Anthony M. Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd., f/k/a ... - Maryland Courts

DeCoteau v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Company, 636 N.W. 2d 432, 437 (N.D. 2001) (“When
a named plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot before a class has been properly certified
or certification has been denied, courts generally hold dismissal of the action is required.”).
The rationale for this rule is that the interests of the putative class are not actually before the
court until a motion for certification has been granted. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399,
95 S.Ct. 553, 557, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 540 (1975) (“When the District Court certified the
propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the certification
acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by appellant.”).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether a
representative plaintiff’s claims being rendered moot prior to certification being granted also
rendered the entire class action suit moot, in Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775 (2nd Cir. 1994).
In that case, Jessie Comer and three others filed a class action suit alleging that the public
housing and assistance programs in Buffalo, New York were discriminatory. In addressing
the question of whether the class action was rendered moot by the defending parties’
voluntary cessation of the alleged discriminatory activity prior to certification of the class,
the court stated that, “in general, if the claims of the named plaintiffs become moot prior to
class certification, the entire class action becomes moot. In contrast, class certification will
preserve an otherwise moot claim.” Id. at 798 (citations omitted).
The Second Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court identified two
instances in which this general rule does not apply: when an intervenor steps in and when the
claims are “so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule
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