <strong>the</strong> drill instructors are really like <strong>the</strong> hallmark <strong>of</strong> what it means to be…a Marine…<strong>the</strong>ir
uniform is perfect, [<strong>the</strong>y’re] motivated, [<strong>the</strong>y’re] loud, [<strong>the</strong>y’re] in physical shape, [<strong>the</strong>y’re]
smart…[<strong>the</strong>y are] everything that a Marine should want to be. 474
Impressive as it may be, <strong>the</strong> Marine version <strong>of</strong> being “squared away,”—looking sharp—can come at <strong>the</strong>
expense <strong>of</strong> practicality: hands are not allowed in pockets, even in cold wea<strong>the</strong>r, nor are wallets. Not all
regard this “tradition” as endearing and esprit building. Maximilian Uriarte, author <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> widely
popular and decidedly irreverent comic strip Terminal Lance, has dedicated more than one <strong>of</strong> his
humorist <strong>of</strong>ferings to <strong>the</strong> pockets topic with <strong>the</strong> following tactical observation:
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: quite possibly <strong>the</strong> most absurd nuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
is not being able to put your hands in your pockets–even when its bitter cold outside. I’ve heard
<strong>the</strong> old tales and adages <strong>of</strong> Chesty Puller saying something along <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong>, “A Marine with
cold hands and empty pockets is a fool”.… In any case, this really just comes down to one
simple belief <strong>of</strong> mine: pockets exist on <strong>the</strong> uniform for a reason. If it’s cold outside, warm your
hands. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,… <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps should encourage such an action, since cold hands
could very well adversely affect <strong>the</strong> way a Marine performs his job. 475
472
Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, “Purpose, Readiness, Quality, Progress,” Marine Corps Gazette, (April
1971): 16.
473
Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
22.
474
Oral history file AFC 2001/001/67587 MS01, Veterans History Project.
475
http://terminallance.com/2011/01/21/terminal-lance-98-unexpected-guest/; See also
http://terminallance.com/2010/01/12/terminal-lance-3-looking-pr<strong>of</strong>essional/.
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Absurd though it may be, hands-out-<strong>of</strong>-pockets is Marine tradition, and infractions have consequences.
One retired Marine wrote to <strong>the</strong> Gazette about <strong>the</strong> deleterious impact casual regard for this rule by
leadership had upon his troops twenty years prior. In anticipation <strong>of</strong> a visit from <strong>the</strong> Commandant his
troops “field-dayed” <strong>the</strong>ir barracks to a “fanatical” degree <strong>of</strong> perfection. The Commandant’s visit and
speech were short. Back at <strong>the</strong> barracks <strong>the</strong> sergeant noticed that his troops were depressed. Upon
inquiry one <strong>of</strong> his young privates “sneeringly” retorted, “He had his hands in his pockets <strong>the</strong> whole time
he spoke to us.” The author notes that this may be a small thing, but “Marines do not put <strong>the</strong>ir hands in
<strong>the</strong>ir pockets, ever.” His message to leadership is that Marine Corps’ standards and traditions matter,
and matter most for those who command and inspire. 476
Strictly constructed as <strong>the</strong>y are, it is inevitable that Marine values <strong>of</strong> appearance and proper form will
clash with values <strong>of</strong> pragmatism or utility in accomplishing mission success. Traditions may matter, but
carrying <strong>the</strong> “squared away” mentality into all forums may create unintended negative consequences
and perhaps even undermine a more strategically significant value set. A Marine blogger featured on
<strong>the</strong> Foreign Policy website complained that appearance, correct processes, and form were <strong>of</strong>ten
privileged in <strong>the</strong> Corps over genuine results in <strong>the</strong> field. The value hierarchy, as he perceived it, seemed
to be “it's okay to fail to provide any added value, so long as <strong>the</strong> PowerPoint slides are free <strong>of</strong> typos, no
serialized gear is lost, and everyone attends <strong>the</strong> Sexual Harassment Prevention training.” 477 The
opportunity cost imposed by one value can <strong>of</strong>ten have serious consequences for ano<strong>the</strong>r.
A close companion to <strong>the</strong> Marine version <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism is “discipline,” a value and practice given
consistent attention across Commandant speeches--“The men who are <strong>the</strong> best disciplined, <strong>of</strong> whatever
country <strong>the</strong>y are, will always fight <strong>the</strong> best” 478 --and referenced by drill instructors as <strong>the</strong> primary
objective <strong>of</strong> boot camp. 479 Boot camp’s ritualized practices: drill, inspections, and rigid requirements <strong>of</strong>
form and appearance are “essential for effecting <strong>the</strong> transition from civilian to Marine. They [teach]
recruits to submit to authority, to venerate tradition, and to sacrifice comfort, safety, and even life, all in
<strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps discipline.” 480 Recruits chant verses about discipline and are instructed to
become embodiments <strong>of</strong> its essence—clean cut, self-possessed men standing apart from “nasty” civilian
society. 481 Marines are quickly socialized to regard “undisciplined” as a deeply humiliating insult. 482 The
result: in <strong>the</strong>ir oral histories Marine veterans are more likely to cite “discipline” as <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps changed his or her life than any o<strong>the</strong>r characteristic.
476 Anonymous, Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1999): 16.
477 http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/04/we_re_getting_out_<strong>of</strong>_<strong>the</strong>_marines_because_we_wanted
_to_be_part_<strong>of</strong>_an_elite_force. Accessed January 7, 2013.
478 Quote borrowed from Kempenfelt in John H. Russell’s pre-Commandant write-up “A Plea for a Mission and
Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1916): 114.
479 Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006).
480 O’Connell, Underdogs, 37.
481 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 71.
482 “Have I trained a bunch <strong>of</strong> nasty undisciplined privates?!” James B. Woulfe captures “typical” DI discourse to
recruits entering <strong>the</strong> Crucible phase <strong>of</strong> training. Woulfe, Into <strong>the</strong> Crucible: Making Marines for <strong>the</strong> 21 st Century,
(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998): 10.
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The textbook definition <strong>of</strong> discipline for modern Marines is holding oneself responsible for one’s “own
actions and o<strong>the</strong>rs responsible for <strong>the</strong>ir actions” as well as a commitment to “maintaining physical,
moral, and mental health, to fitness and exercise, and to life long learning.” 483 In practice, however, <strong>the</strong>
aspects <strong>of</strong> “discipline” referenced by most Marines who comment on this value (usually in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong>
an insult levied at ano<strong>the</strong>r service) are appearance and fitness. Marines chastise o<strong>the</strong>r services
(primarily <strong>the</strong> Army and National Guard) for sloppiness in uniform or fatness. 484 Being overweight is
<strong>of</strong>ten treated as synonymous with being undisciplined – a significant failing. “Being s<strong>of</strong>t or overweight is
not merely against regulations; it demonstrates a departure from <strong>the</strong> warrior culture, and both <strong>the</strong>
institution and fellow Marines are quick to correct Marines that violate this culture.” 485
When in <strong>the</strong> field, however, it is combat discipline that becomes paramount. This comprises both
coolness under fire and being in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> grit and raw dedication required to accomplish <strong>the</strong>
mission. Pain, misery, and insurmountable odds are to be muscled through. “To Marines, failure is
never an option.” 486 When faced with an overwhelming condition “You suck it up, you deal with it, you
deal with <strong>the</strong> situation.” 487
Marines claim that <strong>the</strong>ir pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and discipline account for a higher degree <strong>of</strong> success in training
foreign forces in <strong>the</strong> field. They argue that learners respond better to a mentor <strong>the</strong>y can respect, who
brings stature, bearing, and pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism to <strong>the</strong> equation. Marines actively cultivate a distinctive
body language—“bearing”. They train to hold <strong>the</strong>mselves differently, look people directly in <strong>the</strong> eye,
inspire confidence, exude competence, and radiate <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> leadership that o<strong>the</strong>rs will yearn to
emulate. 488 When proper bearing is achieved, Marines believe <strong>the</strong> natural result is admiration and a
desire for emulation. It is important to note that Marine focus here is on who <strong>the</strong>y are and how <strong>the</strong>y
present <strong>the</strong>mselves ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equation: treatment <strong>of</strong> and training for trainees.
Characteristics and behaviors not included in <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> Marine-defined pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and
discipline deserve attention as possible blindspots. Discipline, in <strong>the</strong> Marine mind, is not incongruent
with extraordinarily rough habits including heavy alcohol and tobacco use, womanizing, and caustic
language. Underage binge drinking, heavy use <strong>of</strong> alcohol, porn, and tobacco are all part and parcel <strong>of</strong>
enlisted life (Terminal Lance makes a point <strong>of</strong> this by crafting a “food pyramid” for corporals which
places tobacco as <strong>the</strong> mainstay, supplemented with alcohol and energy drinks, reinforced by porn to
reduce <strong>the</strong> “pain” <strong>of</strong> Marine life absurdities). 489 The Corps has made some attempt to ameliorate
483
Marine Corps Values and Leadership: User’s Guide for Discussion Leaders, (Marine Corps University, 1996): 2-3.
484
Marine humor <strong>of</strong>ten reflects this <strong>the</strong>me. See http://twitpic.com/8gpdp5.
485
Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
486
Ibid.
487
Sergeant Dax Carpenter commenting on his approach to severe post traumatic stress disorder while still in
combat. Veterans History Project file AFC 2001/001/57035 MS01.
488
Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2011): 19-29.
489
http://terminallance.com/2010/04/16/terminal-lance-30-<strong>the</strong>-lance-corporal-food-pyramid/
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substance abuse 490 with limited effect. Issues <strong>of</strong> sexual assault have received far less attention . A
search <strong>of</strong> “sexual assault,” or “sexual <strong>of</strong>fenses,” over <strong>the</strong> entire Marine Corps Gazette and Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck
history (nearly 100 years) yields fewer than 20 articles. Admiring as he is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps, Thomas Ricks
notes that Marines does worst <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> services in Department <strong>of</strong> Defense assessments <strong>of</strong> sexual
harassment. 491 Until a fundamental value shift occurs at <strong>the</strong> enlisted grass roots level this behavior is
likely to continue as a Marine Corps norm.
While tightly scripted in what is said to <strong>of</strong>ficers and how one addresses civilians on base, Marines’
rapport with one ano<strong>the</strong>r—<strong>of</strong>ten project into public view (in forms such as memoires, blogs, comics, and
YouTube videos)—is rife with base, sexually charged references interwoven with gratuitous pr<strong>of</strong>anity.
Marines would not disagree with this charge. They take a certain pride in it. Flexing creative and witty
muscle by inventing a new form <strong>of</strong> even fur<strong>the</strong>r degraded insult is part and parcel <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> alpha male
bro<strong>the</strong>rhood. In this, Marines have become genuinely “desensitized” to <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> exceptionally
coarse language. They tend to scorn <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fended and discount <strong>the</strong> prospect that some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir bumpier
relations with foreign nationals may stem from this practice. The ban on cursing that exists for Drill
Instructors (and recruits!) at Marine Corps boot camp indicates that, at some level, <strong>the</strong> Corps recognizes
that pr<strong>of</strong>oundly <strong>of</strong>fensive language is <strong>of</strong>fensive, and a signal <strong>of</strong> indiscipline. None<strong>the</strong>less, queries
regarding <strong>the</strong> possibility that Marines might apply <strong>the</strong> same level rigor required <strong>of</strong> haircuts to <strong>the</strong> far
more impactful fare which escapes mouths is most <strong>of</strong>ten met with quick rebuke: “It will never happen.”
Teamwork and “The Individual Marine”
The unique bro<strong>the</strong>rhood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines presents ano<strong>the</strong>r set <strong>of</strong> paradoxical values which make up an
essential component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Corps: <strong>the</strong> tension between valuing teamwork and valuing <strong>the</strong> individual
Marine. Marines do indeed value <strong>the</strong> team, a concept drummed into <strong>the</strong>m both psychologically and
physically in boot camp. Spooner’s legends continue this <strong>the</strong>me into <strong>the</strong> field. Despite <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong>
larger-than-life Marine heroes, 492 his collection <strong>of</strong> tales, for <strong>the</strong> most part, focus on <strong>the</strong> ordinary Marine
and his unit. Cameo appearances <strong>of</strong> famous Marines are peppered throughout, but do not dominate <strong>the</strong>
storyline. Teamwork—moving as a unit, training, patrolling, and even socializing in bro<strong>the</strong>rhoods—is a
consistent image throughout.
490 Jason Raper, “Marine Corps Substance Abuse Program: It's time to implement change,” Marine Corps Gazette;
(Jul 2012); Tom Bartlett; “Alcohol Abuse,” Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, (Sep 1982); H J Sage, “Marines and Alcohol,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (Dec 1976); For a particularly candid assessment <strong>of</strong> this problem as assessed by a Marine see Thomas
James Brennan, “In <strong>the</strong> Military, <strong>the</strong> Drinking Can Start on Day 1,” New York Times, October 1, 2012. Accessed at
http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/in-<strong>the</strong>-military-<strong>the</strong>-drinking-can-start-on-day-1/.
491 Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, 204.
492 Chesty Puller, Dan Daly, “Manila John” Basilone, and Smedley Butler typically top <strong>the</strong> list. Three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se: Puller,
Basilone, and Daly joined Lejeune in being featured on commemoration stamps for <strong>the</strong> Corps. The passion with
which Corps’ members threw <strong>the</strong>mselves into <strong>the</strong> fray <strong>of</strong> who’s-to-be-on-<strong>the</strong>-stamp decisionmaking (<strong>the</strong>re could
be only four) tell <strong>the</strong> reader something about <strong>the</strong> veneration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se men. See R.R. Keene, “Four Legendary
Leaders: Honored With Their Own Stamps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 2005): 46.
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An emphasis on teamwork is not a surprise coming from <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. Far more surprising,
especially for those who have been apprised <strong>of</strong> “individual” as insult in Marine training camps, is <strong>the</strong>
emphasis in Commandant speeches on “<strong>the</strong> individual Marine.” Commandants do speak <strong>of</strong>
bro<strong>the</strong>rhood, but more <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual Marine. From Holcomb: “The emphasis still is on <strong>the</strong>
individual. As always, each man is trained just as if <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> entire war depends on his
personal success—as indeed it does to a higher degree than he is likely to realize.” 493 Shoup follows:
“The Marine Corps continues to emphasize <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> small unit leader and <strong>the</strong> individual
Marine. Success in battle ultimately depends on <strong>the</strong>m.” 494 And through <strong>the</strong> Vietnam years:
“[Chapman’s] summation <strong>of</strong> this first trip to Vietnam as CMC (‘But not my last’) is an even firmer
conviction that <strong>the</strong> key to successful Corps operations in Vietnam rests solely with <strong>the</strong> individual
Marine.” 495
The paradox is made sensible when context and repetition reveal that <strong>the</strong> Commandants’ concern is
nothing like <strong>the</strong> American cultural notion <strong>of</strong> “individual”—a focus on personal needs and rights—but
ra<strong>the</strong>r a concern for <strong>the</strong> excellent craftsmanship, fine tuning, and careful maintenance <strong>of</strong> an individual
weapon. The Marine is a weapon. In this, <strong>the</strong> paradox is undone and <strong>the</strong> prose becomes a natural fit
with Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck culture. The “transformation” glamorized by Marine Corps advertising is a promise
that <strong>the</strong> Corps will take raw, somewhat ordinary, human material and transform it into a state-<strong>of</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-art
lethal weapon. Recruits expect this <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir training <strong>the</strong>y want to stand with
fellow Devil Dogs Cooling and Turner and say: “The principle (sic) weapon system aboard an amphibious
ship is not <strong>the</strong> main battery or <strong>the</strong> aviation squadron—it is <strong>the</strong> Marine.” 496
The excellent craftsmanship and fine tuning required <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine weapon comprises many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
martial arts, but none more important than marksmanship. “Every Marine a rifleman” is not just motto.
It is institutional practice:
Because Marines do not recognize artificial battlespace divisions such as those associated with
<strong>the</strong> deep, close, and rear fights, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps seeks to train every Marine as a rifleman. In
o<strong>the</strong>r words, regardless <strong>of</strong> a Marine’s military occupational specialty (MOS), he or she is
expected to be able to pr<strong>of</strong>iciently fight hand-to-hand and with infantry weapons systems up to
493 th
Thomas Holcomb, “Our 168 Anniversary: A Message from <strong>the</strong> Commandant,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(November 1943): 5. Italics original.
494
“Corps Standing Tall; Ready, Willing, Able,” Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1961): 1.
495
“Individual Marine is Key, Says CMC,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1968): 1.
496
Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
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and including heavy machine guns…. Consistent with its warrior culture, Marines do not think <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>mselves as pilots, logisticians, or infantrymen. They are Marines, and <strong>the</strong>y can all fight. 497
The rifle is central to <strong>the</strong> Marine corporate persona and identity so it is unsurprising that in Spooner’s
legends <strong>the</strong> combat expertise valued uppermost is marksmanship—mentioned significantly more times
than any o<strong>the</strong>r skill. In his stories success is consistently attributed to “carefully aimed rifle fire,”
compelling o<strong>the</strong>r forces to note <strong>the</strong> “fighting skills and remarkable marksmanship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American
Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks.” 498 It is worth noting that “It wasn’t until after <strong>the</strong> turn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twentieth century that
marksmanship became a key focus for Marines.” 499 It is a norm, however, that Marines developed and
came to own. Commandant speeches supply no end <strong>of</strong> emphases on competence with <strong>the</strong> rifle.
“[Commandant Cushman] reminded commanders that even with <strong>the</strong> advanced weaponry available to
<strong>the</strong> Corps today, <strong>the</strong> individual Marine and his rifle is still <strong>the</strong> key to combat success…. ‘[O]ne round-one
hit’ will be as valuable to <strong>the</strong> Marine leader <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> next war as <strong>the</strong>y have been to <strong>the</strong> leaders <strong>of</strong> all wars
which comprise our proud history.” 500 Commandant Shoup, famous for his “Shoupisms” quipped, “The
M-14 rifle—Not all Marines have it, but (not) ‘a single enemy will remain unshot for this reason.’” 501
Marines overtly celebrate <strong>the</strong>ir enjoyment <strong>of</strong> a firing weapon. Of <strong>the</strong> twenty-six “Fighter Identity and
Ethos” slogans catalogued, nearly half are “firing-oriented,” including such gems as: “Happiness is…a
belt-fed weapon.” 502 General James N. Mattis caused no small dust-up with <strong>the</strong> American public (but
only fur<strong>the</strong>r endeared himself to Marines) when, during a panel discussion, he cheerfully declared:
“Actually it's quite fun to fight <strong>the</strong>m, you know. It's a hell <strong>of</strong> a hoot,...It's fun to shoot some people. I'll
be right up <strong>the</strong>re with you. I like brawling. You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women
around for five years because <strong>the</strong>y didn't wear a veil,…You know, guys like that ain't got no manhood
left anyway. So it's a hell <strong>of</strong> a lot <strong>of</strong> fun to shoot <strong>the</strong>m.” 503
Enthusiasm aside, <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>y can all fight” bit <strong>of</strong> Marine mentality may be dangerous if applied with
slogan-borne hubris. Infantry Marines see <strong>the</strong>mselves (understandably) as preeminent in this regard
and tend to sneer at <strong>the</strong> notion that <strong>the</strong>ir POG counterparts merit <strong>the</strong> label “rifleman.” Training is
required <strong>of</strong> all, but training may not guarantee pr<strong>of</strong>iciency. An overconfidence in <strong>the</strong> “every Marine a
rifleman” mantra may have serious consequences when put to <strong>the</strong> test. Marines in Vietnam’s CAP units,
existing by <strong>the</strong>ir wits and infantry training at <strong>the</strong> squad level, had little patience for replacements from
<strong>the</strong> “rear”:
497
Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
498
Spooner: 48, 74, 76, 82, 249.
499
David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and <strong>the</strong> Making <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Modern Marine Corps, 1936-
1943, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011): 16
500
Anonymous, “CMC Issues Challenge,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1975): 4.
501
“Grim Determination, But No Hate,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1961): 1.
502
See Appendix D.
503
“General: It’s ‘fun to shoot some people’,” CNN.com (February 4, 2005). Accessed at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/general.shoot/
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We get out <strong>the</strong>re and this Marine didn't…know how to break down his rifle. We are training
<strong>the</strong>se people [Popular Forces] how to fight, how to fight for <strong>the</strong>ir own country, how to protect
security when <strong>the</strong> Americans pull out <strong>of</strong> Vietnam. They'll be able to carry this on <strong>the</strong>mselves. We
get Marines in <strong>the</strong>re that doesn't (sic) know enough about his own weapon. 504
Genuine skill with <strong>the</strong> rifle is not spread evenly throughout <strong>the</strong> Corps, but <strong>the</strong> egalitarian spirit <strong>of</strong> “all as
fighters” permeates this service to a degree significantly higher than its sisters, and forges a general
valuing <strong>of</strong> fighting skill over any o<strong>the</strong>r sort <strong>of</strong> military competence. When without firing metal Marines
are expected to remain a weapon personified and must use whatever is at hand: “The company
gunnery sergeant made a good argument for carefully aimed rifle fire as he passed <strong>the</strong> word to all hands
that if <strong>the</strong>y were to run out <strong>of</strong> ammo because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dump, <strong>the</strong>y would fight with bayonets,
K-Bar knives or <strong>the</strong>ir bare hands.” 505
The Human Element v. Technology
In its doctrine, <strong>the</strong> Corps, more than any o<strong>the</strong>r service, places confidence in <strong>the</strong> human element to win
wars. 506 Warfighting makes explicit <strong>the</strong> Corps’ emphasis: “No degree <strong>of</strong> technological development or
scientific calculation will diminish <strong>the</strong> human dimension in war.” 507 General Mattis, in <strong>the</strong> 2006
introduction to <strong>the</strong> Corps’ Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency, reinforces this point when
applied to insurgents: “There is no magic bullet, nor technological breakthrough that will win this fight
for us. The human factor, more than ever, will determine <strong>the</strong> victor in this test <strong>of</strong> wills.” 508 While
technology is appreciated and employed it is <strong>the</strong> frontline Marine—<strong>the</strong> grunt—that is <strong>the</strong> Corps’ main
investment. H<strong>of</strong>fman cites as evidence that “<strong>the</strong> Corps invests a larger portion <strong>of</strong> its budget in
personnel than any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Service</strong>s, and invests more on a per capita basis on selection, initial training,
and development.” 509
Warfighting overtly downplays any romance with high technology: “Equipment should be easy to
operate and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with o<strong>the</strong>r equipment. It should require minimal
specialized operator training.” 510 Later, “There are two dangers with respect to equipment: <strong>the</strong>
overreliance on technology and <strong>the</strong> failure to make <strong>the</strong> most <strong>of</strong> technological capabilities…[T]echnology
504 Oral history file 2599, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. See also Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action
Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986).
http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm and Oral history file 2367, United States Marine Corps
Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center,
Quantico, VA. Transcription prepared by Lacey Lee 21 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
505 Spooner: 249.
506 Frank G. H<strong>of</strong>fman, “The Marine Mask <strong>of</strong> War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, November 10, 2011: 2,
found 25 January 2012 at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.h<strong>of</strong>fman.marines.pdf.
507 Warfighting: 14.
508 Mattis, Foreword, Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency, US Marine Corps, MCIP 3-33.01, (2006).
509 Frank G. H<strong>of</strong>fman, “The Marine Mask <strong>of</strong> War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, November 10, 2011: 2,
found 25 January 2012 at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.h<strong>of</strong>fman.marines.pdf.
510 Warfighting, MCDP 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997): 65.
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cannot and should not attempt to eliminate humanity from <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> waging war.” The manual
fur<strong>the</strong>r warns that one must not become so reliant on technology as to be rendered dysfunctional
without it. 511 Cooling and Turner argue that Marines have achieved this in practice: “…<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
notably avoids relying on technology to <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Service</strong>s” but is not unwilling to benefit
from <strong>the</strong> industrial might <strong>of</strong> its mo<strong>the</strong>rland. It maintains a cautious relationship with technology –
benefitting from but not relying on it. 512 In this, <strong>the</strong> Marines take pride in representing a significant
contrast to <strong>the</strong>ir sister services. They do not “man” <strong>the</strong> equipment. They equip <strong>the</strong> man. Devil Dog
caution in its relationship with technology and its emphasis on self-reliance and on-<strong>the</strong>-fly fixes places
Marines in a better prepared position than its American military counterparts to serve in austere
environments or navigate fighting terrain where advanced weapons technology may not follow,
including cityscapes rendered impenetrable due to dense civilian populations.
Penny Pinching
Not all Marine distance from high tech is due to moral superiority. Some <strong>of</strong> it is budget. Marines have
made forced frugality a virtue by embracing “a willingness to make do with less.” 513 Krulak dedicates an
entire chapter to this topic (The Penny Pinchers) and credits Commandant Archibald Henderson (1820-
59) with setting “<strong>the</strong> tune in establishing institutional frugality as a Marine Corps principle.” 514 Even
Builder, despite his emphasis on The Big Three, pauses to take note <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ frugality:
[T]he Marine Corps has enjoyed a reputation with Congress for its competency within a welldefined,
if limited, role and for its relatively modest claims for resources. Thus <strong>the</strong> Marines have
generally been bystanders in <strong>the</strong> almost continuous jostling and bumping <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy,
and Air Force over military strategy and resources. They appear to be protected from harm by
Congress and quite comfortable with hand-me-down equipment developed by <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
services, taking more pride in who <strong>the</strong>y are than in what <strong>the</strong>y own. 515
Marine authors <strong>of</strong> all sorts love to prove <strong>the</strong> point by quoting Corps’ budget numbers to <strong>the</strong> public.
Most recently, but entirely typically, Commandant Amos took <strong>the</strong> budget boasting stage. Like
Commandants before him, he had <strong>the</strong> numbers to prove that “The Marine Corps has always given our
Nation <strong>the</strong> ‘best bang for its buck.’” In <strong>the</strong> fiscal year he cited, 2010, “<strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps
consumed only 8.5% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DOD budget, while it provided our Nation 31% <strong>of</strong> its ground operating
forces, 12% <strong>of</strong> its fighter/attack aircraft and 19% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nation’s attack helicopters.” Marines have
learned to make a virtue, and public hay, out <strong>of</strong> getting <strong>the</strong> short end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> stick: “At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
511
Warfighting, MCDP 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997): 67.
512
Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
513
Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access…Winning Small Wars, Third Edition, (June 2010): 8.
Accessed November 2012 at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf.
514
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 141.
515
Carl Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1989): Chapter 1, footnote 7: 208.
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day, Congress and <strong>the</strong> American people know that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is a value and that we only ask for
what we truly need.” 516
To make up for <strong>the</strong>ir limited means, <strong>the</strong> Corps cheerfully consumes hand-me-downs, 517 hoards goods
like Depression-era grandmo<strong>the</strong>rs, and has made a virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “honorable art <strong>of</strong> institutional <strong>the</strong>ft.” 518
One Marine recounts a joyful hand-me-down scene in Kuwait:
We were doing take down, camp take down.… a bunch <strong>of</strong> Brits had left already and we were
taking down all <strong>the</strong>ir tents. And my guys were just going crazy over <strong>the</strong> gear <strong>the</strong>y left. Etools
and berets, stuff like that, you know. It was like Christmas for <strong>the</strong>m, all <strong>the</strong> gear that <strong>the</strong>y were
finding. That was…[a] memorable experience. It’s something in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps so when we
get hand-me-downs and find stuff that it’s just like a holiday. 519
Both practical and paranoid “Marines have been known to hoard goods such as folders, toilet paper,
MREs, magazines, etc., as <strong>the</strong> rainy day—or existential threat to <strong>the</strong> unit or Corps—might be around <strong>the</strong>
corner.” 520 Accepted behaviors in <strong>the</strong> “<strong>the</strong>ft” category include “appropriating” Army issue whenever
<strong>the</strong> opportunity arises. “Appropriating” also means stripping kits <strong>of</strong> needed gear within Marine Corps
circles. “As <strong>the</strong> Marine aphorism goes, ‘<strong>the</strong>re’s only one thief in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. Everyone else is just
getting <strong>the</strong>ir stuff back.’” 521 In good Department <strong>of</strong> Defense fashion, Marines have made an acronym <strong>of</strong>
it: STEAL (<strong>Strategic</strong>ally Taking Equipment to Ano<strong>the</strong>r Location). 522 One Vietnam-era CAP Marine fondly
recalled a “hero” from his unit:
Lt. Silvia, our Delta Company Commander, was kind <strong>of</strong> a legend for two reasons. First, he was a
great thief, he stole one <strong>of</strong> those big generators from <strong>the</strong> Air Force Base just so he and <strong>the</strong> guys
could keep <strong>the</strong>ir beer and pop cold. Second, [h]e was coming back down…[Road One] and took
small arms fire...so he called in artillery...waited for a reactionary squad and checked out <strong>the</strong>
enemy KIA's with just a pistol...got to love that. 523
Thieving and fighting credentials both. A solid Marine.
By necessity, a celebration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> frugality norm mandates an attendant valuing <strong>of</strong> innovation or
inventiveness to make up for material shortcomings. In this <strong>the</strong> Marines seem to defy Colin Gray’s
516 Speech given before <strong>the</strong> Marines Memorial Association, San Francisco, California and printed in <strong>the</strong> area
newspaper: “MILITARY: Gen. James Amos outlines vision <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps,” North County Times, (Feb. 8, 2011).
Accessed at http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/military/article_9624e7b0-340a-11e0-baf7-001cc4c002e0.html.
517 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 199.
518 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 150-51.
519 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/65466 MS01, Veterans History Project.
520 Salmoni and Holmes-Eber: 278.
521 Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, Operational <strong>Culture</strong> for <strong>the</strong> Warfighter, 278.
522 Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2011): 9.
523 Response from Steve Markley, CAP veteran, to a CAPMarines@yahoogroups query regarding CAP legends.
(October 31, 2012). Used with permission.
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characterization <strong>of</strong> U.S. armed forces: “<strong>Strategic</strong> necessity is <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> military invention, and since
<strong>the</strong> 1860s, at least, Americans have had little need to invent clever work-arounds for material lack.” 524
Marines would beg to differ. Marine lore is full <strong>of</strong> work-around stories, 525 <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> which seem
to defy explanation given <strong>the</strong> largess <strong>of</strong> Big Tent Army. The explanation is not just <strong>the</strong> American
military’s material contempt for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, it is also a natural repercussion <strong>of</strong> being out in front
<strong>of</strong> supply lines. Again, <strong>the</strong> Corps has made a virtue out <strong>of</strong> material shortages and publicizes it as a
natural fit with life in <strong>the</strong> “seams.” Commandant Amos points out that <strong>the</strong> Corps is ideally suited for
expeditionary crisis response, in part, because “we’re trained and willing to live pretty austerely,…” 526
Austerity, in this case, might be best captured by Fick, who lived it. Marines are frugal not only in
substance, but in o<strong>the</strong>r dimensions as well: “The Marine Corps has an institutional culture <strong>of</strong> doing
more with less, and that includes not only less money and less equipment but also less time, less
certainty, less guidance, and less supervision.” 527
Misery
Doing more with less comes with a dose <strong>of</strong> externally imposed misery. Marines deem this insufficient,
and impose more. In Spooner’s tales “[s]weating, tired Marines wearing gas masks and marching along
a dusty road under a blistering tropical sun” are made to do air raid drills over and over again.
Disgusted, “Fearless Frank” asks “Why do we always have to practice to be miserable?” Ross shoots
back with, “Cause when we really are miserable we’ll be so accustomed to it that it won’t seem so
bad.” 528 In Operational <strong>Culture</strong> for <strong>the</strong> Warfighter, Salmoni and Holmes-Eber capture <strong>the</strong> same concept:
“Even more than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services, Marines engage in, and are socialized to value, hard labor—as one
SNCO commented, ‘working stupid-hard beyond <strong>the</strong> necessary.’” 529
Relishing <strong>the</strong> rough life seems to fit Marines for <strong>the</strong>ir selected “lane.” Marines are far more
comfortable and happy with expeditionary duty than <strong>the</strong> Army. They know how to “pack <strong>the</strong>ir trash”
and make <strong>the</strong> worst circumstances seem like a party. In Ricks’ words, <strong>the</strong>y “tend to display a kind <strong>of</strong>
funky joie de vivre, especially in <strong>the</strong> field” where he watched <strong>the</strong>m make a Mogadishu party out <strong>of</strong>
random chunks <strong>of</strong> meat, several tiny bottles <strong>of</strong> Tabasco sauce [stolen from <strong>the</strong> Navy galley] and Little
Richard’s greatest hits pumping from a Walkman hooked to miniature speakers. “They knew how to
live—a sharp contrast to <strong>the</strong> infantry squad from <strong>the</strong> Army’s 10 th Mountain Division that I saw in Haiti
sitting bored in a tent, reading dirty magazines, and grousing about its cold rations.” 530
524
Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Enemies and <strong>the</strong> Essence <strong>of</strong> Strategy: Can <strong>the</strong> American Way <strong>of</strong> War Adapt?,” <strong>Strategic</strong>
Studies Institute monograph, March 2006: 39, available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=650.
525
For one which features a Humvee repair via boot band (an article mandatory to “squared away” appearance)
and boot lace see Dye, Backbone, 10-18. For ano<strong>the</strong>r which details <strong>the</strong> out-<strong>of</strong>-pocket expenses involved in jimmyrigging
Humvee’s with civilian fare CB antennas see Fick, One Bullet Away, 166.
526
Eliason interviewing Amos, JFQ: 15.
527
Nathanial Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
320.
528 Spooner, A Marine Anthology, 319-320.
529 Salmoni and Holmes-Eber: 275.
530 Ricks: 21.
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Ricks goes so far as to argue that Marines tend to see suffering as a good in and <strong>of</strong> itself. 531 O’Connell
agrees and argues that this is yet ano<strong>the</strong>r way in which Marine Corps culture parallels a religious order:
While members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, Navy, and Air Force…speak approvingly <strong>of</strong> tradition, morale, and
<strong>the</strong> bonds <strong>of</strong> fraternity, <strong>the</strong>ir training literature, memoires, and service journals make no
mention <strong>of</strong> “spiritual unity” or ghosts, and <strong>the</strong>y do not refer to <strong>the</strong>ir service as a “religion,” as
<strong>the</strong> literature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps did. Nor did <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services have quite <strong>the</strong> same deep
veneration <strong>of</strong> suffering, which <strong>of</strong>fered prestige in exchange for a demonstrated capacity to
endure hardship. 532
O’Connell argues that recruits learn to measure <strong>the</strong>ir worth according to <strong>the</strong>ir capacity to suffer.
“Recruits learned, in ways <strong>the</strong>y would not forget, that what made Marines exceptional was <strong>the</strong>ir ability
to endure more pain than members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir sisters services.” 533 The same point is captured a bit more
ligh<strong>the</strong>artedly in military humor. Only Special Forces outdo Devil Dogs in relishing misery:
An Army grunt sitting in a foxhole, eating MREs and wearing 50lbs <strong>of</strong> gear after having marched
12 miles says: "This sucks."
A Navy seaman sitting on his 5' X 2' bunk, in a closet-sized room smelling <strong>of</strong> oil and rolling from
<strong>the</strong> waves, which he shares with 6 o<strong>the</strong>r men, after not having seen <strong>the</strong> sky for 30 days says:
"This really sucks."
A Marine, doing push-ups in <strong>the</strong> mud during a downpour, after an 18 mile march with 60 lbs <strong>of</strong>
gear says: "I love <strong>the</strong> way this sucks, oorah!"
The Special Forces Green Beret crawling through a leech-infested swamp, eating nothing but
bugs and tree bark for 6 days, sneaking around past armed terrorists says: "I wish this could suck
some more!"
An Air Force pilot sitting in an easy chair in an air conditioned hotel, holding a remote control
says: "No cable? This sucks!"
One Marine veteran conveys <strong>the</strong> status Marines derive from <strong>the</strong> rough life:
The first [tour in Iraq] we pretty much didn’t have any supplies. We got like three pairs <strong>of</strong> socks
that we’d have to try to wash with a rock and a bar <strong>of</strong> soap to try to clean <strong>of</strong>f because <strong>the</strong>y were
rock hard. We didn’t take showers for a few months; clo<strong>the</strong>s were quite dirty and grimy after a
few months <strong>of</strong> not being washed. We really didn’t get a whole lot <strong>of</strong> food. Sometimes we
would have to ration <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> water because <strong>the</strong>y didn’t bring enough to us. That’s part <strong>of</strong> what
sucks about being ahead <strong>of</strong> everybody, but at <strong>the</strong> same time it makes you feel like more <strong>of</strong> a
badass than <strong>the</strong>m and you run <strong>of</strong>f with a certain factor <strong>of</strong> pride. 534
531 Ricks: 150.
532 O’Connell: 42.
533 O’Connell: 36.
534 Veterans History Project, file AFC 2001/001/67094 MS01.
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Bias for Action
Omnipresent through Marine tales, doctrine, self descriptions, and training is lived evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marine maxim: bias for action. Enshrined in Marine Corps doctrine, repeated as a catechism by
<strong>of</strong>ficers, and attributed to Patton, Marines ardently believe: “a good plan violently executed now is
better than a perfect plan executed next week.” 535 For Marines, “intense” and “motivated” constitute
verbal praise. “Boots” are rewarded for “aggressiveness” and “audacity.” Kael Weston, a State
Department <strong>of</strong>ficer who served with Marines for several consecutive years in both Iraq and Afghanistan
described <strong>the</strong> result: <strong>the</strong> “Marine instinct is to sprint, <strong>the</strong>y are twitch muscle guys.” 536
The way this plays out in <strong>the</strong> field is described by Marine veteran Joseph Mariani:
[My story starts with] a sign in Afghanistan hanging in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NATO political advisor
from Britain. It was <strong>the</strong> "Keep Calm and Carry On" poster from <strong>the</strong> blitz, and I was struck by how
out <strong>of</strong> place it was, almost to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> being <strong>of</strong>fensive. The more I thought about it, <strong>the</strong>
more I realized that this was because <strong>the</strong> sign stood for exactly <strong>the</strong> opposite <strong>of</strong> both side[s] <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps culture. While one certainly wants to be cool under fire, <strong>the</strong>re are necessarily
things in war that demand determination, resolve, and emotion. Every General or senior
Colonel I worked with were bundles <strong>of</strong> kinetic energy. LtGen Mills, who I worked under in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, is 61 years old going on 90, but he ran 6 miles every night after work, and
at a pace faster than most men half his age. Keeping sedately calm is simply not an option for
Marines. And while this certainly gives rise to <strong>the</strong> YouTube chauvinism <strong>of</strong> Marines that is so
annoying, it also provides <strong>the</strong> motivation and determination to accomplish <strong>the</strong> mission
regardless <strong>of</strong> difficulty or cost.
But that resolve alone cannot accomplish anything. Simply holding your nerve and battering
away with a conventional strategy is exactly what had failed <strong>the</strong> Army in Anbar up to 2006. The
o<strong>the</strong>r half <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps organizational culture is <strong>the</strong> rejection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> "Carry On" <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
poster. With Marine forces replacing NATO troops across Helmand in 2010, <strong>the</strong> distinction was
clear. Many NATO commands, even some elite Royal Marine Commando units, were content
simply to hold <strong>the</strong>ir FOBs, [Forward Operating Bases] patrol intermittently, and, as a result,
come under regular attack when <strong>the</strong>y ventured out. Marine commanders refused to simply
accept <strong>the</strong> status quo for <strong>the</strong> 7 months <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir deployments and across <strong>the</strong> Helmand river
valley, <strong>the</strong>y increased <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> patrols and <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> engagement with <strong>the</strong> population. It
was <strong>the</strong> drive to find innovative solutions, not accept <strong>the</strong> status quo, that shaped Marine
strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 537
Marines are required to demonstrate initiative and employ <strong>the</strong> “70% Solution” – acting now on
imperfect information ra<strong>the</strong>r than waiting to assess enough for a perfect judgment call. 538 Subordinates
535 Warfighting: 87.
536 Kael Weston, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (February 1, 2012).
537 Joseph Mariani, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (November 3, 2011).
538 Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2011):2-18, 100.
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are expected to tell <strong>the</strong>ir superiors what <strong>the</strong>y can do, not what <strong>the</strong>y can’t. 539 Boldness—“<strong>the</strong>
characteristic <strong>of</strong> unhesitatingly exploiting <strong>the</strong> natural uncertainty <strong>of</strong> war to pursue major results ra<strong>the</strong>r
than marginal ones”—will inevitably result in mistakes. The Marine Corps accepts that. “On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
hand, we should deal severely with errors <strong>of</strong> inaction or timidity.” 540
The Marine Corps bias for action is tied to at least two key features <strong>of</strong> Marine role: readiness and <strong>the</strong>
ability to thrive in <strong>the</strong> assumed chaos <strong>of</strong> a war environment. The most constant “mission” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps
across its bumpy “role” history has been readiness. Pursuant to this norm and mission set immediate!
response is daily drilled into recruits during boot camp. 541 The only fictional literature listed on <strong>the</strong>
Commandant’s reading list—Starship Troopers—is a sci-fi allegory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines <strong>the</strong>mselves. In it,
Heinlein captures <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> quick response as “on <strong>the</strong> bounce.” It may be <strong>the</strong> most <strong>of</strong>t repeated
phrase in <strong>the</strong> book. 542 The immediate response penchant, married to an expeditionary nature, fosters in
<strong>the</strong> Corps an “in and out mentality” 543 where combat operations are concerned. Marine Expeditionary
Units (MEUs) execute <strong>the</strong>se sorts <strong>of</strong> operations with regularity. In <strong>the</strong> last few years “in and out” ops
have included coming ashore to assist flood victims in Pakistan, rescuing a ship and crew from Somali
pirates, rescuing a downed pilot (in less than 90 minutes!) in Libya, and assisting with earthquake relief
and nuclear containment in Japan. 544
When major operations are on <strong>the</strong> horizon, “paving <strong>the</strong> way” for o<strong>the</strong>r troops—those better suited for
second string and garrison duty—is <strong>the</strong> role Marines would prefer to fill. Their determined
stubbornness to stick to this role set is most fascinating in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ early history, which was
heavy with years-long occupation duty, and even more interesting given <strong>the</strong>ir twenty and twenty-first
century experience in which it has been <strong>the</strong> rare exception (most famously in <strong>the</strong> Pacific campaign <strong>of</strong>
World War II) for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps to “pave <strong>the</strong> way” for o<strong>the</strong>r troops without staying—in some cases
for extremely protracted duration—for <strong>the</strong> length <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground war and <strong>the</strong> stability operations that
intermix it.
A second potentially problematic mentality for success in population-dense counterinsurgency
operations is <strong>the</strong> Marine attachment to <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> war as chaos. This is not, on <strong>the</strong> whole, an
illegitimate assumption. War, and any battle, large or small, is chaos. Warfighting, as doctrine, is
meant to prepare Marines for this environment. It is a treatise on being able to thrive in chaos—in <strong>the</strong>
thick <strong>of</strong> friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and complexity. “It is precisely this natural disorder
which creates <strong>the</strong> conditions ripe for exploitation by an opportunistic will.” 545 If sufficient disorder to
destabilize <strong>the</strong> enemy, and thus gain <strong>the</strong> advantage, does not exist, Marines should create it. “[W]e
539
Nathanial Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
87.
540
Warfighting: 44, 58.
541
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 27.
542
Robert A. Heinlein, Starship Troopers, (New York: Ace Books, 1959, 1968, 1987).
543
Kim Hodges, formerly USMC, now Lt. Col. Army, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (August 01, 2011). A linguistic
manifestation <strong>of</strong> this mentality is that where <strong>the</strong> Army has “forts,” Marines have “camps.” The Army has “forward
operating bases,” and <strong>the</strong> Marines have “combat outposts.” Salmoni and Holmes-Eber: 276.
544
This particular listing supplied by Commandant Amos. Eliason, JFQ: 13.
545 Warfighting: 11.
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must not only be able to fight effectively in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> disorder, we should seek to generate disorder
and use it as a weapon against our opponents.” 546 General Mattis’ call sign, referenced with enthusiasm
by <strong>the</strong> Marines beneath him in Iraq, was “Chaos.” 547 So what <strong>of</strong> a mission to stabilize ra<strong>the</strong>r than create
chaos? To engage in civic action and patiently cultivate intelligence ra<strong>the</strong>r than pursue <strong>the</strong> enemy? The
“small twitch” muscles that perform so admirably in high adrenalin, constant motion environments may
begin to short circuit in stabilizing operations which require restraint and a calming influence.
Marines study <strong>the</strong> tempo <strong>of</strong> war as a dimension that must be harnessed and directed at full speed by
<strong>the</strong>ir own machine. “In general, whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a
tremendous, <strong>of</strong>ten decisive advantage.” 548 A well-trained Fick echoes this mentality in his memoire:
“Winning a firefight requires quick action by leaders. The key is to make decisions about your enemy
and act on <strong>the</strong>m faster than he is acting on decisions made about you.” 549 Speed as a weapon, and as a
stand-alone value, is so ingrained in Marine ethos that it <strong>of</strong>ten comes at <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> lives. Comparing
Army and Marine strategies in <strong>the</strong> Pacific, O’Connell writes:
[T]he Army believed in conserving manpower at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> time or terrain seized. When
<strong>the</strong>y encountered stiff resistance, <strong>the</strong>y would prudently regroup or attempt a different avenue
<strong>of</strong> attack. Their methods were effective but slow. The Marines, by contrast, trained for quick,
decisive engagements….
Speed <strong>of</strong> conquest was critical; <strong>the</strong> carnage it produced was <strong>the</strong> unfortunate but necessary price
for victory. The Army found <strong>the</strong> Marines’ direct approach reckless and unimaginative; <strong>the</strong>
Marines thought <strong>the</strong> Army lacked tenacity. The differences were never resolved. In all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
combined operations, <strong>the</strong> Marines had higher casualty ratios but took more ground; <strong>the</strong> Army
worked more slowly but conserved lives in ways Marine tactics did not. 550
An insurgent force may also see <strong>the</strong> temporal sphere as a weapon, but in perhaps very different terms
than <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps: one <strong>of</strong> protraction and exhaustion. 551 An insurgent who knows
Marines well may attempt to bait <strong>the</strong>m into rash action, causing <strong>the</strong>m to trample political aims in
pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy. Major Jason Spitaletta characterizes <strong>the</strong> dominant personality type in <strong>the</strong> Corps
as “higher strung” and notes that this is not conducive to “tactical patience.” Therefore, “if in stability
operations <strong>the</strong> best action is no action, it is counterintuitive” to enlisted Marines. Due to <strong>the</strong>ir bias for
action, <strong>the</strong>y may “force things unnecessarily.” He notes that when in a foreign <strong>the</strong>ater “we tend to want
to assume <strong>the</strong> lead and dictate how things are run” even when <strong>the</strong> more effective long-term strategy
might be “enabling”—supplying support from behind. 552
546
Warfighting, MCDP 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997):12.
547
Fick: 163.
548
Warfighting: 85.
549
Fick: 181.
550
O’Connell: 49.
551
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 30-35.
552
Correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 25, 2011).
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Combat Prowess
As is abundantly clear by this point in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis, in expeditionary duty or protracted ground warfare,
“Marines possess an unwavering devotion to <strong>the</strong> belief that [<strong>the</strong>irs] is <strong>the</strong> finest fighting institution in
<strong>the</strong> world.” 553 They are “fighters who are ready, willing, and able to win.” 554 Unpacking <strong>the</strong> norms and
values which attend <strong>the</strong> Marine brand <strong>of</strong> fighting, what <strong>the</strong>y perceive as <strong>the</strong> fighting characteristics
which “win,” is essential to understanding <strong>the</strong>ir modes and how <strong>the</strong>se might suit in a counterinsurgency
environment. The Marine-as-fighter persona is reinforced in even <strong>the</strong> most mundane organizational
norms. Marines do not dig foxholes. They dig “fighting holes.” Foxholes are for hiding in. Fighting
holes are, instead, ano<strong>the</strong>r “weapon to kill <strong>the</strong> enemy.” 555 Ricks tracks <strong>the</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “fighting”
value on leadership positions within <strong>the</strong> Corps. In <strong>the</strong> platoon he is following Recruit Lee is made <strong>the</strong>
“guide” for 3086 because he performed best in “combat hitting skills.” 556
Though not specifically trained toward, bravery bordering on insanity—an extreme form <strong>of</strong>
audaciousness (a value which is consciously cultivated)—is oorahed in <strong>the</strong> Corps and is a signature <strong>of</strong>
many legendary heroes. What might be diagnosed as clinical psychosis in civilian society is loved and
revered if it is geared toward <strong>the</strong> good <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. Describing his boot camp DIs one Marine
reminisced:
Instructors were hardcore, Gunnery Sgt. Lamar among <strong>the</strong>m. He was a former sniper, a man <strong>of</strong>
high morals, very honorable, and could bring on <strong>the</strong> pain. Gunnery Sgt. Leonard was a regular
guy and <strong>the</strong> easiest, not a good platoon sergeant. Sgt. Wyatt was sadistic but <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong> all
because he was hard, a sniper and was crazy. He would destroy us to no end until you liked it.
Then he would increase <strong>the</strong> temperature in order to make you hate it. He was constantly trying
to break morale. [He’d] talk crap to belittle you and laugh at you, but he was <strong>the</strong> most
respected drill instructor in <strong>the</strong> whole platoon. He tried <strong>the</strong> hardest to teach us stuff, spent
extra night[s] when he didn’t need to, and [went]…out <strong>of</strong> his way to make <strong>the</strong> platoon learn. 557
The consequent Marine fighting ethos has mixed results. Cameron claims that attempts to achieve <strong>the</strong>
impossibly high standard <strong>of</strong> bravery under fire set for <strong>the</strong>m sometimes worked well for <strong>the</strong> World War II
era Marines and o<strong>the</strong>r times “conflicted with more rational, commonly accepted military practices, and
at <strong>the</strong>se times <strong>the</strong> [M]arines paid a price in blood incommensurate with <strong>the</strong>ir accomplishments.” 558 On
<strong>the</strong> flip side, Marines relish <strong>the</strong> upshots <strong>of</strong> a reputation which precedes <strong>the</strong>m. Kael Weston reported
<strong>the</strong>ir out-front reputation this way from his area <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan: “The Afghans love <strong>the</strong> Marines. They
fear <strong>the</strong> Marines <strong>the</strong> most, but in a warrior culture <strong>the</strong>y respected <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> most. They know that
when <strong>the</strong> Marines are in town, <strong>the</strong> sheriff is here. The Army guys are not bad, [but] <strong>the</strong>y are not as
aggressive. The Afghans respond to <strong>the</strong> aggressiveness.” 559 This sentiment was echoed, but in more
553
Captain August Immel, “My Tribe is <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (July 2010): 59.
554
Major John E. Coonradt, “Corps Values,” Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1998): 27.
555
Fick: 28.
556
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 76.
557
Veterans History Project, AFC 2001/001/17844 MS01.
558
Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 36.
559
Kael Weston, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (February 1, 2012).
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negative form, by a Marine veteran from Afghanistan who noted that civilians near <strong>the</strong> base would stop
what <strong>the</strong>y were doing and emit vibes <strong>of</strong> possible fear, awe, or apprehension when <strong>the</strong> Marines walked
by. If it was Army soldiers, <strong>the</strong>y would just keep sweeping. 560
Adapt and Overcome
The ability to adapt, innovate, and improvise is not just recommended behavior, it is core to Marine
identity. Two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> five sections <strong>of</strong> Krulak’s book are dedicated to this topic: “The Innovators” and
“The Improvisers.” 561 Note that <strong>the</strong>se titles capture <strong>the</strong> action not as a transient verb, but as a noun – a
trait woven into <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. In assessing <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> a Marine, USMC
veteran Charles Wynn writes, “The Marine goes everywhere, does everything. It is taken for granted
that nothing is impossible. He is simply ordered to do a given job. He goes and does it. Nobody tells
him how. He works it out on <strong>the</strong> spot. He invariably succeeds. It never occurs to him that he may
fail.” 562
“Adapt and overcome” is verse, doctrine and expected practice. The Third Edition (2010) Marine Corps
Operating Concepts manual opens with this injunction: “Military excellence is defined by <strong>the</strong> excellence
<strong>of</strong> our Marines; <strong>the</strong>ir thinking, ability to innovate, adapt, and to overcome <strong>the</strong> challenges presented by
complex environments, threats, and conditions.” 563 Krulak claims that “improvisation has been a way <strong>of</strong>
life for <strong>the</strong> Marines” and highlights <strong>the</strong> technological advancements initiated by <strong>the</strong> Corps throughout its
history. He expands on this <strong>the</strong>me by pointing out that <strong>the</strong> Corps has had to remake itself as an
institution—moving from “expeditionary duty in <strong>the</strong> colonial infantry role” (Haiti, China, Santo Domingo,
Nicaragua) to masters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> amphibious assault, 564 and one might fur<strong>the</strong>r add—to today’s
expeditionary crisis response force.
Historical accounts and current scholarship temper somewhat <strong>the</strong> innovative accolades celebrated by
<strong>the</strong> Corps. A read <strong>of</strong> Millet’s account <strong>of</strong> early Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck history makes it clear that in many instances
Marine role “innovations” were largely forced upon <strong>the</strong>m. A ra<strong>the</strong>r constant <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first part <strong>of</strong>
Millet’s tome on Marine history is <strong>the</strong> Corps’ failure to innovate even when <strong>the</strong> need is obvious and
possible avenues available. For instance, Millet records that it was pressures from <strong>the</strong> Navy, not <strong>the</strong>
Corps, to “reorganize <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps into permanent expeditionary battalions that could develop and
defend temporary advanced naval bases for <strong>the</strong> battle fleet.” Marine Commandant Heywood, for his
part, remained tied to <strong>the</strong> Corps’ nearly obsolete duties <strong>of</strong> seagoing military service – ships guards, naval
gunnery and landing party service, and a security force for Navy yards and stations. Millett characterizes
<strong>the</strong> forced changes to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps roles as exogenous pressures: <strong>the</strong> forward development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
560 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/48860 MS01, Veterans History Project.
561 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999).
562 Colonel Charles A. Wynn, USMC, “A Marine is Different,” Marine Corps Gazette (May 1944): 15.
563 Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access…Winning Small Wars, Third Edition, (June 2010)
accessed November 2012 at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%2013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf.
564 Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 109, 73.
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Navy and <strong>the</strong> expansionist thrust <strong>of</strong> American diplomacy. 565 It needs be noted that Millet’s history, to
<strong>the</strong> point referenced, predates <strong>the</strong> Marine’s self imposed image <strong>of</strong> “innovative.” One must ask what <strong>the</strong>
effects <strong>of</strong> embracing, inculcating, and marrying identity to such a trait have had on <strong>the</strong> modern service.
Terry Terriff examines this question via two contemporary examples: <strong>the</strong> shift from frontal assault to
maneuver warfare and <strong>the</strong> failed attempt by Commandant Charles Krulak 566 to institutionalize “a culture
<strong>of</strong> constant innovation.” In <strong>the</strong> first instance Commandant Gray accomplishes an “innovation” in <strong>the</strong>
Marine way <strong>of</strong> war by turning <strong>the</strong> organization toward maneuver warfare. Terriff takes care to note that
this was no small feat, resisted by a number <strong>of</strong> factions within <strong>the</strong> Corps and successful only due to <strong>the</strong>
enormous effort applied and <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>of</strong> Gray himself. Gray personified significant investment in
<strong>the</strong> “old way” <strong>of</strong> war and was <strong>the</strong>refore able to use his position as Commandant and his reputation as an
old breed warrior to wield <strong>the</strong> leadership necessary for <strong>the</strong> change. New identity goods in a familiar
frame—“smart warrior”—alongside revised education, field training, and proven success in <strong>the</strong> field
were additional requisites for altering <strong>the</strong> annihilation warfare mindset <strong>of</strong> a ra<strong>the</strong>r change-adverse body
<strong>of</strong> Marines. 567
In <strong>the</strong> second instance, despite all efforts, Charles Krulak’s attempt to institutionalize (via training and
fighting methods) an identity trait already claimed by <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps—innovators—largely failed.
Krulak’s initiation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory was meant to “experiment with forward
leaning concepts and technologies” and “test <strong>the</strong>m to failure” in order to assess which held promise for
future engagements and which not. At <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> his efforts <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>ficer corps,
when polled, produced a painfully ironic assessment. They “viewed <strong>the</strong>ir service as being very open to
innovation, [but]…also thought that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps had no present need to innovate.” Ra<strong>the</strong>r than
seizing upon <strong>the</strong> opportunity to explore innovations, <strong>the</strong> critical mass <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps stumbled at <strong>the</strong>
open-endedness <strong>of</strong> Krulak’s concept and gradually turned <strong>the</strong> MCW Laboratory into a typical
deliverables-based unit for current operating forces. 568 These two episodes provide instructive lessons,
and somewhat cautionary tales, for those who would hold up <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps as an innovative
standard. 569
Terriff’s summary claim is that <strong>the</strong> Marines’ past record <strong>of</strong> innovation “makes clear that it is willing to
innovate, but this does not mean that its self-perception <strong>of</strong> being a body <strong>of</strong> ‘innovators’ means it
accepts innovation easily.” 570 Terriff’s evidence that <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps as an innovative
565 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: This History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, The Revised and Expanded
Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 137-138.
566 Son <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> previously referenced Victor Krulak.
567 Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> in <strong>the</strong> US Marine Corps,”
Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2006): 222-34.
568 Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> in <strong>the</strong> US Marine Corps,”
Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2006): 233.
569 See, for instance: Michael B. Siegl, “Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Transformation,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 49, 2 nd
quarter 2008: 103-106.
570 Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> in <strong>the</strong> US Marine Corps,”
Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2006): 235. An historic issue that highlights both <strong>the</strong> service’s gender issues
and its reluctance to innovate might be <strong>the</strong> arduous process undertaken by a few female pioneers in overturning
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institution may be a far higher standard than is lived is well taken. It may be that <strong>the</strong> Corps at <strong>the</strong>
strategic, institutional level finds itself as bound as any service by its own strong identity, projected
image, and carefully cultivated norms <strong>of</strong> Marine-ness. Marine efforts to continue to pursue an
innovative identity—drumming it into new recruits and reinforcing it through internal writings amongst
<strong>of</strong>ficers—are not for naught, however. Demanding flexibility and creative solutions from <strong>of</strong>ficers and
grunts on <strong>the</strong> ground may mean that Marines, while not living organizational innovation to <strong>the</strong> levels
<strong>the</strong>y tout, are still better than o<strong>the</strong>r services at immediate-term improvisations and mission-relevant
inventiveness in situations <strong>of</strong> uncertainty. Major General Nicholson claims that this is <strong>the</strong> aspect <strong>of</strong>
Marine culture particularly well suited for COIN. “We prize above all else, innovation at <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong>
friction.” He points out that this is what <strong>the</strong> Corps selects for in its <strong>of</strong>ficer candidates and rewards in its
NCOs. The Corps looks for individuals who can “think on <strong>the</strong>ir feet” and <strong>the</strong>n trains <strong>the</strong>m to become
even better. 571
Deborah Avant reinforces this concept in her work on military doctrine. Her scholarship leans perhaps
too heavily on Krulak’s testimonial <strong>of</strong> Marine innovation, contending along with him that flexibility has
become “a part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional ethos <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> [M]arines.” 572 She takes Krulak at his word – that <strong>the</strong>
Marines have historically been rewarded for innovation, and not usually punished if <strong>the</strong> innovations
didn’t work out. Ricks observed as much during his stint with Marines and claims that <strong>the</strong> Corps,
consequently, is most adept among <strong>the</strong> American services at addressing its own faults. 573 He cites a
culture <strong>of</strong> open and candid criticism, even bottom up. It is due to this ethos, in part, that USMC
intelligence <strong>of</strong>ficer Ben Connable claims that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s makes <strong>the</strong> grade in John
Nagl’s “learning organization” test: 574 “it promoted suggestions from <strong>the</strong> field, encouraged subordinates
to question policies, institutionally questioned its basic assumptions, generated local SOPs, and had a
senior <strong>of</strong>ficer corps in close touch with men in <strong>the</strong> field.” 575
Connable builds on this claim to assert that <strong>the</strong> modern Corps is more skilled than sister services at
“operating in culturally complex environments.” 576 Marine doctrine assumes warfighting in a complex
context: “Success depends in large part on <strong>the</strong> ability to adapt—to proactively shape changing events to
our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing conditions.” 577 Recruit training follows
in <strong>the</strong> same spirit by imposing swift switches <strong>of</strong> both task and location on recruits, a regimen designed
to force would-be Marines to deal with situations <strong>of</strong> flux and rapid change. “One day <strong>the</strong>y could find
<strong>the</strong> regulation requiring automatic discharge for female Marines who became mo<strong>the</strong>rs. See both “Mary Sue
League” and “Jeanne Botwright” in Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their
Own Words, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006): 229-241.
571
Major General Larry Nicholson, conversation with <strong>the</strong> author, (January 11, 2012).
572
Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources <strong>of</strong> Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol 37, No. 4 (Dec 1993): 421.
573
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 20.
574
John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002).
575
Maj Ben Connable, USMC, “<strong>Culture</strong> Warriors: Marine Corps Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and Adaption to Cultural
Terrain,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/4-connable.pdf, accessed 29
August 2011: 4.
576
Connable: 2.
577 Warfighting, MCDP 1 (U.S. Marine Corps, 1997): 9.
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<strong>the</strong>mselves reacting to confusing changes <strong>of</strong> environment in a short period <strong>of</strong> time. They might feed <strong>the</strong>
hungry one minute and be engaging a deadly enemy with rifle fire <strong>the</strong> next.” Tomorrow’s Marines must
be trained against getting comfortable because “<strong>the</strong>ir lives depend on <strong>the</strong>ir ability to adapt quickly to
<strong>the</strong> changing situation.” 578 Their lives, and, according to First to Fight Krulak, <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battle
as well: “Try as hard as you can to be ready for it but be willing to adapt and improvise when it turns out
to be a different battle than <strong>the</strong> one you expected, because adaptability is where victory will be
found.” 579
Marines are primed to contend with somewhat chaotic environments. “Culturally complex” is a bit <strong>of</strong> a
different matter. In this <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps present a strange dichotomy. They are <strong>the</strong> most forward
leaning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> services in emphasizing cultural competence and investing in research and training. As
<strong>the</strong> man at <strong>the</strong> tip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spear, Marines grasp that culture impacts on <strong>the</strong> way humans behave and may
play a significant role in battlefront terrain. Connable’s claim that Marines also possess “an innate
ability to adapt to foreign cultures” 580 however, may be a bit <strong>of</strong> a stretch. Rampant racism, an “in and
out” mentality, and bro<strong>the</strong>rhood insularity all inhibit successful investment in understanding an alien
culture on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> individual Marines. Few Marines would disagree that <strong>the</strong> cultural aim is
laudatory. Even Spooner makes place for a cultural expert among his historical heroes: First Lieutenant
Savage is a hero not for combat valor but because he exercises sound judgment and effectively trains
<strong>the</strong> Gendarme by speaking <strong>the</strong>ir patois, understanding <strong>the</strong>ir culture, and respecting <strong>the</strong>m as soldiers.
Savage is also portrayed as exceptional. A bit <strong>of</strong> a “one <strong>of</strong> a kind.” 581
Nathaniel Fick captures what is more likely a typical relationship Marines have with foreign cultures:
I realized that although [Marines] traveled a lot, <strong>the</strong>y rarely saw <strong>the</strong> places <strong>the</strong>y visited. Marines
aren’t travelers in <strong>the</strong> traditional sense. They view foreign countries ei<strong>the</strong>r from behind a gun
sight or through <strong>the</strong> haze <strong>of</strong> a night on liberty. Perspective skews to one dimension, as if <strong>the</strong>
Marines are <strong>the</strong> players and everything else is a prop. 582
Fick confesses: “During planning in Kuwait, and during <strong>the</strong> first few days <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war, we repeatedly made
<strong>the</strong> same mistake: assuming that <strong>the</strong> Iraqi military would do what we would have done in <strong>the</strong>ir
situation.” 583 Although cultural competence is emphasized to near exhaustion in <strong>the</strong> Small Wars
Manual, Marines have not systematically translated this into operational practice.
578 st
James B. Woulfe, Into <strong>the</strong> Crucible: Making Marines for <strong>the</strong> 21 Century, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998): 20.
579
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 179.
580
Maj Ben Connable, USMC, “<strong>Culture</strong> Warriors: Marine Corps Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and Adaption to Cultural
Terrain,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/4-connable.pdf, accessed 29
August 2011: 2.
581
Spooner: 70-91
582
Nathanial Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005):
109. A far crasser view comes in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a Marine Corps bumper sticker: “Travel to Exotic Places, Meet New
People, KILL THEM.” Appendix D.
583
Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making <strong>of</strong> a Marine Officer, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
2005):201.
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Adaptability to tactile ra<strong>the</strong>r than civilian environments comes most easily to Marines. Blagovest
Tashev, a contractor who has worked for several years alongside Marines, notes that field-related
exogenous forces have long been <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> Marine adaptability and innovation:
Marines usually have more limited resources compared to o<strong>the</strong>r services and <strong>the</strong>refore have no
choice but to adapt and improvise. Also, Marines are usually <strong>the</strong> first to be sent to <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong>
operations, which means that <strong>the</strong>re is relatively limited support in terms <strong>of</strong> logistics, firepower,
etc. They have no choice but [to] adapt and improvise. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, adaptability and
improvisation is a trait that is taught through training and action, imposed by austere conditions
in <strong>the</strong> field, and reinforced by scarce material capabilities. 584
Strong emphasis on adaptability and improvisation may also cultivate a bit <strong>of</strong> a rebellious son attitude
toward standard operating procedures. 585 Captain Joseph Mariani captures <strong>the</strong> tension created
between an “adaptive” mindset and codified doctrine this way:
Marines have an odd relationship with <strong>the</strong>ir doctrine. MCDP-1, called, Warfighting, is basically
<strong>the</strong> bible for all Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers. One <strong>of</strong> my peers was almost thrown out <strong>of</strong> a moving MRAP in
Iraq for arguing against doctrine to his boss. The only issue is that doctrine is vague enough to
admit almost infinite interpretations. The result is that we also take pride in not following
doctrine. There is an <strong>of</strong>ten repeated story at TBS that Marine Advisors arrive for partnered
training with ano<strong>the</strong>r country. As <strong>the</strong>y begin exercises <strong>the</strong> Marines notice <strong>the</strong> host country
<strong>of</strong>ficers becoming increasingly agitated until a shouting match breaks out. Finally, <strong>the</strong> Marines
walk over and ask what <strong>the</strong> problem is. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> host country <strong>of</strong>ficers explains, “we worked
for weeks reading and studying your doctrine so that we would be ready to work well when you
arrived. But once you began <strong>the</strong> mission we discovered that you don't even follow your own
doctrine.” The best I can say is that like religion, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps has a few guiding principles
which constantly have to be redefined to fit <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> time and place. And it is that
process, more than any particular outcome <strong>of</strong> it, that makes <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps. 586
Marine reverence for doctrine is genuine, as is <strong>the</strong> admiration <strong>of</strong> some outsiders. In comparing doctrine
generated by <strong>the</strong> Corps to that produced by its sister services Williamson Murray writes: “The one oasis
in <strong>the</strong> desert that is military doctrine remains <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. Its doctrinal manuals connect with <strong>the</strong>
real world and to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> American military is supposed to be preparing and thinking seriously
about war.” He praises <strong>the</strong> common sense manifest in <strong>the</strong> Marines’ Warfighting manual which aims in
genuine fashion to give Marines “a realistic and intelligent understanding <strong>of</strong> war’s uncertainties,
584 Blagovest Tashev, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (February 14, 2012).
585 Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources <strong>of</strong> Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol 37, No. 4 (Dec 1993): 421.
586 Joseph Mariani, correspondence, (Nov. 3, 2011).
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ambiguities, and horror.” 587 Marines enjoy bragging that <strong>the</strong> Army envies <strong>the</strong> Corps’ concise,
intelligently flexible, and user-friendly doctrine and are <strong>of</strong>ten found toting it to joint exercises. Marines
may have affection for <strong>the</strong>ir doctrine in part because <strong>the</strong>y see it as playing a less prescriptive role than
that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir service counterparts. “Marine commanders know <strong>the</strong>ir doctrine and frequently apply it,
but true to <strong>the</strong>ir naval heritage, <strong>the</strong>y retain <strong>the</strong> prerogative to deviate from it. Marine authored
doctrine also tends to be broader and less prescriptive than that authored by <strong>the</strong> Army.” 588 For Marines
doctrine is a departing point. Marines believe that doctrine is a guideline, a warfighting
philosophy, ra<strong>the</strong>r than a directive because only mission analysis can determine how exactly a
mission is to be done. Policy cannot be a cookie cutter because according to Marines’ outlook
(and <strong>the</strong>ir doctrine, Warfighting) <strong>the</strong> world is replete with uncertainty, chaos, and friction. That
is why policy is a point <strong>of</strong> departure. Thus, what o<strong>the</strong>r services see as Marines’ unwillingness to
be team players and just follow <strong>the</strong> rules, are simply <strong>the</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir doctrine; and
yes, it is cultural. 589
Leadership
When asked what he had done in <strong>the</strong> Corps that most epitomized being a Marine, Dale Nicholas said,
“The leadership.” Dale Nicholas is a corporal. As a corporal in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, leadership defined him.
Leadership was “having six guys who look up to you, you are <strong>the</strong> role model. What you do, good or bad,
<strong>the</strong>y pick up on. You have to do what <strong>the</strong>y are going to look up to.” 590
Joe Mariani explains ano<strong>the</strong>r aspect <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps leadership:
The command and responsibilities entrusted to junior <strong>of</strong>ficers (and junior NCOs for that matter)
in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is not…matched in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services. The Army promotes <strong>of</strong>ficers so
quickly that anyone below <strong>the</strong> rank <strong>of</strong> captain is merely a warm body to fill a chair. In
deployments to Iraq I would have trouble getting my counterparts from Army commands on <strong>the</strong>
phone because <strong>the</strong>y thought that a [lieutenant] could not possibly be <strong>the</strong> senior analyst for a
regional command. Where else but in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps would a 25 year old 1stLt be entrusted
with $14 million dollars in equipment, and <strong>the</strong> only guidance I got from my commander was “as
long as you don’t get anyone killed, do whatever you have to do to improve ground sensor
collection in Afghanistan.” 591
587 Williamson Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” in John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman eds., America
<strong>the</strong> Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute,
2002): 149-150.
588 Although it must be noted that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps continues to borrow a good deal <strong>of</strong> its doctrine—that which it
deems outside <strong>of</strong> its core competencies—from <strong>the</strong> Army. Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant
Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,”
supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point) website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-
CULTURE.pdf.
589 Blagovest Tashev, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (Feburary 14, 2012).
590 Dale Nicholas, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (September 20, 2011).
591 Joseph Mariani, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (November 3, 2011).
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These two vignettes capture <strong>the</strong> two fold essence <strong>of</strong> leadership in <strong>the</strong> Corps—one a focus on leadership
traits – <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> character and behavior one expects from a leader, and <strong>the</strong> second a focus on
leadership dispersal—<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps commitment to push authority to <strong>the</strong> lowest levels.
In his 1916 “Plea for a Mission and Doctrine” John Russell foreshadows both aspects in an effort to
advocate a more serious approach to leadership training within <strong>the</strong> Corps. “It is a mistaken idea that
Leaders are born and not made…Of prime importance is a study <strong>of</strong> psychology and its relation to
discipline and morale.”...“We demand ‘initiative’ <strong>of</strong> subordinates and yet fail to train <strong>the</strong>m for an
intelligent initiative.” 592 The Corps has evolved over time a dedicated consciousness to leadership
training and practice. In fact, Julia Dye, a hoplology scholar with both academic and personal
attachments to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, argues that “[T]he Marine Corps treasures leadership above virtually
all o<strong>the</strong>r qualities in <strong>the</strong> ranks; even above and beyond such obvious military virtues as bravery and
tenacity in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> danger or hardship.” 593
Spooner’s legends highlight a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> character and pr<strong>of</strong>essional traits expected <strong>of</strong> leaders.
Leaders living <strong>the</strong> Marine standard were pr<strong>of</strong>essional, cool under fire, competent, but most importantly,
<strong>the</strong>y took care <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir men. Leadership on <strong>the</strong> front lines meant an ability to maintain discipline and
exercise with good judgment <strong>the</strong> license to innovate. The aspect <strong>of</strong> leadership most valued throughout
<strong>the</strong> stories, however, was a willingness to get down at <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enlisted man, tutor him, and
share his hardship. Spooner describes <strong>the</strong>n Major “Tony” Waller, (an au<strong>the</strong>ntic and <strong>of</strong>ten publicly
controversial figure), as one who
made it a point to spend time with each <strong>of</strong> his subordinate units as <strong>the</strong>y moved through <strong>the</strong>
fields and villages. He encouraged his Marines and reminded <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir responsibility to
uphold <strong>the</strong> proud traditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. The Marines loved and respected Waller and <strong>the</strong>y did
<strong>the</strong>ir utmost not to let him down. 594
Waller’s advice to junior <strong>of</strong>ficers was that “Taking care <strong>of</strong> your Marines and rewarding <strong>the</strong>m as
appropriate is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important aspects <strong>of</strong> leadership.” 595 Waller was not portrayed as
exceptional, but ra<strong>the</strong>r as fulfilling <strong>the</strong> Marine ideal alongside o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>of</strong> caliber:
Crowe was a legendary Marine, known throughout <strong>the</strong> Corps for his fearlessness….
Crowe always shared <strong>the</strong> same hardships as his troops. He inspected, no matter where you
were, in <strong>the</strong> battalion area or out in <strong>the</strong> field, no matter what you were doing, no matter what
time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day or night it was, every once in a while you could look up and see him standing
<strong>the</strong>re. Always sharing <strong>the</strong> utmost concern from his troops and <strong>the</strong>ir welfare. The flip side <strong>of</strong> this
592 Russell, “A Plea for Mission and Doctrine”: 113, 120.
593 Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions, and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2011): xvii.
594 Spooner: 41.
595 Spooner: 51.
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was that he was known as <strong>the</strong> toughest <strong>of</strong>ficer in <strong>the</strong> Corps and he expected more from his men
that (sic) any o<strong>the</strong>r commander. 596
The same traits that endeared leaders to <strong>the</strong>ir men in Spooner’s tales are <strong>the</strong> traits that contemporary
Marines note as distinguishing <strong>of</strong> great leadership:
Probably <strong>the</strong> finest <strong>of</strong>ficer I knew was not my last main <strong>of</strong>ficer but <strong>the</strong> commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer
before him, Lt. Col. Mike Dana. I mean he was a man’s man. He was not scared to come to
work and work all day with us on a 5 ton or on a generator replacing a head gasket. And <strong>the</strong>n
<strong>the</strong> next day he’s over at motor-t or HT and all he does is move gear all day. Then <strong>the</strong> next day
he’s over at fuel. All he does is fuel vehicles all day. He was not afraid to do what he asked
every marine in his command to do and not only that…[h]e knew everybody by name, he knew
everybody’s wife’s name, and for <strong>the</strong> most part he knew what was going on with your family. I
remember—and this is what stands out for me most with him—I had a bad time because my
dad went in for heart surgery and I’d never talked to <strong>the</strong> man but I had talked to some people in
my platoon and after I got <strong>the</strong> news Col. Dana came to my room in <strong>the</strong> barracks after hours and
asked if I was OK and if I needed some leave. And to me, that’s what makes an <strong>of</strong>ficer right
<strong>the</strong>re. 597
Drill Instructors training up new recruits are schooled to demonstrate this paternal mode <strong>of</strong> leadership
from <strong>the</strong> boots’ first day. “[T]here is no way that I will eat until every single one <strong>of</strong> my recruits has
eaten. There is no way that I will go to sleep until my recruits are in bed. Those are things that just
don’t happen. If I have a problem, I start coming apart inside [but do not show it on <strong>the</strong> outside]. That’s
just <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps leadership.” 598
A Marine leader should not only demonstrate paternal regard for each Marine under his or her
command, he or she must also become expert in <strong>the</strong> arts <strong>of</strong> war (its history and philosophies). A
Marine leader will add to this package intelligence, exceptional boldness, and a willingness to dish out
and receive candid assessment. 599 When <strong>the</strong> Corps’ leadership ideal is achieved, it results in a
veneration without peer in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services. “The Marine Corps exhibits hero worship to <strong>the</strong> extent
<strong>the</strong> Roman legions did.” 600 Marines are socialized to hold <strong>the</strong>ir senior leaders in high esteem and to
treat <strong>the</strong>m with a sort <strong>of</strong> reverence. Major Ben Connable points out that <strong>the</strong> Commandant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps can use his position <strong>of</strong> superior trust and legitimacy to good effect for <strong>the</strong> Corps. The
Commandant’s popular status and <strong>the</strong> Corps’ smaller service numbers means “<strong>the</strong> Commandant can
sometimes effect paradigm shifts against strong currents <strong>of</strong> internal and external protest. This authority
has proven critical to <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contemporary Marine Corps to adapt to asymmetric threats.
596
Spooner: 199-200. For o<strong>the</strong>r examples <strong>of</strong> ideal leadership see pages 30, 47, and 242.
597
Veterans History Project, AFC 2001/001/65466 MS01. It is important to note that this same Marine had equally
powerful stories <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> negative sort <strong>of</strong> about <strong>of</strong>ficers whom he held in <strong>the</strong> lowest possible esteem.
598
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): 262.
599
See Warfighting: 56-58.
600
Major Jason Spitaletta, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 25, 2011).
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Commandants have <strong>of</strong>ten served as <strong>the</strong> ultimate champion <strong>of</strong> maverick or revolutionary ideas.” 601 The
sheer loyalty and determined admiration <strong>of</strong> key leaders is perhaps best captured in <strong>the</strong> words Captain
Mariani used after returning from a 2010 deployment: “If General Kelley showed up at my door tonight,
I would follow him barefoot to Afghanistan.” 602
Marine leadership recognizes that <strong>the</strong> trust it demands and socializes into new Marines is a precious
commodity. Doctrine emphasizes <strong>the</strong> path Waller and Crowe exhibited in attaining trust: “Only by <strong>the</strong>ir
physical presence—by demonstrating <strong>the</strong> willingness to share danger and privation—can commanders
fully gain <strong>the</strong> trust and confidence <strong>of</strong> subordinates.” 603 Trust in leadership is <strong>the</strong> requisite good for
inspiring combat effectiveness in fighting men. “Leaders should develop unit cohesion and esprit and
<strong>the</strong> self-confidence <strong>of</strong> individuals within <strong>the</strong> unit. In this environment, a Marine’s unwillingness to
violate <strong>the</strong> respect and trust <strong>of</strong> peers can overcome personal fear.” 604
Not all leaders measure up. Examples <strong>of</strong> outrageously poor leadership, (<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sort typically kept from
public view) and its repercussions for Marines, are portrayed with painful accuracy in Generation Kill. 605
A Marine blogger hosted by Tom Ricks on <strong>the</strong> Foreign Policy website expressed his own frustration at
belonging to an “elite” organization that refused to clean house:
I'm talking about <strong>the</strong> Field Grade Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan who didn't know who
Mullah Omar was. I'm talking about a senior Staff NCO in <strong>the</strong> intelligence community who could
not produce a legible paragraph. I'm talking about a Battalion Commander who took pride in <strong>the</strong>
fact that he had done zero research on Afghanistan, because it allowed him to approach his
deployment with "an open mind." …The problem is not so much that <strong>the</strong>se individuals pop up
every now and <strong>the</strong>n, as every organization has its bad eggs, but ra<strong>the</strong>r that we see <strong>the</strong>m passed
on through <strong>the</strong> system, promoted and rewarded. If we are truly <strong>the</strong> elite organization we claim
to be, how do we justify <strong>the</strong> fact that we allow <strong>the</strong>se individuals to retain positions <strong>of</strong> immense
influence, much less promote through <strong>the</strong> ranks? How do we justify this endemic tolerance for
mediocrity or outright incompetence? 606
The same Mariani who rated <strong>the</strong> general <strong>of</strong>ficers in <strong>the</strong> Corps as “pure talent” and would have followed
General Kelley “barefoot to Afghanistan,” left <strong>the</strong> service because “in <strong>the</strong> middle ranks (Maj-LtCol) <strong>the</strong>
601
Maj Ben Connable, USMC, “<strong>Culture</strong> Warriors: Marine Corps Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and Adaption to Cultural
Terrain,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/4-connable.pdf, accessed 29
August 2011: 7.
602
Joseph Mariani, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (Nov. 3, 2011).
603
Warfighting: 80.
604
Warfighting: 15.
605
An HBO series based on <strong>the</strong> book <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same title by Evan Wright (and validated by a second accounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
same events in Nathanial Fick’s, One Bullet Away). This pseudo documentary series is widely regarded amongst
members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps as <strong>the</strong> most true-to-life film <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m ever made.
606
Italics original. Accessed on January 6, 2012:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/04/we_re_getting_out_<strong>of</strong>_<strong>the</strong>_marines_because_we_wanted_to_b
e_part_<strong>of</strong>_an_elite_force
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distribution <strong>of</strong> talent is skewed towards stupidity…[and] <strong>the</strong> prospect <strong>of</strong> 6-10 years suffering through
<strong>of</strong>ten incompetent middle management tilted <strong>the</strong> scales toward getting out.” 607
Uneven talent in <strong>the</strong> leadership pool poses a risk for <strong>the</strong> second tenet <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps leadership: an
ethos <strong>of</strong> pushing <strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> leadership to junior levels: “Train <strong>the</strong>m; back <strong>the</strong>m up; Let <strong>the</strong>m
lead; and Make <strong>the</strong>m lead.” 608 Cushman’s admonition is <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> Mission Command as captured
in doctrine:
Rooted in service culture and fundamental to our warrior spirit, Mission Command is a cultivated
leadership ethos that empowers decentralized leaders with decision authority and guides <strong>the</strong>
character development <strong>of</strong> Marines in garrison and combat. Mission Command promotes an
entrepreneurial mindset and enables <strong>the</strong> strong relationship <strong>of</strong> trust and mutual understanding
necessary for decentralized decision making and <strong>the</strong> tempo <strong>of</strong> operations required to seize <strong>the</strong>
initiative, degrade enemy cohesion and streng<strong>the</strong>n our own cohesive relationships in <strong>the</strong> crucible
<strong>of</strong> combat. 609
Mission Command is an outgrowth <strong>of</strong> Commander’s Intent, a founding principle within Warfighting, that
encourages initiative within <strong>the</strong> bounds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commander’s primary objectives: “The purpose <strong>of</strong>
providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from <strong>the</strong> original
plan when <strong>the</strong> unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with higher commanders’ aims.” 610
Subordinates should understand <strong>the</strong> intent <strong>of</strong> commanders at least two levels up. Senior leaders set <strong>the</strong>
tone, convey intent, and let subordinates figure out <strong>the</strong> details. 611
The Marine Corps works harder than its sister services at training juniors for leadership and ought to be
credited with such. Ricks, alongside o<strong>the</strong>r scholars, notes this as a distinguishing factor: “Much more
than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r branches, [<strong>the</strong> Marines]…place pride and responsibility at <strong>the</strong> lowest levels <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
organization.” 612 The genuine effort to empower Marines at <strong>the</strong> lowest levels might be contrast with
<strong>the</strong> Army who gives mission command <strong>of</strong> this sort lip service, but remains fairly rigidly hierarchical in
practice. 613 Marines do, typically, have more discretion than <strong>the</strong>ir rank equivalents in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services
and have developed a consequent comfort with operating autonomously in small groups.
Applying decentralized decisionmaking to <strong>the</strong> field, however, is rife with risk. It is difficult for senior
commanders to resist <strong>the</strong> technological lure <strong>of</strong> micromanaging those beneath <strong>the</strong>m. In fact,
607 Joseph Mariani, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (November 3, 2011).
608 Commandant Robert E. Cushman, “The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Leadership,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1972): 15.
609 Italics in original. Marine Operating Concepts: 16-17.
610 Warfighting: 89.
611 Warfighting: 91, 60.
612 Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 19. See also Colonel Norman L. Cooling,
USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine
Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point) website:
http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.; and Julia Dye, Backbone: History, Traditions,
and Leadership Lessons <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps NCOs, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2011).
613 Brigadier Nigel R.F. Alywin-Foster, British Army, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,”
Military Review, November-December 2005: 32.
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conventional wisdom in <strong>the</strong> Corps is that “<strong>the</strong> push to enable <strong>the</strong> strategic corporal through technology
[has] unintentionally resulted in <strong>the</strong> tactically focused colonel.” 614 Despite <strong>the</strong>ir clear and unambiguous
doctrinal focus on pushing decisionmaking to <strong>the</strong> lowest possible levels: “in order to generate <strong>the</strong>
tempo <strong>of</strong> operations we desire and to best cope with <strong>the</strong> uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity <strong>of</strong> combat” 615
<strong>the</strong> risk factor acts as impediment. “[W]e talk a lot about a culture [which allows]…failure but it does
not sit comfortably…. [L]etting guys loose and trusting <strong>the</strong>m to do <strong>the</strong> right thing—[it is hard]…for <strong>the</strong>
culture to adopt and accept that.” 616 Hard especially in <strong>the</strong> eye <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public media, with young forces
which bring with <strong>the</strong>m “a linguistic gap, maturity gap, and a number <strong>of</strong> issues that contribute to
friction” 617 and are doing so in engagements that are far from existential for <strong>the</strong> nation.
Art Corbett, <strong>the</strong> author behind <strong>the</strong> Mission Command section <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Operating Concepts,
assesses that his Corps would live <strong>the</strong> Mission Command ideal in fuller form if engaged in “real” war.
Counterinsurgencies <strong>of</strong> peripheral significance tend to bring out <strong>the</strong> risk adverse side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation, and
<strong>the</strong> military:
The USMC is far closer [to achieving <strong>the</strong> Mission Command ideal] than our sister services, but
we have much ground to cover. Elective, peripheral wars that do not pose an existential
challenge or attack core national interests become birdies in political badminton. They cause
leaders to become distracted by equally peripheral issues and political correctness, and so are
breeding grounds for risk aversion. It infects us all to some degree…. What is important is that
we understand our foibles and deficiencies <strong>of</strong> courage and character in <strong>the</strong> contemporary
setting, so that when a real war challenges us with hard capable warriors who are bent on
victory and military advantage we know how to rectify our military institutions quickly….
[In <strong>the</strong> meantime]…I believe it is important to promulgate <strong>the</strong> best ideas regarding leadership so
<strong>the</strong>y are available when <strong>the</strong>y are needed by men <strong>of</strong> character. 618
Corbett’s point is a painful irony since it is in irregular operations that competent, decentralized
leadership would be <strong>of</strong> most value. Marine efforts toward this decentralized leadership structure,
flawed as <strong>the</strong>y may be, still put <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> upper tier. They are <strong>the</strong> American service, alongside Special
Forces, best organized to deliver innovative tailor-made strategy to diverse and localized
counterinsurgency fights. Should <strong>the</strong> Corps decide to become small wars pr<strong>of</strong>essionals, <strong>the</strong>y would be
best placed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> services to win <strong>the</strong> title. This somewhat wistful could-be reality is little match,
however, for strong Marine Corps preferences and <strong>the</strong> particular bias for action it cultivates. In <strong>the</strong> end,
Marines are primed (and prepared) to do exactly what <strong>the</strong>y advertise: immediate expeditionary action
to whatever clime and place; <strong>the</strong> Nation’s shock troops; and an eager tip in <strong>the</strong> military spear.
614
Major Jason Spitaletta, USMC, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 25, 2011).
615
(Italics original) Warfighting: 78.
616
Major Jeffrey Davis, USMC (Ret), correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 26, 2011).
617
Major Jason Spitaletta, USMC, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (October 25, 2011).
618
Art Corbett, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, (January 20, 2012).
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Perceptual Lens
Victor Krulak combines three relevant cultural frames (norms, values, and perceptual lens) in summing
up Marine mentality: “Partaking variously <strong>of</strong> pride, aggressiveness, dedication, loyalty, discipline, and
courage, [<strong>the</strong> Marines’] complex personality was—and is—dominated by a conviction that battle is <strong>the</strong>
Marines’ only reason for existence and that <strong>the</strong>y must be ready to respond promptly and effectively
whenever given <strong>the</strong> opportunity to fight.” 619 “Battle” in this context is not just a convenient term, it is a
sincere description <strong>of</strong> Marine focus. As recently as 2004, <strong>the</strong> Corps saw itself as providing “two critical
services for our nation: we make Marines and we win battles.” 620 Marines win battles. It is up to <strong>the</strong>
Army to win wars. The Marine perspective that <strong>the</strong>y are “first to fight” and “perform missions at <strong>the</strong>
lower end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> military operations” 621 means a more tactically focused eye. Successful
missions are <strong>the</strong> key to winning battles, thus, for <strong>the</strong> individual Marine an “ethos <strong>of</strong> ‘mission, mission,
mission’” 622 reigns supreme. From his perspective, it is why America keeps her Marine Corps.
Mission, Mission, Mission
The <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> “accomplishing <strong>the</strong> mission” – no matter how insensible it may seem (chasing a seagull at
boot camp) – is a constant thread running through training histories and conversations with Marines.
“Mission” in this sense is nearly wholly tactical. It involves accomplishing <strong>the</strong> task immediately at hand.
It is not anti-strategic, as long as someone “higher up” is thinking strategically, but it may mean that
leadership training at <strong>the</strong> lower levels (squad, platoon, perhaps company) emphasizes leadership within
<strong>the</strong> tactical mission ra<strong>the</strong>r than leadership to adjust <strong>the</strong> tactical mission if it is not accomplishing
strategic objectives.
In some ways, it seems, enlisted Marines consciously or unconsciously keep <strong>the</strong>ir thinking on strategic
objectives underdeveloped. Staff Sergeant Henning commented on her camaraderie with o<strong>the</strong>r females
while stationed in Iraq: “We don’t really see each o<strong>the</strong>r that much but, when we do, we don’t talk about
<strong>the</strong> war. We try to talk about o<strong>the</strong>r things when we are sitting in our hooch watching TV. So I don’t
know what <strong>the</strong>y think. I don’t really know what I think ei<strong>the</strong>r but I am glad that I am part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war
trying to help <strong>the</strong> Iraqi people have a better life.” 623 A second Marine voices similar sentiments and
provides some insight into <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> being strategically indifferent:
I’ve been in many situations I thought were unjust. I still don’t trust <strong>the</strong> government. After
being in Iraq, I really started to distrust <strong>the</strong> government and what <strong>the</strong>y were willing to give our
lives for. But, I am a United States Marine. I’m not a politician, my job is to defend <strong>the</strong> United
States against all enemies foreign and domestic. I do not get to choose who those enemies are.
619
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999): 3.
620
Sustaining <strong>the</strong> Transformation, (U.S. Marine Corps MCRP 6-11D): 17.
621
Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
622
Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, Operational <strong>Culture</strong> for <strong>the</strong> Warfighter, 281.
623
Larry Smith, The Few and The Proud: Marine Corps Drill Instructors in Their Own Words, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2006): 248.
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That is <strong>the</strong> job <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government. I’m just a pawn in <strong>the</strong> whole scheme <strong>of</strong> things. I just do my
job, keep my Marines alive, and live to fight ano<strong>the</strong>r day. 624
Spooner’s legendary Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks projected <strong>the</strong> same consigned disregard for <strong>the</strong> “why” behind <strong>the</strong>
mission. They deployed “[n]ot because <strong>the</strong>y wanted to, none did. Not because <strong>the</strong>y were fearless, none
were. It certainly was not for patriotism or because <strong>the</strong>y were heroes. They would go simply because
<strong>the</strong>y were Marines following orders.” 625
The emphasis for Marines is not on grand strategy—on bridging military means to political aims. Ra<strong>the</strong>r
<strong>the</strong> force <strong>of</strong> mind that sets Marines apart is a willingness to do what o<strong>the</strong>r humans shrink to do in order
to accomplish <strong>the</strong> mission—whe<strong>the</strong>r it is crawl in filth, vertically patrol enemy infested caves, or walk
over hundreds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own dead to continue <strong>the</strong> assault on <strong>the</strong> enemy. Marines believe in <strong>the</strong>mselves
and in "mission accomplishment”—no matter how dirty, hard, bloody, or fatal.
Marine heroes do not possess a common set <strong>of</strong> personality traits or leadership characteristics. They
range from disciplined to maverick, cool and taciturn to outrageous and undiplomatic; <strong>the</strong>ir human
strengths and failings cover <strong>the</strong> full range. What <strong>the</strong>y do have in common is mission accomplishment
against tall odds and with uncommon flair, bravery, or audacity. These men are not heroes because
<strong>the</strong>y save Marine lives. They are heroes because <strong>the</strong>y accomplished <strong>the</strong> objective. In fact, if <strong>the</strong>
objective required a high number <strong>of</strong> lives, this only increases Marine prestige in accomplishing <strong>the</strong>
mission. Focusing on <strong>the</strong> Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pacific campaign, O’Connell observes:
[A]no<strong>the</strong>r form <strong>of</strong> discipline was also in operation on <strong>the</strong> islands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pacific—a cultural
discipline that framed <strong>the</strong> continuous assault as a course <strong>of</strong> action that was preferred to safer
but less Marine-like tactics. In short, <strong>the</strong> Marines continued forward because <strong>the</strong>ir ideas about
proper Marine behavior gave <strong>the</strong>m no alternative. Death was not unimaginable; it could be
incorporated into <strong>the</strong> Marine’s stories about his own identity. Failing one’s comrades or
appearing to prefer <strong>the</strong> Army, however, could not. As one Marine noted in his last letter to his
wife before being killed in <strong>the</strong> assault on Tarawa: “The Marines have a way <strong>of</strong> making you
afraid—not <strong>of</strong> dying but <strong>of</strong> not doing your job.” 626
High casualty rates could be incorporated into <strong>the</strong> Marines’ cultural <strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> prestige via suffering and
dying. O’Connell claims that “The Corps’ steadily increasing casualties in World War II—which were
twelve times greater in <strong>the</strong> last year <strong>of</strong> fighting than <strong>the</strong>y were in <strong>the</strong> first—fur<strong>the</strong>r convinced Marines
that <strong>the</strong>ir service was superior to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs around <strong>the</strong>m.” The bloody price compounded <strong>the</strong> insularity
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps and only deepened its members’ attachment: “The narratives <strong>of</strong> Marine exceptionalism
continued to function, even when <strong>the</strong> service’s principal marker <strong>of</strong> difference was greater suffering and
dying.” 627 Spooner’s legends carry much <strong>the</strong> same <strong>the</strong>me. A lot <strong>of</strong> Marines die. They do not "get away,"
624 Oral history file AFC 2001/001/46366 MS01,Veterans History Project,.
625 Spooner, A Marine Anthology, 270.
626 O’Connell, Underdogs, 58.
627 O’Connell: 28-29.
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nor is it <strong>the</strong> heroic or "best" who survive. Sacrifices at this level can be made because <strong>the</strong> Marine, and
<strong>the</strong> decision to put him in harm’s way, are part <strong>of</strong> accomplishing <strong>the</strong> mission; and accomplishing <strong>the</strong>
mission is what keeps <strong>the</strong> Corps’ alive.
Clinical Paranoia
Terry Terriff identifies organizational paranoia as <strong>the</strong> key feature <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps culture. 628 He is in
good company. Ricks, during his time in <strong>the</strong>ir midst, came to <strong>the</strong> same conclusion: “This abiding sense
<strong>of</strong> vulnerability, and <strong>the</strong> consequent requirement to excel to ensure that survival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution, is <strong>the</strong>
central fact <strong>of</strong> Marine culture.” 629 As did O’Connell: “Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most recurrent <strong>the</strong>me in <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> early Cold War was a notion <strong>of</strong> being under siege from without, both by enemies in combat
and by o<strong>the</strong>r forces in <strong>the</strong> executive branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. government.” 630 The Marine Corps’ fight to
survive is <strong>the</strong> primary plot line <strong>of</strong> Krulak’s First to Fight narrative. He details <strong>the</strong> Corps’ tenuous
existence and its last minute pulls back from <strong>the</strong> brink <strong>of</strong> extinction, not once, but multiple times over
<strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> its history. 631 Marine paranoia is not unfounded, but Terriff usefully distinguishes why
<strong>the</strong>ir perspective is “cultural” ra<strong>the</strong>r than simply utilitarian:
What distinguishes <strong>the</strong> organizational paranoia <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps as a cultural trait, ra<strong>the</strong>r
than simply a reasonable response to environmental conditions, is its pervasiveness and
persistence, even when <strong>the</strong>re is no one out to get <strong>the</strong> Corps, and <strong>the</strong> propensity it creates to
perceive any and all challenges, real or imagined, significant or insignificant, as putative threats
to <strong>the</strong> very survival <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps as a service and to react accordingly in a forceful manner. 632
Norman and Cooling believe that this trait has served <strong>the</strong> Corps well. Paranoia has been a healthy force
“driving <strong>the</strong> Marines to constantly evaluate <strong>the</strong>ir competence and direction against <strong>the</strong> challenges and
opportunities associated with emerging and future operational environments.” 633 The Marine’s own
anthropologists credit paranoia with <strong>the</strong> Marines’ penchant to excel: The “ambiguous economic, social,
and political position within <strong>the</strong> U.S. military has led to a belief that <strong>the</strong> Corps as institution is always
under threat, and must show that it can always do all things…better than o<strong>the</strong>r services.” 634 H<strong>of</strong>fman
points out that <strong>the</strong> Marine’s lack <strong>of</strong> distinctive domain means <strong>the</strong>y are reasonably concerned with <strong>the</strong>ir
legitimacy as an organization: “[A] Marine Corps is a luxury for most countries” 635 and agrees that this
628
Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 475-503, June 2006: 477.
629
Thomas E. Ricks, Making <strong>the</strong> Corps, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007): 197.
630
O’Connell, Underdogs, 10-11.
631
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999).
632
Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 475-503, June 2006: 484.
633
Colonel Norman L. Cooling, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Turner, USMC, “Understanding <strong>the</strong> Few
Good Men: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>,” supplied to <strong>the</strong> Ed Darack (author <strong>of</strong> Victory Point)
website: http://www.darack.com/sawtalosar/USMC-SERVICE-CULTURE.pdf.
634
Salmoni and Holmes-Eber: 277.
635
Frank G. H<strong>of</strong>fman, “The Marine Mask <strong>of</strong> War,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, November 10, 2011: 3,
found 25 January 2012 at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201111.h<strong>of</strong>fman.marines.pdf.
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institutional paranoia usefully promotes innovation. Terriff puts a finer point on this logic by suggesting
three distinctive behaviors resulting from <strong>the</strong> Corps perception <strong>of</strong> organizational vulnerability:
First, <strong>the</strong> Corps is perennially wary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> implications for its organizational survival <strong>of</strong> external
pressures for change. Second, it is perennially vigilant to <strong>the</strong> ramifications <strong>of</strong> change in <strong>the</strong>
strategic, military environment, lest a failure to adjust make it appear effectively irrelevant as a
distinct organization. And third, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is perennially concerned that in adjusting to
environmental changes or to pressures to change, that it not be seen to be encroaching on <strong>the</strong>
functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r US military services, or, worse, to be perceived as becoming little more
than ano<strong>the</strong>r version <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r US military service, particularly <strong>the</strong> US Army, lest this create <strong>the</strong>
perception that it provides a redundant military capability. 636
Amphibious Roots
The Marine Corps must be not only better, but different. Why <strong>the</strong> return to amphibious roots? Major
General Larry Nicholson has two words for it: “service relevance.” The Corps must show that it can
bring something that <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army can’t bring. “The Army can do COIN and can do it very well. The
Army can’t do amphibious operations.” 637 It is interesting to note that today’s “return to amphibious
roots” rhetoric is a near replay <strong>of</strong> Commandant General Robert E. Cushman’s similar refrain in <strong>the</strong>
aftermath <strong>of</strong> Vietnam: “we are pulling our heads out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> jungle and getting back into <strong>the</strong> amphibious
business.” 638
Second Lieutenant Valerie J. Cranmer challenges <strong>the</strong> amphibious assault identity narrative <strong>the</strong> Marines
hold dear in favor <strong>of</strong> an identity incorporating small wars as <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> what makes Marines unique.
Cranmer first notes <strong>the</strong> ridiculousness <strong>of</strong> basing one’s “roots” on <strong>the</strong> inconsequential landing at New
Providence, <strong>the</strong>n goes fur<strong>the</strong>r:
Amphibious warfare is an integral and important facet <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps history, strategy and
ethos. However, to say we are a <strong>Service</strong> based in <strong>of</strong>fensive amphibious warfare is <strong>the</strong> myth.
The Navy by nature is amphibious and without it we could not perform an amphibious assault.
Also, <strong>the</strong> Army conducted arguably <strong>the</strong> most well-known amphibious assault on Normandy in
World War II. It is our roots in small wars that alone separates us, not amphibious assault. 639
Cranmer might have also noted that <strong>the</strong> Marine Hymn celebrates involvement in a “small war” as its
first beginnings – Tripoli. While this may not have been any more strategically significant than <strong>the</strong>
636 Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 475-503, June 2006: 484.
637 Maj General Larry Nicholson, conversation with <strong>the</strong> author (January 11, 2012). General Nicholson also sees <strong>the</strong>
Marine’s “turn” back to amphibious roots as a security imperative in an era which features China as a potential
threat: “[I]f you have a Marine Corps that is not talking about amphibious operations…[t]hen you are in great
peril.”
638 Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 475-503, June 2006: 486. Cushman’s original
quote can be found in Gen. Robert E. Cushman, “A Weapon System Defined,” Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck 55/6 (June 1972), 14ff.
639 2dLt Valerie J. Cranmer USMC, “The Myth <strong>of</strong> Our Amphibious Roots: How Our Small Wars History Has Been
Usurped,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 2011, Vol. 95, No. 10: 18.
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landing at New Providence, it did demonstrate far more élan and ingenuity than <strong>the</strong> New Providence
escapade.
Cranmer’s essay explores cultural ra<strong>the</strong>r than security-oriented reasons for Marine rejection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> small
wars heritage: “[T]here remains a…feeling <strong>of</strong> impending doom if <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps develops an
alternative specialization in tactics dealing with counterinsurgency (COIN) or small wars.” 640 Marines
believe that <strong>the</strong>y have a knack for counterinsurgency 641 —a belief reinforced by outsiders who remind
all that <strong>the</strong> Corps was first amongst American services to produce a small wars manual—but <strong>the</strong>y don’t
want to have a knack for it. Cranmer argues, convincingly, that Marine resistance to small wars may also
be linked to <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> glory from such engagements and, more importantly, popular approval. 642 In <strong>the</strong>
context <strong>of</strong> Marine survival strategy this makes a good deal <strong>of</strong> sense. The Corps has survived, more than
once, on sheer popularity with <strong>the</strong> public and with Congress. O’Connell recounts <strong>the</strong> immediate postwar
political battle waged against <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps: “Like <strong>the</strong> Navy’s [earlier] efforts, <strong>the</strong>se attempts
failed, but not before convincing Marines that <strong>the</strong>ir only trustworthy allies lay outside <strong>the</strong> executive
branch: Congress, <strong>the</strong> public, and <strong>the</strong>ir own veterans.” 643 Reflecting on this history, Victor Krulak’s
sobering reminder to his Corps rings constant in <strong>the</strong> ears <strong>of</strong> all living Marines: “…in terms <strong>of</strong> cold
mechanical logic, <strong>the</strong> United States does not need a Marine Corps. However, for good reasons which
completely transcend cold logic, <strong>the</strong> United States wants a Marine Corps.” 644
Acknowledgement <strong>of</strong> its special relationship with <strong>the</strong> public opens <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’
leadership guide: “Feared by enemies, respected by allies, and loved by <strong>the</strong> American people, Marines
are a ‘special breed.’” 645 Avant notes that Marines keep a wea<strong>the</strong>r eye on <strong>the</strong> civilian institutions that
keep <strong>the</strong>m alive and prepare to adapt <strong>the</strong>mselves accordingly. 646 Keeping this relationship healthy
requires every Marine a publicist. 647 Marines are expected to be personally modest, but enjoy full
boasting right on <strong>the</strong>ir Corps. One grey-headed Marine in Spooner’s legends is reflecting back on his
decades spent in <strong>the</strong> nation’s service, and <strong>the</strong> men he fought alongside: “He knew warrior-monks who
were pr<strong>of</strong>essionals, some were bonafide heroes but most denied it. Real Marines brag about <strong>the</strong>ir
Corps but not about <strong>the</strong>mselves.” 648 Over <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last seven decades Marines have taken <strong>the</strong>
publicity task to heart and have become accomplished enough to inspire <strong>the</strong> ire <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir political
opponents. An exasperated Truman, in a moment <strong>of</strong> poor judgment, wrote into correspondence “For
your information, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is <strong>the</strong> navy’s police force and as long as I am President that is what it
will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s.” Truman was made to
640
Cranmer: 12.
641
Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Be All <strong>the</strong> Army Can’t—or Won’t—Be,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 2010): 12.
642
Cranmer: 14.
643
O’Connell: 13.
644
Italics in original. Krulak: xv.
645
R. R. Blackman Jr., President, Marine Corps University, “Foreword,” in Marine Corps Values and Leadership:
User’s Guide for Discussion Leaders, (Marine Corps University, 1996).
646
Avant: 421.
647 Ricks: 198.
648 Spooner: 344.
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publicly apologize for <strong>the</strong> “Stalin” bit <strong>of</strong> his comment, and Marine “propaganda” continued at full
speed. 649
Having escaped extinction at <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> domestic enemies, a confident Commandant Shoup assured a
Washington audience, “Thus, I am sure that in <strong>the</strong> years ahead <strong>the</strong> American public will continue to
extol our Corps.” 650 Many perceive popular adulation as in jeopardy, however, if <strong>the</strong> Corps becomes
<strong>the</strong> force that takes up and executes small wars, a war type Cranmer characterizes as: “slaughter <strong>of</strong> a
civilian populace, torture, and <strong>the</strong> prolonged struggle that sucks every resource from <strong>the</strong> country like a
leech.” Cranmer cites <strong>the</strong> Good Neighbor policy <strong>of</strong> 1933 as an attempt to distance <strong>the</strong> American
Government from <strong>the</strong> “unpopular interventions in South America.” Roosevelt, in so doing, “left <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps hanging out to dry” as <strong>the</strong> public face <strong>of</strong> such interventions. In her estimation, “There has
never been a small war that has been good or popular.” Amphibious assault, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, belongs
in <strong>the</strong> camp with “good wars” and is <strong>the</strong>refore far more likely to meet with popular approval and
support. 651
Marine attitudes that stability operations in irregular settings are “un-glamorous and, perhaps, un-
Marine” 652 stand in contrast to <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public at large. Both <strong>the</strong> Army and Marine Corps have
received a significant boost in “importance” in <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American public during <strong>the</strong> two recent
counterinsurgency campaigns. The Marine Corps’ prestige numbers have moved up ten percentage
points since 2001, bumping it to an even higher number one position than it held on <strong>the</strong> eve <strong>of</strong> 9/11. 653
Marine push-back on counterinsurgency competence cannot be laid entirely at <strong>the</strong> feet <strong>of</strong> her American
public.
Marines survive as an American institution due to <strong>the</strong> championing <strong>of</strong> Congress and <strong>the</strong> love <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
American people. They get to survive as a physically capable force only with sufficient budget. A second
piece <strong>of</strong> rationale <strong>of</strong>fered by Marines concerning <strong>the</strong> current “return to amphibious roots” is based on
fiscal considerations. The Marines are conscious <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that conventional war preparation demands
a healthier sized budget. Bigger budgets result in sounder footing as an institution – <strong>the</strong> more deeply
invested <strong>the</strong> nation becomes financially in a particular service, <strong>the</strong> more likely <strong>the</strong>y are to hang on to it.
Due to organizational paranoia, <strong>the</strong> Marines are well aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir slim fit where budgets are
concerned, and despite <strong>the</strong>ir native frugality, would like a weightier budget anchor attached to <strong>the</strong>ir
organizational ship. “[T]he ‘paranoia’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is not simply that <strong>the</strong>y might lose some <strong>of</strong>
649
O’Connell: 142.
650
“The Commandant’s Policies,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1960): 58.
651
2dLt Valerie J. Cranmer USMC, “The Myth <strong>of</strong> Our Amphibious Roots: How Our Small Wars History Has Been
Usurped,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 2011, Vol. 95, No. 10: 14-16.
652
2dLt Valerie J. Cranmer USMC, “The Myth <strong>of</strong> Our Amphibious Roots: How Our Small Wars History Has Been
Usurped,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 2011, Vol. 95, No. 10: 14.
653
Scott Schonauer, “Poll: War Boosts Image <strong>of</strong> Army, Marines,” Stars and Stripes, (June 20, 2004) online edition:
http://www.stripes.com/news/poll-war-boosts-image-<strong>of</strong>-army-marines-1.21183; Gallup poll results retrieved 23
November 2012: http://www.gallup.com/poll/148127/americans-army-marines-important-defense.aspx.
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<strong>the</strong>ir budget share per se, ra<strong>the</strong>r that losing some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir budget share, or an element <strong>of</strong> its assigned
‘roles and missions,’ is or could be a harbinger <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps as it understands itself.” 654
Conclusion
The above pr<strong>of</strong>ile captures Marine culture in <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> author is writing. The assumption
embedded in <strong>the</strong> Cultural Topography model and in this research is that this pr<strong>of</strong>ile is bound to
experience change as <strong>the</strong> Corps moves forward in time. Concomitantly, its current state is <strong>the</strong> product
<strong>of</strong> changes that have been wrought upon it in <strong>the</strong> past. Colin Gray insists that in order to merit <strong>the</strong> label
“cultural” an organizational trait must have some staying power. His companion argument, however,
notes that
Belligerents and <strong>the</strong>ir several military (inter alia) tribes and branches may well bring ra<strong>the</strong>r
stable bodies <strong>of</strong> cultural lore, expressed in customary behavior, to <strong>the</strong> struggle, but armed
struggle, <strong>the</strong> violent duel itself, with its many calories <strong>of</strong> chance and surprising epiphanies will
encourage attitudes and preferred modes <strong>of</strong> military behavior that constitute a marked
alteration from those that were traditional, effectively meaning cultural, before battle was
joined. 655
The next two chapters examine Marine Corps culture in its dialectic with counterinsurgency operations
across two eras. The Marine Corps culture we know today may be, in some ways, significantly different
from <strong>the</strong> culture from which <strong>the</strong> Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars years were drawn. In part, this is an
investigation <strong>of</strong> institutional memory, defined by John Nagl as “<strong>the</strong> conventional wisdom <strong>of</strong> an
organization about how to perform its tasks and missions.” 656 Builder advises looking at service history
and behavior ra<strong>the</strong>r than “<strong>the</strong> words <strong>the</strong>y may use to mask or explain <strong>the</strong>mselves.” 657 This historical
combination: how Marines perceived <strong>the</strong>ir task, which cultural stumbling blocks were acknowledged,
which blindpots remained, and which natural assets <strong>the</strong> Corps is likely to bring to its next irregular
engagement, are <strong>the</strong> summary subjects to which we now turn.
654
Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Origins <strong>of</strong> Maneuver Warfare in <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps,” The Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 475-503, June 2006: 483.
655
Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, forthcoming: 201.
656
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
(Chicago, IL: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press, 2002, 2005): 6.
657
Carl Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1989): 4.
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CHAPTER 6
LESSONS LEARNED, LOST, AND CULTURAL BLINDSPOTS: MARINES AS AMERICANS
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors
Step 6: Mapping Critical Cultural Factors Across Cultural Influences
When attempting to forecast which aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten internally contradictory elements <strong>of</strong> identity,
norms, values, and perceptual lens will matter in a particular scenario, which meet <strong>the</strong> threshold <strong>of</strong>
“relevance, robustness, and likelihood <strong>of</strong> provoking a behavior response” (Step 5) and are <strong>the</strong>refore
deemed “critical cultural factors,” pattern analysis is particularly instructive. Pattern analysis—
examining <strong>the</strong> actor’s choices and behavior over time—allows <strong>the</strong> researcher <strong>the</strong> opportunity to
examine <strong>the</strong> priorities consistently expressed when members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> group in question are forced to
make a hierarchy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir cultural preferences. The more consistent <strong>the</strong> pattern across time and
geographic space, <strong>the</strong> more likely this ordering <strong>of</strong> cultural forms is to persist into <strong>the</strong> next conflict.
As noted in <strong>the</strong> introductory chapter, <strong>the</strong> depth provided by <strong>the</strong> comprehensive cultural research
conducted in Step 4 (provided in Chapters 4 and 5), however, arms a strategist with something beyond
<strong>the</strong> surface observation <strong>of</strong> patterns <strong>of</strong> behavior over time. A Cultural Topography approach not only
recognizes patterns <strong>of</strong> behavior, it is far more likely to highlight those that will remain stable by virtue <strong>of</strong>
a sound cultural fit versus those that are being selected at high opportunity cost for group members.
Those that remain painful (albeit somewhat consistent) choices are far more likely to come under stress
and result in norms shifts than those that impose no cultural dissonance—that are an easy fit with
organizational culture. Understanding <strong>the</strong> opportunity costs <strong>of</strong> privileging one cultural value over
ano<strong>the</strong>r aids a strategic planner in anticipating norms shifts, in forecasting with more accuracy <strong>the</strong> shape
new developments are likely to take if old modes come under sufficient pressure, and in constructing
service roles in a way that will reduce, to <strong>the</strong> point possible, culturally unsound task orientations. Both
<strong>the</strong> cultural traits predominantly in play and those waiting immediately in <strong>the</strong> wings, comprise Step 5’s
Critical Cultural Factors and are <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> primary attention for <strong>the</strong> remainder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analysis.
Honing <strong>the</strong> data amassed down to “critical cultural factors” means that much that was discovered as
interesting (or even entertaining) about <strong>the</strong> group in question must be set aside if no significant linkages
surfaced over <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> research connecting cultural traits to <strong>the</strong> issue selected in Step 1. In <strong>the</strong>
present task, <strong>the</strong>refore, consideration will be given to those cultural traits which distinguished
<strong>the</strong>mselves as consequential across <strong>the</strong> episodes <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency effort. Those which did not will
be left aside. In <strong>the</strong> practical day to day processes <strong>of</strong> producing finished intelligence or crafting strategic
plans only a selection <strong>of</strong> any complex cultural inquiry may be relevant to <strong>the</strong> task. Assembling wide
reaching data in <strong>the</strong> way grounded <strong>the</strong>ory and <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping process requires, however, arms
<strong>the</strong> intelligence analyst or strategic planner with <strong>the</strong> data resources to address in more immediate and
competent fashion <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> new issues that continue to emerge on an operational landscape.
A review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars episodes and later Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam reveals a
number <strong>of</strong> competing cultural mores. Which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se emerged on top after significant wrangling may
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not have been easy to predict at <strong>the</strong> outset. The result speaks to not only <strong>the</strong> immediate culture in
question (Marine Corps culture) but also to <strong>the</strong> influences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> powerful cultures which surround and
feed it: in this case American national culture and American military culture.
Before proceeding fur<strong>the</strong>r, a brief snapshot <strong>of</strong> each intervention is in order. The pages <strong>of</strong> this chapter
cannot afford a detailed examination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political machinations that compelled each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se conflicts
and <strong>the</strong> personalities that waged <strong>the</strong>m. Happily, this is treated in good form elsewhere. 658 What is
necessary here is an overview sufficient for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> painting a broad portrait <strong>of</strong> basic aims, length
<strong>of</strong> stay, contours <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> effort, and general outcomes.
The Banana Wars
The counterinsurgency episodes in question: Haiti from 1915-1934, intervention in <strong>the</strong> Dominican
Republic from 1916-1924, and <strong>the</strong> active suppression <strong>of</strong> rebels in Nicaragua from 1927-1933, are each
counterinsurgency episodes which comprise both an enemy-centric effort as well as an expressly
pursued, in sometimes overwhelmingly comprehensive form, civic action program aimed at nationbuilding.
Small wars, as Marines understood <strong>the</strong>m, were a comprehensive affair, significantly more
complicated than major war:
In a major war, <strong>the</strong> mission assigned to <strong>the</strong> armed forces is usually unequivocal—<strong>the</strong> defeat and
destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. More <strong>of</strong>ten than not, <strong>the</strong>
mission will be to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing <strong>the</strong> civil
government in countries or areas in which <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States have been placed in
jeopardy, in order to insure <strong>the</strong> safety and security <strong>of</strong> our nationals, <strong>the</strong>ir property and interests.
If <strong>the</strong>re is an organized hostile force opposing <strong>the</strong> intervention, <strong>the</strong> primary objective in small
wars, as in a major war, is its early destruction….Frequently <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> a force operating
in a small wars <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations is not given a specific mission as such in his written orders
or directive, and it <strong>the</strong>m becomes necessary for him to deduce his mission from <strong>the</strong> general
intent <strong>of</strong> higher authority, or even from <strong>the</strong> foreign policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States. In any event,
<strong>the</strong> mission should be accomplished with a minimum loss <strong>of</strong> life and property and by methods
that leave no aftermath <strong>of</strong> bitterness or render <strong>the</strong> return to peace unnecessarily difficult. 659
Marines in all three Caribbean episodes chased after (and killed) a good many bandits, always in
favorable ratios, and in <strong>the</strong> end successfully quelled, if not defeated, insurgent activity in Haiti and
Dominican Republic (albeit not in Nicaragua – Sandino remained at large even as <strong>the</strong> Marines departed).
Marines were aided by, and eventually provided aid to, a national constabulary which <strong>the</strong>y established,
658 For excellent work on <strong>the</strong> origins and details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars see Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine
Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001); Lester D. Langley,
The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources
Inc., 1985); Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971); Bruce J. Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention: The Dominican Republic During <strong>the</strong> U.S.
Occupation <strong>of</strong> 1916-1924, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006); Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American
Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
659 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 2 “Organization,”: 2. Due to <strong>the</strong> chapter-specific pagination style <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
reprinted Small Wars Manual, all citations will include a chapter reference as well as relevant page number.
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recruited, and trained. Meant as an apolitical, national force to replace divided armies typically
controlled by partisan or regional power brokers, <strong>the</strong> constabularies were devised for <strong>the</strong> dual purposes
<strong>of</strong> soldiering and policing. In each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three cases Marines continued to <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>the</strong>se forces until
<strong>the</strong>ir politically determined and publically announced exit required that <strong>the</strong>y make hasty authority
transfers to newly minted local <strong>of</strong>ficers.
Marine efforts to govern in <strong>the</strong> two states over which <strong>the</strong>y held nearly uncontested power—Haiti and
<strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic—included a strong focus on “law and order” (with an emphasis on order),
economic recovery to sometimes unprecedented levels, improved sanitation and health conditions,
roads built and communication systems upgraded and extended, and enhanced educational
opportunities. Although military exigency certainly inspired many infrastructural improvements,
evidence abounds that Marines also pursued <strong>the</strong>ir full spectrum <strong>of</strong> tasks with sincere intent to improve
<strong>the</strong> countries in which <strong>the</strong>y resided. 660 Their efforts, <strong>the</strong>y believed, provided an example <strong>of</strong> a “valuable
and novel political idea, ideal, that a government can be one <strong>of</strong> popular service.” 661 Never<strong>the</strong>less, in all
three Caribbean cases: Haiti, <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, America’s First to Fight troops
were pressured to leave, <strong>the</strong>ir time in country leaving a bitter taste in <strong>the</strong> mouths <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local
populations as well as inciting <strong>the</strong> indignation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own American public.
Although <strong>the</strong> Caribbean conflicts occurred in close temporal proximity (Haiti and Dominican
simultaneously) evidence abounds that <strong>the</strong>re existed very little transfer <strong>of</strong> knowledge from one conflict
to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. 662 This, combined with <strong>the</strong> extraordinary paucity <strong>of</strong> direction from civilian masters, 663
meant that Marines (and <strong>the</strong>ir sometimes Navy counterparts) were left to devise policy from scratch in
each round. Vague instruction in foreign lands is not typically welcome for any policy-wielding outpost,
but for a mission-centric institution like <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps proves particularly maddening. Complaining
as artfully as he can manage it Dominican veteran Colonel Thorpe wrote in 1919:
It would seem that it would be a fine thing if troops in <strong>the</strong> tropics, and especially in <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Republic and Haiti, were told exactly what <strong>the</strong>ir mission is. In <strong>the</strong> first place, it would
help if our government could announce its policy in reference to <strong>the</strong>se countries—if it could say
definitively what its program was intended to be, so that its representatives out among <strong>the</strong>
people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries could tell <strong>the</strong>m exactly what our government conceives its mission to
be <strong>the</strong>re. Uncertainty is always unsatisfactory. Men can face a very black future if <strong>the</strong>y but
660
For an example <strong>of</strong> such sentiments see Captain Frank L. Bride, G. d’H., “The Gendarmerie d’Haiti,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1918): 298.
661
Brigadier General John H. Russell, American High Commissioner, “The Development <strong>of</strong> Haiti During <strong>the</strong> Last
Fiscal Year,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1930): 106.
662
Bickel, Mars Learning, 94, 108, 112.
663
Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, 108-109; Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy,
“Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S.
Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps University Press): 105, 110; Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, 1.
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know what it is. But an uncertain future, even with bright possibilities is annoying and
unsettling. 664
Frustrating though it may have been to <strong>the</strong> Marines who lived it, <strong>the</strong> dearth <strong>of</strong> civilian oversight supplies
useful context for this <strong>the</strong>sis. The absence <strong>of</strong> civilian instruction during <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars puts not only
Marine tactical tendencies on display, but also Marine instinct as regards strategic level aims in <strong>the</strong>
areas <strong>of</strong> political, civil, and economic policy.
Haiti
The Corps which landed Marines in 1915 was no stranger to Haitian shores. The U.S. had landed its
Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks over a dozen times between 1867 and 1915. 665 The particular event precipitating Marine
involvement in 1915 was <strong>the</strong> dismembering and parading through <strong>the</strong> street <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> former President
Guillaume Sam, provoked by his bloody breach <strong>of</strong> Haitian norms as regards treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political
opposition. Haitian political upheaval was more typical than rare. 666 This particularly nasty incident
drew <strong>the</strong> interventionist attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States not out <strong>of</strong> pure concern for “protection <strong>of</strong>
American citizens and property”—its usual chestnut—but also a more strategic fear that European
powers, specifically France and Germany, would take advantage <strong>of</strong> Haitian political disarray and
economic debt to intervene and take control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Haitian side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Winward Passage. Such
proximity to <strong>the</strong> Panama Canal was too close for U.S. comfort. 667 Thus, in preemptive displacement <strong>of</strong>
possible European geo-strategic ambitions, <strong>the</strong> United States sent in <strong>the</strong> Marines.
Marines did not at first perceive <strong>the</strong>ir role in Haiti as much beyond <strong>the</strong> normal in-and-out quelling
function. 668 As it became clear that <strong>the</strong>ir civilian masters had a more enduring mission set in mind, 669
Marines settled in. Their primary foe in this endeavor was a motley bunch termed cacos after a local
bird <strong>of</strong> prey. These opportunistic “revolutionists” abided <strong>the</strong> hills until <strong>the</strong>ir services were solicited by
some would-be political figure who could pay <strong>the</strong> appropriate bill. 670 Once amassed cacos represented
a formidable force <strong>of</strong> somewhat practiced guerrillas 671 which plundered its way to Port-au-Prince. 672 For
<strong>the</strong> Haitian Chamber <strong>of</strong> Deputies it was <strong>the</strong> norm to choose an executive, even under <strong>the</strong> most chaotic
664 Colonel George C. Thorpe, “Dominican <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1919): 325.
665 Langley, The Banana Wars, 115; Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace, 159.
666 Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 119; Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace, 157;
667 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 181; Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace, 159.
668 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 184.
669 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 69; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971): 71.
670 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 178.
671 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 71.
672 Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace, 157.
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<strong>of</strong> circumstances, once <strong>the</strong> previous one was disposed. The choice was typically <strong>the</strong> candidate with <strong>the</strong>
greatest show <strong>of</strong> caco strength. 673 Once “succession” had taken place <strong>the</strong> cacos returned to <strong>the</strong> hills.
Sympa<strong>the</strong>tic to <strong>the</strong> candidate who had persuaded <strong>the</strong>ir support and had been foiled by Marine
intervention in succeeding Sam 674 , <strong>the</strong> cacos took up a steady policy <strong>of</strong> harassment vis a vis Marine
forces. Their efforts intensified 675 as it became clear that Marines not only intended to stay but also
intended to displace (and perhaps eliminate) caco bands in <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> Haitian kingmaker. 676 Marines
flattened <strong>the</strong> first string <strong>of</strong> rebellions in just over a year. 677 Marine efforts at domestic improvement—
specifically road building using <strong>the</strong> French-era practice <strong>of</strong> corvee 678 (forced labor in lieu <strong>of</strong> taxes)—
prompted a second, more brutal rebellion which stretch from 1918-1920. 679 Marines continued to
patrol and suppress spasms <strong>of</strong> insurgent violence after this period, but <strong>the</strong> vast bulk <strong>of</strong> energy was
channeled into state building.
Over <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> nineteen years (1915-1934) Marines usurped most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> effectual powers <strong>of</strong>
government, engaging in blatant election-fixing, dissolution <strong>of</strong> governing bodies, and ensuring <strong>the</strong>
passage <strong>of</strong> a U.S. penned constitution. 680 Criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se heavy handed moves by <strong>the</strong> Haitian press
was not allowed. 681 One Marine defended <strong>the</strong> comprehensive gag order as sensible given <strong>the</strong>
unpr<strong>of</strong>essional disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Haitian press: “Edited in <strong>the</strong> polemic tradition <strong>of</strong> France, Haitian
journals had only secondary regard for dissemination <strong>of</strong> news and none at all for truth. Enjoying
freedom and security unknown before <strong>the</strong> Marines arrived, <strong>the</strong>y delighted in attacking <strong>the</strong> U.S.
673
Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 123.
674
Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 121; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 186.
675
Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, “The American Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti: I Pacification, 1915-1921,”
Marine Corps Gazette, 62, 11, (Nov. 1978): 32; Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong>
Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001): 70.
676
Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 162.
677 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 82-86.
678 Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, “The American Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti: I Pacification, 1915-1921,”
Marine Corps Gazette, 62, 11, (Nov. 1978): 35; Edward Bimberg Jr., “Black Bandits <strong>of</strong> Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(August 1941): 9; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1971): 100; and Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine
Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 196.
679 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 102-103; Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars
Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001): 72;
680 Edward Bimberg Jr., “Black Bandits <strong>of</strong> Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1941): 6; Langley, The Banana
Wars, 123-125; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1971): 98-99; Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American
Power, (New York: Basic Books, 2002, 2003): 166-167.
681 Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 161; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1971): 75.
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occupation with irresponsibility and scurrility licensed by Haitian courts that refused to convict an
editor.” 682
Marines not only usurped <strong>the</strong> powers <strong>of</strong> government, <strong>the</strong>y also established its military arm by recruiting,
training, and <strong>of</strong>ficering a national constabulary force—<strong>the</strong> Gendarmerie—which both administered and
enforced comprehensive government policy. This included policing as well as participating in an
impressive string <strong>of</strong> structural health and material improvements: lighthouses, unprecedented
communication systems, clean water, roads, much improved health and sanitation systems, and
agricultural improvements. 683
Impressed as <strong>the</strong>y were with Marine state building advances, American public opinion toward Marine
practices in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean nation began to sour as reports filtered out <strong>of</strong> gratuitous killings <strong>of</strong> natives—
many in somewhat dubiously documented “attempts to escape”—culminating in a formal Senate
Inquiry in 1921. 684 The evidence <strong>of</strong> Marine conduct shamed a public which held a high opinion <strong>of</strong> itself
as “rescuer” and “friend to poor nations.” Haitian student revolts in 1929 sparked a fatal skirmish with
Marines which sealed <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American intervention. 685 Preparation for an extended withdrawal
began and <strong>the</strong> last Marine departed Haitian shores in 1934.
Within a very short period <strong>the</strong> public works which consumed so much time, energy, and treasure fell
into decay: telephones gone, roads eroded and overgrown, and many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strides forward in health
and sanitation collapsed. Local politics reverted to <strong>the</strong> “spoils system” with <strong>the</strong> Gendarmerie (renamed
Garde d’Haiti) passed as a tool from one Haitian strongman to ano<strong>the</strong>r. 686 Marine accounts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Haitian experience do not analyze its after effects. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> remembered history within <strong>the</strong> Corps
credits its Marines with vast strides forward in progressive state building and effective training <strong>of</strong> a local
constabulary. The tales that live in legend are those <strong>of</strong> fabled figures Smedley Butler and Herman
Hannekan: Butler for his audaciously aggressive patrols (including a race up a drain pipe against live fire
in order to take caco stronghold Fort Riviere) 687 and Hanneken for his patient intrigue and gutsy
infiltration <strong>of</strong> Charlemagne Peralte’s inner circle, resulting in Peralte’s death and <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second Haitian rebellion. 688
The Dominican Republic
The Marines’ arrival in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic in 1916 was again founded on <strong>the</strong> need to shore up a
pr<strong>of</strong>oundly unstable government in an island republic which comprised <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r half <strong>of</strong> a key launching
682
Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, “The American Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti: II Problems and Programs,
1920-1928,” Marine Corps Gazette, 62, 12, (Dec. 1978): 54.
683
Bickel, Mars Learning, 75-80; Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, “The American Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti: II
Problems and Programs, 1920-1928,” Marine Corps Gazette, 62, 12, (Dec. 1978): 53.
684
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 199, 202-203; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971): 105-107.
685
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 210.
686
Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 233-235.
687 th
See Brigadier General USMC (Ret) Edwin Howard Simmons, The United States Marines: A History, 4 Edition,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 89-92.
688
T.R. Fehrenbach, U.S. Marines in Action: Two Hundred Years <strong>of</strong> Guts and Glory, (New York, NY: E-reads books,
1962, 2003), 34-45.
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pad to <strong>the</strong> Panama Canal. The move, like <strong>the</strong> intervention in Haiti, was part and parcel <strong>of</strong> a larger
strategic impulse to exert U.S. hegemony in <strong>the</strong> region. 689 The Dominican head <strong>of</strong> state had been
toppled by his own military and <strong>the</strong> aging and somewhat sickly president refused to be part <strong>of</strong> a Marine
march on <strong>the</strong> capital to take it back. He resigned on <strong>the</strong> spot. Marines, nudged forward by <strong>the</strong> State
Department, bid him adieu and proceeded to take on <strong>the</strong> usurper--General Desiderio Arias--and his
army. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than face <strong>the</strong> Marines head-on <strong>the</strong> Dominican general and his forces fled <strong>the</strong> capital. 690
Marching in columns Marines demonstrated little acknowledgment <strong>of</strong> any irregular lessons learned from
<strong>the</strong>ir brethren’s experience in Haiti <strong>the</strong> year prior. 691 Despite this, <strong>the</strong>y were rewarded with success.
Marines encountered little resistance marching in pursuit <strong>of</strong> Arias and overtook and occupied <strong>the</strong> city in
which he was ensconced in short order. Most Dominicans kept to <strong>the</strong> sidelines and out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong>
Marines, assuming that <strong>the</strong> U.S. presence was only temporary—enough to ensure a new election which
Arias had promised to respect. 692
One by one <strong>the</strong> candidates <strong>the</strong> Dominican Congress put forward were deemed unsuitable by U.S.
representatives. When <strong>the</strong> Dominican Congress elected one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se anyway <strong>the</strong> U.S. imposed severe
financial sanctions and refused to recognize <strong>the</strong> president-elect. 693 Political over lording <strong>of</strong> this sort
raised <strong>the</strong> ire <strong>of</strong> Dominicans and caused a level <strong>of</strong> anti-American feeling from <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
occupation. These sentiments only intensified in ensuing months as Marines behaved abusively toward
local populations. 694 When, seven months into <strong>the</strong> occupation, it became clear that <strong>the</strong> Dominican
Congress was moving to support Arias in <strong>the</strong> next round <strong>of</strong> promised elections <strong>the</strong> State Department
directed <strong>the</strong> Navy to intervene and assume <strong>the</strong> full powers <strong>of</strong> government until a “suitable” candidate
could be found. 695 The Dominican army was disbanded and disarmed. 696 Marines declared martial law
and implemented a comprehensive military government which would endure for nearly eight years.
The military government was characterized by seemingly contradictory impulses. The first was an
emphasis on order at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> democratic practices. The primary victim was <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> press. The
military government enforced strict censorship– Dominicans were fined, abused, and jailed for even <strong>the</strong>
lightest criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military occupation. 697 The second was a sincere dedication to do what was good
689 Bruce J. Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention: The Dominican Republic During <strong>the</strong> U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> 1916-1924,
(Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 2006), xxvi.
690 Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 168-69; Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934,
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 133-35.
691 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 94, 98, 112.
692 Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, 10.
693 Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, 10-19; Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong>
Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 137.
694 Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, 15.
695 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 191.
696 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 108.
697 Bruce J. Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention: The Dominican Republic During <strong>the</strong> U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> 1916-1924,
(Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006): 21; Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong>
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for Dominicans by way <strong>of</strong> comprehensive public works projects including reforming education, building
roads and o<strong>the</strong>r key infrastructure, improving health and sanitation, and establishing an apolitical
constabulary. Marines were dedicated enough to <strong>the</strong>ir Dominican charges that <strong>the</strong>y ran interference
for <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> U.S. commercial interests and pled <strong>the</strong>ir case for favorable financial
arrangements. 698 Both resulted in an unprecedented but not long lasting boost to <strong>the</strong> Dominican
economy. Sincere attempts by Marine leadership at improving <strong>the</strong> welfare <strong>of</strong> Dominican citizens at a
state level existed alongside serious abuses <strong>of</strong> Dominican citizens by Marine personnel at <strong>the</strong> local level.
Five and a half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ eight years in Dominican—from early 1917 until <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong> 1922—
were spent fighting a largely unsuccessful counterguerrilla campaign against a disparate bunch—some
anti-Americans, some bandits, some unemployed peasants, some displaced strongmen from <strong>the</strong>
countryside (caudillos). This insurgency was not a direct follow-on from <strong>the</strong> Arias rebellion but ra<strong>the</strong>r
was a reaction to Marine moves into <strong>the</strong> east which threatened <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> local powerbrokers who
had traditionally posed a counterforce to <strong>the</strong> central government. 699 The insurgency was hydra headed
in <strong>the</strong> extreme—led in sometimes competing factions by multiple strongmen—and grew in strength as
Marine activities in <strong>the</strong> east inspired <strong>the</strong> ire and hatred <strong>of</strong> locals <strong>the</strong>re. “[T]he marines long failed to
comprehend <strong>the</strong> nature ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir opponents or <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong>y were fighting” which condemned
<strong>the</strong>m to “make <strong>the</strong> same mistakes again and again” and kept <strong>the</strong>m from controlling <strong>the</strong> eastern half <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> republic. 700 The <strong>of</strong>ficial Corps history, looking back, seems to mourn <strong>the</strong> inability to morph <strong>the</strong> fight
into a conventional one:
Against Marine superiority in artillery, machine guns, small-unit maneuver, and individual
training and marksmanship, no Dominican force could hold its ground. However, with too few
men to cover too much terrain, inadequate mounted or motorized forces, and <strong>of</strong>ten poor
communications, <strong>the</strong> Marines usually could not force <strong>the</strong> elusive enemy to stand for a decisive
battle. 701
By <strong>the</strong> time Marines, along with <strong>the</strong>ir trained Dominican constabulary and civilian recruits (“civil guard”),
began to bring effective pressure to bear on <strong>the</strong> insurgents, popular sentiment to remove Marine forces
from <strong>the</strong> scene—in both <strong>the</strong> Dominican and <strong>the</strong> U.S.—had already achieved an indignant critical mass.
Increasing military successes on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> military forces combined with <strong>the</strong> Marines’ imminent
withdrawal convinced insurgent forces to end <strong>the</strong> stalemate, accept amnesty at <strong>the</strong> negotiating table,
and lay down arms. 702 Marines were required to transfer most functions <strong>of</strong> government to a provisional
Dominican administration in 1922 and focus strictly on completing grand public works projects and
Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines
and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University
Press):108; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free
Press, 1980, 1991): 193.
698
Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, 43-53, 69-85.
699
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 108.
700
Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, xxviii.
701
Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic 1916-1924, 16.
702
Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, xxviii.
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training up Dominican leadership to take over <strong>the</strong> Guardia. Pushed out by popular will, <strong>the</strong> last Marine
departed Dominican shores in 1924.
Within very few years most endeavors in <strong>the</strong> Dominican sphere had reverted to <strong>the</strong> 1916 standard.
Politics was equally corrupt and personality driven, <strong>the</strong> economy was beholden to <strong>the</strong> same few
interests, health and education improvements had proved unsustainable, and peasants rejected <strong>the</strong>
agricultural practices <strong>of</strong>fered by U.S. advisors in favor <strong>of</strong> traditional methods. Two key changes
remained, however. The national government, by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ dismantlement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
strongman-based caudillo system, became a much stronger and uncontested force in <strong>the</strong> lives <strong>of</strong> most
Dominicans. Improved roadways and communication lines aided <strong>the</strong> government’s reach into
previously insulated areas. The Guardia Nacional, trained up by <strong>the</strong> Marines, proved capable <strong>of</strong>
maintaining order. As head <strong>of</strong> this service Rafael Trujillo used it to spy internally, take over <strong>the</strong> reins <strong>of</strong>
government, and wield a dictatorship for thirty-one years. 703
Nicaragua
For reasons never entirely clear, many Marines, and those writing on Marines, regard <strong>the</strong> 1927-1933
Nicaraguan affair as “[p]robably <strong>the</strong> most significant small war experience in Marine Corps history.” 704 A
number <strong>of</strong> variables <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong>mselves up by way <strong>of</strong> explanation. Augusto César Sandino, a lieutenant in
<strong>the</strong> Liberal army unwilling to lay down arms alongside his fellows in <strong>the</strong> U.S. brokered peace agreement
between warring partisan militants, represented a far more formidable foe than Marines had faced in
previous counterinsurgent conflict. He was, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Banana era Marines chose to admit it or not, a
genuine political revolutionary 705 ra<strong>the</strong>r than opportunistic bandit and managed to supply his followers
with machine guns, dynamite bombs, and hand grenades in addition to studied tactics in guerrilla
warfare. Sandino’s forces appeared to have had at least rudimentary marksmanship training and were
willing to reduce <strong>the</strong> Marine advantage <strong>of</strong> superior firepower skills by attacking at night. 706 Sandino’s
success in eluding Marines for five consecutive years is partially attributed to <strong>the</strong> additional asset <strong>of</strong>
outside help from Mexico and external sanctuary in Honduras. 707 Nei<strong>the</strong>r insurgent group in <strong>the</strong>
Marines’ previous two conflicts in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean had been able to exercise <strong>the</strong> advantages <strong>of</strong>
geographically proximate ally.
The inflated status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan conflict within Marine small war circles remains intriguing,
however, since <strong>the</strong> Corps’ political power was most limited in this conflict vis a vis <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two. In
Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic <strong>the</strong> Marines not only directed kinetic affairs, <strong>the</strong>y also supervised or
directly executed <strong>the</strong> government entire. Thus, <strong>the</strong> comprehensive power exercised by <strong>the</strong> Marines and
range <strong>of</strong> possible lessons learned would seem to pr<strong>of</strong>fer up ei<strong>the</strong>r Haiti or Dominican as <strong>the</strong> more
interesting case study. That Nicaragua wins this post seems to reinforce Marine interest in improving
703
Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention, 61, 238-252.
704
LtCol Richard J. Macak Jr. “Lessons from Yesterday’s Operations Short <strong>of</strong> War: Nicaragua and <strong>the</strong> Small Wars
Manual,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1996): 56.
705
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 246.
706 Bickel, Mars Learning, 157-158.
707 Langley, The Banana Wars, 194, 206.
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direct fighting skill—<strong>the</strong> skill set robustly challenged and refined in Nicaragua—over more administrative
skill sets applied in small wars environments.
Although small wars lessons from Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic were available by way <strong>of</strong> a
smattering <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer courses, informal mentorship, and articles submitted to <strong>the</strong> Gazette by <strong>the</strong> time
Nicaragua rolled around, 708 behavioral evidence in <strong>the</strong> Marines’ first forays against Sandino reflects
none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessons learned. 709 Small patrols had been resorted to as <strong>the</strong> most strategic approach in
both previous episodes but Sandino was initially pursued in default form: by large columns both “slow
and blunt.” 710 Small unit combat patrolling became <strong>the</strong> “cornerstone <strong>of</strong> success” in Nicaragua but had
to undergo much <strong>the</strong> same learning process as had been forged in Haiti and Dominican. 711
The Marines were aided in <strong>the</strong>ir anti-insurgent task by an aggressive and innovative aviation arm;
Marine aviation “came <strong>of</strong> age” in <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan conflict. 712 Fire support by air was pioneered—
including history’s first dive-bomb attack—with sometimes surprising success in <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan
campaign. 713 Resupply by air and <strong>the</strong> evacuation <strong>of</strong> wounded, both novel concepts at <strong>the</strong> time, enabled
increasingly savvy (and smaller) patrols to remain in <strong>the</strong> field for weeks in pursuit <strong>of</strong> insurgent forces
ra<strong>the</strong>r than be te<strong>the</strong>red to garrison post. 714
The Marines’ primary accomplishment in Nicaragua was not <strong>the</strong> dissolution or dissuasion <strong>of</strong> an insurgent
force but ra<strong>the</strong>r oversight <strong>of</strong> two rounds <strong>of</strong> free and fair elections. Michel Gobat, who in <strong>the</strong> main tends
to be pr<strong>of</strong>oundly critical <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine intervention in Nicaragua, never<strong>the</strong>less cedes credit to <strong>the</strong>m on
this point: “The historical evidence thus suggests that Nicaragua’s U.S.-managed elections were not
simple charades. However tentatively, <strong>the</strong>y fostered political equality, participation, accountability, and
contestation—outcomes that political scientists deem key to <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> a democratic polity.” 715
Marines accomplished this by keeping Sandino’s forces sufficiently at bay 716 and by a steady and
conscious demolition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> caudillismo system <strong>of</strong> regional powerbrokers in <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan countryside.
It was for this secondary purpose that <strong>the</strong> Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua was originally constituted. 717
Based on <strong>the</strong> model used in <strong>the</strong> two previous Caribbean encounters, <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan Guardia
experienced some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same challenges: low quality recruits, abusive traditions, inattentiveness to
discipline, and a steep learning curve on all martial arts. In short, it was “not an effective organization
708
Janine Davidson provides an interesting defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conventional-prone logic drawn from <strong>the</strong> Civil War in
Lifting <strong>the</strong> Fog <strong>of</strong> Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War, (Ann Arbor: The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan
Press, 2010): 48.
709
Bickel, Mars Learning, 144, 161, 167.
710
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 248.
711
Bickel, Mars Learning, 171; First Lieutenant J. G. Walraven, “Typical Combat Patrols in Nicaragua,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1929);
712
Millett, Semper Fidelis: 252.
713
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 247; Bickel, Mars Learning, 177; Langley, The Banana Wars, 190.
714
Bickel, Mars Learning, 171-173, 176; Langley, The Banana Wars, 208; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 251.
715
Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005): 215.
716 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 250.
717 Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream, 205-206, 217.
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for <strong>the</strong> first year and a half <strong>of</strong> its existence.” 718 In <strong>the</strong> end, however, <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan Guardia was
deemed a success by its Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers 719 as both <strong>the</strong> best trained 720 —it was fighting <strong>the</strong> Sandino
insurgency almost entirely on its own by 1930 721 —and most loyal (despite ten mutinies, seven <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m
lethal! 722 ) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Caribbean constabularies:
[T]he Nicaraguan guardsman were intensely proud and excellent fighters…. Once trained, <strong>the</strong>y
exhibited a devotion to <strong>the</strong>ir Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers unequaled in previous Marine Corps constabulary
experience. Deeds <strong>of</strong> bravery by guardsmen protecting <strong>the</strong> Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers were not
uncommon and many earned <strong>the</strong> coveted wound chevron. In short, Guardia efficiency was
directly attributable to <strong>the</strong> excellent rapport between Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers and Nicaraguan enlisted
men. 723
Like its two predecessors, <strong>the</strong> Marine trained national constabulary in Nicaragua became <strong>the</strong> republic’s
strongest state institution, armed with unprecedented reach into <strong>the</strong> countryside. 724
After five years <strong>of</strong> fighting and oversight <strong>of</strong> two elections Marines were pulled from Nicaragua. Intense
political and fiscal pressure from home—present from <strong>the</strong> beginning—was only exacerbated by <strong>the</strong>
negative press skillfully cultivated by Sandino’s cause célèbre, <strong>the</strong> disenchantment <strong>of</strong> a disgruntled elite
in-country, and democratic processes which signaled an indisputable marker <strong>of</strong> Nicaraguan readiness to
take <strong>the</strong> helm. 725 Marines did not get Sandino.
Sandino, however, agreed to amnesty in <strong>the</strong> wake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ departure. His sandinistas disarmed,
came in from <strong>the</strong> field, and were later assassinated by Jefe Director Anastasio Somoza’s Guardia forces;
this to include Sandino after an evening dining with <strong>the</strong> Jefe Director himself. 726 Somoza in turn took
advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general upheaval to unseat <strong>the</strong> elected president and, Guardia in hand, establish a
family dictatorship that would rule Nicaragua for forty-five years. 727
Marines, for <strong>the</strong>ir part, left <strong>the</strong> Caribbean with accrued small wars competence, but a decidedly bitter
taste toward <strong>the</strong> American nation that dispatched <strong>the</strong>m:
[Small wars] deaths tended to emphasize to <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States that <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong>
training a national constabulary was far from being a peaceful and safe occupation. The yeoman
work <strong>of</strong> this nature which so <strong>of</strong>ten falls to <strong>the</strong> lot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines is too frequently considered by
718
Bickel, Mars Learning, 169; See also Millett, Semper Fidelis, 252-254, 257.
719
William L. Bales, “The Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1932): 18-19.
720
Langley, The Banana Wars, 205.
721
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 256.
722
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 258; Langley, The Banana Wars, 205.
723
Italics added. LtCol Richard J. Macak Jr. “Lessons from Yesterday’s Operations Short <strong>of</strong> War: Nicaragua and <strong>the</strong>
Small Wars Manual,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1996): 59; See also Langley, The Banana Wars, 205.
724
Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: 205-206, 216-219.
725
Bickel, Mars Learning, 163-164; Langley, The Banana Wars, 183, 188, 193; Millett, Semper Fidelis: 248, 259;
Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream, 215, 232-266.
726 Bickel, Mars Learning, 178.
727 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 260-261.
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<strong>the</strong> folks at home as a normal peacetime function which is free <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hazards which are
ordinarily associated with a major war. But a man is just as dead if he is killed in a minor
engagement <strong>of</strong> a minor expedition as he is if he succumbs in <strong>the</strong> greatest battle <strong>of</strong> a major war.
It perhaps takes more courage to carry on in a minor war for <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> individual lacks <strong>the</strong> moral
support which is provided by <strong>the</strong> propinquity <strong>of</strong> large numbers in a major operation. 728
Intervening Years
The Caribbean episodes imposed stress upon some extant Marine norms and values and inspired a
discussion <strong>of</strong> best practices in counterinsurgency environments. A process which promised to assemble
<strong>the</strong>se practices and imbed <strong>the</strong>m in training was started at <strong>the</strong> cognitive level and resulted in a new
doctrinal text: <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual (SWM). 729 More <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “lessons recognized’ may have been
imbedded in Marine culture if <strong>the</strong> Corps’ next major engagement were faced in <strong>the</strong> bush ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong>
Pacific and if that series <strong>of</strong> bush engagements proved markedly more successful by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new
doctrine. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual was shelved. 730 The lack <strong>of</strong> attention to and training toward
many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best practices <strong>the</strong>rein meant that <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> preferred default norms within <strong>the</strong> Corps
persisted, even those in sharp contrast with <strong>the</strong> most emphasized practices outlined in <strong>the</strong> laboriously
assembled Small Wars text.
Not all was lost, however. The proximity <strong>of</strong> Vietnam to <strong>the</strong> Banana War years meant that some in senior
positions during <strong>the</strong> 1960s carried with <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> informal tutoring <strong>of</strong> mentors who had served in <strong>the</strong>
Caribbean. 731 Out <strong>of</strong> this mix an experimental Marine-driven program within <strong>the</strong> Vietnam context was
born. Fewer than 1.5% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines in Vietnam were in <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Program (CAP). 732 Its
impact on <strong>the</strong> annals <strong>of</strong> studied counterinsurgency history, however, is likely to continue to have it
punching far above its numerical weight.
Vietnam: The CAP Program
Several <strong>of</strong>ficial histories <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program cast it as a direct outgrowth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana War
experiences. Victor Krulak, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> programs strongest and most senior supporters argued: “Senior
Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers and those who had an interest in Marine Corps history knew that <strong>the</strong> Combined Action
idea had been applied with success before—in Haiti (1915-34), in Nicaragua (1926-33) and, probably
most effectively, in Santo Domingo (1916-22).” 733 O<strong>the</strong>r Marine voices are more circumspect about
728
Captain Evans F. Carlson, “The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1937): 13.
729
Research notes on <strong>the</strong> summary Identity, Norms, Values and Perceptual Lens <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USMC evoked in <strong>the</strong>
doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual may be found in Appendix F alongside <strong>the</strong> same sort <strong>of</strong> analysis conducted on
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ current doctrinal manual <strong>of</strong> most significance: MCDP-1 Warfighting.
730
Ronald Schaffer, “The 1940 Small Wars Manual and <strong>the</strong> ‘Lessons <strong>of</strong> History,’” Military Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2
(April 1972): 49. As was <strong>the</strong> Caribbean experience generally: Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’
Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001): 142.
731
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 16.
732
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 11.
733
Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1984, Bluejacket Books printing, 1999), 190; See also Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 3; and Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31
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CAP’s Banana War heritage. William Corson, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program’s most famous and controversial
Directors, challenged <strong>the</strong> assumption that <strong>the</strong> CAP program represented a natural follow-on to <strong>the</strong>
Banana Wars experience and duplicated its lessons. He points out that <strong>the</strong> CAP program, ra<strong>the</strong>r than
being an accumulated set <strong>of</strong> “lessons learned” from previous irregular eras, was instead a program that
falls much more along <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> Marine “innovation”—an evolving project <strong>of</strong> many fa<strong>the</strong>rs 734 which
grew organically 735 out <strong>of</strong> an effort to protect airfields and lines <strong>of</strong> communication running through
hamlets. 736 In order to augment limited personnel numbers some enterprising Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers decided
to team Marines with Vietnamese Popular Force soldiers already present in <strong>the</strong> respective area. 737 The
program ran in continually evolving fashion 738 from 1965 to <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 1970 at which time it was phased
into a separate program which watered down much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP’s distinctive influence. The CAP mission
was entirely dissolved after six years (spring 1971). 739
The CAP program was, in fact, so “innovative,” that many saw it as outside <strong>of</strong> Marine traditional
boundaries. Bruce Allnutt, who completed a nine month review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program in 1969, including
interviewing a wide swath <strong>of</strong> CAP participants, claimed that at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> CAP program was rolling
forward some “traditionalists” were decrying <strong>the</strong> CAP effort as being “outside <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’
historical mission.” 740 Fur<strong>the</strong>r evidence <strong>of</strong> that sentiment comes from <strong>the</strong> enlisted Marines <strong>the</strong>mselves.
When asked what advice he would pass along to a new Marine joining his unit a seasoned CAP Marine
March 1970), 1. Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website
http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013.
734
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 9; Lt. General Victor
H. Krulak, Foreword, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), x.
735
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 23.
736
Lt. Col. William R. Corson, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1994), 49.
737
Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 9; Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An
Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986).
http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
738
For examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAPs evolving priorities and functions see: MSgt George Wilson, GySgt Jack Childs, SSgt
Norman MacKenzie, Cpl Michael Sweeney, “Combined Action,” Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1966); Fact Sheet
on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), 1-2. Declassified document
provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on
February 7, 2013; Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim
Technical Report commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 21;
and Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 35, 39.
739
Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 4-15.
740
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 3. For a contrary
opinion see Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New
York, NY: Praegar, 1989): 22.
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cautioned: “The major thing is to have an open mind you must be open-minded because this line <strong>of</strong>
work is different than anything else you might work in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps.” 741
A review <strong>of</strong> CAP beginnings and evolution does seem to indicate that much as <strong>the</strong> Caribbean may have
been in <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps’ most senior ranks, <strong>the</strong> corporals and privates who carried it out and
shaped its practices were doing so with little conscious regard for lessons <strong>the</strong>ir progenitors may have
learned in <strong>the</strong> jungles <strong>of</strong> Haiti, Dominican, or Nicaragua. They were instead—in <strong>the</strong>ir own minds—
engaging in a ra<strong>the</strong>r novel experiment in counterinsurgency. A brief set <strong>of</strong> instructions, an in-country
two week course, and <strong>the</strong>ir own previous training and cultural inclinations were to guide <strong>the</strong>m.
This cobbled package—circumstantial and informal as it may have been—yielded positive dividends in
setting up a basic structure far more effective in counterinsurgency practice than Army General William
C. Westmorland’s conventional approach in Vietnam. Some successes in <strong>the</strong> CAP program in Vietnam
were born <strong>of</strong> informal small wars practice inertia carried forward by particularly strong personalities,
o<strong>the</strong>rs came from natural assets that continued as part <strong>of</strong> Marine culture, and still o<strong>the</strong>rs were <strong>the</strong>
result <strong>of</strong> somewhat accidental circumstances that turned out favorably for counterinsurgent practice.
The CAP program ensconced in <strong>the</strong> larger Vietnam War poses some striking differences to <strong>the</strong>
operational objectives and tactical posture pursued in <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars episodes. The CAP approach
might be fairly termed “aggressive garrison duty.” A squad <strong>of</strong> fourteen enlisted Marines and one Navy
corpsman were assigned to a specific village (comprising a number <strong>of</strong> hamlets) and were instructed to
“dry up <strong>the</strong> pond” for insurgent fishes: “deny <strong>the</strong> enemy recruits, food, and intelligence…needed to
achieve victory.” 742 They were also to kill <strong>the</strong>m. Aggressive local patrolling, ambushes, and patient
intelligence collection were <strong>the</strong> primary tactics on this end. Unlike <strong>the</strong>ir Caribbean predecessors,
Marines did not actively pursue <strong>the</strong> enemy beyond <strong>the</strong> bounds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> village. Should <strong>the</strong>ir nightly
efforts at ambush successfully produce a clash with <strong>the</strong> enemy, Marines (when communications
equipment and wea<strong>the</strong>r cooperated) had access to illumination and artillery reinforcements by air.
Marines in <strong>the</strong> CAP program trained local ra<strong>the</strong>r than national militia forces. Popular Forces (PFs) 743
were (most <strong>of</strong>ten) village males who represented <strong>the</strong> least <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese military brethren. These
forces ranged <strong>the</strong> full spectrum <strong>of</strong> military competence and cooperative sentiment toward U.S. forces.
Marines did not <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>the</strong>se forces, ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> CAP program was designed to operate with parallel
741 Oral history file 3679, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Jacquelyn Thompson, 22 February
2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
742 Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 17; See also Fact Sheet on
<strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), 3-4. Declassified document provided
on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7,
2013.
743 Some CAPs trained Regional Forces (RFs) which were somewhat higher on <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese military ladder.
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American/Vietnamese chains <strong>of</strong> command. In practice, <strong>the</strong> operating command structure varied with
personality and CAP-specific agreements reached between PF and Marine squad leaders. 744
The <strong>of</strong>t touted primary success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program was that “[n]o CAP hamlet ever returned to VC
control.” 745 This did not mean that CAPs were not lethally overrun. Some were. But ano<strong>the</strong>r CAP unit
arrived within twenty four hours to replace <strong>the</strong>m. Although many PFs proved <strong>the</strong>mselves worthy allies
and very helpful guides <strong>of</strong> local terrain and culture, PFs on <strong>the</strong>ir own, without <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> Marine
forces or artillery, were not able to fend <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> surge <strong>of</strong> North Vietnamese forces that eventually took
<strong>the</strong> countryside. Marine-trained PFs provided a sometimes excellent force multiplier but not standalone
military arm.
CAP Marines were instructed to engage in civic action projects in order to “win <strong>the</strong> hearts and minds” <strong>of</strong>
villagers and “work <strong>the</strong>mselves out <strong>of</strong> a job” by transferring skills to locals and ceding legitimacy to <strong>the</strong>
South Vietnamese government. Their civic action, however, was provided at a far more humble level
than <strong>the</strong> major public works projects <strong>of</strong> Haitian and Dominican eras. Though accidental and
circumstantial in genesis, this boy-scout level <strong>of</strong> civic action—a product <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ frugal
circumstances combined with <strong>the</strong>ir familiarity with village life and action-oriented, protective instincts—
proved more successful in inspiring <strong>the</strong> sincere gratitude <strong>of</strong> locals and in achieving sustainability than
most much larger operations did.
In <strong>the</strong> end, although <strong>the</strong> larger military to which <strong>the</strong>y belonged incurred <strong>the</strong> anger and <strong>of</strong>ten hatred <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Vietnamese population and eventually determined to withdraw, CAP Marines maintained generally
positive relations with <strong>the</strong> villagers most affected by <strong>the</strong>ir presence, some remarkably so. Many
Marines, in return, attached in pr<strong>of</strong>ound fashion to <strong>the</strong> villagers <strong>the</strong>y served. In commenting on <strong>the</strong>
remarkable extension <strong>of</strong> tour rate <strong>of</strong> Marines in <strong>the</strong> CAP program, and his own voluntary extension in
America’s most controversial war, CAP squad leader Philip Leiker explained why couldn’t leave Vietnam:
“I felt like I would be deserting my family.” 746
The CAP program, imbedded in America’s most divisive and souring counterinsurgency conflict, remains
a fairly remarkable bright spot. A bright spot, but until recently, an only selectively celebrated one. The
Vietnam CAP program was enough outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mainstream Marine Corps effort under Army
command that some CAP Marines who requested records after <strong>the</strong> war were told that <strong>the</strong> Corps <strong>of</strong>fice
“never heard <strong>of</strong> CAP.” 747 By virtue <strong>of</strong> its small size and irregular practices, <strong>the</strong> CAP program had little
lasting impact on <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ conventionally-driven culture. It <strong>of</strong>fered up rich lessons to be
recognized and learned but most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se were lost when <strong>the</strong> American military en masse rejected <strong>the</strong>
Vietnam experience. A study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program demonstrates, however, <strong>the</strong> lessons Marines are able
to learn and <strong>the</strong> cultural instincts which may prove useful when located within <strong>the</strong> proper mission
744 Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 17.
745 Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 11.
746 Philip Leiker, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, February 15, 2013.
747 Rocky Jay, oral history, Hemingway: 118.
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parameters. It also, more than <strong>the</strong> Caribbean cases, provides ra<strong>the</strong>r interesting accidental practices
worthy <strong>of</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r evaluation.
Mapping Critical Cultural Factors
The purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Mapping feature outlined in Step 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> methodology is to highlight for strategists
those cultural variables which are robust in nature by virtue <strong>of</strong> acceptance across compounding layers—
in this case national, military, and service specific cultures. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interesting (if somewhat
discouraging) patterns which emerges in <strong>the</strong> data discussed below is <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> Marine innovations
pursued at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r national or military culture. These innovations tended to persist during
<strong>the</strong> immediate conflict but <strong>of</strong>ten failed to be captured and reproduced in doctrine and training due to
overwhelming external cultural pressures, causing <strong>the</strong>m to disappear from <strong>the</strong> tactical menu. The
discussion below will provide insight into a selection <strong>of</strong> prominent strategic cultural patterns: lessons
recognized and learned or lost as well as cultural blindspots by starting with those most widely shared at
<strong>the</strong> American public cultural level and <strong>the</strong>n drawing congruence with or contrast to those possessed by
<strong>the</strong> American military and U.S. Marine Corps.
American <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lessons lost, lessons grudgingly learned, and persistent blindspots that make up <strong>the</strong> fabric
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine counterinsurgency experience are not a product <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps culture alone but are <strong>the</strong>
natural outgrowth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national culture from which Marines are drawn. Both due to troops’
sensibilities as Americans, and <strong>the</strong> additional pressure <strong>of</strong> an American public requiring a behavioral
standard, American culture plays a major role. When American cultural proclivities are compounded
with those perceived as martially useful by <strong>the</strong> American military as a whole and Marines in particular,
<strong>the</strong>se cultural predispositions acquire particularly durable form.
When There’s a Will, There’s a Way Naïveté
An American perspective that did not suffer much between <strong>the</strong> initial years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Caribbean episodes
and <strong>the</strong> initial years <strong>of</strong> Vietnam was <strong>the</strong> can-do and should-do attitude that Marines brought with <strong>the</strong>m
to <strong>the</strong>ir nation-and-state-building enterprises. Shared in common with <strong>the</strong> American public at large was
a Marine notion that <strong>the</strong> U.S. was embarking on a civilizing enterprise: building order from chaos, and
doing so for peoples who could not do so for <strong>the</strong>mselves. The introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual
makes this clear:
The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give <strong>the</strong> people a better
government than <strong>the</strong>y had before, and to establish peace, order and security on as permanent a
basis as practicable. Gradually <strong>the</strong>re must be instilled in <strong>the</strong> inhabitants’ minds <strong>the</strong> leading ideas
<strong>of</strong> civilization, <strong>the</strong> security and sanctity <strong>of</strong> life and property, and individual liberty. 748
The Marines initially approached this comprehensive mission set as simply ano<strong>the</strong>r task to be done.
Only after significant years in country do we detect any recognition that <strong>the</strong> task taken on is bigger than
one military force might pursue, but <strong>the</strong>se sentiments, while peeking out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> window from time to
time, are no match for <strong>the</strong> general argument going in: Americans, and most certainly Marines, are able
748 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction”: 32.
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fixers <strong>of</strong> such messy things as small nations who can’t seem to get <strong>the</strong>ir act toge<strong>the</strong>r. A small backwater
nation <strong>of</strong> indigents is no match for determined American plans to bring it order, security, and
prosperity. 749 Major E. H. Ellis, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most influential <strong>of</strong> Marine small-wars voices, starts his seminal
article “Bush Brigades” with: “Uncle Sam undoubtedly stands preeminent in every ‘New Movement’;
whe<strong>the</strong>r it be national or international, he is always to be found distinctly at <strong>the</strong> front. ‘Clean Up’ weeks
are his specialty and he will ‘clean up’ anything or any place—a disease or a nation.” 750 Marines saw this
as an American tradition or capacity and were certainly not going to prove incapable <strong>of</strong> its
implementation.
Speaking as both a Marine and an <strong>of</strong>ficer in <strong>the</strong> two-years-old Gendarmerie d’Haiti, Captain Frank L.
Bride expresses exquisite naïveté on <strong>the</strong> task before him. In his mind, a functioning, prosperous
government should be <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> a few years’ time:
The Gendarmerie was, in fact, facing <strong>the</strong> problem <strong>of</strong> reconstruction for this government down to
its most minute detail. It was hoped and believed that within a few years this land which is
abundant in all things which nature plans for <strong>the</strong> welfare <strong>of</strong> humanity, would be running without
hitch or friction; that all connected with <strong>the</strong> government would consider country first and
personal gain as a secondary consideration… 751
Indigenous cultural change at a foundational level was part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> assumed package. Bo<strong>the</strong>rsome
though it may be, Marines intended to oversee “<strong>the</strong> irksome months or years <strong>of</strong> reconstruction, when
<strong>the</strong>re must be effected a continual and vital change in native methods <strong>of</strong> life in all its respects,...” 752
Those “few years’ time” produced Marines somewhat schizophrenic in <strong>the</strong>ir views as regards <strong>the</strong>ir
ability to impact local culture. Some remained dedicated to a baldly ethnocentric functional approach,
convinced that natives introduced to a superior practice would most certainly see <strong>the</strong> error <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
ways. On <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> eradicating cock-fighting, perceived as “disgusting entertainment for
Americans” :
Our first inclination is promptly to illegalize cock-fighting. We favor prize-fighting. No doubt we
are right and that cock-fighting should not be. The way to accomplish that is by <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong>
substitution instead <strong>of</strong> elimination. If Guardia <strong>of</strong>ficers can show <strong>the</strong> native something better
than cock-fighting he will not be very slow to adopt <strong>the</strong> improvement. The <strong>of</strong>ficer will get his
troops and o<strong>the</strong>r natives interested in baseball, tennis, and o<strong>the</strong>r athletic games, which are not
only more entertaining than cock-fighting but more improving, and gradually <strong>the</strong> native will
prefer <strong>the</strong>se pastimes to <strong>the</strong> chicken affair. 753
749
Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 118.
750
Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 1.
751
Italics added. Captain Frank L. Bride, G. d’H., “The Gendarmerie d’Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1918): 296.
752
Major E. H. Ellis, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 14.
753
Italics added. Colonel George C. Thorpe, “Dominican <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1919): 324.
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Lt. Colonel Henry C. Davis, also a veteran <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican years, reflects on his service in a totally
different vein. In an o<strong>the</strong>rwise pr<strong>of</strong>oundly ethnocentric article he writes:
It is typically American to believe that we can exert a subtle alchemy by our presence among a
people for a few years which will eradicate <strong>the</strong> teaching and training <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> years,
which will remold character according to our lines and which will educate races which have
been kept in <strong>the</strong> grossest ignorance by <strong>the</strong> powers ruling over <strong>the</strong>m. It is a hopeful <strong>the</strong>ory, but it
lacks common sense. 754
These men are not separated by years <strong>of</strong> experience—<strong>the</strong>y are writing within months <strong>of</strong> one ano<strong>the</strong>r—
but have come away with diametrically different perspectives on <strong>the</strong> prospects for significant norms
transitions within <strong>the</strong> local population. The result is a paradoxical Small Wars Manual which intends to
remake society, but in referring to training local forces, supplies this caution: “Each race <strong>of</strong> people has
its peculiar characteristics and customs. These may be modified somewhat under influence, but cannot
be entirely destroyed or supplanted. These characteristics and customs should always be recognized
and considered when dealing with persons <strong>of</strong> different races.” 755 Although a selection <strong>of</strong> Marines may
have recognized this lesson, <strong>the</strong>ir nation did not, and given that it is <strong>the</strong> civilian administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
nation that dictates where Marines will be sent and which tasks <strong>the</strong>y pursue, this continuing blindspot in
<strong>the</strong> American polity propelled <strong>the</strong>m into a similar affair in Vietnam. Suffering little damage by defeat
<strong>the</strong>re, it persisted into nation-building enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bias for Material Achievements and Economic Solutions
The American assumption <strong>the</strong>n, as now, is that most all problems can be solved through proper
economics. The Small Wars Manual sums up as much: “Revolution is <strong>the</strong> term generally applied to
sudden political changes, but <strong>the</strong> expression may be employed to denote any sudden transformation
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> beliefs, ideas, or doctrines. In most cases <strong>the</strong> basic causes are economic.” 756 The leading
perception upon which Marines in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean determined <strong>the</strong>ir course <strong>of</strong> national change and
stability was an economic and materials-centric one. For instance, ra<strong>the</strong>r than addressing <strong>the</strong> low
quality <strong>of</strong> recruits to <strong>the</strong>ir newly established Guardia’s as an identity issue—affiliation with foreign
troops, especially imperious ones, tends to threaten a reputation stain for well-regarded and talented
locals—<strong>the</strong> SWM authors continued to see it as a problem to be solved through material inducements:
“The rates <strong>of</strong> pay should be such as to attract <strong>the</strong> best type <strong>of</strong> natives to join <strong>the</strong> constabulary. By
making <strong>the</strong> rates <strong>of</strong> pay attractive, natives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest type will be encouraged to make <strong>the</strong>
constabulary a career.” 757 Even loyalty could be bought:
The confidence and loyalty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native troops is promoted by careful supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
material needs. More <strong>of</strong>ten than not, <strong>the</strong>y will have been accustomed to meager salaries
irregularly paid, scant food carelessly provided, as well as indifferent shelter, clothing, and
754
Lt Col Henry C. Davis, “Indoctrination <strong>of</strong> Latin-American <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1920): 156.
755
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section III “Operations and Training” p. 18.
756
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction”: 20.
757
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p.
13.
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equipment. When <strong>the</strong>y are regularly paid in full on <strong>the</strong> date due, when fed adequately a
provided by <strong>the</strong> allowance, and when good shelter, clothing, and equipment are provided,
native troops will usually respond in <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> service rendered. 758
On <strong>the</strong> whole, <strong>the</strong> Marine approach in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean focused primarily on material <strong>of</strong>ferings ra<strong>the</strong>r than
positive person-to-person contact with locals. Although numerous directives at <strong>the</strong> time (and later in
<strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual) supplied a steady stream <strong>of</strong> admonition to know <strong>the</strong> culture in nuanced fashion
and treat locals well, it ran aground a dysfunctional value set applied to <strong>the</strong> population-centric task.
Marines, true to <strong>the</strong>ir American heritage, were driven by <strong>the</strong>ir own bias for action in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong>
efficiently achieved material accomplishments. 759 Marines intended to get <strong>the</strong> country built up and
“working again,” and this as fast as possible. Bringing natives on board during <strong>the</strong> process would slow
<strong>the</strong>m down and create innumerable inefficiencies. 760
John Russell, summing up Marine efforts in June 1930 notes that all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> impressive <strong>the</strong> nationbuilding
under his tutelage has been accomplished despite <strong>the</strong> Haitian people: “These achievements
have been accomplished in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> handicaps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mentality and tradition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people, in <strong>the</strong>
face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> frequent non-cooperation and at times actual hostility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> courts.” 761 Lt Colonel Henry
Davis, fancying himself an expert on Latin culture, strikes much <strong>the</strong> same tone in advice he published for
<strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> fellow Marines. Lt. Colonel Davis sees himself as one who has taken all <strong>the</strong> proper steps
to come to know <strong>the</strong> “native,” but has not allowed his absorption <strong>of</strong> local culture and understanding to
perturb notions <strong>of</strong> his own dictatorial superiority:
I spoke to <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong>ir own language, not fluently, but with increasing facility as time went on.
I tried to understand <strong>the</strong>ir viewpoint, and I believe I succeeded as far as any one else could in
<strong>the</strong> time I was <strong>the</strong>re. But <strong>the</strong>y were also made to understand from <strong>the</strong> very first night I was in
Macoris that <strong>the</strong> American commander was <strong>the</strong> boss and that his word in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> orders
from higher authorities to <strong>the</strong> contrary was absolute law. It was a military government.
Later, when discussing how to properly communicate government policy:
I found it <strong>of</strong> value to assemble <strong>the</strong> representative men at frequent intervals and try to make
clear to <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> wishes <strong>of</strong> our government as expressed through its representative, <strong>the</strong> senior
<strong>of</strong>ficer present. This conference never took <strong>the</strong> phase <strong>of</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> merits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> case or
758
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p.
9
759
For reports celebrating Marine material and structural accomplishments see Brigadier General John H. Russell,
American High Commissioner, “The Development <strong>of</strong> Haiti During <strong>the</strong> Last Fiscal Year,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June
1930); Second Lieutenant Leslie H. Wellman, “Mapping Activities and Compilation <strong>of</strong> Hand-books by <strong>the</strong> Second
Brigade, U.S.M.C., in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,” Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1923): 169; Colonel Rufus H.
Lane, “Civil Government in Santo Domingo in <strong>the</strong> Early Days <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Military Occupation,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(June 1922); Anonymous, “Conditions in Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1932).
760
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 83.
761
Brigadier General John H. Russell, American High Commissioner, “The Development <strong>of</strong> Haiti During <strong>the</strong> Last
Fiscal Year,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1930): 88.
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<strong>the</strong> propriety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> action, but was merely an effort to have <strong>the</strong> representative men understand
what we were trying to do at <strong>the</strong> time. To have allowed any discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> merit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
matter would at once have created <strong>the</strong> impression that an opinion was desired when nothing <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> kind was <strong>the</strong> case. 762
Nation-building has likely always been a misnomer, but for Marines it was certainly so. Marines built <strong>the</strong>
structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state, <strong>of</strong>ten, ironically, by overriding <strong>the</strong> voices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation. By confusing state and
nation, not just semantically but conceptually, Marines privileged material achievements (<strong>the</strong>
infrastructure <strong>of</strong> state) over intangible achievements (fostering democratic and positive relations with
<strong>the</strong> peoples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation) and <strong>the</strong>refore left behind a well-equipped state structure in <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> a
browbeaten and <strong>of</strong>ten resentful national community.
Perhaps <strong>the</strong> strangest feature <strong>of</strong> American cultural perception is that <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> this combination:
enormous material outlay orchestrated with disdainful and <strong>of</strong>ten abusive treatment <strong>of</strong> locals, should
incur gratitude. Marines, even after many in Congress had soured on intervention and become cynical
about its perhaps overwhelming economic intent, continued to believe that <strong>the</strong>ir nation’s
“[i]nterventions or occupations are usually peaceful or altruistic.” 763 Major E. H. Ellis argued “that in
every case where <strong>the</strong> United States has taken charge <strong>of</strong> a small state it has been actuated by purely
altruistic motives.” The U.S. is a “good angel” who attempts to interfere as little as possible in <strong>the</strong> lives
<strong>of</strong> native peoples. 764
The resistance <strong>of</strong> locals was <strong>of</strong>ten chalked up to ignorance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> true intentions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American
occupation. If only American motives and intentions were explained, locals would be eager to lend
support. The Small Wars Manual recommends using “[p]rominent native civilians” as proxy
ambassadors. Taken on patrols <strong>the</strong>y could “…do much to explain <strong>the</strong> mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening forces
in <strong>the</strong> community, spread <strong>the</strong> gospel <strong>of</strong> peace, friendly relations, and cooperation, and counter <strong>the</strong>
propaganda <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy. The natives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community are all potential enemies and many will
become actively hostile if <strong>the</strong>y are not convinced <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> true objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupation.” 765
Again privileging material outlay over personal behavior, Americans defined and defended <strong>the</strong>ir selfperceived
altruistic motives by pointing to dollars:
The object <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States as explained in <strong>the</strong> beginning has never changed. It has been
throughout <strong>the</strong> occupation to this time <strong>of</strong> returning <strong>the</strong> government to <strong>the</strong> Dominican people an
unselfish object, looking only toward <strong>the</strong> betterment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican people and at great
expense to <strong>the</strong> United States. It might be pointed out that <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>of</strong> nations give to one
nation which occupies ano<strong>the</strong>r’s land, <strong>the</strong> right to support <strong>the</strong> occupation by taxation levied
upon <strong>the</strong> country occupied. The United States has never even considered causing <strong>the</strong>
762
Lt. Colonel Henry C. Davis, “Indoctrination <strong>of</strong> Latin-American <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1920): 157.
763
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Organization”: 13.
764
Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 1, 11.
765
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 6 “Infantry Patrols”: 12.
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Dominican people to defray <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupation in such a manner, but has itself borne
<strong>the</strong> entire cost. 766
A nation measuring its altruism by <strong>the</strong> material “gifts” it <strong>of</strong>fers and dispensing <strong>the</strong>m through a service
that means to act efficiently presents a cultural formula fairly determined to focus on physical successes
as primary objectives. These intrinsic motivations were only compounded by <strong>the</strong> instrumental
motivation <strong>of</strong> military necessity. Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers in Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic could not afford
<strong>the</strong> disease rates, inability to travel, and inability to communicate that <strong>the</strong> current state <strong>of</strong> affairs
entailed. In order to achieve anything, from <strong>the</strong>ir point <strong>of</strong> view, <strong>the</strong>se had to be remedied. And quick.
Instrumental needs combined comfortably with cultural inclinations. Marines preferred to focus <strong>the</strong>ir
own action-oriented, efficient energies on tangible tasks which could be chalked up in quantitative
fashion for American domestic consumption.
Nei<strong>the</strong>r Marines nor <strong>the</strong>ir American civilian overseers saw <strong>the</strong> fallacy in this approach. Preferred norms
<strong>of</strong> action and efficiency were very likely to undermine <strong>the</strong> strategic ends which inspired American
intervention in <strong>the</strong> first place, <strong>the</strong> need for a self-operating, stable, and democratic leaning republic.
Lieutenant Fellowes’ comments on “progress” in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic betray this blindspot. In his
view, Americans in Santo Domingo have worked with “ceaseless, and it must be remarked, almost
unrecognized energy, to improve conditions in <strong>the</strong> Island Republic, to evolve order out <strong>of</strong> political and
economic chaos, and eventually to turn over to <strong>the</strong> natives a nucleus with which to work in <strong>the</strong>
establishment <strong>of</strong> self-governed Republic." 767 The American Marines pursuing <strong>the</strong>se initiatives in Haiti
and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic seemed blind to <strong>the</strong> inverse foundation <strong>the</strong>y were laying: immense
material and infrastructural improvements providing unprecedented reach into <strong>the</strong> countryside by a
centralized military-run government largely unaccountable to <strong>the</strong> people. 768 Nowhere in <strong>the</strong> Small Wars
Manual are we provided an analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contributions this formula may have made to a dictatorial
aftermath despite clear acknowledgements that unprecedented government reach was being achieved.
One Marine proudly notes: “<strong>the</strong>se roads give military control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole Republic to <strong>the</strong> government
and its military police force.” 769 Clearly any connection remained a blindspot for American policymakers
and <strong>the</strong> U.S. military who replicated <strong>the</strong> formula: supporting a repressive President Diem while
engaging in vast civic action projects in Vietnam.
Civic Action on a Shoestring: CAP
Marines in <strong>the</strong> CAP program found <strong>the</strong>mselves somewhat immune to this phenomenon by virtue <strong>of</strong>
circumstance. Disconnected from <strong>the</strong> larger war, and budgetary victim to Westmorland’s disdain for <strong>the</strong>
program, 770 Marines were left with few resources and dysfunctional Vietnamese political avenues for
766
First Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1922): 378-79.
767
Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes, “Training Native Troops in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1923): 215.
768
For intensive treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se effects see Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention; Schmidt, The United States
Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti; and Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream.
769
First Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1922): 382.
770
William R. Corson, The Betrayal, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1968), 178.
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procuring <strong>the</strong>m. Still imbued with <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir civic action mandate, CAP Marines tended to fill
<strong>the</strong>ir billet by scrapping resources from o<strong>the</strong>r services or digging into <strong>the</strong>ir own pockets. The results
reveal both <strong>the</strong> benefits and limitations <strong>of</strong> civic action as a strategic component <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency.
The Marine experience in <strong>the</strong> CAP program revealed that much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> grand scale civic action being
attempted by <strong>the</strong> various U.S. services around <strong>the</strong>m yielded limited strategic benefit and was <strong>of</strong>ten
unwanted or under resourced when placed in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population for whom it was built.
Although not articulated in <strong>the</strong>se words, CAP Marines—much more attuned to village life than <strong>the</strong>ir
Army or fellow Marine counterparts—tended to complain about <strong>the</strong> egocentric and unsustainable
nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> projects <strong>the</strong>y saw go up around <strong>the</strong>m.
[T]hey [Army, Navy, and line Marine units] make one mistake and that is <strong>the</strong>y like to build
something or do something that has immediate results and <strong>the</strong>y <strong>of</strong>tentimes don't look into <strong>the</strong>
future. For instance <strong>the</strong>y will build a hospital and <strong>the</strong>y will make no provision for providing <strong>the</strong>
hospital with medical supplies, <strong>the</strong>y will make no provision for feeding patients in <strong>the</strong> hospital or
maintaining medical personnel <strong>the</strong>re. They will make no provisions for a hospital
maintenance. 771
CAP Marines were not entirely immune to American enthusiasm for idealized, material centric,
impatiently executed civic action practices. In his assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program (focusing primarily on <strong>the</strong>
years 1967-68) Bruce Allnutt saw behavioral patterns very reminiscent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana War years. The
spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program was different—in this case regulations specifically instructed Marines to make sure
that <strong>the</strong> project was a village choice not <strong>the</strong>ir own—but in practice things turned out ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> same.
Marines found it frustrating to track down village <strong>of</strong>ficials or get <strong>the</strong>m to commit to anything, so <strong>of</strong>ten,
in defiance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulation, decide on something <strong>the</strong>mselves – many times a schoolhouse (without
researching <strong>the</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> teachers). After waiting for weeks (or months) for <strong>the</strong>ir request for
approval and supplies to be answered through <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> Vietnam (GVN) channels Marines
would run out <strong>of</strong> patience and “scrounge” <strong>the</strong> goods needed for <strong>the</strong> project. Once goods had been
obtained, Marines were to encourage villagers to supply <strong>the</strong> labor for <strong>the</strong> project. When villagers’ slow
and nonchalant progress became too much for <strong>the</strong>m, Marines scooped up <strong>the</strong> project and finished it
<strong>the</strong>mselves. The project became American, start to finish. Unsurprisingly, <strong>the</strong>se projects inspired little
villager attachment or affection. If victim to VC destruction, villagers tended not to be overly upset.
The prevailing attitude: “The Americans have many fine projects and programs, but none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m ever
amount to much.” 772
771 Oral History File 2304-6, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription prepared by Victoria
Cattanach February 2012. For <strong>the</strong> empty fate <strong>of</strong> schoolhouses see John A. Daube, oral history, in Hemingway, Our
War Was Different: 122.
772 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 45-47. See also Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program:
An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986).
http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
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Over time, CAP Marines began to recognize <strong>the</strong> inutility <strong>of</strong> this approach and resent it being foisted on
<strong>the</strong>m. They understood that even projects that had worked well in one area did not necessarily have
transferability to ano<strong>the</strong>r:
But, ours, every time we had a civic action program we were sort pushed into it at a wrong time.
The attitude [from <strong>the</strong> people] was like, we don't particularly care for this sort <strong>of</strong> thing. …[O]ne
time we were gonna dig wells, we had word from higher up, that we were gonna dig wells for
<strong>the</strong> people. They didn't need wells but we had to dig <strong>the</strong>m anyway. Make wells for <strong>the</strong>m. They
got this-- <strong>the</strong>y got to thinking we are doing a lot <strong>of</strong> useless things…. 773
And CAP Marines agreed. They resented being <strong>the</strong> dispersal unit for handouts (usually soap and hygiene
supplies) that villagers ei<strong>the</strong>r didn’t want or opted to sell on <strong>the</strong> market, and resented <strong>the</strong> entitlement
attitude amongst locals that <strong>the</strong>y believed was being cultivated by American largess. 774 One Captain
with oversight over two CAPs observed: “Generosity which cannot be returned breeds hostility, not
affection.” 775
Those that were able to step aside from American impulses for grand-scale and domestically endearing
projects and genuinely vest in <strong>the</strong> locally-inspired spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program 776 found that <strong>the</strong>y met with
much higher degrees <strong>of</strong> success. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than building a school (an American favorite), one CAP unit
constructed a grain storage unit. Not only did this result in genuine gratitude from <strong>the</strong> population, it
also accomplished significant disruption to <strong>the</strong> adversary’s ability to obtain food:
[This platoon] built a large concrete warehouse with tin ro<strong>of</strong>ing. The people brought in <strong>the</strong>ir
harvested rice and stored it <strong>the</strong>re, and … this was <strong>the</strong> first time, when <strong>the</strong>y stored this rice, this
was <strong>the</strong> first time in a number <strong>of</strong> years, probably almost a decade, that <strong>the</strong>se people had been
able to keep all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rice, and not have to give any sort <strong>of</strong> tax levy to <strong>the</strong> Viet Cong. Of course,
this meant a great deal to <strong>the</strong> people because <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> rice was rising in Da Nang. They were
able to send <strong>the</strong>ir children to school. They were able to buy <strong>the</strong>ir transistor radios, and bicycles,
… something <strong>the</strong>y hadn't done in a long time, and this created good relations with <strong>the</strong> people.
… [T]he marines <strong>of</strong> this position were receiving fifteen to twenty invitations a day to eat
with…<strong>the</strong> Vietnamese in <strong>the</strong>ir village. 777
773 Oral history file 2599, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Tawni Chambers, 20 February 2012,
in author’s possession.
774 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 28, 44.
775 Capt. R. E. Williamson, “A Briefing for Combined Action,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1968): 43.
776 William Corson set, and practiced <strong>the</strong> CAP standard for village-inspired civic action and describes it here:
Corson, The Betrayal, 154-173; See also Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’
O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY: Praegar, 1989): 40.
777 Oral history file 2251, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Noah Johnson, 21 February 2012.
For an equally successful report on a village brick making business see Oral history file 2304-6, United States
Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research
Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Victoria Cattanach, 21 February 2012.
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The villagers’ attempt to return <strong>the</strong> favor, by way <strong>of</strong> feeding Marines who were o<strong>the</strong>rwise ra<strong>the</strong>r
confined to C-rations, became a useful measuring stick for CAP Marines <strong>of</strong> public affection.
Most CAP Marines, although <strong>the</strong>y voiced institutionally required support for civic action, were dubious
about its strategic value. Their much closer than <strong>the</strong> norm connection with villagers meant that <strong>the</strong>y
were more likely to see <strong>the</strong> conflict through villagers’ eyes. Villagers were <strong>of</strong>ten apa<strong>the</strong>tic. And
exhausted. “And being in this place so long, and in <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fighting daily and nightly <strong>the</strong>y're
getting to be very tired and all <strong>the</strong>y're living is just day by day until <strong>the</strong>y wait to die.” 778 Ra<strong>the</strong>r than
attempting civic action to “win <strong>the</strong>m over” and secure loyalty vis a vis <strong>the</strong> Viet Cong, Marines took a
more pragmatic approach to minor acts <strong>of</strong> civic action and did it out <strong>of</strong> a ra<strong>the</strong>r boy-scout impulse to be
a decent person and make village life more enjoyable. 779
In those CAPs where relationships with villagers began to bloom (many were inhibited by an aggressive
VC presence or poor leadership on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP) <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong>se initially instrumental or habit-borne
impulses to lend a hand fostered a genuine desire to do good for “<strong>the</strong>ir” villagers. Inhibited by limited
supplies but armed with native make-do Marine ingenuity, many found ways to pursue <strong>the</strong>ir aims
despite <strong>the</strong>ir frugal circumstances. Two separate CAP Marines exercised <strong>the</strong> Army dump as a repository
for supplies. In an effort to rebuild damaged homes <strong>the</strong> first carted villagers with him to scrounge any
materials—primarily wood—<strong>of</strong> value. Upon return, villagers would sell <strong>the</strong>se cast <strong>of</strong>f supplies to fellow
villagers. With <strong>the</strong> pooled pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>the</strong> enterprising group could buy <strong>the</strong> more expensive materials
needed, like cement, <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> local economy. 780 A second Marine talks about efforts to build a school,
this time locally inspired:
[I]f you can get <strong>the</strong> people on your side, like well <strong>the</strong>y worked with us side by side. We built a
schoolhouse, <strong>the</strong> people worked with us. The biggest thing was <strong>the</strong>y couldn't get <strong>the</strong> materials,
like <strong>the</strong> tin and nails and stuff. And we could go down to a place where <strong>the</strong>y burned ammo
boxes, and I took a crew down <strong>the</strong>re myself and we pulled nails out <strong>of</strong> wood and straightened
<strong>the</strong>m ourselves to build a school house. And that was a combined deal with <strong>the</strong> civilians and
military working toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re. And <strong>the</strong> people were really on our side. They didn't care for <strong>the</strong>
way <strong>the</strong> VC treated <strong>the</strong>m and I'd say that once you get <strong>the</strong> people on your side, where <strong>the</strong>y
don’t want <strong>the</strong> communists in <strong>the</strong> area you got <strong>the</strong> war half won right <strong>the</strong>re. 781
778 Oral history file 2614, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Megan Hansen, 22 February 2012,
in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
779 Bing West, The Village, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1972, 2003): 176.
780 Oral History File 2304-6, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription prepared by Victoria
Cattanach February 2012.
781 Oral History File 2571, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Tawni Chambers, 21 February 2012
in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
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Armed with this perspective, CAP Marines began fudging <strong>the</strong>ir reports to satisfy large scale
expectations 782 and curbing <strong>the</strong>ir practice to more “neighborly” activity such as sharing <strong>the</strong>ir one meal a
day (if <strong>the</strong>y got that meal) with PFs and villagers, 783 teaching kids to swim, or pooling platoon money to
send village children to school or hire a teacher. 784 Marines found ways to secure farm implements and
<strong>of</strong>ten used <strong>the</strong>ir native skills to help with farm work. 785 When in pursuit <strong>of</strong> an idea, Marines made up for
shortages by “appropriating” goods from <strong>the</strong> Army 786 or personal requests to home. 787 Because medical
attention was always <strong>the</strong> most appreciated <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civic action forms, some CAP units sought out dentists
for <strong>the</strong>ir village. Of <strong>the</strong>ir small scale efforts Allnutt noted: “<strong>the</strong>y help satisfy <strong>the</strong> common American
desire to ‘do good’ or help in some way, and <strong>the</strong>y not uncommonly yield real benefit to <strong>the</strong> people.” 788
Marines engaging in action <strong>of</strong> this sort found it more satisfying in a number <strong>of</strong> ways. Their perception
was that villagers regarded <strong>the</strong>ir efforts as genuine. CAP Marines typically existed in a steady state <strong>of</strong>
ragged disrepair. Their uniforms were filthy from night patrols and by 1969 compounds had been
discontinued—CAP Marines were now “mobile”—living and sleeping in <strong>the</strong> bush. Little about American
largess—save <strong>the</strong> enormous firepower <strong>the</strong>y could draw upon—characterized CAP Marine life. To <strong>the</strong>
extent that a foreign fighter can invoke a sympa<strong>the</strong>tic picture, CAP Marines seemed to do it. Their
efforts to “help out” <strong>the</strong>refore, were met with a higher degree <strong>of</strong> gratitude.
What strategic benefits did this yield? It is perhaps easier to talk about <strong>the</strong> strategic backlash that was
not produced. Villagers tended not to develop entitlement complexes to <strong>the</strong> same degree as was
detected in o<strong>the</strong>r areas. CAP Marines did not destabilize <strong>the</strong>ir area by an inrush <strong>of</strong> goods or funds, nor
did <strong>the</strong>y build as many structures that villagers were unable to maintain. From <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> U.S.
national treasure, both are a plus. Far more importantly, however, Marines <strong>of</strong>ten s<strong>of</strong>tened what might
have been purposeful plotting for <strong>the</strong>ir demise. Some Marines saved <strong>the</strong>ir own lives. One fairly
dramatic example comes from a Marine who returned to his village decades after <strong>the</strong> war was over.
Friends in <strong>the</strong> village confessed to him that <strong>the</strong>y were all VC. Shocked, <strong>the</strong> former CAP Marine asked
why <strong>the</strong>y had allowed his squad to live—especially when so many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir sister CAPs had been overrun.
The villagers’ formula was fairly simple: “You didn’t hurt anybody intentionally. You were pretty good
kids. You ran around <strong>the</strong> village and worked on kids with your first aid kits who had sores.” And if we
782 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 48.
783 Jack Broz, oral history, Hemingway: 127.
784 Oral history files 2341, 2571, 2670, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine
Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Or teach English: Oral history file
2304-6, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special
Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Victoria Cattanach, 21 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong>
author’s possession.
785 Skip Freeman, oral history, in Hemingway: 104; A.W. Sundberg, oral history in Hemingway: 110.
786 Tony Vieira, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),
42.
787 Swing set – Oral history Tom Krusewski in Hemingway: 90.
788 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 47.
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killed you, who would replace you? A company <strong>of</strong> grunts on a search and destroy mission. You were
protecting our village, not from <strong>the</strong> VC or <strong>the</strong> NVA, but from <strong>the</strong> American machine. 789
It is likely strategic fallacy that Marine civic action in any form can yield legitimacy for <strong>the</strong> host national
government—a perception in <strong>the</strong> American polity which does not seem to suffer from its consistent
disproval. If local governing <strong>of</strong>ficials were cooperative, which many were, Marines were happy to pass
<strong>the</strong> feel good benefits <strong>of</strong> a civic action accomplished to <strong>the</strong>m. In <strong>the</strong> main, however, Marine civic action
incurred legitimacy for Marines. In this sense it provided some short term stabilizing effects and
counterinsurgent help, but not a lasting legacy which could be passed <strong>of</strong>f to a host government upon
departure.
Of <strong>the</strong> short term advantages <strong>the</strong> primary forms were an intermeshing with village life—knowing your
terrain in far better terms—and consequent dividends in intelligence. Superior intelligence cannot be
attributed wholly, or even in <strong>the</strong> main, to civic action efforts. Ra<strong>the</strong>r it was a combination <strong>of</strong> relentless
work to establish security (to be discussed later), a well developed sixth sense for <strong>the</strong> village, and
treatment <strong>of</strong> villagers that did not smack <strong>of</strong> hatred or racism. In sharp contrast to CAP Marines, <strong>the</strong>ir
Caribbean forbearers had incidental and inconsistent patterns <strong>of</strong> interaction with locals which produced
limited understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local environment and remained colored by a strong wash <strong>of</strong> racism.
Paternalistic Racism
American racism shaped many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> attitudes Marines brought with <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> Caribbean. Racism,
deeply imbedded by <strong>the</strong> American experience with slavery and compounded by ignorance <strong>of</strong> local
conditions and culture, drove perceptions <strong>of</strong> what was likely, what was possible, and what solutions
would work best on <strong>the</strong> indigenous population. 790 Speaking <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican experience specifically
Calder writes: “[T]he Marines’ racist culture had accustomed <strong>the</strong>m to patterns <strong>of</strong> white superiority and
black subservience in both <strong>the</strong> nor<strong>the</strong>rn and sou<strong>the</strong>rn United States, a fact which in <strong>the</strong> Dominican
Republic led to Marine abuse and Dominican bitterness.” 791 As if to prove him out, one Lt Colonel Henry
C. Davis, <strong>the</strong> same who styled himself as an expert on Latin culture, described to fellow Marines a
proper understanding <strong>of</strong> Latin American natives. Acknowledging that much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lackadaisical work
ethic which he witnessed was a product <strong>of</strong> a years and years <strong>of</strong> insecurity and thievery <strong>of</strong> crops by local
bandits, his remedies are none<strong>the</strong>less filtered through an overwhelming superiority complex. Excerpts
include:
789
Will Gilmore, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, 31 January 2012. For ano<strong>the</strong>r example see B. Keith Cossey, oral
history, Hemingway: 88.
790
Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and
Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press): 111; Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars:
United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 127.
791
Bruce J. Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros versus <strong>the</strong> United States Marines: Guerrilla Insurgency during <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Intervention, 1916-1924,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007:
Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press): 123.
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The Dominican is constitutionally opposed to work in <strong>the</strong> cane fields. He will cut wood,
occasionally; he will till his land, spasmodically; he will drive a bull cart, indifferently; but he will
not work in <strong>the</strong> cane.
The Dominican is himself indoctrinated with one thing—respect for FORCE. I do not mean to say
that a brutal application <strong>of</strong> force is all that he understands or respects, but I do most
emphatically say that to gain his respect one must have and exert <strong>the</strong> strong hand in dealing
with him.
He does not want to be patted on <strong>the</strong> back and told he is an equal. He has had a master his
entire life; he recognizes <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> a master, and he wants a master.
Men who respect <strong>the</strong>mselves are bound to make those under <strong>the</strong>m respect <strong>the</strong>m. This <strong>the</strong> Latin
understands, and this he looks for in <strong>the</strong> man whom Fate has, for <strong>the</strong> time being, placed in
charge <strong>of</strong> his destinies. 792
Racist notions in Marine minds were validated and exacerbated by <strong>the</strong>ir initial contact with <strong>the</strong> physical
conditions <strong>of</strong> Haiti. 793 Up close it was an entirely different scene than <strong>the</strong> alluring green hills that had
beckoned from sea. In <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> more colorful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines who landed, <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>t quoted
Faustin Wirkus:
It hurt, It stunk, Fairyland had turned into a pigsty. More than that, we were not welcome. We
could feel it as distinctly as we could smell <strong>the</strong> rot along <strong>the</strong> gutters…In <strong>the</strong> street were piles <strong>of</strong>
evil-smelling <strong>of</strong>fal. The stench hung over everything. Piles <strong>of</strong> mango seeds were heaped in <strong>the</strong>
middle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highway, sour-smelling. It was not merely that <strong>the</strong>se, mingled with banana peels
and o<strong>the</strong>r garbage, were rotting—<strong>the</strong> whole prospect was filthy…Haitians <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> working class
have <strong>the</strong> ugliest feet in <strong>the</strong> world. In my bewilderment I somehow blamed <strong>the</strong>m for <strong>the</strong> horrid
things on which <strong>the</strong>y stood. We were all annoyed. 794
Racism did not abate significantly with contact. A year into <strong>the</strong> Haitian intervention a fictional tale billed
by <strong>the</strong> Gazette as “without question <strong>the</strong> best short story that has been written <strong>of</strong> Hayti” painted a Haiti
<strong>of</strong> exotic evil, massively degraded under black rule from its previously French-inspired enlightenment:
Once Hayti was called <strong>the</strong> "Jewel <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Antilles" and boasted its "Little Paris <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> West," but
when <strong>the</strong> black men rose to power it became a place <strong>of</strong> evil reputation, a land behind a veil,
where all things are possible and most things come to pass. In place <strong>of</strong> monastery bells <strong>the</strong>re
sounds <strong>the</strong> midnight mutter <strong>of</strong> voodoo drums; <strong>the</strong> priest has been succeeded by <strong>the</strong> "papaloi,"
<strong>the</strong> worship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Virgin has changed to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> serpent. Instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sacramental bread
792
Lt. Colonel Henry C. Davis, “Indoctrination <strong>of</strong> Latin-American <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1920): 155-
56.
793
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 186.
794
Quoted in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1971): 68.
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and wine men drink <strong>the</strong> blood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> white cock, and, so it is whispered, eat <strong>the</strong> flesh <strong>of</strong> "<strong>the</strong>
goat without horns." 795
Marine racism, perhaps unsurprisingly, tended to become more pronounced in direct proportion to skin
hue. For instance, racial prejudice was stronger toward Haitians (<strong>of</strong>ten openly expressed) than it was
toward Dominicans 796 but even within particular republics Marines tended to attribute intelligence
(even if not likeability) to <strong>the</strong> same gene that carried lighter skin. Describing his training efforts within
<strong>the</strong> Dominican Guardia a Lieutenant Fellowes writes:
As a general rule, <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> intelligence increased with <strong>the</strong> decrease <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ebony tinge. The
blacker recruits were generally simple-minded giants who did what <strong>the</strong>y were told simply from
<strong>the</strong> habits <strong>of</strong> discipline, and lacked sense <strong>of</strong> responsibility and initiative. Those who were <strong>of</strong>
clearer complexion usually were more intelligent, and could be trusted with responsible jobs. 797
Nicaragua was <strong>of</strong>ten described by Marines as an attractive posting, but even <strong>the</strong>re Marines brought <strong>the</strong>
full spectrum <strong>of</strong> ethnocentrism to bear: racism, paternalism, and superiority. Despite <strong>the</strong> fact that
Nicaraguan elites saw <strong>the</strong>mselves as “white,” <strong>the</strong>ir U.S. guests “typically considered all native
Nicaraguans to be nonwhite (usually <strong>of</strong> mixed race) and thus culturally inferior,” and by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
inferiority prone to civil disorder. These views were expressed in articles penned for North American
journals, articles which were read by local elite. These tended to exaggerate exotic aspects <strong>of</strong> Nicaragua
and cast <strong>the</strong> country in a primitive light. 798 Later, <strong>the</strong>y were penned into doctrine: “The influence <strong>of</strong>
racial psychology on <strong>the</strong> destiny <strong>of</strong> a people appears plainly in <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> those subject to perpetual
revolutions. When composed largely <strong>of</strong> mixed races…those populations present a special problem. This
class is always difficult to govern, if not ungovernable, owing to <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a fixed character.” 799
In its best form racism came in <strong>the</strong> guise <strong>of</strong> paternalism. The “for your own good” mentality possessed
by Marines provided cognitive justification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir strict and coercive measures, usurpation <strong>of</strong> decisionmaking
authority, and ongoing presence in order to achieve what was “best” for <strong>the</strong> country. Mary
Renda documents a consistent strain <strong>of</strong> paternalism as regards Marine attitudes toward <strong>the</strong> occupation
<strong>of</strong> Haiti. She quotes <strong>the</strong> most famous <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Haitian expeditionary figures, Smedley Butler, in testimony
to Congress during its 1921 and 1922 investigations:
We were all embued [sic] with <strong>the</strong> fact that we were <strong>the</strong> trustees <strong>of</strong> a huge estate that belonged
to minors. That was <strong>the</strong> viewpoint I personally took, that <strong>the</strong> Haitians were our wards and that
795
Rex Beach, “Rope’s End,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1917).
796
Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and
Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press): 111.
797
Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes, “Training Native Troops in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1923): 231.
798
Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005): 257.
799
It is ironic that <strong>the</strong>se words were penned by a Marine Corps proudly representing <strong>the</strong> American “melting pot.”
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction”: 19.
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we were endeavoring to make for <strong>the</strong>m a rich and productive property, to be turned over to
<strong>the</strong>m as such a time as our government saw fit. 800
Documented elsewhere Butler’s private remarks reflected <strong>the</strong> attitudes <strong>of</strong> most Marines when calling
his Gendarmerie subordinates “my little chocolate soldiers” and casting his ambitions as an effort to do
his “level best to make a real and happy nation out <strong>of</strong> this blood crazy Garden <strong>of</strong> Eden.” 801 Renda argues
that this paternalism came in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> “domination, a relation <strong>of</strong> power, masked as benevolent by its
reference to paternal care and guidance, but structured equally by norms <strong>of</strong> paternal authority and
discipline.” Paternalism was not an alternative to violence “but ra<strong>the</strong>r as one among several cultural
vehicles for it.” 802 Although America’s resolve to do “what was best” for <strong>the</strong> republics was not insincere,
its marriage to racist paternalism ensured incurring <strong>the</strong> sharp and strategically undermining resentment
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nations’ populations. Marines alone cannot be saddled with <strong>the</strong> blame for bringing racism with
<strong>the</strong>m—<strong>the</strong>y did this by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir American heritage—but <strong>the</strong>y must own <strong>the</strong> actions <strong>the</strong>y validated
through this perceptual lens, actions which fell enough outside <strong>the</strong> American norm—racist as it was—
that it was publicly rejected and brought shame and indignation down upon <strong>the</strong>ir service.
Marines Behaving Badly: The Banana War Years
Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana War era, not so different from Marines today, were racist, rough, primed for
coercive measures, somewhat divorced from domestic civilian life, trained toward violence as a problem
solving device, and dangerous when bored. To cite only one example, Marines acting as Legation Guard
in Nicaragua, well before <strong>the</strong> civil war <strong>of</strong> 1926, got <strong>the</strong>mselves kicked out for brawling with local thugs,
sacking press <strong>of</strong>fices that insulted <strong>the</strong>m, and a knock-down drag-out with police that became fatal. 803 It
should have been a surprise to no one, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong> Marines landing <strong>the</strong> beaches <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Caribbean
for long term state-building duty posed a plausible liability for local civil/military relations.
Marine leadership was not naïve to <strong>the</strong> potential strategic impact <strong>of</strong> Marine treatment <strong>of</strong> locals and
issued orders mandating that <strong>the</strong>ir relations be positive and friendly. In this sense <strong>the</strong> need for positive
relations with locals was not a blindspot in <strong>the</strong> Banana War era. Well before admonitions for good
treatment were penned in <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual, Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers overseeing <strong>the</strong>
deployment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir troops to <strong>the</strong> Caribbean stressed diplomatic and courteous behavior. Colonel
Joseph Pendleton, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Fourth Regiment <strong>of</strong> Marines landing in
Dominican Republic, admonished his troops:
Members <strong>of</strong> this command will <strong>the</strong>refore realize that we are not in an enemy’s country, though
many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inhabitants may be inimical to us, and <strong>the</strong>y will be careful so to conduct <strong>the</strong>mselves
as to inspire confidence among <strong>the</strong> people in <strong>the</strong> honesty <strong>of</strong> our intentions and <strong>the</strong> sincerity <strong>of</strong>
800
Quoted in Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940,
(Chapel Hill: University <strong>of</strong> North Carolina Press, 2001): 13.
801
Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 166.
802
Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, (Chapel Hill:
University <strong>of</strong> North Carolina Press, 2001): 15.
803
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 240.
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our purpose. Officers will act toward <strong>the</strong> people with courtesy, dignity and firmness, and will
see that <strong>the</strong>ir men do nothing to arouse or foster <strong>the</strong> antagonism towards us that can be
naturally expected toward an armed force that many interested malcontents will endeavor to
persuade <strong>the</strong> citizens to look upon as invaders. 804
Orders <strong>of</strong> a similar sort were issued in Haiti. 805 While some measure <strong>of</strong> Marines may have taken this
advice to heart, a critical mass did not. The immediate failing for <strong>the</strong> Corps is not in <strong>the</strong> extant state <strong>of</strong>
Marines—this came as part and parcel <strong>of</strong> a racist nation <strong>of</strong>fering up some <strong>of</strong> her most caustic members
for service in <strong>the</strong> Corps—<strong>the</strong> failing was in Marine Corps’ leadership’s lackluster effort in disciplining and
<strong>the</strong>refore restraining or eliminating <strong>the</strong>ir abusive actions.
The well-intended paternalistic benevolence <strong>of</strong> some members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps cannot be denied. 806 Some
members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps took a genuine interest in <strong>the</strong> welfare <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local population and went to
great lengths, some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m exercising personal connections, to improve <strong>the</strong> lot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population <strong>the</strong>y
perceived as in <strong>the</strong>ir care. These efforts did not bear <strong>the</strong> fruits <strong>of</strong> gratitude that <strong>the</strong>y might have,
however, given <strong>the</strong> context created by o<strong>the</strong>r Marines exercising more abusive behavior and by <strong>the</strong>
generally paternalistic and condescending manner in which even those most favorable actions were
dispensed. Marines tended to sympathize with <strong>the</strong> most impoverished <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local citizens and
cultivated a concomitant disdain for <strong>the</strong> local elite who seemed callous to, or culpable in, <strong>the</strong> suffering
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir countrymen. 807 Although peasants <strong>of</strong>ten appreciated Marines rising to <strong>the</strong>ir defense in
economic and political matters, 808 <strong>the</strong> end result was a hostile relationship with <strong>the</strong> national elite—
those with whom <strong>the</strong> Marines had to cooperate in order to achieve nation-building aims and those who
possessed <strong>the</strong> most robust communication connections to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Congress and domestic public.
The American penchant to side with <strong>the</strong> underdog and to disdain social propriety especially toward an
established aristocratic class, meant that Marines exhibited little restraint in demonstrating <strong>the</strong>ir
repugnance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elite lifestyle and were happy to act as obstructionists to elite agendas. Typical <strong>of</strong>
Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck contempt for <strong>the</strong> do-nothing upper class Captain Frank Bride writes:
The better educated as a whole had a tendency to promenade <strong>the</strong> streets with a cane as an
inseparable companion and discuss among <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong> best thing to be done and <strong>the</strong> easiest
way for someone else to do it. "Easy money" was <strong>the</strong> golden motto….If a man can read and
804
Major Samuel M. Harrington, “The Strategy and Tactics <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1921): 479.
805
Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 78.
806
See <strong>the</strong> panegyric <strong>of</strong> Captain William Knox in Colonel George C. Thorpe, “Dominican <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1919): 318.
807
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 209; Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine, (Lexington, The University Press <strong>of</strong> Kentucky): 80-85; Michel Gobat,
Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005):
218; Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 166; Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934,
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 133.
808
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 209.
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write he immediately aspires to join <strong>the</strong> class <strong>of</strong> " do-littles," probably becomes a government
employe (sic) and perhaps, in <strong>the</strong> past, aspired to direct <strong>the</strong> secret affairs <strong>of</strong> some senator or
deputy who could not read or write. 809
Marine disdain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elite encouraged <strong>the</strong>m to find opportunity to diminish <strong>the</strong>ir highbrow stature,
sometimes in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> “humiliating arrests for petty <strong>of</strong>fenses.” 810 Anti-elite sentiment was made all
<strong>the</strong> more venomous by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> elite were not white. “Negroes were accepted, sometimes with
fondness, so long as <strong>the</strong>y ‘stayed in <strong>the</strong>ir place,’ while those who exhibited wealth, education, or
ambition were subject to attack as ‘uppity niggers.’” 811 Even those members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elite with whom <strong>the</strong>
U.S. occupiers had reasonably good relations were subjected to inferior treatment. Smedley Butler, who
did not exhibit <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> vitriolic racism spewed by some, was still no respecter <strong>of</strong> black persons,
even if those were head <strong>of</strong> state. When traveling with <strong>the</strong> Haitian president, Dartiguenave, Butler slept
in <strong>the</strong> bed while <strong>the</strong> president slept on <strong>the</strong> floor. 812
Physical abuse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population tended to be more pronounced in kinetic areas. Marines were
frustrated by <strong>the</strong> elusiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir insurgent quarry and tended to take this out on inhabitants that
resided <strong>the</strong> same geographic quarters. 813 The atrocity that seems best documented (much is rumored)
is <strong>the</strong> illegal killing <strong>of</strong> Haitian prisoners “trying to escape.” There are clear indications that Marines
practiced “open season” from time to time—wreaking brutality down on Haitians without discrimination
between bandit and good citizen: burning homes and destroying property. Despite active efforts at <strong>the</strong>
very highest levels <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps to keep this in house and out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Congressional eye, reports
continued to leak out until <strong>the</strong> situation became a major national issue. 814
Not every Marine behaved this way, but perhaps <strong>the</strong> exception proves <strong>the</strong> rule. Captain Merritt A.
Edson, who would become famous for his aggressive and successful patrols in Nicaragua, gained <strong>the</strong>
confidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Miskito Indians in a critical area <strong>of</strong> Sandino influence through patient cultivation <strong>of</strong>
personal relations, adopting <strong>the</strong> local riverine skill set, and providing security assurances to <strong>the</strong>
cooperators.
809 Captain Frank L. Bride, G. d’H., “The Gendarmerie D’Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1918): 296.
810 Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005): 219.
811 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 80.
812 Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and
Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press):105.
813 Of special note is Charles Merkel, <strong>the</strong> “Tiger <strong>of</strong> Seibo” who habitually arrested local people for <strong>the</strong> crime <strong>of</strong>
reserving information. He became notorious for gruesome torture and <strong>the</strong> burning <strong>of</strong> two small villages. Lester D.
Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1985): 146-47. For o<strong>the</strong>r accounts <strong>of</strong> abuse see Bruce J. Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros versus <strong>the</strong>
United States Marines: Guerrilla Insurgency during <strong>the</strong> Dominican Intervention, 1916-1924,” in Col. Stephen S.
Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps University Press): 123-25.
814 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 104-107.
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Edson and Utley’s gradual and humane approach to <strong>the</strong> Indians <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rio Coco contrasted
markedly with <strong>the</strong> way that at least some Marines treated Sandinista “collaborators” in Nueva
Segovia on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side <strong>of</strong> Nicaragua. There, <strong>the</strong> burning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> houses <strong>of</strong> guerrilla
sympathizers and <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> many prisoners “shot while attempting to escape” took place
frequently enough that it compelled <strong>the</strong> Marine command to issue orders in 1928 and in 1931
asking for restraint in dealing with <strong>the</strong> locals and prohibiting <strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> homes. 815
Despite Edson’s strategic advances in cooperating successfully with locals to track down and upend
Sandino insurgents, his methods were not adopted by <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps; worse still, his assurances <strong>of</strong>
security were not respected by higher <strong>of</strong>ficers and <strong>the</strong> Miskito were left to <strong>the</strong>ir fate after Edson was
pulled out. 816 Edson’s innovative normative set required a less than racist lens, norms favoring
cultivation <strong>of</strong> relationships ra<strong>the</strong>r than destruction <strong>of</strong> goods, and ran afoul <strong>of</strong> Marines’ typically
intemperate bias for action. The Edson approach remained extraordinary ra<strong>the</strong>r than becoming <strong>the</strong>
norm.
In less kinetic areas abuses were still widely felt, sometimes flaring to unconscionable levels, 817 but
most <strong>of</strong>ten tending toward obnoxious rudeness, racist epi<strong>the</strong>ts, and disrespect ra<strong>the</strong>r than outright
brutality. 818 Marines had to be barred from <strong>the</strong> local cantinas in Nicaragua where <strong>the</strong>y were prone to
get drunk “terminating ei<strong>the</strong>r in arguments, fistic encounters or a visit to <strong>the</strong> commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer and
eventually <strong>the</strong> calaboose.” 819 Attempting to warn fellow Marines <strong>of</strong>f such behavior First Lieutenant
Robert Kilmartin casts assaulting a citizen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic as a “small matter” that gets big
publicity. 820 The culmination <strong>of</strong> small wars “do-nots” emphasized in <strong>the</strong> Marines’ Small Wars Manual
provides a window into o<strong>the</strong>r unhelpful practices pursued by Marines: “When passing or halting in <strong>the</strong>
vicinity <strong>of</strong> dwellings occupied by peaceful natives, do not take fruit, eggs, or o<strong>the</strong>r things without fair
payment; do not gamble or drink with natives; do not enter native houses without clearly understood
invitation; do not assume a hostile attitude.” 821
Marine leadership recognized <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Marines as unfavorable but made few serious efforts
to curb it. The Corps’ effort entailed a mostly fruitless search for native speaking and non-racist Marine
personnel for <strong>of</strong>ficer posts in <strong>the</strong> various Guardias, alongside a charade <strong>of</strong> limited and dramatically
815
David C. Brooks, “U.S. Marines and Miskito Indians: The Rio Coco Patrol <strong>of</strong> 1928,“ in Colonel Stephen S. Evans
ed., U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine
Corps University Press, 2008): 71-72.
816
Brooks, “U.S. Marines and Miskito Indians”
817
Bruce J. Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention: The Dominican Republic During <strong>the</strong> U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> 1916-1924,
(Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006): 15.
818
Often categorized as “public drunkenness or rowdyism” Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 188; For typical attitudes towards locals see
Wes Ley, “A Recruit in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1927). Some <strong>of</strong> this was blamed on <strong>the</strong>
morally deteriorating effects <strong>of</strong> tropical heat: Colonel George C. Thorpe, “Dominican <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1919): 321-324.
819
Anonymous, “Nicaragua and <strong>the</strong> United States Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1924): 8.
820
First Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1922): 379.
821 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 6 “Infantry Patrols”: 32.
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uneven redress <strong>of</strong> sometimes very serious grievances (destruction <strong>of</strong> property, rape, torture, murder) by
a court structure run by Marines and unable to force itself to deal jurisprudence in anything but
protective-<strong>of</strong>-bro<strong>the</strong>rs-and-Corps, fashion. 822 This in complete contravention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small Wars wisdom
that followed:
One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important duties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inspector in small wars is to investigate matters which
involve controversies between individuals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> force and local inhabitants. These
investigations should be promptly, thoroughly, and fairly made, bearing in mind <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> individuals concerned and those <strong>of</strong> our Government. The finding <strong>of</strong> facts should be
recorded and filed for future reference to meet those charges <strong>of</strong> impropriety which so <strong>of</strong>ten
follow our withdrawal from <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations. 823
The only tactical solution to have any real effect was to keep Marines as segregated from <strong>the</strong> local
population as possible. 824 On this point Lt. Colonel Utley recommends supplying goods directly from <strong>the</strong>
States which might o<strong>the</strong>rwise be found in local markets in order to avoid putting enlisted Marines “in
direct contact with <strong>the</strong> natives,--native people, native liquor, native women, native prices—all <strong>of</strong> which
can be prevented by <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> a little foresight.” 825 When conducting a patrol, Marines were
ordered to stay outside <strong>of</strong> saloons and houses and to interact as little as possible with <strong>the</strong> natives. 826
Even within constabulary units Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong>ten kept <strong>the</strong> peace through segregation. Major
Hanneken <strong>of</strong> Haiti fame, now operating a “Voluntarios” unit in Nicaragua wrote:
To assure <strong>the</strong> wholehearted and harmonious cooperation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> group; to prevent any
individual friction or racial enmity arising between <strong>the</strong> units <strong>the</strong> following policy was adhered to:
822
On efforts toward <strong>the</strong> selection process see Colonel George C. Thorpe, “Dominican <strong>Service</strong>,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 1919); Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New
York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 188; and Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1971): 88. On <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> lopsided justice see Richard Millett
with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,”
in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography,
(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press): 109; Bruce J. Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros versus <strong>the</strong> United
States Marines: Guerrilla Insurgency during <strong>the</strong> Dominican Intervention, 1916-1924,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed.
U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps
University Press): 15, 126;
823
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 2 “Organization,” p. 36. These sentiments are reinforced in Major E. H. Ellis,
“Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 14.
824
Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, “The American Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti: II Problems and Programs,
1920-1928,” Marine Corps Gazette, 62, 12, (Dec. 1978): 54-55; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 211
825
Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, “The Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars: Part III.—Functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Personnel (First) Section <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Staff,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1933): 43.
826
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 96.
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The campsite, messing, and toileting, <strong>of</strong> each unit were kept separated. Each unit established its
own security, however tactical security was coordinated. 827
Not until <strong>the</strong> Senate inquiry <strong>of</strong> 1921 forced Marine abuses into <strong>the</strong> limelight did <strong>the</strong> Corps take its
crackdown efforts seriously. Once <strong>the</strong>y did, in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> Brigadier General Harry Lee who aggressively
prosecuted <strong>of</strong>fenses and took seriously <strong>the</strong> indoctrination <strong>of</strong> troops in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic, it
became clear that impact could have been made much earlier on. 828 Even though Lee was able to put a
stop to most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> serious abuses in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic, <strong>the</strong> Marine mindset and set <strong>of</strong> normative
habits at <strong>the</strong> time prevented genuinely productive relationships with locals on any scale.
Banana War era behavior toward locals produced a number <strong>of</strong> negative strategic consequences. In all
three Caribbean cases Marines supplied grievances sufficient for joining insurgent ranks. Marine abuses
produced enemies, sometimes faster than <strong>the</strong>y could defeat <strong>the</strong>m. 829 In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> Haiti, Marines were
directly responsible for policies which inspired an entirely new round <strong>of</strong> insurgency. 830 To compound
<strong>the</strong> matter, <strong>the</strong> Gendarmerie was underprepared to help Marines respond due, in large part, to Marines’
racist perceptions which kept <strong>the</strong>m from “trusting” <strong>the</strong>ir Haitian enlisted with guns and allowing <strong>the</strong>m
target practice. 831 Unsurprisingly, this behavioral context also had an impact on intelligence.
Although <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual speaks <strong>of</strong> cultivating positive relations with locals in order to elicit
useful intelligence, <strong>the</strong>re is no evidence that Marines were able to achieve this in any systematic way
across any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three Banana War episodes. 832 Individual innovations <strong>of</strong> this sort occurred: one
827
Major Herman Hanneken, “A Discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Voluntario Troops in Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(November 1942): 250.
828
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 205-207.
829
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980,
1991): 200; Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940,
(Chapel Hill: University <strong>of</strong> North Carolina Press, 2001): 11; Bruce J. Calder, “Caudillos and Gavilleros versus <strong>the</strong>
United States Marines: Guerrilla Insurgency during <strong>the</strong> Dominican Intervention, 1916-1924,” in Col. Stephen S.
Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps University Press): 124-25.
830
Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 100-102; Edward Bimberg Jr., “Black Bandits <strong>of</strong> Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August
1941): 9; Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and
<strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology
and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press):105. For a description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> abuses <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> corvée: Robert Debs Heinl and Nancy Gordon Heinl, “The American Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti: I Pacification, 1915-
1921,” Marine Corps Gazette, 62, 11, (Nov. 1978): 35; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United
States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 196.
831
Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 103; Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S.
Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare,
1898-2007: Anthology and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press):105; Allan R.
Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991):
187, 197.
832
Ellis claims “scant attention” had been given to <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> intelligence up to this point and suggests that <strong>the</strong>
Corps’ take a population centric approach and become more serious about it. Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush
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Sergeant Darmond, already ahead <strong>of</strong> his peers by being fluent in <strong>the</strong> local language, was celebrated for
his intrepid and successful patrols and efforts to capture bandits alive. “A reformed bandit does us
more good than a dead one. Dead men tell no tales, but live ones, treated right, tell tales and <strong>the</strong>y tell
<strong>the</strong> tales we want <strong>the</strong>m to tell. They told that <strong>the</strong> white man wasn’t such a bad lot and that <strong>the</strong> Haitian
people could have confidence in <strong>the</strong>m, but <strong>the</strong>y must behave <strong>the</strong>mselves.” 833 Unfortunately, Sergeant
Darmond’s techniques did not catch on.
Marine intelligence efforts instead involved comprehensive mapping--as <strong>of</strong>ten none currently existed,
aviation reconnaissance, ground patrols, quizzing foreign nationals living in <strong>the</strong> region, and attempts to
glean information from natives by ei<strong>the</strong>r pecuniary rewards or force. 834 Drawing from an identity
favoring <strong>of</strong>fensive action and a national heritage which believes all things can be solved with money, <strong>the</strong>
Marines initially saw intelligence as something you bought with straight cash. “In <strong>the</strong> employment <strong>of</strong>
natives, ei<strong>the</strong>r regularly or for a given occasion, money is usually <strong>the</strong> keynote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Intelligence
system.” 835 When without cash, you coerced it: “It is safe to say that at least 50 per cent. <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> socalled
harsh measures used in bush warfare could be eliminated by providing <strong>the</strong> troops with adequate
information money.” 836 Marines assumed that <strong>the</strong> bandits, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, benefit from
intelligence freely <strong>of</strong>fered up by <strong>the</strong> population. The Small Wars Manual accepts this as a steady state,
lamenting that Marine “[o]perations are based on information which is at best unreliable, while <strong>the</strong>
natives enjoy continuous and accurate information.” 837
Racism tinged even this perspective. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than attributing <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> useful voluntary intelligence
from <strong>the</strong> population to <strong>the</strong>ir own abusive actions, Marines <strong>of</strong>ten blamed this failure on deficient local
intellect. Marines paid cash for what <strong>the</strong>y regarded as intelligence <strong>of</strong> very wobbly reliability, citing <strong>the</strong>
Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 13; Bickel claims that <strong>the</strong> Marines did slightly better on <strong>the</strong>
intelligence front in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic than in Haiti: Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’
Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001): 112-115, 122-123. See
also Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic 1916-1924, (Washington DC:
History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974): 67-68; Lester D. Langley, The Banana
Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985):
145.
833
Sergeant Daramond quoted in <strong>the</strong> Gazette: Anonymous, “One-Man Armies <strong>of</strong> Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(September 1931): 13.
834
For an overview <strong>of</strong> intelligence methods sans those involving force see Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley,
“Tactics and Techniques <strong>of</strong> Small Wars: Part II.—Intelligence,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1933): 47. Though
omitted from Utley’s article, physical abuse to extract information was a common enough practice that a
recommendation for a new method was printed in <strong>the</strong> Gazette. This particular approach involved slapping <strong>the</strong>
jugular vein with a flat wooden tool. The recalcitrant guide was <strong>the</strong>n te<strong>the</strong>red with a rope around his neck. Major
John A. Gray, “Cul de Sac,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1932): 42. It is unclear whe<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> practices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
day methods like <strong>the</strong>se were <strong>the</strong> sort renounced in <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual some years later: “Methods <strong>of</strong>
extracting information which are not countenanced by <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>of</strong> war and <strong>the</strong> customs <strong>of</strong> humanity cannot be
tolerated. Such actions tend to produce only false information and are degrading to <strong>the</strong> person inflicting <strong>the</strong>m.”
Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 28.
835
Utley, “Tactics and Techniques <strong>of</strong> Small Wars: Part II” 47. The Small Wars Manual also advocates <strong>the</strong> “[l]iberal
use <strong>of</strong> intelligence funds” in order to obtain “information <strong>of</strong> hostile intentions.” Ch. 2 “Organization,” p. 5.
836
Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 9, 11.
837 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction,” p. 15.
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limited morality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> natives in question, “Name <strong>the</strong> information you want and pay for it when
verified. Natives invariably, when <strong>the</strong>y talk, tell you what <strong>the</strong>y think you want to hear. Their sense <strong>of</strong>
right and wrong, time, distance, etc., is usually about zero per cent., but by sticking and striking averages
fair results can eventually be obtained.” 838 Utley, in one <strong>of</strong> his seminal small wars pieces written for <strong>the</strong>
Gazette, cites <strong>the</strong> logic <strong>of</strong> British small wars expert Colonel C. E. Callwell: “Callwell says that <strong>the</strong> ordinary
native found in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>aters <strong>of</strong> war people by colored races lies simply for <strong>the</strong> love <strong>of</strong> lying.” Even when
attempting <strong>the</strong> truth “his ideas <strong>of</strong> time, numbers and distances are <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vaguest. My own impression
is that he will exaggerate numbers and minimize distances in nearly every case.” 839
The logical fallacy is striking. Locals, in <strong>the</strong> Marine perception, were capable <strong>of</strong> providing <strong>the</strong> enemy
with perfectly accurate and detailed advice about where Marines resided and intended to patrol, but
were intellectually unable to provide <strong>the</strong> same sort <strong>of</strong> information in <strong>the</strong> reverse. The double layer
perceptual lens—one layer racism, diminishing ideas about what is possible from this population, and
one layer insular egocentrism, a refusal to see clearly <strong>the</strong> mistakes one’s own group is making and lay
fault at <strong>the</strong> Corps’ feet—prevented Marines from addressing this problem in a way that may have
reversed some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strategic backlash and helped <strong>the</strong>m cultivate a more fruitful intelligence
relationship with locals in <strong>the</strong> know. Instead <strong>of</strong> engaging in some introspective analysis, negative
relations with indigenous populations were blamed on <strong>the</strong> “gullibility and ignorance” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population
exploited by agitators, <strong>the</strong> local press, 840 or “so-called Americans who under one pretext or ano<strong>the</strong>r will
assist in originating and spreading tales <strong>of</strong> alleged ‘atrocities’ said to have been committed by our
troops.” 841 The Marines’ refusal to acknowledge <strong>the</strong>ir own culpability may be due, in part, to <strong>the</strong>ir
perception that <strong>the</strong>ir own abuses paled in comparison to <strong>the</strong> collateral damage meted out by peer
European powers on indigenous populations. 842 Although this may have been true in some measure, 843
<strong>the</strong>ir restricted level <strong>of</strong> abuse was still sufficient to incur <strong>the</strong> ire and even hatred <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
population. The fact that this was diminished in proportion to global standard was likely a benefit lost
on those who suffered it.
Looking back on <strong>the</strong>se experiences Small Wars authors hoped to construct doctrine that would turn <strong>the</strong>
situation around. Their verbiage indicates some hope <strong>of</strong> fostering a different sort <strong>of</strong> intelligence
relationship with locals in <strong>the</strong> future, “The extent to which <strong>the</strong> intelligence service can obtain
838
Captain G. A. Johnson, “Junior Marines in Minor Irregular Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1921): 160.
839
Utley, “Tactics and Techniques <strong>of</strong> Small Wars: Part II” 46.
840
Brigadier General John H. Russell, American High Commissioner, “The Development <strong>of</strong> Haiti During <strong>the</strong> Last
Fiscal Year,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1930): 83; Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (March 1921):12-14.
841
Major Harold H. Utley, “An Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(May 1931): 51.
842
See this argument made by Ellis, “Bush Brigades,” 10 and supported by Utley, “An Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Tactics
and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” 51.
843
Wray R. Johnson, “Airpower and Restraint in Small Wars: Marine Corps Aviation in <strong>the</strong> Second Nicaraguan
Campaign, 1927-33,” in Colonel Stephen S. Evans ed., U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology
and Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008): 62. For an example <strong>of</strong> kinetic
restraint due to women and children being present see Anonymous, “Events in Nicaragua Since February 28,
1928,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1928): 144.
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information depends largely on <strong>the</strong> attitude adopted toward <strong>the</strong> loyal and neutral population…” but
does not give up entirely on coercion: “The natives must be made to realize <strong>the</strong> seriousness <strong>of</strong>
withholding information, but at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong>y must be protected from terrorism.” 844 Whatever
intelligence wisdom was gained in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> prosecuting <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars and ruling island
societies, it came too late to have effect in <strong>the</strong> immediate episodes. The fact that in all three cases
Marines had to use means o<strong>the</strong>r than decent intelligence to locate <strong>the</strong> enemy—using <strong>the</strong>mselves in
small patrol fashion as bait, systematically canvasing large areas with constant small patrols, or scouring
<strong>the</strong> landscape by air—indicates that <strong>the</strong>ir intelligence from <strong>the</strong> population remained poor. 845
Hostility between Marines and <strong>the</strong> local elite ensured that <strong>the</strong>y would eventually be driven from <strong>the</strong>
country and that <strong>the</strong> national narrative concerning <strong>the</strong>ir experience <strong>the</strong>re would be a negative one.
More importantly for Marines, <strong>the</strong> negative narrative would play in <strong>the</strong>ir home country. The American
population soured on <strong>the</strong> Marine intervention, not because Marines failed to “get bandits,” but because
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> abuses which came to light and brought <strong>the</strong> nation shame. By 1922 <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gazette are
already acknowledging <strong>the</strong> repercussions. Kilmartin’s is an attempt to use love and loyalty to <strong>the</strong> Corps,
and <strong>the</strong> strong dedication to not tarnish its image, in order to elicit restraint and good behavior toward
citizens:
Every time a member <strong>of</strong> this brigade commits an act <strong>of</strong> abuse upon a citizen or resident <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Republic he brings forth <strong>the</strong> criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican people. And where does that criticism
fall? Upon <strong>the</strong> man who committed <strong>the</strong> abuse? No, but upon <strong>the</strong> United States and its <strong>of</strong>ficials
and <strong>of</strong>ficers, your president receives <strong>the</strong> blame; your whole government receives <strong>the</strong> blame;
your Marine Corps and my Marine Corps receives <strong>the</strong> blame, and especially your commanding
general and <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> this brigade. 846
Despite this plea <strong>the</strong> impulse for abuses continued in Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic and was carried
through 1927-33 in Nicaragua. Institutionally, this damaged <strong>the</strong> Corps’ place in <strong>the</strong> nation and impacted
in at least <strong>the</strong> short term its ability to accrue strategic strength via talented recruits and sympathy in <strong>the</strong>
budget-setting Congress. Hoping, perhaps, to influence <strong>the</strong> next generation <strong>of</strong> Marine small warriors
<strong>the</strong> authors <strong>of</strong> Corps’ doctrine beat a steady drum throughout <strong>the</strong> text admonishing change in Marine
behavior: “In major warfare, hatred <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage. In
small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be <strong>the</strong> keynote <strong>of</strong> our relationship with <strong>the</strong> mass
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population.” 847 Although this lesson may have been recognized, <strong>the</strong> lesson that was internalized
was <strong>of</strong> a different sort. Marines came to believe that effective participation in small wars was inimical to
popular public opinion. “We must never, in our zeal for <strong>the</strong> perfection <strong>of</strong> plans for a Small War,
844
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction,” p. 27.
845
Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic 1916-1924, (Washington DC:
History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974): 37; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The
History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 200.
846
First Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin, “Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1922): 379.
847
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Organization”: 32. See repeated admonitions <strong>of</strong> this sort within this chapter
on pp. 23, 24, 30, 45 as well as in Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section V “Civil and Military Relationship”
p. 24.
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overlook <strong>the</strong> fact that behind and over us is that force known as ‘Public Opinion in <strong>the</strong> United States.’”
Therefore, “[m]easures justifiable in a regular war, tactically sound, and probably <strong>the</strong> most efficient
available, must frequently be eliminated from <strong>the</strong> plan <strong>of</strong> campaign as not being in accord with public
policy in <strong>the</strong> existing situation.” 848 Marines came to believe so forcefully that counterinsurgent
experience could only produce negative press in <strong>the</strong> American population that <strong>the</strong>y sealed it as doctrine:
“An ordinary characteristic <strong>of</strong> small wars is <strong>the</strong> antagonistic propaganda against <strong>the</strong> campaign or
operations in <strong>the</strong> United States press or legislature.” 849
Marines in <strong>the</strong> CAP program did not study <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual, but <strong>the</strong>y managed, none<strong>the</strong>less, to
garner favorable (albeit limited) press on <strong>the</strong>ir efforts and to do a better job <strong>of</strong> living some <strong>of</strong> its “lessons
recognized” precepts. Marines arriving to <strong>the</strong> CAP program were no less naïve about America’s ability
to accomplish her purposes, no less materially-inclined, and only somewhat less racist than <strong>the</strong>ir
Caribbean counterparts (or <strong>the</strong> Marines that were serving in <strong>the</strong> larger Vietnam war). What made a
significant difference in <strong>the</strong>se Marines’ behavior was a rudimentary selection process, a brief
population-centric training followed by real incentives for careful treatment <strong>of</strong> locals, a confined
geographic location, and altered mission optic. Contextual and operational boundaries drew a different
set <strong>of</strong> values and norms to <strong>the</strong> fore, one that operated in stark contrast to those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> American
forces operating around <strong>the</strong>m.
Marines Revised: CAP
The Marine Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnam era continued to be institutionally racist. 850 Vietnam-era boot camp
training emphasized an every-Vietnamese-a-Viet-Cong approach and inculcated a hatred for <strong>the</strong>m. 851
Marines drawn into <strong>the</strong> CAP program may not have been racist at <strong>the</strong> socially ingrained levels <strong>of</strong>
Marines entering black Haiti and Dominican, but still reacted strongly, and negatively, upon initial
contact with Vietnamese villagers. A Marine who had grown up in <strong>the</strong> squalor <strong>of</strong> Harlem was still
unprepared for <strong>the</strong> realities <strong>of</strong> impoverished Vietnamese village life and reacted with “awe and
revulsion.” 852 One CAP interviewee who was three months into a CAP tour from a line unit confessed:
“[W]ell up north I was never used to having <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese around me because I hated <strong>the</strong>m. There
was -- <strong>the</strong> number one thing that I hated in this world was <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese.” 853 His sentiments about <strong>the</strong>
Vietnamese were unusually harsh for a CAP Marine (he was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rare few interviewees from <strong>the</strong>
CAP program to ever refer to <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese as “gooks”) but demonstrate that <strong>the</strong>se sorts <strong>of</strong> attitudes
were in <strong>the</strong> mix. On balance, one CAP Marine surmised, “you don’t have to love <strong>the</strong>m, just don’t hate
<strong>the</strong>m. Lots <strong>of</strong> CAP Marines didn’t like <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese.” 854 Racist attitudes, although initially present,
were tempered and sometimes entirely ameliorated during a tour in <strong>the</strong> CAP program by virtue <strong>of</strong> three
848
Major Harold H. Utley, “An Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(May 1931): 51, 52. Second quote printed originally in all capital letters for extreme emphasis.
849
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction,” p. 28.
850
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 45.
851
Tim Duffie, CAP veteran, lecture Utah State University, February 16, 2012.
852
Hop Brown, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),
22.
853
Oral History File 2926.
854
Tim Duffie, CAP veteran, lecture Utah State University, February 16, 2012.
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programmatic realities: an attempt at a careful screening process for participants, unforgiving peer
pressure from fellow CAP members to treat locals well, and <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> positive and rewarding
relationships with villagers over time. 855
For many assessors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program, including CAP Marines <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>the</strong> overriding sentiment
which emerged was that “not just any Marine” could fill this billet. The precepts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program
were clearly not perceived as an easy and natural fit for products <strong>of</strong> Marine culture. The Gazette’s
introductory article on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Program billed CAP service as requiring “a special kind <strong>of</strong>
breed, even among <strong>the</strong> New Breed.” 856 “You needed a special kind <strong>of</strong> Marine to be in a CAP” agrees CAP
vet Warren V. Smith. “I hate to say this, but you had to be a gook lover. That’s what <strong>the</strong>y used to call
me. I wouldn’t say I was a gook lover though, I just treated <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese <strong>the</strong> way I’d want to be
treated.” 857
Acknowledging <strong>the</strong> need for careful selection, <strong>the</strong> CAP screening process was designed with high
standards in mind, but was not applied with consistency in practice. In its ideal form Marines who were
selected for <strong>the</strong> program had volunteered for it and also came highly recommended by a commanding
<strong>of</strong>ficer with strong marks in conduct and pr<strong>of</strong>iciency, had been in country for at least two months but
had at least six months remaining, were “motivated to live and work with <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese people,”
exceptionally mature, had not been wounded more than once, and were high school graduates. 858 In
practice, <strong>the</strong> selection process suffered some ra<strong>the</strong>r significant bumps. In some eras and in some
regions Marines coming in were tightly and systematically screened, 859 in o<strong>the</strong>r cases Marines were
“volunteered” out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir units because <strong>the</strong>y were not liked by <strong>the</strong>ir commanders and <strong>the</strong> commanders
knew or cared little about <strong>the</strong> CAP program—a “cleaning out <strong>the</strong> trash” approach. 860 Some Marines
855 This <strong>of</strong>ten pertained to intra-Corps racism as well. One black CAP Marine claims that racism toward his color—
so pronounced in some areas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps that it drove him to aggressive behavior—disappeared during his service
with <strong>the</strong> CAP program: Hop Brown, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994), 24, 26. For a thorough examination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> distinctly less racist attitudes <strong>of</strong> CAP veterans vis
a vis o<strong>the</strong>r Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnam era see John Southard, The Marine Corps Way: Combined Action Platoons in <strong>the</strong>
Vietnam War, PhD dissertation submitted to <strong>the</strong> Graduate Faculty <strong>of</strong> Texas Tech University, May 2011.
856 MSgt George Wilson, GySgt Jack Childs, SSgt Norman MacKenzie, Cpl Michael Sweeney, “Combined Action,”
Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1966): 31. William Corson, one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most outspoken directors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program,
set a high standard: “If <strong>the</strong>y entered <strong>the</strong> job with an ethnocentric attitude, <strong>the</strong>y would not succeed.” Lt. Col.
William R. Corson, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1994), 50
857 Warren V. Smith, oral history, Hemingway: 141.
858 Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong>
History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm. An even tighter
screening program was designed based on extensive research <strong>of</strong> Vietnamese culture and <strong>the</strong> right type <strong>of</strong> Marine
for <strong>the</strong> job but was never implemented as practice. See Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The
U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY: Praegar, 1989): 41-42.
859 Captain Tom Moore, oral history, Hemingway: 151.
860 Tom Harvey, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1994), 72; Hop Brown, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1994), 26; Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis,
Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
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volunteered out <strong>of</strong> line units, not because <strong>the</strong>y were interested in CAP, but ra<strong>the</strong>r because <strong>the</strong>y
misperceived it as an opportunity to get out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bush. 861
When it became difficult to find infantry Marines with <strong>the</strong> proper mentality – too many had seen too
much action and had been hardened against <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese—<strong>the</strong> CAP program started pulling Marines
from rear echelon duties or assigning <strong>the</strong>m directly to CAP duty from training in <strong>the</strong> States. 862 This
process was listed as a key shortcoming for <strong>the</strong> program by <strong>the</strong> American Consul who systematically
reviewed it in 1970. Interestingly enough, his concerns focused on <strong>the</strong> resultant youth and lack <strong>of</strong>
combat experience <strong>of</strong> squad leaders—an opinion seconded by CAP Marines—ra<strong>the</strong>r than issues <strong>of</strong>
ethnocentrism or underdeveloped people skills. 863 He also recommended a return to a volunteer
orientation for <strong>the</strong> program ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> direct assignment approach since <strong>the</strong> predominantly
volunteer era seemed to exhibit higher degrees <strong>of</strong> enthusiasm for <strong>the</strong> population-oriented principles <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> CAP program. 864
Marines, wherever <strong>the</strong>y were sent, were all trained in <strong>the</strong> same Marine boot-camp style. Once assigned
to a CAP, <strong>the</strong>se Marines would continue to lean heavily on <strong>the</strong>ir infantry training, but needed to be
“retooled” in mindset for <strong>the</strong> CAP program. At its best, <strong>the</strong> CAP program trained its Marines for three to
four weeks at a special in-country CAP school on Vietnamese language and customs. Marines reacted
unevenly to this effort. Some proved resistant, 865 o<strong>the</strong>rs noted <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> this brief training and
advocated for significantly more. 866 Preparedness on local culture with adequate linguistic training is
probably <strong>the</strong> subject that receives <strong>the</strong> most lip service and least practice across Marine Corps lessons
861
Harvey Baker, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1994), 61.
862
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 73.
863
For CAP Marines opinions on this topic see oral history file 2367, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral
History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
Transcription prepared by Lacey Lee 21 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession and Oral history file 2599, United
States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray
Research Center, Quantico, VA.
864
Francis T. McNamara, letter to Lt. Gen Melvin Zais attached as addendum to Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action
Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970). Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines
Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013. For an
additional detailed look at <strong>the</strong> shifting selection process over <strong>the</strong> life <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program see Robert A. Klyman, The
Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong>
Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
865
For complaints from a Captain attempting to get Marines to take cultural training seriously see oral history file
753. United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special
Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcribed by Noah Johnson, February 23, 2012.
866
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 48; Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis,
Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm;
Hop Brown, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),
23; Oral history files 2202-2341, 2599, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine
Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
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recognized. 867 The need for cultural competence is a lesson recognized, across multiple texts (Gazette
articles, orders, and doctrine) and in ardent form, but consistently lost in competition with more
kinetically oriented training or between one counterinsurgency episode and ano<strong>the</strong>r. Given <strong>the</strong>
extraordinarily limited culture and linguistic training provided to Marines before <strong>the</strong>ir entry into fendfor-yourself
village life, it is no wonder that a summary assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program provided <strong>the</strong>
following strong recommendation: “The Vietnamese-language training is inadequate and has seriously
hampered <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> some teams to ga<strong>the</strong>r intelligence and to protect <strong>the</strong>mselves.” 868
Language barriers inhibited <strong>the</strong> core mission set <strong>of</strong> CAP Marines: training PFs to patrol pr<strong>of</strong>iciency,
engaging productively with villagers, and ga<strong>the</strong>ring operational intelligence. Marines, imbued with
strong incentive to make up <strong>the</strong> training <strong>the</strong>y lacked, spoke in a limited English/Vietnamese pidgin with
<strong>the</strong>ir Popular Force counterparts and used a range <strong>of</strong> hand gestures to be understood. Any
misunderstandings with PFs were difficult to resolve due to <strong>the</strong> language barrier. “On three or four
occasions we had language problems with <strong>the</strong> PFs. The translation would be lost and somebody would
get insulted, and before you knew it <strong>the</strong>re’d be eight Marines on one side and twenty-five or thirty PFs
on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r locked and loaded.” 869 If it wasn’t misunderstandings that caused danger, it was <strong>the</strong>
inability to use <strong>the</strong> charade-like hand signals when working toge<strong>the</strong>r during <strong>the</strong> dark hours <strong>of</strong> night
patrols. 870 Some CAPs were fortunate enough to be donned a linguist, but most had to make do, <strong>of</strong>ten
training up interested children to speak English and translate for <strong>the</strong>ir parents. Those who possessed
Vietnamese language ability to an unusual degree reported friction precipitously reduced: “They'll give
you information that's usually very vital and you'll have no problem at all with <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese.” 871
Whatever <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> training received, newly arrived CAP recruits were made to conform to a certain
standard <strong>of</strong> conduct by <strong>the</strong>ir peers. This was informed at <strong>the</strong> highest level by a decidedly unique mission
optic: “We were first and foremost to become deeply involved, on a personal basis, with <strong>the</strong>
Vietnamese people; helping <strong>the</strong>m throughout <strong>the</strong>ir daily lives in whatever small way we could…our
second responsibility was to train new warriors in each village.” 872 Although <strong>the</strong> mission set provided
<strong>the</strong> grand rationale, an immediate and unforgiving instrumentality provided <strong>the</strong> genuine incentives: if
you treated villagers badly you put yourself and your entire squad at much greater risk <strong>of</strong> death.
867 For enthusiastic admonishments to know <strong>the</strong> culture and speak <strong>the</strong> language in <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual see Ch.
1 “Introduction”: 13, 18, 19, 22, 26, 28, 41; Ch. 2 “Organization”: 1, 17, 18, 28; Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols”: 12;
Ch. 13 “Military Government”: 10-13; Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections”: 12;
868 Francis T. McNamara, letter to Lt. Gen Melvin Zais attached as addendum to Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action
Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970). Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines
Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013. See also
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 26.
869 Rocky Jay, oral history, Hemingway: 115.
870 Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong>
History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
871 Oral history file 2202-2341, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
872 Barry L. Goodson, CAP Mot: The Story <strong>of</strong> a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969, (Denton, TX:
University <strong>of</strong> North Texas Press, 1997): viii-ix. Not all agreed that <strong>the</strong> priorities be laid out in this order, see Chuck
Ratliff, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 28.
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Therefore Marines policed <strong>the</strong>ir own, and each o<strong>the</strong>r’s behavior. If a Marine could not keep this
standard he was ousted by <strong>the</strong> squad and shipped back to a line unit. 873 CAP squads <strong>of</strong> only fourteen
enlisted (at full strength) and one Navy corpsman could not afford to incur <strong>the</strong> ill will <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten VCsupporting
villagers around <strong>the</strong>m.
CAP Marines were initially motivated toward good treatment <strong>of</strong> locals for this key instrumental reason—
it helped keep <strong>the</strong>m alive. Over time, however, many internalized <strong>the</strong>se norms for emotional
preference reasons ra<strong>the</strong>r than raw instrumentality. As time passed and relations with <strong>the</strong> villagers
warmed, Marines found both instrumental and intrinsic value in forging positive and personal ties and
saw it as <strong>the</strong> secret to <strong>the</strong>ir success: “I think living in <strong>the</strong> villages, amongst <strong>the</strong> people, we showed <strong>the</strong>m
that we could face <strong>the</strong> same dangers <strong>the</strong>y did. We didn’t abuse <strong>the</strong>m or <strong>the</strong>ir women, ei<strong>the</strong>r physically
or verbally. We honored <strong>the</strong>ir customs and traditions.” 874 One Marine emphasizes eating <strong>the</strong> food,
even when it was hard, in order to gain <strong>the</strong> people’s trust. 875 The result <strong>of</strong> this combination <strong>of</strong> good-will
interactions, according to a lance corporal, was that “[s]ome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m shared <strong>the</strong>ir hootches, <strong>the</strong>ir food,
<strong>the</strong>ir laughter, and <strong>the</strong>ir tears with us.” 876 A norm combining both strategically instrumental and
intrinsically satisfying rewards is very powerful, and if experienced by a much wider population <strong>of</strong>
Marines may have produced lasting changes in <strong>the</strong> Corps’ approach to counterinsurgency. CAP Marines
evidenced <strong>the</strong>ir commitment to this new normative set by <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> tour extension: sixty percent <strong>of</strong>
CAP Marines voluntarily extended <strong>the</strong>ir tours for an additional six months when <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>the</strong> option to
return home. 877
Marines came to see <strong>the</strong> strategic benefits from positive treatment, in part, from experiencing <strong>the</strong>
opposite effects that o<strong>the</strong>r services produced. Captain R. E. Williamson, an organizer <strong>of</strong> CAP units in
<strong>the</strong>ir earliest years (1966-67), spent a good deal <strong>of</strong> time detailing this logic in a Gazette article to fellow
<strong>of</strong>ficers. He cited a number <strong>of</strong> incidents in which military expediency was privileged over local
considerations and a strategic backlash resulted. These included interrogating citizens whom <strong>the</strong>
elected village chief had already cleared—and <strong>the</strong>reby undermining his credibility as protector with his
citizens, barbed wire incursions into valuable grazing land, and summary cancelations <strong>of</strong> local markets
all in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> military expediency.
873
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 29. For a specific
discussion <strong>of</strong> a Marine who had to be removed see oral history file 753. United States Marine Corps Vietnam War
Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
Transcribed by Noah Johnson, February 23, 2012. For a discussion <strong>of</strong> one who was not removed soon enough see
Dr. Wayne Christiansen, oral history, Hemingway: 133-134. Even <strong>the</strong> corpsman, valuable as he was, was not
immune. CAP 1-3-9 shipped him back for poor conduct. Philip Leiker, lecture at Utah State University, April 5,
2013.
874
Hop Brown, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),
27. Ano<strong>the</strong>r Marine details <strong>the</strong> lengths his squad went to protect <strong>the</strong> reputations <strong>of</strong> females in his ville: Oral
history file 2724, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and
Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
875
Tom Krusewski, oral history, in Hemingway: 90.
876
Rocky Jay, oral history, Hemingway: 117.
877
Krulak, First to Fight, 190; See also Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r
War in Vietnam, (New York, NY: Praegar, 1989): 26.
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Sometime after <strong>the</strong> above incidents <strong>the</strong>se same people were subjected to a somewhat more
serious affront to <strong>the</strong>ir human dignity. An extended perimeter required <strong>the</strong> desecration <strong>of</strong>
ancestral burial grounds. Bulldozing <strong>the</strong> burial grounds <strong>of</strong> an entire village marked its
inhabitants as unworthy and virtually non-beings. 878
CAP Marines, aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir villagers’ sensibilities, acted protectively toward <strong>the</strong>m and <strong>the</strong> goods <strong>the</strong>y
valued and felt enormous indignation toward Army and Marine units who didn’t. 879 Army units coming
through paid little regard to <strong>the</strong> people, <strong>of</strong>ten damaging or stealing precious property. 880 Poor form and
kinetic disasters were <strong>of</strong>ten exacerbated, to near fatal degrees, 881 by a lack <strong>of</strong> communication between
<strong>the</strong> “friendly” units and <strong>the</strong> CAP force. 882 The clashes demonstrate that attitudes <strong>of</strong> Marines in <strong>the</strong> CAP
program had developed in strikingly different fashion than that <strong>of</strong> grunts in a line unit. The CAP Marines
recognized: “So whatever <strong>the</strong> troops do over here because <strong>of</strong> ignorance comes right back on <strong>the</strong>
American government and this isn't good, it doesn't make for good relations with <strong>the</strong> people, and you'll
find that <strong>the</strong>y're not responsive when something like this happens.” 883
CAPs were not without friction. Relationships that were fostered in <strong>the</strong> village were <strong>of</strong>ten damaged by
events beyond <strong>the</strong> Marine’s control or by <strong>the</strong> accidents <strong>of</strong> war. In one case an American truck killed a
village girl. In quick response <strong>the</strong> CAP secured solatium payment and put two tanks treads in <strong>the</strong> road to
slow down traffic. 884 Consistent thieving on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> Popular Forces was a problem and caused
strained relations in nearly every platoon. 885 Relationships were also damaged if Marines were unable
to protect <strong>the</strong> villagers from VC assassinations.
Despite <strong>the</strong> friction <strong>of</strong> war, <strong>the</strong>ir youth and inexperience, limited training, and almost nil linguistic skill,
results from a 1970 survey conducted by Francis T. McNamara, American Consul and Political Adviser to
<strong>the</strong> Commanding General XXIV Corps, revealed that Vietnamese villagers were “generally quite happy
with <strong>the</strong> CAP Marines.” They appreciated <strong>the</strong> medical service provided by <strong>the</strong> Navy corpsman as well as
<strong>the</strong> Marines’ attempts at civic action and praised <strong>the</strong>ir “general standard <strong>of</strong> conduct.” Key in this
assessment was <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Marines stayed long term in <strong>the</strong> village, so if any unfortunate incident
878
Capt. R. E. Williamson, “A Briefing for Combined Action,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1968): 42.
879
For instance see Tom Harvey, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994), 82; Rocky Jay, oral history in Hemingway: 118; and oral history file 2599 United States
Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research
Center, Quantico, VA.
880
Oral history file 2202-2341, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcriptions in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
881
Warren Carmon, oral history, Hemingway: 168-69.
882
Warren V. Smith, oral history, Hemingway: 140-141.
883
Oral history file 2202-2341, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcriptions in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
884
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 27.
885
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 27; Robert A.
Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The
University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
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did occur, <strong>the</strong> friction was more easily resolved. The villagers knew <strong>the</strong> Marines by name and could
report <strong>the</strong>m with accuracy through <strong>the</strong> PF chain <strong>of</strong> command. The result, according to this data, was
that <strong>the</strong>se incidents were <strong>the</strong>refore typically resolved “on <strong>the</strong> spot.” 886
Although <strong>the</strong> priority given to specific missions within <strong>the</strong> CAP program fluctuated over time, <strong>the</strong> basic
set remained <strong>the</strong> same: protecting <strong>the</strong> village from VC intimidation, taxation, and harm; training
Popular Forces; engaging in civic action; and gaining intelligence from villagers. On <strong>the</strong> last point CAP
Marines were ordered to “organize local intelligence nets” in a formal manner. 887 Marines rarely did this
but managed to achieve superior intelligence in <strong>the</strong>ir own way. 888 They tended toward populationcentric
detective-like methods ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten brutal sort employed by PFs or o<strong>the</strong>r
Vietnamese. 889 Some commanders deemed <strong>the</strong>ir resultant intelligence <strong>the</strong> most valuable contribution
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program. 890
In sharp contrast to Banana War enlisted men, Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program were admonished to make
<strong>the</strong>ir community contacts “continuous and personal” and did. They recognized that without consistent
interaction one would miss or misinterpret <strong>the</strong> communications being sent contextually – apart from <strong>the</strong>
polite forms <strong>of</strong> interaction practiced by village <strong>of</strong>ficials. 891 Marines who ingratiated <strong>the</strong>mselves to
villagers were allowed closer involvement in, and understanding <strong>of</strong>, village life. Marines visited local
homes, attended village ceremonies, and ate on <strong>the</strong> local market. Marines came to know “<strong>the</strong>ir”
villagers and <strong>the</strong> personal habits, customs, and physical signatures <strong>of</strong> normal life in <strong>the</strong>ir “ville.” “We
became familiar with most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people…[so]we’d recognize any stranger immediately.” 892 Marines
also recognized village habits so could refrain from fire when a familiar pr<strong>of</strong>ile appeared outside after
886 Francis T. McNamara, letter to Lt. Gen Melvin Zais attached as addendum to Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action
Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970). Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines
Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013.
887 For an example <strong>of</strong> an effort <strong>of</strong> this kind see oral history file 2141, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral
History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
Transcriptions in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
888 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 40-42; Hop Brown, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was
Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 25; Jimmy Sparrow, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War
Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 45; “We were invited to village Tet parties and
sometimes we even received some good intelligence because <strong>of</strong> what we did for <strong>the</strong>m.” Skip Freeman, oral
history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 104; oral history
files 2141, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special
Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcriptions in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
889 Oral history file 2367, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription prepared by Lacey Lee 21 February
2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession. “Our Kit Carson scout showed no mercy when he was interrogating a suspect.” L.
Cpl. Paul Hernandez, oral history, Hemingway: 174.
890 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, 42; For an assessment from Lt. Col. Brunnenmeyer, a Director
within <strong>the</strong> CAP program see Oral history file 2898, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History
Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by
Kristen Amundsen, 22 February 2012, in author’s possession. See also Oral history file 2304-6, United States
Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research
Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Victoria Cattanach, 21 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
891 Capt. R. E. Williamson, “A Briefing for Combined Action,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1968): 42.
892 L. Cpl. Paul Hernandez, oral history, Hemingway: 174.
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curfew. 893 This collective familiarity imbued young American Marines with a heightened “sixth sense”
for shifts signaling danger.
The CAP sixth sense proved to be, perhaps, its most essential intelligence and counterinsurgency tool.
Villagers were not always forthcoming with information and Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP sort were far more
sophisticated in <strong>the</strong>ir analysis <strong>of</strong> why, <strong>of</strong>ten more so than <strong>the</strong>ir distant commanding <strong>of</strong>ficers. 894 The
enlisted on <strong>the</strong> ground were aware that many older Vietnamese had sons and daughters in <strong>the</strong> VC or
North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Their <strong>of</strong>fspring could be held as hostages against <strong>the</strong>m for
cooperating. 895 Those villagers less affiliated with <strong>the</strong> VC were <strong>of</strong>ten just worn out. “Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
farmers provided us with intelligence, but most just wanted to get on with <strong>the</strong>ir lives. They couldn’t
care less about <strong>the</strong> war, although it touched <strong>the</strong>m in some way nearly every day.” 896 One CAP Marine
summed up somewhat sympa<strong>the</strong>tically: “The villagers were so tired <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong>y really didn’t care
who controlled things. They just wanted to be left alone.” 897
A number <strong>of</strong> Marines cited <strong>the</strong> familiarity gained by living in <strong>the</strong> ville – <strong>the</strong> ability to detect small
changes that meant that <strong>the</strong> VC were in <strong>the</strong> area—as <strong>the</strong>ir most important intelligence asset. 898 When
villagers were mum, intelligence could still be gleaned contextually:
Our main mission was to prevent <strong>the</strong> VC from stealing <strong>the</strong> farmers’ rice and harassing <strong>the</strong>m.
One way <strong>of</strong> knowing if <strong>the</strong> VC were in <strong>the</strong> area was to keep an eye on <strong>the</strong> vats <strong>the</strong> farmers kept
<strong>the</strong>ir rice in. If <strong>the</strong>y were empty, Charlie had passed through. The farmers would never tell us
anything, so we didn’t know if we were helping <strong>the</strong>m or hindering <strong>the</strong>m. It was very
frustrating. 899
Marines also became attuned to <strong>the</strong> body language <strong>of</strong> villagers <strong>the</strong>y knew fairly well: “While working
with <strong>the</strong>se CAP units each individual has to be on <strong>the</strong>ir toes and you have to be extremely watchful for
things only you can pick up from <strong>the</strong> people. You learn <strong>the</strong>ir actions, what <strong>the</strong>y’re afraid <strong>of</strong>, you can tell
by <strong>the</strong>ir eye movements sometimes…something’s going on that o<strong>the</strong>r people would ignore….” 900 One
CAP squad member summed up <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r obvious distinctive quality <strong>of</strong> CAP intelligence ra<strong>the</strong>r nicely:
893
Oral history file 2599, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
894
For an intelligence discussion from a frustrated <strong>of</strong>ficer see Major H. G. Duncan, oral history, Hemingway: 156.
895
For instance, see oral history file 2202-2341, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection.
Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
896
A. W. Sundberg, oral history, Hemingway: 111. See also Art Falco, oral history, Hemingway: 162.
897
Rocky Jay, oral history, Hemingway: 117.
898
Dr. Wayne Christiansen, oral history, Hemingway: 133; Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An
Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986).
http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
899
L. Cpl. Paul Hernandez, oral history, Hemingway: 171.
900
Oral history file 2367, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription prepared by Lacey Lee 21 February
2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
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Q: Your CAP seems to be unusually successful in gaining intelligence from <strong>the</strong> people. To what
would you attribute your success in this regard?
A: Well, <strong>the</strong> first reason is, and one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main functions in <strong>the</strong> program, is to work closely with
<strong>the</strong> people. I think in <strong>the</strong> past guerrilla wars that have been carried on that <strong>the</strong> Allied forces or
<strong>the</strong> American forces or French or whoever it may be separated <strong>the</strong>mselves from <strong>the</strong> people and
did not allow <strong>the</strong>mselves to get <strong>the</strong> information <strong>the</strong> people have to <strong>of</strong>fer. 901
Unbelievably, much <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong> CAPs had to <strong>of</strong>fer in this camp was ignored at strategic levels. One <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> serious frustrations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAPs was that <strong>the</strong>ir intelligence was not believed and acted upon because
<strong>the</strong>y did not have <strong>of</strong>ficers with <strong>the</strong>m reporting it in, 902 this to include warnings in advance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tet
Offensive. 903 Their suspicions and analysis were not translated up <strong>the</strong> chain <strong>of</strong> command because
command did not put enough stock in enlisted opinions. “That was one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems with <strong>the</strong>
CAPs—we didn’t have any <strong>of</strong>ficers with us. They thought we exaggerated.” 904 As a result, most CAP
intelligence was gleaned and applied locally, helpful in that <strong>the</strong>ater, but a missed opportunity for larger
strategic effect.
Looking back, a number in <strong>the</strong> Corps deem <strong>the</strong> CAP program largely successful—it undermined VC
influence in villages where it operated, won <strong>the</strong> help <strong>of</strong> locals to a much higher degree, and produced
Marines far more satisfied with and committed to <strong>the</strong>ir Vietnam service—but are not sure it could be
replicated on a grand scale. They are simply not confident that <strong>the</strong> character requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
program can be met by a sufficient number <strong>of</strong> Marines. These attitudes are expressed by <strong>of</strong>ficers: “I
think <strong>the</strong> CAP program was <strong>the</strong> most successful thing we had going in Vietnam, but I also think too much
emphasis was placed on not <strong>of</strong>fending <strong>the</strong> people we were protecting. We expected tact and diplomacy
from young American Marines who did not possess such qualifications, nor had <strong>the</strong>y been trained for
such a mission...; 905 and by enlisted: “I don’t think we could ever have found enough Marines with <strong>the</strong>
intelligence and sensitivity to make it work on a large scale, nor could we have provided <strong>the</strong> language
and cultural training.” 906
This <strong>the</strong>sis would like to <strong>of</strong>fer a few thoughts for consideration about <strong>the</strong> viability <strong>of</strong> a future CAP-like
operation. The first is that <strong>the</strong> program worked decently well despite hitches in its selection process.
Bad apples that were allowed through <strong>the</strong> initial screening (if any was in place at that moment) were
removed by <strong>the</strong> far more efficacious vetting <strong>of</strong> peer review on <strong>the</strong> ground. Secondly, accounts that
901 Oral history file 3679, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Jacquelyn Thompson, 22 February
2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
902 Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 56.
903 Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 56.
904 Tom Krusewski in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 60.
905 Major H. G. Duncan, oral history, Hemingway: 156.
906 Edward Palm, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1994), 39.
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claim <strong>the</strong>re weren’t enough sufficiently mature Marines for <strong>the</strong> task might think about personnel
numbers that might be incurred if commanders across <strong>the</strong> Corps understood and supported <strong>the</strong>
program as signature Marine fare and selected <strong>the</strong>ir highest caliber NCOs to lead it (ra<strong>the</strong>r than tossing
<strong>the</strong> program <strong>the</strong> misfits <strong>the</strong>y were hoping to be rid <strong>of</strong>). The results may produce a surprising number <strong>of</strong>
young men willing and able to fill a CAP-like billet. Third, <strong>the</strong> duty pursued in <strong>the</strong> CAP posed no threat to
warrior image. CAP duty (as will be discussed in a following section) saw plenty <strong>of</strong> action and was <strong>of</strong>ten
regarded as a death trap by reputation. CAP casualty rates were high. 907 The perception <strong>of</strong> those rates
was even higher. One Marine recalled being buffeted by bloody tales on his way to CAP duty: “All <strong>the</strong>
‘old salts’ rotating back to <strong>the</strong> States stopped in and told us some real horror stories about <strong>the</strong> CAPs.
They kept telling us how <strong>the</strong>y were being overrun. These war stories began to get to us and we
contemplated asking for a transfer, but we decided to stick it out and see what <strong>the</strong>se CAPs were all
about.” 908 To <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>the</strong> Marines value suffering and audacious bravery in <strong>the</strong> line <strong>of</strong> fire, <strong>the</strong>
isolated, counterinsurgent CAP life provided it. Finally, <strong>the</strong> training supplied to all Marine recruits,
including those that ended up in a CAP, remained conventionally inspired and “gook”-hating. If training
were reconsidered along lessons learned lines—maintaining an emphasis on hard hitting infantry and
patrol skills, but combining <strong>the</strong>se with cultural intelligence and a much stronger dose <strong>of</strong> linguistics—<strong>the</strong>n
Marines would arrived much better prepared for <strong>the</strong> mission set that awaited <strong>the</strong>m. The above
recommendations have been recognized by <strong>the</strong> Corps as valuable and are certainly logistically possible,
but are likely to fall victim to a much weightier desire: conventional excellence and readiness for Big
War.
907 According to Peterson mid-1967 statistics gave CAP Marines a 75-80 percent chance <strong>of</strong> being wounded once, a
25 percent chance <strong>of</strong> being wounded twice and 16-18 percent chance <strong>of</strong> being killed. Peterson, The Combined
Action Platoons, 88. See also Major H.G. Duncan, oral history, Hemingway: 154.
908 L. Cpl. Paul Hernandez, oral history, Hemingway: 170.
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CHAPTER 7
LESSONS LEARNED, LOST, AND CULTURAL BLINDSPOTS: MARINES AS MILITARY MEN
Step 5: Hone Critical Cultural Factors
Step 6: Mapping Critical Cultural Factors Across Cultural Influences
Military <strong>Culture</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Marine efforts at both civic and kinetic tasks have been heavily influenced by <strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir being
military men. Marines embraced <strong>the</strong>ir tasks <strong>of</strong> governing and training up national constabularies in very
typical military fashion with a strong emphasis on order and efficiency. This combination served to
establish <strong>the</strong> infrastructure <strong>of</strong> state with <strong>of</strong>ten unprecedented speed, but also prepared—in ways
Marines did not clearly foresee—<strong>the</strong> means for centralized dictatorships which followed. The CAP
program, by accident <strong>of</strong> its defensive ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>of</strong>fensive posture, produced exactly <strong>the</strong> opposite
results. CAP training <strong>of</strong> local ra<strong>the</strong>r than national armed forces meant increased protection for <strong>the</strong>
countryside ra<strong>the</strong>r than increased reach from a central administration. The strategic results were
mixed.
The overwhelming conventional preference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. military has served both to impede <strong>the</strong>
development <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency doctrine and to squelch some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> innovations Marines produced.
A very slow dawning <strong>of</strong> recognition in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps that small wars doctrine was needed and <strong>the</strong>n
shockingly quick disregard <strong>of</strong> that which was laboriously forged are largely attributable to <strong>the</strong> ongoing
and overwhelming conventional preference <strong>of</strong> not only a critical mass <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers within <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps, but across <strong>the</strong> U.S. military generally. Tactical innovations fared a little better. Marines tended,
in each Caribbean case, to start with a default conventional approach against irregular enemies. Failure
along <strong>the</strong> same repeated learning curve, ra<strong>the</strong>r than predeployment training, served as <strong>the</strong> educational
device in each round. Gradually, Marines came to <strong>the</strong> same tactical conclusion in each <strong>the</strong>ater and
evolved toward small aggressive patrols and decentralized leadership— tactics adopted early in <strong>the</strong> CAP
program. Although largely successful, <strong>the</strong> strengths <strong>of</strong>fered by <strong>the</strong> operational posture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP
program as well as amelioration <strong>of</strong> its shortcomings and significant risks, would require that <strong>the</strong> Corps
invest in early and consistent training and preparation and begin to recruit based on an image vested in
excellence in civil-military relations, not just excellence in martial skill. Due to <strong>the</strong> overwhelming
preference for regular warfare, this we are not likely to see.
Order and Efficiency as Enemies <strong>of</strong> Democracy
For <strong>the</strong> societies <strong>the</strong>y oversaw, Marines as military governors prioritized values held dear in martial
structures: order and efficiency. These were pursued at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r values and <strong>of</strong>ten in sharp
contrast to local culture. Order and efficiency were so ingrained as military values that <strong>the</strong> founding
value set upon which <strong>the</strong> American political system survives—a careful balancing <strong>of</strong> powers in order to
obstruct tyranny—was given no thought in <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political regime and its coercive arm.
Marines, raised in a democratic system which all viewed as exceptional and superior, attempted to
duplicate this system by undermining nearly every principle upon which it was founded. Marines built
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<strong>the</strong> states <strong>the</strong>y oversaw, not according to <strong>the</strong> principle every American school child is taught as
foundational: separation <strong>of</strong> powers, but according to a value that <strong>the</strong> U.S. military, and its American
public prized far more highly: efficiency. There is no substantial evidence that <strong>the</strong> Marines’ pursuit <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>se values and centralization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state stands in contrast to what o<strong>the</strong>r branches <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. military
might have done had <strong>the</strong> reins been handed to <strong>the</strong>m. In this sense it is more appropriate to cast Marine
actions as a natural outgrowth <strong>of</strong> military culture ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong>ir culture alone. Their own American
heritage pitted <strong>the</strong> inefficiencies <strong>of</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> powers in politics against <strong>the</strong> strident value <strong>of</strong>
efficiency in all this social and commercial; this already competing value set tipped heavily when <strong>the</strong>
balance <strong>of</strong> military preference for efficiency was added to <strong>the</strong> scales. In <strong>the</strong> end, drives toward
efficiency were certainly drawn from both national and military cultural sources, but military identity
structure and norms dictated <strong>the</strong> order-driven and coercive means to achieve it.
Executive Order No. 47 which put into place <strong>the</strong> Dominican constabulary: <strong>the</strong> Guardia Nacional
Dominicana, stresses efficiency as <strong>the</strong> key value to be transmitted to <strong>the</strong> new force:
The <strong>of</strong>ficer appointed to command <strong>the</strong> Guardia Nacional Dominicana shall be a citizen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
United States, as shall be such o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong> as <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States
shall regard necessary for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> training <strong>the</strong> Guardia, and <strong>of</strong> bringing it to and <strong>of</strong>
keeping it in a high state <strong>of</strong> efficiency. 909
Marine-trained constabularies in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three Caribbean republics had as a primary aim <strong>the</strong>
removal <strong>of</strong> competing sources <strong>of</strong> power. 910 In all three cases traditionally based resistance to <strong>the</strong> newly
muscled centralized government came in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> informal and <strong>of</strong>ten corrupt regional powerbrokers.
The U.S. found <strong>the</strong>ir interference in <strong>the</strong> smooth running <strong>of</strong> centralized outreach intolerable. Lost to
American ahistoricism, tyranny as a likely outcome was simply not an active and present part <strong>of</strong>
American perceptual lens. The efficient ability to “do good” in <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> an adolescent, but growing,
central government, was <strong>the</strong> perspective with which <strong>the</strong> centralizing forces were pursued. When
indigenous factions—<strong>of</strong> whatever sort—resisted <strong>the</strong> consolidation <strong>of</strong> power, <strong>the</strong> military response was
to assert fur<strong>the</strong>r control under <strong>the</strong> rubric “restoring internal order.” Asserting control over one aspect
<strong>of</strong> society <strong>of</strong>ten led to attempts to control those it to which it was linked, until <strong>the</strong> military found itself
deep in <strong>the</strong> weeds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two societies <strong>the</strong>y governed: Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic. 911
So strong was <strong>the</strong> valuing <strong>of</strong> efficiency and <strong>the</strong> perceptual lens that centralized and uncontested power
would bring good things to <strong>the</strong> population that Marines were happy to extend this logic to <strong>the</strong> unseating
<strong>of</strong> local <strong>of</strong>ficials as well. The purposeful diminishing <strong>of</strong> not only informal powerbrokers, but <strong>of</strong> elected
909 Italics added. Major Charles F. Williams, USMC, “La Guardia Nacional Dominicana,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(September 1918): 196. Efficiency as well as “peace and order”: First Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin,
“Indoctrination in Santo Domingo,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1922): 383.
910 Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005): 207, 216; Bruce J. Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention: The Dominican Republic During <strong>the</strong> U.S.
Occupation <strong>of</strong> 1916-1924, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006).
911 Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and
Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press): 111.
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local governance in Haiti is framed as a cleaning up and expediting process: “There was a gradual
disappearance <strong>of</strong> local government, and commissioners appointed by <strong>the</strong> President took <strong>the</strong> place <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> horde <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice holders who in previous years had spent most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir time exacting under <strong>the</strong> guise
<strong>of</strong> ‘taxes’ a harsh tribute from <strong>the</strong> people.” Marines are fully aware that <strong>the</strong>y are privileging efficiency
over popular representation: “While this system <strong>of</strong> government may have been criticized by some in
view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> control exercised over it by American <strong>of</strong>ficials, it certainly lent itself to <strong>the</strong> expeditious
reformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country and <strong>the</strong> government.” 912
In <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic <strong>the</strong> Marines made <strong>the</strong> same moves, usurping local power in order to “reduce
<strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> provincial governors and local <strong>of</strong>ficials to disrupt <strong>the</strong> peace and frustrate national
programs.” 913 Colonel Rufus Lane who served as Minister <strong>of</strong> Foreign Relations, Justice, and Public
Instruction within <strong>the</strong> Dominican military government acknowledged that provincial governments had
previously been “a very prominent factor in <strong>the</strong> administration” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country but that <strong>the</strong>se duties had
since been taken over by <strong>the</strong> military government in order to execute policy more efficiently. The
centralizing reach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military government did not stop at <strong>the</strong> provincial level. Rufus goes on to
explain,
The municipal governments were, under <strong>the</strong> constitution <strong>of</strong> Santo Domingo, nominally
independent. The <strong>of</strong>ficers were elected and <strong>the</strong>y had certain legislative powers within <strong>the</strong>
confines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir municipalities. In fact, however, all municipal governments were subject to <strong>the</strong>
control <strong>of</strong> national government, and under <strong>the</strong> military occupation <strong>the</strong> tendency towards <strong>the</strong>
ascendency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national government was increased. These municipal governments were
highly inefficient and wasteful and seemed to be incapable <strong>of</strong> carrying responsibility in
reformatory measures. The Department <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Interior and Military Police gradually assumed
<strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se governments, with <strong>the</strong> prospect that at no distant date even nominal
independence will disappear. 914
In Nicaragua Guardia <strong>of</strong>ficials took over police and judicial functions, replaced sheriffs and ousted local
mayors whom <strong>the</strong>y deemed corrupt. In so doing <strong>the</strong> “Guardia emerged as <strong>the</strong> main link between <strong>the</strong>
peasantry and <strong>the</strong> state” and evolved into <strong>the</strong> country’s “most powerful and cohesive state
institution…” 915 Marines did not succeed in defeating insurgents in all three Caribbean episodes, but
<strong>the</strong>y did succeed in centralizing and extending <strong>the</strong> reach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state. Traditional powerbrokers were
demolished or scattered and by exercising <strong>the</strong>ir various constabularies not only as counterinsurgent
armies, but also as internal police forces and providers <strong>of</strong> social services, Marines created not only <strong>the</strong>
most powerful martial instrument in <strong>the</strong> country, but <strong>the</strong> most powerful political instrument as well. 916
912
J C Fegan, “After Nineteen Years We Leave Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1934): 23.
913
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 193.
914
Colonel Rufus H. Lane, A. A. and I., “Civil Government in Santo Domingo in <strong>the</strong> Early Days <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Military
Occupation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1922): 135-36.
915
Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream, 217-220.
916
Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005): 4; Bruce J. Calder, The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Intervention: The Dominican Republic During <strong>the</strong> U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong>
1916-1924, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006): xii.
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Newly constructed roads, telephone and telegraph services, and a wide variety <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r infrastructure
improvements allowed <strong>the</strong> U.S. military to pursue bandits with more efficiency, allowed <strong>the</strong> state to
govern with more oversight, and paved inroads into rural societies previously insulated from central
administration.
Marine moves were congruent with and accomplished military values. They did create order, and built
state structures efficiently, <strong>of</strong>ten in unprecedented fashion. Marines were very proud <strong>of</strong> both
achievements. Reflecting on <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> Haiti in 1924 <strong>the</strong> Quartermaster Clerk remarked: “The period
just passed has been <strong>the</strong> most peaceful and prosperous in <strong>the</strong> annals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic; <strong>the</strong>re was no
semblance <strong>of</strong> an uprising and banditry has been non-existent. There has been a notable decrease in
crime and <strong>of</strong>fenses against <strong>the</strong> Haitian Laws.” 917 General Russell notes that Marines managed to
establish “law and order, uninterrupted, except for <strong>the</strong> banditism <strong>of</strong> 1919-1920 and <strong>the</strong> abortive
disorders <strong>of</strong> November and December, 1929, for a period <strong>of</strong> fourteen years,” a feat “remarkable when
viewed against <strong>the</strong> background <strong>of</strong> previous conditions in <strong>the</strong> Republic.” 918
The legacy <strong>of</strong> this approach, however, was not likely <strong>the</strong> one Marines and <strong>the</strong>ir American sponsors had
in mind. Within a short while <strong>of</strong> Marine departure Haiti crumbled, politically and economically, its
future warlords somewhat aided by <strong>the</strong> Guardia and <strong>the</strong> infrastructure supplied. In <strong>the</strong> Dominican
Republic and Nicaragua <strong>the</strong> legacy remained stability and order, but under <strong>the</strong> iron fist <strong>of</strong> an
unprecedented length <strong>of</strong> dictatorship. These legacies were laid, by <strong>the</strong> populations who suffered <strong>the</strong>m,
at <strong>the</strong> door <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines. For <strong>the</strong> decades <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Somoza regime Nicaraguans held to an anti-
American narrative, blaming <strong>the</strong>ir current state on <strong>the</strong> Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks who had put it in motion. Many
Nicaraguans viewed <strong>the</strong>ir country as having existed as a “quasi-U.S. colony” until <strong>the</strong> Somoza’s were
deposed in 1979. The three Somozas: Anastasio Somoza Garcia and his two sons, Luis and Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, were dubbed “<strong>the</strong> last Yankee Marines.” 919
Before <strong>the</strong> Corps fully realized what a menace <strong>the</strong>ir one-time apprentice Rafael Trujillo was to become,
<strong>the</strong>y relished his praise as President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic. 920 The reputation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ejercito
Nacional, (<strong>the</strong> renamed Guardia), however, ought to have given <strong>the</strong>m pause. A Marine general <strong>of</strong>ficer
passing through <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic in 1924—<strong>the</strong> first to visit <strong>the</strong>re since <strong>the</strong> Marines had
departed—paraphrased Trujillo’s comments about <strong>the</strong> institution he now wielded and Marines had
forged:
It seemed that in his opinion <strong>the</strong> military were not popular with <strong>the</strong> people nor with some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
leading politicians. This he explained was due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>y wore <strong>the</strong> uniform <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marines, and that <strong>the</strong>ir bugle calls and drums were a continual reminder to <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
American occupation, which had not been popular with many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people and <strong>the</strong> leaders.
917
Quartermaster Clerk John D. Brady, “Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1924): 150.
918
Brigadier General John H. Russell, American High Commissioner, “The Development <strong>of</strong> Haiti During <strong>the</strong> Last
Fiscal Year,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1930): 87.
919
Michel Gobat, Confronting <strong>the</strong> American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2005): 267.
920
Major Edwin North McClellan, “Down in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic,” Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1932).
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But Colonel Trujillo explained that he and his <strong>of</strong>ficers were proud that <strong>the</strong>y were <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fspring <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps even though some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leading politicians had used <strong>the</strong> expression—that
<strong>the</strong> Policia, or Ejercito, was <strong>the</strong> son <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American Marines. 921
Perhaps it is defensible that Marines <strong>of</strong> this era, in <strong>the</strong>ir pioneering moment <strong>of</strong> nation-building, did not
see <strong>the</strong>ir infrastructure improvements and enthusiastic amplification <strong>of</strong> a centralized government as a
precursor to dictatorship, but it is much less defensible that this mindset seems to have remained
unaltered into <strong>the</strong> present day—that <strong>the</strong>se dangers do not surface for serious consideration in U.S.
current counterinsurgency practice. Marine experiences and <strong>the</strong> lessons that could be gleaned with
critical hindsight are largely lost upon a forward-looking, ahistoric population. Should <strong>the</strong>y be
considered, <strong>the</strong>se would have something to say about being ever mindful <strong>of</strong> laying groundwork for a
dictatorship, especially into far reaches <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country that have heret<strong>of</strong>ore not suffered direct
oppression from a central administration.
Locals First: The CAP Experience
CAP Marines pursued precisely <strong>the</strong> opposite course—not by conscious design <strong>of</strong> a dictatorship-wary
strategy—but ra<strong>the</strong>r by accident <strong>of</strong> placement and defensive mission set. As pointed out earlier, <strong>the</strong>
Combined Action Program began in defensive posture, protecting air fields and logistics lines important
to <strong>the</strong> wider U.S. military effort. As <strong>the</strong> program’s successes at keeping <strong>the</strong> VC at bay became clear, its
progenitors saw greater strategic ambitions for it—a sort <strong>of</strong> “ink blot” strategy which had potential to
squeeze VC influence from <strong>the</strong> countryside. Though this may have in fact worked if <strong>the</strong> CAP program
had been applied to villages across Vietnam (CAP vets continue to debate this point), <strong>the</strong> program never
moved beyond five provinces within I-Corps, a Marine area <strong>of</strong> responsibility, and peaked at 42 <strong>of</strong>ficers,
2,050 enlisted, 2 naval <strong>of</strong>ficers, 126 Navy corpsman, and approximately 3,000 Popular or Regional
Forces. 922
One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program that ran ra<strong>the</strong>r counter to <strong>the</strong> larger U.S. military efforts within
South Vietnam was <strong>the</strong> empowerment <strong>of</strong> local regions vis a vis <strong>the</strong> state. The loyalties <strong>of</strong> Marine-trained
Popular Forces were tied and encouraged differently than were <strong>the</strong> larger constabulary forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Caribbean. Whilst Caribbean forces were trained to break former alliances and vest identity in <strong>the</strong>
success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> newly formed Gendarmerie or Guardia national institution, PF loyalties remained
population ra<strong>the</strong>r than institution centric. PF identity was not forged in any meaningful way into <strong>the</strong>
larger armed force body within Vietnam. Instead, Popular Forces forged identity locally as protectors <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> population. PFs were trained for <strong>the</strong> express purpose <strong>of</strong> protecting <strong>the</strong>ir village and derived status
from <strong>the</strong>ir ability to do so. Loyalty was to <strong>the</strong> people and to <strong>the</strong> Marines ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> Marines
genuinely aided <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> protecting PF friends and family. An identity <strong>of</strong> localized protector ra<strong>the</strong>r
than enforcer <strong>of</strong> government edicts upon local populations represents a significant departure from <strong>the</strong>
form and function <strong>of</strong> Banana War constabularies. A spot <strong>of</strong> irony is that it is precisely <strong>the</strong> occupation <strong>of</strong>
921
Italics in original. Anonymous, “Santo Domingo After <strong>the</strong> Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1930):
11.
922
Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 5; Klyman, The Combined Action Program; Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined
Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), 1. Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S.
Marines Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013.
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training native troops that prompted <strong>the</strong> Marine’s own “Fact Sheet” on <strong>the</strong> CAP program to draw
parallels between <strong>the</strong> effort in Vietnam and <strong>the</strong> experience in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean. 923
There is no evidence that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps thought in any conscious way about empowering local
forces as a balancer to national (and largely corrupt) institutions. Quite to <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong> general
American military effort was aimed at providing exactly <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> centralized, conventional armed
force that had produced a tool for dictators in Haiti, Dominican, and Nicaragua. Doing o<strong>the</strong>rwise with
<strong>the</strong> PFs—training a locally oriented force much less likely to accede to acts against <strong>the</strong>ir countrymen on
behalf <strong>of</strong> a newly sprouted dictator—is representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> historical happy accidents that Marines
stumbled upon by virtue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operational realities <strong>of</strong> a rolling program. PFs were trained as a force
multiplier. They were available to Marines as <strong>the</strong> “belittled and neglected…bottom rung in <strong>the</strong>
Vietnamese military ladder.” 924
The locally-focused nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program was a conscious part <strong>of</strong> its design at <strong>the</strong> highest levels,
but <strong>the</strong> local focus was fixed on anti-VC kinetic effects. From Krulak, a key agitator and advocate from
<strong>the</strong> program’s beginnings: “The Combined Action Program’s basic concept was to bring peace to <strong>the</strong>
Vietnamese villages by uniting <strong>the</strong> local knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Popular Forces with <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional skill and
superior equipment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines….The Vietnamese knew who <strong>the</strong> guerrillas were and where <strong>the</strong>y hid;
<strong>the</strong> Americans knew how to kill <strong>the</strong>m.” 925 O<strong>the</strong>r assessors saw more general population-centric
strategic effects: “In addition [to <strong>the</strong> conflict role], by working with <strong>the</strong> PF and earning <strong>the</strong>ir respect and
confidence, <strong>the</strong> Marines in <strong>the</strong> CAP are able to relate to <strong>the</strong> local people in a way that no conventional
US military organization could do. The PF <strong>the</strong>refore act as a link between <strong>the</strong> Marines and <strong>the</strong> local
people. In a ‘peoples war,’ it goes without saying that this link is a vital asset.” 926
The record on PF performance was decidedly mixed. When commenting on <strong>the</strong>ir PFs, Marines <strong>of</strong>ten
rated <strong>the</strong>m individually ra<strong>the</strong>r than as a group – this one was trustworthy, that one useless, that one
was almost definitely VC, etc. 927 O<strong>the</strong>rs were primarily frustrated with <strong>the</strong>m, sometimes to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong>
treating <strong>the</strong>m like <strong>the</strong> enemy. 928 Marines complained that PFs were easily insulted (exacerbated by <strong>the</strong>
923
Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), 1. Declassified
document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm.
Accessed on February 7, 2013.
924
Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 4.
925
Lt. General Victor H. Krulak, Foreword, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1994), x.
926
Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), 1. Declassified
document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website http://capmarine.com/index.htm.
Accessed on February 7, 2013.
927
Tim Duffie, CAP veteran, lecture Utah State University, February 16, 2012.
928
Tony Vieira, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994),
41. Calls PFs “useless.” Harvey Baker says he “didn’t trust most <strong>of</strong> ‘em.” Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 62. Rocky Jay called <strong>the</strong>m “a bunch <strong>of</strong> draft dodgers” who were
worse than useless and “always busting ambushes.” He and a fellow Marine would “take <strong>the</strong>m out to <strong>the</strong> sand
dunes and leave <strong>the</strong>m out <strong>the</strong>re all night just to get away from <strong>the</strong>m.” Rocky Jay, oral history, Hemingway: 116.
Major H. G. Duncan claims that in <strong>the</strong> era in which he oversaw CAPs (1970) “There was hostility between Marines
and PFs in almost all <strong>the</strong> CAPs.” Oral history, Hemingway: 155; Warren V. Smith, oral history, Hemingway: 140.
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Marines’ lack <strong>of</strong> cultural training), were lazy, <strong>of</strong>ten ran from a fight or refused to go out on patrols, and
did not attend <strong>the</strong> training classes <strong>the</strong> Marines attempted to <strong>of</strong>fer. 929
The CAP idea is a good idea as it is on paper but it doesn't always work out <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong> big
honchos figure it should. We have 30 PFs with us and approximately maybe three or four <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>se PFs are fighting men, <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are just toy soldiers in green uniforms with rifles.
They're pr<strong>of</strong>essionals in one sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> word, <strong>the</strong>y're pr<strong>of</strong>essional thieves, pr<strong>of</strong>essional
skaters. If <strong>the</strong>y can get out <strong>of</strong> doing anything <strong>the</strong>y'll do it. They expect everything and <strong>the</strong>y don't
give anything. They run when <strong>the</strong>y're under fire, <strong>the</strong>y sleep when <strong>the</strong>y're on guard. They lie,
<strong>the</strong>y steal, everything you can think <strong>of</strong>. 930
All Marines seemed aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mixed record, so in describing <strong>the</strong>ir own experience <strong>the</strong>y would <strong>of</strong>ten
<strong>of</strong>fer a contrast: “The PFs we had…were very dependable. They wouldn’t di-di [run away] like o<strong>the</strong>rs
did.” 931 Some CAPs, however, <strong>of</strong>fered straight up high praise for <strong>the</strong>ir PF counterparts. 932 When <strong>the</strong>
combined action unit worked well Marines tended to ascribe it to <strong>the</strong> PF’s localized motivations:
The PF is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> finest fighters that I have worked with in Vietnam though. I think it's due to
<strong>the</strong> fact that he is out <strong>the</strong>re protecting his family, his rice crop, and that he is <strong>the</strong>re fighting as
hard as he does. We have not had a problem with <strong>the</strong> PF <strong>of</strong> turning on us or running away from
us during a firefight. In fact lately on our last four contacts, <strong>the</strong>y have seemed real aggressive
and we feel this comes through our training with <strong>the</strong>m. 933
The unintended kinetic result <strong>of</strong> Marines assuming “ownership” <strong>of</strong> Vietnamese villages—with or without
<strong>the</strong> useful military help <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PFs—was that <strong>the</strong>ir protective sphere took on <strong>the</strong> same localized PF
orientation and extended to any who might bring harm to <strong>the</strong> hamlet, including <strong>the</strong> forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South
Vietnamese government. A number <strong>of</strong> CAP veterans believe that <strong>the</strong>y won <strong>the</strong>ir villagers’ loyalty, and
counterinsurgency help, in moments when <strong>the</strong>y confronted rapacious or o<strong>the</strong>rwise malintended South
929 Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong>
History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
930 Oral history file 2614, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Megan Hansen, 22 February 2012,
in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
931 Skip Freeman, oral history, in Hemingway: 101; See also Dr. Wayne Christiansen, oral history, Hemingway: 131;
oral history file 2141, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and
Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
932 “They perform outstandingly.” Oral history file 3679, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History
Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by
Jacquelyn Thompson, 22 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession; Art Falco calls <strong>the</strong>m “really motivated.” Oral
history, Hemingway: 159; See also Jimmy Sparrow, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 45; Tom Harvey, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was
Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 76; Tom Krusewski, oral history, in Hemingway: 90; Warren
V. Smith, oral history, Hemingway: 137.
933 Oral history file 2202-2341, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Megan Hurst, 21 Feburary
2012, in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
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Vietnamese troops and chased <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong>ir villages. 934 When villagers perceived that Marines were
genuinely invested in <strong>the</strong>ir protection and in <strong>the</strong>ir interests, <strong>the</strong>y began to <strong>of</strong>fer <strong>the</strong>ir services in a more
meaningful way. Despite <strong>the</strong> unconsciously cultivated nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relationship, Marines, and o<strong>the</strong>r
forces, would do well to examine <strong>the</strong> immediate security benefits (<strong>of</strong> villager help) and less likely future
pitfalls <strong>of</strong> localized constabulary training.
The Counterinsurgency Consequences <strong>of</strong> U.S. Military Preference for Conventional War
Doctrine Slow to Dawn, Quick to Fade
The total absence <strong>of</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> insurgent problem within <strong>the</strong> pages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gazette during <strong>the</strong>
early years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupation in Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic infer an air <strong>of</strong> already achieved
competence being carried out in business as usual fashion. The first article <strong>of</strong> any consequence to
appear in <strong>the</strong> Gazette (beyond quick references to Haiti on such subjects as <strong>the</strong> building <strong>of</strong> latrines or
commemorations to fallen Marines) is in December 1916, a year and a half after <strong>the</strong> Marines landed (in
fairness, <strong>the</strong> Gazette had only been running since March <strong>of</strong> 1916) and after <strong>the</strong> first Caco rebellion was
already defeated. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than revisiting <strong>the</strong> lessons learned in this exchange or formalizing some level
<strong>of</strong> doctrine from <strong>the</strong> experience, <strong>the</strong> first article on Haiti is advice to <strong>of</strong>ficers in a form very like a travel
brochure. 935 The writer dispatches advice to his fellows about <strong>the</strong> conditions which <strong>the</strong>ir families will
encounter should <strong>the</strong>y choose to join <strong>the</strong> Marine adventure in Haiti. He addresses such vital topics as
market fare, climate, and <strong>the</strong> appropriate gut to choose for one’s tennis racquet. No mention
whatsoever is made <strong>of</strong> military exploits <strong>of</strong> any variation.
The next Haiti submission is equally lightweight. It is purportedly on reconnaissance, but reads more
like a chatty diary entry, describing colorful scenes along a patrol, interactions with villagers along <strong>the</strong>
way, <strong>the</strong> food eaten, <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> burro, and a wide assortment <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r colorful details one
might write in a letter home. It is written in <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> a lark, with no serious intent to convey advice
or say anything much about a manner <strong>of</strong> reconnaissance patrolling. 936 In short, early writings
demonstrate little strategic curiosity about how <strong>the</strong> job is getting done and if it is being done well. The
Marine perception seems to be that <strong>the</strong>y know how to do this; it is small fare and a serious discussion <strong>of</strong>
such is unwarranted.
By 1928, after having spent 13 years in Hispaniola fighting multiple insurgencies, <strong>the</strong> Corps found itself
still without a common body <strong>of</strong> lessons learned. Writing from <strong>the</strong> Division <strong>of</strong> Operations and Training,
Glendell Fitzgerald noted:
This type <strong>of</strong> combat, which might well be called “bush warfare” is <strong>the</strong> one which has been most
frequently encountered by [M]arine personnel in <strong>the</strong> past, and yet is still unknown to many
934
Philip Leiker, lecture at Utah State University, April 5, 2013; Tim Duffie “I Keep it in My Heart and Wait for You,”
posting on capmarine.com.
935
Randolph Coyle; “<strong>Service</strong> in Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette; (Dec 1916).
936
Walter N. Hill, “A Haitian Reconnoissance,” Marine Corps Gazette (March 1917).
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<strong>of</strong>ficers, ei<strong>the</strong>r through a failure to be a participant with some expeditionary force, or through a
lack <strong>of</strong> any available reports which might be studied. 937
The naïve perceptual lens as regards <strong>the</strong> ease <strong>of</strong> subduing bandits and building nations from scratch was
certainly tempered by <strong>the</strong> Marines’ lived experience. These lessons remained locally learned and not
shared across <strong>the</strong> service for an inexcusable number <strong>of</strong> years, however, due to <strong>the</strong> Marine valuing <strong>of</strong>
field experience over formalized education. The action orientation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines was well entrenched
in early twentieth century Marines. In 1916 <strong>the</strong>n Colonel Ben Fuller (later to become Commandant)
described <strong>the</strong> Marine approach to education thus:
His education as a [M]arine has always been obtained mostly by practical methods ; what <strong>the</strong>
older and experienced ones have learned in service is passed on to <strong>the</strong> new ones by actual
demonstration; in unaccustomed circumstances and unfamiliar conditions he experiments for
himself because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> a doctrine and <strong>of</strong> thoroughly trained knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> best
practice. 938
Fuller makes clear that traditional though it may be, this mode <strong>of</strong> instruction is insufficient for <strong>the</strong> tasks
presently facing <strong>the</strong> Corps:
Our sphere <strong>of</strong> action and <strong>the</strong> tasks given us are sufficiently different from those <strong>of</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>
Army or <strong>the</strong> Navy to require an education and a training that cannot be obtained in ei<strong>the</strong>r or
both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> War Colleges. A graduate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se may learn how to be a Major General
commanding an Army division or be well-instructed in <strong>the</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> strategy necessary to a
Fleet Commander, but where can he learn anything about being a Brigadier-General or a Colonel
commanding an advance base or an expeditionary force which may have to administer <strong>the</strong>
affairs <strong>of</strong> a Caribbean republic? 939
Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Marine valuing <strong>of</strong> jumping into <strong>the</strong> task at hand ra<strong>the</strong>r than pausing (at some length)
to receive somewhat sedentary instruction on how one might do it better, prevailed. Attempts at
schoolhouses in <strong>the</strong>ater were pursued in both Haiti and <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic but with limited
attendance and with little to no educational reach beyond <strong>the</strong> immediate <strong>the</strong>ater. 940 Smedley Butler,
like many Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks, took a certain pride in <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> formal education possessed by bush Marines.
He derided too much education as having a detrimental effect on warrior spirit. 941 Butler characterized
937
Glendell L. Fitzgerald, “Combat Reports <strong>of</strong> Operations in Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1928):
241.
938
Col. Ben H. Fuller, “Should <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Have Its Own War College?” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1916): 359. This sentiment is repeated fifteen years later by Utley. See Major Harold H. Utley, “An Introduction to
<strong>the</strong> Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1931): 50.
939
Col. Ben H. Fuller, “Should <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Have Its Own War College?” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1916): 359.
940
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 137-39.
941
Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine, (Lexington, The University Press <strong>of</strong> Kentucky): 75, 111.
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his superior in Haiti, Eli Cole, as being a “fine <strong>of</strong>ficer” but “over-educated.” This, Butler believed, led him
to overthink action to <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> risk-adverse paralysis. 942
Without comprehensive doctrine—which informal mentorship and trial and error learning curves most
certainly were not, “Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers wound up ‘reinventing <strong>the</strong> wheel’ in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three insurgencies
<strong>the</strong>y encountered.” 943 The negative consequences <strong>of</strong> this deficit were eventually recognized by small
wars practitioners and earnest articles began a discussion within <strong>the</strong> Gazette in order that those who
“pass judgment upon plans for this type <strong>of</strong> operations, should likewise have more than a hazy
knowledge <strong>of</strong> what has occurred in <strong>the</strong> past.” 944 All three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most significant voices <strong>of</strong> this time
period recognized that operations and tactics <strong>of</strong> small wars differed significantly from those <strong>of</strong> a
conventional battlefield and thus required a separate sort <strong>of</strong> training. 945 It was <strong>the</strong>ir cumulative efforts
in combination with support from an influential cadre <strong>of</strong> Marine leadership which resulted in support
behind <strong>the</strong> basic premise <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual: “The responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers engaged in small
wars and <strong>the</strong> training necessary are <strong>of</strong> a very different order from <strong>the</strong>ir responsibilities and training in
ordinary military duties.” 946
Marine preference for action over education certainly slowed <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> small wars doctrine
within <strong>the</strong> Corps. What sealed its fate, however, was circumstance which pitted expertise within this
sphere in conflict with preparation for more conventional prospects in <strong>the</strong> future. This process at <strong>the</strong>
level <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commandancy, and <strong>the</strong> resultant squeezing out <strong>of</strong> small wars training from Corps’
classrooms has been detailed in Chapter 4. Here, a second strategically significant attitudinal shift is
examined. Marines in advance <strong>of</strong> WWI may not have craved counterinsurgent tropical duty, but <strong>the</strong>y
certainly did not resent it as being outside <strong>the</strong>ir sphere. When this mission set came at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong>
participation in <strong>the</strong> world’s conventional war, however, Marines soured on <strong>the</strong>ir Caribbean fare and
began to regard it as beneath <strong>the</strong>ir military station.
The <strong>Strategic</strong> Effects <strong>of</strong> Second Rate Status
Although it took Marines a good while to take <strong>the</strong>ir Caribbean fights seriously by way <strong>of</strong> doctrine, one
does not detect any initial antipathy within <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sort that Beede assumes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S.
military toward small wars. He not only claims its presence in <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars era, he sympathizes
with it:
942 Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace, 163,
943 Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 6.
944 Major Harold H. Utley, “An Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(May 1931): 50.
945 Major Samuel M. Harrington, “The Strategy and Tactics <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1921): 480; Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921); A disagreeing voice is
Captain G. A. Johnson, “Junior Marines in Minor Irregular Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1921);
946 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction”: 31.
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And fur<strong>the</strong>r:
The traditional aversion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military services to counterinsurgency is doubtless justified. As
<strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual, developed by <strong>the</strong> [M]arines in <strong>the</strong> 1930’s, recognized, fighting guerrilla
forces involves putting <strong>the</strong> civilian population in <strong>the</strong> middle, a distasteful assignment at best,
and ultimately a nearly intolerable responsibility. The converse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> counterinsurgency
problem is that a commander may be called upon to violate military doctrine in order to achieve
nonmilitary goals.
A vigorous prosecution <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency can breed hatred that is quite different in kind
from that which develops in a conventional war, because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> uses both sides make <strong>of</strong> civilians
and because <strong>of</strong> situations that almost invite atrocities as a normal part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> campaign. 947
For those who had signed up to Marine life as pr<strong>of</strong>ession, “warlike operations when a state <strong>of</strong> war does
not exist,”—were assumed to be “fundamentally a function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps.” 948 These sentiments
held fair enough sway until <strong>the</strong>y came at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> being able to participate in <strong>the</strong> real stuff: Big
War. A good portion <strong>of</strong> Marines who ended up in service during <strong>the</strong> Banana War years had rushed to
Marine <strong>of</strong>fices in 1917 in order to participate in <strong>the</strong> war <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> century, not thinking much <strong>of</strong> Marine
service beyond <strong>the</strong> great event in front <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. 949 These were recruits not pleased to be diverted to
Hispaniola. Cut <strong>of</strong>f from <strong>the</strong> Big War, <strong>the</strong>ir intense frustration mirrored that <strong>of</strong> long-time salt Smedley
Butler, <strong>the</strong>n Commandant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Haitian Gendarmerie, who complained that Haiti was “becoming more
and more detestable every day and <strong>the</strong> knowledge that I am not to be allowed to fight for my country,
makes it even more unbearable.” 950
With a few exceptions like Smedley Butler, <strong>the</strong> Corps was pulling its best out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tropics and sending
<strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> front. Those left behind felt <strong>the</strong> sting <strong>of</strong> second rating. 951 Langley believes this to have
contributed to maltreatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population: “Those who stayed behind grew increasingly resentful
<strong>of</strong> occupation duty; <strong>the</strong>ir frustration and bitterness over policing ‘spigs,’ as <strong>the</strong>y <strong>of</strong>ten called Dominicans,
made <strong>the</strong>m less sympa<strong>the</strong>tic toward <strong>the</strong>ir subjects or <strong>the</strong>ir plight.” 952 Bickel applies <strong>the</strong> same logic to
those who returned from <strong>the</strong> front and “resented serving in <strong>the</strong> isolated tropics after having done <strong>the</strong>ir
947
Italics added. Benjamin R. Beede, Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small
Wars <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States, 1898-1984, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1985): xxxi.
948
Major Harold H. Utley, “An Introduction to <strong>the</strong> Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(May 1931): 50.
949 th
Edwin Howard Simmons, Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.), The United States Marines: A History, 4 Edition,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003): 95.
950 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 93.
951 Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 170-71. See also Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New
York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 199.
952 Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985): 147.
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part in <strong>the</strong> war.” 953 Schmidt characterizes Haiti’s irregular war as one that became perceived as a
“frustrating and degrading experience” for superior forces who allowed <strong>the</strong> difficulty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terrain, <strong>the</strong>ir
own imbedded prejudice, and <strong>the</strong> irregular nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir foe to justify lapses in <strong>the</strong> “rules <strong>of</strong> civilized
warfare” and consequent commission <strong>of</strong> atrocities. 954
Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “degrading” condition was bound up in fighting a foe which Marines, especially with <strong>the</strong> war
in Europe as backdrop, could not consider worthy. In <strong>the</strong>ir disdain Marines tended to oversimplify <strong>the</strong>ir
adversary, casting <strong>the</strong>m as “bandits” ra<strong>the</strong>r than proper military adversaries (even <strong>of</strong>ten during <strong>the</strong>
Sandino era in Nicaragua) and had difficulty imagining that any serious consideration need be given to
<strong>the</strong> tactics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir defeat. 955 A stubbornly narrow conception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adversary contributed to
exacerbating ra<strong>the</strong>r than limiting insurgent recruits. Throughout <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars Marines tended to
underestimate <strong>the</strong>ir foe’s appeal, ascribing only criminal and predatory intent to this population. This
inhibited <strong>the</strong>m from understanding “bandit” appeal to locals—<strong>the</strong> political or social narrative acting as
wind to <strong>the</strong>ir sails—and from seeing clearly <strong>the</strong> contextual motives <strong>of</strong> refreshed supplies <strong>of</strong> insurgent
recruits. Ellis places this blindspot in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> day when he places two notions side by side in his
seminal piece on “Bush Brigades.” He describes <strong>the</strong> adversary as typically “outlaw bandits (bandits,
ladrones, cacos) who rob and murder members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forces <strong>of</strong> occupation and <strong>the</strong>ir own people
indiscriminately” 956 <strong>the</strong>n notes two sentences later that “[t]he enemy will have moral support from most
<strong>of</strong> his own people, material support from many, and will operate in <strong>the</strong>ir midst.” 957 Ellis does not seem
bo<strong>the</strong>red with <strong>the</strong> apparent contradiction this logic seems to present, nor prodded to unravel <strong>the</strong> nature
<strong>of</strong> popular support in such a situation.
Harrington provides his own sort <strong>of</strong> underestimation <strong>of</strong> Caribbean adversaries by rendering a portrait <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>m as highly emotional ra<strong>the</strong>r than logical:
Now <strong>the</strong> tactics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy and his morale are affected by his psychology which varies with
different peoples. In general, among semi-civilized and savage peoples, this is a matter <strong>of</strong>
953
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 138.
954
Schmidt <strong>of</strong>fers <strong>the</strong> enormously imbalanced kill ratio as partial evidence: 3,250 Haitians to 14-16 Marines. Hans
Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1971): 104.
955
Max Boot, The Savage Wars <strong>of</strong> Peace: Small Wars and <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> American Power, (New York: Basic Books,
2002, 2003): 17. The USMC <strong>of</strong>ficial history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican experience, written in 1974, does not write it as
counterinsurgency but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> “suppression <strong>of</strong> banditry.” See Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas,
Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic 1916-1924, (Washington DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, 1974): 33. For typical prose regarding “bandits”—persisting even a near century later see LtCol
Richard J. Macak Jr. “Lessons from Yesterday’s Operations Short <strong>of</strong> War: Nicaragua and <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual,”
Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1996): 59.
956
Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 3. See also Captain G. A.
Johnson who defines irregular warfare during <strong>the</strong> same period as “campaigns against nature, surprise, treachery,
inferior weapons, tactics, and people. The enemy, if he has any tactics at all, usually descends to mere
bushwhacking.” In a particularly ironic twist this author makes <strong>the</strong> point, some pages later, that one should
“Ra<strong>the</strong>r over-rate than under-rate <strong>the</strong> enemy in making your plans.” “Junior Marines in Minor Irregular Warfare,”
Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1921): 152, 161.
957
Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, “Bush Brigades,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1921): 3.
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emotion. Intellect and reason abstracted from emotion are characteristic <strong>of</strong> civilized peoples.
Reason is a development. Emotion is fundamental; peoples who are not developed
intellectually are by comparison wholly emotional. Similarly children are impulsive and
emotional, exposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundamental psychological factor <strong>of</strong> man. 958
The “bandit” mentality, persistent even after facing <strong>of</strong>f a genuine revolutionary in Nicaragua, became
enshrined in doctrine in <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual: “The mission <strong>of</strong> our forces usually involves <strong>the</strong>
training <strong>of</strong> native <strong>of</strong>ficers and men in <strong>the</strong> art <strong>of</strong> war, assisting in <strong>of</strong>fensive operations against organized
banditry and in such defensive measure against threatened raids <strong>of</strong> large organized bandit groups as are
essential to <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> lives and property.” 959 One line in <strong>the</strong> Manual <strong>of</strong>fers some glimmer <strong>of</strong>
insight that adversaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future may be made <strong>of</strong> different stuff: “If [M]arines have become
accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong>y must now prepare <strong>the</strong>mselves for <strong>the</strong>
increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in <strong>the</strong> future.” 960 The bulk <strong>of</strong> SWM
assessments, however, born out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lea<strong>the</strong>rnecks’ tropical experience and validated in <strong>the</strong> Marine
mind by overwhelmingly lopsided casualty rates, 961 did little to prepare Marines for <strong>the</strong> foe <strong>the</strong>y would
face in Vietnam. 962
Learned <strong>the</strong> Hard Way: Small Patrols and Decentralized Structure
Despite opportunity to do o<strong>the</strong>rwise, Marines started each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir irregular Caribbean fights in highly
regular fashion. Although Marines had no counterinsurgency doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own, <strong>the</strong>y did have
access to <strong>the</strong> Army’s Landing Force Manual which <strong>of</strong>fered advice on small patrol tactics and night
patrols. 963 Ra<strong>the</strong>r than resort to <strong>the</strong>se, however, Marines leaned on more familiar mechanisms and
started <strong>the</strong>ir anti-insurgent duties in Haiti, <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua by garrisoning <strong>the</strong>
major population centers first and situating <strong>the</strong>mselves on <strong>the</strong> operationally defensive. Their first forays
into <strong>of</strong>fensive posture came in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> large columns marching in regular fashion. 964 Not all <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>se were disasters, but <strong>the</strong>y did not solve <strong>the</strong> “bandit” problem ei<strong>the</strong>r. Over time, Marine moves to
958
Major Samuel M. Harrington, “The Strategy and Tactics <strong>of</strong> Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1921): 481. Italics in original.
959
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction,” p. 43.
960
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 1 “Introduction,” p. 8.
961
For instance, one article points out that in <strong>the</strong> accounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> time more Marines in <strong>the</strong> Nicaraguan campaign
had died <strong>of</strong> accidents and disease (65) than <strong>of</strong> wounds sustained in action (48). Anonymous, “The Marines Return
from Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1933): 25.
962
CAP Marines learned quickly to hold <strong>the</strong>ir VC and NVA foes in high esteem. See Hop Brown, oral history, in Al
Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 25; Edward Palm, oral history, in
Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 39; Tony Vieira, oral history,
in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 43; Oral history file 2367,
United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections.
Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription prepared by Lacey Lee 21 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s
possession.
963
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 91.
964
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 74-75, 120-121.
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protect towns became increasingly more aggressive and pushed fur<strong>the</strong>r into <strong>the</strong> countryside. 965 Given
that <strong>the</strong> primary challenge for Marines was finding insurgents ra<strong>the</strong>r than killing <strong>the</strong>m once discovered,
Marines began using <strong>the</strong>ir own small patrols as "bait”—attempting to lure <strong>the</strong>ir adversary into attacking
and <strong>the</strong>n being defeated by expert marksmanship. 966
In all three episodes small, aggressive patrols emerged as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ most successful tactics in
<strong>the</strong> counter guerrilla field. 967 These were not <strong>the</strong> only innovative tactic developed by Banana War
Marines, but comprised <strong>the</strong> approach that proved most useful. Many, such as reconcentrating <strong>the</strong>
population in order to isolate insurgents, were not. 968 By <strong>the</strong> time Marines came to <strong>the</strong> small patrols
tactical discovery (once again) in Nicaragua, <strong>the</strong> Corps became serious about its documentation. 969 An
article entitled “Events in Nicaragua Since February 28, 1928” is nothing but patrols. This approach
became serialized in <strong>the</strong> Gazette. 970 If Marines couldn’t claim <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> relentless patrols in finding
insurgent leaders and a respectable number <strong>of</strong> lesser insurgent bodies to kill, <strong>the</strong>y could at <strong>the</strong> very least
claim <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> keeping <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong>f balance. Marines were “constantly on <strong>the</strong> go, so
that…[insurgents] in this area never knew when or where a patrol would drop in on <strong>the</strong>m.” 971 Marines
hoped that on-<strong>the</strong>-run status would break down organizational features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> insurgency, including
information flow.
Above all, an active and aggressive campaign against <strong>the</strong> hostile forces in <strong>the</strong> field is <strong>the</strong> most
effective method <strong>of</strong> destroying <strong>the</strong>ir intelligence service. A guerrilla band which is constantly
harassed and driven from place to place soon loses contact with its own sources <strong>of</strong> information;
it becomes confused and its intelligence system breaks down. As <strong>the</strong> occupation continues,
superiority in this respect will gradually be obtained by <strong>the</strong> intervening forces.” 972
965
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 85. The most dramatic <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se led by Smedley Butler in Haiti: Allan R. Millett, Semper
Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 187; Lester D.
Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, 1898-1934, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1985): 131-33; and “Chesty” Puller in Nicaragua: LtCol Richard J. Macak Jr. “Lessons from
Yesterday’s Operations Short <strong>of</strong> War: Nicaragua and <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November
1996): 59.
966
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 87, 120; Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic
1916-1924, (Washington DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974): 37.
967
Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001): 87-88, 124.
968
On reconcentration, and “cordon operations” see Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’
Development <strong>of</strong> Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001): 124-126; Allan R. Millett,
Semper Fidelis: The History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 201-2;
Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic 1916-1924, (Washington DC: History
and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974): 43.
969
First Lieutenant J. G. Walraven, “Typical Combat Patrols in Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (December 1929):
245.
970
Anonymous, “Events in Nicaragua Since February 28, 1928,” Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1928): 143.
971
Major John A. Gray, “Cul de Sac,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1932): 41.
972 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 2 “Organization,” p. 5.
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As late as 1933, small wars doctrinal advocate Lt. Col. Utley was still hedging on <strong>the</strong> now-proven tactic <strong>of</strong>
small patrols. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than recommend <strong>the</strong>m outright he advises <strong>the</strong>ir use “[w]hen <strong>the</strong> military situation
permits” in order to diminish “<strong>the</strong> comparative superiority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> irregular” in tracking Marines’
whereabouts. 973 The combined wisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Small Wars Manual is more forthright: “It is desirable to
keep <strong>the</strong> patrol as small as is consistent with <strong>the</strong> accomplishment <strong>of</strong> its mission. The larger <strong>the</strong> patrol
<strong>the</strong> more difficult its control in combat, <strong>the</strong> more complicated its supply problems, and <strong>the</strong> more it
sacrifices in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> concealment and secrecy <strong>of</strong> movement.” 974 It advises patrols both small and
relentless: “[B]y energetic patrolling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area and vigorous pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hostile forces once contact
is gained, <strong>the</strong> irregulars should be forced to disband completely or to move to more remote and less
fertile areas. The pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se small bands must be continuous.” 975 Marines should expect to be
outnumbered, but not outfought. Their victory will come through “increased fire power through <strong>the</strong>
proper employment <strong>of</strong> better armament, superior training and morale, and development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive.” Mobility is key: “Infantry patrols <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening force must develop mobility equal to
that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opposing forces. The guerrilla groups must be continually harassed by patrols working
throughout <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operation.” 976 Looking back, one would think CAP Marines were carrying this
chapter around in <strong>the</strong>ir pockets.
Beating Guerrillas at Their Own Game: The Signature <strong>of</strong> CAP Patrols
CAP units were small by design and were mandated to make daily and nightly patrols from <strong>the</strong> get-go.
Allnutt, in real time, notes that by far “<strong>the</strong> largest proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> time and energy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP Marine
is consumed in <strong>the</strong> planning, conduct, and reporting <strong>of</strong> strictly military operations—<strong>the</strong> patrols and
ambushes…” No matter <strong>the</strong> “pacification” level, Marines were required to engage in “continual,
aggressive patrolling.” 977 The bounded nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir patrolling, however, represents an important
distinction from patrolling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars sort. The objective <strong>of</strong> CAP patrols was not to seek out
<strong>the</strong> enemy and pursue him to extinction, ra<strong>the</strong>r CAPs were designed to clear and hold a specific village—
to protect it from VC incursions and discourage any relationship with <strong>the</strong> VC at all. CAPs concerned
<strong>the</strong>mselves only with <strong>the</strong> enemy who entered, not <strong>the</strong> enemy without. 978 While limited in geographic
reach, <strong>the</strong> mobile CAPs fit Marine psychology in being <strong>of</strong>fensively oriented. “We learned to move
toge<strong>the</strong>r as if we were one, and we never made a sound. We were among <strong>the</strong> best at what we did.” 979
Given <strong>the</strong>ir small size, squad members had to create tactical depth by cross training on all weapons and
achieving universal familiarization with communications equipment. 980 Living in and patrolling a fixed
973
Lieutenant Colonel Harold H. Utley, “The Tactics and Technique <strong>of</strong> Small Wars: Part II.—Intelligence,” Marine
Corps Gazette, (August 1933): 47.
974
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 6 “Infantry Patrols,” p. 8.
975
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 2 “Organization,” p. 6.
976
USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 6 “Infantry Patrols,” p. 2.
977
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 31-32.
978
Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), Enclosure 7.
Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website
http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013.
979
Chuck Ratliff, oral history, in Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1994), 29.
980 L. Cpl. Paul Hernandez, oral history, Hemingway: 171.
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geographic location lent CAP Marines immense advantages in knowledge <strong>of</strong> terrain. “I guess <strong>the</strong> reason
<strong>the</strong> Combined Action Program worked so well, at least in our CAG [Combined Action Group], was <strong>the</strong>
fact we knew our AO [Area <strong>of</strong> Operations] so well. The regular grunt units left and returned six weeks
later, but we knew every bush, stick, and bend in <strong>the</strong> river where an ambush could be set for us.” 981
Marines knew <strong>the</strong>y were fighting an unconventional fight, much closer to <strong>the</strong> ground, much more like
<strong>the</strong> enemy, and not at all like <strong>the</strong> Army. “[T]his CAP compound [has] its advantages over <strong>the</strong> Victor
Charlie due to <strong>the</strong> fact that we use guerrilla tactics against guerrilla tactics instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> major
conventional warfare as which are usually used in infantry tactics.” 982
The aggressive and geographically bounded patrolling posture <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP Marines yielded a number <strong>of</strong>
benefits. Villagers responded first and foremost to a clearly demonstrated ability to provide security.
When Marines succeeded, villagers tended to open up. 983 When <strong>the</strong>y did not, <strong>the</strong> opposite occurred.
One vet cites <strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> Papa-3 which was “never effective” because a steady stream <strong>of</strong> battles
showed villagers that Marines could “get <strong>the</strong>ir butts kicked.” The security context played a huge role in
<strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP. 984
The first generation <strong>of</strong> CAP units set up a day compound where <strong>the</strong>y slept, cleaned equipment, and held
medcaps for villagers. When it became increasingly clear, after a number were lethally overrun, that
<strong>the</strong>se compounds represented juicy targets for <strong>of</strong>ten overwhelming forces <strong>of</strong> VC or NVA Marine Corps
leadership made a bold break to “mobile” CAPs. 985 Marines didn’t “live” anywhere, <strong>the</strong>y remained
constantly on <strong>the</strong> move throughout <strong>the</strong>ir village, taking up randomly selected day sites with village
families (<strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> family would abandon <strong>the</strong> hootch for <strong>the</strong> day and turn it entirely over to <strong>the</strong>
Marines). Not all were enthusiastic about <strong>the</strong> switch. Arguing for <strong>the</strong> compound approach CAP scholar
Michael Peterson notes:
As a center <strong>of</strong> pacification, <strong>the</strong> compound CAP was a focal point for civic action. The peasants
knew where to come for medical help (although <strong>the</strong>y also knew where a mobile CAP could be
found – <strong>the</strong> ‘bamboo grapevine’ was very efficient). The CAP compound could be a muchneeded
haven <strong>of</strong> safety for hamlet <strong>of</strong>ficials and elders. And <strong>the</strong>y were a warehouse for supplies
earmarked for impending civic action projects. This is much more important than it appeared at
first glance. 986
Some Marines agreed. One argues strongly against <strong>the</strong> mobiles, saying that <strong>the</strong>y were terrifying, didn’t
allow <strong>the</strong> men to build up supplies, or even acquire sufficient food. In addition, “[c]ivic action duty just
981 Rocky Jay, oral history, Hemingway: 116.
982 Oral history file 2614, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Megan Hansen, 22 February 2012,
in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
983 Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 26, 30.
984 Tim Duffie, CAP veteran, lecture Utah State University, February 16, 2012.
985 Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 9.
986 Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 62.
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fell by <strong>the</strong> wayside.” 987 The mobile life certainly lacked in creature comforts. In one Marine’s
description:
We stayed on <strong>the</strong> move constantly. At night, when we could, we slept in <strong>the</strong> cemeteries. The
Vietnamese believed that to enter a cemetery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir loved ones was bad. We also slept near
dung piles out in <strong>the</strong> middle <strong>of</strong> rice paddies. The Vietnamese stayed away from <strong>the</strong>re for
obvious reasons. Our CAP always slept in full combat gear, rifles across our laps, propped up
against gravestones, trees, rocks, whatever. 988
Robert Klyman, whose <strong>the</strong>sis on <strong>the</strong> CAP program has merited both archiving in historic files at Quantico
and a place on <strong>the</strong> CAP Marine website, says most Marines were enthusiastic about <strong>the</strong> switch since it
required less “overhead” in time and materials invested in <strong>the</strong> compound and it made <strong>the</strong>m harder to fix
and kill. 989 Compound-era Marines seemed to spend an inordinate amount <strong>of</strong> time fixing up <strong>the</strong>
compound, getting it “squared away” and adding what comforts and defensive measure <strong>the</strong>y could
ra<strong>the</strong>r than spending that time in <strong>the</strong> village. 990 Klyman also emphasizes some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> advantages seen
by <strong>the</strong> Directors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program. Mobile CAPs forced Marines to live a lifestyle similar to <strong>the</strong> PFs.
Marines were not seen to have any special privileges or accommodations and this helped seal a closer
bond with both villagers and <strong>the</strong> Marines’ Popular Force trainees. It also meant that Marines were out
and about in <strong>the</strong> village (<strong>the</strong>y had nowhere else to be!) instead <strong>of</strong> hanging out at <strong>the</strong> compound all
day. 991
In <strong>the</strong> end <strong>the</strong> mobile CAPs “suffered fewer casualties and killed more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy…which to <strong>the</strong>
Marine commanders was <strong>the</strong> cardinal principle <strong>of</strong> war.” 992 The 1970 Fact Sheet notes that by being
stealthy and unpredictable (a different ambush site every night), <strong>the</strong> CAP capitalized on <strong>the</strong> advantage
<strong>of</strong> surprise, enabling it to take on much larger groups. The CAP’s small numbers were protected by
elusiveness ra<strong>the</strong>r than “sheer bulk <strong>of</strong> forces and firepower alone.” The enemy found it difficult to find
and fix <strong>the</strong> CAP target in order to bring a superior force against it. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than defending a fixed
position—<strong>the</strong> compound—<strong>the</strong> Marines’ strategic optic became more comprehensively oriented on
protecting <strong>the</strong> hamlet. The evidence supplied as to <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> this approach is fairly straightforward:
“[T]he enemy has succeeded in destroying some <strong>of</strong> our compound CAPs. He has never destroyed a
mobile CAP.” The reverse logic is undeniably compelling: “In pondering <strong>the</strong> relative merit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
987 Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 61. An interview <strong>of</strong> Gene Ferguson by Jack Shulimson 10/13/84. Peterson owns <strong>the</strong> tape.
988 John A. Daube, Navy Corpsman, oral history, Hemingway: 119.
989 Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong>
History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
990 See oral history files 2141, 2670, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcriptions in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
991 Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong>
History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
992 Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 61.
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compound CAP versus <strong>the</strong> mobile CAP, it might be well to reflect on how short this war would have
been if <strong>the</strong> VC and NVA operated out <strong>of</strong> fixed compounds.” 993
Mission Command: Pluses and Pitfalls
Banana Wars veterans, like <strong>the</strong>ir CAP successors, decentralized leadership, more out <strong>of</strong> necessity than
doctrine, and in <strong>the</strong> end came to see its value in strategic <strong>the</strong>ory: “A force assigned a small wars mission
should be tactically and administratively a self-sustaining unit. It must be highly mobile, and tactical
units, such as <strong>the</strong> battalion, must be prepared to act independently as administrative organizations.” 994
Fur<strong>the</strong>r, “Considerable authority must be granted all leaders to act independently and on <strong>the</strong>ir own
initiative. In <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> orders, action on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> patrol’s subdivision is preferable to
inaction.” 995
The lack <strong>of</strong> attendant leadership training during <strong>the</strong> 1915-1930s era, however meant that “[m]ilitary
control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupied towns and cities varied in style and emphasis according to <strong>the</strong> personalities <strong>of</strong>
local commanders,” 996 and sometimes with serious consequences. Even <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial history concedes:
“Life in insolated outposts, where <strong>the</strong>y <strong>of</strong>ten exercised wide authority under minimal supervision from
superiors, <strong>of</strong>fered temptations to corruption and <strong>the</strong> misuse <strong>of</strong> power to which a few Marines fell
victim.” 997 On a number <strong>of</strong> occasions, one ra<strong>the</strong>r infamously, Marine <strong>of</strong>ficers became so emboldened in
<strong>the</strong>ir private tropical districts that <strong>the</strong>y refused to follow orders. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most strategically damning
episodes came in Haiti at <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> Major Clark H. Wells who continued <strong>the</strong> corvée illegally despite an
order issued by Colonel John Russell to desist. 998 The Corps paid <strong>the</strong> price in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a renewed caco
uprising originating in Wells’ area. 999
CAP units, on <strong>the</strong> whole, fared significantly better. This might be expected given <strong>the</strong> instrumental and
intrinsic incentives described in Chapter 6, but remains remarkable in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that CAP squads
were composed entirely <strong>of</strong> enlisted Marines. One Director <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program pointed out <strong>the</strong> enormous
administrative responsibility that had been handed to <strong>the</strong>se young Marines:
It's interesting to note that you have a Sergeant running a Combined Action Platoon who maybe
has at most three years in <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. He has maybe had a high school education and
maybe not and he is a United States ambassador to this particular village where he operates. It
993 Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), Enclosure 7, p. 2.
Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website
http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013.
994 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 2 “Organization,” pp. 43-44.
995 USMC, Small Wars Manual, Ch. 6 “Infantry Patrols,” pp. 48-49.
996 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 70.
997 Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, Marines in <strong>the</strong> Dominican Republic 1916-1924, (Washington DC:
History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974): 32.
998 Richard Millett with G. Dale Gaddy, “Administering <strong>the</strong> Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti and <strong>the</strong>
Dominican Republic,” in Col. Stephen S. Evans ed. U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898-2007: Anthology and
Selected Bibliography, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press):105.
999 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation <strong>of</strong> Haiti, 1915-1934, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1971): 101.
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is also interesting to note that he is a Commander in <strong>the</strong> field, he has got to be his own
Operations Officer, he's got to be his own Supply Officer and he has to be his own Administrator
almost. The major supply sources <strong>of</strong> course came from <strong>the</strong> group but he was <strong>the</strong> guy that had
to order and I think that it's amazing that we got as much out <strong>of</strong> those young fellows as we
did. 1000
A second <strong>of</strong>ficer focused on <strong>the</strong> sensitive nature <strong>of</strong> commanding in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> a civilian Vietnamese
village:
I think that what <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Program is -- how it turns out, how successful it is--
depends entirely upon <strong>the</strong> key man, <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Platoon leader. In this Combined
Action Group our platoons are led by corporals and sergeants, mostly by corporals. This was
perhaps <strong>the</strong> first thing that impressed me when I entered <strong>the</strong> program. The magnitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
job that we've called upon this corporal to do; I compared it to <strong>the</strong> job I called upon my new
lieutenants to do when I had <strong>the</strong> 1 st Battalion 27 th Marines prior to coming up here. I think <strong>the</strong>re
is a great deal more to <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> leading a Combined Action Platoon. It requires an
understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnamese people, appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir attitudes and culture; it requires
a finesse that <strong>the</strong> normal platoon leader doesn’t <strong>of</strong>ten run into. Of course, <strong>the</strong> man we asked to
do this job has had little <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> background or little <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> training that we normally give our
platoon leaders. In effect I would say that in <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Program [we have an] almost
…built-in leadership gap or leadership problem, yet it is <strong>the</strong> most remarkable aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
program, is how well <strong>the</strong>se young corporals and sergeants rise to <strong>the</strong> task. 1001
Squad leaders exercised <strong>the</strong>ir autonomy by determining <strong>the</strong> mission priorities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP and by
“innovations” in combat dress and patrol procedures. The fluctuating mission set <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAPs allowed
squad leaders to determine locally driven priorities. Allnutt notes this as one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program’s foremost
advantages—squad leaders were allowed <strong>the</strong> flexibility to accommodate <strong>the</strong>ir different situations and
respond to “tactical environments and local conditions” in ways that made sense. 1002 CAP Marines, far
from <strong>the</strong> eye <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers in <strong>the</strong> rear, jettisoned all trappings <strong>of</strong> proper Marine kit and appearance that
were not useful for preserving life in <strong>the</strong> bush. Marines discarded flak jackets, helmets, and any o<strong>the</strong>r
gear that made noise and did not compensate by <strong>the</strong> virtue <strong>of</strong> firing power or radio communications for
such. 1003 PFs were drilled on patrol discipline—how to walk point, keep quiet, and maintain presence <strong>of</strong>
mind under fire, but unlike <strong>the</strong> Caribbean constabularies were not drilled in parade form and military
1000 Director Lt. Col. Brunnenmeyer, oral history file 2898, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History
Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by
Kristen Amundsen, 22 February 2012, in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
1001 Oral history file 3480, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives
and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Claire Ahlstrom 23 February 2012 in
<strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
1002 Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 17-20.
1003 Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities, Appendix E, E-5; See also Jimmy Sparrow, oral history, in Al
Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 44 and <strong>the</strong> wide range <strong>of</strong> motley
photos on <strong>the</strong> CAP website: http://capmarine.com/
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appearance. In <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>t present war between squared away dress appearance and combat utility, CAP
platoons went all out for <strong>the</strong> latter.
“Killer Teams” (KTs) were ano<strong>the</strong>r innovation devised within <strong>the</strong> CAPs. These were a handful
(sometimes only two) <strong>of</strong> Marines who went out at night with “no pack, flak jacket, helmet, or radio” and
<strong>of</strong>ten wearing VC signature black. They’d haunt <strong>the</strong> hootches <strong>of</strong> VC relatives or suspected sympathizers
and if “Victor Charlies” were discovered, attempt to kill <strong>the</strong>m with grenades. 1004 When <strong>the</strong> rear heard
about this “innovation” it was ordered stopped immediately. CAP Marines <strong>the</strong>mselves thought <strong>the</strong> idea
very useful and continued to press for its inclusion. 1005 Alternative orders did not force CAPs to stop <strong>the</strong>
KTs, but to rename <strong>the</strong>m: security teams. 1006
Mission command, CAP style, rested entirely upon <strong>the</strong> Corps’ ability to produce and select good leaders.
Bruce Allnutt captures this concept with <strong>the</strong> appropriate emotive force:
The major variable affecting <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> military operations is <strong>the</strong> leadership ability <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Marine squad leader. This man is <strong>the</strong> key to <strong>the</strong> entire operation, and on his ability all else
hinges. He must lead in a vacuum, with no higher <strong>of</strong>ficers behind him to reinforce his authority,
nowhere to pass <strong>the</strong> buck, and nowhere to hide (such as an NCO club) if things go wrong. He
must have <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> character to enforce his decisions against argument or complaint, and
<strong>the</strong> endurance to live with his mistakes. And above all, in his isolated position, he must be an
excellent tactician. Rarely is such responsibility placed in <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> a 22 year-old (that is <strong>the</strong>
average—some are 19) sergeant in o<strong>the</strong>r units. If he is strong, smart, and earns <strong>the</strong> respect <strong>of</strong>
his men, <strong>the</strong> CAP is a superb fighting machine; but if he weakens (because “after all, I have to
live with <strong>the</strong>se guys”), loses control, or makes mistakes that destroy his men’s respect for him,
<strong>the</strong> CAP goes slack and becomes not only ineffectual or a liability, but also quite vulnerable to
<strong>the</strong> enemy. 1007
Although <strong>the</strong> cumulative effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAPs was largely a positive one, <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> supervision and
extraordinary autonomy placed in young, largely untrained hands, meant that some individual CAPs
suffered <strong>the</strong> worst <strong>of</strong> human caprice. 1008 Mission command is not a risk-adverse strategy. In order to
hedge against those risks a significant investment in leadership training combined with an emphasis on
ethics and discipline and likely a recruiting image which draws civic minded as well as warrior bound
young men to <strong>the</strong> Corps would need be in place. Although this may seem a tall order, it is not
1004
Warren Carmon, oral history, Hemingway: 167; Oral history file 3480, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War
Oral History Collection. Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
Transcription by Claire Ahlstrom 23 February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
1005
Art Falco, oral history, Hemingway: 161
1006
Warren Carmon, oral history, Hemingway: 167.
1007
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 35; See also Robert
A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong> History, The
University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm; and Major H.G. Duncan, oral
history, Hemingway: 155.
1008
For examples see Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, 89-92.
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impossible. Already one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps’ contemporary heroes has handed it a new mantra: No better
friend, no worse enemy. 1009 Building on this image, should <strong>the</strong> Corps choose to become serious about it,
could provide <strong>the</strong> identity platform for precisely this sort <strong>of</strong> recruitment and training.
1009 Advice dispensed to Marines returning to Iraq in 2004 by <strong>the</strong> venerable Major General James N. Mattis. The
phrase has since taken on motto-like quality within <strong>the</strong> Corps. For example see Gordon Dillow, “Building Karmah:
Fighting Terrorism with Handshakes and Smiles,” Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, (August 2004).
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSES
Step 7: Assess Results
The preceding survey <strong>of</strong> Lessons Recognized, which were learned and which lost, as well as persistent
Cultural Blindspots at all three cultural levels: American national culture, U.S. military culture, and
Marine service culture prepares <strong>the</strong> groundwork for an assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> central questions <strong>of</strong> this
<strong>the</strong>sis:
To what extent has Marine Corps’ culture shaped, and been shaped by, counterinsurgency practice?
What does that tell us about <strong>the</strong> form engagement will likely take in future counterinsurgency
conflict?
Bound up in <strong>the</strong> answers to <strong>the</strong>se will be material which sheds light on ancillary questions:
What is it about counterinsurgency practice that is repellent to <strong>the</strong> American military—even to that
service which might be most primed to execute it effectively?
Does this overarching aversion prohibit <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps from being able to engage in sound practices?
And finally, <strong>the</strong> cultural data unear<strong>the</strong>d enable <strong>the</strong> crafting <strong>of</strong> recommendations to strategists who may
find it necessary to wield <strong>the</strong> USMC instrument in future counterinsurgency scenarios.
In reinforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “mapping” function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> research tool, <strong>the</strong> above questions will be answered
with special care giving to marking <strong>the</strong> cultural level which seems to play a dominant role in outcome—
<strong>the</strong> “operational” cultural layer. As has been demonstrated, <strong>the</strong> Marine experience with <strong>the</strong> two
counterinsurgency eras and four episodes is reflective not only <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own culture, but also <strong>the</strong> larger
mindset within <strong>the</strong> American military and <strong>the</strong> sentiments, hopes, and notions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American public
from which <strong>the</strong>y were drawn. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines’ most consistent and deleterious mistakes were
born not from Marine-ness, but <strong>the</strong>ir American-ness. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir most promising irregular
innovations were stunted in growth and denied reproduction not because <strong>of</strong> anything inherent to
Marine culture but ra<strong>the</strong>r due to <strong>the</strong> predominant influence <strong>of</strong> U.S. military culture across <strong>the</strong>ir own
commands. A key take-away from this analysis is to recognize that understanding <strong>the</strong> logic <strong>of</strong> a
strategically sound practice does not automatically translate into enactment. Even capacity for superior
warfare practices—already proven and demonstrated—can fall victim to preference for those <strong>the</strong> wider
services find more honorable or culturally comfortable to pursue. Therefore, in some cases <strong>the</strong> layer
most determinative <strong>of</strong> outcome will be national culture, in o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>the</strong> predisposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. military
as a whole, and in several <strong>the</strong> operational layer will be <strong>the</strong> distinctive essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps
itself.
“Shaping”: The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Multilayered <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> on Counterinsurgency Practice
The combination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American view <strong>of</strong> humans as problem solving agents, <strong>of</strong> itself as a possessor <strong>of</strong>
“exceptional” keys to success, a strong penchant for ahistoricism, and ignorance <strong>of</strong> foreign cultures is a
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consistent cultural recipe that has led, and will continue to lead this nation to shape nation-building and
counterinsurgency tasks in improbable, if not impossible terms for <strong>the</strong> service members sent to execute
<strong>the</strong>m. Americans believe that <strong>the</strong>y possess motives more pure than o<strong>the</strong>r actors on <strong>the</strong> foreign stage.
Although <strong>the</strong>y acknowledge some mistakes <strong>the</strong>y insist that <strong>the</strong>se be viewed through <strong>the</strong> lens <strong>of</strong>
intentions—which were good. American identity also insists on exceptionalism—<strong>the</strong> obvious (to
Americans) possession <strong>of</strong> a unique recipe for economic and political success and see it as an obligation
to bring this formula to whomever <strong>the</strong>y can. These sentiments <strong>of</strong> identity and purpose diminish in <strong>the</strong>
American heart and mind <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> or interest in studying foreign cultures. When nations are in
distress and American interests on <strong>the</strong> line <strong>the</strong> general tendency is to view <strong>the</strong> situation as a problem to
be solved. The American perspective on how to do it is only reinforced, at least initially, by Marines’
own beliefs about what <strong>the</strong>ir country and <strong>the</strong>ir service can do. Although many Marines who live
through comprehensive counterinsurgency experiences may come to tempered conclusions concerning
<strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> a foreign power to dramatically change <strong>the</strong> culture <strong>of</strong> an indigenous population and build
<strong>the</strong> institutions that will yield it political and economic success, <strong>the</strong>ir views are chronically lost to history.
Because <strong>the</strong>y are not chronicled, codified, and studied, <strong>the</strong> memory <strong>of</strong> many “lessons recognized” dies
with <strong>the</strong> veterans who lived <strong>the</strong>m. In <strong>the</strong>ir place <strong>the</strong> ardent problem-solving and optimism-as-power
<strong>the</strong>mes <strong>of</strong> American culture which are consistently validated in domestic social, economic, and technical
arenas as components <strong>of</strong> an instrumental and virtuous perceptual lens prep ano<strong>the</strong>r generation for
naïveté in <strong>the</strong> foreign realm and optimistic overstretch. Naysayers to this process are cast in disfavor
along <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>t-referenced American slogan: “The man who says it can't be done is generally
interrupted by someone doing it.” 1010
The evidence pulled from <strong>the</strong> reviewed case studies reveals that although roundly abused in <strong>the</strong> Banana
War and Vietnam cases, <strong>the</strong> dominant American mentality that nations can be “fixed” and that <strong>the</strong>
American polity and its military arm have <strong>the</strong> means to do so has not suffered any lasting harm. It
remains a blindspot. This is due, in part, to a failure to examine <strong>the</strong> impacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state-building and
counterinsurgent legacies left in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se places with <strong>the</strong> same energy as was poured into pursuing
<strong>the</strong>m. American ahistoricism combined with service narratives Marines crafted to put <strong>the</strong> best possible
spin on efforts in foreign climes have forged a lens decidedly unhelpful for critical analysis. The
summary accounts <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps service in <strong>the</strong> three Caribbean countries, Haiti, Dominican and
Nicaragua, were written as sentimental and ceremonious departures. The Gazette reported a Haiti in
which Marines left behind “a splendid atmosphere <strong>of</strong> friendship.” 1011 In Nicaragua <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>red crowd
was struck with “curious silence” as <strong>the</strong>y faced “<strong>the</strong> stark realization that <strong>the</strong> men who had provided
security for <strong>the</strong>ir persons and homes for over five years were departing, and sensing <strong>the</strong>ir impending
loss <strong>the</strong>y were deeply touched.” 1012 As regards <strong>the</strong> Dominican <strong>the</strong> Gazette claims “Friendship <strong>of</strong>
1010
Attributed to writer, artist, and libertarian Elbert Hubbard. For a quick reference see
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Elbert_Hubbard.
1011
Anonymous, “Final Ceremonies in Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1934): 20.
1012
Captain Evans F. Carlson, “The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1937): 19.
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Dominicans is Outgrowth <strong>of</strong> Our Occupation.” 1013 In none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> narratives is <strong>the</strong>re acknowledgment
that Marines were pressured to leave due to popular sentiment against <strong>the</strong>m. 1014
The scope <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency tasks is also shaped by an American perceptual lens which regards third
world “o<strong>the</strong>rs” as underdeveloped Americans. This perspective allows Americans to dismiss accusations
that <strong>the</strong>y are attempting to “change culture” and heightens notions about likely success. Although
Banana War era <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong>ten acknowledged that changing indigenous culture was exactly what <strong>the</strong>y
were about, American culture has rendered it no longer acceptable to pr<strong>of</strong>ess nor engage in such action.
Therefore contemporary Marines (and o<strong>the</strong>r service members) are assigned nation-building tasks <strong>of</strong>
similar sort but saddled with an even more obfuscating lens. An American cosmology has developed
which regards backward third-world circumstances as a stalled-out stage along a nearly predetermined
human pathway toward democratic practices and improved living. Americans value change as a marker
<strong>of</strong> progress and expect o<strong>the</strong>rs to do <strong>the</strong> same. Men with guns, dispatched at Uncle Sam’s behest, are
only <strong>the</strong>re to safeguard <strong>the</strong> passage <strong>of</strong> progress by removing its obstacles and, when necessary, hurrying
indigenous foot draggers along. The process is inevitable; American forces are only helping expedite it.
This mentality will shape counterinsurgency efforts by causing American service members to perennially
undervalue local cultural traditions and overestimate <strong>the</strong> attractiveness <strong>of</strong> American cultural features on
<strong>of</strong>fer. Marine culture <strong>of</strong>fers no counternarrative to this one nor does it encourage its members toward
critical analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> task assigned.
The successes pursued by <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps in irregular conflict have been largely shaped by American
metrics requiring countable and tangible achievements. The result is detrimental to desired strategic
effect. As has been demonstrated, given <strong>the</strong> robust nature <strong>of</strong> American valuing <strong>of</strong> countable and
material things, Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana War era were believers in pursuing material and quantifiable
ends over <strong>the</strong> intangible sort. Marines <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnam era, initially from national habit, and later against
<strong>the</strong>ir better judgment, continued to measure <strong>the</strong>ir success using very typically American yardsticks.
Their experience demonstrates <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> service inclinations which run significantly counter to
American and U.S. military norms. Commandant Leonard Chapman, in a “State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps” write-up
intended for political consumption, outlined <strong>the</strong> basic goal <strong>of</strong> his institution in Vietnam: “The Marine
Corps has consistently advocated <strong>the</strong> principle that <strong>the</strong> war in South Vietnam can be conclusively won
only through convincing <strong>the</strong> South Vietnamese people in <strong>the</strong> villages and hamlets that <strong>the</strong>ir hope lies
with freedom, not with communism,” and <strong>the</strong>n goes on to <strong>of</strong>fer up “success” by way <strong>of</strong> countable
things: enemy dead, major operations <strong>of</strong> battalion size or larger, <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> amphibious landings,
number <strong>of</strong> enemy caches uncovered, <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> sorties flown, troops lifted, supplies delivered, and
finally, a countable perhaps worth counting: enemy defected. 1015 The Commandant, despite his
inclinations o<strong>the</strong>rwise, finds himself distracted from genuine strategic ends by pressure to report on <strong>the</strong>
1013
Earl B. Hardy, “Friendship <strong>of</strong> Dominicans is Outgrowth <strong>of</strong> Our Occupation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August
1933): 5-7.
1014
Anonymous, “The Marines Return from Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1933): 23-27; J C Fegan,
“After Nineteen Years We Leave Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1934): 21; Captain Evans F. Carlson, “The
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette, (August 1937): 12.
1015
Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., “State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1969): 29-30.
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American means valued for achieving <strong>the</strong>m. In this case, superior strategic inclinations were held
captive to cultural means mistaken for ends.
The CAP program suffered particularly in this regard. As Deborah Avant points out, <strong>the</strong> metrics used to
measure success were devised by <strong>the</strong> Army and were a poor fit for <strong>the</strong> ambitions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP
program. 1016 If CAPs were successful in <strong>the</strong>ir mission, <strong>the</strong>n VC elements would disappear from <strong>the</strong>ir
neighborhood and cease to inflict <strong>the</strong>mselves in material and ideological ways on <strong>the</strong> villagers.
Therefore, a measure <strong>of</strong> CAP success would be a decrease in VC engagements (a drop in contacts and
<strong>the</strong>refore kills) and a consequent blooming <strong>of</strong> political and economic life in <strong>the</strong> village (perhaps
measured in number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials who move back, upticks in intelligence, renewed economic activity,
resettlement <strong>of</strong> refugees, friendly attitudes expressed toward CAP Marines, etc.). 1017 Instead, all reports
assessing <strong>the</strong> CAP program, including those produced by Bruce Allnutt and <strong>the</strong> American Consul each <strong>of</strong>
whom detail <strong>the</strong> strategic but essentially intangible program priorities outlined above, supply exactly <strong>the</strong>
same sort <strong>of</strong> information that a line unit at <strong>the</strong> time was providing as an indication <strong>of</strong> success: number
<strong>of</strong> kinetic contacts, number <strong>of</strong> VC dead, and comparative number <strong>of</strong> Marines and PFs wounded and
killed in action. 1018 Captain Williamson articulates his frustration with this seemingly inescapable misfit
<strong>of</strong> measurement:
If one measures success in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> V.C. captured and killed, <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong>
ammunition and funds expended, or <strong>the</strong> quantity <strong>of</strong> soap and candy distributed, <strong>the</strong>n one may
realize a statistical triumph and a practical disaster. But if <strong>the</strong> criteria <strong>of</strong> accomplishment
involved more subjective judgments, like <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> an esprit de Corps among men <strong>of</strong>
totally alien cultures, a reciprocity <strong>of</strong> confidence and respect, <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> a
communication system that is open, honest and frank, and <strong>the</strong> ability to work effectively as a
team despite <strong>the</strong> impediments <strong>of</strong> language or <strong>the</strong> dichotomy inherent between <strong>the</strong> part-time
amateur and <strong>the</strong> full-time pr<strong>of</strong>essional, <strong>the</strong>n evaluation will at least have validity. If <strong>the</strong>
obstreperous V.C. become concerned enough to make participants a special target for <strong>the</strong>ir
attentions, <strong>the</strong>n one can begin to claim success with reliability. 1019
The American penchant for measuring success in largely dispensed quantitative and material terms also
shapes <strong>the</strong> scope and content <strong>of</strong> civic action, a cultural approach which will eclipse <strong>the</strong> valuable “frugal
civic action” lessons produced within <strong>the</strong> CAP program and ensure that <strong>the</strong>y are unlikely to be replicated.
America enjoys her largess and feels a genuine obligation to share it with o<strong>the</strong>rs in need. To do less
1016
Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources <strong>of</strong> Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol 37, No. 4 (Dec 1993): 420.
1017
For examples <strong>of</strong> CAP reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sorts <strong>of</strong> indicators see Warren V. Smith, oral history, Hemingway: 140;
Robert A. Klyman, The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken, Honors Thesis, Department <strong>of</strong>
History, The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan, (1986). http://www.capmarine.com/cap/<strong>the</strong>sis-klyman.htm
1018
Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience, Interim Technical Report
commissioned by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Research Group Psychology Programs, (December 1969): 11-12; See
Enclosures 8-12, Fact Sheet on <strong>the</strong> Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, (31 March 1970), 3-4.
Declassified document provided on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marines Combined Action Platoons website
http://capmarine.com/index.htm. Accessed on February 7, 2013.
1019
Capt. R. E. Williamson, “A Briefing for Combined Action,” Marine Corps Gazette, (March 1968): 43.
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would be patently un-American. Thus <strong>the</strong> prognosis remains that <strong>the</strong> American force <strong>of</strong> public need for
big presents and generous <strong>of</strong>ferings and <strong>the</strong> belief that <strong>the</strong>se will incur <strong>the</strong> strategic gratitude <strong>of</strong> local
populations will obliterate frugal civic-action wisdom to <strong>the</strong> back corners. It will remain a positive
blindspot—a lesson unrecognized and unlearned. The U.S. will build big again. And likely with an
emphasis on schools, roads, and grand scale infrastructure. Because CAP inability to do large scale civic
action was circumstantial, and was internalized as a good fit only by those who lived it, we are not likely
to see it again out <strong>of</strong> American forces except in similar accidental circumstances.
Marine Corps service culture itself undermines efforts to improve upon and shape future civic action—
even those lessons potentially drawn from <strong>the</strong> CAP program. The Marine perception is that a strong
focus and developed expertise along civic action lines threatens to diminish a core feature <strong>of</strong> Devil Dog
identity: an “elite fighting force.” In an award-winning essay in <strong>the</strong> Gazette, written in <strong>the</strong> thick <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
U.S. civic action whirlwind in Vietnam, one Marine highlights identity worries and organizational
paranoia about pursuing civic action. He acknowledges <strong>the</strong> likely strategic advantages <strong>of</strong> civic action but
worries about <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> pursuing this obviously (to him) essential component <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency
on <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation’s premier fighting force. His historically inaccurate perceptual lens is that
past Marine practices as regards civic action have been <strong>of</strong> limited and temporary nature (!). The sort
demanded in Vietnam, he argues, would represent a “significant departure” from Marine Corps practice
and a “trespass into an area generally accepted as <strong>the</strong> domain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> US Army and civilian governmental
agencies….” More worrying than territoriality is <strong>the</strong> impact that pursuing civic action would have on
Marine Corps image and recruitment. “Excessive attention to humanitarian programs will ultimately
result in a change in <strong>the</strong> service image beyond that which is conducive to <strong>the</strong> procurement <strong>of</strong> fighting
men. Under <strong>the</strong>se circumstances <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps could be attracting men who would be <strong>of</strong> greater
service to <strong>the</strong> Peace Corps.” Organizational paranoia rears its head and drives <strong>the</strong> deliberation:
The Marine Corps has no inherent right to perpetuity within <strong>the</strong> Armed Forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United
States. It remains a separate service because it has purchased this position with combat power
and performance. An adjustment in objectives that would curtail this power could lead to
military weakness and self-oblivion. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, if civic action does in fact complement
combat power, it could prove equally fatal to reject this political, economic, social and
ideological instrument.
His summary statement on <strong>the</strong> matter is to try it out, carefully, but withdraw “from civic action
involvement if such steps are determined to be in <strong>the</strong> best interest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nation and <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps.” 1020 The prognosis here is that Marines will do civic action “windows” if it is assigned to <strong>the</strong>m,
but will prefer to keep it on <strong>the</strong> down-low. Strategists ought be advised however, that if packaged
within a larger kinetically-based role, as <strong>the</strong> CAP program was, Marines can prove exceptionally good at
civic action. Let loose to pursue more boy-scout style, “neighborly” tasks for a population over whom
<strong>the</strong>y feel some protective obligation, Devil Dog norms <strong>of</strong> ingenuity and making-<strong>the</strong>-best <strong>of</strong> frugal
circumstances shine.
1020 Maj. William C. Holmberg, “Civic Action,” Marine Corps Gazette (June 1966): 23-28.
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Perhaps <strong>the</strong> most deleterious <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American cultural inclinations when applied to nation-building tasks
is a hard-wired need for efficiency. This is present in American public (and commercial!) culture in
robust form already but is only amplified by <strong>the</strong> internal cultures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. military and especially U.S.
Marines. Marines pride <strong>the</strong>mselves on <strong>the</strong> quickest tempo <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> services—<strong>the</strong> quickest to <strong>the</strong> scene
and quickest to mission accomplishment. They are willing to pursue this “lane” at great cost to
<strong>the</strong>mselves, and o<strong>the</strong>rs. Therefore, tasks pursued by Marines reflect <strong>the</strong> instinct <strong>of</strong> “small-twitch”
muscles. For Marines success is synonymous with efficiency and high tempo action and <strong>the</strong>se
approaches threaten to diminish potential for success in civic action and training efforts.
Even in <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgency circumstances—those with <strong>the</strong> asset <strong>of</strong> a semi-legitimate political
structure at <strong>the</strong> center—Marines will find <strong>the</strong>mselves in <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> “nation-building”—buttressing
whatever aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government were flagging in sufficient form to start an uprising. Never will this
be an “efficient” task. As we have learned through repeated iteration, <strong>the</strong> civic action that prospers, not
just during <strong>the</strong> counterinsurgency engagement, but beyond, is that in which locals have personally
invested and that which is sustainable through local resources after foreign “mentors” leave. Involving
local input in a meaningful way will almost universally be a process which taxes <strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> Marine
patience and runs aground his ability to watch a project founder ra<strong>the</strong>r than step in and get it done. The
Marine values <strong>of</strong> efficiency in action and mission accomplishment do not easily endure <strong>the</strong> sorts <strong>of</strong>
convoluted local processes or much slower cultural tempos an indigenous <strong>the</strong>ater may impose. Much
worse, Marines, with American administrative support, gravitate towards centralizing structures in order
to accomplish efficient ends, disenfranchising local sources <strong>of</strong> power and providing long reach into areas
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country traditionally removed from central influences. This tendency would be inappropriately
assigned to Marines alone. Military culture across <strong>the</strong> global martial pr<strong>of</strong>ession is more likely to value
law and order than pluralism and contending voices. When combined with American largess, however:
determination to build large scale national forces and vastly improve infrastructure, <strong>the</strong> results can be a
dramatic reversal <strong>of</strong> what was intended. Despite repeated iterations <strong>the</strong> authoritarian outcomes <strong>of</strong> this
particular formula remain obscured by a perceptive lens which focuses on American intentions in <strong>the</strong>
nation-building process to <strong>the</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong> a thorough analysis <strong>of</strong> unintended (but consistent) after
effects.
Future strategists may as well be apprised that countering this impulse is unlikely to be accomplished
through educational workshops. A more productive strategy might be an attempt to channel American
and Marine tendencies ra<strong>the</strong>r than redoctrinate <strong>the</strong>m. Contextual channeling will require contours
similar to <strong>the</strong> CAP program: such penurious circumstances in dispersed outposts that each stage <strong>of</strong> a
civic action enterprise requires combined local and Marine effort, channeling <strong>the</strong> abundant can-do
energy possessed by Marines into devising creative “procurement” strategies which work to village
effect. Marines must reside in a specific location long enough to acquire <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> empathy (even if
not affection) for village life necessary to cultivate <strong>the</strong> patience to listen to villager input, <strong>the</strong> wisdom to
pursue useful and sustainable civic action projects, and <strong>the</strong> protective instinct that inspires
empowerment <strong>of</strong> local ra<strong>the</strong>r than central administrative structures.
Population-centric approaches have been and continue to be negatively impacted by Marine values
which favor action over sedentary (especially cultural) education, expeditionary over occupation duty,
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insular bro<strong>the</strong>rhood over understanding <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs, and Marine norms which allow racism and sexism to
persist. Marines are capable <strong>of</strong> treating indigenous populations well, but are not primed for it. The
cultural knowledge and training that would help substantially reduce racist tendencies is over-talked and
under valued. It gets significant lip service in doctrine and speeches and <strong>the</strong>n loses in practice when it
battles for time and resources against kinetic preparations. The result is a lesson recognized but not
internalized. All indicators suggest that this trend will continue. Expeditionary duty is anti-cultural. This
shouldn’t be true, but it is. Today’s expeditionary mindset makes it hard for Marines to take seriously
any long term investment in understanding any one place. Part <strong>of</strong> what grunts enjoy about being a
Marine is an excuse to have attention deficit disorder. An in-and-out mentality justifies hitting hard and
blowing <strong>of</strong>f local complexities. The current perception is that cultural expertise is a COIN-class s<strong>of</strong>t tool.
As <strong>the</strong> service moves away from its most recent counterinsurgent experience and toward “amphibious
roots,” <strong>the</strong> cultural swell <strong>of</strong> enthusiasm which threatened to force Marines to adjust <strong>the</strong>ir cultural
rudder in <strong>the</strong> last decade will likely recede into a ripple. Improved treatment <strong>of</strong> foreign populations is
unlikely to come from this source.
The shape <strong>of</strong> jurisprudence when bounded up in state building tasks and meted out by Marine hands
has fallen along two tracks. In one, <strong>the</strong> preeminent valuing <strong>of</strong> Marine bro<strong>the</strong>rs and <strong>the</strong> Corps led
Marines to dispense wildly one-sided justice when locals brought grievances against Marines, losing <strong>the</strong>
respect, trust, and participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public in <strong>the</strong> process. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> Marine penchant to
side with <strong>the</strong> underdog led Marines in both <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars and CAP program to defend
underprivileged populations in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own elite. Although Marines were not explicitly tasked
with jurisprudence in CAP villages, locals sought <strong>the</strong>m out for mediation from time to time because <strong>the</strong>ir
judgment was considered less biased, and free from <strong>the</strong> corruption <strong>of</strong> local politics. The take-away is
that soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea can be relied on in large measure to serve as very decent arbitrators if
sufficiently tuned to local circumstances, but will fail in spades if asked to sit court against fellow
Marines.
As has been well documented in earlier sections, racism, endemic to <strong>the</strong> American population during <strong>the</strong>
Banana and Vietnam eras and certainly unabated by entrance into <strong>the</strong> Marine institution had
pronounced effect on <strong>the</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> locals, <strong>the</strong> sizing up <strong>of</strong> adversary, and <strong>the</strong> resultant stain in both
foreign and domestic spheres on <strong>the</strong> Marines’ reputation. A long shot which some intrepid strategist
might pursue in an effort to ameliorate <strong>the</strong> worst <strong>of</strong> some Marine behavior would require a like-minded
norms entrepreneur, necessarily in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a Commandant in possession <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proper warrior
credentials. This formidable figure within <strong>the</strong> Corps might co-opt General Mattis’s mantra <strong>of</strong> “No Better
Friend, No Worse Enemy” in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> “honorable” (leaning on one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three key values: Honor,
Courage, Commitment) behavior toward civilians. This would require obsessive reinforcement at <strong>the</strong>
“identity” level via Drill Instructors who socialize new recruits to perceive “nasty” and “undisciplined”
behavior as including infractions in <strong>the</strong> civilian world (drunken behavior, caustic language, sexual
predation, and rowdiness). New norms must be cultivated and internalized through real punishments <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> sort now doled out for serious transgressions <strong>of</strong> Marine culture on base. Though most Marines
regard a norms transition <strong>of</strong> this sort as impossible, <strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> a no-cursing standard in boot
camp <strong>of</strong>fers evidence o<strong>the</strong>rwise.
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Counterinsurgency tasks have been and will continue to be shaped by chronic under preparedness by <strong>the</strong>
American services which pursue <strong>the</strong>m. The U.S. military preference for conventional wars and <strong>the</strong>
Marine adoption <strong>of</strong> a similar posture early in its formative years will mean that Marine training will
move into <strong>the</strong> future without <strong>the</strong> aid <strong>of</strong> widely consulted counterinsurgency doctrine. Despite its
emergence in <strong>the</strong> last decade, COIN doctrine will likely suffer <strong>the</strong> same fate as its Small Wars
predecessor. The need for doctrine is a lesson recognized, but not preferred, and not helped by <strong>the</strong> fact
that <strong>the</strong> American nation engages in <strong>the</strong> same sort <strong>of</strong> “never again counterinsurgency” perceptual lens
denial as does its services. Builder argues that when “a service seriously misperceives in peacetime <strong>the</strong>
kind <strong>of</strong> war it ends up having to fight, <strong>the</strong>n its actual capacity for, or effectiveness in, fighting that war
will depend upon its adaptability and its freedom to adapt.” 1021 Happily for Marines, “adapt and
overcome” is a talent at which <strong>the</strong>y excel. It will resign <strong>the</strong>m, however, to lessons learned all over again;
a learning curve that <strong>the</strong>y could read about in at least four different accounts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own history.
“Being Shaped”: The <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Counterinsurgency Practice on Marine <strong>Service</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>
Marine service culture has been shaped in limited, primarily tactical measure by its experiences in
counterinsurgency warfare largely due to <strong>the</strong> overwhelming orientation toward conventional warfare <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> U.S. military at large and evolving perceptions within <strong>the</strong> Corps itself that irregular practice was
bound to bring <strong>the</strong>m nothing but institutional grief. The impacts to Marine culture which can be tracked
to small wars service are an emphasis on small unit action including aggressive, agile patrols;
decentralized command structure; and growing inhibitions on <strong>the</strong> mistreatment <strong>of</strong> locals due to <strong>the</strong>
nearly omnipresent watch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American public eye on Marine action in <strong>the</strong>ater.
Marines in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three Caribbean <strong>the</strong>aters started <strong>of</strong>f in conventional posture and, through trial
and error, resorted to small, agile patrols that were low on heavyweight armaments and high on
marksmanship training. These norms were reinforced in each counterinsurgency <strong>the</strong>ater—especially
those in which Marines had developed little relationship with locals and <strong>the</strong>refore had to rely on <strong>the</strong>ir
small numbers to “bait” <strong>the</strong> enemy into showing himself. There is little evidence to suggest that
Marines rejected <strong>the</strong> U.S. military love for “lavish firepower,” but from an instrumental standpoint
learned that couldn’t bring it along very easily on patrols. CAP Marines enjoyed <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong> both
worlds—superlight patrols combined with access to <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong> American firepower via radio—and it is
this combination <strong>of</strong> tactical resources that has imbedded in <strong>the</strong> Marine normative set and is likely to
continue.
If Banana War Marines forged small patrols as an institutional tactic, CAP Marines combined <strong>the</strong>se with
<strong>the</strong> advantages <strong>of</strong> familiar village living and bounded geographic space. The result was a significant
diminution <strong>of</strong> home court advantage for insurgents. CAP Marines became “guerrillas in <strong>the</strong>ir own Areas
<strong>of</strong> Operations.” 1022 The efficacy <strong>of</strong> small, relentless patrols and <strong>the</strong> decentralized structure necessary to
1021
Carl Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1989): 129.
1022
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ O<strong>the</strong>r War in Vietnam, (New York, NY:
Praegar, 1989): 60.
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sustain <strong>the</strong>m are two <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> few lessons learned, and not lost, between Marine counterinsurgent
episodes. Whe<strong>the</strong>r carried forward by informal mentoring, leadership training in small groups, or
decades <strong>of</strong> now honed cultural reflex, small unit patrols made <strong>the</strong>ir way into Marine culture in a way
decidedly distinct from Army counterparts. Marines continue to be far more comfortable with small
unit action than <strong>the</strong>ir companion ground service and combined this counterinsurgency advantage with a
heavy emphasis on leadership training.
The second aspect <strong>of</strong> Marine training most likely to remain robust and prove relevant to future
counterinsurgency is <strong>the</strong> Corps’ devotion to and training in leadership. This is a lesson recognized and
pursued. CAPs, no matter how well strategically designed, were only as good as <strong>the</strong> squad leader who
headed <strong>the</strong>m. The Marine ethic known today as “mission command”—pushing decision making
authority to <strong>the</strong> most junior levels—matured appreciably in <strong>the</strong> CAP program and demonstrated <strong>the</strong>
level <strong>of</strong> leadership enlisted are capable <strong>of</strong> providing, for better and for worse. It is unclear whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>
decentralized approach was a conscious follow-on from lessons learned in <strong>the</strong> Banana War era or a
tactic simply “tried again” by virtue <strong>of</strong> circumstance. What is clear is that CAP Marines experienced a
much higher degree <strong>of</strong> success with a decentralized operational structure than did <strong>the</strong>ir novice
Caribbean counterparts and that <strong>the</strong> ethic <strong>of</strong> junior leadership continues to evolve and improve as a
distinctive Marine norm.
Many within <strong>the</strong> Corps are actively working <strong>the</strong> dual realities <strong>of</strong> mission command as advantageous in
strategic <strong>the</strong>ory and rife with risk in strategic practice. Potential for leadership has become an explicit
recruiting imperative and an identity marker for those who join <strong>the</strong> Corps. They will not let this concept
go easily. Marines will continue to train toward small unit action, complete with aggressive patrolling
and autonomous decisionmaking at enlisted levels. The extent to which this impacts upon positive civilmilitary
relations in future counterinsurgent fights will depend upon <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leadership taught
and <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> recruits <strong>the</strong> Corps continues to draw. It is fair to say, however, that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S.
services, <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps remains most prepared to step into a high friction environment demanding a
flattened command structure and confident decisionmaking from junior levels.
Marine culture continues to be reluctantly shaped by domestic national insistence that Marines live up to
righteous American values, <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> being a “good angel” abroad, and <strong>the</strong> need to be liked. Marine
mistreatment <strong>of</strong> locals has been reigned in and collectively shamed by American citizens who rely on
<strong>the</strong>ir forces to act <strong>the</strong> part in American fights cast as moral crusades. When Marines break faith with
this role <strong>the</strong>y transgress core American values and are yanked home in shame. Perhaps at <strong>the</strong> essence
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public/military divide between Marines and <strong>the</strong> nation <strong>the</strong>y serve are divergent notions <strong>of</strong> victory
and defeat. For Americans engaged in counterinsurgency <strong>the</strong> primary victory is to establish some sort <strong>of</strong>
stability through doing good and being liked. Americans suppose that <strong>the</strong>y may even win over
insurgents this way; consequently <strong>the</strong>y expect <strong>the</strong>ir Marine Corps to incur strategically productive
gratitude on <strong>the</strong>ir behalf. For Marines, conversely, victory is ra<strong>the</strong>r concretely defined by <strong>the</strong> abject
defeat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy. Marines grumble at <strong>the</strong>ir public overlords for not understanding that victory—
clearly and obviously defined in this traditional sense—requires measures which may not make <strong>the</strong>m
popular. Marines are happy with that. Their public is not.
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Marine training has increasingly ingested <strong>the</strong> American population-centric ethic, less out <strong>of</strong> internalized
morality and more out <strong>of</strong> instrumental necessity. The “strategic corporal” concept drums into Marines
<strong>the</strong> notion that any misstep <strong>the</strong>y may make, sympa<strong>the</strong>tic as bro<strong>the</strong>rs may be to <strong>the</strong>ir actions, will be
picked up by <strong>the</strong> global sized screen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> all-pervading media and transmitted for powerful and
negative strategic effect. Marines hate this fact and complain unceasingly about it. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>ir
behavior in Iraq and Afghanistan shows significant upgrades in ethical treatment from Banana and
Vietnam eras. What begins as an instrumental norm—pursued to avoid punishment from <strong>the</strong> public—
may become internalized as intrinsically valued as individual Marines and <strong>the</strong> Corps as a whole perceive
mission relevance and derive personal emotional and status rewards from it.
Why Marines Could Love Counterinsurgency…and Why They Don’t
Thus, <strong>the</strong> puzzle that drove <strong>the</strong> central query <strong>of</strong> this <strong>the</strong>sis: Why would an institution with an extensive
counterinsurgency history, some natural cultural assets for success <strong>the</strong>re, claim as <strong>the</strong> originators <strong>of</strong> U.S.
doctrine on <strong>the</strong> subject, and possession <strong>of</strong> a decade’s worth <strong>of</strong> honed expertise, turn its back on
counterinsurgent competence in favor <strong>of</strong> largely exaggerated amphibious roots? Why <strong>the</strong> repellence for
COIN operations?
An examination <strong>of</strong> Marine service culture <strong>of</strong>fers up a number <strong>of</strong> reasons why Marines should find fights
against irregulars in particularly hostile environments attractive. It can be plenty bloody enough as
Vietnam has demonstrated. Warrior ethos should not feel slighted deadly (and even horrific)
encounters. It also plays to Marine grunt-based strengths. The Marine valuing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human ra<strong>the</strong>r
than technical elements <strong>of</strong> war and showcasing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual Marine as weapon are nowhere better
staged than in <strong>the</strong> low-tech, marksmanship intensive requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bush. In addition, <strong>the</strong> austere
environment, away from large bases and masses <strong>of</strong> supporting flanks, requires individual Marines to
exercise <strong>the</strong> full range <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir “adapt, improvise, and overcome” training in a semi-autonomous
environment. The “intangibles” that Marines pride <strong>the</strong>mselves on: challenge, leadership, and selfreliance,
hold more promise for application in a dispersed and decentralized irregular war than a topdown,
highly orchestrated conventional conflict. And, whe<strong>the</strong>r Marines are ready to admit it or not, <strong>the</strong>
CAP program demonstrates that a healthy mix <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right sort <strong>of</strong> civic action in a kinetic zone can yield
strong emotional benefits for <strong>the</strong> Marines who participate. This combination, especially in fights <strong>of</strong>
dubious national necessity, provide a balm to some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disillusionment that might o<strong>the</strong>rwise beset
forces sent to counterinsurgent scenes.
This combination <strong>of</strong> cultural traits form a potential “good fit” for small wars practice, but are trumped
by values that Marines hold yet more dear. For <strong>the</strong> Marines a shunting <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgent expertise is
largely <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> organizational paranoia. Builder asks “Can institutions plan objectively for
contingencies that may only diminish or challenge <strong>the</strong> institutional self-image?” 1023 The conclusion <strong>of</strong>
this research is “No.” COIN competence threatens coming at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> Marine preferred
identities: seaborne 911 teams who swoop in, save <strong>the</strong> day, and are <strong>of</strong>ten out before <strong>the</strong> nightly news.
When missions <strong>of</strong> that sort are not <strong>the</strong> ones tasked, <strong>the</strong> Marine preference is still toward <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong>
1023 Carl Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1989): 128.
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“shock troops”—<strong>the</strong> vanguard <strong>of</strong> conventional forces, <strong>the</strong> team you call “When It Absolutely, Positively,
Must Be Destroyed Overnight.” 1024 Marine legend is almost silent on <strong>the</strong> adventures <strong>of</strong> small wars and
pays tribute to only a fraction <strong>of</strong> its heroes but is rife with deeds done and battles fought and heroes
arrived in conventional fashion. Marines, despite <strong>the</strong>ir own history, aimed for <strong>the</strong> preferred role <strong>of</strong>
frontline troops who pave <strong>the</strong> way for Army occupiers who follow. When <strong>the</strong>y get stuck alongside <strong>the</strong>m
for a decade in <strong>the</strong>ater it is an accident <strong>of</strong> Uncle Sam’s limited resources, not a fulfillment <strong>of</strong> “natural”
role.
Marines will eschew irregular expertise as a natural role in large part because <strong>the</strong>y perceive that
counterinsurgencies inevitably bring out <strong>the</strong> worst in an ungrateful nation. They believe that Americans
simply do not understand what must be done in a counterinsurgency <strong>the</strong>ater and end up resenting and
reviling Marines for doing it. Therefore, counterinsurgency efforts are a corrosive which, if done too
<strong>of</strong>ten, may utterly dissolve popular support for <strong>the</strong> Corps. Institutional paranoia fires up anytime
Marines must embark on <strong>the</strong>se endeavors and <strong>the</strong> assumption is that <strong>the</strong> outcome will be ano<strong>the</strong>r
misunderstood, unavoidable, black mark.
The Marine perceptual lens is wrong. It is not <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict but <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> Marine
treatment <strong>of</strong> civilians (and belligerents) in <strong>the</strong>se peripheral encounters that determines popular
approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. Americans are perfectly capable <strong>of</strong> rejecting <strong>the</strong> war but accepting <strong>the</strong> warriors
who fight it. The CAP program is still recognized as a national proud spot by any who come across it.
CAP Marine behavior in Vietnam, while certainly not perfect, was light years ahead <strong>of</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong>
populations in <strong>the</strong> Banana War years. The new Marine mantra-- “No better friend, no worse enemy” --is
precisely what <strong>the</strong> American people want. Marines could capitalize on this strength if <strong>the</strong>y chose to, and
become highly competent specialists in <strong>the</strong> art <strong>of</strong> small war. As discussed throughout this <strong>the</strong>sis, a
number <strong>of</strong> factors will continue to inhibit that possible trajectory but perhaps principle among <strong>the</strong>m is
that, despite today’s positive polling numbers for <strong>the</strong> Counterinsurgency Corps, Marines don’t believe it.
Their institutional paranoia and beliefs that counterinsurgencies yield nothing but black marks are too
entrenched.
From one perspective it is pr<strong>of</strong>oundly unfortunate that when <strong>the</strong> United States inevitably engages in
counterinsurgency again its service most suited to competence will remain undertrained and
underprepared to attack <strong>the</strong> task with internalized lessons learned and take best advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
“golden hour.” Marines will engage instead in <strong>the</strong> same learning curve, “adapting” from an initially
conventional approach supplied by <strong>the</strong>ir training.
From an institutional perspective, however, <strong>the</strong> Marines are likely aiming straight in turning <strong>the</strong>ir arrow
from COIN competence. The history <strong>of</strong> U.S. involvement in counterinsurgencies indicates a track record
<strong>of</strong> naïveté as regards what military and treasury resources can fix and what <strong>the</strong>y cannot. If American
administrations continue to undervalue <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> a legitimate political structure and sound
political story in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations as paramount, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y will continue to place Marines in
counterinsurgency environments in which Marines may make significant headway against belligerents,
1024 See Marine narratives Appendix D.
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may build an impressive array <strong>of</strong> infrastructure, and may guard all patrons participating in forms <strong>of</strong>
elections, but cannot will or force <strong>the</strong> political structure to be legitimate and <strong>the</strong>refore cannot, for all
<strong>the</strong>ir competence at <strong>the</strong>ir own tasks (even should <strong>the</strong>y become dedicated small wars pr<strong>of</strong>essionals)
achieve a true strategic victory.
What’s more, America’s legitimacy as a fight-to-<strong>the</strong>-end finisher continues to diminish. The primary
asset <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CAP program—<strong>the</strong> Marines’ permanency in <strong>the</strong> village until <strong>the</strong> job was done—encouraged
trust from <strong>the</strong> villagers “knowing we are going to stay.” 1025 This trust, however, was misplaced. Looking
back one CAP Marine stated bitterly, “Do you want to know <strong>the</strong> worst thing I did in Vietnam? Winning
hearts and minds. Winning hearts and minds was <strong>the</strong> ultimate betrayal. Those are <strong>the</strong> folks who were
hanging on to <strong>the</strong> helicopters and embassy walls. It’s really sad that we won some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m over.” 1026
Marines believed that <strong>the</strong>y would stay in <strong>the</strong> CAP, or at least <strong>the</strong>ir replacements would, until Americans
had worked <strong>the</strong>mselves out <strong>of</strong> a job: until PFs were ably trained and <strong>the</strong>y alongside legitimated South
Vietnamese regulars could handle VC incursions. In reality, however, <strong>the</strong> Marines had no control over
how long <strong>the</strong>y stayed. Decisions from “higher” and <strong>the</strong> political climate at home were intervening
variables. The trust that became strategically helpful in <strong>the</strong> CAP program, yielding intelligence on <strong>the</strong>
VC, increased safety for <strong>the</strong> Marines, and more comfortable living conditions by virtue <strong>of</strong> native
<strong>of</strong>ferings in food and services, may be impossible to replicate in future counterinsurgency operations.
The U.S. national record – <strong>of</strong> “leaving before <strong>the</strong> job is done” in both Vietnam and very likely in
Afghanistan—to <strong>the</strong> extent that it is known by populations in future counterinsurgency scenarios, will
(and should!) act as an impediment to strategically productive relationships with indigenous civilians.
1025 Oral history file 2304-6, United States Marine Corps Vietnam War Oral History Collection. Marine Corps
Archives and Special Collections. Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA. Transcription by Victoria Cattanach, 21
February 2012 in <strong>the</strong> author’s possession.
1026 Mike Patton, correspondence with <strong>the</strong> author, January 17, 2012. See also John Balanco, oral history, in Al
Hemingway, Our War Was Different, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 69.
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APPENDIX A:
U.S. ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE CULTURES
Continuing Step 3: Amass a Range <strong>of</strong> Cultural Influences – Sister <strong>Service</strong>s
The following analyses <strong>of</strong> Air Force, Army, and Navy service cultures will be discussed within <strong>the</strong> four
dimensions at <strong>the</strong> core <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cultural Mapping Exercise: Identity, Norms, Values, and Perceptual Lens.
It is worth <strong>of</strong>fering a reminder that <strong>the</strong>se are elastic concepts and mutually overlapping. For instance,
<strong>the</strong> “spread <strong>of</strong> democracy” might be considered a core aspect <strong>of</strong> one’s primary service role, and
<strong>the</strong>refore identity, as well as a strongly held value which shapes warfare activities (norms) and
perceptions about <strong>the</strong> purpose and rightness <strong>of</strong> wars fought (perceptual lens). The function <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se
analytic categories is not to separate cultural information into cleanly chopped packages for <strong>the</strong>
purposes <strong>of</strong> categorization but ra<strong>the</strong>r to aid in widening and deepening <strong>the</strong> dimensions within which we
view and make sense <strong>of</strong> service motivations, perceptions, and behavior. Our traditional, linear based
formulas need significant enhancing in order to capture <strong>the</strong> complex, institutionally derived, and
ultimately human needs, desires, and insecurities that culminate in strategic policy. It is most useful,
<strong>the</strong>refore, to think <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se four analytic drivers as question sets crafted to push research into territory
not typically tackled with much sophistication in <strong>the</strong> American security community. 1027 The categories
are not ends in <strong>the</strong>mselves, but simply a means for acquiring a more complete image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong>
study. The end result for <strong>the</strong> respective services is organized here with deference to <strong>the</strong> four categories
in order to demonstrate <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> data that may be unear<strong>the</strong>d in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four as well as those
cultural traits which present significant overlap – appearing in multiple dimensions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective
service’s culture – and <strong>the</strong>refore are most likely to represent core, difficult to budge, features <strong>of</strong> service
orientation.
Researching organizational culture is complex. Values dearly held, motivations which inspire behavior,
and key perceptions about <strong>the</strong> world may not be <strong>of</strong>fered rhetorically or even consciously rendered in
<strong>the</strong> mind <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sailor, soldier, airman or marine. If <strong>the</strong> need to mask national interest in moral virtue is
genuinely more pronounced in Americans than o<strong>the</strong>r nationals <strong>the</strong>n it is unsurprising that service
members—<strong>of</strong>ten sincerely—perceive decisions emanating from institutional self interest as responses
to <strong>the</strong> national interest. It is useful, <strong>the</strong>refore, to add an outsider perspective to those <strong>of</strong>ten compelling
and insightful treatises on organizational culture provided by those inside a service. More useful yet is
<strong>the</strong> side by side sort <strong>of</strong> comparison that Carl Builder <strong>of</strong>fers in his pioneering work. To date, no o<strong>the</strong>r
author has attempted a comparison <strong>of</strong> U.S. services on a similar scale. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> following sections
will use Builder’s work as foundation, built up with contributions from o<strong>the</strong>rs over <strong>the</strong> last two decades,
and adjusted where <strong>the</strong> cultures <strong>of</strong> those organizations have adapted and morphed in notable ways.
Our survey will start with that service fur<strong>the</strong>st removed from Marine Corps heritage and practice: <strong>the</strong> Air
Force, and move to those with whom it grudgingly (Army) and historically (Navy) finds itself intertwined.
1027 See comprehensive question set provided in Appendix A in Jeannie L. Johnson and Mat<strong>the</strong>w T. Berrett,
“Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 55 No 2, June 2011, Center
for <strong>the</strong> Study <strong>of</strong> Intelligence.
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Air Force <strong>Culture</strong>
The Air Force has <strong>the</strong> most limited historical basis for its identity, not just in <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> temporal
formation as a distinct service, but conceptually as well. Major William Thomas points out that <strong>the</strong>
Army, Navy, and Marines have progenitors for <strong>the</strong>ir craft stretching back centuries. Warriors have been
fighting, ships sailing, and strategists <strong>the</strong>orizing about ground and naval warfare across all <strong>of</strong> that time.
“The Air Force, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, can trace its conceptual history only to <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 20 th
century, when aircraft were invented, and its identity as a separate service only to 1947…[T]he oldest
book on <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s current pr<strong>of</strong>essional reading list was written in 1990, and most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> books do
not specifically address airpower.” 1028
Equally troublesome, <strong>the</strong> United States Air Force’s (USAF) short history has not been one <strong>of</strong> consistently
accreted strength, vitality, and sense <strong>of</strong> self. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bumps it has suffered to identity have been
seismic. The invincibility <strong>of</strong> strategic bombing which formed <strong>the</strong> soul <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Air Force, and founded its
raison d’être post World War II, 1029 was “shattered” by <strong>the</strong> “disaster” <strong>of</strong> Vietnam. As an agricultural
country beset by a guerilla movement, Vietnam had no vital centers to target. Defeated by a war which
had no use for its most cherished fighting form, <strong>the</strong> Air Force was forced into a transformation <strong>of</strong> core
mission values and identity, resulting in a dramatic post-Vietnam shift from strategic bombing to <strong>the</strong>
mission sets <strong>of</strong> fighter pilots. 1030
The current shift toward irregular warfare competency poses a potentially yet more debilitating
transformation for <strong>the</strong> Air Force. Most in <strong>the</strong> air service would see it as a devolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> core
competencies <strong>the</strong>ir service should be <strong>of</strong>fering <strong>the</strong> nation. USAF Special Tactics <strong>of</strong>ficer Capt Daniel
Magruder claims that <strong>the</strong> very factors facilitating <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s institutional success: <strong>the</strong> pursuit <strong>of</strong>
technology, a culture <strong>of</strong> individualism, and <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> progressive airpower, simultaneously “limit its
ability to adapt to irregular warfare.” Irregular warfare casts in doubt <strong>the</strong> master <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sky’s “almost
divine belief in airpower’s ability to yield decisive effects.” 1031 The role that <strong>the</strong> Air Force can and has
played in irregular conflicts strikes in negative ways at every dimension <strong>of</strong> its still adolescent institutional
self: identity, values, norms, and perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> right kind <strong>of</strong> war.
Identity
The Air Force has an identity problem. At its core is <strong>the</strong> reality that its members have congregated not
so much for love <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution—<strong>the</strong> United States Air Force (USAF)—but for “love <strong>of</strong> flying machines
and flight.” The Air Force sense <strong>of</strong> self is bound up in <strong>the</strong> technology it employs. More than an
1028 Maj. William C. Thomas, “The Cultural Identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Air Force,” Air & Space Power Journal, 30
January 2004, accessed on 4 June 2012 at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/thomas.html
1029 James M. Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion: Building and Air and Space Force for <strong>the</strong> 21 st Century, INSS
Occasional Paper 19, Air Force Planning Series, (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security
Studies, June 1998): 10. Accessed on 24 May 2012 at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usafa/ocp19.pdf
1030 Phillip S. Meilinger, Book Review, “The Icarus Syndrome: The Role <strong>of</strong> Air Power Theory in <strong>the</strong> Evolution and
Fate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Air Force,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 22, Issue 1, (Fall 1995): 142.
1031 Daniel L. Magruder, Jr., “The U.S. Air Force and Irregular Warfare: Success as a Hurdle,” Small Wars Journal,
2009, accessed 4 June 2012 at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/272-magruder.pdf.
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institution, it is an “embodiment <strong>of</strong> an idea, a concept <strong>of</strong> warfare, a strategy made possible and
sustained by modern technology.” 1032
The Air Force knows it has an identity problem and has felt, in acute form, some <strong>of</strong> its repercussions. Air
Force retention suffers from its lack <strong>of</strong> cohesion and amorphous sense <strong>of</strong> mission. The “intangibles”
that form <strong>the</strong> bread and butter <strong>of</strong> Marine Corps recruiting—bro<strong>the</strong>rhood, identity, viscerally rooted
common cause—are somewhat absent in <strong>the</strong> nation’s airborne service. The young force has yet to
claim <strong>the</strong> sorts <strong>of</strong> celebrated norms and deeply rooted values that feed and sustain identity. Without
<strong>the</strong>se, common bonds will founder, “reduc[ing] <strong>the</strong> commitment <strong>of</strong> airmen to <strong>the</strong> Air Force as a
pr<strong>of</strong>ession” and “leaving <strong>the</strong>m more likely to be lured away by o<strong>the</strong>r jobs that <strong>of</strong>fer better pay, location,
or working conditions.” 1033
Fractured “occupationalism” may be <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s most worrisome centrifugal force. The Air Force is
an organization in which “small, <strong>of</strong>ten technology-based, subcultures flourish” 1034 creating a ra<strong>the</strong>r
pronounced “cohesion problem.” USAF personnel tend to identify with <strong>the</strong>ir weapon system over <strong>the</strong>ir
service. 1035 As Builder noted in his original assessment: “The pride <strong>of</strong> association is with a machine, even
before <strong>the</strong> institution.” 1036 Occupationalism—<strong>the</strong> tendency to identify more with one’s civilian
counterparts than with o<strong>the</strong>r members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> service—is one result. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
are less beset with this phenomenon, due, likely in large part, to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>ir servicemembers
have few civilian counterparts. As technical specialists in commercially available fields, Airmen are in a
different category. 1037 James M. Smith points to a study conducted in <strong>the</strong> 1980s which attempted to
assess Airmen identity. Its results clearly demonstrated a lack <strong>of</strong> significant identity attachment to <strong>the</strong>
Air Force as an institution, even among its most prized members: “[J]unior <strong>of</strong>ficer flyers identified
<strong>the</strong>mselves as pilots first—<strong>the</strong>y just happened to be practicing that occupation for <strong>the</strong> USAF.” 1038
Air Force leadership has attempted to remedy <strong>the</strong> identity problem through a consciously produced rally
round a common, unifying label. Men and women in <strong>the</strong> Army are soldiers, Marines are marines, but
<strong>the</strong> Air Force has lived institutionally divided between pilots and all o<strong>the</strong>rs. 1039 To bridge this division
and <strong>of</strong>fer a common identity, USAF leadership attempted to amp renewed enthusiasm around <strong>the</strong> title
“Airmen.” Reception to this overture remains a bit unsteady, however. USAF personnel are not sure to
whom <strong>the</strong> label appropriately applies, and <strong>the</strong> vast non-pilot class is somewhat uncomfortable accepting
“Airmen” as an identity moniker. USAF leadership has also floated “wingman” as a term <strong>of</strong>
1032 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 32.
1033 Thomas, “The Cultural Identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Air Force.”
1034 Thomas, “The Cultural Identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Air Force.”
1035 James M. Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion: Building and Air and Space Force for <strong>the</strong> 21 st Century, INSS
Occasional Paper 19, Air Force Planning Series, (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security
Studies, June 1998): xi. Accessed on 24 May 2012 at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usafa/ocp19.pdf
1036 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 23.
1037 Thomas, “The Cultural Identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Air Force.”
1038 Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 18.
1039 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 26.
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identification and camaraderie. This label seems to have more play across Air Force personnel. 1040 Very
likely, however, any top down effort <strong>of</strong> this sort will require an organic infusion <strong>of</strong> grit and heart and
history in order to root-in a common identity and draw o<strong>the</strong>rs to it. 1041 The institution will have to come
into its own on its own terms.
Combat pilots claim <strong>the</strong> clearest and proudest identity within <strong>the</strong> force and dominate both its
leadership 1042 and its legends. James Burk, in his classic piece on military culture, notes that pilots
represent a romantic holdout <strong>of</strong> military fighting form: “individual warriors each fighting for his own
reputation and honor.” While <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern military emphasizes a strict adherence to team,
<strong>the</strong> fighter pilot engaging in air combat manages to continue a tradition <strong>of</strong> individual glory in <strong>the</strong> midst
<strong>of</strong> modern war. 1043 Heroes, in <strong>the</strong> Air Force tradition, possess “<strong>the</strong> ability to single-handedly wield an
advanced technological machine in combat.” 1044
Tales <strong>of</strong> airborne heroism in World War II and Vietnam are <strong>the</strong> heritage upon which <strong>the</strong> institution is
built. Given that <strong>the</strong> pilot class makes up only five percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total Air Force, <strong>the</strong>se hero stories have
somewhat limited inspirational value for <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> Air Force membership. 1045 Effective as
<strong>the</strong>ir operations may be, even today’s “Drone jocks” have had a hard time fitting into this traditional
elite. The Air Force has not “taken to” <strong>the</strong> unmanned aerial vehicle role with much enthusiasm.
Instead, Air Force culture “[remains] largely defined by <strong>the</strong> collective dreams <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers…to fly jets fast
and high.” 1046
On <strong>the</strong> surface <strong>the</strong> Air Force would appear to have <strong>the</strong> healthy makings <strong>of</strong> a superiority complex – <strong>the</strong>
sort <strong>of</strong> identity that egoed young men and women would be eager to claim. “[N]o o<strong>the</strong>r military service
has enjoyed such global dominance in comparison to its peers. The US Air Force is completely unrivaled
regarding <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> air power across <strong>the</strong> globe.” 1047 The Air Force flashes fast, progressive,
sometimes mind boggling excellence and precision in what it does; and it seems to flout a youthful
stripe that projects an image <strong>of</strong> preeminence—a modern branch overtaking <strong>the</strong> roles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional
1040
Carolyn Chu, Brandon Dues, and Laura Miller, Cultural Themes in Messages from Top Air Force Leaders, 2005-
2008, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010) 23.
1041
The attitude embedded in this commissioned study says something about Air Force disregard for organic vice
purposefully constructed forces. The study’s authors, likely parroting <strong>the</strong>ir sponsors, assume that “one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
major responsibilities <strong>of</strong> senior leaders is to shape an organization’s culture and manage its various identities.”
Chu, Dues, and Miller, Cultural Themes in Messages from Top Air Force Leaders, 2.
1042
Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 78.
1043
James Burk, “Military <strong>Culture</strong>,” Encyclopedia <strong>of</strong> Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume 2, (San Diego, CA:
Academic Press, 1999): 449.
1044
Daniel L. Magruder, Jr., “The U.S. Air Force and Irregular Warfare: Success as a Hurdle,” Small Wars Journal,
2009, accessed 4 June 2012 at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/272-magruder.pdf.
1045
Chu, Dues, and Miller, Cultural Themes in Messages from Top Air Force Leaders, 24.
1046
Gordon Lubold, “The Air Force’s New Poster Boys: Drone Jocks,” Christian Science Monitor, July 5, 2009.
Accessed on 10 July 2012 at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2009/0714/p02s01-usmi.html.
1047
Daniel L. Magruder, Jr., “The U.S. Air Force and Irregular Warfare: Success as a Hurdle,” Small Wars Journal,
2009, accessed 4 June 2012 at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/272-magruder.pdf.
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services. 1048 In 1989, Builder assessed that <strong>the</strong> Air Force was “supremely confident about its relevance,
[and] about <strong>the</strong> decisiveness <strong>of</strong> air power as an instrument <strong>of</strong> war.” 1049 After more than a decade <strong>of</strong>
status in a supporting role however, (Kosovo excepted), some airmen have begun to doubt <strong>the</strong>ir worth
to <strong>the</strong> nation. 1050
Without question, <strong>the</strong> identity being asked <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Air Force in irregular conflict is that <strong>of</strong> a support
service. Even worse, participants in its own 2007 symposium on counterinsurgency assessed that, given
<strong>the</strong> near perfect failure record <strong>of</strong> outside powers attempting to win inside wars, <strong>the</strong> Air Force ought to
bend to historical logic and relegate itself to a “standing-in-<strong>the</strong>-back-row” type <strong>of</strong> engagement in which
it did not fight COIN, but ra<strong>the</strong>r enabled internal partners to do <strong>the</strong> fighting. 1051 This approach may
make all <strong>the</strong> good sense in <strong>the</strong> world, but, combined with a role confined to supporting ground forces,
threatens all that <strong>the</strong> Air Force has fought to become. “[T]he Air Force still remembers its struggle with
<strong>the</strong> Army for independence, and it is sensitive to challenges to that independence or to its attachment
to <strong>the</strong> ground combat mission. It emphasizes <strong>the</strong> strategic dimensions <strong>of</strong> aerial combat over <strong>the</strong> ground
support roles to continue to assert its case for autonomy as a service.” 1052 The fight for autonomy was
long and hard, thus Airmen feel deeply insecure about rolling back to an identity founded in servicing
U.S. ground and sea forces. 1053 For institutional security and reasons <strong>of</strong> sheer pride, <strong>the</strong> Air Force
prefers by far a scheme <strong>of</strong> warfare in which <strong>the</strong>y make autonomous contributions to “war at <strong>the</strong> high
end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spectrum.” Wishful thinking <strong>of</strong> this sort has meant a continued institutional focus “almost
exclusively on major combat operations or situations where [<strong>the</strong> Air Force] alone can be decisive” and
neglect <strong>of</strong> “situations where it serves primarily in a supporting role.” 1054 The ramifications <strong>of</strong> neglect
are evidenced in <strong>the</strong> USAF’s material and ideational values, as well as <strong>the</strong> norms <strong>the</strong>y support.
Values
An organization possesses both a set <strong>of</strong> values which it consciously cultivates and projects, as well as a
set which it pursues systematically, but, for <strong>the</strong> most part, unconsciously. In ei<strong>the</strong>r case, <strong>the</strong> Air Force
finds itself wanting. Air Force Academy pr<strong>of</strong>essor George Mastrioianni passes sweeping judgment on
both: “[T]here is not a…widespread vision <strong>of</strong> shared institutional values in <strong>the</strong> Air Force.” 1055
Certainly <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s top-down marketing <strong>of</strong> institutionally designed values has seemed to suffer a
bit. The RAND Corporation was asked by Air Force leadership to conduct content analysis <strong>of</strong> key
leadership communications to service members across USAF specialties and evaluated <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong>
1048
George R. Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” Parameters, Winter
2005-06: 89. Accessed on 26 June 2012 at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/05winter/mastroia.htm
1049
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 28.
1050
Lt. Col. Robert Spalding, USAF, “America’s Two Air Forces,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2,
(Summer 2009).
1051
Col. Robyn Read, USAF, Ret., “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 21,
Issue 4 (Winter 2007).
1052
Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 13. See also Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 27.
1053
Magruder, Jr., “The U.S. Air Force and Irregular Warfare.”
1054
Maj Kenneth Beebe, USAF, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 20, Issue 1,
(Spring 2006): 28, 32.
1055
Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 79-80.
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receptivity to Air Force stated values. RAND assessed that two Air Force values: Integrity First and
Excellence in All We Do were being communicated effectively and consistently to service members, but
<strong>the</strong> third: <strong>Service</strong> Before Self, remained in a lackluster state – receiving some lip service but very little
underpinning by way <strong>of</strong> examples or conveyed conviction. 1056 Whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se values were internalized
(beyond simply being received) RAND did not determine.
Even if glossy cover values are not making <strong>the</strong> headway leadership would like, <strong>the</strong> Air Force is not
entirely without grassroot varieties. No observer in his right mind could miss <strong>the</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r intense valuing
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s true heroes: its planes. James Smith strikes a “hero” comparison with <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s
Army parent:
[Although] cannon and shell, instruments <strong>of</strong> war, abound around <strong>the</strong> periphery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> West
Point plain…<strong>the</strong> central area closest to <strong>the</strong> cadets who will lead <strong>the</strong> future Army is reserved for
statues <strong>of</strong> military leaders <strong>of</strong> note—Washington, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and even Patton. At
<strong>the</strong> Air Force Academy, [on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand] busts <strong>of</strong> air leaders, from <strong>the</strong> Wright Bro<strong>the</strong>rs
through Hap Arnold, surround <strong>the</strong> central area, but upon that area one finds static displays <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> F-4 and F-105 from Vietnam and <strong>the</strong> F-15 and F-16 from Desert Storm. Technologies <strong>of</strong>
flight take center stage. 1057
It is not even <strong>the</strong> purpose for which <strong>the</strong>se machines were invented that draws young pilots to <strong>the</strong>ir
wings; it really is <strong>the</strong> planes <strong>the</strong>mselves. “The prospect <strong>of</strong> combat is not <strong>the</strong> essential draw; it is simply
<strong>the</strong> justification for having and flying <strong>the</strong>se splendid machines.” 1058 Builder notes, by way <strong>of</strong> partial
evidence, that pilots asked to articulate images <strong>of</strong> future conflict have almost nothing to say—<strong>the</strong>y are
too focused on describing <strong>the</strong> capabilities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sleek machine beside <strong>the</strong>m. Only <strong>the</strong> Warthog pilot—
who can take no pride in his airplane, (so must focus on mission!)—can supply a vivid portrayal <strong>of</strong> what
future warfare might look like for him. Army <strong>of</strong>ficers, by contrast, spring immediately to task and paint
compelling and detailed portraits <strong>of</strong> future combat scenarios. 1059
It should be, <strong>the</strong>refore, unsurprising that for US Air Force service members “technology management is
more prized than combat leadership.” 1060 A recent nostalgia piece seems to provide a case in point.
Written as a tribute to three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most inspired leadership figures in Air Force history, <strong>the</strong> author
marks <strong>the</strong>ir crowning achievement as having “understood <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> technology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
1056
Chu, Dues, and Miller, Cultural Themes in Messages from Top Air Force Leaders.
1057
Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 13.
1058
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 23.
1059
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 115-123.
1060
Franklin D. Margiotta, “Changing Military Manpower Realities: Implications for <strong>the</strong> Next Decade,” in Franklin D.
Margiotta, James Brown, and Michael J. Collins, eds., Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1983): 22-24, cited in Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 17.
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time, and more important (sic) fashioned a path for <strong>the</strong> technology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future.” 1061 A second
heritage piece was entitled simply “The Things We Are.” 1062
The USAF seems to have taken to heart Builder’s admonition that “If <strong>the</strong> Air Force is to have a future <strong>of</strong>
expanding horizons, it will come only from understanding, nurturing, and applying technology.” 1063
When assessing its technological health, <strong>the</strong> Air Force does so with an eye toward sophistication ra<strong>the</strong>r
than numerical largess. 1064 “To be outnumbered may be tolerable, but to be outflown is not.” 1065 One
consequence <strong>of</strong> prizing high tech, and consistently investing material goods that direction, is that <strong>the</strong> Air
Force has very little to <strong>of</strong>fer potential allied partners in third world irregular conflicts by way <strong>of</strong>
technology transfer or training. 1066
The Air Force could change this with relative ease. One <strong>of</strong> its own, Lt Col Robert Spalding, detailed with
some precision how <strong>the</strong> current force, with limited adjustments to airframe procurements, could
acclimate to <strong>the</strong> material needs <strong>of</strong> an effective counterinsurgency effort. 1067 He is seconded by an
equally convincing case pr<strong>of</strong>fered by Col. Russell J. Smith, who argues that not only could <strong>the</strong> Air Force
budget handle <strong>the</strong> acquisition <strong>of</strong> light attack aircraft for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> irregular conflict, it would in
short order accumulate budget surpluses from this wise investment which would allow for procurement
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sexier craft—like <strong>the</strong> F-35—which Air Force <strong>of</strong>ficialdom prizes. 1068
In addition to budget advantages for <strong>the</strong> service as a whole, Col. Smith spends a good deal <strong>of</strong> time
detailing <strong>the</strong> advantages a light attack aircraft would afford airmen and <strong>the</strong>ir joint partners on <strong>the</strong>
ground. Size and comportment would allow <strong>the</strong>se airframes to be co-locate at Army forward operating
bases—dramatically improving air-to-ground coordination 1069 --and would also allow for deployment “to
locations where our frontline fighters wouldn’t dare land.” Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>ir understated technology would
provide “<strong>the</strong> ideal aircraft for our mission <strong>of</strong> building partner capacity in developing countries!” Despite
his impassioned plea for common sense to rule, Col Smith resigns himself to a value driven reality:
“Unfortunately, <strong>the</strong> empirical data clearly shows that <strong>the</strong> Air Force does not value joint air-to-ground
1061 Walter J. Boyne, “Reflections on <strong>the</strong> U.S. Air Force: Three Inspired Leaders Molded America’s Air Force in
Their Own Image—and Changed it Forever,” Aviation History, Vol 18, Issue 1, (September 2007): 26.
1062 Jeff Duford, “The Things We Are: Air Force Heritage and History in Artifacts,” Air Power History, Spring 2008,
Vol. 55, Issue 1: 4-15.
1063 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 19.
1064 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 21. See also Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 13.
1065
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 22.
1066
Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 49.
1067
Lt. Col. Robert Spalding, USAF, “America’s Two Air Forces,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2,
(Summer 2009). See also Oliver Fritz and Gregory A. Hermsmeyer, “The U.S. Air Force and Stability Operations
Transformation,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 47, (4 th Quarter 2007).
1068
Col Russell J. Smith, USAF, “Common Sense at <strong>the</strong> Crossroads for Our Air Force,” Air and Space Power Journal,
Vol. 26, Issue 2, (March-April 2012).
1069
Attempts to improve this dynamic include conferences like <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps-Air Force Warfighter Talks
highlighted in Daniel J. Darnell and George J. Trautman III, “Shoulder to Shoulder: The Marine Corps and Air Force
in Combat,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, (1 st quarter 2009). As one might imagine, airframes that could
facilitate much closer air-ground coordination would be preferred to conferences as a more effective fix.
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interdependence, certainly not over shiny, new fifth-generation capability like <strong>the</strong> F-35.” 1070 For <strong>the</strong> Air
Force it is not a matter <strong>of</strong> capacity, or budget. It is a matter <strong>of</strong> will.
Given that sophisticated technology requires a sophisticated education, it is a logical outcome that <strong>the</strong>
Air Force values and rewards advanced degrees within its service. As a result, it boasts <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong>
being <strong>the</strong> most educated <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forces: When tabulated in 1998, over half <strong>of</strong> Air Force line <strong>of</strong>ficers held
graduate degrees, and <strong>the</strong> graduate degrees held across <strong>the</strong> membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> USAF claimed 70
percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> graduate degrees for <strong>the</strong> entire U.S. military. In 1997, <strong>the</strong> Navy registered 77 doctoral
degrees. The Air Force, in <strong>the</strong> same year, had almost 900. 1071 The educational record is certainly
impressive, but some within <strong>the</strong> Air Force are arguing that advanced degrees are being pursued
primarily for career advancement and have done little to enhance <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>iciency <strong>of</strong> Air Force tasks:
For unknown reasons, <strong>the</strong> Air Force lost its way regarding <strong>the</strong> value and importance <strong>of</strong> graduatelevel
education for its <strong>of</strong>ficers. Instead <strong>of</strong> [advanced degrees] representing something <strong>of</strong> value
that increased skills and knowledge and signaled higher levels <strong>of</strong> human capital, <strong>the</strong>y and <strong>the</strong>
process <strong>of</strong> earning <strong>the</strong>m devolved into a test <strong>of</strong> loyalty or a sign <strong>of</strong> commitment to an Air Force
career. 1072
Pr<strong>of</strong>essor George R. Mastroianni might agree. He insists that technical and degreed though it may be,
<strong>the</strong> Air Force service is, en masse, imperiously and naively anti-intellectual. “The paradox <strong>of</strong> Air Force
culture is that it can be decidedly anti-intellectual—a circumstance perhaps not uncommon in
authoritarian cultures such as <strong>the</strong> military—but never<strong>the</strong>less convinced <strong>of</strong> its intellectual superiority.
This tendency is perhaps stronger in <strong>the</strong> Air Force than in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r service cultures.” 1073 USAF expertise
in technology does not seem to produce a concomitantly high level <strong>of</strong> critical thinking about
technology’s strategic use. The Army outproduces <strong>the</strong> Air Force in scholarly literature by a wide margin
and “[w]hen it comes to injecting ideas into national debates, [<strong>the</strong> USAF finds itself] similarly
behind.” 1074 Even in <strong>the</strong> most foundational <strong>of</strong> service oriented intellectual endeavors: doctrine, <strong>the</strong> Air
Force comes <strong>of</strong>f a bit sophomoric. Williamson Murray elects to abandon diplomatic tact when he
characterizes <strong>the</strong> Air Force <strong>of</strong>ferings in this category:
The [A]ir [F]orce has…devoted considerable resources to doctrine, but <strong>the</strong> results reflect a
service with few interests outside <strong>of</strong> technology (and certainly not <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> war). Its new Air
Force Basic Doctrine is long on pictures and short on content. In <strong>the</strong> doctrinal world its
1070
Smith, “Common Sense at <strong>the</strong> Crossroads for Our Air Force,” 101-104.
1071
Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 20-21. Despite <strong>the</strong>se impressive statistics, Col Robyn Read argues that <strong>the</strong>
Air Force still lacks in cultural and linguistic pr<strong>of</strong>iciency. Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 46.
1072
Maj Tobias Switzer, USAF, “Air Force Policy for Advanced Education,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol 25,
Issue 4 (Winter 2011): 41.
1073
Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 82-83.
1074
Lt. Gen. Stephen R. Lorenz, USAF, “Transforming Air Force Education for <strong>the</strong> Long War and Beyond,” Air and
Space Power Journal, Vol. 21, Issue 2, (Summer 2007): 7.
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approach is close to that <strong>of</strong> “See Spot fly; See Jane bomb.” And in case <strong>the</strong> reader is incapable
<strong>of</strong> picking out <strong>the</strong> key points, <strong>the</strong>y are italicized in blue. 1075
Major William C. Thomas explains <strong>the</strong> thin air that passes for doctrinal oxygen in <strong>the</strong> Air Force as <strong>the</strong>
result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “primacy <strong>of</strong> technology over warfighting <strong>the</strong>ory.” He argues that this is <strong>the</strong> natural result <strong>of</strong>
an institution founded out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong> a particular technology ra<strong>the</strong>r than a <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>
warfighting. The Army, Marines, and Navy have cultures grounded in <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>of</strong> land or naval warfare;
<strong>the</strong> Air Force, by contrast, banks its success not on better tactics and strategies, but ra<strong>the</strong>r in possessing
technology <strong>of</strong> such surpassing sophistication that <strong>the</strong> enemy gives up before he begins. 1076
US Airmen may not value complex and erudite doctrine, but do value efficiency, progress, and <strong>the</strong>
lifestyle appropriate to <strong>the</strong> nation’s least primitive force. Builder notes that Air Force material culture
radiates a clean crisp future orientation. Its <strong>of</strong>fice space in <strong>the</strong> Pentagon gleams with modern white and
chrome décor and touches that smack less <strong>of</strong> history and tradition and more <strong>of</strong> a modern
corporation. 1077 Efficiency, in so far as it is synonymous with progress, is a “highly prized, highly
regarded hallmark <strong>of</strong> US airpower.” 1078 While efficiency yields a variety <strong>of</strong> laudable benefits, an
overemphasis this direction threatens to mistake quick and decisive strikes for strategic efficacy—a
logic easily misapplied in a politically sensitive COIN environment.
The Air Force’s corporate-like values yield expectations <strong>of</strong> a concomitantly well heeled lifestyle. Interservice
jabs abound which relegate Airmen to <strong>the</strong> “chair force” – a service for whom “securing a
building” means calling <strong>the</strong> lease agent. In contrast to <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, <strong>the</strong>re is no valuing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
“rough life.” Pilots and Airmen foster no romantic notions about time in <strong>the</strong> dirt. “Moreover, many Air
Force members will tell you that <strong>the</strong>y generally sacrifice much less in terms <strong>of</strong> creature comforts and
o<strong>the</strong>r associated costs <strong>of</strong> military service than do ‘grunts.’ In fact, many will tell you that this is why <strong>the</strong>y
chose <strong>the</strong> Air Force.” 1079 In this, <strong>the</strong> Air Force values are exactly upsidedown that <strong>of</strong> US Marines. While
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps focuses institutional values on <strong>the</strong> warrior prowess required at <strong>the</strong> tip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spear –
<strong>the</strong> infantry level marine – Air Force culture is defined and promulgated by <strong>the</strong> “elite” pr<strong>of</strong>essions:
pilots, logisticians, maintainers, and intelligence <strong>of</strong>ficers. 1080 As might be expected, this has direct
impact upon prevailing norms.
Norms
Given that pilots overwhelmingly dominate Air Force leadership culture and institutional focus, <strong>the</strong>re is
some evidence that <strong>the</strong> decionmaking style pr<strong>of</strong>icient for flying an aircraft—shutting out “distracting”
data and “discount[ing] inputs not easily and readily assimilated into a pre-existing or rapidly developing
schema,” may find <strong>the</strong>ir way from <strong>the</strong> cockpit and into managerial and leadership situations where <strong>the</strong>y
1075
Williamson Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” in John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman eds., America
<strong>the</strong> Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How to Fix Them, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute,
2002): 148.
1076
Thomas, “The Cultural Identity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Air Force.”
1077
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 35-36.
1078
Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 42.
1079
Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 81-82.
1080 Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 5.
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are a less healthy fit. 1081 The typical pilot’s upbringing as an individual, autonomous expert, can lead him
to be more authoritarian in his <strong>of</strong>ficer role within decisionmaking structures:
Because Air Force pilots (who are all <strong>of</strong>ficers) are technical experts at a task to which non-pilots
have nothing to contribute, pilots have very different needs (and perhaps habits) when it comes
to seeking out information and advice from o<strong>the</strong>rs, as compared to ground force <strong>of</strong>ficers. For
<strong>the</strong> Army <strong>of</strong>ficer, o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>ficers, NCOs, and soldiers are all valuable resources to be respected for
<strong>the</strong> expertise and experience <strong>the</strong>y bring to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer’s warfighting task. 1082
Authoritarian organizational hierarchies jive nicely with <strong>the</strong> Air Force value <strong>of</strong> efficiency, and while this
arrangement may facilitate streamlined aggression in conventional war, a flattening <strong>of</strong> this structure in
ways which capitalize on <strong>the</strong> creativity <strong>of</strong> young <strong>of</strong>ficers and allow for localized pockets <strong>of</strong> flexibility, is
necessary to an uneven, <strong>of</strong>ten dispersed counterinsurgent fight. 1083 For <strong>the</strong> Air Force such a shift would
require not only adjustments to structure, but to expectations about <strong>the</strong> appropriate roles <strong>of</strong>
subordinates. Critical thinking about mission sets and outcomes would need be encouraged and
rewarded from top down. An adjustment <strong>of</strong> this sort would mark a significant cultural change for <strong>the</strong>
U.S. Air Force. “Accustomed to seeing itself as <strong>the</strong> preeminent, modern branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> service overtaking
<strong>the</strong> roles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traditional services, <strong>the</strong> Air Force has not had to develop <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> self-reflective and
self-critical leadership culture that ‘questions everything.’” 1084
Forced attention on cultivating an irregular competency may nudge tendencies toward introspection
forward. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review directed <strong>the</strong> Air Force, along with its sister services, in
no uncertain terms to develop competencies in two irregular mission sets: “(1) succeed in
counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations,” and (2) “build <strong>the</strong> security capacity <strong>of</strong>
partner states.” 1085 Thus far, however, <strong>the</strong> Air Force remains absent norms cultivated with an eye
specifically focused on excellence in irregular warfare. Like its American service partners, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Air
Force (USAF) “has operated with some success in COIN environments before but has lost <strong>the</strong> peculiar
capacities associated with COIN following drawdowns or conversions after each conflict.” Said more
directly, “USAF competencies in COIN have simply atrophied as soon as circumstances permitted.” 1086
The norms that <strong>the</strong> Air Force prefers: kinetic, tactical efficiencies—“one target, one bomb, one kill,” 1087
—are not without virtues, but have potential to prove counterstrategic in collateral damage prone
environments where <strong>the</strong> “one bomb” is terribly powerful and unlikely to yield only “one kill.” 1088 The Air
1081 Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 76-78.
1082 Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 79-80.
1083 Lt. Col. Robert Spalding, USAF, “America’s Two Air Forces,” Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 23, Issue 2,
(Summer 2009): 54-55.
1084 Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 89.
1085 Department <strong>of</strong> Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: Department <strong>of</strong> Defense,
February 2010): 17. Accessed on 17 July at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_<strong>of</strong>_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
1086 Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 42, 45.
1087 Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 43.
1088 Beebe notes that smaller bombs need to be developed—smaller than <strong>the</strong> 250 pound small diameter bombs
that are currently being developed—to match <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> a counterinsurgent fight. Beebe, “The Air Force’s
Missing Doctrine,” 31.
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Force’s dominant “action chain,” (to place it in cultural parlance), is a high-speed “find, fix, track, target,
engage, and assess” that may be a poor fit for protracted, politically complex, irregular engagements.
The Air Force is habituated to a tempo characterized by “a frequently truncated assessment cycle, a lack
<strong>of</strong> patience for cascading or long-term effects, and a spotlight on near-term tactical reporting, in stark
contrast to <strong>the</strong> glacial progress in most historical accounts regarding insurgency.” 1089
The airpower <strong>of</strong> use in a counterinsurgency environment is indirect in its approach and cumulative in
effects. Air Force support for reconnaissance, transport, close air support, and communications are
more likely to be more fruitful endeavors. Painfully for <strong>the</strong> Air Force, its more celebrated doctrinal roles:
“counterair, air interdiction, and strategic attack” are <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>of</strong> limited use in COIN. 1090 The overriding
desire to avoid engagement with land forces and make history by strikes on “vital centers” from <strong>the</strong>
air, 1091 simply has no traction in Third World <strong>the</strong>aters. Those Airmen relegated to COIN-appropriate
tasks—known as ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—are “seen by some in <strong>the</strong> Air Force
as a ‘leper colony,’ because it remains so unpopular in some quarters.” 1092
In fairness to <strong>the</strong> wider population (beyond pilots) <strong>of</strong> Air Force personnel, Air Force Civil Engineers and
o<strong>the</strong>r specialized groups have found an easier role fit within <strong>the</strong> task set <strong>of</strong> irregular warfare. 1093 As an
institution, however, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Air Force refuses to take small wars seriously. 1094 In addition to <strong>the</strong> threats
to identity and preferred norms and values, this dismissive attitude toward small wars is based on <strong>the</strong>
insistent perception that small wars are just that—smaller versions <strong>of</strong> “real” war.
Perceptual Lens
The Air Force’s lack <strong>of</strong> earnest endeavor where small war preparation is concerned can be largely
chalked up to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> force continues to view irregular war as a diminutive version
<strong>of</strong> conventional war, 1095 or “a lesser included case <strong>of</strong> peer or near-peer conflicts,”—views which a
selection <strong>of</strong> Air Force <strong>of</strong>ficers dedicated to Air Force preparation for counterinsurgeny recognize as
“fundamentally flawed” concepts. 1096 In addition, <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> US Air Force personnel remain convinced
that irregular war is properly <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> special operations forces and that <strong>the</strong>ir mission should and
will remain “outside <strong>the</strong> full-spectrum USAF mission.” 1097
1089 Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 48.
1090 Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” 30.
1091 Phillip S. Meilinger, “American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46, 3 rd Quarter 2007:
82.
1092 Gordon Lubold, “The Air Force’s New Poster Boys: Drone Jocks,” Christian Science Monitor, July 5, 2009.
Accessed on 10 July 2012 at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2009/0714/p02s01-usmi.html.
1093 Lt Col Kendall Brown, USAFR, “The Role <strong>of</strong> Air Force Civil Engineers in Counterinsurgency Operations,” Air and
Space Power Journal, Vol. 22, Issue 2, (Summer 2008).
1094 Smith, “Common Sense at <strong>the</strong> Crossroads for Our Air Force,” 110.
1095 Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” 27-28.
1096 Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 44. See also Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” 27-28.
Col. Read’s paper is based on <strong>the</strong> combined thinking <strong>of</strong> participants in <strong>the</strong> 2007 Air Force Symposium on
Counterinsurgency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 24-26 April.
1097 Read, “Irregular Warfare and <strong>the</strong> US Air Force,” 50.
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The long overdue status <strong>of</strong> irregular doctrine within <strong>the</strong> service reflects, in <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> an Air Force
Major, “that <strong>the</strong> Air Force deems it unimportant…a case <strong>of</strong> preparing to fight <strong>the</strong> wars we prefer and not
preparing for <strong>the</strong> wars we are most likely to fight.” 1098 The rollout <strong>of</strong> Army and Marine counterinsurgent
doctrine in 2006 included a paltry Air Force contribution <strong>of</strong> four pages, relegated to an annex. 1099 At
long last, <strong>the</strong> Air Force produced its own two doctrinal manuals regarding irregular warfare: Air Force
Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, and AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) but
<strong>the</strong>se seem to be serving little more than a box checking function for a force that perceives investments
toward COIN competence in zero sum competition with sleeker, sexier, conventional craft
investments. 1100 Not only is significant COIN competence restructuring as regards material goods and
personnel deemed unnecessary, it is also perceived as a threat to ongoing conventional upgrades.
One might think that <strong>the</strong> Air Force’s pronounced future orientation 1101 would inspire preparation for
irregular conflict (given that its nation’s security documents project much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same for <strong>the</strong> next two
decades). But perception rules. The Air Force has interpreted its mandate to develop a
counterinsurgency competency as a small, specialized sideshow to <strong>the</strong> larger Department <strong>of</strong> Defense
movement away from irregular competency. 1102 The Air Force view ensures that it will face a renewed,
and unnecessary learning curve in <strong>the</strong> next round <strong>of</strong> counterinsurgent warfare and that its current force
will remain untroubled by a critical review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> repercussions <strong>of</strong> neglecting irregular preparations in
<strong>the</strong> past. Even should an historical record <strong>of</strong> length be available to wing and airmen, <strong>the</strong>y would be
unlikely to read it. As an institution, <strong>the</strong> Air Force is particularly bad at deigning <strong>the</strong> past with any sort <strong>of</strong>
relevance for <strong>the</strong> future – <strong>the</strong> repercussion <strong>of</strong> a youthful force and a technically driven culture. 1103
Army <strong>Culture</strong>
Upon invitation from <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army, British Brigadier Nigel R.F. Aylwin-Foster shared some
systematically derived observations and constructive criticisms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s early performance in Iraq.
His insights are remarkably consistent with many <strong>of</strong> those pr<strong>of</strong>fered in earlier eras: an identification <strong>of</strong>
Army “default settings” that manifest <strong>the</strong>mselves in <strong>the</strong> initial stages <strong>of</strong> conflict across time. He credits
U.S. soldiers with “an unparalleled sense <strong>of</strong> patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and determination,
with plenty <strong>of</strong> talent, and in no way lacking in humanity or compassion.” The Army’s primary faults in
<strong>the</strong> early stages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Iraq counterinsurgency environment were comprised <strong>of</strong> an overly heavy
bureaucracy, “a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to <strong>of</strong>fensive operations, and a sense that
duty required all issues to be confronted head-on.” In addition, despite a courteous and considerate
1098
Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” 27-28.
1099
Oliver Fritz and Gregory A. Hermsmeyer, “The U.S. Air Force and Stability Operations Transformation,” Joint
Force Quarterly, Issue 47, (4 th Quarter 2007): 130.
1100
Smith, “Common Sense at <strong>the</strong> Crossroads for Our Air Force,” 92.
1101
Smith, USAF <strong>Culture</strong> and Cohesion, 13.
1102
The U.S.Air Force interpretation <strong>of</strong> U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Defense intent where counterinsurgency competency is
concerned was captured in <strong>the</strong> Air Force Times: “[T]he Defense Department is trying to pivot away from <strong>the</strong>
counterinsurgency campaigns <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past decade, which required large numbers <strong>of</strong> conventional forces, toward
smaller, less expensive missions waged primarily by special operations forces.” Jeff Schogol, “5 A-10 Squadrons to
Be Cut,” Air Force Times, 30 January 2012, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/01/airforce-5-a10squadrons-cut-013012
1103
Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” 140.
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nature, <strong>the</strong> typical soldier possessed cultural ignorance, resulting in extraordinary insensitivity, at levels
that might be characterized as “institutional racism.” 1104
Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se traits have a familiar ring given <strong>the</strong> sections on American public culture and American
military culture already discussed. O<strong>the</strong>rs are deeply rooted in <strong>the</strong> particulars <strong>of</strong> Army culture and Army
identity, both <strong>of</strong> which mandate a specific set <strong>of</strong> warfighting competencies (norms) and shape outlook
on future conflict (perceptual lens).
Identity
The preference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army to possess and execute a conventional force posture has been a
consistent aspect <strong>of</strong> its persona across time and seems to be an early act <strong>of</strong> choice ra<strong>the</strong>r than a product
<strong>of</strong> historic determinism. For Yankee <strong>of</strong>ficers and enlisted <strong>the</strong>ir initial, and what one might consider
“formative,” combat history was not <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regular sort. Robert Cassidy compares <strong>the</strong> British experience
to <strong>the</strong> American. Both experienced a long stretch <strong>of</strong> irregular warfare during <strong>the</strong> 19 th century with an
intermittent symmetric conflict, but used that similar history to reinforce dramatically different
identities:
Both armies…have over one hundred years experience fighting asymmetric conflicts against
indigenous tribes. What’s more, after a century (19 th ) <strong>of</strong> unqualified successes in small wars, <strong>the</strong>
two armies fought peripheral wars that were successful yet Pyrrhic at <strong>the</strong> turn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> century—
<strong>the</strong> British Army fought <strong>the</strong> Boer Wars and <strong>the</strong> American Army fought <strong>the</strong> Spanish-American
War. However, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army’s culture was shaped more significantly by <strong>the</strong> Civil War—<strong>the</strong>
most conventional and symmetric war it fought in <strong>the</strong> 19 th century—ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> host <strong>of</strong>
asymmetric and unorthodox campaigns it prosecuted against indigenous peoples. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
hand, British Army culture was shaped more by its host <strong>of</strong> asymmetric …wars <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 19 th century
than it was by its one conventional and symmetric conflict <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> post-Napoleonic period—<strong>the</strong>
Crimean War. 1105
The lessons <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army chose to learn, and used to “shape” its culture, it drew from <strong>the</strong> short stack <strong>of</strong>
its historical experience. 1106 Its culture was formed not from <strong>the</strong> Army it had been for most <strong>of</strong> its
history, but <strong>the</strong> Army it aspired to be. That trend was only enhanced through <strong>the</strong> two world wars and
remained in robust form during <strong>the</strong> Vietnam experience. Reflecting on those years and since John Nagl
sums up: “The essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American army, in <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> its career <strong>of</strong>ficers, is ground combat by
organized regular divisional units.” 1107 Within this posture <strong>the</strong> Army views itself as “<strong>the</strong> essential
1104
Brigadier Nigel R.F. Alywin-Foster, British Army, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,”
Military Review, November-December 2005: 28.
1105
Robert M. Cassidy, Peacekeeping in <strong>the</strong> Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice After
<strong>the</strong> Cold War, (Westport, Conneticut: Praeger, 2004): 35.
1106
Janine Davidson provides an interesting defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conventional-prone logic drawn from <strong>the</strong> Civil War in
Lifting <strong>the</strong> Fog <strong>of</strong> Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War, (Ann Arbor: The University <strong>of</strong> Michigan
Press, 2010): 34.
1107
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
(Chicago, IL: University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Press, 2002, 2005): 6.
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artisans <strong>of</strong> war.” 1108 Army soldiers are comforted in <strong>the</strong>ir legitimacy and staying power as an institution,
more so than any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four services, given <strong>the</strong>ir perspective that despite advances in technology, even
modern warfare is “ultimately decided on <strong>the</strong> ground.” 1109 It is not worries about longevity as an
institution, or <strong>the</strong> vitality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>the</strong>y perform, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> inability to replicate <strong>the</strong> World War II
experience that pricks at <strong>the</strong> Army sense <strong>of</strong> identity. 1110
The identities fostered at <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individual soldier and across Army specializations impact upon
internal dynamics and <strong>the</strong> ability to act cohesively toward a common mission set. Internally, <strong>the</strong> Army
seems pr<strong>of</strong>oundly better than <strong>the</strong> Navy or Air Force in dispersing status equitably across its traditional
combat arms. 1111 The Army’s “bro<strong>the</strong>rhood <strong>of</strong> guilds” 1112 is a bro<strong>the</strong>rhood in which distinctive branches
represent <strong>the</strong> “guilds” from which individual soldiers and <strong>of</strong>ficers draw <strong>the</strong>ir primary identity
affiliation. 1113 The warmer relations between Army branches and specializations may be attributed, in
part, to a strong sense <strong>of</strong> mutual dependence. “Whereas <strong>the</strong> Navy submariners and fliers and <strong>the</strong> Air
Force TAC and SAC pilots may privately think that <strong>the</strong>y could get <strong>the</strong> job done largely on <strong>the</strong>ir own, <strong>the</strong>
Army branches <strong>of</strong> infantry, artillery, and armor each see <strong>the</strong>mselves as inextricably dependent upon
<strong>the</strong>ir bro<strong>the</strong>r branches if <strong>the</strong>y are to wage war effectively.” 1114 The common bonds <strong>of</strong> mutual
dependence hold sway not just across “guilds” but across rank as well. In contrast to <strong>the</strong> Air Force
which prepares pilots to engage <strong>the</strong> fighting on <strong>the</strong>ir own, “<strong>of</strong>ficers, NCOs, and soldiers do <strong>the</strong>ir
warfighting toge<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> Army—<strong>the</strong>y are interdependent in <strong>the</strong> most pr<strong>of</strong>ound and literal sense <strong>of</strong>
that term.” 1115 Common identity is fur<strong>the</strong>r reinforced through <strong>the</strong> mentorship mechanisms which upend
<strong>the</strong> rank structure in a young <strong>of</strong>ficer’s formative stage: “Crew chiefs simply don’t teach pilots how to fly,
but NCOs (among o<strong>the</strong>rs) do teach young lieutenants how to be good leaders in <strong>the</strong> Army and Marine
Corps” resulting in Army <strong>of</strong>ficers whose identity roots down to <strong>the</strong> “Shoot, I’m just an old soldier” level.
“This kind <strong>of</strong> downward identification, in which virtually everyone in <strong>the</strong> Army can participate,
simultaneously has <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> publicly endorsing a vision <strong>of</strong> shared institutional values, and
emphasizing <strong>the</strong> fundamental importance <strong>of</strong> everyone in <strong>the</strong> organization as a vital element <strong>of</strong> that
vision.” 1116
Historically, it has been <strong>the</strong> Army that has been most tied to America’s public citizenry. Its warmaking is
in <strong>the</strong>ir service. The patriotic zeal noted by Alywin-Foster tracks with Builder’s account two decades
earlier: “What is <strong>the</strong> Army? It is, first and foremost, <strong>the</strong> nation’s obedient and loyal military servant. It
1108
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 33.
1109
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 30. The Army would likely argue <strong>the</strong> air-driven Kosovo conflict as an aberration,
and a dangerously simplistic episode not worthy to count as precedent for future engagements.
1110
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 38.
1111
Thomas G. Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” in Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner
and Jeffrey A. Larsen eds. <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Weapons <strong>of</strong> Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into
Comparative National Security Policymaking, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 77.
1112
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 33.
1113
Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 77. Mahnken draws a distinction with Marines
who, even individually, derive primary identity from service affiliation.
1114
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 27.
1115
Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 78-79.
1116
Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 79-80.
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takes pride in being <strong>the</strong> keeper <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essential skills <strong>of</strong> war that must be infused into <strong>the</strong> citizenry when
<strong>the</strong>y are called upon to fight.” 1117 While patriotism seems in ra<strong>the</strong>r good form today, Builder’s
assessment <strong>of</strong> its draft-related underpinnings strikes <strong>the</strong> modern reader as ra<strong>the</strong>r anachronistic. One
wonders how <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military and <strong>the</strong> continuing socio-cultural drift apart from its
citizenry may impact on <strong>the</strong> Army’s patriotic regard for <strong>the</strong> nation, and <strong>the</strong> tasks she assigns, in coming
years.
Values
The core value for <strong>the</strong> Army has always been its manpower. The Army measures its readiness and
“value” in terms <strong>of</strong> its end strength fighting component. Traditionally this has meant a service which
took greater pride in <strong>the</strong> “basic skills <strong>of</strong> soldiering than in [its] equipment” 1118 -- but this emphasis seems
to be shifting. The trend Builder noted in 1989 as a “shift toward toys” Thomas Mahnken dubs two
decades later an Army tradition for substituting technology for manpower. 1119 Mahnken’s assessment
seems to be validated by a key criticism levied by Alywin-Foster concerning <strong>the</strong> Army’s penchant for
putting technology in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong> human interaction in <strong>the</strong> Iraqi <strong>the</strong>ater: “U.S. Army personnel
instinctively turned to technology to solve problems. Similarly, <strong>the</strong>ir instinct was to seek means,
including technology, to minimize frequent close contact with <strong>the</strong> local population, in order to enhance
force protection, but this served fur<strong>the</strong>r to alienate <strong>the</strong> troops from <strong>the</strong> population.” 1120 The Army is
certainly not alone in its technology fetishism (see sections on Air Force and Navy) but <strong>the</strong>irs is notable
as a cultural shift from a traditional manpower emphasis.
As is <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> case, those values an organization or polity encourages through socializing behavior—
rewarding its occurrence and punishing its omission—may not be <strong>the</strong> values members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> group
would consciously register as “core” or perhaps even important for <strong>the</strong>ir group. Many values are
unconsciously applied and become very close to instinctive over time. It is in <strong>the</strong>se instances that an
outside perspective can be most useful. For instance, Alywin-Foster notes that <strong>the</strong> well meaning U.S.
Army servicemen around him seemed to value <strong>the</strong> sanctity <strong>of</strong> proper processing over <strong>the</strong> ends those
processes were meant to serve. 1121 Builder would not be surprised. “Army analysts are more likely to
associate <strong>the</strong>mselves with models (or particular analytic techniques) than with <strong>the</strong> problems to which
<strong>the</strong>ir models are applied.” And, unsurprisingly, given <strong>the</strong>ir American heritage, <strong>the</strong> preference is that
<strong>the</strong>se processes be linear and yield “a single answer (<strong>of</strong>ten a number) ra<strong>the</strong>r than illuminating <strong>the</strong>
alternatives in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> recognized uncertainties.” 1122 In sum, <strong>the</strong> Army penchant, conscious or not, is
toward valuing measurement oriented, exacting processes ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> resultant ends <strong>of</strong> strategic
political effect.
Numerically driven processing is not <strong>the</strong> only idol worshipped in America’s astrategic temple. A search
for, and <strong>the</strong>n devotion to, <strong>the</strong> certainty <strong>of</strong> moral authority <strong>of</strong>ten acts as replacement for a keen
1117 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 33.
1118 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 22, 24.
1119 Italics added. Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 80.
1120 Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 31.
1121 Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 32.
1122 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 106.
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assessment <strong>of</strong> a potential conflict’s strategic value and <strong>the</strong>n complicated analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political and
military maneuvers required to bring about strategic effect. The Army’s sense <strong>of</strong> mission and <strong>of</strong>
“rightness” stems in one part from utter devotion to country 1123 and in ano<strong>the</strong>r from a sense that if <strong>the</strong>
cause is right, <strong>the</strong> end will come out right as well, lack <strong>of</strong> strategy notwithstanding. Alywin-Foster notes
that in <strong>the</strong> Iraqi <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army “fervently believed in <strong>the</strong> mission’s underlying purpose, <strong>the</strong>
delivery <strong>of</strong> democracy to Iraq, whereas o<strong>the</strong>r nations’ forces tended to be more ambivalent about why
<strong>the</strong>y were <strong>the</strong>re.” While this bolstered optimism and morale generally, it also led to a dangerous moral
assumption: that <strong>the</strong> end aspired toward—democracy—was so valuable intrinsically, (a fact assumed to
be obvious to <strong>the</strong> local population), that whatever <strong>the</strong> means employed toward its achievement,
including bloody collateral losses, <strong>the</strong>se would be acceptable to all involved. In Alywin-Foster’s
estimation, extremity in <strong>the</strong> belief <strong>of</strong> moral rightness, combined with a penchant toward emotivity,
combined to cloud military judgment. 1124
Builder cites <strong>the</strong> Army as <strong>the</strong> most unstrategic <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> services for a more earthy reason. He leans on
Admiral J.C. Wylie who fingers <strong>the</strong> dirt <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s combat geography in explaining its myopic and
unstrategic stance. Airmen and seamen think in global terms about <strong>the</strong> vast reach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir nearly
unchanging “terrain.” The soldier, by contrast, must focus in immediate and detailed terms on <strong>the</strong> piece
<strong>of</strong> ground in front <strong>of</strong> him: his use, and his enemy’s use <strong>of</strong> surrounding topographical features that
provide sanctuary or expose vulnerabilities in a hot exchange. This perspective, constantly engaged,
leads to a mentality that fixates on and values local, immediate successes ra<strong>the</strong>r than a systems-like,
strategic perspective. 1125 The valuing <strong>of</strong> battle successes over war-level political achievements is a
natural outgrowth <strong>of</strong> this perspective and a natural ally to <strong>the</strong> Army’s preferred set <strong>of</strong> norms.
Norms
An accounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Army’s preferred ways <strong>of</strong> war will, at this point in <strong>the</strong> narrative, strike <strong>the</strong>
reader as repetitive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> American public culture and military culture preferences delineated in
Chapter 3. They are reflective <strong>of</strong> a narrow Clausewitzian upbringing (narrower than Clausewitz would
have allowed) and are dominated by an overwhelming inclination toward kinetic action. The Army
preference for a war <strong>of</strong> annihilation is codified—as pointed out by Aylwin-Foster—in its Soldier’s Creed.
The Creed commands American soldiers not to defeat an enemy, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to destroy him. 1126 O<strong>the</strong>r
pronounced trends include a yearning for close combat with <strong>the</strong> enemy 1127 , a draw toward technical
ra<strong>the</strong>r than particularly clever human solutions, and, like <strong>the</strong> society that gave birth to it, a requirement
for quick results. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, a can-do attitude is hitched to nearly unfailing optimism in a combination
which <strong>of</strong>ten misleads those attempting to gauge progress and genuine successes. 1128
1123
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 19-20.
1124
Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 31.
1125
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 88.
1126
Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 29, 39.
1127
Meilinger, “American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” 82. Williamson Murray adds <strong>the</strong> Marines to <strong>the</strong> Army as
<strong>the</strong> two services most in possession <strong>of</strong> a Clausewitzian view <strong>of</strong> war. Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” 145.
1128
Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 31, 32, 35.
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While <strong>the</strong> redundancy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above listing may be tedious for <strong>the</strong> reader, it is a necessary and instructive
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> research process. Repeated manifestations <strong>of</strong> particular cultural traits across cultural levels
(public, military and service culture) as well as between cultural categories (Identity, Norms, Values, and
Perceptual Lens) highlight precisely those cultural traits and patterns which grounded <strong>the</strong>ory seeks to
identify. These are those entrenched deeply enough, and exhibited consistently enough, to merit
inclusion in <strong>the</strong> final analysis.
If many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s “default settings” are widely agreed upon at this point, <strong>the</strong> idea that it has
acquired <strong>the</strong> ability to morph <strong>the</strong>se in significant ways and adapt as a “learning organization” is not.
John Nagl gained military wide attention with his persuasively written contention that <strong>the</strong> US Army was
not a learning organization in Vietnam; and this due to its organizational culture. 1129 Not all agree. As an
Army Lt. Colonel working for <strong>the</strong> Air Force George Mastroianni provides a dual service comparative
perspective and argues that consistent adaption has been a longstanding and necessary part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Army’s heritage: “Perhaps because <strong>the</strong> Army has existed long enough to have been repeatedly, and
sometime brutally, forced to reexamine its role in national defense, self-reflection and analysis are vital
components <strong>of</strong> Army culture.” 1130 Janine Davidson takes Nagl to task in a more detailed and empirical
work which argues that today’s Army is a fundamentally changed institution, restructured in ways that
will allow it to learn timely and lasting lessons. 1131
While Davidson may be right – that new structural changes are better suited to allow for <strong>the</strong> integration
<strong>of</strong> contemporaneous learning—this does not preclude <strong>the</strong> Army from refusing to institutionalize lessons
it does not want to learn. Aylwin-Foster makes a particularly useful distinction in <strong>the</strong> debate on learning
and adaptability. In general he characterizes <strong>the</strong> Army as open minded, frank, and in possession <strong>of</strong> a
“hunger to learn and adapt, in order to improve military effectiveness.” 1132 He argues that <strong>the</strong> Army is
quite capable, even very good, at adaptations and creative innovations within its conventional mission
set, but fumbles when required to adapt to <strong>the</strong> Phase 4 (stability type) mission sets required <strong>of</strong> a
counterinsurgency. 1133 These are outside its role conception. In this Alywin-Foster stumbles upon a
ra<strong>the</strong>r remarkable insight. It may be inappropriate to deem a service “adaptable,” or “learning” in
absolute terms and more appropriate to talk about within which dimensions that organization manifests
adaptability. In this case <strong>the</strong> Army, and very likely <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services, receives high marks for
adaptations which improve upon, and within, its preferred identity, and neglects to institutionalize
adaptations (even if <strong>the</strong>se have been hard-learned, hard-won by <strong>the</strong>ir own forces in battlespace) that
threaten core aspects <strong>of</strong> this identity.
A study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> norms <strong>the</strong> Army has been willing to jettison in favor <strong>of</strong> moral or utilitarian “adaptation,”
can be as interesting and instructive as tracking those which persist. The Army <strong>of</strong>fers a particularly
interesting view <strong>of</strong> norms shifts in light <strong>of</strong> irregular warfare. For <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> its early history Army
1129
Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.
1130
Mastroianni, “Occupations, <strong>Culture</strong>s, and Leadership in <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force,” 83.
1131
Janine Davidson, Lifting <strong>the</strong> Fog <strong>of</strong> Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War, (Ann Arbor: The
University <strong>of</strong> Michigan Press, 2010).
1132
Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 37.
1133
Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations.”
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experience with irregular conflict built up a reserve <strong>of</strong> informal “doctrine” and best practices which
became reflexive in <strong>the</strong> successful conduct <strong>of</strong> frontier warfare. One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se reflexes, lost over time,
was a habit <strong>of</strong> raising and employing indigenous forces. In a paper prepared for <strong>the</strong> Army War College,
Lt. Colonel James D. Campbell tracks <strong>the</strong> Army’s long and involved heritage <strong>of</strong> employing indigenous
forces to fight local low intensity conflicts: “This traditional practice <strong>of</strong> raising, training, and working
closely with indigenous groups to assist in <strong>the</strong> prosecution <strong>of</strong> what we now term ‘low-intensity’ military
operations began in <strong>the</strong> colonial period, reached a level <strong>of</strong> doctrinal maturity during <strong>the</strong> fighting on <strong>the</strong>
Western plains and in <strong>the</strong> Southwest after <strong>the</strong> Civil War, and achieved its ultimate expression in <strong>the</strong>
incorporation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Scouts into <strong>the</strong> Regular Army in 1920.” 1134 For <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> this time period,
standing up and fighting alongside indigenous forces was <strong>the</strong> normal order <strong>of</strong> business—in large part
because it yielded consistent success. These <strong>of</strong>ficers recognized <strong>the</strong>ir incapacity to navigate local
terrain, discern friend from foe among its occupants, and glean reliable intelligence without native
speaking, local fighting forces and guides.
Value notwithstanding, however, this relationship was never a completely comfortable one. In addition
to issues <strong>of</strong> trust, Army <strong>of</strong>ficers had to contend with <strong>the</strong> “customs” <strong>of</strong> native troops in pursuing and
downing enemies. These were <strong>of</strong>ten indefensibly brutal in nature comprising torture, rape, beheadings,
cannibalism, and systematic barbarism <strong>of</strong> varying forms. 1135 In essence, Army norms born <strong>of</strong> practicality
and utility were warring against Army values <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most essential sort. Over time <strong>the</strong> Army stepped
back its involvement in rearing and employing local forces and unhitched itself from <strong>the</strong> practice – giving
it over to <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> specialized forces – and resurrecting it as a regular tactic only when exigency
required, but never long enough that it rooted again as a “norm” with any sort <strong>of</strong> staying power.
For better or worse, efficacious norms have not been <strong>the</strong> only casualty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s disenchantment
with counterinsurgent warfare. A conventional mindset armed with powerfully effective conventional
means has subconsciously or o<strong>the</strong>rwise prompted a re-rendering <strong>of</strong> Army history which capitalizes on
<strong>the</strong> conventional bits and clouds perception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution’s own heritage <strong>of</strong> irregular form and
function.
Perceptual Lens
In <strong>the</strong> run up to our two current counterinsurgent engagements Army soldiers were taught, and
accepted, a very negative view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir institution’s past with counterinsurgencies. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than focusing
on <strong>the</strong> creditable aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philippine Insurgency for instance, cadets at West Point (as <strong>of</strong> 2003-
2004) were taught that <strong>the</strong> U.S. was simply no good at fighting insurgencies. 1136 Even Davidson, who
argues that <strong>the</strong> Army has transformed itself into a counterinsurgent capable learning institution,
acknowledges that 230 years worth <strong>of</strong> experience with counterinsurgency and stability operations have
1134 James D. Campbell, “’Making Riflemen from Mud’: Restoring <strong>the</strong> Army’s <strong>Culture</strong> <strong>of</strong> Irregular Warfare,” paper
made available to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> Studies Institute, (October 2007): 1-2, accessed on 26 June 2012 at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub803.pdf
1135 Campbell, “’Making Riflemen from Mud’,” 9, 10.
1136 Alywin-Foster, “Changing <strong>the</strong> Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” 33.
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been “controversial missions that soldiers and marines were eager to forget.” 1137 So eager, apparently,
that soldiers wiped even <strong>the</strong>ir successes from <strong>the</strong> historical record.
Organizational history is most <strong>of</strong>ten remembered in ways that make it a better fit with preferred identity
and aspiration. Perceived history, institutionalized and socialized, becomes self fulfilling in that its
images fill projections <strong>of</strong> future war with revised interpretations <strong>of</strong> past conflict. Builder found service
“images <strong>of</strong> war” to be a compelling object <strong>of</strong> study. He recognized that <strong>the</strong>se mental maps, based—as
his research convincingly argues—on institutional preferences ra<strong>the</strong>r than objective analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
threat environment, provided <strong>the</strong> foundation for readiness, or lack <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>, when circumstances
required a shift from peacetime preparation to realtime application. He outlines <strong>the</strong> potential
consequences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army’s image <strong>of</strong> war (consequences that also apply to Marines):
[In contrast to <strong>the</strong> Air Force and Navy] [t]he Army’s dream <strong>of</strong> war…if irrelevant to <strong>the</strong> actual
wars it may be asked to fight, is likely to be more costly to <strong>the</strong> nation’s vital interests. Because it
must generally fight on terms imposed by o<strong>the</strong>rs, as to time and place and means, <strong>the</strong> Army
cannot elect to delay engaging, borrow equipment from o<strong>the</strong>rs, or—as <strong>the</strong> Navy and Air Force
have historically been able to do—pick a time and place <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own choosing to engage. What
<strong>the</strong> Army contributes most to any conflict are people trained in those arts <strong>of</strong> war relevant to <strong>the</strong>
conflict at hand…[I]f <strong>the</strong> Army has prepared for <strong>the</strong> wrong kind <strong>of</strong> war, its failures, much more
than those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy or Air Force, are likely to be apparent and to have much more serious
consequences to <strong>the</strong> nation’s security and to <strong>the</strong> Army’s self-image as an institution. 1138
Writing from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> a still intact Cold War in 1989, Builder captured <strong>the</strong> Army’s image <strong>of</strong> war
and made a case for its persistence:
[T]he experience <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army in its final and finest year <strong>of</strong> World War II, from <strong>the</strong> invasion <strong>of</strong>
France to <strong>the</strong> collapse <strong>of</strong> Nazi Germany, made an impression that has persisted with remarkable
tenacity and effect right down to <strong>the</strong> present. The Army’s experiences in Korea and Vietnam
have been relegated to unpleasant aberrations—<strong>the</strong> wrong kinds <strong>of</strong> wars because <strong>of</strong> political
constraints or lack <strong>of</strong> public support. The suggestion that <strong>the</strong> Army’s experience in World War II
was <strong>the</strong> aberration, and that such peripheral conflicts might be <strong>the</strong> only kind <strong>of</strong> wars <strong>the</strong> Army
will be asked (or permitted) to fight in <strong>the</strong> nuclear era, has probably been rejected
unconsciously, not because it is clearly wrong, but because it undermines a much more
satisfying self-image. 1139
If Korea and Vietnam had very little impact on a doggedly conventional self-image and its attendant
ways <strong>of</strong> war, one wonders what factors in <strong>the</strong> simultaneous and extended experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan would inspire <strong>the</strong>se to be stored and built upon in significantly different fashion?
1137 Davidson, Lifting <strong>the</strong> Fog <strong>of</strong> Peace, 2.
1138 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 133-134.
1139 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 186.
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Navy <strong>Culture</strong>
Navy culture runs a close second to Army culture in <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> attention devoted to understanding it
as a distinctive cultural space. As previously noted, most literature making generalizations about U.S.
“military” culture is, in essence, focused on <strong>the</strong> Army. The Navy, however, has received intensive
treatment in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a seminal work produced by one <strong>of</strong> its own: Roger Barnett’s Navy <strong>Strategic</strong>
<strong>Culture</strong>: Why <strong>the</strong> Navy Thinks Differently. 1140 Barnett does a superb job <strong>of</strong> introducing <strong>the</strong> uninitiated to
<strong>the</strong> life and lexicon <strong>of</strong> sailors aboard ship. Barnett notes that <strong>the</strong> Navy may be <strong>the</strong> least understood <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> services. Americans, already disinterested in history, are even less inclined to acquaint <strong>the</strong>mselves
with history, or even current affairs, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> maritime variety. When Americans do tune in to military
efforts abroad, it is typically to <strong>the</strong> adventures, exploits and mishaps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir soldiers and land based
marines ra<strong>the</strong>r than sailors afloat on distant seas. 1141 Barnett <strong>of</strong>fers his work by way <strong>of</strong> remedy. His
studied insights over <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> a full Navy career will inform in ample measure <strong>the</strong> categories below.
Identity
The “Holy Grail” dominating <strong>the</strong> Navy’s sense <strong>of</strong> self is <strong>the</strong> ability to wield independent command at sea.
“Until <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> telecommunications, a ship ‘over <strong>the</strong> horizon’ was a world unto itself, with its
captain absolutely responsible for every soul and consequence that fell under his command.” 1142 The
Navy’s historic ability to sail beyond <strong>the</strong> reach <strong>of</strong> its political masters has fostered an identity that prizes
institutional independence and its own wisdom <strong>of</strong> seaborne affairs (as opposed to that possessed by any
landlubber civilian, no matter his elevated station). Builder characterizes <strong>the</strong> Navy as “<strong>the</strong> supranational
institution that has inherited <strong>the</strong> British Navy’s throne to naval supremacy.” He quips, only slightly
tongue in cheek, that “[t]he Navy’s stature as an independent institution is on a level with that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
U.S. government (which <strong>the</strong> Navy must sometimes suffer). 1143 The Navy’s attitude toward “suffering”
civilian control and direction is chronicled historically in <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> Admiral Bradley Fiske. To his early
twentieth-century <strong>of</strong>ficers he issued admonition and warning: “Let us remember…that <strong>the</strong> naval
defense <strong>of</strong> our country is our pr<strong>of</strong>ession, not that <strong>of</strong> Congress.” Samuel Huntington paraphrases Fiske’s
fur<strong>the</strong>r message:
The naval pr<strong>of</strong>ession must obey its civilian superiors, but it also has <strong>the</strong> duty to make its
pr<strong>of</strong>essional opinions known. If an ordered course <strong>of</strong> action ran counter to “pr<strong>of</strong>essional
convictions” and seemed “fraught with harm,” a “proper representation” to <strong>the</strong> senior <strong>of</strong>ficials
was “<strong>of</strong> course obligatory.” 1144
A more contemporary example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> friction in naval U.S. civil-military relations is captured in one <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> most famous outbursts <strong>of</strong> frustration recorded in U.S. history. Of <strong>the</strong> Navy’s underwhelming
response to his orders President Franklin D. Roosevelt groaned, “To change anything in <strong>the</strong> Na-a-vy is
1140
Roger W. Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Why <strong>the</strong> Navy Thinks Differently, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2009).
1141
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, preface.
1142
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 18.
1143
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 32, 31.
1144
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and <strong>the</strong> State, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press <strong>of</strong> Harvard University
Press, 1957) :262.
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like punching a fea<strong>the</strong>r bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are
finally exhausted, and <strong>the</strong>n you find <strong>the</strong> damn bed just as it was before you started punching.” 1145
The political inattention that has allowed <strong>the</strong> Navy to develop such a robust countervoice in maritime
affairs has been <strong>the</strong> long developed product <strong>of</strong> ra<strong>the</strong>r pragmatic aspects <strong>of</strong> U.S. foreign policy. “Because
naval forces do not need to ask permission <strong>of</strong> anyone to go anywhere—including in <strong>the</strong> territorial waters
<strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states so long as <strong>the</strong>y are conducting innocent passage—because <strong>the</strong>y are self-contained, and
because <strong>the</strong>y tend to be out-<strong>of</strong>-sight out-<strong>of</strong>-mind, <strong>the</strong> political and economic costs attending <strong>the</strong>ir
expeditionary nature [have tended] to be low.” 1146 The low political costs <strong>of</strong> dispatching <strong>the</strong> Navy (as
opposed to <strong>the</strong> Army) and naval autonomy granted by force <strong>of</strong> distance allowed <strong>the</strong> service to grow up
in independently directed expeditionary form. Today, advanced telecommunications have improved,
ra<strong>the</strong>r substantially, <strong>the</strong> reach <strong>of</strong> political decisionmakers onto <strong>the</strong> platforms <strong>of</strong> warships, no matter
how far flung. Even still, <strong>the</strong> Navy manages to evade political pressures born <strong>of</strong> public scrutiny—<strong>the</strong>
“unblinking eye <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern media”—in a way that its landbased sister services would envy. 1147
The Naval sense <strong>of</strong> independence is fur<strong>the</strong>r amplified by its necessary self reliance. A typical aircraft
carrier floats <strong>the</strong> equivalent <strong>of</strong> a small city in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> people and <strong>the</strong> variety <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
capacities. 1148 Their “world apart” suggests few reminders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> land life left behind—“[n]ei<strong>the</strong>r trees,
houses, river banks, highways, mountains, nor malls” dot <strong>the</strong> landscape. The environment is hostile and
reminds all on board <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> raw fact that, should <strong>the</strong> ship come under distress, outside help is rarely
available. The result is a dedicated devotion to well prepared, well stored, self reliance and “a greater
feeling <strong>of</strong> community than exists in o<strong>the</strong>r military services.” 1149
The Navy’s sense <strong>of</strong> community may be intensified by <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> a common demise but is not
o<strong>the</strong>rwise founded in lateral notions <strong>of</strong> equality. Builder cites <strong>the</strong> Navy as <strong>the</strong> “most elaborate in its
distinctions among, and <strong>the</strong> relative ranking <strong>of</strong>, its various components, branches or activities” providing
“an extensive, fine-structured, hierarchical pecking order from top to bottom.” Distinctions are made
according to “platforms” – “<strong>the</strong> machines in which <strong>the</strong> men serve, and <strong>the</strong>ir basing.” 1150 Barnett
acknowledges <strong>the</strong> disparate individual identities within sub-specialty clusters but defends a collective
U.S. naval culture none<strong>the</strong>less. Recognizing naval special operations (SEALS) as having <strong>the</strong>ir own
distinctive culture, Barnett argues that <strong>the</strong> differences between <strong>the</strong> social and organizational cultures <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r three primary subgroups: surface ship, submarine, and aviation do not impact in pr<strong>of</strong>ound
ways upon “<strong>the</strong>ir strategic culture—conditioned as it is by <strong>the</strong> same factors pertaining to <strong>the</strong> application
<strong>of</strong> military force” which remains “identical in all important respects.” 1151 When <strong>the</strong> Navy’s <strong>of</strong>ficers and
1145
Quoted in Peter J. Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross, “Transforming <strong>the</strong> Navy,” Naval War College Review, Vol
56, Issue 3, (Summer 2003): 107.
1146
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 68.
1147
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 18.
1148
Terry Terriff, “Blue Water and Muddy Deck Shoes: U.S. Navy Support for <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps in SSTR
Operations,” in James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds., Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations:
Stability from <strong>the</strong> Sea, (Abingdon and New York: Routeledge, 2008): 81-94.
1149
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 26, 13.
1150 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 25.
1151 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 10.
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sailors warn <strong>of</strong> cohesion problems it is not typically <strong>the</strong> differences between subgroups aboard ship to
which <strong>the</strong>y refer, but ra<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> divide between <strong>the</strong> sea-based and Washington-based Navy. 1152
Careerism within <strong>the</strong> latter threatens a deleterious effect on morale, as noted by some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy’s
strongest public voices. 1153
Institutional sense <strong>of</strong> identity is very <strong>of</strong>ten tied to role conception. In this vein <strong>the</strong> Navy sails in slightly
rougher waters. While it is “supremely confident <strong>of</strong> its legitimacy as a independent institution” <strong>the</strong> Navy
has not been without eras in which “its relevancy has come into question.” The Navy sees as its primary
mandate <strong>the</strong> preservation and wielding <strong>of</strong> “sea power as <strong>the</strong> most important and flexible kind <strong>of</strong> military
power for America as a maritime nation.” 1154 How, precisely, to go about that mission set is not always
perfectly clear. In foundational terms <strong>the</strong> Navy sees itself as <strong>the</strong> nation’s first line <strong>of</strong> active defense. 1155
In <strong>the</strong> run up to World War II that meant a vision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy in which “Neptune was God, Mahan his
prophet, and <strong>the</strong> United States Navy <strong>the</strong> only true church.” 1156 Mahan’s primary strategem, “to seek out
and to defeat an opponent’s battle fleet” suffered a loss <strong>of</strong> relevancy during <strong>the</strong> Cold War. Given <strong>the</strong>
lack <strong>of</strong> maritime prowess or exposed coastlines by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, <strong>the</strong> Navy found itself in a roles
identity crises. The Soviets simply had no substantial blue water navy with which to contend. The
Korean and Vietnam conflicts helped rescue and redefine <strong>the</strong> Navy role with an enhanced focus on
power projection into Third World conflict. 1157
Despite extended Third World engagement, <strong>the</strong> Navy remains adrift as concerns its identity in an
irregular capacity. The Navy’s own historian, John B. Hattendorf, chastises his hosts for inattention to
<strong>the</strong>ir own, and <strong>the</strong> wider scope <strong>of</strong>, naval history. He cites a year 2000 report which concluded that <strong>the</strong>
Navy had “failed to use <strong>the</strong> rich historical information available to it” in order to improve operations. 1158
As has been chronicled thus far, ahistoricism is a ra<strong>the</strong>r constant thread throughout American public and
military culture. This may be particularly inexcusable in <strong>the</strong> Navy since an appreciation for history must
fill in for <strong>the</strong> extraordinary paucity <strong>of</strong> lived sea based combat experience from which a captain might
draw. 1159 Should attention be turned to historical pages, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Navy would find a rich repository <strong>of</strong>
irregular lessons learned across its own growing up experience:
American naval strategy prior to <strong>the</strong> Spanish-American War was not based on <strong>the</strong> decisive fleet
engagement but on gunboat diplomacy, blockade, commerce raiding, riverine campaigns, and
1152 Captain Tyler Wooldridge, “A Tale <strong>of</strong> Two Cities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 125, Issue 7, (July 1999).
1153 James Webb “Defending <strong>the</strong> Navy’s <strong>Culture</strong>,” speech delivered on April 25, 1996 at <strong>the</strong> Naval Institute's 122nd
Annual Meeting and Sixth Annapolis Seminar. Accessed on 28 June 2012 at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/navy/readings/jwebbspeech.html.
1154 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 29, 32.
1155 Steven Miller, “The US Navy in <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Age,” in Carl G. Jacobsen ed. <strong>Strategic</strong> Power USA/USSR, (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1990): 457; Roger W. Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Why <strong>the</strong> Navy Thinks Differently,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009): 5.
1156 Quote by Secretary Stimson captured in Huntington, The Soldier and <strong>the</strong> State, 303, taken from Henry L.
Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active <strong>Service</strong> in Peace and War (New York: Harper Bros., 1947): 506.
1157 Miller, “The US Navy in <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Age,” 458-59.
1158 John B. Hattendorf, “The Uses <strong>of</strong> Maritime History in and for <strong>the</strong> Navy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 56,
Issue 2, (Spring 2003): 14.
1159 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 20.
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amphibious warfare. In <strong>the</strong> twenty-first-century context <strong>of</strong> naval power, much <strong>of</strong> America’s
early naval heritage would be considered irregular warfare or a hybrid <strong>of</strong> irregular and
conventional campaigns. 1160
Ignoring this past carries its own set <strong>of</strong> unnecessary contemporary complications. The “presentmindedness
<strong>of</strong> American naval culture typically leads serving pr<strong>of</strong>essionals to consider as entirely new
‘bright ideas’ that have in fact been tried before, in circumstances that may cast light on <strong>the</strong>ir
applicability in a new and different context.” 1161
As late as 2011, after a decade <strong>of</strong> supporting two irregular fronts, <strong>the</strong> Navy remains in search mode as
regards its irregular role, tasking <strong>the</strong> Center for Naval Analysis with such basic questions as: assessing
which Naval capabilities and forces are uniquely or most suitable for addressing irregular challenges;
how general purpose forces, not simply special operations forces, could contribute more directly to
meeting irregular challenges; and what overarching changes <strong>the</strong> Navy should consider in order to more
effectively confront irregular challenges in <strong>the</strong> future. 1162 Small wars doctrine, for <strong>the</strong> Navy as a whole,
remains noticeably absent. 1163
Values
If independent command at sea anchors <strong>the</strong> Navy sense <strong>of</strong> identity, it is a veneration for tradition that
steers its value set. 1164 Builder paints a vivid image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> material culture trappings which convey <strong>the</strong>
Navy’s attachment to tradition during his time in <strong>the</strong> Pentagon:
The Navy’s corridor is rich in dark wainscoting and brass door hardware. Stern faces in gilded
frames stare from <strong>the</strong> wall at all who pass here. Along <strong>the</strong> walls are low glass cases with
exquisitely detailed ship models. Change <strong>the</strong> ship models from steel and steam to wood and
sail, and one could easily imagine being in <strong>the</strong> British Admiralty <strong>of</strong>fices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ninetenth (sic)
century. The whole effect is one <strong>of</strong> a stuffy British men’s club somewhere in <strong>the</strong> Mayfair or
Haymarket districts <strong>of</strong> London. Truly, one gets <strong>the</strong> message that it is an institution with stability,
with a history and a rich set <strong>of</strong> traditions. It is a place for gentlemen, properly attired, to meet
and decide <strong>the</strong> fate <strong>of</strong> empires. 1165
Barnett agrees with Builder on <strong>the</strong> Naval reverence for tradition and argues that <strong>the</strong> core “tradition”
most venerated within <strong>the</strong> Navy is “one <strong>of</strong> independence in operations, success in battle distinguished
by courage and sacrifice, and <strong>of</strong> technological excellence.” 1166 Barnett’s inclusion <strong>of</strong> technology in Naval
tradition indicates that technological progression within <strong>the</strong> Navy does not come at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong>
1160
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, U.S. Navy, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval
Irregular Warfare,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, (Autumn 2010): 116.
1161
Hattendorf, “The Uses <strong>of</strong> Maritime History in and for <strong>the</strong> Navy,” 26.
1162
A. Fritz, A. Freedman, P. Haussmann, The Navy Role in Confronting Irregular Challenges, (Center for Naval
Analysis, 2011): 1.
1163
Not only absent, but “badly needed.” Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret), “A Bimodal Force for <strong>the</strong>
National Maritime Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 60, Issue 2, (Spring 2007): 36.
1164
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 18.
1165 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 35.
1166 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 17.
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tradition, but fits comfortably within it. Builder’s previous characterization <strong>of</strong> Navy tradition—at least
where it concerns <strong>the</strong> Navy’s valuing <strong>of</strong> technology—is a bit at odds with Barnett’s assessment. Builder
diminished <strong>the</strong> Navy’s valuing <strong>of</strong> “toys” in favor <strong>of</strong> its connection to <strong>the</strong> institution as a whole. 1167
Barnett might agree with <strong>the</strong> strong institutional affiliation <strong>of</strong> sailors but, to <strong>the</strong> extent that “toys” are
synonymous with technology, would take ra<strong>the</strong>r acute exception to <strong>the</strong> dismissal <strong>of</strong> technology as a core
Navy value. He pens something very near poetry as concerns sailors regard for <strong>the</strong>ir sailing machines:
Long it has been asserted that <strong>the</strong> Army equips <strong>the</strong> man, while <strong>the</strong> Navy mans <strong>the</strong> equipment.
And long has it been true. That <strong>the</strong> Navy has had a lasting love affair with technology should
come as no surprise to anyone. The reason is clear: technology represents life. It keeps surface
sailors alive out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> water, where <strong>the</strong>y want to be; and it keep submariners alive under <strong>the</strong>
water, where <strong>the</strong>y want to be. Technology, however, is more to mariners than life: it is home.
To be sure, <strong>the</strong> airmen <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Air Force and <strong>the</strong> tankers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army are at one with <strong>the</strong>ir
technology, and it is vital to <strong>the</strong>ir survival. But <strong>the</strong>y do not live on it. Sailors do. 1168
Barnett goes fur<strong>the</strong>r—tying <strong>the</strong> Navy’s sense <strong>of</strong> community, its very esprit de corps, to advanced
technology: “Bonding derives from shared understandings, a coherent organization that encourages it,
and <strong>the</strong> confidence-building effects <strong>of</strong> first-rate equipment.” 1169 As an insider—one who has spent
considerable time astride world class carriers at sea—this intimate relationship with technology makes
perfect sense to Barnett. Outsiders take care to note that like any love affair, <strong>the</strong> one with technology
may cause its naval admirers to see its virtues in exaggerated fashion. There is no doubt that love <strong>of</strong>
technology springs justifiably from <strong>the</strong> protection it affords sailors from <strong>the</strong> elements, 1170 but success
against this adversary can lead Navy planners to an overconfidence in dominating willful human
adversaries in <strong>the</strong> same manner. Naval thinking demonstrates a tendency toward seeking
advancements in technology as a “silver bullet” solution to problems; cultivating in some naval minds
<strong>the</strong> ambitious notion <strong>of</strong> permanently removing <strong>the</strong> fog <strong>of</strong> war. 1171 It also means that technical
enhancements may be sought for <strong>the</strong>ir own sake ra<strong>the</strong>r than as a well reasoned means for improving
strategy. As a case in point, <strong>the</strong> Navy’s Sea Power 21 initiative, which persisted some years into <strong>the</strong> U.S.
War on Terror, continued to be “driven not by <strong>the</strong> asymmetrical challenges posed by regional or
transnational threats but by a concerted effort to exploit (and <strong>the</strong>reby help preserve) <strong>the</strong> asymmetry
inherent in U.S. technological preeminence.” 1172 Preservation and amplification <strong>of</strong> valued systems were
prioritized over a cool headed assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir legitimate fit with <strong>the</strong> impending threat environment.
It is through preservation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> largest <strong>of</strong> its “technologies”—<strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> its capital ships, and <strong>the</strong>n
1167 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 24.
1168 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 74.
1169 Italics added. Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 13.
1170 Mahnken, “U.S. <strong>Strategic</strong> and Organizational Subcutlures,” 76-77.
1171 Murray, “Does Military <strong>Culture</strong> Matter?,” 146.
1172 Dombrowski and Ross, “Transforming <strong>the</strong> Navy,” 114.
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o<strong>the</strong>r ships—that <strong>the</strong> Navy measures its own health. 1173 When <strong>the</strong> Navy thinks <strong>of</strong> “force structure” it is
in terms <strong>of</strong> ships and aircraft, not manpower. 1174
In some cases it is as useful to point out what is not valued in an organization as it is to point out what is.
Strategy and doctrine form a complicated relationship within Navy circles. Barnett argues that <strong>the</strong>
overwhelming presence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> life-threatening “context” in which <strong>the</strong> Navy operates—<strong>the</strong> ocean’s
unpredictable, uncontrollable, three dimensional environment—creates a disdain for any written decree
which might impinge upon a captain’s ability to exercise a healthy degree <strong>of</strong> flexibility and autonomy in
his far flung, potentially rapidly changing context. “In such an environment, concepts rule—that is, <strong>the</strong>
context is so overwhelming and powerful that doctrine must take a back seat.” 1175 Because doctrine is
created to be “stand alone” or “context free” it is unable to account for <strong>the</strong> myriad factors a global
oceanic force may face, “inhibit[ing] imaginative thinking and battlespace adaptability.” It is based on
notions like <strong>the</strong>se that <strong>the</strong> Navy has engendered a “long-standing aversion” to doctrine. 1176 The result is
that Naval <strong>of</strong>ficers find doctrine most useful as a sort <strong>of</strong> “checklist” ra<strong>the</strong>r than genuine steering
mechanism for action. 1177
The mix <strong>of</strong> strategy with doctrine muddies <strong>the</strong> water still fur<strong>the</strong>r for <strong>the</strong> Navy. Career surface-warfare
<strong>of</strong>ficer Michael Junge takes his home force—<strong>the</strong> Navy—to task for being, in an already astrategic
national military, particularly astrategic. Junge’s criticism, however, stems not from an absence <strong>of</strong>
strategic discussion within <strong>the</strong> Navy, but from its seemingly rudderless nature. He notes in 2012 that
“<strong>the</strong> Navy has changed its strategy five times in 25 years – while its mission has remained unchanged for
more than five decades.” 1178 In fairness to <strong>the</strong> Navy, it is terribly difficult to craft useful strategy absent
a significant maritime adversary. 1179 In fact, military strategy without a breathing adversary in a physical
<strong>the</strong>ater is really little more than a sort <strong>of</strong> projected doctrine: planning and shaping documents meant to
prepare <strong>the</strong> institution for <strong>the</strong> next onslaught, crafted around best guesses, or institutional preferences,
concerning what that might be.
Strategy as a concept meets with some affection within <strong>the</strong> Navy 1180 due to its historic embodiment in
<strong>the</strong> figure <strong>of</strong> Alfred Thayer Mahan. Barnett defends what many see as an anachronistic attachment to
(and some would argue worshipful veneration <strong>of</strong>) <strong>the</strong> famed naval strategist:
1173
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 21.
1174
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 17.
1175
Roger W. Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 60,
No. 1, (Winter 2007): 25-26.
1176
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 18-19.
1177
Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 25-26.
1178
Michael Junge, “So Much Strategy, So Little <strong>Strategic</strong> Direction,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February
2012, Vol. 138, Issue 2: 46.
1179
Miller, “The US Navy in <strong>the</strong> Nuclear Age,” 457. As a case in point, attempts to “pump up <strong>the</strong> fleet” by
Undersecretary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy Robert O. Work could not come at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> a formidable contemporary
adversary; his best shot, <strong>the</strong>refore, at a naval peer was <strong>the</strong> following: “This Fleet and its network would make
short work <strong>of</strong> any past U.S. Fleet—and <strong>of</strong> any potential contemporary naval adversary.” Italics added. Robert O.
Work, “The Coming Naval Century,” Proceedings Magazine, Vol. 138, (May 2012).
1180
Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 80.
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One <strong>of</strong>ten hears that U.S. Navy culture is excessively Mahanian: that it is wedded firmly to <strong>the</strong>
ideas <strong>of</strong> Mahan, and his focus on battle fleets and great battles at sea—especially his classic,
Influence <strong>of</strong> Sea Power Upon History. Pundits have written that <strong>the</strong> Navy must look forward and
not back, exorcising <strong>the</strong> ghost <strong>of</strong> Mahan, being wary <strong>of</strong> “Mahanoia” and “Mahan<strong>of</strong>renzia.”
Those making such assertions intend to tar <strong>the</strong> Navy with brushes labeled “hidebound,”
“antediluevian,” “doctrinaire,” “rigid,” or prone to “steering by its wake.”
It is true that Mahan had many insights on strategic culture in general, and relevant to Navy
<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> in particular, and that many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m apply today…Of course, Mahan’s ideas
were circumscribed by <strong>the</strong> era in which he wrote—submarines and aircraft, for example, played
no part in his strategic musings. Yet, <strong>the</strong>re was much Mahan had to say that remains <strong>of</strong>
relevance if one is to understand today’s Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>. 1181
As a first without equal, <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> Mahan stand apart as venerated naval stratagem. Leaning on his
directives as short cut for <strong>the</strong> crafting <strong>of</strong> modern strategy, however, is fraught with potential
complications. “American naval writers have been all too apt…to search <strong>the</strong> writings <strong>of</strong> Alfred Thayer
Mahan for axioms <strong>of</strong> naval strategy” without sufficient regard for Mahan as an historical figure—
embedded in a particular era and context. 1182
Overreliance on Mahanian insight may not be <strong>the</strong> only factor complicating adept naval strategy within
<strong>the</strong> Navy’s organizational culture. Junge criticizes <strong>the</strong> Navy as a tactical ra<strong>the</strong>r than strategic
organization which seeks out and rewards short-term, and <strong>of</strong>ten short sighted successes. Junge blames
much <strong>of</strong> this on <strong>the</strong> military education advanced within <strong>the</strong> Navy. He, along with Commander Sheila
Scarborough, have homed in on <strong>the</strong> intellectual and strategic deficits created by a system which has
historically valued only hard science, technical degrees. Junge strongly encourages an increased
exposure to <strong>the</strong> humanities in order to prepare sailors for <strong>the</strong> uncertainty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern battlefield, to
encourage <strong>the</strong>m to speak up to superiors, and to draw useful lessons from history about <strong>the</strong> “alien” life
form known as “civilians.” Scarborough agrees and adds that strategic innovation would more likely
blossom under <strong>the</strong> tutelage <strong>of</strong> less precision oriented disciplines. 1183
Longtime Navy historian Wayne Hughes is willing to strike a more positive note regarding <strong>the</strong> Navy’s
strategic maelstrom, citing <strong>the</strong> “whirlwind <strong>of</strong> guidance, visions, operational concepts, appraisals,
program guidance, and decisions flowing from an unparalleled number <strong>of</strong> statements <strong>of</strong> strategy” as
possible evidence <strong>of</strong> genuine transition within <strong>the</strong> Navy. 1184 If it is transition, Captain Hughes cautions
that onlookers need prepare for a torturously slow turn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mammoth U.S. Navy ship. In <strong>the</strong>
meantime, sailors will have to “make do”:
1181 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 19-20.
1182 Hattendorf, “The Uses <strong>of</strong> Maritime History in and for <strong>the</strong> Navy,” 27.
1183 Junge, “So Much Strategy, So Little <strong>Strategic</strong> Direction,” 46-50; Commander Sheila Scarborough, “Network-
Centric Warfare Meets <strong>the</strong> Laws <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2001, Vol. 127, Issue 5: 30-34.
1184 Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret), “A Bimodal Force for <strong>the</strong> National Maritime Strategy,” Naval
War College Review, Vol. 60, Issue 2, (Spring 2007): 32.
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[T]he Navy is a long-lead-time service. When strategy changes and new kinds <strong>of</strong> demands are
imposed, we cannot scrap <strong>the</strong> fleet and start over. We retool it with some new technology and
matching tactics—cutting red tape as we are allowed—but in most respects will operate for
quite some time with <strong>the</strong> same ships and aircraft, as well as with <strong>the</strong> existing space satellites
and communications networks, which have <strong>the</strong>ir own forms <strong>of</strong> inflexibility. In <strong>the</strong> short term,
we adapt. 1185
In this description Hughes very usefully demarcates a difference between genuine institutional
innovation and mission responsive “adaptability.” Very <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong>se two concepts are conflated in
discussions <strong>of</strong> organizational culture. They are, in fact, distinctive concepts and must be disaggregated
and treated individually in order to weigh <strong>the</strong>ir relative value within Navy organizational culture. For <strong>the</strong>
historical, educational, and material reasons cited above, <strong>the</strong> Navy may be slow to any significant
institutional innovation. Highly valued, however, is an aptitude for keen judgment and <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong>
appropriate administrative flexibility in moments <strong>of</strong> mission-critical decisionmaking: adaptability.
“Adaptability is <strong>the</strong> ability to adjust to <strong>the</strong> current environment or context <strong>of</strong> operations in order to
achieve success.” 1186 Defined this way, “[a]daptability , characterized by individual initiative and
freedom <strong>of</strong> action, has long been a strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy,” 1187 and represents a natural outgrowth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Navy’s distant-from-shore maritime environment. Throughout history naval vessels have been outside
<strong>the</strong> reach <strong>of</strong> diurnal political control, have had to cultivate a self reliance away from immediate logistical
support, and have been made to embrace a multi-mission capability in whichever waters <strong>the</strong>y sail. 1188 In
this context, adaptability ra<strong>the</strong>r than institutional innovation ruled and produced a system which
rewards adaptations <strong>of</strong> an immediate, context driven sort ra<strong>the</strong>r than those generated at <strong>the</strong> strategic
level. Indicative <strong>of</strong> this bent is <strong>the</strong> Navy’s continued struggle to find its sea legs as concerns
unconventional warfare. Long range planning toward a bimodal 1189 (both conventional and irregular)
battle future still features wistful yearnings that <strong>the</strong> irregular bit be <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> some set <strong>of</strong> internal
special forces—who within <strong>the</strong>ir mission set might be encouraged to exercise “adaptability”—ra<strong>the</strong>r
than a revised Navy wide strategy requiring genuine institutional innovation toward irregular
preparedness; a move which might require adjustments to cherished naval traditions. 1190
Norms
The tradition that has inspired <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> naval norms – those behaviors accepted and expected within
naval ranks—can, according to Barnett, be summarized in a word: “expeditionary.” 1191 Norms attendant
to expeditionary life are forward leaning, and improve a crew’s ability to be “mobile, <strong>of</strong>fensive, selfreliant,
and adaptable.” 1192 One can spot a clear marriage between Navy and Marine ethos in <strong>the</strong>ir
1185 Hughes Jr., “Implementing <strong>the</strong> Seapower Strategy,” 54.
1186 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 70.
1187 Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 29. His evidence, however, does not supply
contrast with o<strong>the</strong>r U.S. services but ra<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> Japanese navy in <strong>the</strong> battle <strong>of</strong> Midway.
1188 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 69.
1189 Hughes, Jr., “A Bimodal Force for <strong>the</strong> National Maritime Strategy.”
1190 Armstrong, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” 113.
1191 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 7.
1192 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 59.
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expeditionary mindset. To be out and away, on <strong>the</strong> move, and ready to insert anytime, anywhere is a
hallmark <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> modern U.S. Navy. Protracted length <strong>of</strong> stay garrison-style does not fit easily into this
mindset. 1193
Naval “readiness” for kinetic activity is not simply a state <strong>of</strong> mind. Unlike <strong>the</strong>ir sister services, <strong>the</strong> Navy
does not need to “gear up” in complicated and demanding ways in order to be battle ready. “Navies
transition almost seamlessly from peace to war: <strong>the</strong> environment does not change, and operations—
except for open hostilities—are not altered significantly. There are no discontinuities between
peacetime and wartime operations.” In fact, Barnett argues somewhat wryly, “Naval forces do little
differently, o<strong>the</strong>r than being appreciably more alert and aware, and pulling <strong>the</strong> trigger.” 1194
This level <strong>of</strong> readiness is required in order to achieve <strong>the</strong> immediacy <strong>of</strong> action <strong>the</strong> Navy and Marine
Corps require <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves. Their sustained present readiness counteracts a law <strong>of</strong> nature that has not
been significantly altered: ships move slowly. Not only do ships move slowly, but <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> one,
especially a capital ship, takes an enormous amount <strong>of</strong> time to replace. The physical realities attendant
to its equipment, in combination with <strong>the</strong> vast global nature <strong>of</strong> its terrain, and <strong>the</strong> historic infrequency
<strong>of</strong> actual engagement upon <strong>the</strong> water, 1195 <strong>of</strong>fer opportunity to sailors and <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy to
cultivate a mindset accustomed to patience and fit for <strong>the</strong> prosecution <strong>of</strong> slow lengthy engagements.
Opportunity does not guarantee absorption. Both sailors and marines would insist that acclimation to a
slow pace on a watery surface has not, for <strong>the</strong> Navy or <strong>the</strong> Corps, precluded a bias for action. The form
that action takes, however, especially in response to an able contender, is markedly different in type
and tempo than that pursued by soldiers on <strong>the</strong> ground.
The action related norms which makes sense in maritime conflict with an adversary include indirect
coercion, maneuver, first strike <strong>of</strong>fensive action, and a penchant for risk aversion. Despite its Mahanian
fleet-on-fleet yearnings, <strong>the</strong> Navy has traditionally followed a less Clausewitzian (frontal assault) and
more economic form <strong>of</strong> war focused on “control <strong>of</strong> sealanes and <strong>the</strong> gradual disruption <strong>of</strong> an enemy’s
trade.” 1196 Sea battle is not sought out for its own sake. The Navy acknowledges that “combat at sea, as
has been <strong>the</strong> wise counsel <strong>of</strong> many maritime strategists, is important only ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it affects <strong>the</strong> course
and outcome <strong>of</strong> wars on land.” 1197
When indirect coercive tools fail, or prove insufficient, and more direct contact with <strong>the</strong> enemy is likely,
maneuver becomes <strong>the</strong> order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day. At sea “<strong>the</strong> most difficult problem facing a commander is
finding <strong>the</strong> adversary. The corollary, <strong>of</strong> course, is to take actions so that <strong>the</strong> adversary cannot find
you.” 1198 The result is that “[m]aneuver, correctly understood as movement relative to an adversary, is
not an option for naval forces but a way <strong>of</strong> life.” Maneuver is not an end in itself, it is simply <strong>the</strong> posture
necessary for <strong>the</strong> logistical, <strong>of</strong>fensive and defensive tasks <strong>the</strong> Navy must pursue. Sustaining one’s own
1193
Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 28.
1194
Roger W. Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Why <strong>the</strong> Navy Thinks Differently, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2009): 41, 72.
1195
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 44.
1196
Meilinger, “American Military <strong>Culture</strong> and Strategy,” 82.
1197
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 32.
1198
Italics in original. Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 26.
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sanctuary and denying it to <strong>the</strong> adversary are <strong>the</strong> ambitions <strong>of</strong> an engaged fleet. This requires a bias for
movement and action. “Naval forces, including in particular <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, do not want or like to sit
still; for it compromises <strong>the</strong>ir sanctuary, which is enhanced greatly by mobility.” 1199
Because craft over <strong>the</strong> horizon are terribly difficult to locate and surprise, denying sanctuary to <strong>the</strong>
adversary is most easily done by attacking known and stationary targets. When in <strong>of</strong>fensive mode,
<strong>the</strong>refore, it makes most sense to attack <strong>the</strong> enemy at his source: “[d]estroying adversary forces at <strong>the</strong>ir
berths in port, at <strong>the</strong>ir airdromes, in <strong>the</strong>ir submarine pens, or in <strong>the</strong>ir garrisons” ra<strong>the</strong>r than seeking to
find <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> vast watery battlespace once <strong>the</strong>y have dispersed. 1200 If engagement does occur upon
<strong>the</strong> seas a mindset opposite to that appropriate on land applies. It is <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong>
defensive position which affords <strong>the</strong> advantage. None <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> benefits <strong>of</strong> a ground based defensive
position—natural barriers, fortifications or havens—are available at sea. Given <strong>the</strong> disproportionate
value <strong>of</strong> each ship to its fleet, and <strong>the</strong> inability to mount a “staunch defense”, it becomes crucial in
open-ocean warfare to “attack first and attack effectively.” 1201
Extraordinary caution and redundant drills, training, and physical preparations for all likely scenarios
which may threaten a ship are part and parcel <strong>of</strong> naval life. Given <strong>the</strong> extreme value <strong>of</strong> each ship within
<strong>the</strong> fleet and <strong>the</strong> certainty <strong>of</strong> enormous loss <strong>of</strong> life should she go down, considerable prudence has
made sense to seafarers throughout time. Some argue that a similar caution has seeped into all naval
thinking and planning, resulting in a Navy that is “steadfastly risk averse,” 1202 and headed by a leadership
culture that takes “risk-aversion to an extreme.” 1203 It is interesting to note that despite <strong>the</strong>ir
institutional intertwining with <strong>the</strong> Navy, and life aboard ship with its sailors, Marines seem to grasp risk
from <strong>the</strong> opposite end. Audacity in action is <strong>the</strong> hallmark <strong>of</strong> Marine preferred mode. One explanation
may be that Marines, historically, have paid far less attention to <strong>the</strong> health <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ship. 1204 It has been
<strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> sailors to keep her clean and in good repair and away from <strong>the</strong> rocks and shoals that
might sink her. To <strong>the</strong> extent that protecting <strong>the</strong> ship from harm has produced a risk aversion amongst
its occupants, sailors are far more likely to feel its effects than marines.
Given that <strong>the</strong> Navy’ identity is nowhere grounded in an affiliation with irregular warfare, it is not
surprising that preferred naval norms would require significant adjustment in order to be fit for active
participation in protracted irregular conflicts. Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong points to
four specific shortcomings within <strong>the</strong> U.S. Navy where successful engagement with irregular warfare is
concerned. The first, already rehearsed here, is a mentality that irregular warfare is <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong>
specialized (and <strong>of</strong>ten institutionally ostracized) forces. The irony, as Armstrong points out, is that <strong>the</strong>
most legendary <strong>of</strong> naval irregular acts (<strong>the</strong> burning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Philadelphia in Tripoli’s harbor among <strong>the</strong>m)
were carried out not by specialized branches, but by regular naval and marine forces acting with
1199 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 64.
1200 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 56.
1201 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 67.
1202 Dombrowski and Ross, “Transforming <strong>the</strong> Navy,” 117.
1203 Armstrong, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” 115.
1204 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: This History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marine Corps, The Revised and Expanded
Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1980, 1991): 33.
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particular élan and creativity. 1205 Engaging in successful unconventional endeavors today may be less
about specialized training and more about a shift in mentality that perceives this role, and <strong>the</strong> norms
that attend it, as a normal function <strong>of</strong> regular U.S. Navy <strong>of</strong>ficers and sailors.
Armstrong points to a second shortcoming, this one represented in tangible terms. The Navy’s priorities
and aspirations for itself are clearly identified in <strong>the</strong> material shape <strong>of</strong> its force structure. Evidence <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Navy’s disinterest in serious participation in irregular warfare is <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> appropriate ships—
vessels suited to <strong>the</strong> littoral environment—for conducting it. 1206 A third shortcoming is also technology
related. An unintended consequence <strong>of</strong> advancements in communications technologies has been <strong>the</strong>
undermining <strong>of</strong> junior <strong>of</strong>ficers by highly plugged-in “tactical generals.” 1207 Micromanagement <strong>of</strong> junior
<strong>of</strong>ficers by <strong>the</strong>ir superiors has proved to have a significant and deleterious effect on <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong>
context-essential creativity and innovative problem solving. Overbearing oversight by teleconnected
flag <strong>of</strong>ficers causes a loss in initiative that is fatal to <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> irregular efforts. 1208 Albeit an
unintended negative externality <strong>of</strong> improved communicative links, <strong>the</strong> Navy has done little to counter its
effects.
Armstrong’s fourth point—redundant to any student <strong>of</strong> American strategic culture—is that <strong>the</strong> Navy
needs be far better versed in local and cultural knowledge in order to carry <strong>of</strong>f today <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> small
expeditions that made legend in Navy history. 1209 Armstrong’s admonition that <strong>the</strong> Navy build
partnerships with local forces in order to gain a keener sense <strong>of</strong> local mores should come naturally to a
service for whom “[f]orward deploying means interaction with allied navies,” and which “has always
worked assiduously at initiating and fostering such links.” 1210 The Navy possesses <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong>
pronounced advantages in acquiring and ingesting cultural data in preparation for irregular
engagements in <strong>the</strong> region deployed. Sailors operate in close proximity to <strong>the</strong> regions under study, and
might encourage cultural data collection and dissemination from inland bases. This data could be put to
good use during sailors’ abundant supply <strong>of</strong> “down time.” Sailors spend that time confined aboard a
craft <strong>of</strong>fering a library and computer access and <strong>the</strong> opportunity to research or complete courses
online. 1211 Instead, despite geographic and temporal advantages, cultural investigations <strong>of</strong> a strategic
sort remain on <strong>the</strong> back burner. The cultural nuances <strong>of</strong> small time unconventional foes (potential or
active) are largely ignored. Even those intelligence managers tasked with cultural competence
assignments remain almost wholly fixed on possible future conflicts with a worthy blue water
adversary—projected to be a “rational actor” <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Morgenthau variety. 1212 The American military’s
decade <strong>of</strong> parallel unconventional conflicts is unlikely to have significant impact on this mentality and
<strong>the</strong> preferred norms attached to it. Historian Wayne Hughes puts it in ra<strong>the</strong>r blunt terms: in <strong>the</strong> two
1205
Armstrong, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” 113.
1206
Armstrong, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” 114.
1207
Barnett warns <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same. Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 84-85.
1208
Armstrong, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” 115.
1209
Armstrong, “The Most Daring Act <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare,” 115.
1210
Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 29.
1211
Should sailors devote <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> time to cultural study that <strong>the</strong>y do to video games, <strong>the</strong> Navy’s cultural
incompetence would no longer be an issue.
1212
Based on this author’s experience working with <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> Naval Intelligence.
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current conflicts <strong>the</strong> “Navy, because <strong>of</strong> its sea sanctuary, has not been shot at much and has had less
motivation to change.” 1213
Perceptual Lens
The cultural encodements that affect human perceptions can come in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> cognitive constructs
(<strong>the</strong> way one thinks and organizes information) as well as in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> specific perceptions or
characterizations (<strong>of</strong>ten called stereotypes) <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. One comprises <strong>the</strong> mechanism or habits <strong>of</strong> mind
for processing information, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r has to do with <strong>the</strong> substance, or meaning derived from <strong>the</strong>
information privileged as “accurate.” On <strong>the</strong> first account—habits <strong>of</strong> mind and <strong>the</strong> processing <strong>of</strong>
information—<strong>the</strong> Navy’s “systems” approach to problems serves to advantage in strategic thinking.
The Army must think in <strong>of</strong>ten myopic and compartmentalized terms—focusing on individual units and
organizational charts which detail <strong>the</strong> supply and defense <strong>of</strong> those units. Navy leadership, by contrast,
“is thinking in terms <strong>of</strong> air defense systems, antisubmarine systems, <strong>of</strong> mine warfare, amphibious,
logistics, and strike systems.” The Navy’s optic is more panoramic—taking in <strong>the</strong> full range <strong>of</strong>
connectivity and delivery to <strong>the</strong> effort as a whole—not tightly focused on <strong>the</strong> tactics necessary to
capture a particular piece <strong>of</strong> ground before <strong>the</strong>m. This “encourages approaching questions—including
strategies—from a holistic, systematic point <strong>of</strong> view.” 1214 Barnett argues that this perspective provides
Navy <strong>of</strong>ficers an enhanced ability to think strategically, “to rise above <strong>the</strong> minutiae <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tactical
battlefield, and to discern ‘where <strong>the</strong> big picture fits in’.” 1215
One might assume that a strategic perspective <strong>of</strong> this sort—thinking in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> collective whole
ra<strong>the</strong>r than individual units—would also lend itself to an enthusiasm for jointness; but here <strong>the</strong> Navy’s
strong sense <strong>of</strong> independence and detectable scent <strong>of</strong> superiority bear sway. “[T]he Navy has
traditionally been cool to jointness, viewing it essentially as a one-way street: <strong>the</strong> Navy knows full well
what it can do for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r services, but it is skeptical <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong>y can do for it.” 1216 The Navy is not
interested in an identity forged around “support service.” It remains vested in an identity, however
infrequently applied, <strong>of</strong> naval supremacy defined by triumph in pitched battle at sea and fights to
protect <strong>the</strong> sea lanes. 1217 The values that underpin this identity—self reliance and historic
independence—cannot help but color <strong>the</strong> way its members view joint ventures with sister services.
The Navy perception is that it “provides combat services and support services to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r branches <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> U.S. armed forces, but receives disproportionately less in return.”
The Army, and to a lesser extent, <strong>the</strong> Air Force, is critically dependent on support from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r
services; <strong>the</strong> Navy can operate for extended periods <strong>of</strong> time with little or no support from
outside <strong>the</strong> service. The Navy also conducts missions that have virtually no joint participation—
1213
Hughes, Jr., “A Bimodal Force for <strong>the</strong> National Maritime Strategy,” 43.
1214
Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 27-28.
1215
Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 1.
1216
Barnett, “<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and its Relationship to Naval Strategy,” 28.
1217 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 129.
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anti-submarine warfare, for example. It should not be surprising, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong> Army, and
not <strong>the</strong> Navy, is <strong>the</strong> primary promoter <strong>of</strong> jointness. 1218
The Navy’s distance from shore spawns ano<strong>the</strong>r interesting distinction in perception vis a vis <strong>the</strong> ground
services. The moral crusade that characterizes America’s land forces is less pronounced in her seaborne
variety. “Because modern navies rarely engage in hand-to-hand combat, it is less necessary to demonize
<strong>the</strong> enemy. The enemy is a ‘concept,’ one who can kill you, but not necessarily on a personal mano a
mano basis.” 1219 Should <strong>the</strong> authors who have consistently characterized <strong>the</strong> American military as an
establishment captured by <strong>the</strong> need to vilify one’s enemy and moralize <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> war have spent <strong>the</strong>
majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir time with sailors ra<strong>the</strong>r than soldiers one wonders if a different sweeping
characterization <strong>of</strong> American strategic culture might have been <strong>the</strong> result.
In near direct response to Builder’s provocative challenge: to imagine that military forces are not what
we pretend <strong>the</strong>m to be—military means to political ends—but are instead “institutional ends in
<strong>the</strong>mselves,” 1220 <strong>the</strong> Navy, like <strong>the</strong> Army and Air Force, supplies some interesting supportive examples.
Lest a reader be misled, it is important to point out that evidence in support <strong>of</strong> Builder’s claim is not
fodder for cynicism or grounding for accusations <strong>of</strong> institutional selfishness or disregard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public
interest. Quite to <strong>the</strong> contrary, most who pursue <strong>the</strong>ir institutional interests within preferred identity
lines and employ habituated and comfortable norms, do so while actively perceiving it to be in <strong>the</strong>
nation’s interest. Those wry observers who come along and point out seemingly obvious inconsistencies
are <strong>of</strong>ten treated as disloyal gadflies if inside <strong>the</strong> ranks and, absent exceptional circumstances, are
largely ignored if coming from outside.
Unconscious or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>the</strong> humans at <strong>the</strong> helm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions are acting in ways accurately
described by David Hume over 200 years ago: employing reason in pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir institutional
passions. Builder provides a thought experiment to prove <strong>the</strong> point. Even during a time <strong>of</strong> well defined
threat – <strong>the</strong> Cold War Soviet era—he characterizes <strong>the</strong> Navy’s response as one <strong>of</strong> institutional aspiration
ra<strong>the</strong>r than an objective reaction to threat assessment:
It is not <strong>the</strong> Soviet threat that drives [<strong>the</strong> Navy’s] concept <strong>of</strong> war and, hence, <strong>the</strong> required naval
forces. It is <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way around. It is <strong>the</strong> desired forces that drive <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> war and,
hence, <strong>the</strong> interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> threat. If that sounds perverse, try <strong>the</strong> following
gedankenexperiement: Imagine that <strong>the</strong> Soviets have scuttled <strong>the</strong>ir entire fleet in its harbors
overnight. Everything, all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> warships and submarines, lies sunk or wrecked. Would <strong>the</strong> U.S.
Navy <strong>the</strong>n say, “Well, <strong>the</strong>y did our job for us, now we can safely get rid <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> our own”? Or
would <strong>the</strong> Navy, as it did after World War II, quickly find a new justification for <strong>the</strong> same forces
it wants now and wanted <strong>the</strong>n?
Thus, <strong>the</strong> Navy’s dominant concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> next major war is one that calls for <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> naval
forces and <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> navy to which it aspires. It is that concept—much more than <strong>the</strong> defense
1218 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 107.
1219 Barnett, Navy <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>, 18.
1220 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 6.
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guidance—which defines <strong>the</strong> qualitative character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy’s programs and its priorities for
budget allocations. 1221
Posed as a thought experiment before <strong>the</strong> break <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War, Builder’s words have become all <strong>the</strong>
more poignant as history has borne <strong>the</strong>m out.
1221 Builder, The Masks <strong>of</strong> War, 136.
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APPENDIX B:
USMC RECRUITMENT POSTERS
Note: The following Appendix is selective ra<strong>the</strong>r than exhaustive
Year Description Research Notes Image
1913 On ship sailing to palm
trees
“For Active <strong>Service</strong> Join <strong>the</strong>
Marines”
1913
Soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea
Pre-WWI Men <strong>of</strong> Action
(Tropical scenes, Marines
beach landing)
“Marines fight on land or
seas and <strong>the</strong>y are always
called first when <strong>the</strong> war
trumpets blow”
“For fighting…join <strong>the</strong>
Marines”
1916 “Soldier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea”
“Rally Round <strong>the</strong> Flag”
“First in Defense”
Amphibious assault – beach
landing type picture
Primary Theme: adventure, see far away
places
Very interesting that it is advertising all <strong>the</strong>
“tangibles” that <strong>the</strong> Marines pride
<strong>the</strong>mselves on disdaining today:
Good pay, foreign travel, “congenial
employment”
Not in a position to sell <strong>the</strong>ir image yet.
Tropical beach scenes common – recruits
would expect to be doing colonial duty in
island nations
First to action <strong>the</strong>me already emerging
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Summary Primary <strong>the</strong>me <strong>of</strong> pre WWI era is to be first
to hoist <strong>the</strong> flag, see adventure and far
away places:
WWI Era
WWI “First to Fight – Join <strong>the</strong>
Marines”
No picture
1917 “First to Fight for
Democracy”
Aboard ship scene, loading
a gun
1917 Trim dress blues with
trumpet
1917 “Soldier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea”
Aboard ship
1917 “Spirit <strong>of</strong> 1917”
War scene
First to Fight phrase present
Surprised at <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> ship scenes in
this era <strong>of</strong> posters
Comfortable with <strong>the</strong> “soldier” label –
perfect bridge between Army and Navy
Clearly WWI, European War
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1917 “Be Up to Date = Be a US
Marine
First to Change <strong>the</strong> Old
Campaign Hat
For <strong>the</strong> Modern Helmet”
Shows picture <strong>of</strong> sandbag
warfare
1917 “This device on hat or
helmet means U.S.
Marines”
1917-1918 Walking John classic in
dress blues
“Active <strong>Service</strong> on Land and
Sea”
Walking along doing sentry
service
1917 Flag backdrop, Campaign
Hat and gear, pointing
pistol
1917 “He did his duty – will
you?”
Portrait <strong>of</strong> Dewey – his
quote:
“No finer military
organization than <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps exists in <strong>the</strong>
world”
**This one a big deal. Any who joined
under this banner and with <strong>the</strong>se hopes
and <strong>the</strong>n got sent to Haiti would be bitter
and feel betrayed.
Branding awareness
Interesting that trying to glamorize
something as routine as sentry service.
Still seeing this as a key role.
Themes <strong>of</strong> duty and patriotism emerging
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1917 Series <strong>of</strong> posters with WWI
images
Same image is later re-used
with “First in France
U.S. Marines”
across <strong>the</strong> top
1917 Classic <strong>of</strong> this era.
1917 “Do Your Duty”
Image <strong>of</strong> a Marine loading a
gun aboard ship
Again, recruits signing under this would feel
betrayed if sent to colonial duty
Genuine mixture <strong>of</strong> images – ship life and
shore fighting in <strong>the</strong> WWI set <strong>of</strong> posters.
1917 First to Fight Image as fighters – that is how
distinguishing self from o<strong>the</strong>r services.
Not sure why this is underplayed during
WWII era.
WWI “If you want to FIGHT!”
Join <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Christy girl throwing <strong>the</strong>
gauntlet down for
boys/men to join.
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Unknown “Teufel Hunden
German nickname for U.S.
Marines”
“…Devil Dog”
1918 “E-E-E-Yah Yip
Go Over with <strong>the</strong> U.S.
Marines”
1918 “Tell it to <strong>the</strong> Marines”
Newspaper reads: “Huns
Kill Women and Children”
Not clear in what time frame this was used.
It is interesting that more was not made <strong>of</strong>
this in WWII posters – fighting <strong>the</strong> same
foe!
This image projects raw courage and
bloody, somewhat crazy bravery. WWII
posters are very tame and team-oriented
by comparison.
I am bounded by language and time in
understanding <strong>the</strong> jargon here.
A successful Marine coup in taking a slur
intended <strong>the</strong>ir direction “Tell it to <strong>the</strong>
Marines” and turning it into a slogan. One
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> more famous images <strong>of</strong> this era. A
ra<strong>the</strong>r lengthy explanation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> origins <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> phrase from <strong>the</strong> Marine point <strong>of</strong> view:
"Tell it to <strong>the</strong> Marines." If it's trouble, tell it
to <strong>the</strong>m. They'll take care <strong>of</strong> it in short
order; <strong>the</strong>y always have. But if it's a new
yarn by all means tell it to <strong>the</strong>m, for a
Marine's nearest and dearest pastime is
yarning. The peculiar thing about "Marine
Tales" is that most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m are true and
can be verified by delving into history
books and records. Of course any story
gains added color by repetition, but <strong>the</strong>
tales you'll find scattered throughout this
narrative can each be proven if due time is
allotted for a serious search <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> record.
The next time you hear one that's hardly
believable. "TELL IT TO THE MARINES."
"Tell it to <strong>the</strong> Marines" was naturally
originated by someone. It was certainly not
incorporated into <strong>the</strong> articles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy
which govern our organization. Back in <strong>the</strong>
days <strong>of</strong> old when knights started riding
ships instead <strong>of</strong> steeds and charged down
<strong>the</strong> sea-ways <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Atlantic, to discover
new places and things, Marines were
already in existence. A British Marine
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Captain endeavored to yarn <strong>the</strong> Royal
Court with a tale <strong>of</strong> his travels. He spent
some time trying to convince <strong>the</strong> lords and
ladies he had seen fish in <strong>the</strong> Atlantic's
tropic waters that "flew on wings" like
birds. King Charles II overheard <strong>the</strong>
conversation and sc<strong>of</strong>fed at <strong>the</strong> Captain,
but when <strong>the</strong> story was later proven to be
true, he complimented <strong>the</strong> British Marines
each time a new or interesting fact was
brought to his attention, by saying, "Tell it
to <strong>the</strong> Marines," implying that if it were
true, <strong>the</strong> Marines would probably know
about it. Some claim that <strong>the</strong> story is pure
fiction and that <strong>the</strong> English monarch was
not its originator. Tell that to <strong>the</strong> Marines.
John J. Oboykovits, “Devil Dogs,”
Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck, (Nov 1941).
1918 Comfort with killing and bragging about it.
Summary
INTERWAR
Interesting sidenote: This poster continues
to be a very popular image. Can get it
today on a t shirt or mousepad.
Primary <strong>the</strong>mes:
Soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea
Duty, flag
Pictures <strong>of</strong> life aboard ship but carrying a
gun, ready to land and fight.
Being FIRST emphasized in several places
and on several posters not pictured here.
First in France a key slogan.
Lots <strong>of</strong> WWI scenes.
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1930s “Go Everywhere See
Everything”
Back to colonial service in far flung lands,
but taking with <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> souvenir <strong>of</strong> a
German helmet.
1937 Back to listing <strong>of</strong>f benefits like any o<strong>the</strong>r job
– even “courses <strong>of</strong> study”!
1939 “They Shall Not Pass”
Marine standing in front <strong>of</strong>
a globe – face forward on
globe is Americas.
1940 “Join in Defense <strong>of</strong>
America”
1940 “Let’s Go!” U.S. Marines
WWII
Show <strong>of</strong> bravado – immovable
Note from historic division: resurrected a
lot <strong>of</strong> WWI posters for WWII
Own analysis: Strongly patriotic <strong>the</strong>mes
about country and duty ra<strong>the</strong>r than about
who you are individually or <strong>the</strong> man you
will become: not focusing on <strong>the</strong> appeal <strong>of</strong>
a private good <strong>of</strong> enhanced manhood
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1941 Always on <strong>the</strong> Alert
Sea, Land, Air
1941 “The Marines Have Landed”
Amphibious Assault picture
1942 Marines Want YOU!
1942 READY
Join U.S. Marines
1942 Defend America NOW
1945 Battle scene
Still pretty lacking in emotive force.
Appeals to teamwork, duty, taking part.
Nothing distinctive about Marine <strong>Service</strong> –
<strong>the</strong>y are a part <strong>of</strong> a bigger effort.
This one is more distinctive – more appeal
to sense <strong>of</strong> Marine-ness, distinct
contribution, and elite status.
Appearance image in full play
Dress blues
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Some from a different site
than <strong>the</strong> Historic Division,
so cannot validate
au<strong>the</strong>ntic dates, but are far
more exciting than <strong>the</strong>
bland posters listed on <strong>the</strong>
formal registry.
1945 Enlist Now!
Marine Corps
(most include boiler plate
battle scene, nothing
distinctive about USMC
service)
“Fightin” <strong>the</strong>me and some Marine pride
coming through
Historic Division notes that this was part <strong>of</strong>
a NAVMC series. Variety <strong>of</strong> three battle
scenes. The Historic Division notes that it
was also used during Korean War. The
image pictured is <strong>of</strong> course <strong>the</strong> most
famous USMC moment and <strong>the</strong> most
reproduced <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> series (online).
Post WWII
Post WWII Attempt to keep enlistees in. Still
emphasizing tangibles “travel, sea duty,
adventure, education, action.”
Despite <strong>the</strong> proud performance at Iwo Jima
and across Pacific Islands, still not confident
enough in brand to sell it foremost.
1950 Wanted : Volunteers Pretty tame for Korean War era.
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1950 Uncommon Valor was a
Common Virtue
1954 “Semper Fidelis”
Hat in hand, looking up
1954 Scrolled writing says “Since
1775, United States Marine
Corps” around image <strong>of</strong>
dandied up 1775 Marine
1957 “VALOR
The United States Marine
Corps
BUILDS MEN”
1958 “The Marine Corps builds
LEADERS”
(series)
1 st Portrait <strong>of</strong> Marine
Officer in dress blues
2 nd smug, confident pilot
with cup <strong>of</strong> c<strong>of</strong>fee
Capitalizing on iconic image
This set <strong>of</strong> 1954 posters is strangely
contrite, calm, absent prose about fighting
Start to see manhood <strong>the</strong>me appear again
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1959 “The Marine Corps Reserve
Builds Men”
(Young, smiling, handsome
Marine cleaning his rifle)
1961 TRADITION
A Marine Officer
1963 “Get Set…Go!”
“Marine Aviation”
VIETNAM
1965 “The Marine Corps Builds
Men”
Amphibious Scene –
1964-65 Leader <strong>of</strong> Men
Officer <strong>of</strong> Marines
Strange poster. This <strong>of</strong>ficer does not have
<strong>the</strong> typical Marine “look.” Poster does not
speak to any particular traditions with <strong>the</strong>
exception <strong>of</strong> a portrait <strong>of</strong> Lejeune in <strong>the</strong>
background.
Perhaps released right after our landing at
Da Nang?
Not one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> more popular because does
not appear within online <strong>of</strong>ferings when
this <strong>the</strong>me typed in.
Entire series with this title. Starting a shift
to <strong>the</strong> intangibles: for <strong>of</strong>ficers it is
leadership and prestige
1968 “Ask a Marine Officer” College campus scene with students talking
to a Marine Officer. Seems to be
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1969 The Marine Corps Builds
Men
Ask a Marine
attempting to portray that Marines have a
place among smart students on campus.
Very low key.
Much stronger focus on private good:
enhanced manhood
1971 Rose Garden Theme MUCH tougher elitist image. Although this
poster has become terribly popular, it was
not <strong>the</strong> primary <strong>the</strong>me for this era. The
companion commercial was aired in 1971
but does not appear <strong>the</strong>reafter.
1972 Using WWI poster and
claiming we are still that
Marine Corps
Likely an attempt to address a poor public
image and internal malaise post Vietnam –
reflects a purer patriotism and cleaner
image sort <strong>of</strong> era.
1974 Same thing again here – nostalgia piece
POST
VIETNAM
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1990 “I am looking for warriors
to follow me”
(Cammie painting <strong>of</strong> Al Gray
holding cup)
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APPENDIX C:
U.S. MARINE CORPS SYMBOL AND SIGNIFICANCE
The USMC is over 224 years <strong>of</strong> romping, stomping, hell, death and destruction. The finest fighting
machine <strong>the</strong> world has ever seen. We were born in a bomb crater, our mo<strong>the</strong>r was an M-16 and our
fa<strong>the</strong>r was <strong>the</strong> devil. Each moment that I live is an additional threat upon your life.
I am a rough looking, roving soldier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sea. I am cocky, self-centered, overbearing, and I do not know
<strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> fear, for I am fear itself. I am a green, amphibious monster made <strong>of</strong> blood and guts who
arose from <strong>the</strong> sea, festering on anti-Americans throughout <strong>the</strong> globe. Whenever it may arise, and when
my time comes, I will die a glorious death on <strong>the</strong> battle field, giving my life to mom, <strong>the</strong> Corps, and <strong>the</strong>
American flag.
We stole <strong>the</strong> eagle from <strong>the</strong> Air Force, <strong>the</strong> anchor from <strong>the</strong> Navy, and <strong>the</strong> rope from <strong>the</strong> Army. On <strong>the</strong>
7th day, while God rested, we over-ran his perimeter and stole <strong>the</strong> globe, and we've been running <strong>the</strong>
show ever since.
We live like soldiers and talk like sailors and slap <strong>the</strong> hell out <strong>of</strong> both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Soldier by day, lover by
night, drunkard by choice,
MARINE BY GOD!!!
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APPENDIX D:
MARINE CORPS NARRATIVES
Fighter Identity & Ethos
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Message to <strong>the</strong> American Public
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Marine Pride
(0311 is <strong>the</strong> Military Occupational
Specialty designation for a rifleman –
<strong>the</strong> primary infantry MOS for <strong>the</strong>
Corps).
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Pride: Battle Specific
Pride: Extended to Associated O<strong>the</strong>rs
(Also available with: bro<strong>the</strong>r, sister,
grandson, son)
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Bro<strong>the</strong>rhood and Honor to Marines Who Have Come Before
Marine Bravado
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Marine Norms & Values
Mixed Messages
*Bumper stickers available at Grunt.com. Accessed 21 December 2012
http://www.grunt.com/catalogsearch/result/?q=bumper+stickers&order=relevance&dir=desc
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APPENDIX E:
COMMANDANT SPEECHES: 1916-1975
Commandant Key Speeches Research Notes
GEORGE BARNETT
Major General
Feb. 25 1914-
June 30, 1920
Served as Commander
during WWI and secured
a huge increase in
personnel during his
term (Wikipedia)*
Commandant Biddle’s
Advanced Base Force was
formed under Barnett.
Corps grew to 76,000.
(Gazette)**
JOHN A. LEJEUNE
Major General
1 July 1920-
4 March 1929
Started <strong>the</strong> birthday ball
tradition with Marine
Corps Order 47, still read
annually. (Wikipedia)
Readiness and <strong>the</strong>
development <strong>of</strong>
amphibious doctrine
were his principal
objectives. Began
development <strong>of</strong> landing
craft and amphibious
vehicles. Credited with
having <strong>the</strong> vision that
allowed for success on
“Excerpts from <strong>the</strong> Statement <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> Major General Commandant,
U.S. Marine Corps, before <strong>the</strong>
Committee on Naval Affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
House <strong>of</strong> Representatives on <strong>the</strong>
Estimates for <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps on
January 23, 1918,” Marine Corps
Gazette, (March 1918)
“It’s in Their Blood,” Address
before American Legion
Convention, Oct. 31, 1921, Marine
Corps Gazette, (December 1921)
“Preparation”
Address to Marine Corps School,
Quantico
Marine Corps Gazette, (March
1922)
274
Displays clear pride in Corps. Sees it as
essential that Corps strength be
temporarily increased in order to
participate in WWI: “<strong>the</strong> greatest war
known to history.”
Identity: Refers to Marines as soldiers.
Identity: “Marvelous esprit de corps
which has been handed down from
generation to generation”
Value/Perceptual Lens: Refutes <strong>the</strong>
idea that WWI was not a war <strong>of</strong> glory.
(Note: Strange that this was <strong>the</strong>
contemporary conception.) Says that
pomp was lacking but “true glory was
not lacking.” His marines faced danger
manfully and died heroically.
Perceptual Lens: Emphasis on <strong>the</strong>
American people deciding <strong>the</strong> fate (and
size) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps. “We must consider,
<strong>the</strong>refore, how we can retain and if
possible increase <strong>the</strong> affection and
esteem in which <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is
now held by <strong>the</strong> American people.” p.
53
Value: Article emphasizes frugality as
though it is a new concept. “[S]hortly

