Presentation notes: Vinci: Maja Jaakson - Myweb.dal.ca

“The B-Edition Transcendental Deduction” (Chapter 6 of Thomas Vinci’s 

unpublished manuscript) 

Chapter 6 at a glance: 

1. Introduction 

1.1: a brief orientation to the approach I take in interpreting the B-edition 

Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 

1.2: synthesis, intuitions, judgments 

i. Composition 

ii. Connection 

1.3: the unity of apperception: an overview 

2. An interpretation of the B-Edition Deduction 

2.1: Sections 15-20 (part I) 

i. the argument of section 16 

2.2: The Unity of Apperception and its role in the argument structure of the TDC 

2.3: Finding room for un-unified intuitions 

i. Kant’s doctrine of the relation between empirical schemata and empirical concepts 

2.4: Why the Deduction in the B-Edition needs a second part 

i. first distinction 

ii. second distinction 

iii. third distinction 

2.5: The argument of Section 26 

2.6: A subjective deduction showing that empirical intuitions are logically unified 

intuitions 

i. Argument A 

ii. Commentary 

iii. Regarding the question of “right” 

2.7: An objective deduction showing that the unities of space and time are part of 

the intellectual conditions of objective thinking 

3. Appendix 1 

Presentation Notes. 

1. Introduction 

In Chapter 6, “The B-Edition Transcendental Deduction”, Thomas Vinci is interested in what 

can be learned about the argumentative structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the 

Categories (TDC) if one takes two points as given. The first is that we take the Exposition and the

P r e s e n t a t i o n n o t e s – V i n c i C h a p t e r 6 - P a g e | 2 

Deduction to have similar underlying structures (as discussed in Chapter 4). The second is that the 

structure must accommodate interpretations of certain elements of the B-Edition 1 Transcendental 

Deduction’s argument. Vinci’s project is holistic: he aims at a coherent interpretation of the 

sections of the B-Deduction that squares with his (and Ameriks’) isomorphism thesis. 

Central to Vinci’s Chapter is an account of the reason for which there are two sections to the 

B-Deduction. In particular, Vinci argues against those who take the second part of the B-Deduction 

to concern empirical intuitions that are merely a subspecies of the intuitions discussed in the first 

part, intuitions in general. Moreover, he provides an argument for the existence of un-unified 

intuitions. In what follows, I will present Vinci’s discussion from sections 1 to 2.3. 

1.2 – synthesis, intuitions, judgments 

Notion of synthesis compared to combination. Kant distinguishes two forms of combination 

(Axioms of Intuition, B-Edition): 

1. Composition 

Composition combines objects of the same nature. 

Problem #1: inconsistent with Kant. 

Problem #2: composition does not produce judgment-like wholes (and judgments are produced 

by synthesis) – need heterogeneous parts to the complex. 

2. Connection 

Coincides with the ontological “version” of subject-predicate judgments. 

Problem: cannot produce intuitions as wholes. 

Instead, let us consider the “Sellarsian story” 

• representations of properties and of objects come hand-in-hand; you can't have one without 

the other. 

• the objects of intuitions are objects-in-nexus-with-properties; both are complexes 

• However, a) the object-property complex is not given by the object (Transcendental 

Idealism cited); it is not given by the sensibility either (composition cannot combine 

heterogeneous parts: see Problem #2 of composition.) 

• Therefore: representations of object-property complexes must have come about by 

connection-synthesis. 

• These synthesized intuitions are 'judgments in disguise'. 

1 I refer to the A- and B-Edition Transcendental Deductions as the “A-Deduction” and “B-Deduction” 

respectively.


• This is useful, Vinci maintains, because we can account for four of the five "dogmatic 

assertions" Kant makes in §15 of the B-Deduction if we take combination to be connectionsynthesis. 

• To bridge the gap between the theory of judgment and the theory of sensibility, Vinci 

suggests we (partly) follow Sellars, taking Kant to believe that most seeing is "seeing as." 

I say most seeing because: 

Pt I of B-Deduction: concerns theory of intuitions in general 

Well accounted for on the Sellarsian view. 

Pt II of B-Deduction: theory of empirical intuitions 

Not a subclass of intuitions in general! 

Hence the need for the second section. 

