44ag/11 - Maryland Courts

We shall sustain Bar Counsel’s exception. The critical difference between the hearing
judge’s conclusion and Bar Counsel’s assertion is that the judge determined that the fee was
reasonable because services were rendered, albeit by Mr. Weiskerger , a non-lawyer, while
Bar Counsel emphasizes that no legal services were provided by Mr. Chapman to justify the
fee. Rule 1.5 was violated because, in the instant case, Chapman never anticipated, nor did
he do, any actual legal work to justify a fee of $1,500. When asked at the hearing whether
the loan modification services were legal services, Chapman responded simply “No,” and
acknowledged that Ms. Bogarosh did not receive any legal services.
The uncontroverted findings in this case support that a “critical factor” to Ms.
Bogarosh when she decided to engage Chapman’s firm was that the Chapman firm was a law
firm, as opposed to a loan modification business, because she was concerned about having
legal advice in addition to loan modification services. The retainer agreement between Ms.
Bogarosh and the firm explicitly detailed legal services that would be provided, including
negotiation on her behalf, that, by Chapman’s own testimony at the hearing, he never
provided. In fact, Chapman testified that he knew it was not possible to negotiate with the
lenders on behalf of the borrowers early in this practice but, “just never changed the
document” to eliminate that language to reflect the actual legal services he was capable of
providing.
The hearing judge also found that, “[c]learly, these clients believed they were
engaging the services of a law firm to assist with their foreclosure and loan modification
problems. The fees were paid to a law firm, and a reasonable client would believe them to
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