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Guadalcanal (3 months
before his death). Very
popular Commandant.
Gazette
“A Brief History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine
Corps” Marine Corps Gazette,
(March 1923)
275
after assuming <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong>
Commandant, I issued an order urging
economy. It was a ra<strong>the</strong>r strange
doctrine <strong>the</strong>n. All <strong>of</strong> us were
accustomed to liberal spending.” pp.
53-54 Notes <strong>the</strong> “excellent results”
and that <strong>the</strong> Corps has now
“established a reputation for
economy.”
Role/ Perceptual Lens: Emphasizes
that military forces must make
<strong>the</strong>mselves useful in peacetime. Notes
that <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps is, “more than
any o<strong>the</strong>r military organization”
proving its utility in Haiti and Santo
Dominigo where <strong>the</strong>y are “carrying out
<strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> our Nation by maintaining
peace and tranquility and giving <strong>the</strong>ir
inhabitants an opportunity for peace,
prosperity and happiness. That work is
worth while, as is all work done for <strong>the</strong>
benefit <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r people.”
Identity/Role: “But let us not forget
<strong>the</strong> object <strong>of</strong> our existence, which is to
make and keep <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps a
great fighting machine—<strong>the</strong> greatest
on earth, bar none.” Value:
Ingredients: maintaining a high Esprit
de Corps. “It is a sacred thing. It is our
priceless heritage from <strong>the</strong> past.” Key
to keeping it intact? Discipline.
Historical sketch prepared for
publication by <strong>the</strong> United States
History Association.
Identity/Role: “The Marine as a
soldier is distinct from all o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Nation’s armed forces in that he may
be landed to protect American lives
and rights without a declaration <strong>of</strong>
war.”
Identity: The Marines are constantly
engaged in campaigns, thus, “<strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps has always been a Corps