Hence the reason for which the Sellarsian story can’t be the whole story. 

*** 

Q: How do we get a single object with characteristics C1 and C2 out of distinct, individual 

objectual representations? 

A: via logical unification, a type of composition (taking like aggregates -- representations. This 

is how we get “the red ball” instead of nothing but a bunch of ballish and reddish 

representations. 

The Reciprocity Thesis 

Part of Kant's Phenomenalist Doctrine (see Ch. 5), which explains a characteristic's inherence 

in an object in terms of counterfactual conditionals. . It is maintained in §17 of the B- 

Deduction and the A-Edition's Second Analogy. 

• From what I understand: laws governing a subject's experience amount to the object in 

question (the phenomenalist doctrine) 

• laws are systems of concepts (rules) 

• what unifies concepts (namely the unity of apperception), in turn, unifies intuitions and 

brings unity to objects. 

• Thus the unity of intuitions rests on the unity of apperception. We have seen previously (in 

the A-Deduction) that this rests on the unity of the understanding and, finally, on objective 

unity: see Strawson on objective and subjective sequences. 

1.3 – The Unity of Apperception: an overview 

This is a transitional section. However, the key to the next section is provided here: judgments are 

part of a synthetic conceptual ground having the characteristic of a system of general logic. 

What unifies judgments just is what makes my experiences mine. But the synthetic unity of 

apperception is not the analytical unity of consciousness: this tension is addressed in section 2.1. 

2. An interpretation of the B-Edition Deduction 

2.1 – Sections 15-20 (part I) 

Q: Can an analytic definition of judgment be given?


A: Vinci argues one cannot, because it is not the case that all combination operations have a 

common element identifiable by abstraction. One may think that subject-predicate structure at the 

level of atomic propositions may provide the common element, but Kant's special "disjunctive 

predicates" make this impossible (given his logic.) 

Thus, a synthetic definition of judgment is needed. This can be done in terms of definition with 

respect to a holistic body of judgments (a logical system.) 

The argument of §16 (concerns: a) The nature of the unity of apperception; B) The nature of the self 

known through the unity of apperception.) 

• Vinci suggests we regard the "I think" as a label which may be attached to representations. 

Judging may be thought of as an activity ("grounding concepts") or serving as a second-order 

representation (to which the "I think" may be attached.) If I am right, this is related to the notion 

that unified intuitions are easily converted into subject-predicate judgments. 

• Thinking, then, would be done in a "language of thought" that makes use of the labels attached to 

different judgments as representations. 

• Vinci invokes the mind as a system of rule-governed judgments. 

Analytic unity of consciousness vs. synthetic conception ground 

• what makes an experience mine? It bears a certain mark (vehicle). This mark, as it is common to 

all of my thoughts, makes a concept of my cognitions (and not a mere conception) 

• But at mentioned in 1.3: it seems we are asserting and denying "mine" concepthood. This tension 

is created by our maintaining that what unifies judgments (a synthetic conception ground) also 

explains what makes my experiences mine. 

• Vinci proposes a solution: the concept of "mine" depends on the synthetic unity created by the 

mind's synthetic activity. 

• Turns on synthesis taking place with the application of the "I think" label. 

• Vinci's insightful suggestion: "there is no thing that all cognitions share -- but they do share a 

common conception" as the inputs and outputs of various logical functions within the cognitive 

body that is the mind. 

The upshot: 

The mind attaches the "I think" label to its cognitions. The label becomes a common element (a 

common conception) of all cognitions: this accounts for analytic unity of consciousness. The "I 

think" label makes the cognitive system's self-consciousness possible. 

2.2 - the Unity of Apperception and its role in the argument structure of the TDC 

• §17 in the B-Edition features the same argument as the objective Deduction in A. 

• both arguments are grounded in the notion of the self as system 

• as objects are grounded in rule-sets concerning possible experiences of the self, a central role 

for the Deduction is played by the unity of apperception. 

In the A edition, we see that the notion of the self as a system paralleled with that of nature as a 

system. 

• While this invites an n-correlation explanation, Vinci ultimately argues there is no reason to 

think the unity of apperception and the unity of nature are connected by means of such an 

explanation in the B-Deduction. 

