F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

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Enable management of identities operating in groups or certain roles within GIG systems. Ensure the integrity and confidentiality of what is operating on a network by providing assured PK I-based credentials for any device on that network Activity Increment 1 Spirals 3 and 4 (FOT&E) • JITC conducted separate FOT&Es for DoD PKI Increment I, Spirals 3 and 4 in April 21)10 and August 2010, respectively- Integrated developmental and operational testing was accomplished according to DOT& [-approved test plans and procedures in the JITC PKI laboratory at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. - Spiral 3 testing evaluated software applications encompassing three new or improved capabilities: Local Registration Agent version 4 (LRA v4), Web Based Bulk Revocation (WBBR) server, and the Certificate History Repository Information Service (CHR-IS). - Spiral 4 testing evaluated system upgrades to the Robust Certificate Validation Service (RCVS), which includes migration to a new operating system and architecture enhancements. Increment 2, Spiral 1 (Operational Assessment) • For Increment 2, Spiral 1,JITC conducted an Operational Assessment in June and July 2010 in accordance with the DO T& E-approved test plan and procedures- Typical users from a variety of operational environments participated in the test event. • The PK 1 Program Management Office (IMO) experimented with varying network conditions in February and September 2010 to better define problems with PKI use in tactical and austere environments. Assessment Increment 1, Spirals 3 and 4 (FOT&E) • The testing conducted by JITC was adequate to assess the operational effectiveness and suitability of the DoD PKI Increment 1, Spirals 3 and 4 enhancements- The capabilities provided in the spirals were operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for deployment. • Eleven deficiency reports (DRs) were opened during Spiral 3 testing, with no critical items identified, The two highest priority DRs involved certificate revocations, Inaccurate reporting of certificate revocations resulted in the RA concluding all certificates were revoked when that was not the case. These DRs must be resolved prior to deployment, or written guidelines must be given to users warning them of this potential reporting error- • There are no outstanding issues with the Spiral 4 capabilities- 40 PK1 Major Contractor BAIT Systems (ncorporated - Arlington, Virginia Increment 2, Spiral 1 (Operational Assessment) - The testing conducted by JITC was adequate to assess the capabilities and limitations of DoD PKI Increment 2, Spiral l. • RAs were able to efficiently issue SIPRNet tokens and end users were able to use those tokens to facilitate missions through digital signing, encryption, and web-server authentication. • Nearly ten percent of all tokens were found to be defective, Some tokens failed prior to or during the issuance process. A sizable fraction failed after issuance, having an adverse impact on the users. Problems with the software that formats tokens, inaccurate system documentation, and lack of a back-up system which prevents RAs from performing their duties when the system is down for maintenance also adversely affected operational suitability. • Token problems MINI be resolved prior to starting the 10T& E. Recommendations Status of Previous Recommendations, The PKI PMO satisfactorily addressed one of two recommendations from the FY08 annual report for Increment I, Spirals 1 and 2. The recommendation concerning correction of a physical security vulnerability at Letterkenny Army Depot remains. • FY10 Recommendations, Increment 1, Spirals 3 and 4 I- The PKI PMO should provide data regarding the expected system load for Increment 1 at full deployment so art adequate capacity assessment can be done by DOT&E to support the full deployment decision following Increment Spiral 5 testing in FYI I. Increment 2, Spiral I 2. The PKI PMO should correct unresolved Increment 2, Spiral 1 SIPRNet token deficiencies identified during the Operational Assessment and confirm through testing that the fixes are operationally viable before purchasing more tokens in support of the Increment 2, Spiral 1 IOT&E. 3. The PM° should provide a written Continuity of Operations Plan for Increment 2 and ensure the alternate SIPRNet sight is operational: conduct IA testing during the IOT&E in accordance with DOT&E guidance to assess protect, detect, react, and restore capabilities: and develop a Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan-
Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) AN/ALQ 211 Executive Summary Army Speeial Operations Command • After a lengthy engineering investigation the Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC) Program Office directed a complete redesign of the radio frequency (RF) switch that was the primary source of poor system reliability. The Army was scheduled to receive the newly designed switch in late 20J0 and should complete additional qualification testing in early 20 • Because of continued delays in resolving the RF switch reliability problem, DOT&E published the SIRFC IOT&E report to Congress in October 20J0. In previous reporting, DOT&E stated that SIRFC was operationally effective based on preliminary analysis of operational test results. However, upon completion of a comprehensive analysis of all test data in context with SIR ['Cs ability to support operational mission accomplishment- DOT&E determined that the initial effectiveness assessment was incorrect- The final assessment (characterized below) and supporting analysis is included in the October 2010 IOT&E report. • DOT&E assessed that SIRF(' was not operationally effective and remains not operationally suitable- SIRFC does not provide sufficient survivability even with current aircrew tactics to allow penetration in to the weapon engagement zone of many current radar-guided threat systems. Pending successful qualification and flight testing of the new RF switch, the SIRFC system should be operationally suitable. • SIRFC provides more capability than the legacy RF countermeasures systems on the MH-d7 and MI 1-60 aircraft: nonetheless, it is not effective against its intended threat environment. The SIRFC radar warning sub-system, which can operate separately from the RF countermeasures portion, provides aircrew with excellent situational awareness, rapidly detecting, identifying, and providing accurate relative bearing to threat radar systems- Air Force Special Operations Command and Navy • DOT&E released the CV-22 OT&E Report in January 2010. assessing SIRFC integration on that aircraft as not effective and not suitable. System • SIRFC is an advanced radio frequency self-protection system designed for installation on aircraft- • Major SIRFC subsystems are: - Advanced threat Radar Warning Receivers (Numbers 1, 2, 3. 6, and 9 in picture) 1 LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) Receive Processor 6 - Electrical Assembly 2 Receive Antenna 7 - LRU High Power Receive Transmit 3 Amplifier 8 • Transmit Antenna 4 LRU Advanced Countermeasure 9 - Cockpit Display 5 Radlo Frequency Switch Assembly - Advanced threat radar jammer/Electronic Countermeasures (Numbers 4, 5, 7, and 8 in picture) SIRFC is integrated onto Army Special Operations Command (ASOC) MH-47 and MH-60 helicopters and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) CV-22 tilt rotor aircraft. The AFSOC CV-22 aircraft is supported by the Navy V-22 <strong>Joint</strong> Program Office (PMA-275)- • The SIRFC system integration is 90 percent common between the Service platforms, though the Army MH-47 and MI-60 aircraft have a higher power transmitter installed, Early integration challenges on the A FSOC CV-22 aircraft dictated the installation or a lower power transmitter. Future CV-22 block upgrades are scheduled to incorporate a higher power transmitter- Mission Special Operations Forces will use SIRFC to enhance the survivability of aircraft on missions that penetrate hostile areas- SIRFC-equipped units should be able to provide self-protection against threat radar-guided weapons systems by: • Improving aircrew Situational Awareness and threat warning • Employment of active electronic jamming countermeasures • Expending countermeasures (i.e-, chatf) Major Contractor ITT Electronics Systems — Clifton, New Jersey SIRFC 41
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