Presentation notes: Vinci: Maja Jaakson - Myweb.dal.ca

P r e s e n t a t i o n n o t e s – V i n c i C h a p t e r 6 - P a g e | 6
A good understanding of Kant’s theory of (perceptual) judgment, Vinci suggests, starts with
understanding Kant’s position in relation to Locke’s theory of abstraction. Locke held that, having
come across several particulars that resemble one another in some respect, the mind abstracts
from these individuals and produces an idea. This idea is a picture; it is similar to its associated
particulars, but stripped of the features that set them apart. These abstract ideas are kept in what I
like to think of as a sort of mental rolodex. Every time the subject experiences sensations, the
rolodex flips to the card that matches up with the object sensed.
While this theory seems prima facie plausible, it leads to serious problems. For instance,
consider what Locke would take to be my abstract idea of a dog. This idea is supposed to resemble
every dog, yet lack real dogs’ distinguishing features. But how can something be dog-like if it is
without a particular shape, colour, size and length of coat? In fact, one would be hard-pressed to
find something less dog-like than a shapeless, sizeless, colourless idea. Locke’s theory is
problematic because it is difficult to make sense of what the mental rolodex cards could possibly
look like. 2
Kant suggests we replace Lockean ideas with concepts. The concept of a dog is not a picture;
instead, at B180, Kant says it is “a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the
shape of an animal in general, without being restricted to any particular shape that experience
offers me”(GW Critique 273).
Vinci goes on to distinguish three things: the empirical object (e.g. the dog as such),
empirical schema (which generates doggy pictures) and empirical concept (under which every dog
falls.) The empirical concept of a dog produces judgments concerning the empirical object, the
actual dog. The empirical schema of a dog, in turn, generates schematic objects; these are spatiotemporal
pictures of dogs lacking the properties bestowed by the categories (181). Vinci maintains
schematic objects need not depend on real counterparts for their existence. For instance, pink
2 For more on problems with Locke’s theory of ideas (and a non-Kantian solution to them), see Bolzano,
Bernard. Theory of Science. Trans. Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.