24/12 - Maryland Courts

After 1979, the Good Samaritan Act was amended in minor substantive respects not
pertinent to this case 21 and was recodified as part of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article in 1982. 22
We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that TransCare, as a for-profit ambulance
company, does not have immunity under CJ §5-603(b)(3) regardless of whether Mr. Barbour
is personally covered by the Act.
Whether TransCare as Employer Necessarily Has Same Immunity as its Employee
TransCare makes a broader argument for immunity under the Good Samaritan Act,
untethered to any of the provisions that specifically confer immunity on corporations or other
organizations. It asserts that, given that its liability is predicated on the actions of its
employee, Mr. Barbour, it cannot be vicariously liable if Mr. Barbour is personally immune
under the Good Samaritan Act. 23
21 For example, a 1982 amendment extended immunity to members of corporate fire
departments – as well as the corporation when the members were immune. Chapter 775,
Laws of Maryland 1982.
22 Chapter 770, §4, Laws of Maryland 1982. The statute was originally codified in the
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article as CJ §5-309. It was later recodified as CJ §5-603.
Chapter 14, §9, Laws of Maryland 1997.
23 TransCare supports this view with its analysis of two Court of Special Appeals
decisions. As TransCare concedes, neither of those decisions expressly addresses its theory
that an employer necessarily has immunity under the Good Samaritan Act if its employee has
immunity. Chase v. Mayor and City Council, 126 Md. App. 427, 438, 730 A.2d 239 (1999),
rev’d on other grounds, 360 Md. 121, 756 A.2d 987 (2000) (denying immunity under the
Good Samaritan Act to a paramedic employed by a municipal fire department where the city
charged a fee for ambulance service, but stating, “although appellees’ argument apparently
assumes that the immunities for employer and employee are severable, we decline to consider
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