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the Head of the OSCE Mission, organized to discuss policy and apply pressure to the Parties, both directly and through pressure on Croatia and Serbia. 7 The Dayton Accords outlined an extensive role for the main international agencies to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the decisions of the international policy making bodies in Bosnia. However, in contrast to military implementation supervised by NATO, the responsibility of civilian implementation was distributed annex by annex to the principal agencies. 8 The OSCE and the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) administered the preparation and conduct of elections. The UNHCR undertook return of refugees and displaced persons. The UN peacekeeping operation, which was in Bosnia since 1992 turned to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to monitor and reform the Bosnian police force. The other key implementation organizations included the Council of Europe, the UN High Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights to improve human rights conditions. The state of missing persons have been under the liablility of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). 9 As a result of this framework the new Bosnian state was made up highly dependent on international community’s existence and supervision. In addition, over the years powers given to international community through its implementing institutions have gradually increased and transfer of authority to the locals has been kept postponed. For example the High Representative’s role was initially more consultative and informative than to be fully able to direct or allocate the policies. However, the vague and undefined authority of the OHR has been supplemented by the decision of PIC meetings. In May 1997, during the Sintra meeting of the PIC new measures to warrant co-operation with the High Representative were declared. The new measures incorporated the power to monitor the deadlines and enforce penalty in case of noncompliance. They also comprised visa limitations for uncooperative Bosnian 7 David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, p. 56. 8 Elizabeth M. Cousens, Charles K.Cater, Towards Peace in Bosnia Implementing the Dayton Accords, p. 39. 9 Ibid., p. 39. 68
epresentatives, economic sanctions and the capacity to restrict or defer any media set-up which contradicts with the Dayton agreement. 10 Later, at the Bonn meeting of the PIC the High Representative’s powers further extended. The High Representative was empowered to choose the time, place and chair of vital meetings; to pass provisional procedures when the Bosnian representatives fail; and to take measures against any non-compliant elected or appointed official. 11 At present, executive and legislative powers lies in the hand of OHR who has the power to directly impose legislation, to veto political candidates, and remove obstructionist officials or dismiss uncooperative elected members of Bosnian governing bodies. Moreover, the mandates of leading international organizations have been either regularly extended as it was the case with SFOR, or redefined after a period of extension as it is with OSCE’s mandate. Election managing role of the OSCE was regularly extended from 1996 to 2002; later its task was shifted to the educational reforms. In addition to the regular extension of mandates, institutions or their mandates have been replaced by another as the European Police Mission (EUPM) took over the International Police Task Force (IPTF). In case of the UN Mission in BiH (UNMBH), it transferred the responsibility to the UN Development Program (UNDP) after its mandate was over. Recently, SFOR is replaced with European Force (EUFOR). The extension of mandates, replacements and creation of new mandates for the major international organizations have been justified with the assertion to stimulate and solidify the peace building process. As a consequence since the signing of Dayton Accords in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the most advanced international experiment of peace building. 10 ‘PIC Communique: Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council’, Sintra, 30 May, http://www.ohr.int/docu/d970530a.htm. Cited in David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, p. 54. 11 ‘Bonn PIC Decleration’, 10 December 1997, Article XI, para 2. Cited in David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, p. 54. 69
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PEACE BUILDING AFTER HUMANITARIAN I
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PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that al
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Failure of institutionalization of
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aşarısızlığını ortaya çıka
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I express sincere
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2.5.2 Lack of Commitment...........
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7 LESSONS LEARNT AND NOT LEARNT FRO
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Peace buildi
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shortcomings of the various instrum
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consensus on the probability that r
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Some work undertakes merely the ret
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and International Crises Group, whi
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continues to the implementation of
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concept and make its place in inter
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Since there is no specific referenc
Page 31 and 32: include measures to avoid its repet
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Page 35 and 36: time.” 27 Subsequently, the usual
Page 37 and 38: In general, main objective of peace
Page 39 and 40: 2. 4.1 Governance Reform Internal c
Page 41 and 42: the former combatants are very impo
Page 43 and 44: nature of the interim institutions
Page 45 and 46: een used as an indicator of re-esta
Page 47 and 48: established by a number of peace ac
Page 49 and 50: 2.5.2 Lack of Commitment The concep
Page 51 and 52: paralyzing the rebuilding efforts o
Page 53 and 54: subject to structural reforms as in
Page 55 and 56: the entire basket of postwar needs,
Page 57 and 58: CHAPTER 3 INTERVENTION FOR PEACE: T
Page 59 and 60: When the European Community (EC) re
Page 61 and 62: cleansing defined manifestly as the
Page 63 and 64: need to distinguish who is the aggr
Page 65 and 66: forces.” 33 One month later, five
Page 67 and 68: policing. The central government of
Page 69 and 70: In sum, the main changes from the f
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Page 73 and 74: their full compliance, to coordinat
Page 75 and 76: in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the o
Page 77 and 78: incorporate Annex 2 and 3 which are
Page 79 and 80: enforce order, arrest war criminals
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Page 85 and 86: needed by the State budget. The Par
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Page 89 and 90: and the wide-ranging autonomy of th
Page 91 and 92: 4.1.1.1 Constitutional Reforms The
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Page 97 and 98: Society Program many local NGOs wer
Page 99 and 100: Bosnia and Herzegovina needs is not
Page 101 and 102: effective and legitimate forms of g
Page 103 and 104: peace. 86 This lead to the establis
Page 105 and 106: environment” and the presence of
Page 107 and 108: eason that NATO works merely with s
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Page 111: New York, IPTF officers complained
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Page 116 and 117: In sum, IPTF was mandated by UN Sec
Page 118 and 119: Contrary to most other states, the
Page 120 and 121: Judicial Commission (IJC) in March
Page 122 and 123: CHAPTER 5 IMPLEMENTATION OF DAYTON
Page 124 and 125: Rulings of the PEC superseded pre-e
Page 126 and 127: societies, the integrative capacity
Page 128 and 129: Since the establishment of Bosnian
Page 130 and 131: those who had lower stance during t
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The party generally works together
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and constitutional dilemmas after r
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long process of reconciliation and
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the SDS and her closest opponent wa
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Source: Organization for Security a
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person.” 81 It is clear that most
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Number of voters who cast ballots 2
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to change the political scene.” 1
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the expense of larger parties altho
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parties.” 123 However, the succes
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each other. 128 “If Bosnia is to
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Declaration of the Peace Implementa
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The new Election Law 143 of BiH end
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However, the OSCE election experts
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electoral process which, while in l
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gave advantage to the ethnic partie
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government’s failure enabled the
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Stability Initiative Report, 22 Mar
