27.10.2013 Views

US District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) - United States ...

US District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) - United States ...

US District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) - United States ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Case 1:09-cv-22905-JAL Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/21/2011 Page 5 <strong>of</strong> 15<br />

5<br />

Stringer v. Jackson, et al.<br />

Case No. 09-22905-Civ-Lenard/White<br />

(upholding the dismissal <strong>of</strong> a section 1983 inmate-plaintiff‘s claims for compensatory and<br />

punitive damages flowing from his First Amendment retaliation claim, due to his failure to allege<br />

any physical injury); Frazier v. McDonough, 264 F. App‘x 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding<br />

prisoner‘s claims for compensatory and punitive damages barred where he alleged only mental<br />

and emotional injury, not physical injury, as the result <strong>of</strong> an alleged First Amendment violation);<br />

Asad v. Crosby, 158 F. App‘x 166, 168 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in the absence <strong>of</strong><br />

physical injury, ―district court did not err by dismissing [plaintiff‘s] claims for compensatory or<br />

punitive damages‖ pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).<br />

B. Jackson and Harris are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.<br />

In the event the <strong>Court</strong> finds that the PLRA does not bar Plaintiff‘s claims for monetary<br />

relief, the Complaint should nevertheless be dismissed with prejudice as both Jackson and Harris<br />

are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity completely protects government <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />

performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct<br />

violates the clearly established rights <strong>of</strong> others. Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295,<br />

1303 (11th Cir. 2006); Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003); Cottone v. Jenne,<br />

326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). The purpose <strong>of</strong> qualified immunity is to shield from suit<br />

―all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law‖ thereby allowing<br />

government <strong>of</strong>ficials to carry out their discretionary duties without fear <strong>of</strong> personal liability or<br />

harassing litigation. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Anderson v.<br />

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).<br />

To be entitled to qualified immunity, a defendant must first establish that he was acting<br />

within the scope <strong>of</strong> his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.<br />

Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194<br />

(11th Cir. 2002). An <strong>of</strong>ficer acts within the scope <strong>of</strong> his discretionary authority when his<br />

conduct is undertaken pursuant to the performance <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>ficial duties. Harbert Int’l, Inc. v.<br />

James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998). In this case, it is not disputed that Jackson and<br />

Harris were acting within the course and scope <strong>of</strong> their authority as corrections <strong>of</strong>ficers on behalf<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Miami</strong>-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department. See D.E. No. 48 at 3-4.<br />

Given that Jackson and Harris are alleged to have acted within their discretionary authority, ―the<br />

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.‖ Durruthy, 351<br />

F.3d at 1087 (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!