Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto - Minnesota State Legislature

More documents

Recommendations

Info

given effect anyway. There, the Court held that Kansas state legislators who had been locked in a tie vote that would have defeated the State's ratification ofa proposed federal constitutional amendment, and who alleged that their votes were nullified when the Lieutenant Governor broke the tie by casting his vote for ratification, had"a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness oftheir votes. ,,56 The U.S. Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd, 57 restated the Coleman holding and further explained that individual legislator standing existed when legislators' no votes were nullified by the legislative act being given effect anyway. 60. Likewise, the New York Court ofAppeals in Silver v. Pataki 58 held that the Speaker ofNew York's General Assembly had capacity and standing as a legislator to bring suit seeking to vindicate his rights as a legislator. The Speaker's successful challenge was based on the Governor using the line item veto on non-appropriation bills. 56 Id., at 438 (emphasis added).The U.S. Supreme Court in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534,544-545, n. 7 (1986)(dicta), also recognized legislative standing based on vote nullification. The Court stated, "It might be an entirely different case if, for example, state law authorized School Board action solely by unanimous consent, in which event Mr. Youngman might claim that he was legally entitled to protect "the effectiveness of[his] vot[e]." Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)... But in that event Mr. Youngman would have to allege that his vote was diluted or rendered nugatory under state law and even then he would have a mandamus or like remedy against the Secretary ofthe School Board ..." 475 U.S. at 544,545, n. 7 (citations omitted). 57 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,822 (1997). 58 Silver v. Pataki, 96 N.Y.2d 532, 755 N.E.2d 842, 730 N.Y.S.2d 482,2001 N.Y. Slip Gp. 06138 (N.Y. 2001). 24
The Court stated that a single legislator had standing on a vote nullification claim regardless ofwhether or not other legislators decided to join the suit: Nor is a controlling bloc oflegislators (a number s_ufficient to enact or defeat legislation) a prerequisite to plaintiffs standing as a Member ofthe Assembly. The Coleman Court did not rely on the fact that all Senators casting votes against the amendment were plaintiffs in the action (see, Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, 511 F.2d, at 435 ["In light ofthe purpose of the standing requirement * * * we think the better reasoned view * * * is that an individual legislator has standing to protect the effectiveness ofhis vote with or without the concurrence ofother members ofthe majority"] ). Moreover, plaintiffs injury in the nullification ofhis personal vote continues to exist whether or not other legislators who have suffered the same injury decide to join in the suit. 59 61. According to these precedents, the Petitioners have legislator standing under two categories: first, because ofvote nullification. Vote nullification exists under Coleman and its progeny because the Petitioners through their "no" votes or legislative inaction did not enact appropriations by law. Despite the lack ofappropriations bills enacted by the Legislature, the Respondents have obtained state funding anyway. The actions ofthe Commissioner and the District Court violated the Petitioner's exclusive legislative prerogative to appropriate state funds by law. 62. Second, the state legislators have standing because the Respondents and Ramsey County District Court have and continue to usurp the exclusive-legislative 59 Id. at 848-49. See also, Dodak v. State Admin. Bd., 441 Mich. 547,495 N.W.2d 539 (1993)(A single member ofthe state house appropriations committee had standing to bring an action alleging that the state administrative board's transfer ofappropriated funds from one program to another within a department ofstate government was unauthorized.) 25
Page 2 and 3: TABLE OF CONTENTS PURPOSE OF PETITI
Page 4 and 5: C. The Attorney General's "core fun
Page 6 and 7: INTRODUCTION 1. Minnesota's executi
Page 8 and 9: JURISDICTION The Supreme Court has
Page 10 and 11: ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Article XI requ
Page 12 and 13: STATEMENT OF FACTS Minnesota's fail
Page 14 and 15: 15 fd. Governor vetoed in 2011, Min
Page 16: Moneys appropriated in 2009 Minn. L
Page 19 and 20: 29. For instance, on May 21,2001, t
Page 21 and 22: 38. Similar to 2001, the court orde
Page 23 and 24: exigent ofcircumstances" to justify
Page 25 and 26: an appropriation by law. The need f
Page 27: lost because the judiciary has usur
Page 31 and 32: generallY recognized that a taxpaye
Page 33 and 34: While the consent ofthe attorney ge
Page 35 and 36: circumstances test, however, do not
Page 37 and 38: General Assembly enacted an executi
Page 40 and 41: the constitution grants the Governo
Page 42: fund that state program. But what c
Page 45 and 46: Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, p. 19
Page 47 and 48: Commissioner is to credit revenue f
Page 49 and 50: Supremacy Clause applies. However,
Page 51 and 52: 118. For example, the state is requ
Page 53: C. The Attorney General's "core fun
Page 56 and 57: 131. State statutes are explicit in
Page 58 and 59: appropriate state funds. Because th
Page 60 and 61: PRAYER FOR RELIEF For the foregoing

Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto - Minnesota State Legislature

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?