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“The United States Marine Corps”
Marine Corps Gazette, (December
1923)
Speech to <strong>the</strong> Naval War College
276
<strong>of</strong> veterans” grown grey in war with
very few intervals <strong>of</strong> peace. p. 19
Identity/Perceptual Lens: The part
played by <strong>the</strong> Marines at Belleau Wood
“is familiar to every American
schoolboy.” p. 20
Identity: trace descent from <strong>the</strong> Royal
Marines <strong>of</strong> Great Britain.
Loaded with history <strong>of</strong> Royal Marines.
Notes split jurisdiction over <strong>the</strong> Corps
between <strong>the</strong> Army and Navy in 1798 –
problems it caused. Clarified in 1834
when <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps was totally
subjected to Navy laws and regulations
except when detached for service with
Army.
Norms: Set up Commandant as
“natural protector and friend” to
<strong>of</strong>ficers and enlisted men. p.248
Identity/Role: “The Marine Corps
mission may be succinctly states as
follows, viz.: To support <strong>the</strong> United
States Fleet and to aid <strong>the</strong> Navy in
carrying out that part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> government which has been or
may be assigned to it.” p. 249
Lists 8 duties <strong>of</strong> Corps:
1. protect Navy yards
2. Guards for American legations in
foreign countries
3. Landing forces to protect American
lives, rights and interests
4. Forces <strong>of</strong> occupation to restore
order and to maintain peace and
tranquility in disturbed countries, as,
for instance, Haiti and Santo Domingo
(Note: Marines <strong>of</strong> this era valued First!
but realized that <strong>the</strong>y might also Stay.
This is reflected in <strong>the</strong> “bring <strong>the</strong> family
along” literature in <strong>the</strong> Gazette.)
5. Administration (recruiting, training,

