Federal Court Decisions Involving Electronic Discovery, December 1 ...
Federal Court Decisions Involving Electronic Discovery, December 1 ...
Federal Court Decisions Involving Electronic Discovery, December 1 ...
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<strong>Federal</strong> E-<strong>Discovery</strong> <strong>Decisions</strong>, <strong>December</strong> 1, 2006 – July 31, 2009<br />
failure to produce the emails earlier, including dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. The<br />
plaintiff argued that it was not under any obligation to produce emails that were no longer<br />
in its system, but offered no explanation as to why the emails were not in its system. The<br />
court held that based on the evidence, the emails were response to the defendant’s earlier<br />
requests and that the defendant had been prejudiced by not receiving them. It appeared<br />
that the failure to produced was not due to any systematic deletion of the emails, as at<br />
least one fragment still existed, and the emails themselves were dated after anticipation of<br />
litigation, so were within the scope of the plaintiff’s duty of preservation. The court<br />
ordered that the emails could be included in a motion for summary judgment, and should<br />
there be a trial, the defendant would be entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction.<br />
Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist.<br />
LEXIS 84842, 2007 WL 4098213 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007). The plaintiff sought<br />
sanctions for defendant’s failure to include metadata in its production of ESI in<br />
compliance with a previous court order. However, the previous court order did not<br />
specify native production or the production of metadata, Rule 34 does not specifically<br />
require native production or the production of metadata in all cases, and the court found<br />
that in this case "the production of this metadata would be overly burdensome with no<br />
corresponding evidentiary value."<br />
Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 2009 WL 54887 (D.Del. Jan 9, 2009). In the<br />
continuing saga of nationwide patent infringement actions involving microchip<br />
manufacturer Rambus as both plaintiff and defendant, the court held a bench trial on<br />
competitor Mircon’s allegations that Rambus spoliated evidence and was guilty of<br />
“unclean hands” in its enforcement of patent claims. The court found that Rambus<br />
spoliated evidence by conducting employee “shred days” after a duty to preserve had<br />
attached and that Rambus had made misrepresentations with regard to its destruction of<br />
evidence. Addressing the appropriate sanction, the court noted that “[t]he required burden<br />
of proof to establish spoliation is not a matter of settled law in the Third Circuit,” and<br />
held that a clear and convincing evidence standard “in the patent area in proving<br />
inequitable conduct.” The court continued, “[m]ore specifically, once intent and prejudice<br />
have been established, the court must determine whether their total weight satisfies the<br />
clear and convincing standard of proof. In this regard, the showing of intent (i.e., bad<br />
faith) can be proportionally less when balanced against high prejudice.” The court<br />
concluded that “[t]he spoliation conduct was extensive” and that, in the nonjury context,<br />
an appropriate sanction was to declare the patents in issue unenforceable as against<br />
Micron.<br />
Mid-State Aftermarket v. MQVP, Case 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41914 (E.D. Ark.<br />
Apr. 27 2009). In a trademark infringement case, the requesting party alleged spoliation<br />
of 135,000 electronic invoices for a period of two and one-half years immediately prior to<br />
the commencement of litigation. The requesting party also alleged the destruction of<br />
relevant data due to an improper backup process when the producing party was<br />
previously purchased by another company. While the court noted that the disappearance<br />
of the electronic invoices was “obviously suspicious,” it could not “confidently rule on<br />
the issue” of whether the data was intentionally destroyed until a previously unexamined<br />
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