The Anoshkin Notebook on the Polish Crisis, December 1981

38 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11
any little damage to the interest of the Warsaw Pact might
become a pretext for intervention. Possible difficulties in
military transport would, after all, be a classic violation of
the rules according to which the strategic infrastructure of
the bloc functioned. This is what was constantly on our
minds. Let the fact that I stated, publicly in the Sejm as
well as during a Central Committee plenary meeting, that
the Polish Army takes responsibility for the smooth
functioning of this transportation infrastructure attest to
how important and sensitive this point was. Imputing that
a concern that this transportation should function
smoothly (especially under the conditions of martial law)
meant looking for help from the outside is not only absurd,
but politically and strategically infantile.
One pages [9-10] is another example of how Mr.
Kramer is being led up a “blind alley.” He is, as far as I
am aware, a historian by profession and therefore I assume
that he will read the addendum I have enclosed in the
proper spirit. It will become clear to him from it how thin
the different arguments are of people wishing at any cost
to accuse the so-called authors of martial law, if they are
reduced to using such “evidence.”
On page [13] Mr. Kramer also suggests that Gen.
Siwicki and I attempt to make secret Polish documents
public. <strong>The</strong>re are already many documents (particularly
protocols from the PUWP Politburo meetings, different
materials from other institutions and bodies) that have
been made public in different ways, but Mr. Kramer is
clearly not interested in them. On the other hand, it is true
that there is no access to many documents, particularly
those of the Ministry of National Defense. Perhaps Prof.
Andrzej Paczkowski did not have time to inform Mr.
Kramer that several times I addressed the organizers of the
Jachranka conference and asked for access to be made
possible in Polish institutions. I even wrote statements
which were intended to help in those efforts.
Unfortunately, in many cases these efforts ended
unsuccessfully (it is true that I did not at the time foresee
the possibility that after the conclusion of such an
important international conference some kind of “work
notebook” would be “pulled out of a pocket” and become
a “decisive” source for Mr. Kramer).
However very distasteful—to use just such a term—is
this statement about our notes (Gen. Siwicki’s and
mine)—“assuming they still exist and have not been
tampered with.” So only Polish generals would falsify
things, while Soviet notes are above any suspicion? I
would like to ask here whether we really can treat them
[i.e., the <strong>Anoshkin</strong> notes] as reliable “evidence” (Mr.
Kramer calls it “decisive”) for describing events of great
political, historical, and moral importance? At the same
time, considering the threats and announcements coming
even from the highest offices and leading political circles,
should one treat the suggestions of an American historian
as a welcome gesture in this campaign? I trust that this
was not Mr. Kramer’s intention. All the more so, since
when he wrote his article he did not know many of the
circumstances, facts, and arguments I have presented here.
I understand that Mr. Kramer’s article is based
exclusively on words written then as well as years later.
But this is only a partial base. I do not deny the necessity
and importance of his research. But to make the picture
objective, one needs to look also at evident facts,
phenomena, and symptoms from the time in question.
Many of them have been presented by many witnesses
who testified before the Commission of Constitutional
Oversight under the rules of the Penal Code. I did not
notice even a trace of those testimonies in Mr. Kramer’s
article. But the most important thing is to avoid a situation
of “if the facts indicate something different, then too bad
for the facts.”
<strong>The</strong>refore, counting on the support of Prof. Andrzej
Paczkowski, an outstanding specialist in contemporary
history, I would like to ask Mr. Kramer to reevaluate the
text of the inaugural brochure, the main substance of
which is to be <strong>Anoshkin</strong>’s “working notebook.” Gen.
Siwicki, myself, and other people have a number of
important comments about it, which we will present at a
later point. I am ready for conversations which will lead
to better mutual understanding, will confront and verify
views, and above all, which will bring us closer to the very
complex truth.
To conclude: We are facing a paradoxical situation.
Many people who for years were sworn enemies of the
USSR, who suspected its leaders and officials of all kinds
of wrongdoing, including lies and falsities—I am not
talking of Mr. Kramer, of course, since I don’t know his
views—are suddenly turning into defenders of the USSR.
Everything that comes from that country is true and
constitutes evidence. But what is puzzling is that this
[tendency] seems exclusively to concern things that make
it possible to condemn and accuse the Polish People’s
Republic, including the so-called authors of martial law. I
always have said and to this day keep saying openly that
the Soviet Union was our ally within the “sick” reality of
those years and with all the heavy load of limited
sovereignty. To the Soviet Union we owe what is actually
the most advantageous configuration of Polish territory in
history (although I admit that such a configuration suited
Soviet interests). For many years, the Soviet Union was
the sole guarantor of that territory. I respect and like the
Russians. I think that the relations between our countries
which are now equal should be good and mutually
advantageous. Also, when I look back at those years I try
to keep a rational distance, since as a politician and a
general I know the ruthless logic of that divided world. I
used to say that if I had been a Soviet marshal or general I
would have perceived Poland as a territory endangering
the bloc, with all the consequences of that for us, of
course. We were fully aware of that situation, which was
assessed similarly in the American documents disclosed at
Jachranka. All this required from us, the Polish
authorities, the appropriate measures and countermeasures.
<strong>The</strong>ir effectiveness was proved by life itself. We imposed