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277
supply, etc)
6. Aviation
7. <strong>Service</strong> on board vessels <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fleet
8. Expeditionary forces for service with
<strong>the</strong> Fleet in war
Spends <strong>the</strong> remainder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> article
discussing #8. Characterizes <strong>the</strong> Corps,
however, as service “to support <strong>the</strong>
Fleet by supplying it with a highly
trained, fully equipped expeditionary
force for <strong>the</strong> minor shore operations”
which are necessary for its major
mission. pp. 249-250 Sees <strong>the</strong> “seizure
and defense <strong>of</strong> temporary or advanced
naval bases” as <strong>the</strong> most important.
Marines will “defend such bases until
relieved by <strong>the</strong> Army.” p. 250
Values/Norms: “Mobility, flexibility
and a state <strong>of</strong> constant preparedness”
p. 251
Firmly defending place within <strong>the</strong>
Navy.
Characterizes <strong>the</strong> service in Haiti and
Dominican as “garrisoning.”
Identity/Role: Sees duty as was
performed in WWI as exceptional. It is
<strong>the</strong> Marines’ duty after it has
performed its necessary tasks with <strong>the</strong>
Navy. pp. 253-54
MARINE CORPS ORDER No. 47 (Series 1921)
MARINE CORPS ORDER No. 47 (Series 1921)
HEADQUARTERS
U.S. MARINE CORPS Washington, November 1, 1921
The following will be read to <strong>the</strong> command on <strong>the</strong> 10th <strong>of</strong>
November, 1921, and hereafter on <strong>the</strong> 10th <strong>of</strong> November <strong>of</strong> every
year. Should <strong>the</strong> order not be received by <strong>the</strong> 10th <strong>of</strong> November,
1921, it will be read upon receipt.
On November 10, 1775, a Corps <strong>of</strong> Marines was created by a
resolution <strong>of</strong> Continental Congress. Since that date many thousand

