The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

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16 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies.is the director of the Harvard Project of Cold War Studies at the Davis Center ————— 1 Colonel-General Dmitrii Volkogonov, Sem’ vozhdei: Galereya liderov SSSR, 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. 2, p. 64. A more recent collection of Volkogonov’s unfinished memoirs and MOLCZYK, General of Arms Eugeniusz — Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense; member of Poland’s Military Council for National Salvation NAZAROV, Colonel Vadim Mikhailovich — Chief, Sanatorium and Health Resort Department, Central Military Medical Directorate OGARKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Vasil’evich — Chief of the Soviet General Staff; Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense OLIWA, Division-General Wlodzimierz — member of Poland’s Military Council for National Salvation; Presidium member of League for Defense of the Homeland PASZKOWSKI, Division-General Roman — Governor of Katowice Province (installed with the introduction of martial law) PAVLOV, Vitalii Grigor’evich — Soviet KGB station chief in Warsaw PROSKURIN, Colonel Mikhail Vasil’evich — Soviet GRU officer PUCHALA, Colonel Franciszek — Deputy Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff RAKHMANIN, Oleg Borisovich — First Deputy Head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries; and member of the CPSU Politburo’s Commission on the Polish Crisis RAPACEWICZ, Division-General Henryk — Commander of Poland’s Silesian Military District; member of Poland’s Military Council for National Salvation RUSAKOV, Konstantin Viktorovich — CPSU Secretary; Head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries SHCHEGLOV, Army-General Afanasii Fedorovich — Representative in Poland of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces SIWICKI, General of Arms Florian — Chief, Polish General Staff; Polish First Deputy Minister of National Defense; Candidate Member of the PUWP Politburo; member of Poland’s ...Key Individuals Continued writings, Etyudy o vremeni (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), offers a few additional comments (on pp. 82 and 90-91) about the meetings at Helenow between Kulikov and Jaruzelski in 1981, which <strong>Anoshkin</strong> and Volkogonov attended. Volkogonov writes that they received “detailed instructions by coded telegram every day from Moscow specifying what to do and say,” and that Kulikov “in turn sent coded telegrams back to Moscow, spoke by secure telephone, and submitted reports” to the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov. Military Council for National Salvation SKACHKOV, Semyon Andreevich — Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations SKALSKI, Division-General Jerzy — Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff SOLOV’EV, Colonel Viktor Kirillovich — Chief, Food Supply Department, USSR’s Northern Group of Forces SPIRIN, Vasilii Vasil’evich — Charge d’Affaires at Soviet embassy in Poland SUSLOV, Mikhail Andreevich — Member of the CPSU Politburo; CPSU Secretary responsible for ideology, international affairs, and many other issues; Head of the CPSU Politburo’s Commission on the Polish Crisis SZKLARSKI, General Waclaw — Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff TERESHCHENKO, Colonel-General Mikhail Nikitovich — First Deputy Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces TITOV, Major-General Igor Nikolaevich — First Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, Volga Military District TUCZAPSKI, Army-General Tadeusz — Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense; coordinator of martial law planning; member of Poland’s Military Council for National Salvation USTINOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitrii Fedorovich — Soviet Minister of Defense; Member of the CPSU Politburo UZYCKI, Division-General Jozef — member of Poland’s Military Council for National Salvation WALESA, Lech — founding leader of Solidarity ZARUDIN, Colonel-General Yurii Fedorovich — Commander, USSR’s Northern Group of Forces ZIELINSKI, Division-General Zygmunt — Head of the Cadre Department in the Polish Ministry of National Defense
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1980-1982 17 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Anoshkin</strong> <strong>Notebook</strong> on the Polish Crisis, December 1981 Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer .................................................................................................................................................................................................. WORKING NOTEBOOK Lieutenant-General V. I. ANOSHKIN [dotted line indicates new page in <strong>Notebook</strong>] .................................................................................................................................................................................................. Embassy of the USSR in Poland Cde. Boris Ivanovich Aristov Cde. Vasil Vasilevich Spirin KGB Station in Poland Cde. Vitalii Georgevich Pavlov Cde. Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov C O N T E N T S : (1981 - 1982) (1) Trip to Poland (7-17.12.1981) during the introduction of “Martial Law” (2) Trip to the CSSR for the “Druzhba-82” Exercises (Czechoslovak People’s Army, Central Group of Forces, and the Hungarian People’s Army), 25-30.1.82 Meeting with Cdes. Husak and Dzur and the Armed Forces of the Central Group of Forces 3. Trip to Other Warsaw Pact Countries 1 (Up to 20.3.82) .................................................................................................................................................................................................. [ . . . ]
Page 1 and 2: By Malcolm Byrne In November 1997,
Page 3 and 4: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1
Page 5 and 6: solution that would not require the
Page 7 and 8: Andropov’s sentiments were echoed
Page 9 and 10: the crisis. From the fall of 1980 o
Page 11 and 12: Ostaszewicz. See the comments of Ge
Page 13: translate a few Russian abbreviatio
Page 17 and 18: 9:00 a.m. (Moscow time) 10.12.81 10
Page 23 and 24: 25th tank reg. of 10th tank div.
