1 Confessions of a Moral Schizophrenic* By Jayme Johnson I ...

qualify as friendships.” 34 After all, Juan’s regulative ideal is still consequentialist, and on
these grounds, they argue, acting for one’s sake does not entail being a friend. Moreover,
Juan’s having a deep sense of care and affection for Linda does not, in itself, entail that
Juan is Linda’s friend, or that he has genuine love for her.
Cocking and Oakley explain that the reason Juan might hold these feelings for
Linda, act for her sake, and still not be a friend is that having a friend, as opposed to being
a teacher, or doctor—who also may care for others, and act for their sake—involves a
specific set of acceptance and terminating conditions that are proper for friendships. Call
acceptance conditions the conditions under which an agent would enter a friendship
relationship. Correlatively, call terminating conditions the conditions under which a person
would withdraw from a relationship. 35 Without intending to employ a controversial use of
the following term, call a person’s set of acceptance and terminating conditions his set of
governing conditions. 36 Using this manner of speech, Railton’s sophisticated
consequentialist may appeal to the counterfactual condition, saying that he has as part of
his regulative ideal the governing conditions conducive to being a friend because this is
value-maximizing, that if it failed to do so would stop, and that, “this does not entail that
the agent is thereby moved by his concern to maximize agent-neutral value in his loves or
friendships.” 37 Hence, granting that an agent’s motives can be separated from his criterion
of right, Cocking and Oakley interpret the counterfactual condition (call this interpretation
COI) to be mediating upon each particular friendship relation that an agent engages in.
34 Ibid. 92
35 Ibid. 94
36 I am merely following Cocking and Oakley in the use this term to refer to an agent’s set of acceptance and
terminating conditions for a relationship. See Ibid. 96
37 Ibid. 94
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