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WENDELL C. NEVILLE
Major General
5 March 1929-
8 July 1930
Medal winner
(no o<strong>the</strong>r achievements
men have borne <strong>the</strong> name "Marine". In memory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m it is fitting
that we who are Marines should commemorate <strong>the</strong> birthday <strong>of</strong> our
corps by calling to mind <strong>the</strong> glories <strong>of</strong> its long and illustrious history.
The record <strong>of</strong> our corps is one which will bear comparison with that
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most famous military organizations in <strong>the</strong> world's history.
During 90 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 146 years <strong>of</strong> its existence <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps has
been in action against <strong>the</strong> Nation's foes. From <strong>the</strong> Battle <strong>of</strong> Trenton
to <strong>the</strong> Argonne, Marines have won foremost honors in war, and in
<strong>the</strong> long eras <strong>of</strong> tranquility at home, generation after generation <strong>of</strong>
Marines have grown gray in war in both hemispheres and in every
corner <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seven seas, that our country and its citizens might
enjoy peace and security.
In every battle and skirmish since <strong>the</strong> birth <strong>of</strong> our corps, Marines
have acquitted <strong>the</strong>mselves with <strong>the</strong> greatest distinction, winning
new honors on each occasion until <strong>the</strong> term "Marine" has come to
signify all that is highest in military efficiency and soldierly virtue.
This high name <strong>of</strong> distinction and soldierly repute we who are
Marines today have received from those who preceded us in <strong>the</strong>
corps. With it we have also received from <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> eternal spirit
which has animated our corps from generation to generation and
has been <strong>the</strong> distinguishing mark <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marines in every age. So
long as that spirit continues to flourish Marines will be found equal
to every emergency in <strong>the</strong> future as <strong>the</strong>y have been in <strong>the</strong> past, and
<strong>the</strong> men <strong>of</strong> our Nation will regard us as worthy successors to <strong>the</strong>
long line <strong>of</strong> illustrious men who have served as "Soldiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sea"
since <strong>the</strong> founding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps.
JOHN A. LEJEUNE,
Major General
Commandant
Accessed in anticipation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 2012 birthday celebration on <strong>the</strong>
Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck website:
http://www.lea<strong>the</strong>rneck.com/forums/showthread.php?56719-MARINE-
CORPS-ORDER-No-47-(Series-1921)
No key speeches reflected in
Gazette or Lea<strong>the</strong>rneck
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mentioned in Wikipedia)
Brilliant Marine career
but died <strong>of</strong> a stroke only
16 months into <strong>of</strong>fice.
“Shot at in every rank.”
Career parallels that <strong>of</strong>
Lejeune. Were good
friends.
BEN H. FULLER
Major General
9 July 1930-
28 February 1934
Consolidated <strong>the</strong> Fleet
Marine Force Concept.
(Wikipedia)
Smedley Butler <strong>the</strong>
primary contender for
<strong>the</strong> Commandancy vis a
vis Fuller.
Commanded <strong>the</strong> 2 nd
Brigade in <strong>the</strong>
Dominican. Missed WWI
because <strong>of</strong> it. Created
Fleet Marine Force.
Gazette
“The Mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette,
(November 1930)
279
Value: “But above all, we must be
efficient in doing those things…”
Perceptual Lens: “must satisfy <strong>the</strong>
American public with our services..”
Role/ Norms: Being Jack <strong>of</strong> All Trades.
Flexible. Adaptable. “Our job is
getting results no matter what task we
are assigned.” Proceeds later in <strong>the</strong>
article to list, at ridiculous length, <strong>the</strong>
wide variety <strong>of</strong> tasks Marines have
performed over <strong>the</strong> years. “We know
what our job was yesterday and we are
struggling faithfully to do our work
today, but who knows what it will be
tomorrow? Probably something new
and unique. It may be anything. Our
job is intricate—diffused. It requires
versatility.”
Identity: Strong affirmation <strong>of</strong>
attachment to <strong>the</strong> Navy. “We are a
branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Naval <strong>Service</strong>s” Later:
“Cut <strong>the</strong> ancestral knot that binds us to
<strong>the</strong> waters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oceans, seas, bays,
gulfs, rivers, lakes and o<strong>the</strong>r wet spots
and with <strong>the</strong> same motion you cut <strong>the</strong>
throat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps.” …”Do not let <strong>the</strong>
Naval-Mind <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps be changed to
any o<strong>the</strong>r type <strong>of</strong> mind, that will leave
only a memory, a history, <strong>of</strong> our grand
and glorious Corps <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ocean.” One
senses a worry, a bit <strong>of</strong> panic that
o<strong>the</strong>rs are pressuring o<strong>the</strong>rwise.
Identity/Role: Says that service in

