Assessing the Strategic Impact of Service Culture on ...

Final Draft
nuclear weapon. It was not an instrument <strong>of</strong> war, but <strong>the</strong> instrument which prevents war by virtue <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> ability to wipe entire mortal societies from <strong>the</strong> planet. 140 The cosmology France espoused, its affect
on attitudes toward nuclear acquisition and a national nuclear role, stands in stark contrast to <strong>the</strong>
worldviews <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> its European neighbors (most notably Germany) and <strong>the</strong>ir consequent nuclear
paths. The meaning that cosmologies provide – explanations about how <strong>the</strong> world works and one’s
proper role in it – can have dramatic effect in “rational” security decisionmaking.
Perceptions <strong>of</strong> self add ano<strong>the</strong>r layer to perceptual lens. Given that remembered history is <strong>the</strong>
operative history, one must assess how <strong>the</strong> group in question characterizes and perceives its own
past. 141 Colin Gray notes that while “objective realities certainly matter, <strong>the</strong>re are assumed realities and
narratives that people choose to believe.” He goes fur<strong>the</strong>r,
Knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objective historical facts <strong>of</strong> a society’s past cannot yield reliable understanding
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> narrative <strong>of</strong> historical interpretation dominant in that society, but it should provide some
helpful grasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> menu <strong>of</strong> candidate evidence from which local interpreters must make <strong>the</strong>ir
selection. For example, even if a society prefers to tell itself lies about its past, none<strong>the</strong>less it
can be enlightening to appreciate just what is being denied and to speculate why. 142
When unpacking “remembered history” it may be useful to ask: Which events are highlighted? Which
omitted? What does this group’s history tell <strong>the</strong>m about “dangerous” behaviors?
Perhaps one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most fascinating studies <strong>of</strong> perceptual lens is in <strong>the</strong> area most would contest as
uncontestable: determinations <strong>of</strong> victory and defeat. Victor Hanson is nearly lyrical in his portrayal <strong>of</strong>
<strong>the</strong> bloody exactness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battlefield, “There is an inherent truth in battle. It is hard to disguise <strong>the</strong>
verdict <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battlefield, and nearly impossible to explain away <strong>the</strong> dead, or to suggest that abject
defeat is somehow victory.” 143 He is wrong.
Victory and defeat are human perceptions which may or may not coincide with <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>the</strong>matics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>
battlefield. Societal myths, national ambitions, or historically inherited criteria may define for a military
or a society <strong>the</strong> standards <strong>of</strong> victory and what entails defeat. Two examples may serve as illustration.
The first, <strong>the</strong> Yom Kippur War, demonstrates that material outcomes – <strong>the</strong> territorial, technological and
casualty-based victories measured by outsiders – may not, in fact, be <strong>the</strong> primary determinants <strong>of</strong>
triumph in <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant contenders. The second examines <strong>the</strong> price paid by NATO analysts
for ignoring Serbian notions <strong>of</strong> victory in <strong>the</strong> 1999 bombing campaign over Kosovo.
Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney elucidate <strong>the</strong> phenomenon <strong>of</strong> polities perceiving victory in defeat
and vice versa by examining a number <strong>of</strong> case studies in which an objective observer would have come
140
Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and <strong>the</strong> FRG (London: Macmillan
Press, 1998): 75-84.
141
Glen Fisher, Mindsets: The Role <strong>of</strong> <strong>Culture</strong> and Perception in International Relations, 2nd Edition, (Yarmouth,
Maine: Intercultural Press, 1997): 4.
142
Colin S. Gray, Perspectives in Strategy, forthcoming: 180.
143
Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and <strong>Culture</strong>: Landmark Battles in <strong>the</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> Western Power (New York: Anchor
Books, 2001), 7.
44