Anthony M. Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd., f/k/a ... - Maryland Courts

On appeal, Mr. Hayman argued that the tender was not sufficient to moot his claims,
because he had also demanded attorneys’ fees, interest, and punitive damages, all of which
could have been supported by the causes of action he plead. Id. at 1014. The court first
noted that Mr. Hayman was only appealing the dismissal of his common-law fraud and
conversion counts, not his counts under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, under which he was not entitled to attorneys’ fees. Id.
With respect to Mr. Hayman’s demand for punitive damages, the court first noted that
Autohaus’s tender was a complete refund for the entire amount demanded and, therefore,
“there was no controversy.” Id. The court then reasoned that “[b]ecause full payment, not
a compromise, was offered to Hayman, thus mooting the controversy, the plaintiff had no
right to recover compensatory damages in the trial court” and “[p]unitve damages ‘are in
addition to compensatory damages and cannot be allowed unless actual damage is shown.’”
Id. at 1015. Thus, the court held that punitive damages were not available to Mr. Hayman.
The court’s analysis regarding the effect of tender on punitive damages, however, is
quite different than that employed when it has considered the effect of tender on attorneys’
fees. In Bates v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 53 (Ill. App. 2003) and Jones v.
William Buick, Inc., 785 N.E. 2d 910 (Ill. App. 2003), cases in which the Illinois intermediate
appellate court held that dismissal was not proper because the tender of only compensatory
damages was not sufficient to render moot the entire case, because of the pending demand
for attorneys’ fees. In Jones, Ms. Jones purchased a car from William Buick with a down
payment of $500, the balance to be financed by a lender found by William Buick; Ms. Jones
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