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“Address by Major General Ben H.
Fuller” before <strong>the</strong> Aztec Club <strong>of</strong>
1847 at its Annual Dinner, Nov.
21, 1931, Marine Corps Gazette,
(Feb. 1932)
280
Great War “proved <strong>the</strong> splendid
usefulness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps to <strong>the</strong> Nation”
but it is “<strong>the</strong> magnificent record <strong>of</strong>
constructive achievements, and
successes in minor wars, during a
period <strong>of</strong> over one and a half
centuries” that has “conclusively
proved that <strong>the</strong> Corps is a necessary
part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Government.”
In Haiti and Santo Domingo (as well as
o<strong>the</strong>r places) we succored “little bits <strong>of</strong>
civilization that …dotted <strong>the</strong>
undeveloped spaces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world;
garrisoning <strong>the</strong> outposts <strong>of</strong> our
democratic empire;” Later: “training
national guards” and providing
“occupying forces for those nearby
states over which <strong>the</strong> United States has
elected itself guardian.” p. 8 All <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong>se, for Fuller, fall under “peace-time
duties.”
Identity/Role: In future major war <strong>the</strong>
Corps will act as an adjunct to <strong>the</strong>
Navy, for <strong>the</strong> initial seizure and defense
<strong>of</strong> advanced bases and “for such
limited auxiliary land operations as are
essential to <strong>the</strong> prosecution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
naval campaign.”
Value: Initiative. “What is Initiative?
I’ll tell you: It is doing <strong>the</strong> right thing
without being told.”
Remainder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> speech is a
recounting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> taking <strong>of</strong>
Chapultepec (although nothing about
<strong>the</strong> blood stripe is mentioned) and its
connection to <strong>the</strong> Marine Hymn: From
<strong>the</strong> “Halls <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Montezumas”

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JOHN H. RUSSELL, JR.
Major General
1 March 1934-
30 November 1936
Abolished seniority in
favor <strong>of</strong> selection system.
Withdrew from Haiti.
The number <strong>of</strong> ships
carrying Marine
detachments continued
to increase.
(Wikipedia)
Revitalized <strong>the</strong> Reserve.
Streng<strong>the</strong>ned relations
with <strong>the</strong> Navy. First
Commandant coming
from west <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Mississippi (California).
Led <strong>the</strong> 1 st Marine
Provisional Brigade to
pacify Haiti (1919). In
1922 became High
Commissioner <strong>of</strong> Haiti.
Stayed in this post for
nine years. When
became Assis.
Commandant helped
prepare <strong>the</strong> Corps’ first
formal amphibious
doctrine: “Tentative
Landing Operations
Manual.”
Gazette
“A Plea for a Mission and
Doctrine”
Marine Corps Gazette
(June 1916)
281
Although this article predates his
Commandancy, it was so seminal in <strong>the</strong>
discussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps role
that it deserves inclusion. For Russell,
<strong>the</strong> armies <strong>of</strong> Germany and France
were <strong>the</strong> icons <strong>of</strong> military efficiency, a
value toward which he believe <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps must aspire. For Russell,
efficiency was “<strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> producing
results.” p. 109. This is interesting
since it is precisely this quality that
Marines pride <strong>the</strong>mselves on today.
Identity/Role: “To co-operate with <strong>the</strong>
Navy, in Peace and War, to <strong>the</strong> end
that in <strong>the</strong> event <strong>of</strong> a war <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps could be <strong>of</strong> greatest value to <strong>the</strong>
Navy.”
Russell is clear about <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> clear
mission for <strong>the</strong> Corps. Referencing <strong>the</strong>
above quote he asks: “But is this <strong>the</strong>
‘General Mission’? How many <strong>of</strong>ficers
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps, if interrogated
separately, would give <strong>the</strong> same
answer?” p. 112
Norms/Values: on leadership: “It is a
mistaken idea that Leaders are born
and not made…Of prime importance is
a study <strong>of</strong> psychology and its relation
to discipline and morale.” p. 113
Values: Discipline. Quotes Kempenfelt
“The men who are <strong>the</strong> best disciplined,
<strong>of</strong> whatever country <strong>the</strong>y are, will
always fight <strong>the</strong> best.” p. 114.
Norms: Inattention to doctrine.
Russell spends <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> his
article, not attempting to delineate
Marine doctrine, but to make a case
for having doctrine at all! “The Marine
Corps has no Doctrine” as defined by
Russell. p. 121 “We [<strong>the</strong>refore] have
no creed to bind us toge<strong>the</strong>r.” p. 122
Norms: Leadership. Claims that “We
demand ‘initiative’ <strong>of</strong> subordinates and

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“A New Naval Policy,”
Marine Corps Gazette,
(August 1933)
One year prior to Commandancy
“Final Report <strong>of</strong> Major General
Commandant”
Marine Corps Gazette,
November 1936
282
yet fail to train <strong>the</strong>m for an intelligent
initiative.” p. 120
Writes in what is meant to be
entertaining story form—a fictional but
plausible conversation between
General X and Admiral Y.
Norm/Identity/Role: General X points
out that <strong>the</strong> Marines’ “main job” is to
maintain expeditionary forces in
preparation for seizing advanced Bases
“and perform o<strong>the</strong>r land operations for
<strong>the</strong> Fleet.” Admiral Y concurs but
points out that “you have not sold <strong>the</strong>
idea one hundred per cent to <strong>the</strong> Navy
or to your own Corps.” p. 13 The bulk
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> article is dedicated to this task.
Sees not only <strong>the</strong> seizure, but <strong>the</strong>
occupation and defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bases as
a Marine (not Army) task.
Norm: emphasizes “constant
readiness” p. 14
Norm: self promoters: “And you have
developed a true character <strong>of</strong> publicity.
Truthful information sent out that tells
Americans why <strong>the</strong> Navy needs
Marines.” p. 14
This is a capstone piece that is driven
primarily by <strong>the</strong> need to document
organizational changes and
advancements during Russell’s tenure.
Identity/Role: Key among <strong>the</strong>se was
<strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Fleet Marine
Force.
Identity/Role: Russell gives equal time
in his section on education and
doctrine to <strong>the</strong> two parallel efforts <strong>of</strong>
“amphibious problems and small

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THOMAS HOLCOMB
Lieutenant General
1 December 1936-
31 December 1943
Expanded <strong>the</strong> Corps
almost 20 times in size
for WWII and integrated
women into <strong>the</strong> Corps.
(Wikipedia)
Relatively junior pick for
Commandant. Expanded
Corps from 15,000 to
305,000. Commanded in
all 7 engagements in
France and Germany in
WWI. Was <strong>the</strong> first
Marine to wear four
stars.
Gazette
“Major General John H. Russell,
USMC,”
Marine Corps Gazette,
(November 1926)
This piece is not written by him,
but about him upon retirement.
Author anonymous.
“History <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps”
Marine Corps Gazette
December 1938
“Lieut. General Thomas Holcomb
Sends Message <strong>of</strong> Encouragement
to Marines in Solomons”
Marine Corps Gazette
(November 1942)
283
wars.” Each had doctrine and manual
created under his tenure.
Played key roles in Dominican and
Haitian engagements. Was <strong>the</strong> High
Commissioner in Haiti for 10 years.
Felt compelled to note that he tried to
get into WWI but was prohibited by
<strong>the</strong> late arrival <strong>of</strong> his replacement in
Haiti. Still managed to win a Navy
Cross <strong>the</strong>re somehow.
Bit <strong>of</strong> a strange piece talking about <strong>the</strong>
publication <strong>of</strong> a U.S. Marine Corps
history. Holcomb flashes nothing like
<strong>the</strong> Marine esprit born ego we see
elsewhere. Here, he is worried that it
may not be desirable to print a history
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps because it may not
“have sufficient general interest to
warrant its publication.” p. 82 Hard to
imagine that this is a Commandant
talking.
He makes a case for those within <strong>the</strong>
Corps reading it: basic common sense
including knowing one’s own past and
avoiding similar mistakes, pr<strong>of</strong>iting
from lessons learned. (Note: This
would, <strong>of</strong> course, require a critical
history ra<strong>the</strong>r than a history
manufactured for esprit de corps
purposes.)
Identity/Role: Has been a standard
role for Marines to “protect lives and
property <strong>of</strong> Americans.” In this
iteration he includes “sometimes on
punitive expeditions and again as
component parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Army, as in
France during <strong>the</strong> first World War.”

