US District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) - United States ...

Case 1:09-cv-22905-JAL Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/21/2011 Page 6 of 15
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Stringer v. Jackson, et al.
Case No. 09-22905-Civ-Lenard/White
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test that plaintiffs must meet to pierce a
government official‘s qualified immunity. Under this test the plaintiff must establish that (1) the
defendant violated a federal right and (2) that such a right was clearly established. Id. The
Supreme Court recently altered this test in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). As
a consequence a federal court is now permitted to skip the first part of the test (determining
whether a constitutional violation occurred), and move directly to determining whether the
Plaintiff has alleged a violation of clearly established law. Id. Indeed, as stated by the Supreme
Court, ―judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis
should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.‖ Id.
In this case, the Court need only address the first prong, because Plaintiff has failed to
allege facts suggesting that Jackson or Harris violated his constitutional rights. Failure to satisfy
this first element of the qualified immunity analysis is fatal to Plaintiff‘s claims against Jackson
and Harris under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding
that to prevail in a section 1983 action a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was deprived of a
federally protected right). Therefore, Jackson and Harris are both entitled to qualified immunity.
1. Plaintiff Fails to State a Section 1983 Claim for Loss of Property.
Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim for violation of his due process rights in the alleged
deprivation of his property. See D.E. No. 48 at 5. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Jackson and
Harris deprived him of $47.71 from his inmate account by deducting the amount in response to a
commissary order but not providing him with the items he ordered. Id. It is well established,
however, that negligent or intentional deprivations of property resulting from random,
unauthorized acts of government officials do not become due process violations when there exist
meaningful remedies under state law for Plaintiff to seek redress. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991).
Given that Section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes provides a remedy for the alleged
deprivation of Plaintiff‘s property, Plaintiff cannot maintain a section 1983 action based on the
alleged deprivation of inmate account funds. See, e.g., Weaver v. Geiger, 294 F. App‘x 529, 533
(11th Cir. 2008) (―Florida has expressly waived state sovereign immunity for tort suits involving,
inter alia, loss of property caused by state employees or agents acting within the scope of their
employment [in Fla. Stat. 768.28(1)]. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in