• Instead, the self as an example of a rule-governed body making knowledge of nature a "real 

possibility": see Vinci's "The Schematism as Unintended Interpretation"


Between §§17-20: 

• better presentation of the doctrine of the unity of apperception 

• important conclusion: "Thus the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under 

the categories" 

But Vinci argues Kant is not telling us about the nature of intuitions on the whole. 

• they are singular representations of an object in space and time, BUT 

• the phenomenalist analysis is not a universal analysis; it does not apply to all intuitions 

• i.e. not all intuitions represent a "set of law-like regularities governing possible sense 

experience" 

2 reasons for this. One is that there exist intuitions that do not "make explicit reference to 

properties which the represented object is represented as having": these are un-unified 

intuitions. 

Unlike Henrich, who maintains part II of the B-Deduction aims at showing un-unified intuitions 

also stand under the categories, Vinci argues part II aims at showing intuitions of objects that 

occur in actual perception – intuitions with content, and thus, unified intuitions – stand under 

the categories. 

While unified intuitions have the "seeing as" feature, un-unified ones don't. 

• example: apple in one's peripheral vision. 

A possible objection: un-unified intuitions do not exist. However, in the upcoming section, Vinci 

argues that they do. 

2.3 - Finding room for un-unified intuitions 

Motivation for finding room for un-unified intuitions: 

1. the Prolegomena's judgments of perception seems to concern them 

2. we can fill in the 7-level cognition hierarchy of the Logic 

Q: Need we really make room? What if unified intuitions could lack the "seeing as" feature in 

some cases? 

A: We need to make room for them because §17 of part I of the B-Deduction takes, as a 

premise, that intuitions in general have the feature. 

Vinci deals with obstacles to accepting a view allowing for un-unified intuitions: 

1. Unlike other commentators, he chooses to put more weight on §17 of part I of the B- 

Deduction and take the "seeing as" premise very seriously. 

2. Argument against un-unified intuitions 

resolution: a) the conclusion does not follow from the fourth premise (an argument required 

to make the step); b) Kant does not hold the first premise to be true. 

• Works out objection b) in this section: argues Kant does not think all intuitions are logically 

synthesized ones. 

NEW SECTION: on the Lockean reading and empirical concepts vs. schemata.


A good understanding of Kant’s theory of (perceptual) judgment, Vinci suggests, starts with 

understanding Kant’s position in relation to Locke’s theory of abstraction. Locke held that, having 

come across several particulars that resemble one another in some respect, the mind abstracts 

from these individuals and produces an idea. This idea is a picture; it is similar to its associated 

particulars, but stripped of the features that set them apart. These abstract ideas are kept in what I 

like to think of as a sort of mental rolodex. Every time the subject experiences sensations, the 

rolodex flips to the card that matches up with the object sensed. 

While this theory seems prima facie plausible, it leads to serious problems. For instance, 

consider what Locke would take to be my abstract idea of a dog. This idea is supposed to resemble 

every dog, yet lack real dogs’ distinguishing features. But how can something be dog-like if it is 

without a particular shape, colour, size and length of coat? In fact, one would be hard-pressed to 

find something less dog-like than a shapeless, sizeless, colourless idea. Locke’s theory is 

problematic because it is difficult to make sense of what the mental rolodex cards could possibly 

look like. 2 

Kant suggests we replace Lockean ideas with concepts. The concept of a dog is not a picture; 

instead, at B180, Kant says it is “a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the 

shape of an animal in general, without being restricted to any particular shape that experience 

offers me”(GW Critique 273). 

Vinci goes on to distinguish three things: the empirical object (e.g. the dog as such), 

empirical schema (which generates doggy pictures) and empirical concept (under which every dog 

falls.) The empirical concept of a dog produces judgments concerning the empirical object, the 

actual dog. The empirical schema of a dog, in turn, generates schematic objects; these are spatiotemporal 

pictures of dogs lacking the properties bestowed by the categories (181). Vinci maintains 

schematic objects need not depend on real counterparts for their existence. For instance, pink 

2 For more on problems with Locke’s theory of ideas (and a non-Kantian solution to them), see Bolzano, 

Bernard. Theory of Science. Trans. Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.


elephants dancing on the sidewalk are schematic objects but (in ordinary circumstances) are not 

empirical objects as they are not determined by the categories. 

