F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

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Activity Army Special Operations Command ▪ The SIRFC Program Office engineering investigation discovered deficiencies in the current RF switch design. Asa result, the Technology Applications Program Office (TAP()) directed a complete switch redesign and is planning additional qualification testing to be completed in early FY11. • As an interim solution, the SIRFC Program Office. in coordination with ASOC, reduced the power to the forward transmitter via a software change to minimize the chance of a switch failure- Testing of the reduced power was completed at Eglin AFB, Florida, in July 2009. Although limited in scope. the flight tests experienced no RF switch failures and indicated no change in system effectiveness against the very limited number of threats that SIRFC was effective against during IOT& E. • DOT&E published the SIRFC IOT&E report to Congress in October 2010 based on the IOT&E and post-IOT&E testing. Air Force Special Operations Command and Navy • DOT&E released the CV-22 OT&E Report in January 2010 assessing the SIRFC' integration as not effective and not suitable. Assessment • In previous reporting. DOT&E stated that SIRFC was operationally effective based on preliminary analysis p operational test results. However, upon completion of a comprehensive analysis or all test data in context with SIRFC's ability to support operational missGon accomplishment. DOT&E determined that the initial effectiveness assessment was incorrect. The final assessment (Characterized below) and supporting analysis is included in the October 2010 IOT&E report. • Despite the common SIRFC hardware among all the platforms, some unique aircraft system integration challenges have resulted in a disparity in performance with each Service aircraft. • Although the Services conducted SIRFC development and testing under two separate Test and Evaluation Master Plans, inter-program communication and coordination allowed the CV-22 program to benefit from the ASOC SIRFC program- Army Special Operations Command • SIRFC integration on ASOC helicopters is not operationally effective and remains not operationally suitable- The 42 SIRFC program's newly redesigned RF switch could resolve the suitability problems. pending successful qualification and flight testing- • SIRFC provides more capability than existing RF countermeasures systems on the M11-47 and M1-1-60 aircraft. which include two legacy radar warning receivers (APR-39 and APR-44) and two legacy RF countermeasures systems (A LQ-136 and A LQ-J62). • Nonetheless. SIRFC' does not provide sufficient survivability even with current aircrew tactics to allow penetration into the weapon engagement zone of many current radar-guided threat systems. .1 I does- d however, reduce the ability of some threat radars to track the aircraft and it reduces (but not eliminates) the ability of some radar-guided threat systems to shoot the aircraft. SIRFC has poor to marginal performance against a number of likely threats, and does not reduce the number of shots taken by an air defense system during an entire engagement sufficiently to provide the high survivability a sfow-moving helicopter, operating covertly without support, requires. • The SIRFC radar warning sub-system. which can operate separately from the RF countermeasures portion, provides excellent situational awareness. rapidly detecting. identifying. and providing accurate relative bearing to threat radar systems. Air Force Speeial Operations Command and Navy • As part of DOT&E's assessment of the CV-22 OT&E, SIRFC was assessed to be not operationally effective and not operationally suitable- Effectiveness performance was similar to that on the ASOC helicopters. but the suitability issues were un ique to the CV-22 platform. Recommendations • Status of Previous Recommendations. The Services are satisfactorily addressing the two FY09 recommendations to conduct additional SIRFC flight testing on the RF switch redesign and to conduct CV-22 flight testing to verify correction of situational awareness problems in IOT&E; however, the recommendations have yet to be completed and therefore remain valid. • FY 1(1 Recommendations. None.
Executive Summary • A November 2009 Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) demonstrated that the Teleport Generation 2. Phase 2 (G2P2) system is effective and suitable with some limitations. DoD Teleport G2P2 added military Ka-band terminals to access Wideband Global Satellites (WGS), the LinkStar Internet Protocol (IP) modem, and upgraded the software versions of the LinkWay and iDirect IP modems to use existing Teleport capabilities- • Follow-on integrated testing in April 201)) demonstrated that the program manager corrected a power control problem with the iDirect IP Version-7 modem observed during the MOT& E. • The Milestone Decision Authority granted the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) the authority to enter Teleport Generation 3, Phase I (G3P 1 ) into the Production and Deployment Phase. Teleport (BPI will integrate Advanced Extremely High Frequency (A EHF) Extended Data Rate (X DR) capability into the existing Teleport system Extremely High Frequency (EHF) architecture. System • DoD Teleport sites are globally distributed satellite Communications (SATCOM) facilities- The system has six core Teleport facilities located in Virginia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Hawaii, and California. Teleport sites consist of four segments: The radio frequency segment consists of SATCOM earth terminals that operate in X-, C-. Ku-, Ka-. Ultra High Frequency (UHF), and EHF bands- The terminals provide radio frequency links between the Teleport site and the deployed user SATCOM terminal via commercial or military satellites. The Teleport base-band segment includes encryption, switching, multiplexing, and routing functions for connecting data streams or packetized data to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)- - The network services segment provides connectivity to the DISN long-haul networks and data conversion functions necessary to meet the user's requirements- Activity • The <strong>Joint</strong> Interoperability Test Command (JITC) conducted the G2P2 MOT&E November 2009 at the Hawaii DoD Teleport site and the Pacific Theater Network Operations Center (TNC) at Wheeler Army Air Field, Hawaii- Eleven operational units along with a special LinkStar unit operated from deployed locations in California, Oklahoma, Arizona, Idaho, Hawaii, and Korea. Teleport - The management control segment provides centralized monitoring and control of Teleport base-band hardware, SATCOM earth terminal hardware, transmission security, and test equipment. Mission • Combatant Commanders, Services, and deployed operational forces use Teleport systems in all phases or conflict to gain worJdwide military and commercial SATCOM services- • "Teleport provides deployed forces access to standard fixed gateways from anywhere in the world for all six DISN services: - Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) - Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) Defense Switched Network (DSN) Video Teleconferences (VTC) <strong>Joint</strong> Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) Major Contractor Government Integrator DISA • The MOT&E focused on Teleport's capability to provide deployed users Ka-band access, DISN services using three different current force IP modem variants, and the system control and management capability. • JITC and the program office conducted a follow-on test at the Wahiawa Teleport in April 2010 to verify correction of a Teleport 43
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Page 3 and 4: • The government-contractor test
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Page 7 and 8: Global Combat Support System — o
Page 9 and 10: Joint Chemical Agent De ector Execu
Page 11 and 12: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
Page 13 and 14: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
Page 15: Joint Warning and Reporting Network
Page 18 and 19: BAE RG-33L CAT Ii and Ambulance var
Page 20 and 21: Assessment • The M-ATV is operati
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Page 27 and 28: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Inc
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F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

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