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“First to Fight”
Marine Corps Gazette
(November 1943)
An address to graduating classes
at <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps Schools in
Quantico: Sept. 1943
284
Holcomb – in rare form—was all about
humility as a Marine. He expected it <strong>of</strong>
his <strong>of</strong>ficers.
Identity: Believes <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
reputation, which must be protected
and earned, is a product <strong>of</strong> “training
and experience in combat.”
Role: He is writing in <strong>the</strong> midst <strong>of</strong>
WWII and says “In <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> this
war, on a scale which <strong>the</strong> world has
never before seen, it is possible to lose
sight <strong>of</strong> what your particular job is—<strong>of</strong>
what <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps’ job really is.
The Marine Corps’ primary function is
to prepare <strong>the</strong> way for o<strong>the</strong>r troops.
Ours is an amphibious operation—it
has been recently called a ‘triphibious’
operation. For that purpose we have
trained for over a hundred and sixtyseven
years. We are today, I believe,
<strong>the</strong> most pr<strong>of</strong>icient amphibious
military body in <strong>the</strong> world, and I say
this with due modesty.” p. 16
“First to Fight” “must always be ready”
Amphibious landings a huge source <strong>of</strong>
pride. Credits <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps schools
with “<strong>the</strong> most exhaustive research <strong>of</strong>
landing operations <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs
throughout <strong>the</strong> world’s written military
history.” Sees this as <strong>the</strong> distinctive
expertise <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps brings to
<strong>the</strong> table. The Army and Navy have
<strong>the</strong>ir specialties but “we can run
amphibious and landing operations
better than <strong>the</strong>y can.”
Norms/Values: discipline emphasis. “A
Marine, you see, is <strong>the</strong>refore a man
who disciplines himself and accepts
discipline from o<strong>the</strong>rs when required.
He is a man who has practiced and
learned self-control.” p. 16

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“Our 168 th Anniversary: A
Message from <strong>the</strong> Commandant”
Marine Corps Gazette
(November 1943)
“Marines in War and Peace”
Marine Corps Gazette
December 1943
285
This message highlights concerns about
<strong>the</strong> swelled WWII ranks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps.
Holcomb assures that basic Marine
training will remain constant and still
produce <strong>the</strong> same kind <strong>of</strong> exemplary
Marine. Value: “The emphasis still is
on <strong>the</strong> individual. As always, each man
is trained just as if <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
entire war depends on his personal
success—as indeed it does to a higher
degree than he is likely to realize.” p. 5
Norms/Value: “As every Marine
knows, <strong>the</strong> preparation for service is
not limited to <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong>
technical skills. There is also <strong>the</strong>
development <strong>of</strong> an esprit de corps to
assure that our men’s native and
acquired fighting skills will be vitalized
by an indomitable determination to
win, against any odds.”
Values: “Marine efficiency” and
“Marine integrity”
(Note: haven’t seen much on Marine
integrity up to this point.)
Far friendlier overtures to <strong>the</strong> Army:
Identity: “The Marine Corps, <strong>of</strong>
course, is part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy, but I hope
I’m not indulging in wishful thinking
when I say that if we were orphans I
think <strong>the</strong> Army would be willing to take
us in.” p. 3
Role: Amphibious Assault. Notes why
WWII so pr<strong>of</strong>ound for <strong>the</strong> Marines:
“This war is unlike any o<strong>the</strong>r in history,
not only on account <strong>of</strong> its scope but
also <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fighting. It is <strong>the</strong>
first war in which landings and
amphibious operations have played so
vital a part, most previous wars having
been fought on land exclusively.
Landing operations are, <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>the</strong>
most difficult <strong>of</strong> all military maneuvers,
and have so been acknowledged by all
authorities throughout history. By <strong>the</strong>

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286
same token, <strong>the</strong>y also are apt to be <strong>the</strong>
most costly <strong>of</strong> all operations.” p.4
Sees all <strong>of</strong> this amphibious landing
experience as <strong>the</strong> “great background <strong>of</strong>
practical experience” which has “led to
<strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> a unique esprit de
corps.” p. 4
“Our chief assignment during <strong>the</strong> last
twenty years has been to perfect <strong>the</strong>
most modern techniques <strong>of</strong>
amphibious warfare and to develop an
amphibious expeditionary force <strong>of</strong>
specialists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> kind I have
described.” p.5
Identity: Knows that <strong>the</strong> public
perception is that Marines are
“roughneck[s]” with “tremendous
fighting ability and unlimited courage.”
Wants to alter that perception
somewhat in favor <strong>of</strong> a recognition <strong>of</strong>
Marines as experts in <strong>the</strong>ir field. “We
are not big enough to fight whole wars
by ourselves. But what we lack in size,
we make up in experience and
specialized knowledge…[A] highly
specialized service trained especially
for amphibious operations.” p.4
Notes <strong>the</strong> recent change in hymn to
reflect “in <strong>the</strong> air, on land, on sea.”
Values: Individual initiative. Not
cocky, confident. (Note: good try
Holcomb).
Norms: “be able to carry on
independently “ “Marines know how
to improvise and are taught how to
survive and fight in any circumstances”
**Note, this is not true for <strong>the</strong> Corps
today. They get almost nothing by way
<strong>of</strong> survival skills.
Cont. <strong>of</strong> quote: “when <strong>the</strong> occasion
requires it, without <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>

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ALEXANDER A.
VANDEGRIFT
General
1 January 1944-
31 December 1947
First active duty Marine
to hold <strong>the</strong> rank <strong>of</strong>
General (Holcomb’s came
after retirement).
Resisted attempts to
merge <strong>the</strong> Corps with <strong>the</strong>
Army.
(Wikipedia)
Got Medal <strong>of</strong> Honor from
Guadalcanal.
Commanded 1 st Marine
Amphib Corps in
Bougainville. Had to
demobilize <strong>the</strong> Corps
post WWII to 15%
wartime strength
(484,631) and establish
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps on a
permanent basis within
<strong>the</strong> National Defense
structure. Drove for
statutory acceptance <strong>of</strong>
Marine “force in
readiness” role. Fought
intermittently from 1916-
23 against Cacos in Haiti.
Gazette
“Amphibious Miracle <strong>of</strong> Our
Time”
Marine Corps Gazette
October 1944
287
rule book or orders from a
commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer.”
Perceptual Lens: Guadalcanal <strong>the</strong>
“country’s first successful land
<strong>of</strong>fensive in this war.” p. 5
Identity/Norms: “The Marines are
again ready—and more than willing—
to land anywhere, anytime.” p. 6
This Commandant is definitely more
charismatic:
Role/Pride: “From our do-or-die
beginning we have developed a great
amphibious machine, <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong>
which has amazed <strong>the</strong> warring world.”
p. 3
“There can remain no doubt anywhere,
least <strong>of</strong> all in Germany and Japan, as to
who now calls <strong>the</strong> amphibious tune
and wields <strong>the</strong> weapons <strong>of</strong> decisive
might.” p. 3
Identity: “<strong>the</strong> land arm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy”
Value: get it done quick impatience:
In talking about <strong>the</strong> lengthy estimates
for <strong>the</strong> island hopping route proposed
in order to defeat Japan: “Perhaps <strong>the</strong>
Japanese could constrain <strong>the</strong>mselves
to wait that long for <strong>the</strong> outcome [833
years at <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n current rate <strong>of</strong> taking
islands consecutively]; but being
Americans, bustling and impatient,
who built a nation in one-fifth that
time, we could not.” p. 8
(Note: Surprising that <strong>the</strong>re is only one
<strong>of</strong>fering within <strong>the</strong> Gazette from such
an influential and charismatic
Commandant.)

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CLIFTON B. CATES
General
1 January 1948-
31 December 1951
Recipient <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Navy
Cross
(Wikipedia)
Fought in WWI France.
Led a regiment at
Guadalcanal.
Commanded Marine
Corps Schools <strong>the</strong>n back
to <strong>the</strong> Pacific. Main
responsibility was to
carry on Vandegrift’s
fight to find a permanent
role for Marines in future
defense structures.
Development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
helicopter and vertical
envelopment. 1950
Korea.
Gazette
LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
General
1 January 1952-
31 December 1955
First Commandant to
serve on <strong>the</strong> Joint Chiefs
<strong>of</strong> Staff
(Wikipedia)
<strong>Service</strong> with <strong>the</strong> 5 th
Marines in France in
WWI. Command at
Bougainville.
Commanding General <strong>of</strong>
6 th Marine Division in
“Summary <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
Position”
Marine Corps Gazette
December 1949
Testimony before <strong>the</strong> House
Armed <strong>Service</strong>s Committee, 17
October 1949
“Passing in Review: Books <strong>of</strong>
Interest to Marine Readers”
Marine Corps Gazette
April 1951
**one year prior to becoming
Commandant
288
The Army and Marine Corps are clearly
at odds at this point in time, explicitly
so:
“The Marine Corps believes that <strong>the</strong>
Army General Staff is actively pursuing
<strong>the</strong> three original objectives which it
advanced in 1946 as th price <strong>of</strong> survival
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps:
First: That <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps be
reduced in size and effectiveness.
Second: That <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps be
excluded from amphibious operations.
Third: That <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps be
denied <strong>the</strong> right to mobilize its
strength in time <strong>of</strong> war.” p. 17
“The Marine Corps asks nothing for
itself except <strong>the</strong> right to fight again in
<strong>the</strong> wars <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States.” p. 17
Retired Commandant Vandegrift adds
comments <strong>of</strong> his own, congratulating
Congress for having saved <strong>the</strong> Corps in
<strong>the</strong> past, even in moments when <strong>the</strong>
Congressional position stood contrary
“to an important segment <strong>of</strong>
pr<strong>of</strong>essional opinion”
Identity/Role: “In <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
American people whom <strong>the</strong>y serve, <strong>the</strong>
history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States Marines is
reflected essentially as a procession <strong>of</strong>
noteworthy deeds by individuals and
small groups. While this is not
inaccurate as a characterization <strong>of</strong>
Marines, ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>ir part in history
is concerned, <strong>the</strong>re is ano<strong>the</strong>r—albeit
less colorful—aspect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
accomplishments which would appear
in <strong>the</strong> long analysis to deserve an even
more prominent place in American
historic annals. This is <strong>the</strong> effort <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps, conducted over <strong>the</strong> past
four decades, to rationalize <strong>the</strong>
amphibious operation in terms <strong>of</strong>

Final Draft
WWII. CG FMFPac when
landed at Ichon. Served
in Haiti as district and
department commander.
Public Law 416 put him
on <strong>the</strong> Joint Chiefs <strong>of</strong>
Staff. By 1954 <strong>the</strong> CMC
reported directly to <strong>the</strong>
Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense.
Gazette
RANDOLPH MCC. PATE
General
1 January 1956-
31 December 1959
Nothing noted in
Wikipedia. Weird. He is
<strong>the</strong> only Commandant for
whom <strong>the</strong>re are no
notes.
Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff <strong>of</strong> Supply
during WWII. Then
Director <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps Reserve.
Commanded 1 st Division
in Korea. Peacetime
problems plagued his
term. Was CMC when
Ribbon Creek occurred.
Overhauled recruit
training.
Gazette
DAVID M. SHOUP
General
1 January 1960-
31 December 1963
Medal <strong>of</strong> Honor winner.
(Wikipedia)
Commanded ground
“Commandant’s Birthday
Message”
Marine Corps Gazette
November 1956
“The Commandant’s Policies”
Marine Corps Gazette
February 1960
The Commandant’s policy talk
was delivered in Washington DC
and is being paraphrased here by
a staff writer.
289
modern arms and modern operational
concepts.” p. 62
Value/Identity: “But <strong>the</strong> basic
ingredient which has always made <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps unique and unsurpassed
remains unchanged—<strong>the</strong> superbly
trained, highly motivated, selfconfident
and intensely loyal Marine.”
p. 98
Value: Heritage: “We must strive
constantly to add luster to <strong>the</strong> glorious
record <strong>of</strong> those Marines who have
gone before us. Only by so doing can
we prove ourselves worthy <strong>of</strong> our
heritage. Only thus can we proudly
bear <strong>the</strong> title <strong>of</strong> United States
Marines.”
Norms/Values: “Stressing repeatedly
that combat readiness is <strong>the</strong> Corps’
most important single objective…” p.
58
Perceptual Lens: Instructed <strong>the</strong> Corps
to move beyond a siege mentality and
that it was “operating too much within
<strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> a minority group.” p.
59

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troops on Tarawa. First
in <strong>the</strong> Army, <strong>the</strong>n
transferred to <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps.
Gazette
WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.
General
1 January 1964-
31 December 1967
Oversaw <strong>the</strong> proliferation
“Corps Standing Tall; Ready,
Willing, Able”
Marine Corps Gazette
April 1961
Anonymous author
“Grim Determination, But No
Hate” – CMC
Marine Corps Gazette
December 1961
These are “Shoupisms” captured
by a staff writer
“Special Message From New
CMC”
Marine Corps Gazette
January 1964
290
Perceptual Lens: American public:
“Thus, I am sure that in <strong>the</strong> years
ahead <strong>the</strong> American public will
continue to extol our Corps.” p. 59
Identity/Role: When asked to define
for <strong>the</strong> House Armed <strong>Service</strong>s
Committee where <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
stood and where it was headed, CMC
Shoup said “The purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps
is to provide combat forces <strong>of</strong> willing
and able Marines, prepared to fight
wherever and whenever required. The
Corps is ready to fulfill this purpose…”
(Note: It is notable that <strong>the</strong> Navy is not
mentioned here. The Marine Corps is
moving beyond “we are an arm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Navy.”)
Values: “The Marine Corps continues
to emphasize <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
small unit leader and <strong>the</strong> individual
Marine. Success in battle ultimately
depends on <strong>the</strong>m.”
Role/Value: “Combat readiness—
‘Marine combat units…are ready.
There’s grim determination to be ready
out <strong>the</strong>re.’”
Values: “The M-14 rifle—Not all
Marines have it, but (not) ‘a single
enemy will remain unshot for this
reason.’”
Value: “But even in our years <strong>of</strong>
greatest austerity, we were rich in <strong>the</strong>
indomitable spirit that has
characterized our corps from its very
beginning. It is this spirit that has
enabled us to bear adversity without
complaint and to win victories over
seemingly impossible odds…” p. 1

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<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps in <strong>the</strong>
Vietnam War.
(Wikipedia)
Did small engagements:
Guam, China, Cuba as
well as WWII. 6 th Marine
Brigade sent to
Dominican to “protect
“China <strong>Service</strong> 1937-1939:
Shanghi 1937”
Marine Corps Gazette
(November 1965)
291
Norms: “Each team was led by a
senior private or junior NCO, and could
be employed flexibly in independent
action” p. 63
Compares Nicaragua small unit tactics
to Vietnam.

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American lives and
property.” Corps
escalated in size to
298,498 by retirement in
1967.
“Commandant’s Report”
Marine Corps Gazette
May 1966
Statement before <strong>the</strong> Joint
Committee on Armed <strong>Service</strong>s
and Appropriations, U.S. Senate
292
Role: “Marines were committed in
<strong>the</strong>ir classic role—an amphibious
landing on a foreign shore in support <strong>of</strong>
National policy, as directed by <strong>the</strong>
President.”
Provides an in-and-out “classic”
example <strong>of</strong> amphibious flexibility in
Dominican Republic.
Norms/Values: action orientation.
Notice <strong>the</strong> verbiage: “By a
combination <strong>of</strong> aggressive day and
night military action, complemented by
a dynamic program <strong>of</strong> civic action
designed to improve <strong>the</strong> social and
economic lot <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> long-suffering
Vietnamese people, <strong>the</strong> hold <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Viet Cong over <strong>the</strong> countryside is being
broken.” 22.
Notes <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> training local
forces, winning <strong>the</strong> people.
Notes a lowering <strong>of</strong> standards in order
to meet recruitment needs.
Values/Norms: However, defends
that, “Recruit training is still designed
to develop discipline, physical fitness,
marksmanship, pride and a sense <strong>of</strong>
individual responsibility and moral
integrity.” p. 23
Values: “With our traditional concern
for <strong>the</strong> individual Marine…”
Role: Our “statutory responsibility” is
“amphibious operations”
Role: “mount out on short notice and
fight”
Value/Norm: “This degree <strong>of</strong>
readiness is a priceless commodity,
without parallel by any o<strong>the</strong>r nation.”
Values: “We will continue to combine

Final Draft
LEONARD F. CHAPMAN, JR.
General
1 January 1968-
31 December 1971
Commandant during
“Marine Corps Command and
Management Systems
Development”
Marine Corps Gazette
October 1967
One year prior to Commandancy
293
efficiency and economy, and achieve
<strong>the</strong> readiness for service to this
country that has always been expected
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps <strong>of</strong> Marines.”
Reveals himself as very much a techie
and an organization guy.
Value: Even so, “The main thrust <strong>of</strong>
this revolution does not lie in changes
<strong>of</strong> major lethal equipment; indeed, for
<strong>the</strong> foreseeable future, our strength
will continue to center on <strong>the</strong>

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Vietnam.
(Wikipedia)
WWII artillery <strong>of</strong>ficer.
Fought at Coral Sea and
Midway. Commanded at
Peleliu and Okinawa. At
end <strong>of</strong> Vietnam Corps
dropped to 198,000.
Handled cutbacks well.
Gazette
“Individual Marine is Key, Says
CMC”
Marine Corps Gazette
February 1968
Staff writer: Anonymous
“State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Corps”
Marine Corps Gazette
May 1969
294
infantryman with his rifle, backed by
tanks, artillery, naval gun fire, and
air…” p. 21
Value/Norms: become more efficient
by providing “significantly more rapid
response than our nation has ever
expected <strong>of</strong> us”
Value: “His summation <strong>of</strong> this first trip
to Vietnam as CMC (‘But not my last’)
is an even firmer conviction that <strong>the</strong>
key to successful Corps operations in
Vietnam rests solely with <strong>the</strong> individual
Marine.” p. 1
This piece very interesting for section
on Vietnam. Commandant sets out <strong>the</strong>
following political/strategic end goal
for Vietnam:
“The Marine Corps has consistently
advocated <strong>the</strong> principle that <strong>the</strong> war in
South Vietnam can be conclusively won
only through convincing <strong>the</strong> South
Vietnamese people in <strong>the</strong> villages and
hamlets that <strong>the</strong>ir hope lies with
freedom, not with communism.” p. 29
Metrics <strong>of</strong> Success: The remainder <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> piece, however, uses metrics <strong>of</strong>
success that are entirely quantitatively
driven and bear no connection to <strong>the</strong>
stated strategic goal above:
Number <strong>of</strong>:
Marines killed versus “enemy” killed;
Operations;
Amphibious landings;
Enemy caches uncovered;
Flight sorties;
Troops lifted, casualties medvaced;
Role: “inherent in our role as this
nation’s force in readiness for <strong>the</strong>
projection <strong>of</strong> seapower ashore or such
o<strong>the</strong>r duties as our country may
require.” p. 30
“Congressional legislation established
our primary mission: to prepare for

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“A Letter from The CMC”
Marine Corps Gazette
June 1970
295
and execute landing force operations
as part <strong>of</strong> an amphibious task force.” p.
30
Value: “Continuing <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps
traditional regard for <strong>the</strong> individual
Marine…” p. 31
Value/Norm: Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism: “In my
view, a principal ingredient to our
success was <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marines who were on <strong>the</strong> rolls when
<strong>the</strong> war started. That pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism
was made up <strong>of</strong> many things, but it was
grounded in <strong>the</strong> belief that high
standards in performance and
discipline are vital to battlefield
successes—high standards not just in
military pr<strong>of</strong>iciency and physical
fitness, but in military appearance, in
military courtesy, and in <strong>the</strong> cleanliness
and squared-away appearance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
area where we live, work, and train, all
a reflection <strong>of</strong> individual and group
discipline.” p. 16
“The true pr<strong>of</strong>essional is aware that
<strong>the</strong>se standards are not ends in
<strong>the</strong>mselves, that in fact, <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong>
means by which we breed pride, and
that pride, in turn, builds <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong>
discipline that is essential to victory in
combat with minimum casualties.” p.
16
Value/Norms: Appearance: “To insure
that each new Marine understands
that with his uniform goes an esprit de
corps based on pride in his Country, his
Corps, his unit, and himself.” p. 17
“We must renew our awareness <strong>of</strong>
each Marine’s importance, his
performance, his conduct, his loyalty to
our Corps and to our Country, his
physical fitness, his appearance.” p. 17

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“Commandant’s Holiday Message
1970”
Marine Corps Gazette
December 1970
“Make it Right”
Marine Corps Gazette
January 1971
296
Most critical tone I have ever seen in a
holiday message:
“It is a time to reflect upon what we
have done and to look forward to that
which remains to be done. I challenge
all Marines to take part in this
inspection and to plan and act for our
collective future. Is today’s Corps what
we want it to be? Does our emblem
still stand for cool pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and
an enthusiastic effort toward
attainment <strong>of</strong> soldierly perfection? If
you find deficiencies, no matter how
small, don’t waste words on what
might have been…make it right in ’71.”
Norms/Values: “If our training is
traditionally tough, it is because <strong>the</strong>
application <strong>of</strong> our purpose is tough—in
combat and in being constantly ready
to meet <strong>the</strong> stress <strong>of</strong> combat. If our
discipline is traditionally exacting, it is
because discipline is <strong>the</strong> key to winning
and surviving in battle. If we
traditionally demand pride in personal
appearance and in unit integrity, it is
because pride gives strength, and we
must be strong to serve our purpose.”
p. 19
Identity: “The Marine Corps emblem
remains a symbol <strong>of</strong> tough, demanding
service.” p. 19
Norms/Values: “How much pride can
a man feel in himself if he is not
recognized as an individual Marine?...
…We can’t permit our Corps to become
a mass <strong>of</strong> faceless numbers. We must
maintain our character as a tightly-knit
organization <strong>of</strong> individual Marines,
working as a team under pr<strong>of</strong>essional
leadership.” p. 19 Emphasis also on
“personal leadership.”
Identity: Recognizes constant identity
flux <strong>of</strong> “old breed” and “new breed” –

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“Purpose, Readiness, Quality,
Progress”
Marine Corps Gazette
April 1971
297
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subfactions within <strong>the</strong> Corps
Values/Norms: Section on
Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism in <strong>the</strong> New Corps:
Definition <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional here is
disciplined, a “producer” on a team, be
prepared to command a unit one step
above own rank, fully working chain <strong>of</strong>
command. Heavy emphasis on this
being inculcated by way <strong>of</strong> individual
mentorship. Hands on. Individual to
individual.
Values: “fundamental Marine
traditions <strong>of</strong> toughness, discipline,
pride and loyalty” p. 20
Identity: “We are small; our purpose is
clear; we have <strong>the</strong> best functioning
traditions <strong>of</strong> any military organization
in <strong>the</strong> world; and we have a superb
battle-proven new breed ready to take
over. All we have to do is make it so.”
p. 20
Identity/Role: “One thing we are
absolutely sure won’t change in our
Corps is our purpose. Our purpose in
1971 remains exactly what it was in our
beginning, nearly two centuries ago.
Like <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r armed forces <strong>of</strong> our
nation, <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps is <strong>the</strong> defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United
States.” (Note: When in doubt <strong>of</strong>
one’s specific role, <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong>
purpose becomes widened in order to
convey certainty and purpose.) “And
reality means facing <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>
ultimate application <strong>of</strong> defense is <strong>the</strong>
harsh environment <strong>of</strong> combat.” p. 16
Values/Norms: “Every unit and
individual Marine must be an element
<strong>of</strong> readiness”
Values/Norms: The Tradition <strong>of</strong>
Readiness.
Identity: Smallness. “One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>

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ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, JR.
General
1 January 1972-
30 June 1975
“’Marines don’t do that’”
Marine Corps Gazette
September 1971
“Commandant Answers Young
Marine’s Letter”
Marine Corps Gazette
April 1972
Anonymous
298
assets we have in our efforts in [sic] an
advantage we had in <strong>the</strong> Old Corps:
size. We are not going to be big.”
“…slimmer is what we want to be.” p.
16 (Note: Doesn’t <strong>of</strong>fer an
explanation, just states it.)
Value/Norms: Very strange line here.
A likely repercussion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s
malaise: “Dignity and comfort, and <strong>the</strong>
right tools for <strong>the</strong> right jobs are clear
needs for a solid, pr<strong>of</strong>essional Marine
Corps.” p. 16
Value: Recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dress blues
as an important aspect <strong>of</strong> identity and
ethos. Reinstituted issuing dress blues
to all who graduate boot camp. Likely
financial pressures were inhibiting this
during Vietnam. Uniform: “All <strong>of</strong> this
dressing up has a purpose: to enhance
our pr<strong>of</strong>essional image within
ourselves. Pr<strong>of</strong>essional service to <strong>the</strong>
people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States is our goal
in everything we do; from <strong>the</strong> way we
think to <strong>the</strong> way we act; and from <strong>the</strong>
way we know our pr<strong>of</strong>ession to <strong>the</strong>
way we look.” p. 16
Norms: Intro <strong>of</strong> this article recounts a
story <strong>of</strong> an unkempt young man at an
airport being compared to a squared
away Marine. The first three items
listed in <strong>the</strong> “Marines don’t do that”
list provided by Chapman are
appearance oriented:
Marines don’t:
Wear a scruffy uniform
Slouch around with <strong>the</strong>ir hands in <strong>the</strong>ir
pockets
Wear long hair p. 41
Norms: Appearance: “Concerning <strong>the</strong>
haircut issue, let me put it simply.
Haircuts have nothing to do with
tradition—but <strong>the</strong>y do indeed have
much to do with military appearance
and bearing. The Congress and <strong>the</strong>
public expect Marines to set <strong>the</strong>
example for modern military discipline,

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Saw last <strong>of</strong> Marines leave
Vietnam. Peacetime
strength fell to 194,000
while still maintaining
readiness.
(Wikipedia)
Served as CG III MAF in
Vietnam, <strong>the</strong>n Deputy
Director <strong>of</strong> CIA, gave that
up to be CMC. Earned
Navy Cross in WWII in
Guam, awards at
Bougainville and Iwo Jima
as well.
Gazette
“The Challenge <strong>of</strong> Leadership”
Marine Corps Gazette
August 1972
“Corps Operations Facing
Austerity”
Marine Corps Gazette
August 1973
Taken from a speech by CMC at
<strong>the</strong> General Officers Conference
July 1973
“Commandant Addresses Senate’s
Committee on Armed <strong>Service</strong>s”
Marine Corps Gazette
December 1974
“Walking Tall”
Marine Corps Gazette
April 1975
Statement <strong>of</strong> CMC before <strong>the</strong>
Senate Armed <strong>Service</strong> Committee
on Marine Corps Posture
299
appearance, bearing, and soldierly
virtue.” p. 4
Norms: Mission Command, leadership:
“Train <strong>the</strong>m; back <strong>the</strong>m up; Let <strong>the</strong>m
lead; and Make <strong>the</strong>m lead.”
Value: bias for action leads to quoting
Teddy Roosevelt: “It is not <strong>the</strong> critic
who counts, not <strong>the</strong> man who points
out how <strong>the</strong> strong men stumbled, or
where <strong>the</strong> doer <strong>of</strong> deeds could have
done <strong>the</strong>m better. The credit belongs
to <strong>the</strong> man who is actually in <strong>the</strong>
arena.” p. 15
Value: Frugality: Love to quote budget
numbers: “The Marine Corps receives
only 3.9 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total
Department <strong>of</strong> Defense program; yet
we supply 8.9 per cent <strong>of</strong> DoD’s
manpower.” p. 2
Norms: Racial tension. Notes <strong>the</strong>
problem within this speech and says
are addressing it with time, money and
manpower. Interesting that this
remains a problem.
Value: Frugality and readiness:
“Marine Corps manpower
management practices have been
traditionally directed toward maximum
readiness <strong>of</strong> our combat forces at
minimum cost and will remain so.” p. 4
Identity/Role: Title <strong>of</strong> piece: “After
nearly two centuries <strong>of</strong> service, <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps remains one <strong>of</strong> our
Nation’s best means to cope with <strong>the</strong>
unexpected.” p. 19
Identity: Emphasis on Navy: “The
Marine Corps, as an integral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Navy-Marine Corps amphibious
team…” p. 19. Later “As a recurrent
<strong>the</strong>m, I have stressed <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>

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300
team concept along with <strong>the</strong>
importance <strong>of</strong> a balanced force
posture. In keeping with this <strong>the</strong>me,
and in recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>
Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team is
essentially a single entity, it is
appropriate for me to express my
strong support for certain Navy
programs <strong>of</strong> mutual importance to <strong>the</strong>
marine Corps and <strong>the</strong> Nation as a
whole.” p. 27
Identity/Norms: Jack <strong>of</strong> all trades: “I
will highlight those specific Marine
Corps characteristics and functions
which I believe are most pertinent to
our abiding National Security needs.
The preeminent Marine Corps
characteristic is readiness…We have
long help <strong>the</strong> expectation <strong>of</strong> being <strong>the</strong>
“first to fight.”
A second time-honored characteristic
is versatility. Marine forces are
organized, equipped, trained, and
readied to cover <strong>the</strong> widest possible
spectrum <strong>of</strong> crisis situations.” (Note:
Marines have made a domain out <strong>of</strong>
not having a domain. Versatility is <strong>the</strong>
domain.)
“Marines are prepared for varied
crises, varied climes, and varied
mobility methods.”
“A third characteristic is <strong>the</strong> unique
forcible entry capability <strong>of</strong> Marine
forces.”
“A fourth characteristic might well be
termed our trademark: <strong>the</strong> air-ground
team concept that we conceived and
have been perfecting for more than
four decades.” p. 19
Norms: leadership: highest enlistedto-<strong>of</strong>ficer
ratio. In this era was
approaching 10:1. p. 20

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“CMC Issues Challenge”
Marine Corps Gazette
June 1975
Anonymous
*Wikipedia source (very likely maintained by <strong>the</strong> Corps):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandant_<strong>of</strong>_<strong>the</strong>_Marine_Corps
301
Identity/ Norms: Notes shortages in
<strong>the</strong> technical fields including
communications. (Note: This helps
explain <strong>the</strong> very POG centered
advertising that went on during this
era. Coming out <strong>of</strong> Vietnam <strong>the</strong> Corps
had plenty <strong>of</strong> combat troops, infantry,
but not enough high tech folks.)
Value: education. Not sure how true
this is, but CMC claims “In <strong>the</strong> course
<strong>of</strong> my visits to various Marine Corps
commands, my Marines have been
telling me that <strong>the</strong>y consider
continuing <strong>the</strong>ir education as <strong>the</strong> most
important inducement to a career.” p.
23
Norms: “noting that competition
motivates Marines…” suggests a
marksmanship competition
Identity/Value: “In closing, CMC
reminded commanders that even with
<strong>the</strong> advanced weaponry available to
<strong>the</strong> Corps today, <strong>the</strong> individual Marine
and his rifle is still <strong>the</strong> key to combat
success.”
Norms: marksmanship: “on roundone
hit” as valuable in <strong>the</strong> next war as
it has been “to <strong>the</strong> leaders <strong>of</strong> all wars
which comprise our proud history.” p.
4
**Drawn from a Gazette article highlighting primary achievements <strong>of</strong> Commandants: (no author)
“Portraits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commandants 1775-1975,” Marine Corps Gazette, (November 1975).

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APPENDIX F:
USMC DOCTRINE – SMALL WARS MANUAL AND WARFIGHTING
Doctrinal Text Research Notes
302

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SMALL WARS
MANUAL
U.S.G.P.O. 1940
Reprint:
(NY: Skyhorse
Publishing, 2009)
Identity/Role
SWM
Values
SWM
This manual conveys a sense that small wars are <strong>the</strong> ordinary work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps: “The ordinary expedition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps which does not involve a
major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power may be termed a small
war. It is this type <strong>of</strong> routine active foreign duty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps in which this
manual is primarily interested. Small wars represent <strong>the</strong> normal and frequent
operations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps. During about 85 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last 100 years, <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps has been engaged in small wars in different parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world. The Marine
Corps has landed troops 180 times in 37 countries from 1800 to 1934.” pp. 1-2
It is fair to say that if we are taking <strong>the</strong> manual at face value as a doctrinal
document, <strong>the</strong>n in its first page it establishes small wars and <strong>the</strong>ir political, cultural,
social and economic necessities as “normal” practice for <strong>the</strong> Marines. An
established role. As a last word in this same introductory chapter it says: “There is
a sad lack <strong>of</strong> authoritative texts on <strong>the</strong> methods employed in small wars. However,
<strong>the</strong>re is probably no military organization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. Marine Corps in <strong>the</strong>
world which has had as much practical experience in this kind <strong>of</strong> combat. This
experience has been gained almost entirely in small wars against poorly organized
and equipped native irregulars.” (p. 8)
“Military interventions are actually police functions, although warlike operations
<strong>of</strong>ten ensue.” p. 29
It is hard to imagine fitness being a particular aspect <strong>of</strong> identity when <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>the</strong>
concerns about who goes on patrol:
a. Those who have been recently ill...(including venereal disease)
b. Deformities or diseases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> feet (including flatfoot and hammertoes – two
maladies that would have predated service)
c. “The old or fat, or those <strong>of</strong> obvious poor physique from any cause.”
d. The neurotic or mentally unstable; and <strong>the</strong> alcohol addicts. Chapter 6 “Infantry
Patrols” Section III “Organizing <strong>the</strong> Infantry Patrol” p. 10. This section says quite a
bit about who was let in to <strong>the</strong> Corps during this time.
Some aspects <strong>of</strong> small wars mentioned in <strong>the</strong> closing paragraphs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
introductory chapter are right within contemporary Marine core values and norms:
an emphasis on flexibility and on-<strong>the</strong>-ground innovation: “As regular war never
takes exactly <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> its predecessors, so, even to a greater degree is
each small war somewhat different from anything which has preceded it. One
must ever be on guard to prevent his views becoming fixed as to procedure or
methods.” (p. 9)
303