Page 25 and 26: NATIONAL UNDERGROUND COMMITTEE OF
Page 27 and 28: ————— 1 Translator’s No
Page 29 and 30: the next page refer exclusively to
Page 31 and 32: the supposed readiness expressed by
Page 33 and 34: leadership, but also a member of th
Page 35 and 36: is Miroslaw Milewski. What he says
Page 37 and 38: and carried out martial law alone,
Page 39 and 40: enforcement is provided for in orde
Page 41 and 42: By Francis J. Meehan Reflections on
Page 43 and 44: y far the most crucial element for
Page 45 and 46: . . . . . . . . Francis J. Meehan r
Page 47 and 48: the original draft, with the senten
Page 49 and 50: information to Carter. At a meeting
Page 51 and 52: units locate the best entry routes
Page 53 and 54: Poland, a situation that, from the
Page 55 and 56: sea in early January 1994 while sai
Page 57 and 58: “Centralny plan dzialania organow
Page 59 and 60: 1980 and May 1981 8 and the letter
Page 61 and 62: although the responsible ministeria
Page 63 and 64: afraid that the Polish events could
Page 65 and 66:
does not exist it is impossible to
Page 67 and 68:
Comrade Kania openly stated that th
Page 69 and 70:
[Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 2/19
Page 71 and 72:
Soviet Union should be in the front
Page 73 and 74:
hoping that our nerves will fail. I
Page 75 and 76:
The beginning of t
Page 77 and 78:
of Prime Minister and Minister of N
Page 79 and 80:
necessary to force Solidarity to ho
Page 81 and 82:
have provided them with 2 billion d
Page 83 and 84:
for both the Party and you personal
Page 85 and 86:
on behalf of the Central Committee
Page 87 and 88:
national characteristics. However,
Page 89 and 90:
1980, one day after the Crimea meet
Page 91 and 92:
SED CC secretary for international
Page 93 and 94:
14 See Monika Tantzscher, “‘Was
Page 95 and 96:
Germany, Poland and Hungary on 14-1
Page 97 and 98:
Bulgarian regime: its lack of adapt
Page 99 and 100:
esolved. The extre
Page 101 and 102:
een introduced in Poland on 13 Dece
Page 103 and 104:
mobilized very rapidly when necessa
Page 105 and 106:
in question were simply too small.
Page 107 and 108:
10 TASS dispatch, 27 August 1980, r
Page 109 and 110:
staged in Radom and Ursus in connec
Page 111 and 112:
are stirred, attempts [are made] to
Page 113 and 114:
this has to become evident. This is
Page 115 and 116:
Thank you for your attention. Nicol
Page 117 and 118:
In the course of the past four year
Page 119 and 120:
Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union
Page 121 and 122:
develop after the 90 days agreed to
Page 123 and 124:
the Allied Military Forces, because
Page 125 and 126:
etrayed and even stabbed in the bac
Page 127 and 128:
Warsaw learned that the deployment
Page 129 and 130:
Therefore we must
Page 131:
Committee, Politburo, and Central C
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The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

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