The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

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26 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 Jaruzelski Siwicki All tasks regarding Molczyk the capture + 3 commdrs., navy Tuczapski div. commdr. ?! At 3:00 — signal for troops to shift to military alert, with departure to regions of concentration !? Walesa (Bujak, Michnik) have fled from Gdansk. Some of the leadership of “S” have been arrested. 5:25 Zarudin: Police in Legnica did not act. 5:50 N. V. Ogarkov — about communications — covering the coastline? Departure of Troops — at 5:00 departure to the Wars. Mil. Dis. — at 6:00 all the rest 83-18 Siwicki Walesa + captured (Siwicki reported) <strong>The</strong> navy — begins coastline operations at 6:00 (at 3:00 it was assigned the mission) 89-71 Shcheglov !? Mikhailin — must be redeployed and sent to the front (here) — <strong>The</strong>y handled the situation with the Main Operations Directorate Tereshchenko — based in Legnica; reported .................................................................................................................................................................................................. Legnica— work is proceeding. <strong>The</strong>y began with the detention of as many as 20 people. A signal — to Rapacewicz, Uzycki — Uzycki 8th Mech. Div. — to Gdansk 20th Tank Div. — to Bydgoszcz 11th Tank Div. — Wroclaw Merezhko reported that they have everything in order. In Wroclaw and Legnica, crowds gathered. Wroclaw — 250-300 people. But no resistance was shown. <strong>The</strong> radio stn. has been placed under guard. 5:00 — 10,000 soldiers move into Warsaw Bujak and Michnik — have left Lublin — scuffles with the police Bialystok — all have been detained In Warsaw, 60-70 % have been detained Szczecin – good Leczna — 100 % Gdansk — good LISTS of the Oper. Grps. in the Mil. Dist. Navy, Air Def., Air Force II. Solov’ev — 15 peop. / 25 peop. ____ ____ Economic (Shupov, Dept. Frnt. Hosp.). ..................................................................................................................................................................................................
NATIONAL UNDERGROUND COMMITTEE OF “SOLIDARITY” NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1980-1982 27 First Session of the Military Council of Nat. Salvation, from 11:00 to 19:30 1.5 hours W. Jaruzelski (Dep. Min.) To let the people know that the Army has saved the nation and the country <strong>The</strong> moment is chosen — successful, there were no such things, and it is impossible to delay it any further Ideally taking account of the public mood and other factors. I. there is success, but difficulties lie ahead. <strong>The</strong> West will boycott, but the allies will help. 49 Martial law can be extended by several months. But in accordance with measures to restore order in the provinces, they must display resolve, careful organization, and exactingness Sympathy for the Army and Navy is growing. I thought about dispatching a unit of honor guards — square caps A profound change50 of cadres is necessary: a purge in the PZPR and the gov’t. .................................................................................................................................................................................................. Carry it out immediately; all unworthy officials will be removed from their posts. Comdrs. alloted by zones. He believes they must allot zones for the commanders — Gdansk — Janczyszyn — Katowice — Lozowicki — Poznan — Krepski Appoint Gen. Zielinski — a secretary WRON. (head of Main Pers. Direct. in Min. of Nat.Def.) Remove the Katowice governor; appoint Gen. Paszkowski (former ambass. to Mongolia) Operation has begun — in Warsaw In Khust Lenina — measures were taken to restore order. 20 commissars at the Ministry Repeated — (all the generals), repeated for everyone what was earlier I explained that it all would be in a historical sense and My Assessing the behavior of W. Jaruzelski: assessment many “I”s; the army is forgotten Ù a certain ostentatiousness and bombast came through personal Walesa — this is the politic. map opinion “We are still using him.” Walesa today declared a hunger strike ..................................................................................................................................................................................................
Page 1 and 2: By Malcolm Byrne In November 1997,
Page 3 and 4: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1
Page 5 and 6: solution that would not require the
Page 7 and 8: Andropov’s sentiments were echoed
Page 9 and 10: the crisis. From the fall of 1980 o
Page 11 and 12: Ostaszewicz. See the comments of Ge
Page 13 and 14: translate a few Russian abbreviatio
Page 17 and 18: 9:00 a.m. (Moscow time) 10.12.81 10
Page 23: 25th tank reg. of 10th tank div.
Page 27 and 28: ————— 1 Translator’s No
Page 29 and 30: the next page refer exclusively to
Page 31 and 32: the supposed readiness expressed by
Page 33 and 34: leadership, but also a member of th
Page 35 and 36: is Miroslaw Milewski. What he says
Page 37 and 38: and carried out martial law alone,
Page 39 and 40: enforcement is provided for in orde
Page 41 and 42: By Francis J. Meehan Reflections on
Page 43 and 44: y far the most crucial element for
Page 45 and 46: . . . . . . . . Francis J. Meehan r
Page 47 and 48: the original draft, with the senten
Page 49 and 50: information to Carter. At a meeting
Page 51 and 52: units locate the best entry routes
Page 53 and 54: Poland, a situation that, from the
Page 55 and 56: sea in early January 1994 while sai
Page 57 and 58: “Centralny plan dzialania organow
Page 59 and 60: 1980 and May 1981 8 and the letter
Page 61 and 62: although the responsible ministeria
Page 63 and 64: afraid that the Polish events could
Page 65 and 66: does not exist it is impossible to
Page 67 and 68: Comrade Kania openly stated that th
Page 69 and 70: [Source: SÚA, A ÚV KSC, PÚV 2/19
Page 71 and 72: Soviet Union should be in the front
Page 73 and 74: hoping that our nerves will fail. I
Page 75 and 76:
The beginning of t
Page 77 and 78:
of Prime Minister and Minister of N
Page 79 and 80:
necessary to force Solidarity to ho
Page 81 and 82:
have provided them with 2 billion d
Page 83 and 84:
for both the Party and you personal
Page 85 and 86:
on behalf of the Central Committee
Page 87 and 88:
national characteristics. However,
Page 89 and 90:
1980, one day after the Crimea meet
Page 91 and 92:
SED CC secretary for international
Page 93 and 94:
14 See Monika Tantzscher, “‘Was
Page 95 and 96:
Germany, Poland and Hungary on 14-1
Page 97 and 98:
Bulgarian regime: its lack of adapt
Page 99 and 100:
esolved. The extre
Page 101 and 102:
een introduced in Poland on 13 Dece
Page 103 and 104:
mobilized very rapidly when necessa
Page 105 and 106:
in question were simply too small.
Page 107 and 108:
10 TASS dispatch, 27 August 1980, r
Page 109 and 110:
staged in Radom and Ursus in connec
Page 111 and 112:
are stirred, attempts [are made] to
Page 113 and 114:
this has to become evident. This is
Page 115 and 116:
Thank you for your attention. Nicol
Page 117 and 118:
In the course of the past four year
Page 119 and 120:
Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union
Page 121 and 122:
develop after the 90 days agreed to
Page 123 and 124:
the Allied Military Forces, because
Page 125 and 126:
etrayed and even stabbed in the bac
Page 127 and 128:
Warsaw learned that the deployment
Page 129 and 130:
Therefore we must
Page 131:
Committee, Politburo, and Central C
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The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

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