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And on leadership: “Small wars demand <strong>the</strong> highest type <strong>of</strong> leadership directed by
intelligence, resourcefulness and ingenuity.”
Ability to thrive in chaos: “Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted
<strong>of</strong>ten with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate
orders lacking specific instructions.” (p. 9)
Morals and Mission: “The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to <strong>the</strong>
character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people encountered.” No elaboration on how to go about this.
Really, it is a justification <strong>of</strong> more brutal methods when necessary: “National policy
and <strong>the</strong> precepts <strong>of</strong> civilized procedure demand that our dealings with o<strong>the</strong>r
peoples be maintained on a high-moral plan. However, <strong>the</strong> military strategy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
campaign and <strong>the</strong> tactics employed <strong>the</strong> commander in <strong>the</strong> field must be adapted to
<strong>the</strong> situation in order to accomplish <strong>the</strong> mission without delay.”
p. 13.
“In accordance with national policy, it is to be expected that small wars operations
will not be conducted with a view to <strong>the</strong> permanent acquisition <strong>of</strong> any foreign
territory. A force engaged in small wars operations may expect to be withdrawn
from foreign territory as soon as its mission is accomplished.” Ch. 15 “Withdrawal”
Section I “Introduction” p. 1 “Since eventual withdrawal is certain, it is a governing
factor in troop assignment and field operations.”
Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism: “The personal pride, uniform, and bearing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> marines, <strong>the</strong>ir
dignity, courtesy, consideration, language, and personality will have an important
effect on <strong>the</strong> civilian attitude toward <strong>the</strong> forces <strong>of</strong> occupation.” p. 29
Understanding culture: “The provost service, more than any o<strong>the</strong>r element <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
forces except <strong>the</strong> Intelligence <strong>Service</strong>, should understand <strong>the</strong> people, <strong>the</strong>ir
temperament, customs, activities and <strong>the</strong> everyday working <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> average native
mind.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 17
“It is important to have beforehand a thorough knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> customs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
country to be occupied, for <strong>the</strong> enforcement <strong>of</strong> regulations which run counter to
long-established customs is always extremely difficult.”…”Desirable as such
restrictions may seem from an idealistic standpoint, <strong>the</strong>y will not be conducive to
success unless <strong>the</strong>y are so framed as to harmonize to <strong>the</strong> fullest possible extent
with <strong>the</strong> psychology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population which <strong>the</strong>y are expected to govern.” Ch. 13
“Military Government” Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military
Government” p. 11.
The type <strong>of</strong> cultural knowledge one needed to understand came under <strong>the</strong> rubric
“Psychologic Situation” and included <strong>the</strong> following elements:
General racial characteristics: (superstitious? susceptible to propaganda?
excitable? Degree <strong>of</strong> corruption in politics? Fighting ability? Language and
dialects?
Education: Percentage <strong>of</strong> illiteracy? Compulsory or voluntary? Outline <strong>of</strong>
school system? Location <strong>of</strong> important universities?
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Religion: Prevailing form? Effect <strong>of</strong> religion on life <strong>of</strong> people? Location <strong>of</strong>
religious centers?
Attitude toward o<strong>the</strong>r people: Foreigners in general? Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
occupation? Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section II “Establishment and
Administration <strong>of</strong> Military Government” p. 12-13
After data in this category as well as political, economic, and military has been
collected “a decision must be made as to immediate changes to be effected in <strong>the</strong>
local government. Civil control must be subordinated to military control. All <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government—executive, legislative, or administrative—whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>
a general, provincial, or local character, cease under military occupation, or
continue only with <strong>the</strong> sanction, or if deemed necessary, <strong>the</strong> participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
occupier.” Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section II “Establishment and
Administration <strong>of</strong> Military Government” p. 13.
This statement seems to pose a paradox to <strong>the</strong> many restrictions previously listed:
“In general, a liberal policy should be preserved in all relations with <strong>the</strong> inhabitants
and <strong>the</strong> greatest latitude permitted in public and private affairs, consistent with <strong>the</strong>
rights and security <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military forces and <strong>the</strong> termination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupation.”
Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong>
Military Government” p. 13.
“All local civil <strong>of</strong>ficials, except those duly removed or suspended from <strong>of</strong>fice by <strong>the</strong>
military governor or by <strong>the</strong> military commander having immediate jurisdiction over
said <strong>of</strong>ficials, should be encouraged to remain at <strong>the</strong>ir posts and be protected in
<strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>of</strong>ficial duties.” Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section II
“Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military Government” p. 14. Local courts
should be encouraged to continue to function but “No person in <strong>the</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
naval forces and subject to naval law will be subject to any process <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local
courts.” In addition, “Persons charged with violations <strong>of</strong> military orders, or with
<strong>of</strong>fenses against persons or property <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupying forces, or
against <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>of</strong> war are to be tried by military tribunal.” Ch. 13 “Military
Government” Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military
Government” p. 14.
“<strong>Service</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inhabitants <strong>of</strong> occupied territory may be requisitioned for <strong>the</strong>
needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupying force. These will include <strong>the</strong> services <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional men
and tradesmen, such as surgeons, carpenters, butchers, barbers, etc…” Ch. 13
“Military Government” Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military
Government” p. 18. Public properties may be seized for use, but private property
must be respected.
Knowing <strong>the</strong> local Language: For <strong>of</strong>ficers engaged in election supervision: “A
knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country concerned is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important
qualifications.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section II “Personnel” p. 12. For
enlisted personnel: “The most important qualification <strong>of</strong> enlisted personnel
selected for duty with an Electoral Mission is fitness for independent duty requiring
a large measure <strong>of</strong> responsibility. The should be able to speak, read, and write <strong>the</strong>
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language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country concerned.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section II
“Personnel” p. 12.
Emphasis on Infantry: “Infantry, <strong>the</strong> arm <strong>of</strong> close combat, has been <strong>the</strong> most
important arm in small wars because, from <strong>the</strong> very nature <strong>of</strong> such wars, it is
evident that <strong>the</strong> ultimate objective will be reached only by close combat. The
policy that every man, regardless <strong>of</strong> his specialty, be basically trained as an
infantryman has been vindicated time and again, and any tendency to deviate from
that policy must be guarded against.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 44
Type <strong>of</strong> men needed: “Infantry units must be efficient, mobile, light infantry,
composed <strong>of</strong> individuals <strong>of</strong> high morale and personal courage, thoroughly trained
in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rifle and <strong>of</strong> automatic weapons and capable <strong>of</strong> withstanding great
fatigue on long and <strong>of</strong>ten fruitless patrols. As <strong>the</strong>y must assume <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive
under <strong>the</strong> most difficult conditions <strong>of</strong> war, terrain, and climate, <strong>the</strong>se troops must
be well trained and well led.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 44
Warrior spirit: “The principal weapon <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> combat organization is <strong>the</strong> rifle. The
man so armed must have complete confidence in his ability to hit battlefield
targets and must be thoroughly imbued with <strong>the</strong> ‘spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bayonet’—<strong>the</strong> desire
to close with <strong>the</strong> enemy in personal combat and destroy him.” Ch. 4 “Training” p. 5
In training: “Particular attention should be paid to <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> initiative,
adaptability, leadership, teamwork, and tactical pr<strong>of</strong>iciency on individuals
composing <strong>the</strong> various units.” Ch. 4 “Training” p. 3. Notes that <strong>the</strong>se qualities are
important in major warfare but are yet more important in small wars operations.
The training listing, composing 28 elements, does not/not include any sort <strong>of</strong>
training or instruction on <strong>the</strong> historical/political/economic/or cultural dimensions
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater. It is all combat and support to combat patrols related. Ch. 4
“Training” pp. 3-4
For Training During Concentration (Barracks?): <strong>the</strong>re is a diminution <strong>of</strong> emphasis
on ceremonies and close order drill in favor <strong>of</strong> field exercises and training on
weapons. “Smartness, prompt obedience, and orderly execution can be exacted <strong>of</strong>
troops during such exercises, thus increasing <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> instruction as well as
developing a higher degree <strong>of</strong> battle efficiency in <strong>the</strong> individual.” Ch. 4 “Training”
p. 9
Principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Offensive: “So long as <strong>the</strong>re is armed opposition to <strong>the</strong>
occupation, <strong>the</strong> intervening force must maintain <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive.”
Any lack <strong>of</strong> patrols will only encourage <strong>the</strong> opposition. Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols”
Section I “Small War Tactics” p. 2.
Characteristics valued in <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Guardia: “In active operations, <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary should be models <strong>of</strong> leadership, inspiration, and an example to
<strong>the</strong>ir troops. Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States forces serving with <strong>the</strong> constabulary
must possess good judgment and extreme patience, coupled with tact, firmness,
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justice, and control. Firmness without adequate means <strong>of</strong> support may degenerate
into bluff. Tact alone may be interpreted as weakness.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section III “Operations and Training” p. 19
“Just” and “Fair” governing: “If, as we are taught, a military governor, even in time
<strong>of</strong> war, should be careful to make his government humane, liberal and just,
because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> undesirability <strong>of</strong> making a return to peace difficult, how much more
this principle must apply when <strong>the</strong>re is no war.” Ch. 13 “Military Government”
Section III “Applications <strong>of</strong> Principles to Situations Short <strong>of</strong> War” p. 21. In this case
<strong>the</strong> manual is referring to a formal declaration <strong>of</strong> war.
The Mission: “The fact remains that <strong>the</strong> commander must govern and he must
utilize a military form <strong>of</strong> control. Therefore, he will be justified in adopting any
reasonable measures necessary to carry out <strong>the</strong> task or mission that has been
assigned to him.”… “The very nature <strong>of</strong> his mission demands that he must have
absolute power—War Power.” Some caution is tendered on not being over
rigorous. “The commander’s policy should be to enforce <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>of</strong> war but only
to such extent as is absolutely necessary to accomplish his task.” Ch. 13 “Military
Government” Section III “Applications <strong>of</strong> Principles to Situations Short <strong>of</strong> War” p.
21-22.
Free and Fair Elections: The entire section on “free and fair” elections stands in
stark contrast to actual practices in Haiti. The contrasts are so egregious that it is
difficult to pull out specific sections. What needs to be determined here is which
values were warring with each o<strong>the</strong>r. The sentiments expressed in <strong>the</strong> manual
concerning <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> free and fair elections are not insincere, but when pitted
against something <strong>the</strong> Marines value more highly, are painfully sacrificed: “A ‘free
and fair’ election implies <strong>the</strong> unrestrained popular choice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole people
expressed at <strong>the</strong> polls by all who are lawfully entitled to suffrage. There must be
no restraint or reservation, ei<strong>the</strong>r physical or mental, exerted upon any aspirant to
<strong>of</strong>fice or upon any <strong>of</strong> his supporters, except those normal restrictions required for
<strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> law and order.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section I
“General” p. 3.
There are sections here on protecting voters from intimidation: “The selfish
personal and political partisanship <strong>of</strong> individuals, groups, or political parties may
induce <strong>the</strong>m to use various and sundry methods, including force, in an attempt to
influence <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> election.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section I
“General” p. 4.
The manual advises that U.S. personnel be stationed at polling places in order to
protect electoral personnel as well as <strong>the</strong> election records and ballots from
corruption. Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section I “General” p. 6.
For those enlisted personnel selected for this duty: “A clear record is an important
qualification toge<strong>the</strong>r with a reputation for tact, good judgment, and patience.”
Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section II “Personnel” p. 12. This added to a
scholastic background <strong>of</strong> at least two years <strong>of</strong> high school.
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Norms
SWM
Training: “The responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers engaged in small wars and <strong>the</strong> training
necessary are <strong>of</strong> a very different order from <strong>the</strong>ir responsibilities and training in
ordinary military duties.” p. 31
Training must prepare men “to act independently without <strong>the</strong> slightest hesitation.”
Training aboard ship is <strong>of</strong>ten not so much for skills acquisition as it is to prevent <strong>the</strong>
bad behavior which results from idleness: “It must be remembered that one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
main features <strong>of</strong> a system <strong>of</strong> instruction is <strong>the</strong> prevention <strong>of</strong> idleness and resultant
discontent.” Ch. 4 “Training” p. 11
The aboard ship training does suggest some socio/cultural training in its suggested
curriculum. It is <strong>the</strong> last feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> suggested schedule and puts <strong>the</strong> onus on
<strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficer in charge <strong>of</strong> instruction. It also only allots 15 minutes to this learning!:
“Talk, racial characteristics <strong>of</strong> country <strong>of</strong> destination. Company commander, senior
instructor.” In comparison, <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> automatic rifle gets an hour,
stoppages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> automatic rifle ano<strong>the</strong>r 45 minutes, bayonet training a half hour,
street fighting tactics 45 minutes, first aid 45 minutes. Nothing gets so short
treatment as does socio-culture preparation. No language training in mentioned.
Ch. 4 “Training” p. 13. As an addendum, however, <strong>the</strong> next page <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual
stresses that in addition to <strong>the</strong> training first laid out on p. 1, <strong>the</strong> following should be
“emphasized enroute to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations. (1) Information <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country
<strong>of</strong> destination; its people, language, topography, political and military situation. (2)
Enemy tactics likely to be encountered. Tactics to be adopted by our own troops.
(3) Relations with inhabitants <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country <strong>of</strong> destination.” Ch. 4 “Training” p. 14
Prepared to institute “a complete military government supported by an active
combat force.” p. 1
Next, it is interesting to examine what priority was given to particular tasks and
how <strong>the</strong> Marines rated <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>of</strong> each.
Most small wars undertaken to “suppress lawlessness or insurrection.” p. 2
Protecting <strong>the</strong> lives and property <strong>of</strong> American citizens abroad. p. 3
“The history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States shows that in spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> varying trend <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> foreign policy <strong>of</strong> succeeding administrations, this Government has
interposed or intervened in <strong>the</strong> affairs <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states with remarkable
regularity, and it may be anticipated that <strong>the</strong> same general procedure will
be followed in <strong>the</strong> future.” p. 4 This basic assumption is really important.
I think if you asked a Marine point blank if this was still true, he would say
yes, but <strong>the</strong>re is such a strong wish that it not be true that <strong>the</strong> planning
trajectory starts to drift that way despite all historic precedent.
There is an interesting acceptance that <strong>the</strong> State Department, in small
wars, should exercise “a constant and controlling influence over <strong>the</strong>
military operations.” That is nominally true today in that DOS is supposed
to be chief executive <strong>of</strong> stability operations, but I see it almost no where in
practice.
Still an emphasis here on suddenness – being ready at a moment’s notice
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to deploy: “The word <strong>of</strong>ten comes very suddenly and calls for <strong>the</strong>
immediate concentration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forces…” p. 4 “With <strong>the</strong> present organized
Fleet Marine force ready for ready for movement at a moment’s notice,
<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps now has available a highly trained and well equipped
expeditionary force for use in small wars, thus eliminating in a large
measure <strong>the</strong> former practice <strong>of</strong> hastily organizing and equipping such a
force when <strong>the</strong> emergency arose.” p. 5 The distinctive trait <strong>the</strong> Marines
were selling here was quickness. Today <strong>the</strong>y call it being <strong>the</strong> 911 force.
Was that enough a distinguishing factor for <strong>the</strong>m back <strong>the</strong>n? Are <strong>the</strong>y
more comfortable with this role because during <strong>the</strong> Banana War years <strong>the</strong>
Army wasn’t doing small wars? It seemed more like a distinctive role
ra<strong>the</strong>r than a duplication <strong>of</strong> Army tasks? It emphasizes quick in here, but
not quick out. Today’s mentality is that because <strong>the</strong> Marines are <strong>the</strong> first
in, <strong>the</strong>y shouldn’t also have to be <strong>the</strong> long term occupying force--that is for
<strong>the</strong> Army. Marine preferred norms today could be termed “shorter and
more intense.”
Five “normal” phases <strong>of</strong> small wars (p. 5):
Phase 1: Initial demonstration or landing and action <strong>of</strong> vanguard.
Phase 2: The arrival <strong>of</strong> reenforcements (sic) and general military operations in <strong>the</strong>
field.
Phase 3: Assumption <strong>of</strong> control <strong>of</strong> executive agencies, and cooperation with <strong>the</strong>
legislative and judicial agencies.
Phase 4: Routine police functions.
Phase 5: Withdrawal from Theater <strong>of</strong> Operations.
On Phase 1:
Saw it as normal that forces “dribble in” to <strong>the</strong> countries in which <strong>the</strong>y
intervene. This is to avoid <strong>the</strong> appearance <strong>of</strong> war. (p. 5).
a central goal: “ gaining <strong>the</strong> lasting friendship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inhabitants <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
country” (p. 5-6)
attempting to accomplish its end with “a minimum <strong>of</strong> troops” p. 6
In contravention to <strong>the</strong> Marines’ love <strong>of</strong> fighting <strong>the</strong>re is an assumption <strong>of</strong>
restricted force. The assumption is also that this will be mandated top
down from a superior external to <strong>the</strong> conflict. It appears that it was not at
this time assumed to be common sense on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> landing force. It
may be that enlisted men didn’t have an opportunity to prove that <strong>the</strong>y
could restrict <strong>the</strong>ir own firepower until <strong>the</strong> CAP program in Vietnam. The
quote: “Even after landing, instructions probably will be received not to
exert any physical force unless it becomes absolutely necessary, and <strong>the</strong>n
only to <strong>the</strong> minimum necessary to accomplish its purpose. Thus orders
may be received not to fire on irregulars unless fired upon; instructions
may be issued not to fire upon irregular groups if women are present with
<strong>the</strong>m even though it is known that armed women accompany <strong>the</strong>
irregulars.” (p. 6)
Phase 2:
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Theater divided into areas <strong>of</strong> responsibility
take biggest cities and secure as home base
send out combat patrols in all directions
all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above is to be expected…it is interesting that <strong>the</strong> next
recommendation is to organize a native military and police force.
Phase 3:
If Phase 2 fails to achieve order, <strong>the</strong>n it will be necessary to resort to “more
thorough measures” p. 6 “This may involved <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> military
government or martial law in varying degree from minor authority to
complete control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principal agencies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native government; it will
involve <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>of</strong> our forces by reenforcements (sic).” p.
6-7.
Marines will remain in charge <strong>of</strong> active patrolling with an effort toward
training up native forces to, as soon as possible, take over “proper
responsibility for restoring law and order in <strong>the</strong>ir own country as an agency
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir government.” p. 7
**There is no mention here that <strong>the</strong>se tasks should be State Dept tasks. It
seems assumed that <strong>the</strong> Marines will perform <strong>the</strong>se functions. No mention
is made <strong>of</strong> whom <strong>the</strong> reinforcements will be.
Phase 4:
Routine police functions.
“it is presumed that sooner or later regular forces will subdue <strong>the</strong> lawless
elements.” p. 7 A hint here that <strong>the</strong> Marines understand that <strong>the</strong>se things
are not over in a two week time span.
Judicial authority is discussed here. The emphasis is to keep within legal
bounds – to assume judicial responsibilities if <strong>the</strong> system is completely
broken in <strong>the</strong> country in question but to entirely avoid judicial
responsibilities if <strong>the</strong>re is a functional system.
Marines should be relegated to a reserve role at this point – in support <strong>of</strong>
native agencies. Marines are drawn back to <strong>the</strong> central cities in order to
better care for “<strong>the</strong> health, comfort, and recreation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> command.” p. 7
Phase 5: Withdrawal – come out in reserve order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way you came in.
Significant points: Nowhere here was infrastructure or medical civic action
detailed. Civic action beyond law and order functions and training functions was
not addressed at all. The Marines DID <strong>the</strong>se things. Perhaps it will be addressed
later on.
Search and Destroy: “Seizure or destruction <strong>of</strong>” supplies stolen from regular
citizens by irregulars “is an important factor in reducing <strong>the</strong>ir means <strong>of</strong> resistance.”
pp. 12-13
Caution in pursuing this practice: “In some revolutions, particularly <strong>of</strong> economic
origin, <strong>the</strong> followers may be men in want <strong>of</strong> food. A hungry man will not be
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inclined to listen to reason and will resort to measures more daring and desperate
than under normal conditions. This should be given consideration, when tempted
to burn or o<strong>the</strong>rwise destroy private property or stores <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> guerrillas.” p. 30
<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Injunctions to understand <strong>the</strong> local people, <strong>the</strong>ir customs,
history, language, psychology, previous experiences, political culture, combat
modes, and hospitality procedures are a steady <strong>the</strong>me all through <strong>the</strong> introductory
chapters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> text. Not much direction is given on how exactly to conduct this
research. “After a study has been made <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people who will oppose <strong>the</strong>
intervention, <strong>the</strong> strategical plan is evolved.” p. 13 No elaboration on how <strong>the</strong>
study should be conducted or what sorts <strong>of</strong> things to investigate or how this
impacts upon <strong>the</strong> planning. Later: “It is <strong>of</strong> primary importance that <strong>the</strong> fullest
benefits be derived from <strong>the</strong> psychological aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation. [--<strong>the</strong> social ,
economic, and political development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people] That implies a serious study <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> people, <strong>the</strong>ir racial, political, religious, and mental development.” p. 18 The
tone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prose and <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exercise is to deduce why <strong>the</strong> local people
are in such a state <strong>of</strong> disarray and to figure out “<strong>the</strong> most practical method <strong>of</strong>
solving <strong>the</strong> problem” as well as potential repercussions <strong>of</strong> any actions which may
be contemplated. p. 18 Understanding <strong>the</strong> people is couched in terms <strong>of</strong>
psychology ra<strong>the</strong>r than culture, but <strong>of</strong>ficers are admonished to figure out what
principles should guide <strong>the</strong>ir conduct by “studying <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people” and
<strong>the</strong>n learning from trial and error in practical application. p. 18 “The acts <strong>of</strong> man
are determined by his character; and to understand or predict <strong>the</strong> action <strong>of</strong> a
leader or a people <strong>the</strong>ir character must be understood. Their judgments or
decisions are based upon <strong>the</strong>ir intelligence and experience.” p. 22
An admonishment to study culture: “The correct application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong>
psychology to any given situation requires a knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> traits peculiar to <strong>the</strong>
persons with whom we are dealing. The individual characteristics as well as <strong>the</strong>
national psychology are subject for intensive study. A failure to use tact when
required or lack <strong>of</strong> firmness at a crucial moment might readily precipitate a
situation that could have been avoided had <strong>the</strong> commander been familiar with <strong>the</strong>
customs, religion, morals, and education <strong>of</strong> those with whom he was dealing.” p.
19
“A study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> racial and social characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people is made to determine
whe<strong>the</strong>r to approach <strong>the</strong>m directly or indirectly, or employ both means
simultaneously.” p. 28
Of methods for gleaning information: “Local newspapers and current periodicals
are probably <strong>the</strong> most valuable sources for <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> present psychological
trends <strong>of</strong> various nations.” p. 20 This is an interesting assessment given that <strong>the</strong>
places in which <strong>the</strong> Marines were engaged had illiteracy rates in <strong>the</strong> 90 th percentile.
The last word on “psychology” which is literally <strong>the</strong> last words <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> section are
“The practical application <strong>of</strong> psychology is largely a matter <strong>of</strong> common sense.”
Italics included. p. 32 Could be read as a dismissal <strong>of</strong> serious study. However, <strong>the</strong>
emphasis on gaining an in-depth familiarity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country continues in <strong>the</strong> manual.
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On <strong>the</strong> opening page <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> chapter titled Military-Civil Relationship: “The
satisfactory solution <strong>of</strong> problems involving civil authorities and civil population
requires that all ranks be familiar with <strong>the</strong> language, <strong>the</strong> geography, and <strong>the</strong>
political, social, and economic factors involved in <strong>the</strong> country in which <strong>the</strong>y are
operating. Poor judgment on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> subordinates in <strong>the</strong> handling <strong>of</strong> situations
involving <strong>the</strong> local civil authorities and <strong>the</strong> local inhabitants is certain to involve <strong>the</strong>
commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> force in unnecessary military difficulties and cause publicity
adverse to <strong>the</strong> public interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States.” p. 41.
In Chapter II “Organization,” <strong>the</strong> manual recommends: “If sufficient information <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> probably <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations has not been furnished, maps, monographs, and
o<strong>the</strong>r current data concerning <strong>the</strong> country must be obtained, including information
on <strong>the</strong> following: past and present political situation; economic situation; classes
and distribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population; psychological nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inhabitants; military
geography, both general and physical; and <strong>the</strong> military situation.” Ch. 2
“Organization” p. 1.
Language: “A knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> character <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people and a command <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir
language are great assets…If not already familiar with <strong>the</strong> language, all <strong>of</strong>ficers
upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working
knowledge <strong>of</strong> it.” p. 26
“Troops assigned to combat operations should learn <strong>the</strong> terrain and trails within
<strong>the</strong>ir sectors, and gain a working knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local language as quickly as
possible to that <strong>the</strong>y may dispense with <strong>the</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> native guides and
interpreters ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong> situation permits.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section
III “Organization <strong>the</strong> Infantry Patrol” p. 12.
Dispersion: “detached posts within small areas. Thus <strong>the</strong> regular forces may be
widely dispersed and probably will be outnumbered in some areas by <strong>the</strong> hostile
forces. This requires that <strong>the</strong> Force be organized with a view to mobility and
flexibility, and that <strong>the</strong> troops be highly trained in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir special weapons
as well as proper utilization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terrain.” p. 14
Treatment <strong>of</strong> Civilian Population: One is courteous, friendly, just and firm to <strong>the</strong>
people in order to curb <strong>the</strong>ir passions. p. 15 This is a defensive measure. No
indication here <strong>of</strong> a hope <strong>of</strong> winning <strong>the</strong>m over to provide intel.
Emphasis on restraint: endeavoring “to avoid <strong>the</strong> infliction <strong>of</strong> physical harm to any
native.” p. 18
Very likely a lesson learned, <strong>the</strong> manual emphasizes <strong>the</strong> human need “to be
considered worthy among…fellow human beings” which is based on “how he
presumes he has been treated and how much consideration has been given to his
own merits.” The remainder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> paragraph is a long winded and psychologically
constructed way <strong>of</strong> saying “treat <strong>the</strong> natives with respect.” p. 23 “One should not
award any humiliating punishment or issue orders which are unnecessarily hurtful
to <strong>the</strong> pride <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inhabitants.” p. 24 Later: “Nothing should be said or done which
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implies inferiority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> status or <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sovereignty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native people. They
should never be treated as a conquered people.” p. 30
Has a very sanguine opinion <strong>of</strong> what it will take to properly indoctrinate <strong>the</strong>
enlisted: “The indoctrination <strong>of</strong> all ranks with respect to <strong>the</strong> proper attitude
toward <strong>the</strong> civilian population may be accomplished readily by means <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong>
brief and interesting lectures prepared under <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military
commander and furnished all units.” p. 31
Since <strong>the</strong> military man must necessarily come into contact with <strong>the</strong> civilian
population: “In relations with <strong>the</strong>se persons, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y be business or social, a
superiority complex on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military commander is unproductive <strong>of</strong>
cooperation.” p. 45
A mentality requiring reparations to property damage and a recommendation that
commanders be given a slush fund to promptly attend to <strong>the</strong>se. p. 45 Any
evidence that this was used?
“Every endeavor should be made to assure <strong>the</strong> civilian population <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
friendliness <strong>of</strong> our forces.” p. 46
“Social customs in countries in which small wars operations usually occur differ in
many respects from those in <strong>the</strong> United States. Violation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se customs, and
thoughtless disrespect to local inhabitants, tend to create animosity and distrust
which makes our presence unwelcome and <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> restoring law and order
more difficult.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 18
“The medical personnel with <strong>the</strong> force is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> strongest elements for gaining
<strong>the</strong> confidence and friendship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native inhabitants in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong>
operations. So long as it can be done without depleting <strong>the</strong> stock <strong>of</strong> medical
supplies required for <strong>the</strong> intervening troops, <strong>the</strong>y should not hesitate to care for
sick and wounded civilians who have no o<strong>the</strong>r source <strong>of</strong> medical attention.” Ch. 2
“Organization” p. 60.
The manual suggests garrisoning arrangements in which “The routine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people
is less disturbed; thus better information and less antagonism may result.” Ch. 5
“Initial Operations,” p. 15.
“When passing or halting in <strong>the</strong> vicinity <strong>of</strong> dwellings occupied by peaceful natives,
do not take fruit, eggs, or o<strong>the</strong>r things without fair payment; do not gamble or
drink with natives; do not enter native houses without clearly understood
invitation; do not assume a hostile attitude.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section V
“The March” p. 32.
“Unless <strong>the</strong> [river operation] is planned a considerable length <strong>of</strong> time before its
initiation, local boats will probably be <strong>the</strong> only ones available. These boats should
be purchased outright if <strong>the</strong>y are to be used for combat purposes. If <strong>the</strong> owners
will not agree to sell <strong>the</strong>m, as is sometimes <strong>the</strong> case, it may be necessary to
requisition <strong>the</strong>m. Receipts must be given for such boats.” Ch. 10 “River
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Operations” Section II “Types and Characteristics <strong>of</strong> Boats” p. 7
Free press: Very strange paragraph on this subject which stands in stark contrast
to <strong>the</strong> practices on <strong>the</strong> ground in Haiti and Dominican: “Freedom <strong>of</strong> speech is
ano<strong>the</strong>r liberty <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> inhabitants <strong>of</strong> many countries are not only proud, but
jealous. Editors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local newspapers are not always averse to criticizing <strong>the</strong>
actions <strong>of</strong> troops o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong>ir own. Nothing can be gained by <strong>the</strong> marine
commander in jumping into print and replying to such newspaper articles, o<strong>the</strong>r
than possibly starting a controversy which may make his fur<strong>the</strong>r retention in that
locality undesirable. When a matter is so published and it is considered
detrimental, <strong>the</strong> subordinate marine commander should bring it to <strong>the</strong> attention <strong>of</strong>
his immediate superior for necessary action by higher authority.” p. 46 What does
this mean? What sort <strong>of</strong> higher action? This paragraph also indicates an
abdication <strong>of</strong> information operations.
<strong>Strategic</strong> Corporal concept: Many natives have never, nor will ever, come into
contact with ano<strong>the</strong>r American. “It may be no more than a passing patrol whose
deportment or language is judged, or it may be fairness in <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> a bunch
<strong>of</strong> bananas...” “…<strong>the</strong> Marine Corps never<strong>the</strong>less represents <strong>the</strong> United States to
<strong>the</strong>m also, and it behooves every marine to conduct himself accordingly. There is
no service which calls for greater exercise <strong>of</strong> judgment, persistency, patience, tact,
and rigid military justice than in small wars, and nowhere is more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> humane
and sympa<strong>the</strong>tic side <strong>of</strong> a military force demanded than in this type <strong>of</strong> operation.”
p. 31
Restraint v. Bias for Action: “The application <strong>of</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> psychology in small
wars is quite different from <strong>the</strong>ir normal application in major warfare or even in
troop leadership. The aim is not to develop a belligerent spirit in our men but
ra<strong>the</strong>r one <strong>of</strong> caution and steadiness. Instead <strong>of</strong> employing forces, one strives to
accomplish <strong>the</strong> purpose by diplomacy. A Force Commander who gains his objective
in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who
resorted to <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> arms.” p. 18 **Note: even though small wars, not major
wars, are <strong>the</strong> “normal” business <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps <strong>the</strong> norm here is cast as
belligerent preparation for major war. If small wars are <strong>the</strong> ordinary duty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Marines, it strikes as a sharp paradox that <strong>the</strong>ir ethos is so frontal assault, warrior
driven.
“Lack <strong>of</strong> exact information is normal in <strong>the</strong>se operations, as is true in all warfare.
Lack <strong>of</strong> information does not justify withholding orders when needed, nor failing to
take action when <strong>the</strong> situation demands it.” p. 26
“Tactical operations <strong>of</strong> regular troops against guerrillas in small wars are habitually
<strong>of</strong>fensive. Even though operating under a strategic defensive campaign plan,
regular combatants in contact with hostile forces will emphasize <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive to gain psychological supremacy.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 8
Spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Offensive: “Troops engaged in small war operations must be
thoroughly indoctrinated with a determination to close with <strong>the</strong> enemy at <strong>the</strong>
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earliest possible moment. A rapid, aggressive attack is necessary to overrun <strong>the</strong>
hostile positions and seize his automatic weapons.” Ch. 6 “Infantry Patrols”
Section VIII “Attacking Ambushes” pp. 47-48
Governing: The perception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual is that some peoples are submissive by
nature and are “too willing to shirk <strong>the</strong>ir individual responsibility and are too ready
to let o<strong>the</strong>rs shoulder <strong>the</strong> full responsibility for restoring and, still worse,
maintaining order and normalcy.” p. 23 In this case it is very difficult to “return
responsibility to those to whom it rightfully belongs.” “As little local responsibility
as possible to accomplish <strong>the</strong> mission should be assumed, while <strong>the</strong> local
government is encouraged to carry its full capacity <strong>of</strong> responsibility. Any o<strong>the</strong>r
procedure weakens <strong>the</strong> sovereign state, complicating <strong>the</strong> relationship with <strong>the</strong>
military forces and prolonging <strong>the</strong> occupation.” p.23 “National policy demands
minimum interference with that sovereignty.”
“One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important duties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inspector in small wars is to investigate
matters which involve controversies between individuals <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> force and local
inhabitants. These investigations should be promptly, thoroughly, and fairly made,
bearing in mind <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> individuals concerned and those <strong>of</strong> our
Government. The finding <strong>of</strong> facts should be recorded and filed for future reference
to meet those charges <strong>of</strong> impropriety which so <strong>of</strong>ten follow our withdrawal from
<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 36
Claims to personal injury and property damage should be settled immediately
(but!) “No claims should be allowed for damage to property or for personal injury
which is incident to military operations or to <strong>the</strong> maintenance <strong>of</strong> public safety,
when no criminal intent or carelessness is in question.” **Note: which likely
means that all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prior referenced claims are from bad behavior. Ch. 2
“Organization” p. 37
**Note: bad behavior was frequent enough that <strong>the</strong>re is a regulation on not
confining members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening force with members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native population
in detention facilities.
Civil-Military relations: With <strong>the</strong> local governing authority: A bit amazing that <strong>the</strong>
authors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual felt compelled to state this in print: “Meetings with [local
national government <strong>of</strong>ficials] frequently require considerable tact.” p. 41…”[I]f
animosity should be shown or cooperation be denied or withdrawn, <strong>the</strong> military
commander cannot compel <strong>the</strong> foreign government <strong>of</strong>ficials to act according to his
wishes.” p. 42
“In giving <strong>the</strong> fullest cooperation to <strong>the</strong> civil authorities, <strong>the</strong> military commander
should insist on reciprocal action on <strong>the</strong>ir part toward <strong>the</strong> military forces.
Interference with <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> civil <strong>of</strong>ficials should be
avoided, while noninterference on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> those authorities with <strong>the</strong>
administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military forces should be demanded. In brief, a feeling <strong>of</strong>
mutual respect and cooperation between members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military forces and civil
<strong>of</strong>ficials on a basis <strong>of</strong> mutual independence <strong>of</strong> each o<strong>the</strong>r should be cultivated.” p.
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43 This is a formula for mutual respect?
Infrastructure: If infrastructure is damaged by sabotage, civilian or prisoner labor
should be used to repair it ra<strong>the</strong>r than occupation forces for proper psychological
effect on <strong>the</strong> revolutionists. **The manual does not discuss how one gets civilians
to participate in <strong>the</strong> repairs. p. 24
Intelligence: Here, finally, is an indication that treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civilian will
determine whe<strong>the</strong>r that civilian <strong>of</strong>fers up information: “The extent to which <strong>the</strong>
intelligence service can obtain information depends largely on <strong>the</strong> attitude adopted
toward <strong>the</strong> loyal and neutral population.” Sets up a contradiction: “The natives
must be made to realize <strong>the</strong> seriousness <strong>of</strong> withholding information, but at <strong>the</strong>
same time <strong>the</strong>y must be protected from terrorism.” p. 27
“It can be stated as an accepted premise that, in small wars, <strong>the</strong> intelligence service
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opposing forces will be superior initially to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening force.
From <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening power, <strong>the</strong> intervention is usually
considered a friendly effort to assist <strong>the</strong> occupied country to reestablish peace and
order within its boundaries. From <strong>the</strong> viewpoint <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> occupied country, however, this action by an alien power is an unfriendly one.
Although <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se inhabitants will not actively oppose <strong>the</strong>
intervention, many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m will indirectly assist <strong>the</strong> native forces with information
relative to <strong>the</strong> movements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening forces. This is especially true <strong>of</strong> those
citizens who have relatives among <strong>the</strong> native forces operating in <strong>the</strong> field. To <strong>of</strong>fset
this situation, recourse must be had to propaganda clearly stating <strong>the</strong> definite
purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening forces in order to show <strong>the</strong> friendly aid that is being
<strong>of</strong>fered to <strong>the</strong> country. Friendships should be made with <strong>the</strong> inhabitants in an
honest and faithful endeavor to assist <strong>the</strong>m to resume <strong>the</strong>ir peaceful occupations
and to protect <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong> illegal demands made upon <strong>the</strong>m by <strong>the</strong>
malcontents.” Efforts to gain intelligence will be made through “<strong>the</strong> liberal use <strong>of</strong>
intelligence funds” “Routine patrols must be avoided.” “Above all, an active and
aggressive campaign against <strong>the</strong> hostile forces in <strong>the</strong> field is <strong>the</strong> most effective
method <strong>of</strong> destroying <strong>the</strong>ir intelligence service. A guerrilla band which is
constantly harassed and driven from place to place soon loses contact with its own
sources <strong>of</strong> information; it becomes confused and its intelligence system breaks
down. As <strong>the</strong> occupations continues, superiority in this respect will gradually be
obtained by <strong>the</strong> intervening forces.” Ch. 2 “Organization” pp. 4-5
**Note: <strong>the</strong> intel method here is to disrupt <strong>the</strong> opposing forces intel collection
ra<strong>the</strong>r than improve upon our own by positive relations with <strong>the</strong> population.
Leaning on <strong>the</strong> War Department Field Manual 101-5 for intelligence practices
ra<strong>the</strong>r than cultivating practices that are most conducive in a small wars
environment. A few points pertinent to small wars are added in order to capture
“not only information <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military situation, but <strong>the</strong> political economic, and
social status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupied area, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> attitude and activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
civil population and political leaders ins<strong>of</strong>ar as those elements may affect <strong>the</strong>
accomplishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mission.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 19. Those listed in <strong>the</strong>
manual are strangely obvious – hard to imagine <strong>the</strong>m not being in a standard intel
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instruction manual: names and descriptions <strong>of</strong> leaders, areas in which <strong>the</strong>y
operate, and methods and material means <strong>the</strong>y use in combat; hostile propaganda
and how it is propagated; liaison with local government <strong>of</strong>ficials; close liaison with
aviation; maintenance <strong>of</strong> cordial relations with local, American, and foreign press
and censoring <strong>of</strong> all press releases. Ch. 2 “Organization” pp. 19-20.
Suggests selecting those intel personnel for service who know <strong>the</strong> language. This
section suggests advance study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations including a detailed
understanding <strong>of</strong> its history and politics, its economics and infrastructure,
geography, its “psychological situation” by which it means “General racial
characteristics,” education, religion, attitudes toward foreigners, and susceptibility
to propaganda. For all <strong>the</strong> attention <strong>the</strong> manual gives culture, this section in <strong>the</strong>
preparation form is <strong>the</strong> shortest, least detailed, and misses much <strong>of</strong> what is
important about culture. Next on <strong>the</strong> list is Combat Estimate—an assessment <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> military strength, leadership, training, material resources, and organization <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> supported force versus <strong>the</strong> adversary forces. This is followed by “General
Conclusion.” Ch. 2 “Organization” pp. 20-22.
Modes <strong>of</strong> intel ga<strong>the</strong>ring include secret agents hired from <strong>the</strong> local population.
These are usually citizens who are politically opposed to <strong>the</strong> “native forces whose
activities have resulted in <strong>the</strong> intervention.” These must be closely supervised. Ch.
2 “Organization” p. 24
The attitude <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual author <strong>of</strong> this chapter toward voluntary intel from <strong>the</strong>
population is largely negative: “The major portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> information obtained
from voluntary informers is <strong>of</strong>ten false, grossly distorted, or too late to be <strong>of</strong> value
unless <strong>the</strong> informer has personal reasons for making <strong>the</strong> report.” Therefore <strong>the</strong>y
suggest “[l]iberal cash payments” for information that proved correct and timely.
The manual also suggests leaning on <strong>the</strong> cooperation <strong>of</strong> business establishments
that are reliant on <strong>the</strong> U.S. forces for protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir business assets and using
aerial reconnaissance. Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 25
Warns its own against relying too much on intel from o<strong>the</strong>r U.S. agencies which
tend to locate <strong>the</strong>mselves only within <strong>the</strong> capital and speak only with members <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> higher classes. Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 26
“Intelligence activities are greatly handicapped if <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers attached to <strong>the</strong>
battalions and smaller units in <strong>the</strong> field are not familiar with <strong>the</strong> local
language….Each <strong>of</strong>ficer should endeavor to learn <strong>the</strong> language sufficiently well to
engage in social activities and to dispense with interpreters as soon as possible.”
Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 28
O<strong>the</strong>r sources <strong>of</strong> suggested intel: “Establishing a service <strong>of</strong> information through
<strong>the</strong> local mayor or senior civil <strong>of</strong>ficial” as well as questioning commercial travelers;
interrogating persons or <strong>the</strong> relatives <strong>of</strong> persons injured or molested by <strong>the</strong> hostile
forces; close surveillance <strong>of</strong> relatives <strong>of</strong> hostile individuals; examination <strong>of</strong>
prisoners; and constant observation <strong>of</strong> all able bodied men in <strong>the</strong> district.” Ch. 2
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“Organization” p. 28.
Torture renounced: “Methods <strong>of</strong> extracting information which are not
countenanced by <strong>the</strong> laws <strong>of</strong> war and <strong>the</strong> customs <strong>of</strong> humanity cannot be
tolerated. Such actions tend to produce only false information and are degrading
to <strong>the</strong> person inflicting <strong>the</strong>m.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 28.
Interestingly, in <strong>the</strong> periodic report suggested “Attitude <strong>of</strong> Civil Population” is <strong>the</strong>
first matter addressed.
Use <strong>of</strong> violence: Indecision is derided, but caution is extolled on <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong>
violence. Use <strong>of</strong> judicious violence ra<strong>the</strong>r than “drastic punitive measures” or
“action in <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> reprisals” may lean <strong>the</strong> sympathies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population
toward <strong>the</strong> revolutionaries. p. 27 An indication here that <strong>the</strong> enlisted men are
prone to reprisal: “In extreme cases, a commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer may be forced to resort
to some mild form <strong>of</strong> reprisal to keep men from taking more severe action on <strong>the</strong>ir
own initiative.” p. 27
Information Operations: An emphasis on both propaganda toward locals and
“Propaganda at home also plays its part in <strong>the</strong> public support <strong>of</strong> small wars.” p. 28
“Many authorities believe that <strong>the</strong> Marine Force should restrict publicity to a
minimum in order to prevent <strong>the</strong> spread <strong>of</strong> unfavorable and antagonistic
propaganda at home.” p. 28-29
Training local forces: “The mission <strong>of</strong> our forces usually involves <strong>the</strong> training <strong>of</strong>
native <strong>of</strong>ficers and men in <strong>the</strong> art <strong>of</strong> war, assisting in <strong>of</strong>fensive operations against
organized banditry and in such defensive measure against threatened raids <strong>of</strong> large
organized bandit groups as are essential to <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> lives and property.” A
presumption embedded here is that you can train <strong>the</strong>se local forces to perform
defensive and policing roles properly without ever handing <strong>the</strong>m real leadership or
ownership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> organization: “Due to <strong>the</strong> fact that in most cases <strong>the</strong> individuals
occupying <strong>the</strong> important positions in those native organizations performing police
duties, are United States <strong>of</strong>ficers and enlisted men, questions arising with regard to
cooperation and assistance are easy <strong>of</strong> solution.” p. 44
Patrols: To counter surprise attacks: “To <strong>of</strong>fset such action, patrols must be strong
enough in numbers and armament to withstand any anticipated attack or ambush,
and <strong>the</strong> principal villages and town must be given adequate protection. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, by
energetic patrolling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> area and vigorous pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hostile forces once
contact is gained, <strong>the</strong> irregulars should be forced to disband completely or to move
to more remote and less fertile areas. The pursuit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se small bands must be
continuous.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 6
Selection <strong>of</strong> Officers in Constabulary: Note: this topic gets its own chapter but
this chapter is twelfth <strong>of</strong> fifteen. “In time, as <strong>the</strong> domestic situation becomes
tranquil and <strong>the</strong> native members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary become pr<strong>of</strong>icient in <strong>the</strong>ir
duties, <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary are replaced by native
<strong>of</strong>ficers.” Any U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficers serving in <strong>the</strong> constabulary should be “acceptable to <strong>the</strong>
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local government” be qualified according to U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficer standards, be physically fit
enough to “withstand arduous duty in <strong>the</strong> field” and “should be pr<strong>of</strong>icient in <strong>the</strong>
language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country concerned.” “They should be known for <strong>the</strong>ir tactful
relationships, and should be in sympathy with <strong>the</strong> aspirations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inhabitants <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> country concerned in <strong>the</strong>ir desire to become a stable sovereign people.” Ch. 12
“Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 7.
“Early establishment <strong>of</strong> a school for training candidates for commission should
receive much thought and consideration.” This is for <strong>of</strong>ficer replacement reasons
and also because it “indicates to <strong>the</strong> local government <strong>the</strong> altruistic motives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
United States Government and indicates its intention to turn over <strong>the</strong> control <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> constabulary to <strong>the</strong> local government at <strong>the</strong> earliest possible moment.” Ch. 12
“Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 7.
“In establishing and maintaining an organization <strong>of</strong> native troops, attempts should
be made to provide better clothing and shelter and particularly better food than
native civilians <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same social class enjoy. This is decidedly an important
morale factor.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a
Constabulary” p. 11.
“There is a natural inclination on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> United States forces when organizing a
constabulary to outfit <strong>the</strong> troops with a uniform similar to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States
forces, with slight modifications in <strong>the</strong> distinctive ornaments, texture <strong>of</strong> clothing,
and design. Any uniform adopted for <strong>the</strong> constabulary should be suitable for <strong>the</strong>
combat and climatic conditions likely to be encountered.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 11.
Were ahead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> FOBs in Iraq on this one: “In <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> a general mess, no
attempt should be made to supply foreign food products. The ration component
should be confined to local staples and garden products, since it is this type <strong>of</strong> food
to which <strong>the</strong> troops are accustomed.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations”
Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 12.
“Reports and records should always be in <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country concerned.
It is unreasonable to require natives to learn <strong>the</strong> English language simply because
that is <strong>the</strong> language <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States forces.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 12.
“The training <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recruit has two distinct objects in view, namely, training as a
member <strong>of</strong> a military combat organization and training for police duties.” Ch. 12
“Armed Native Organizations” Section III “Operations and Training” p. 17 **Note:
The idea that native recruits will use <strong>the</strong>ir training for beneficial purposes seems to
be assumed. “The early training <strong>of</strong> competent police forces for <strong>the</strong> larger cities is
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most effective methods to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> local government and secure
<strong>the</strong> good will <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> better class <strong>of</strong> inhabitants.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section III “Operations and Training” p. 18.
The section on training up native <strong>of</strong>ficers recommends that “rigid physical
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qualifications” be adopted and that candidates have “sufficient scholastic
qualifications to insure <strong>the</strong>ir ability to absorb <strong>the</strong> military instruction.” The period
<strong>of</strong> instruction is 1 year, followed by a probationary period <strong>of</strong> commission that is
“confirmed after 1 year <strong>of</strong> service with <strong>the</strong> troops.” “This method <strong>of</strong> instruction
provides a steady supply <strong>of</strong> native <strong>of</strong>ficers to replace <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United
States forces.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section III “Operations and
Training” p. 18. **Note: this statement seems disingenuous since in none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
three cases did U.S. forces deem natives in any significant number to be qualified
to lead and <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>the</strong> troops. Only when it was clear that <strong>the</strong> U.S. was pulling out
were commissions turned over to natives.
“Each race <strong>of</strong> people has its peculiar characteristics and customs. These may be
modified somewhat under influence, but cannot be entirely destroyed or
supplanted. These characteristics and customs should always be recognized and
considered when dealing with persons <strong>of</strong> different races.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section III “Operations and Training” p. 18. Therefore…”[i]n <strong>the</strong>
organization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary, consideration should be given <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong>
warfare to which <strong>the</strong> troops are accustomed. No attempt should be made to
impose entirely new forms <strong>of</strong> tactics unless a long period <strong>of</strong> training and
indoctrination is available. In emergencies, or when only a limited time is available
for training, it may be better to organize <strong>the</strong> troops according to native methods.”
Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section III “Operations and Training” p. 19.
**Question: so how do you train in methods not your own? Is this advice possible
to apply with good effect? Perhaps set up as a mutual learning method? The CAP
may be somewhat more reflective <strong>of</strong> this.
On discipline: “Strict justice exerts a marked influence on <strong>the</strong> discipline <strong>of</strong> native
troops. A few lessons suffice, as a rule, to impress upon <strong>the</strong>m that orders are to be
obeyed. When this idea has been implanted in <strong>the</strong>ir minds, <strong>the</strong>y generally become
amenable to discipline.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section III
“Operations and Training” p. 19.
Authority: “When it has attained full strength, <strong>the</strong> constabulary should have sole
responsibility for <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> law and order. Since <strong>the</strong> United States forces
have set up this military instrumentality for <strong>the</strong> local state and endowed it with a
certain strength, <strong>the</strong> constabulary should have unhampered opportunity in its
conduct <strong>of</strong> operations as <strong>the</strong> armed force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country. Interference by United
States forces not only seriously decreases <strong>the</strong> prestige <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary, but also
denies to <strong>the</strong> local state <strong>the</strong> ability to utilize freely <strong>the</strong> force that has been created
to increase its power and prestige.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section V
“Civil and Military Relationship” p. 24.
Repeated throughout <strong>the</strong> text is <strong>the</strong> “pull back” commitment on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> U.S.
forces when native forces are ready to assume policing and military duties. “When
order is restored and <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>iciency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native troops or police is such that
<strong>the</strong>re is no fur<strong>the</strong>r need for United States forces in close support, <strong>the</strong> latter may be
concentrated in a locality or localities where <strong>the</strong>y will be available in case <strong>of</strong>
emergency.” Ch. 15 “Withdrawal” Section II “Withdrawal From Active Military
Operations” p. 3 When in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> drawing down for permanent withdrawal:
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“Unforeseen developments in <strong>the</strong> military situation may necessitate active combat
operations by United States forces in order to maintain <strong>the</strong> morale and prestige <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> native military forces that find <strong>the</strong>mselves hard-pressed.” Ch. 15 “Withdrawal”
Section II “Withdrawal From Active Military Operations” p. 4.
Organization <strong>of</strong> units: “A force assigned a small wars mission should be tactically
and administratively a self-sustaining unit. It must be highly mobile, and tactical
units, such as <strong>the</strong> battalion, must be prepared to act independently as
administrative organizations.” Ch. 2 “Organization” pp. 43-44
Engaging <strong>the</strong> Adversary: First, create neutral zone and defend it. Alert allies and
enemies alike <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> neutral zone. Use mobile columns or flying columns as
appropriate to move into <strong>the</strong> interior in order to seek out <strong>the</strong> hostile groups. “The
mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> flying column will be to seek out <strong>the</strong> hostile groups, attack <strong>the</strong>m
energetically, and <strong>the</strong>n pursue <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> limit.” Therefore, men should be lightly
equipped with only those essentials necessary for combat and subsistence. These
columns are supplied from permanent garrisons which should be within 1 or 2 days
march <strong>of</strong> each o<strong>the</strong>r. Ch. 5 “Initial Operations” p. 6 The flying column should carry
a lot <strong>of</strong> cash in order to buy supplies and intel.
“The column should be <strong>of</strong> sufficient strength to enable it to cope with <strong>the</strong> largest
force likely to be encountered. While weakness in <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> a column is
dangerous, yet excessive strength should be avoided…A larger train…decreases <strong>the</strong>
mobility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> column.” Ch. 5 “Initial Organizations” p. 7
In <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> “clear and hold” <strong>the</strong> manual indicates that forces should first
disperse hostile forces, <strong>the</strong>n establish an advanced base <strong>the</strong>re (or fortified post) for
<strong>the</strong> prosecution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> next phase: <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> flying columns into <strong>the</strong>
interior. The functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fortified post would be to (1) cover productive areas
and <strong>the</strong>ir lines <strong>of</strong> communication with <strong>the</strong>ir markets, (2) To afford protection to <strong>the</strong>
local population, (3) to form a base <strong>of</strong> supply, rest and replacement for flying
columns. Ch. 5 “Initial Organizations” pp. 9-10
Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification: These fall under a Section <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same title. The primary
methods listed are: Occupation <strong>of</strong> an area, patrols, roving patrols, zones <strong>of</strong> refuge,
cordon system, blockhouse system, special methods. Ch. 5 “Initial Operations,”
Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification” p. 17
Garrisoning: Occupation section notes <strong>the</strong> tension between garrisoning some
areas permanently (needs to be permanent because “withdrawal…during active
operations involves protests from those protected directly or indirectly, loss <strong>of</strong>
prestige, and increased danger to <strong>the</strong> installations or individuals that were
protected. The greater <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> localities that are garrisoned permanently,
<strong>the</strong> less is <strong>the</strong> mobility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> command; consequently, care should be taken to
retain sufficient reserves properly located to take up <strong>the</strong> counter-<strong>of</strong>fensive at every
opportunity.” Ch. 5 “Initial Operations,” Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification” p. 18.
Patrolling: “Patrolling is essentially an <strong>of</strong>fensive action. Accordingly its use in
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small-wars operations is universal even under conditions that require <strong>the</strong>
strategical defensive.” “When information <strong>of</strong> hostile forces is lacking or meager,
recourse to patrolling for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> denying <strong>the</strong> opposing forces terrain and
freedom <strong>of</strong> movement may be <strong>the</strong> only effective form <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive action open to
<strong>the</strong> commander. In this case, patrols become moving garrisons and deny <strong>the</strong>
opposing forces such terrain as <strong>the</strong>y can cover by observation, movement and fire.
Extensive operations <strong>of</strong> this nature exhaust <strong>the</strong> command, but on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand
are <strong>of</strong>ten more effective in <strong>the</strong> restoration <strong>of</strong> order than first appearance indicate.”
Ch. 5 “Initial Operations,” Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification” p. 18-19.
“The larger <strong>the</strong> patrol <strong>the</strong> more difficult its control in combat, <strong>the</strong> more
complicated its supply problems, and <strong>the</strong> more it sacrifices in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>of</strong>
concealment and secrecy <strong>of</strong> movement.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section III
“Organizing <strong>the</strong> Infantry Patrol” p. 8
Roving Patrols: Something like a “flying column” by <strong>the</strong> description here. Meant
to be detached and to pursue <strong>the</strong> guerrilla force relentlessly. Ch. 5 “Initial
Operations,” Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification” p.19.
Zones <strong>of</strong> Refuge: The description here looks a lot like <strong>the</strong> concentration system:
“Peaceful inhabitants are drawn into this protected area toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong>ir
effects, livestock, and movable belongings…This procedure is applicable at times
when, through sympathy with or intimidation by insurgents, <strong>the</strong> rural population is
furnishing such extensive support to <strong>the</strong> resistance as to seriously hamper attempts
at pacification. This is a ra<strong>the</strong>r drastic procedure warranted only by military
necessity.” Ch. 5 “Initial Operations,” Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification” p.19.
The cordon system: “This system involves placing a cordon <strong>of</strong> troops around an
infested area and closing in while restoring order in <strong>the</strong> area.” Ch. 5 “Initial
Operations,” Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong> Pacification” p. 19.
The Blockhouse system: “The blockhouse system involves <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a
line <strong>of</strong> defended localities.” Similar in principle to <strong>the</strong> cordon system but defensive
ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>of</strong>fensive. Ch. 5 “Initial Operations,” Section IV “Methods <strong>of</strong>
Pacification” p. 19.
Principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Offensive: “So long as <strong>the</strong>re is armed opposition to <strong>the</strong>
occupation, <strong>the</strong> intervening force must maintain <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive.”
Any lack <strong>of</strong> patrols will only encourage <strong>the</strong> opposition. If <strong>the</strong>y are not sought out
<strong>the</strong>y will increase in confidence, draw more to <strong>the</strong>ir ranks, and prey on
“defenseless towns” and “<strong>the</strong> peaceful citizenry.” The force <strong>of</strong> occupations “must,
<strong>the</strong>refore, adopt an aggressive attitude in order to seek out, capture, destroy, or
disperse <strong>the</strong> hostile groups and drive <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong> country.” Chapter 6 “Infantry
Patrols” Section I “Small War Tactics” p. 2.
Marines expect to be outnumbered. Their victory will come through “increased fire
power through <strong>the</strong> proper employment <strong>of</strong> better armament, superior training and
morale, and development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive.” Mobility is key: “Infantry
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patrols <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening force must develop mobility equal to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
opposing forces. The guerrilla groups must be continually harassed by patrols
working throughout <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operation.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section
I “Small War Tactics” p. 2.
Rules <strong>of</strong> Engagement: The manual’s authors recognize a need for clear rules <strong>of</strong>
engagement (to be determined by <strong>the</strong> force commander) in <strong>the</strong> following areas:
a. Firing upon suspicious individuals or groups before being fired upon.
b. Firing upon guerrillas accompanied by women and children.
c. The seizure <strong>of</strong> property and foodstuffs for <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> patrol or to prevent
its use by hostile forces.
d. The destruction <strong>of</strong> houses.
e. The destruction <strong>of</strong> crops which may be <strong>of</strong> value to <strong>the</strong> hostile forces.
Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section II “Orders and General Instructions” p. 5.
Search and Destroy: The manual dissuades from burning guerrilla camps: “The
value <strong>of</strong> a bivouac as a known enemy camp site should be considered before
destroying it. Guerrillas have a weakness for occupying camp sites <strong>the</strong>y have
previously found satisfactory, particularly if shelters have been constructed. The
burning <strong>of</strong> bivouac shelters rarely serves any useful purpose unless <strong>the</strong>y contain
military stores <strong>of</strong> some value.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section IX “Attacking
Houses and Small Bivouacs” p. 52.
Night Operations: Very discouraging tone set for night operations in this section.
A brief sketch <strong>of</strong> what it may entail is given followed by strong advice to not
employ night marches which will be <strong>of</strong> “doubtful value” or night attacks in which
“[t]he favorable outcome <strong>of</strong> an attack is so doubtful that this operation should be
attempted only after <strong>the</strong> most careful consideration.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols”
Section XII “Special Operations” p. 68.
Aviation: “The primary mission <strong>of</strong> combat aviation in a small war is <strong>the</strong> direct
support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ground forces.” Ch. 9 “Aviation” Section VI “Combat Support” p. 17
“When hostile forces seek <strong>the</strong> shelter <strong>of</strong> occupied towns and villages, air combat
support cannot be given <strong>the</strong> attacking troops without endangering <strong>the</strong> lives <strong>of</strong>
noncombatants. However, it may be feasible to drop warning messages to <strong>the</strong>
inhabitants, and allow <strong>the</strong>m sufficient time to evacuate before initiating an attack.”
Ch. 9 “Aviation” Section VI “Combat Support” p. 20.
Disarming Population: Regarded as “<strong>the</strong> most vital step in <strong>the</strong> restoration <strong>of</strong>
tranquility,” “an imperative necessity.” Ch. 10 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong> Population” p. 2
**Note: why this is so is not explained. “[D]is armament can be effected only
through <strong>the</strong> greatest tact and diplomacy” and <strong>the</strong> full cooperation <strong>of</strong> native
leaders. “This involves <strong>the</strong> responsibility to provide security not only for <strong>the</strong>
natives who have been disarmed but for <strong>the</strong> individuals depending upon <strong>the</strong>m for
protection.” “[I]f properly executed, <strong>the</strong> native military organizations and a large
proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> populace may be disarmed voluntarily.” Ch. 10 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong>
Population” p. 2 “Although complete disarmament may not be attained, yet <strong>the</strong>
enforcement <strong>of</strong> any ordinance restricting <strong>the</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> arms will result in <strong>the</strong>
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illegal possession <strong>of</strong> such arms only by opposing native forces, outlaws or bandits,
and a few inhabitants who will evade this ordinance as <strong>the</strong>y would attempt to do
with any unpopular legislation.” Ch. 10 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong> Population” pp. 2-3
“The disarming order will probably not influence <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional guerrilla fighters
to give up <strong>the</strong>ir weapons but such source <strong>of</strong> supply and replenishment <strong>of</strong> weapons
and ammunition within <strong>the</strong> country will be practically eliminated.” Ch. 10
“Disarmament <strong>of</strong> Population” p . 3 This section indicates an interesting level <strong>of</strong>
flexibility, including acknowledgement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need for locals to retain guns for
shooting game and <strong>the</strong> difference between working machetes and fighting
machetes. The manual’s authors also recognize that allowing a flexible time period
is important. Peasants who may be long in getting <strong>the</strong>ir weapons to <strong>the</strong> military
may become fearful that <strong>the</strong>y will suffer consequences and in such a state will be
vulnerable to recruiting by bandits. Ch. 11 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong> Population” pp. 4-5
“There is such a thing as being over-zealous in <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> disarmament, and it is
<strong>of</strong>ten advisable to make certain concessions to responsible parties in order to
secure <strong>the</strong>ir full cooperation in <strong>the</strong> enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> laws.” Ch. 10 “Disarmament
<strong>of</strong> Population” p. 6. However, “to be fully effective, disarmament must be
practically complete.” Ch. 11 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong> Population” p. 7
The authors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual suggest using <strong>the</strong> full comportment <strong>of</strong> possible
resources: civil <strong>of</strong>ficials, native guardia, members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military occupation,
provincial governors and local police, intelligence <strong>of</strong>ficers, etc. when meeting <strong>the</strong>
personnel requirements <strong>of</strong> collecting armaments. That said, <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>n detail <strong>the</strong>
possible pitfalls inherent to employing each group (possibly employing dishonest
practices or using <strong>the</strong> situation to get gain.) Ch. 11 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Population” pp. 7-8. Despite <strong>the</strong>se potential drawbacks, civilian authorities are
preferable to military occupiers in performing this duty because it avoids civilians
being “subjected to what <strong>the</strong>y might consider <strong>the</strong> indignity <strong>of</strong> making a personal
surrender to <strong>the</strong> military authorities,” misunderstandings born <strong>of</strong> language barriers
or cultural ignorance, and is additionally beneficial because “it relives <strong>the</strong> armed
forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unpleasant responsibility and eliminates <strong>the</strong> factor <strong>of</strong> personal
contact at a time when <strong>the</strong> population views <strong>the</strong> intentions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forces <strong>of</strong>
occupation with doubt and suspicion.” Ch. 11 “Disarmament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Population” p. 8
**Note: The tone throughout <strong>the</strong> manual is one <strong>of</strong> keeping Marines from contact
with civilians as much as possible – <strong>the</strong>re is a base assumption that this contact is
unpr<strong>of</strong>itable and should be avoided wherever possible. There is not/not an
assumption apparent here that <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>of</strong> Marines can be changed sufficiently
in ways that would make relationships with <strong>the</strong> population productive. Hints <strong>of</strong> it
occur throughout <strong>the</strong> manual but <strong>the</strong> general tone is one <strong>of</strong> hard lessons learned
and a preference to avoid <strong>the</strong> contact altoge<strong>the</strong>r. This is very different from <strong>the</strong>
encouragement received from higher today which promotes mingling with
villagers. In fact, this approach had changed seismically even by <strong>the</strong> Vietnam era.
Fitness <strong>of</strong> Men: This is <strong>the</strong> only mention made thus far in <strong>the</strong> manual as to physical
fitness. Here it is specifically targeting those who should not be allowed on patrol:
a. Those who have been recently ill...(including venereal disease)
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b. Deformities or diseases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> feet (including flatfoot and hammertoes – two
maladies that would have predated service)
c. “The old or fat, or those <strong>of</strong> obvious poor physique from any cause.”
d. The neurotic or mentally unstable; and <strong>the</strong> alcohol addicts. Chapter 6 “Infantry
Patrols” Section III “Organizing <strong>the</strong> Infantry Patrol” p. 10. This section says quite a
bit about who was let in to <strong>the</strong> Corps during this time.
Leadership and Initiative: “Considerable authority must be granted all leaders to
act independently and on <strong>the</strong>ir own initiative. In <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> orders, action on
<strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> patrol’s subdivision is preferable to inaction.” Chapter 6 “Infantry
Patrols” Section VIII “Attacking Ambushes” pp. 48-49
Military Government: “It follows that <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupying force is <strong>the</strong>
representative <strong>of</strong> his country and should be guided in his actions by its foreign
policy, <strong>the</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> justice inherent in its people, and <strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> justice as
recognized by civilized nations.” Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section I “General”
p. 3.
A proclamation to <strong>the</strong> population needs be sent out “Warning that strict obedience
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> orders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupying forces is to be expected <strong>of</strong> all,
and that those who disobey such orders or regulations, or commit acts <strong>of</strong> hostility
against <strong>the</strong> occupying forces, will be severely punished; but those who cheerfully
accept <strong>the</strong> new sovereignty and abide by its orders will be protected.” The
proclamation should also include “A statement that <strong>the</strong> occupying forces come not
to make war upon <strong>the</strong> inhabitants but to help <strong>the</strong>m reestablish <strong>the</strong>mselves in <strong>the</strong>
ways <strong>of</strong> peace and to enable <strong>the</strong>m to resume <strong>the</strong>ir ordinary occupations.” Ch. 13
“Military Government” Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military
Government” p. 8
Injunction to not be unduly harsh, lest we “stand in disrepute before <strong>the</strong> civilized
world.” “One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principal aims should be to so administer <strong>the</strong> military
government that upon conclusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupation, <strong>the</strong> transition to <strong>the</strong> new
state <strong>of</strong> affairs may be accomplished without radical change in <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> life <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> inhabitants or undue strain in <strong>the</strong> return to, or setting in motion <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong>
machinery <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own laws and institutions.” Ch. 13 “Military Government”
Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military Government” p. 9.
Notes here that freedom <strong>of</strong> assembly should be restricted, even if for holidays or
religious processions. “The principal restrictions included in <strong>the</strong> supplemental
order relate to unlawful assembly, circulation, identification, possession <strong>of</strong> arms
and ammunition, policy as to manufacture and sale <strong>of</strong> alcoholic beverages, and
<strong>of</strong>fenses in general again <strong>the</strong> personnel, establishments, installations, and material
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> forces <strong>of</strong> occupation. Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section II
“Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military Government” p. 9.
Press censorship: Punishable <strong>of</strong>fenses include:
To utter seditious language.
To spread alarmist reports.
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To circulate newspapers or publications <strong>of</strong> a seditious nature.
To print, post, circulate, or publish anything antagonistic or detrimental to
<strong>the</strong> Military Government or <strong>the</strong> Forces <strong>of</strong> Occupation. (Publications may be
suspended or censored for cause.) Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section II
“Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong> Military Government” p. 10
O<strong>the</strong>r infractions include:
To overcharge for merchandise sold to members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupying forces.
To signal or communicate with <strong>the</strong> opposing forces by any means.
To show disrespect to <strong>the</strong> flag or colors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States. Ch. 13
“Military Government” Section II “Establishment and Administration <strong>of</strong>
Military Government” p. 10.
Supervising Elections: “Whenever practicable, <strong>the</strong> larger portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military
and police duties required to guarantee an impartial election should be provided by
<strong>the</strong> native military organization.”… “The display <strong>of</strong> United States armed forces at or
near <strong>the</strong> polling places is kept to a minimum in order to avoid <strong>the</strong> charge that <strong>the</strong>
Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States had influenced <strong>the</strong> election, or placed favored
candidates in <strong>of</strong>fice by <strong>the</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> military forces.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong>
Elections” Section I “General” p. 5.
“A number <strong>of</strong> United States civilians should be included in <strong>the</strong> personnel <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Electoral Mission. This is done to reduce <strong>the</strong> likelihood <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> charge that <strong>the</strong>
elections are being controlled by <strong>the</strong> military, a charge to which an enterprise <strong>of</strong>
this nature is peculiarly susceptible.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section II
“Personnel” p. 13.
The manual requires language and electoral law instruction <strong>of</strong> at least one month
for any who are going over to participate. Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section
II “Personnel” p. 13.
“The average voter will judge <strong>the</strong> efficiency and fairness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> election supervision
by <strong>the</strong> procedure and methods employed during <strong>the</strong> registration period. The
impression received by <strong>the</strong> average citizen at this time will determine, in a large
measure, <strong>the</strong> amount and kind <strong>of</strong> criticism that <strong>the</strong> Electoral Mission will receive.”
Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section V “Registration and Voting” p. 33.
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Perceptual Lens
SWM
Characteristics <strong>of</strong> Small Wars: Recognized that <strong>the</strong> definition must cover a wide
range <strong>of</strong> military operations. “[S]mall wars are operations undertaken under
executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in
<strong>the</strong> internal or external affairs <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r state whose government is unstable,
inadequate, or unsatisfactory for <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> life and <strong>of</strong> such interests as
are determined by <strong>the</strong> foreign policy <strong>of</strong> our Nation.” p. 1
Primary point <strong>of</strong> entry into most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se engagements perceived to be to “protect
<strong>the</strong> lives and property <strong>of</strong> American citizens” and doing so did not necessarily
“constitute an act <strong>of</strong> war.” p. 3
The perception, at least <strong>of</strong> those writing <strong>the</strong> manual, is that <strong>the</strong> U.S. government
“has interposed or intervened in <strong>the</strong> affairs <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r states with remarkable
regularity, and it may be anticipated that <strong>the</strong> same general procedure will be
followed in <strong>the</strong> future.” p. 4
The introductory chapter ends on a very strange note: “If marines have become
accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong>y must now prepare
<strong>the</strong>mselves for <strong>the</strong> increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in <strong>the</strong>
future.” (p. 8) Did <strong>the</strong> Marines consider <strong>the</strong>se Banana Wars easy? Were <strong>the</strong>y
comparing <strong>the</strong>m to WWI? This is a totally unexpected sentiment. The authors go
on to warn that irregulars <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> future will be able to combine his natural
advantages <strong>of</strong> territory and numbers with modern armaments and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong>
Marines should consider him a formidable foe and prepare accordingly. Seems to
be perhaps arguing against an internal complacency given <strong>the</strong> “ease” <strong>of</strong> previous
small wars.
Far more uncertainty in small wars than in regular warfare which, if an <strong>of</strong>ficer is
unprepared, can produce abnormal or erratic behavior. In regular warfare one can
expect to receive clear cut orders. Not in small wars. “in small wars, <strong>the</strong> initial
orders may be fragmentary and lack much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ordinary detail.” p. 31 This is
“normal.”
Strategy: A note that “The military strategy <strong>of</strong> small wars is more directly
associated with <strong>the</strong> political strategy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> campaign than is <strong>the</strong> case in major
operations.” Small wars happen concurrently with diplomacy. p. 11 Because <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> heavy influence <strong>of</strong> politicians, even on strategy and tactics “marines have been
referred to as State Department Troops in small wars.” p. 11 This is an interesting
statement since by most accounts <strong>the</strong> State Department provided very little
direction in <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars engagements.
Manual quotes Callwell’s Small Wars in which he claims that “small wars are,
generally speaking, campaigns ra<strong>the</strong>r against nature than against hostile armies…It
constitutes on <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most distinctive characteristics <strong>of</strong> this class <strong>of</strong> warfare.” He
cites difficulties <strong>of</strong> supply, climate, absence <strong>of</strong> communication, “<strong>the</strong> jungle and <strong>the</strong>
bush embarrass a commander”; difficulty keeping man and beast fed. Ch. 3
“Logistics” p. 13
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Perceptions <strong>of</strong> own objectives: “Interventions or occupations are usually peaceful
and altruistic.” p. 13
Civilian/Insurgent: Recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civilian/insurgent dilemma “In warfare <strong>of</strong>
this kind, members <strong>of</strong> native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant
workers when it suits <strong>the</strong>ir fancy and convenience.”
Manual gives a strong endorsement for manufacturing and dispersing identity
cards. Indicates that this is not only a source <strong>of</strong> individual pride for <strong>the</strong> native but
successfully separates <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong> insurgents and in so doing avoids “most <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> humiliating and o<strong>the</strong>rwise unproductive process <strong>of</strong>ten resorted to in
attempting to identify natives or <strong>the</strong>ir possible relationship to <strong>the</strong> opposing forces.”
p. 25
An assumed clear line is present throughout much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual—that <strong>the</strong>re are
two camps: hostile forces and “peaceful and law abiding inhabitants.” Ch. 11
“Disarmament <strong>of</strong> Population” pp. 1-2
Racism: “The influence <strong>of</strong> racial psychology on <strong>the</strong> destiny <strong>of</strong> a people appears
plainly in <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> those subject to perpetual revolutions.” Goes on to say
that mixed races present a particularly difficult problem—difficult to govern, if not
ungovernable--because <strong>the</strong>y do not have a “fixed character.” Highly ironic coming
from forces representing <strong>the</strong> American melting pot. p. 19
Paternalism: “Inhabitants <strong>of</strong> countries with a high rate <strong>of</strong> illiteracy have many
childlike characteristics. In <strong>the</strong> guidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> destinies <strong>of</strong> such people, <strong>the</strong> more
that one shows a fraternal spirit, <strong>the</strong> easier will be <strong>the</strong> task and <strong>the</strong> more effective
<strong>the</strong> results. It is manifestly unjust to judge such people by our standards.” p. 24
Intelligence: The perception here is that <strong>the</strong> population will feed intel to <strong>the</strong>
insurgents and be unreliable to U.S. forces: “The population will be honeycombed
with hostile sympathizers, making it difficult to procure reliable information.” p. 14
See <strong>the</strong>mselves in a position <strong>of</strong> disadvantageous asymmetry: “Operations are
based on information which is at best unreliable, while <strong>the</strong> natives enjoy
continuous and accurate information.” Do not seem to see selves as agents that
could alter this balance. p. 15
An interesting defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> typical peasant. The manual notes that he is likely to
refuse information to a patrol passing through and that this is sensible since he
would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be signing his own death warrant. p. 25
The perception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intelligence situation is on target: “It can be stated as an
accepted premise that, in small wars, <strong>the</strong> intelligence service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opposing forces
will be superior initially to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening force. From <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> intervening power, <strong>the</strong> intervention is usually considered a friendly effort to
assist <strong>the</strong> occupied country to reestablish peace and order within its boundaries.
From <strong>the</strong> viewpoint <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupied country,
however, this action by an alien power is an unfriendly one. Although <strong>the</strong> majority
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<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se inhabitants will not actively oppose <strong>the</strong> intervention, many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m will
indirectly assist <strong>the</strong> native forces with information relative to <strong>the</strong> movements <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> intervening forces. This is especially true <strong>of</strong> those citizens who have relatives
among <strong>the</strong> native forces operating in <strong>the</strong> field. To <strong>of</strong>f-set this situation, recourse
must be had to propaganda clearly stating <strong>the</strong> definite purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening
forces in order to show <strong>the</strong> friendly aid that is being <strong>of</strong>fered to <strong>the</strong> country.
Friendships should be made with <strong>the</strong> inhabitants in an honest and faithful
endeavor to assist <strong>the</strong>m to resume <strong>the</strong>ir peaceful occupations and to protect <strong>the</strong>m
from <strong>the</strong> illegal demands made upon <strong>the</strong>m by <strong>the</strong> malcontents.” Efforts to gain
intelligence will be made through “<strong>the</strong> liberal use <strong>of</strong> intelligence funds” “Routine
patrols must be avoided.” “Above all, an active and aggressive campaign against
<strong>the</strong> hostile forces in <strong>the</strong> field is <strong>the</strong> most effective method <strong>of</strong> destroying <strong>the</strong>ir
intelligence service. A guerrilla band which is constantly harassed and driven from
place to place soon loses contact with its own sources <strong>of</strong> information; it becomes
confused and its intelligence system breaks down. As <strong>the</strong> occupations continues,
superiority in this respect will gradually be obtained by <strong>the</strong> intervening forces.” Ch.
2 “Organization” pp. 4-5
**Note: <strong>the</strong> intel method here is to disrupt <strong>the</strong> opposing forces intel collection
ra<strong>the</strong>r than improve upon our own by positive relations with <strong>the</strong> population.
On “Questioning inhabitants for information” along a patrol: “Patrol leaders must
evaluate cautiously information obtained by questioning inhabitants encountered
on <strong>the</strong> trail. A person who resides in a community overrun by guerrillas generally is
sympa<strong>the</strong>tic towards <strong>the</strong>m or fearful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir reprisals.” Chapter 6 “Infantry
Patrols” Section VI “Reconnaissance and Security” p. 39.
Soc/Pol/Econ Angle: Recognition that many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problems cannot be solved by
military force. All efforts need to be coordinated in order to achieve ultimate
objective: “restore peace.” p. 16What if peace has not existed in generational
memory in this regime?
Economic focus: Interesting that even back <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> American focus was
economic. Problems had <strong>the</strong>ir root in economics and <strong>the</strong>refore, so did <strong>the</strong> likely
solutions. On revolution: “Revolution is <strong>the</strong> term generally applied to sudden
political changes, but <strong>the</strong> expression may be employed to denote any sudden
transformation whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> beliefs, ideas, or doctrines. In most cases <strong>the</strong> basic
causes are economic.” p. 20
Leader-centric: The philosophy espoused in <strong>the</strong> manual is that revolutions are not
grassroots movements born out <strong>of</strong> deep seated social or political grievances, but
are movements which “emanate from a few leaders” and attracts all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
“malcontents and adventurous elements in <strong>the</strong> community.” p. 21 Forces are
warned: “Attempt should be made to prevent <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> a hero <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
revolutionary movement.” How? Fur<strong>the</strong>r, “[N]o one should be permitted to
become a martyr to <strong>the</strong> cause.” Likely this line is a lesson learned from <strong>the</strong> Peralte
affair.
Interesting bit on <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> leaving a leader in place – this was not put in
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practice anywhere in <strong>the</strong> historical accounts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banana Wars, <strong>the</strong> converse is
true: “Unless a revolutionary leader can be discountenanced in <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> his
followers, it may be best to admit such leadership. Through him a certain discipline
may be exercised which will control <strong>the</strong> actions <strong>of</strong> a revolutionary army; for
without discipline, people and armies become barbarian hordes.” p. 22
Penchant to simplify: “One obstacle in dealing with a revolution lies in <strong>the</strong>
difficulty <strong>of</strong> determining <strong>the</strong> real cause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> trouble. When found, it is <strong>of</strong>ten
disclosed as a minor fault <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> simplest nature. The <strong>the</strong>n remedies are also
simple.” p.22
U.S. Rightness: An assumption that U.S. forces will always be right in <strong>the</strong>ir
objectives: “On occasion <strong>the</strong>re is clash <strong>of</strong> opinion between <strong>the</strong> military and local
civil power in a given situation, and <strong>the</strong> greatest tact and diplomacy is required to
bring <strong>the</strong> local political authorities to <strong>the</strong> military point <strong>of</strong> view. When <strong>the</strong> matter
is important, final analysis may require resort to more vigorous methods.” p. 24
Small Wars not Popular with Public: “An ordinary characteristic <strong>of</strong> small wars is
<strong>the</strong> antagonistic propaganda against <strong>the</strong> campaign or operations in <strong>the</strong> United
States press or legislature.” p. 28 No reason is given. Later: “At this time, public
opinion shows little patience in <strong>the</strong> enterprise, and accepts with less patience any
explanation for <strong>the</strong> delay necessary to bring <strong>the</strong> operation to a close.” Not clear
whe<strong>the</strong>r talking about <strong>the</strong> local population or <strong>the</strong> U.S. population here. p. 29
Supervising elections a preferred interventionary role since “Such action is in
keeping with <strong>the</strong> popular revulsion against armed intervention in <strong>the</strong> internal
affairs <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries, and supports <strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> self-determination and
majority rule.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section I “General” p. 1.
Contrast with Regular War: In regular war one attempts to produce <strong>the</strong> maximum
physical effect with <strong>the</strong> force at one’s disposal. “In small wars, caution must be
exercised, and instead <strong>of</strong> striving to generate <strong>the</strong> maximum power with forces
available, <strong>the</strong> goal is to gain decisive results with <strong>the</strong> least application <strong>of</strong> force and
<strong>the</strong> consequent minimum loss <strong>of</strong> life.” p. 32
“In major warfare, hatred <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy is developed among troops to arouse
courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be <strong>the</strong> keynote
<strong>of</strong> our relationship with <strong>the</strong> mass <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population.” p. 32
Small wars are uncertain and <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> military man is uncertain, but “The
military individual cannot afford to be intimidated by <strong>the</strong> responsibilities <strong>of</strong> his
positions, or by <strong>the</strong> fear that his actions will not be supported.” p. 32
Purpose <strong>of</strong> intervention: “The purpose should always be to restore normal
government or give <strong>the</strong> people a better government than <strong>the</strong>y had before, and to
establish peace, order and security on as permanent a basis as practicable.
Gradually <strong>the</strong>re must be instilled in <strong>the</strong> inhabitants’ minds <strong>the</strong> leading ideas <strong>of</strong>
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civilization, <strong>the</strong> security and sanctity <strong>of</strong> life and property, and individual liberty.” p.
32
The Mission: Experience for <strong>the</strong> Marines up to this point likely informs <strong>the</strong>
following paragraph as regards mission: “In a major war, <strong>the</strong> mission assigned to
<strong>the</strong> armed forces is usually unequivocal—<strong>the</strong> defeat and destruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hostile
forces. This is seldom true in small wars. More <strong>of</strong>ten than not, <strong>the</strong> mission will be
to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing <strong>the</strong> civil
government in countries or areas in which <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States have
been placed in jeopardy, in order to insure <strong>the</strong> safety and security <strong>of</strong> our nationals,
<strong>the</strong>ir property and interests. If <strong>the</strong>re is an organized hostile force opposing <strong>the</strong>
intervention, <strong>the</strong> primary objective in small wars, as in a major war, is its early
destruction. In those cases where armed opposition is encountered only from
irregular forces under <strong>the</strong> leadership <strong>of</strong> malcontents or unrecognized <strong>of</strong>ficials, <strong>the</strong>
mission is one <strong>of</strong> diplomacy ra<strong>the</strong>r than military. Frequently <strong>the</strong> commander <strong>of</strong> a
force operating in a small wars <strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> operations is not given a specific mission
as such in his written orders or directive, and it <strong>the</strong>m becomes necessary for him to
deduce his mission from <strong>the</strong> general intent <strong>of</strong> higher authority, or even from <strong>the</strong>
foreign policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States. In any event, <strong>the</strong> mission should be
accomplished with a minimum loss <strong>of</strong> life and property and by methods that leave
no aftermath <strong>of</strong> bitterness or render <strong>the</strong> return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”
Ch. 2 p. 2
“Upon arrival within <strong>the</strong> foreign country, <strong>the</strong> armed forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States
Government immediately become responsible for <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> life and
property <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> inhabitants <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> foreign country” this due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>
native police and armed forces have obviously proved unable to suppress whatever
disturbance brought <strong>the</strong> U.S. to foreign shores in <strong>the</strong> first place. Ch. 12 “Armed
Native Organizations” Section I “General” p. 1
“In assisting any country to restore peace and order, it is not <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
United States Government to accept permanent responsibility for <strong>the</strong> preservation
<strong>of</strong> governmental stability by stationing its armed forces indefinitely in <strong>the</strong> foreign
country for that purpose. The United Sates forces seek to restore domestic
tranquility as soon as possible…” **Note: assumption here is that peace and
tranquility is <strong>the</strong> normal state <strong>of</strong> things, <strong>the</strong>refore it can be “restored” and will
stick. Cont…<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quote: “…and to return <strong>the</strong> normal functions <strong>of</strong> government to
<strong>the</strong> country concerned.” **Note: again, <strong>the</strong> assumption here is that a functioning
government is <strong>the</strong> default and that once set back on its tracks it will continue in <strong>the</strong>
right direction. This is, <strong>of</strong> course, an assumption that flies in <strong>the</strong> face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political
history <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> countries <strong>of</strong> concern: Haiti, Dominican, Nicaragua. “To
accomplish this, <strong>the</strong> United States Government will usually insist upon <strong>the</strong>
establishment <strong>of</strong> an efficient and well-trained armed native force, free from
political influence and distatorial (sic) control.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section I “General” p. 2 **Note: free from dictatorial control?
Does a military occupation represent a dictatorship? It certainly fits that category
better than <strong>the</strong> category <strong>of</strong> democracy. Because <strong>the</strong> Marines are representatives
<strong>of</strong> a democratic country <strong>the</strong>y do not see <strong>the</strong>mselves as dictatorial. They may have
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to employ dictatorial methods from time to time…or nearly wholesale…but <strong>the</strong>se
are means, not ends. The blindspot here, <strong>of</strong> course, is that this approach sets a
standard <strong>of</strong> governance that is a match for dictatorship ra<strong>the</strong>r than democracy. In
<strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> “efficiency” (noted as a key value in <strong>the</strong> quote above) <strong>the</strong> Marines
perform functions <strong>the</strong>mselves, in dictatorial fashion, that would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be
messy, more highly corrupted, slower, and all around less efficient if performed
democratically.
“Having assumed <strong>the</strong> obligation for <strong>the</strong> restoration <strong>of</strong> domestic tranquility within
<strong>the</strong> foreign country concerned, <strong>the</strong> obligation is fulfilled by <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> United States
forces. There is also present <strong>the</strong> obligation to restore to <strong>the</strong> foreign country its
organic native defensive and law-enforcement powers as soon as tranquility has
been secured.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section I “General” p. 2.
**Note: <strong>the</strong> assumption here is that both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se things are possible and are
wholly <strong>the</strong> obligation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. armed forces and that “tranquility” is primarily a
product <strong>of</strong> competent military endeavors ra<strong>the</strong>r than a political state wherein a
population is satisfied with its government.
“The organization <strong>of</strong> an adequate armed native organization is an effective method
to prevent fur<strong>the</strong>r domestic disturbances after <strong>the</strong> intervention has ended, and is
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervention since <strong>the</strong> United States
armed forces may have superseded or usurped <strong>the</strong> function <strong>of</strong> armed forces <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
country concerned at <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervention. It is obvious that such
armed forces must be restored prior to withdrawal.” **Note: no hint here that <strong>the</strong>
training may result in an effective tool for dictatorship. The constabulary must be
formed by order <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sitting Chief Executive (or legislature if available) in <strong>the</strong> host
country and must be paid for out <strong>of</strong> that national budget. Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section I “General” pp. 2-3 However, as regards plans for <strong>the</strong>
constabulary, “When a military government has been established, only <strong>the</strong>
approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States executive, legislative, and departmental agencies is
required.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a
Constabulary” p. 6. **Note: a value that is surfacing through all <strong>of</strong> this process is
legality – <strong>the</strong> validation <strong>of</strong> processes via law. It matters less whe<strong>the</strong>r this law is
democratic or dictatorially imposed via military decree or some o<strong>the</strong>r route
circumventing native preferences. What matters is that it has <strong>the</strong> surface structure
<strong>of</strong> codified law that may be referenced as a justification and sanctification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
practices which follow. The letter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law is far more important than <strong>the</strong> spirit
when imposing law-like structures on a foreign <strong>the</strong>ater. Lines like this one are
indicative <strong>of</strong> this value: “In order that <strong>the</strong> constabulary may be constituted military
instrument <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> local government, it must be legally established and provided
with <strong>the</strong> legal power to execute its functions. In <strong>the</strong> law or decree establishing <strong>the</strong>
constabulary, <strong>the</strong>re should be definite provisions setting forth <strong>the</strong> authority and
responsibility ” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a
Constabulary” p. 6 **Note: an assumption apparent here is that legality is
legitimacy. Assumed is a cultural norm or value that legal structures are legitimate
by nature and <strong>the</strong>refore confer legitimacy. No thought seems to be given to <strong>the</strong>
possibility that <strong>the</strong>re is little reverence for law and that legitimacy may have, in <strong>the</strong>
past, been vested in personal characteristics <strong>of</strong> key leaders: charisma, strong arm
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tactics, benign treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population, ethnic heritage and family name, or
some o<strong>the</strong>r source.
When supervising elections: “A free, fair, and impartial election cannot be held in
a country torn by civil strife. Before such an election can be held, <strong>the</strong> individual
must be made to feel safe in his everyday life. The presence <strong>of</strong> United States
military and naval forces is <strong>of</strong>ten necessary to furnish that guarantee.” Ch. 14
“Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections” Section I “General” p. 3.
The Adversary: As noted by o<strong>the</strong>r authors, Marines <strong>of</strong> this time period tended to
class <strong>the</strong>ir small wars foes as “bandits” ra<strong>the</strong>r than as insurgents. “The mission <strong>of</strong>
our forces usually involves <strong>the</strong> training <strong>of</strong> native <strong>of</strong>ficers and men in <strong>the</strong> art <strong>of</strong> war,
assisting in <strong>of</strong>fensive operations against organized banditry and in such defensive
measure against threatened raids <strong>of</strong> large organized bandit groups as are essential
to <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> lives and property.” p. 43
“The leadership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opposing forces in small wars must not be underestimated.”
But this is because <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong>se men have been trained in <strong>the</strong> U.S. or Europe. The
irregulars will also attract foreign “soldiers <strong>of</strong> fortune” who will influence <strong>the</strong>
fighting methods. Ch. 2 p. 6
In a self-aware moment <strong>the</strong> authors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manual suggest: “In view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peculiar
status <strong>of</strong> our forces in small wars operations, in which <strong>the</strong>y frequently become
involved for <strong>the</strong> sole purpose <strong>of</strong> providing military aid to <strong>the</strong> civil power <strong>of</strong> a foreign
nation in order to restore peace within <strong>the</strong> boundaries <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state, <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
term ‘enemy’ should be avoided in all records, reports, and o<strong>the</strong>r documents.” Ch.
2 “Organization” p. 32
Provides a worthy description <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Marine’s lived experience at <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong>
Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols”: During <strong>the</strong> initial phases <strong>of</strong> intervention, when <strong>the</strong>
landing and movement inland may be opposed by comparatively large, well led,
organized, and equipped hostile forces, <strong>the</strong> tactics employed are generally those <strong>of</strong>
a force <strong>of</strong> similar strength and composition engaged in major warfare. If a crushing
defeat can be inflicted upon those forces, <strong>the</strong> immediate cessation <strong>of</strong> armed
opposition may result. This is seldom achieved. Usually <strong>the</strong> hostile forces will
withdraw as a body into <strong>the</strong> more remote parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country, or will be dispersed
into numerous small groups which continue to oppose <strong>the</strong> occupation. Even
though <strong>the</strong> recognized leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders <strong>of</strong>ten
refuse to abide by <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> capitulation. Escaping to <strong>the</strong> hinterland, <strong>the</strong>y
assemble heterogeneous armed groups <strong>of</strong> patriotic soldiers, malcontents,
notorious outlaws, and impressed civilians, and, by means <strong>of</strong> guerrillas warfare,
continue to harass and oppose <strong>the</strong> intervening force in its attempt to restore peace
and good order throughout <strong>the</strong> country as a whole.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols”
Section I “Small War Tactics” p. 1
An assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adversary’s values: “The morale <strong>of</strong> guerrilla forces is little
affected by <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> a particular position, but it is seriously affected by <strong>the</strong>
number <strong>of</strong> casualties sustained in combat.” **Note: is this true? Chapter 6
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“Infantry Patrols” Section III “Organization <strong>the</strong> Infantry Patrol” p. 13. Therefore,
weapons capable <strong>of</strong> accurate fire are more important than those that deliver
volume <strong>of</strong> fire.
“The opposition usually encountered in small war operations consists <strong>of</strong> scattered
bands <strong>of</strong> irregular troops, well armed and extremely mobile, but deficient in
disciplined morale. Logistical arrangement for such forces are apt to be very
primitive and sketchy, <strong>of</strong>fering no substantial target for bombing aviation.” Ch. 9
“Aviation” Section I “Introduction” p. 1
Adversary’s Tactics: Will be primarily ambushes and “surprise-meeting
engagements”. Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section I “Small War Tactics” p. 1. The
adversary will seek out cover – woods or mountains (does not list jungle) since
open fields yields an advantage to regular troops. Interestingly, <strong>the</strong> manual notes
that <strong>the</strong> combat tactics needed against guerrillas in <strong>the</strong> woods can be drawn from
manuals constructed for wooded area contact in major warfare. Chapter 6
“Infantry Patrols” Section I “Small War Tactics” p. 2.
Provost service: “The provost service, including <strong>the</strong> exceptional military-court
system, represents <strong>the</strong> military government to <strong>the</strong> mass <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people, with whom
it comes in direct contact, and is <strong>the</strong> normal active instrument for <strong>the</strong> maintenance
<strong>of</strong> tranquility, freeing <strong>the</strong> natives from agitation and intimidation by <strong>the</strong>ir own
countrymen.” Ch. 2 “Organization” pp. 16-17 **Note: many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Dominican
complaints came from misuse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provost courts.
Civil / Military Relations: “Since our relations with <strong>the</strong> local government in <strong>the</strong>
<strong>the</strong>ater <strong>of</strong> perorations is usually friendly…” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 35
The assumption going in is that initial relations between minor <strong>of</strong>ficials and newly
minted members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary will be bumpy: “It is to be expected that
some animosity and jealousy will be prevalent during <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
constabulary by <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States forces. Attempts may be made to
interfere with or embarrass <strong>the</strong> constabulary in its operations indirectly by civilcourt
actions and by noncooperation on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> minor <strong>of</strong>ficials.” Ch. 12 “Armed
Native Organizations” Section V “Civil and Military Relationship” p. 23.
“In <strong>the</strong>ir contacts with civil <strong>of</strong>ficials, members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary must be
courteous, firm in <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir duties, and just in dealing with any and all
classes <strong>of</strong> inhabitants, regardless <strong>of</strong> rank, title, creed, or social position. Tact is one
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most necessary attributes which may be possessed by members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
constabulary. Fair and just operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constabulary must always be
tempered with tact. Brutality in making investigations and arrests should be firmly
and promptly suppressed. The inhabitants should be encouraged to regard <strong>the</strong>
constabulary as an honest, impartial, and just law enforcement agency, friendly
toward <strong>the</strong> law-abiding population.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section
V “Civil and Military Relationship” p. 24.
Military Government: “It is decidedly to <strong>the</strong> military advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupying
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forces to establish a strong and just government, such as will preserve order and,
as far as possible, pacify <strong>the</strong> inhabitants.” Ch. 13 “Military Government” Section I
“General” p. 2.
“It should be remembered that <strong>the</strong> inhabitants do not owe <strong>the</strong> military
government allegiance; but <strong>the</strong>y do owe it obedience.” Ch. 13 “Military
Government” Section I “General” p. 3.
Civic Action – Infrastructure: “Experience has demonstrated that <strong>the</strong> construction,
improvement, and maintenance <strong>of</strong> routes <strong>of</strong> communication, including railroads, is
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most important factors in a successful small-wars campaign.” **Note:
no indication <strong>of</strong> why. Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 50 As for building up local
infrastructure: “In most small-wars situations, <strong>the</strong> necessary manual labor involved
can be obtained locally.” Ch. 2 “Organizations” p. 50
Training: Bayonet training, even if not practically useful in small wars due to <strong>the</strong>
jungle terrain, remains useful for cultivating <strong>the</strong> proper warrior spirit. “It is only
through such training that each individual <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> combat team is imbued with <strong>the</strong>
‘will to win’.” Ch. 4 “Training” p. 5.
Native Troops: “When native troops are available, <strong>the</strong>y may be included in <strong>the</strong>
patrol. In addition to <strong>the</strong>ir combat duties, <strong>the</strong>y will, if properly indoctrinated, do
much to establish friendly relations between <strong>the</strong> peaceful inhabitants and <strong>the</strong>
intervening force.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section III “Organization <strong>the</strong>
Infantry Patrol” p. 12.
“Prominent native civilians” may also play a valuable role on patrols: “They can do
much to explain <strong>the</strong> mission <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening forces in <strong>the</strong> community, spread <strong>the</strong>
gospel <strong>of</strong> peace, friendly relations, and cooperation, and counter <strong>the</strong> propaganda
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy. The natives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community are all potential enemies and many
will become actively hostile if <strong>the</strong>y are not convinced <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> true objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
occupation.” Chapter 6 “Infantry Patrols” Section III “Organization <strong>the</strong> Infantry
Patrol” p. 12. **Note: interesting assumption here: that <strong>the</strong> true objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
occupation will be a cheerful reality to <strong>the</strong> native people. It is not what we are
doing that is <strong>of</strong>fensive, it is a lack <strong>of</strong> properly explaining what we are doing that is
<strong>the</strong> problem.
“Several months <strong>of</strong> active operation in <strong>the</strong> field are required to train average
individuals as efficient scouts, and only a small proportion will acquire <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong>
a native to interpret correctly <strong>the</strong> things observed along <strong>the</strong> trail.” Chapter 6
“Infantry Patrols” Section VI “Reconnaissance and Security” p. 37.
The perception is that loyalty to <strong>the</strong> organization may be obtained through
material benefits: “The confidence and loyalty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> native troops is promoted by
careful supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir material needs. More <strong>of</strong>ten than not, <strong>the</strong>y will have
been accustomed to meager salaries irregularly paid, scant food carelessly
provided, as well as indifferent shelter, clothing, and equipment. When <strong>the</strong>y are
regularly paid in full on <strong>the</strong> date due, when fed adequately a provided by <strong>the</strong>
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allowance, and when good shelter, clothing, and equipment are provided, native
troops will usually respond in <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> service rendered.” Ch. 12 “Armed
Native Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 9
Again, <strong>the</strong> manuals authors do not seem to see affiliation with foreign troops as a
reputation problem for natives. It is material inducements that are king: “The
rates <strong>of</strong> pay should be such as to attract <strong>the</strong> best type <strong>of</strong> natives to join <strong>the</strong>
constabulary. By making <strong>the</strong> rates <strong>of</strong> pay attractive, natives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest type will
be encouraged to make <strong>the</strong> constabulary a career.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 13. Added to this is a
continuing naïveté as concerns <strong>the</strong> way in which native forces are likely to be
employed after <strong>the</strong> fact: “This feature [career constables] is particularly desirable
since it will tend to promote tranquility throughout <strong>the</strong> country after <strong>the</strong>
withdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States forces, if <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers and men have
served in <strong>the</strong> constabulary for a number <strong>of</strong> years.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native
Organizations” Section II “Organization <strong>of</strong> a Constabulary” p. 13.
Role <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: After three wars in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean, Marines were not totally
ignorant <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resilience <strong>of</strong> cultural mores: “Each race <strong>of</strong> people has its peculiar
characteristics and customs. These may be modified somewhat under influence,
but cannot be entirely destroyed or supplanted. These characteristics and customs
should always be recognized and considered when dealing with persons <strong>of</strong>
different races.” Ch. 12 “Armed Native Organizations” Section III “Operations and
Training” p. 18.
Result <strong>of</strong> previous occupations: “The Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States has
supervised <strong>the</strong> presidential or congressional elections <strong>of</strong> neighboring republics on
12 different occasions. By accepting <strong>the</strong> responsibility for such supervision, <strong>the</strong>
Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States has settled serious political disturbances and
assisted in <strong>the</strong> reestablishment <strong>of</strong> law and order. Sanguinary revolutions were
stopped and countries rescued from a state <strong>of</strong> civil war.” Ch. 14 “Supervision <strong>of</strong>
Elections” Section I “General” p. 1.
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Warfighting
MCDP 1
(U.S. Marine
Corps, 1997)
Identity/Role
Warfighting
Values
Warfighting
Jack <strong>of</strong> all trades: “The Marine Corps, as <strong>the</strong> nation’s force-in-readiness, must have
<strong>the</strong> versatility and flexibility to deal with a situation at any intensity across <strong>the</strong>
entire spectrum <strong>of</strong> conflict” p. 27
Core features (as outlined in <strong>the</strong> Preparing for War chapter): readiness to go
anywhere and do anything: “As <strong>the</strong> nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness, <strong>the</strong>
Marine Corps must maintain itself for immediate employment in “any clime and
place” and in any type <strong>of</strong> conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on
achieving combat readiness.” p. 53 In truth, though, Marines have to plausibly
assess which sorts <strong>of</strong> missions “Marine forces are likely to be required to perform
and how <strong>the</strong>y might accomplish those missions.” p. 53 This section does not
name, in any specific way, what those missions will be. The scope <strong>the</strong>y will fall
within will be “expeditionary operations in any environment” so in addition to
maintaining <strong>the</strong>ir “unique amphibious capability, <strong>the</strong> operating forces must
maintain <strong>the</strong> capacity to deploy by whatever means is appropriate to <strong>the</strong>
situation.” p. 54
Immediate response force: “The active operating forces must be capable <strong>of</strong>
responding immediately to most types <strong>of</strong> crisis and conflict.” p. 54 Priorities should
be deployability and <strong>the</strong> ability to task-organize according to specific situations. p.
55
Every Marine a Rifleman: “All Marines, regardless <strong>of</strong> occupational specialty, will
be trained in basic combat skills.” p. 59
Speed and focus generate combat power. 40 “speed is a weapon.” p. 40
Boldness “is <strong>the</strong> characteristic <strong>of</strong> unhesitatingly exploiting <strong>the</strong> natural uncertainty
<strong>of</strong> war to pursue major results ra<strong>the</strong>r than marginal ones.” p. 44 “boldness must
be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness.” p. 44 “Boldness is an
essential moral trait in a leader for it generates combat power beyond <strong>the</strong> physical
means at hand.” p. 57 “[Boldness and initiative] carried to excess can lead to
rashness, but we must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming from
overboldness are a necessary part <strong>of</strong> learning.” p. 57 Counsel to allow for mistakes
born <strong>of</strong> boldness. “On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, we should deal severely with errors <strong>of</strong>
inaction or timidity…We must not tolerate <strong>the</strong> avoidance <strong>of</strong> responsibility or
necessary risk.” p. 58
Action Orientation: The chapter entitled Preparing for War starts with this quote,
“The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: <strong>the</strong> decision born <strong>of</strong>
thought, <strong>the</strong> order or preparation for execution, and <strong>the</strong> execution itself. All three
stages are governed by <strong>the</strong> will. The will is rooted in character, and for <strong>the</strong> man <strong>of</strong>
action character is <strong>of</strong> more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will
is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.” – Hans von Seeckt p. 51
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Interesting that this injunction to action heads <strong>the</strong> chapter on Preparing for War.
Of any stage <strong>the</strong> preparatory stage would seem to call for contemplation and
thoughtful planning ra<strong>the</strong>r than an action orientation.
Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism: emphasis on competence in warfighting. “As military
pr<strong>of</strong>essionals charged with <strong>the</strong> defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nation, Marine leaders must be true
experts in <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> war.” O<strong>the</strong>r defining features <strong>of</strong> “pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism”:
Individuals <strong>of</strong> action and intellect
Skilled at “getting things done”
Conversant in <strong>the</strong> military art (a student <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> art and science <strong>of</strong> war,
including a solid foundation in military <strong>the</strong>ory and history)
Resolute
Self-reliant
Energetic in execution pp. 56-57
This section is combined with a commentary on leadership:
Intelligent leaders
penchant for boldness and initiative down to <strong>the</strong> lowest levels (<strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> leadership section deals heavily with both traits). pp. 57-58
Establish mutual trust with subordinates. “Trust is a product <strong>of</strong> confidence
and familiarity. Confidence among comrades results from demonstrated
pr<strong>of</strong>essional skill. Familiarity results from shared experience and common
pr<strong>of</strong>essional philosophy.” p.58
Honesty and frankness, and receiving honesty and frankness from
subordinates in advance <strong>of</strong> a decision.
Human skill over Technology: “a doctrine <strong>of</strong> maneuver warfare…places a premium
on individual judgment and action.” p. 64 “Equipment should be easy to operate
and maintain, reliable, and interoperable with o<strong>the</strong>r equipment. It should require
minimal specialized operator training.” p. 65 No glorification <strong>of</strong> high technology
here. Despite Marine pride in developing core technologies and machines for
amphibious assault, <strong>the</strong>re is little emphasis here on research and development: “In
order to minimize research and development costs and fielding time, <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps will exploit existing capabilities—“<strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> shelf” technology—to <strong>the</strong> greatest
extent possible.” p. 65 Any new piece <strong>of</strong> technology needs to justify <strong>the</strong> support it
requires by proving combat effectiveness. Must also have demonstrated in a broad
range <strong>of</strong> environments, including “underdeveloped” <strong>the</strong>aters. pp. 65-66. “There
are two dangers with respect to equipment: <strong>the</strong> over-reliance on technology and
<strong>the</strong> failure to make <strong>the</strong> most <strong>of</strong> technological capabilities.” “Better equipment is
not <strong>the</strong> cure for all ills;” “Any advantages gained by technological advancement are
only temporary for someone will always find a countermeasure, tactical or itself
technological, which will lessen <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> technology. Additionally, we
must not become so dependent on equipment that we can no longer function
effectively when <strong>the</strong> equipment becomes inoperable.” p. 67 The Marines’
appreciative but unreliant attitude toward technology might be cast as a natural
asset for counterinsurgency operations since <strong>the</strong>se are typically, by nature, a small
patrol enterprise largely unassisted by highly sophisticated technologies (with <strong>the</strong>
exception <strong>of</strong> night vision) or sizeable war machines.
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Norms
Warfighting
Marine leadership warns against using <strong>the</strong> reach <strong>of</strong> increasingly advanced
communications to micromanage subordinates. p. 67
Flexibility: in order to effectively cope with uncertainty, Marines must possess
“flexibility <strong>of</strong> mind”…”independence <strong>of</strong> mind”…”a willingness to act with initiative
and boldness” and “<strong>the</strong> moral courage to accept responsibility for this type <strong>of</strong>
behavior.” p. 76
Camaraderie: Marines in o<strong>the</strong>r writing have acknowledged <strong>the</strong>ir explicit valuing <strong>of</strong>
bro<strong>the</strong>rhood within <strong>the</strong> Corps, in <strong>the</strong> Warfighting manual it lends itself to
communication purpose: “Our philosophy <strong>of</strong> command must also exploit <strong>the</strong>
human ability to communicate implicitly. We believe that implicit
communication—to communicate through mutual understanding, using a
minimum <strong>of</strong> key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each o<strong>the</strong>r’s
thought—is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong>
detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity and trust,
which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.” p. 79 “Our
philosophy also requires familiarity among comrades because only through a
shared understanding can we develop <strong>the</strong> implicit communication necessary for
unity <strong>of</strong> effort.” p. 82
Taking initiative. “By taking <strong>the</strong> initiative, we dictate <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict and
force <strong>the</strong> enemy to meet us on our terms.” p. 32 “In order to develop initiative
among junior leaders, <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> training—like combat—should be
decentralized.” Senior leaders set <strong>the</strong> tone, convey intent, and let subordinates
figure out <strong>the</strong> details. p. 60
Attrition v. Maneuver. Contrasts <strong>the</strong>se two styles <strong>of</strong> warfare. (pp. 36-37) Defines
maneuver warfare as “a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a
position <strong>of</strong> advantage ra<strong>the</strong>r than meet it straight on.” p. 37 Goal is to attack and
incapacitate <strong>the</strong> enemy’s “system.” “Ra<strong>the</strong>r than being viewed as desirable
targets, enemy concentrations are generally avoided as enemy strengths. Instead
<strong>of</strong> attacking enemy strength, <strong>the</strong> goal is <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> our strength against
selected enemy weakness in order to maximize advantage.” “Success depends not
so much on <strong>the</strong> efficient performance <strong>of</strong> procedures and techniques, but on
understanding <strong>the</strong> specific characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy system.” pp 37-38
“Tempo is itself a weapon.” p. 38
Text places most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War in <strong>the</strong> attrition category but casts <strong>the</strong> CAP
program as maneuver warfare “by eliminating <strong>the</strong>ir essential popular support base
through <strong>the</strong> pacification <strong>of</strong> rural villages.” p. 39
Maneuver is <strong>the</strong> doctrine <strong>of</strong> warfare pursued by Marines today. p. 39
Aspiring toward surprise and boldness. p. 42 “By surprise we mean a state <strong>of</strong>
disorientation resulting from an unexpected event that degrades <strong>the</strong> enemy’s
ability to resist.” p. 42
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Seek out centers <strong>of</strong> gravity. These can be tangible or intangible. p. 46 Then seek
critical vulnerabilities in <strong>the</strong>se centers <strong>of</strong> gravity. p. 47
Doctrine: Marines are overt about <strong>the</strong>ir loose relationship with doctrine. “Our
doctrine does not consist <strong>of</strong> procedures to be applied in specific situations so much
as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Therefore,
while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.” p. 56
Training: “The purpose <strong>of</strong> all training is to develop forces that can win in combat.”
p. 59. This is an interesting supposition since in a counterinsurgency environment
combat is only one portion <strong>of</strong> what Marines do. Training would also need to
include preparation toward productive civil engagement, intelligence ga<strong>the</strong>ring,
and effective information operations.
Emphases: developing initiative, drills, and exercises that simulate combat
conditions (with an emphasis on independent, opposing wills as adversaries). pp.
60-61
Education: <strong>the</strong> purpose: “to develop creative, thinking leaders.” p. 61 “focus on
developing a talent for military judgment, not on imparting knowledge through
rote learning.” p. 63 Examples provided are <strong>of</strong> a kinetic preparation sort:
“supervised reading programs, map exercises, war games, battle studies, and
terrain studies.” p. 63
Maneuver warfare: The core feature <strong>of</strong> Warfighting, <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> its doctrinal
contribution, is to make a case for maneuver over attrition in warfighting. Thus, it
is not Clausewitz but Sun Tzu that introduces <strong>the</strong> section on The Conduct <strong>of</strong> War:
Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids <strong>the</strong>
heights and hastens to <strong>the</strong> lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes
weakness.
Speed is <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> war. Take advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy’s
unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has
taken no precautions. p. 69
In order to be useful in all times and places, <strong>the</strong> Marines must develop doctrine
that is fungible. The ability to generate and exploit superior tempo “requires a
concept that is consistently effective across <strong>the</strong> full spectrum <strong>of</strong> conflict because
we cannot attempt to change our basic doctrine from situation to situation and
expect to be pr<strong>of</strong>icient.” p. 71 For <strong>the</strong> Marines, it also requires doctrine “with
which we can succeed against a numerically superior foe because we cannot
presume a numerical advantage ei<strong>the</strong>r locally or overall.” p. 72
Key features: rapid, flexible, opportunistic. Creating psychological, technological,
spatial or temporal advantages. Emphasis: time. Creating a faster operating
tempo. p. 72 Note: a mentality that fits well with <strong>the</strong> kinetic aspects <strong>of</strong>
counterinsurgency but not <strong>the</strong> civic action or legitimacy-to-govern sides.
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The tone here is still conventional-centric in <strong>the</strong> sense that it is written from a
Marine-as-underdogs point <strong>of</strong> view. “It is through maneuver in all dimensions that
an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at <strong>the</strong> necessary time and place.”
pp. 72-73
Not wearing down enemy defenses, but bypassing <strong>the</strong>m “in order to penetrate <strong>the</strong>
enemy system and tear it apart.” p. 73 Key: shatter enemy cohesion ra<strong>the</strong>r than
destroying him physically. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than destroy physical strength, disrupt ability to
use it. p. 73 The mentality demonstrated here runs along conventional foe lines.
There is an assumption that <strong>the</strong> foe will have an organized, fighting “system” and
<strong>the</strong> fighting mode <strong>of</strong> choice will be to fight “as an effective, coordinated whole.”
The following sentence may indicate some hubris, and an absent historical
memory, given <strong>the</strong> typical nature <strong>of</strong> insurgencies: “Even if an outmaneuvered
enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy <strong>the</strong> remnants
with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight effectively as a
force.” The primary aim, as it is stated here: “to shatter <strong>the</strong> cohesion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enemy
system” p. 74 may be misplaced when battling a foe that it factional and diversely
employed by nature. The goal: “panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost <strong>the</strong>
ability to resist.” p. 74
Speed. Seizing <strong>the</strong> initiative, dictating <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> action and keeping <strong>the</strong> enemy
<strong>of</strong>f balance – outpacing <strong>the</strong> adversary. p. 74
Boldness: “any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly.”
“When <strong>the</strong> decisive opportunity arrives, we must exploit it fully and aggressively,
committing every ounce <strong>of</strong> combat power we can muster and pushing ourselves to
<strong>the</strong> limits <strong>of</strong> exhaustion.” p. 75 This is <strong>the</strong> fighting ethos that defines <strong>the</strong> Marine
Corps. It is also not <strong>the</strong> sort <strong>of</strong> combat posture that is <strong>the</strong> right fit for many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
restraint oriented counterinsurgency rules <strong>of</strong> engagement.
Cultivate uncertainty: While <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> keeping one’s enemy <strong>of</strong>f balance has
combat merit, p. 75 <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> being unpredictable generally is ana<strong>the</strong>ma to <strong>the</strong>
strategic counterinsurgency aim <strong>of</strong> winning legitimacy (based in part on
predictable patterns <strong>of</strong> acceptable behavior) from <strong>the</strong> population.
Cope with uncertainty: More advantageous to <strong>the</strong> counterinsurgent <strong>the</strong>ater is <strong>the</strong>
comfort with uncertainty that Marines attempt to inculcate. A first step, admirably
accomplished here, is to make clear that uncertainty is <strong>the</strong> normal state <strong>of</strong> warfare.
“To delay action in an emergency because <strong>of</strong> incomplete information shows a lack
<strong>of</strong> moral courage.” p. 86
Enemy-centric, Conventional: “Orienting on <strong>the</strong> enemy is fundamental to
maneuver warfare.” Assumed here is that <strong>the</strong> enemy has a “system” that can be
attacked. The description that follows is conventional-centric: air defense systems,
ground defense systems, electronic warfare systems, major combat formations,
command and control, logistics and intelligence organizations.
<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: To <strong>the</strong> extent that one investigates an enemy it is how his
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Perceptual Lens
Warfighting
system functions, so that it can be penetrated and destroyed. This does include
understanding how he perceives <strong>the</strong> world: “We should try to ‘get inside’ <strong>the</strong>
enemy’s thought processes and see <strong>the</strong> enemy as he sees himself so that we can
set him up for defeat. It is essential that we understand <strong>the</strong> enemy on his own
terms. We should not assume that every enemy thinks as we do, fights as we do,
or has <strong>the</strong> same values or objectives.” p. 77 Given war history, even a narrow focus
on our own war history, it is somewhat shocking that <strong>the</strong>se principles need to be
stated as insightful ra<strong>the</strong>r than already accepted as obvious.
Command: “in order to generate <strong>the</strong> tempo <strong>of</strong> operations we desire and to best
cope with <strong>the</strong> uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity <strong>of</strong> combat, command and control
must be decentralized.” p. 78 Initiative based on senior’s intent. “our philosophy
<strong>of</strong> command must be based on human characteristics ra<strong>the</strong>r than on equipment or
procedures.” p. 78 “Our philosophy must not only accommodate but must exploit
human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength <strong>of</strong> will, and
imagination.” p. 78 Note: boldness listed here first.
Leadership: “Only by <strong>the</strong>ir physical presence—by demonstrating <strong>the</strong> willingness to
share danger and privation—can commanders fully gain <strong>the</strong> trust and confidence <strong>of</strong>
subordinates. We must remember that command from <strong>the</strong> front should not equate
to oversupervision <strong>of</strong> subordinates.” p. 80 The section on mission tactics reinforces
this ethic: pp. 87-88 as does Commander’s Intent: “The purpose <strong>of</strong> providing
intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart from
<strong>the</strong> original plan when <strong>the</strong> unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with
higher commanders’ aims.” p. 89 Subordinates should understand <strong>the</strong> intent <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> commander at least two levels up. p. 91
Bias for Action: “The essence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> problem is to select a promising course <strong>of</strong>
action with an acceptable degree <strong>of</strong> risk and to do it more quickly than our foe. In
this respect, “a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan
executed next week.” p. 87
The nature <strong>of</strong> war: In Warfighting <strong>the</strong> emphasis on war, <strong>the</strong> philosophy <strong>of</strong> how
war works, <strong>the</strong> Marine cosmology about war …: “War is a violent clash <strong>of</strong> interests
between or among organized groups characterized by <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> military force.” p.
3. At first glance, a very conventional definition. Does include non-state groups, as
long as that group can generate organized violence. This manual was originally
penned in 1991, so well in advance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current counterinsurgency focused era.
War is an interactive social process that requires constant mutual adaption. The
enemy is willful, not static. “The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy.
The means to this end is <strong>the</strong> organized application or threat <strong>of</strong> violence by military
force.” p. 4.
The second feature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> war to receive full attention is friction, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
Clausewitzian sort. The Marine handbook describes friction as mental, physical,
external, induced by self or fortune, be <strong>of</strong> a political or technical nature. Marine
aims in this unavoidable environment are to “fight effectively despite <strong>the</strong> existence
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<strong>of</strong> friction” and “raise our enemy’s friction to a level that weakens his ability to
fight.” p. 6 One overcomes friction through sheer will <strong>of</strong> mind and spirit (note, not
necessarily preparation, in fact <strong>the</strong> manual notes that it is impossible to fully
appreciate <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> friction without experiencing it <strong>the</strong>refore, “Only through
experience can we come to appreciate <strong>the</strong> force <strong>of</strong> will necessary to overcome
friction.” There is some attempt to duplicate this in training. p. 6
Right after friction <strong>the</strong>y treat its companion, uncertainty (which would seem to be
<strong>the</strong> same thing, but gets its own segment). The bottom line here is that <strong>the</strong>re will
always be unknowns, sometimes even critical unknowns, and that actions in war
will have to be based on “incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory
information.” Clearly this is an attempt to set Marines up as adaptors, thriving in
chaos. The attendant norm is to develop “simple, flexible plans; planning for likely
contingencies; developing standard operating procedures; and fostering initiative
among subordinates.” p. 8
Some resistance to <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> set doctrine can be validated by <strong>the</strong> following
perception <strong>of</strong> wars as each and every a unique enterprise: “Each episode in war is
<strong>the</strong> temporary result <strong>of</strong> a unique combination <strong>of</strong> circumstances, presenting a
unique set <strong>of</strong> problems and requiring an original solution.” p. 9 Again, an emphasis
on flexibility: “Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility <strong>of</strong>
thought. Success depends in large part on <strong>the</strong> ability to adapt—to proactively
shape changing events to our advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly
changing conditions.” p. 9
Disorder is next. The entire war section is a treatise on being able to thrive in
chaos: friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and complexity. Thriving means
taking advantage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inescapable fog and friction <strong>of</strong> war: “It is precisely this
natural disorder which creates <strong>the</strong> conditions ripe for exploitation by an
opportunistic will.” p. 11 So what if your mission is to stabilize ra<strong>the</strong>r than create
chaos? The “small twitch” muscles that perform admirably in high adrenalin,
constant motion environments may begin to short circuit in stabilizing operations
which require restraint and a calming influence. Emphasis on this again later: “war
is inherently disorderly, uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction.” p. 80
Learn to thrive in an environment <strong>of</strong> chaos. p. 80 Don’t strive for certainty before
you act and don’t attempt to maintain excessive control over subordinates. p. 81
Improvisation emphasized here as well: “As <strong>the</strong> situation changes continuously,
we are forced to improvise again and again until finally our actions have little, if
any, resemblance to <strong>the</strong> original scheme.” p. 11 Line about generating disorder in
order to win…
Complexity. When breaking down an adversary’s complex parts <strong>the</strong> manual does
so in a reflection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>mselves: divisions, regiments, battalions, down to fire
teams. This belies a conventional mindset despite all that was said before about
battling non state actors. p. 12
In line with valuing <strong>the</strong> individual Marine, <strong>the</strong> Corps emphasizes <strong>the</strong> human
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dimension <strong>of</strong> war. “War is shaped by human nature and is subject to <strong>the</strong>
complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human
behavior.” p. 13 Emotions and morals play a role. So does reaction to fear and
danger. “Although material factors are more easily quantified, <strong>the</strong> moral and
mental forces exert a greater influence on <strong>the</strong> nature and outcome <strong>of</strong> war.” p. 16
This is acknowledged, but <strong>the</strong> Marine Corps measuring stick for success seems to
remain a numbers game, relying on those things more easily quantified. “[W]ar is a
human enterprise and no amount <strong>of</strong> technology can reduce <strong>the</strong> human
dimension.” p. 78
<strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Culture</strong>: Some recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> need to know one’s enemy: “an act
that may break <strong>the</strong> will <strong>of</strong> one enemy may only serve to stiffen <strong>the</strong> resolve <strong>of</strong>
ano<strong>the</strong>r.” This thought is not developed fur<strong>the</strong>r. No emphasis is developed on
understanding <strong>the</strong> strategic culture <strong>of</strong> an adversary although it is acknowledged
that war “contains social, cultural, psychological, and o<strong>the</strong>r elements” and that
<strong>the</strong>se can “exert a strong influence on <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> war as well as on <strong>the</strong> war’s
usefulness for solving political problems.” p. 24 “Our ability to achieve surprise
thus rests on our ability to appreciate and <strong>the</strong>n exploit our enemy’s expectations.”
p. 43 Later, in <strong>the</strong> section detailing maneuver warfare: “By studying our enemy,
we will attempt to appreciate his perceptions. Through deception we will try to
shape <strong>the</strong> enemy’s expectations.” p. 75 This is a very enemy-centric formula that
focuses much like one would on a adversary on <strong>the</strong> sports field – his moves and
habits <strong>of</strong> play.
The premium on leadership comes through, however, as <strong>the</strong> critical factor:
“Human will, instilled through leadership, is <strong>the</strong> driving force <strong>of</strong> all action in war.”
p. 13-14 It is on <strong>the</strong> shoulders <strong>of</strong> leadership to foster <strong>the</strong> courage necessary to
overcome fear. “Leaders should develop unit cohesion and esprit and <strong>the</strong> selfconfidence
<strong>of</strong> individuals within <strong>the</strong> unit. In this environment, a Marine’s
unwillingness to violate <strong>the</strong> respect and trust <strong>of</strong> peers can overcome personal
fear.” p. 15
“Actions in war more or less reflect <strong>the</strong> constant imperative to seize and maintain
<strong>the</strong> initiative.” p. 33
“The defense tends to be <strong>the</strong> more efficient form <strong>of</strong> warfare—meaning that it
tends to expend less energy—which is not <strong>the</strong> same as saying <strong>the</strong> defense is
inherently <strong>the</strong> stronger form <strong>of</strong> warfare.” p. 33
The Theory <strong>of</strong> War: Key emphasis here is that war must serve policy. p. 23 Those
this is given primary emphasis, it runs counter to an operational culture which
“fights <strong>the</strong> nation’s battles.” Battles, not wars. Battles are by nature myopic
endeavors and a focus here is not intrinsically policy focused. The Marines <strong>of</strong>fer up
a fair warning: “Of course, we may also have to adjust our policy objectives to
accommodate our chosen means. This means that we must not establish goals
outside our capabilities. It is important to recognize that many political problems
cannot be solved by military means.” p. 23 A valid point. It is also a moot point for
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Marines. They do not get to determine policy and whatever policy <strong>the</strong>y are handed
<strong>the</strong>y will exert utmost energy and <strong>the</strong> practiced tools at hand to achieve it. Of <strong>the</strong>
impossible task <strong>of</strong> establishing a stable and civil and America-like society in Haiti,
accomplished bushwacker Smedley Butler claimed it a matter <strong>of</strong> national and Corps
honor to succeed. It had been assigned to <strong>the</strong> Marines (and only <strong>the</strong> Marines) and
<strong>the</strong>y meant to do it. What <strong>the</strong>y achieved were surface successes, quick to fall apart
upon departure.
Small wars likely: “Military operations o<strong>the</strong>r than war and small wars are more
probable than a major regional conflict.” p. 27 Small wars “are not simply lesser
forms <strong>of</strong> general war.” p. 27
Levels <strong>of</strong> war: “As strategy deals with winning wars and tactics with winning
battles and engagements, <strong>the</strong> operational level <strong>of</strong> war is <strong>the</strong> art and science <strong>of</strong>
winning campaigns.” p. 30
Public Support: Marines exhibit wariness where smaller versions <strong>of</strong> warfare are
concerned. Part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> justification <strong>of</strong> maneuver warfare: “Especially in
expeditionary situations in which public support for military action may be tepid
and short-lived, it requires a concept with which we can win quickly against a larger
foe on his home soil with minimal casualties and limited external support.” p. 72
Tempo as a weapon: “In general, whoever can make and implement decisions
consistently faster gains a tremendous, <strong>of</strong>ten decisive advantage.” p. 85 **An
insurgent would also see <strong>the</strong> temporal sphere as a weapon, but one <strong>of</strong> protraction
and exhaustion.
The perception is that <strong>the</strong> maneuver warfighting philosophy outlined here “applies
regardless <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conflict, whe<strong>the</strong>r amphibious operations or
sustained operations ashore, <strong>of</strong> low or high intensity, against guerrilla or
mechanized foe, in desert or jungle.” p. 96
Temporal aspect <strong>of</strong> small wars: “Prolonged operations are detrimental to <strong>the</strong>
morale and prestige <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intervening forces. They can be avoided only by
properly estimating <strong>the</strong> situation and by evolving as comprehensive, flexible, and
simple a plan as possible before <strong>the</strong> campaign begins.” Ch. 2 “Organization” p. 9
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