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een eradicated in BiH national part
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take part in the election campaigns
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contributed to keep nationalist pol
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Civil society building becomes a pr
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question the role international com
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international personnel can do a li
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of the foreign donors. Although fro
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From a more technical point of view
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to be the “second after the Nazi
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mechanism to address human rights v
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functioned similar to the European
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standing of the parties, which was
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(MHRR) to this end. The MHRR as a c
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whose office in Bosnia is responsib
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contributions for pension and healt
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Additionally, as part of the larges
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uilding. 73 Therefore, the majority
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justice in peace building process,
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of cooperation with international c
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wait for the trail. This policy pro
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information gathered by the Bosnian
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War Crimes Chamber decided to be st
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improved the level of Dayton implem
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will definitely influence the succe
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For this end, the OSCE started to c
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Croat history books. Nevertheless,
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Herzegovina. 168 In this respect, A
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Moreover, the organization works to
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seeking to return to their pre-war
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operation in management and the imp
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first years of Dayton implementatio
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and political control as well as fo
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“682,365 persons, of 74% of the t
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Table 9: Returns Summary to BiH fro
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There has been a hostile environmen
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country was mine infected, or that
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ensure successful refugee return, r
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utilities and health care and repre
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The progress especially in the Repu
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activities towards the full impleme
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persons, refugees and returnees. Ne
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Returnees should be assured the sam
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the various international instituti
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contaminated by institutional pride
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CHAPTER 7 LESSONS LEARNT AND NOT LE
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1990 that operated with no trouble.
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7.2 Rambouillet Accords and the Imp
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the KLA and the Yugoslav government
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Reconstruction UNMIK Administration
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General sought to establish a clear
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more limited especially in the begi
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plan in December 2003 conditioning
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Serb military and police forces.’
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directly to support the UN mission.
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7.4.2.3 Judicial Reform One of the
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“security environment on the grou
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of Bosnia moderate forces have been
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once the issue of human rights in a
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ethnic violence and crimes committe
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on Education and Youth and UNMIK De
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The UNSCR 1244 gave the responsibil
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international body for the resoluti
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authorities needs to be re-examined
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field. 196 The wider implications o
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community and the UN ever.” 206 Y
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION Peace building
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At this point, the peace building p
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institutions as well as implement t
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Nevertheless, the local police coul
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instruments provide standards for t
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dissertation found out that returne
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Moreover, the same instruments of p
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Bergling, Per, ‘Judicial Reform u
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Demichelis, Julia, ‘NGOs and Peac
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Democracy and Human Rights in Multi
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International Crisis Group, ‘Koso
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OHR, ‘Decision on the Establishme
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Putnam, Tonya L., ‘Human Rights a
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UN, ‘S.C. Res. 781’, U.N. SCOR,
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APPENDICIES APPENDIX A DAYTON PEACE
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This Agreement shall enter into for
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Parties shall respond to alleged vi
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d. The Parties immediately after th
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Fire Zone of Separation which are f
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. The IFOR Commander shall have sol
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to the Joint Military Commission an
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7. NATO military personnel under al
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Article II: Confidence- and Securit
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pursuant to Annex 1-A to the Genera
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2. Elections. The Parties request t
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Annex 4: Constitution - Constitutio
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commitments or statements relating
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3. Procedures. a. Each chamber shal
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g. Reporting as requested, but not
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1. The Parliamentary Assembly shall
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For the Republika Srpska Annex 5: A
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2. The Ombudsman shall be appointed
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2. If the Chamber succeeds in effec
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13. 1989 Convention on the Rights o
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The Parties hereby establish an ind
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The Commission shall promulgate suc
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Bearing in mind that reconstruction
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f. Report periodically on progress
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6. The Parties shall accord the IPT
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APPENDIX B MAP OF BOSNIA AND HERZEG
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Determined to ensure the safety and
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17. Welcomes the work in hand in th
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Notes 1. Other required elements: o
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Bu temelde çalışmanın esas soru
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toplumun Bosna ve Hersek’teki bar
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arış inşasıyla ilgilenmeyen mil
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sonrası barış inşa çabaların
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2003 Courses taught: International
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