Vinci anticipates the following objection may be raised: If quantity is a category and mere 

appearances (schematic objects) have no category-properties, how can they have geometrical 

properties? He responds by saying we should take schematic objects to have quantifiable 

properties that do not satisfy the category of quantity and appeals to the notion of “relative 

quantity” (with respect to measurement.) I think a problem remains with Vinci’s response to this 

criticism – not for specifically geometrical reasons, but insofar as it seems the category of quantity 

plays some role in my experience of a (hallucinated) pink elephant with three spots on its forehead. 

*** 

• How do we pick out schematic objects from the flurry of sense-data? Vinci reconstructs an 

answer to this question: 

1) Sense impression acquisition 

2) The understanding goes to work and establishes what was sensed 

- Runs through a schematic rolodex (as opposed to a Lockean idea one); finds 

match 

- Key: “Judging . . . is an act of synthesis matching a sense impression x with an 

image [schematic object] y constructed by applying a certain schema labelled S, 

resulting in the judgment that x is S”(185). 

• Vinci proposes a reading of Kant’s theory of judgment on which there are three types of 

unification 

• Sensory unification is not a type of synthesis on this view 

• At 186, a challenge is raised against Vinci’s reading; it receives a Sellarsian response 

Thus, Vinci concludes we have reason to believe Kant thought some intuitions are not 

logically synthesized. However, Vinci argues both parts I and II of the B-Deduction 

concern unified, not un-unified, intuitions. 

The aims of part II of the B-Deduction are the following: 

3) to provide a new transcendental argument in support of the claim that intuitions of objects 

"perceptually present to an observer" (i.e. intuitions of objects actually perceived) are 

logically, not phenomenologically, unified; 

4) to establish the connection between the descriptive content of part-II intuitions to the 

categories; 

5) to provide a new argument for the "right" to employ categories. 

2.4: Why the Deduction in the B-Edition needs a second part 

j. first distinction 

• categorically-determined judgments vs. judgments of perception 

ii. second distinction


• Vinci establishes he will argue that Part I concerns intuitions subject to the categories 

proper, while Part II concerns intuitions subject to schematized categories 

iii. third distinction 

• Internal vs. external involvement of an intuition in synthetic activity 

• Vinci argues the intuitions discussed in Part II are “unified by internal applications of 

judgment” 

• Important for nomic prescriptivism 

• Key: Part I and Part II intuitions need different arguments in support of their being unified 

• Sense-impressions are directly relevant to establishing why Part II needs an argument that 

differs from the one presented in Part I: they render the first premise of Vinci’s 

reconstructed argument false. Deficiency of the Sellarsian story. 

• Vinci maintains the perception of perceptually present objects occurs by way of unified 

empirical intuitions, not occur by way of sense impressions 

• Vinci’s reading provides a better understanding of Kant’s claim that the §20 conclusion is 

made in relation to only a partly characterized notion of empirical intuition; also accounts 

for Kant’s claim that Part I is only a beginning. 

2.5: The argument of Section 26 

• Four themes: 1) nomic prescriptivism; 2a) synthesis of apprehension, 2b) synthesis’ 

conformity to the unity of space and time; 3) unity present in intuitions in general 

transferred to empirical intuitions; 4) all synthesis stands under the categories. 

• Two arguments require reconstruction: one supporting the claim that “intuitions of 

perceptually present objects are intellectually unified”; another for the claim that “the 

unities of space and time are now part of intellectual conditions” 

• The A-deduction provides a guide. 

• Four causality options: Vinci prefers option D, although it too has its shortcomings. 

- Option D: intuitions of objects not perceptually present to us are subject to the 

(all) unschematized categories; intuitions of perceptually present objects are 

subject to the schematized categories of causality and community – to the 

synthetic unities of space and time. 

2.6: A subjective deduction showing that empirical intuitions are logically unified intuitions 

iv. Argument A 

v. Commentary 

vi. Regarding the question of “right” 

2.7: An objective deduction showing that the unities of space and time are part of the 

intellectual conditions of objective thinking

Presentation notes: Vinci: Maja Jaakson - Myweb.dal.ca

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