Presentation notes: Vinci: Maja Jaakson - Myweb.dal.ca

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P r e s e n t a t i o n n o t e s – V i n c i C h a p t e r 6 - P a g e | 2 Deduction to have similar underlying structures (as discussed in Chapter 4). The second is that the structure must accommodate interpretations of certain elements of the B-Edition 1 Transcendental Deduction’s argument. Vinci’s project is holistic: he aims at a coherent interpretation of the sections of the B-Deduction that squares with his (and Ameriks’) isomorphism thesis. Central to Vinci’s Chapter is an account of the reason for which there are two sections to the B-Deduction. In particular, Vinci argues against those who take the second part of the B-Deduction to concern empirical intuitions that are merely a subspecies of the intuitions discussed in the first part, intuitions in general. Moreover, he provides an argument for the existence of un-unified intuitions. In what follows, I will present Vinci’s discussion from sections 1 to 2.3. 1.2 – synthesis, intuitions, judgments Notion of synthesis compared to combination. Kant distinguishes two forms of combination (Axioms of Intuition, B-Edition): 1. Composition Composition combines objects of the same nature. Problem #1: inconsistent with Kant. Problem #2: composition does not produce judgment-like wholes (and judgments are produced by synthesis) – need heterogeneous parts to the complex. 2. Connection Coincides with the ontological “version” of subject-predicate judgments. Problem: cannot produce intuitions as wholes. Instead, let us consider the “Sellarsian story” • representations of properties and of objects come hand-in-hand; you can't have one without the other. • the objects of intuitions are objects-in-nexus-with-properties; both are complexes • However, a) the object-property complex is not given by the object (Transcendental Idealism cited); it is not given by the sensibility either (composition cannot combine heterogeneous parts: see Problem #2 of composition.) • Therefore: representations of object-property complexes must have come about by connection-synthesis. • These synthesized intuitions are 'judgments in disguise'. 1 I refer to the A- and B-Edition Transcendental Deductions as the “A-Deduction” and “B-Deduction” respectively.
P r e s e n t a t i o n n o t e s – V i n c i C h a p t e r 6 - P a g e | 3 • This is useful, Vinci maintains, because we can account for four of the five "dogmatic assertions" Kant makes in §15 of the B-Deduction if we take combination to be connectionsynthesis. • To bridge the gap between the theory of judgment and the theory of sensibility, Vinci suggests we (partly) follow Sellars, taking Kant to believe that most seeing is "seeing as." I say most seeing because: Pt I of B-Deduction: concerns theory of intuitions in general Well accounted for on the Sellarsian view. Pt II of B-Deduction: theory of empirical intuitions Not a subclass of intuitions in general! Hence the need for the second section. Hence the reason for which the Sellarsian story can’t be the whole story. *** Q: How do we get a single object with characteristics C1 and C2 out of distinct, individual objectual representations? A: via logical unification, a type of composition (taking like aggregates -- representations. This is how we get “the red ball” instead of nothing but a bunch of ballish and reddish representations. The Reciprocity Thesis Part of Kant's Phenomenalist Doctrine (see Ch. 5), which explains a characteristic's inherence in an object in terms of counterfactual conditionals. . It is maintained in §17 of the B- Deduction and the A-Edition's Second Analogy. • From what I understand: laws governing a subject's experience amount to the object in question (the phenomenalist doctrine) • laws are systems of concepts (rules) • what unifies concepts (namely the unity of apperception), in turn, unifies intuitions and brings unity to objects. • Thus the unity of intuitions rests on the unity of apperception. We have seen previously (in the A-Deduction) that this rests on the unity of the understanding and, finally, on objective unity: see Strawson on objective and subjective sequences. 1.3 – The Unity of Apperception: an overview This is a transitional section. However, the key to the next section is provided here: judgments are part of a synthetic conceptual ground having the characteristic of a system of general logic. What unifies judgments just is what makes my experiences mine. But the synthetic unity of apperception is not the analytical unity of consciousness: this tension is addressed in section 2.1. 2. An interpretation of the B-Edition Deduction 2.1 – Sections 15-20 (part I) Q: Can an analytic definition of judgment be given?
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Presentation notes: Vinci: Maja Jaakson - Myweb.dal.ca

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