S/2013/337 - National Committee on North Korea

S/<strong>2013</strong>/<strong>337</strong>
99. Other documents obtained by the Panel showed Song Chang-Sik, Counsellor,
Embassy of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea in the Congo, was actively
involved in negotiating the contract for these shipments on behalf of the General
Department of Military Cooperation of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces of the
<strong>National</strong> Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see
annex XVII, sects. B and D). The specified arms-related parts and material were
provided by Machinery Export and Import Corporation, an entity whose director is
named as Jong Yong-Kyong. Senior Colonel Kim Kwang-Nam (see annex XVII,
sects. D and E) was in overall charge of the repair services project and nearly
40 technicians from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
100. Banque de France refused to accept a wire transfer associated with the contract
from the Bank of Congo to an account held in the name of Kim Kyong-Ho,
Commercial Attaché at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
in Beijing (see annex XVII, sect. F). Subsequently, funds were deposited into an
account opened at the Bank of Congo in the name of the “Bureau de la
représentation militaire près l’Ambassade de Corée”. The Panel continues to seek
information on the routing of funds that may have been transferred from this
account as part of its efforts to uncover and disclose illicit financial networks
involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This case illustrates how the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea makes use of its diplomatic officials in the
conduct of prohibited activities, both in negotiating and concluding contracts and in
using bank accounts to shield illicit financial transfers from banks’ due diligence
procedures.
C. Implementation of the luxury goods ban
101. The Panel has investigated a number of luxury goods incidents, including nine
reported by Japan to the <strong>Committee</strong> since May 2012. The newly reported cases are
summarized in table 1 (see further details in annex XVIII). In addition, the Panel
examined a compact disc seized by Japan on 18 September 2012. The Panel has
requested information from China about six earlier cases.
102. The information provided by Japan confirms that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea continues to violate the Security Council ban on luxury goods.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea circumvented sanctions using
dissimulation techniques, including false shipping and customs declarations, and the
use of intermediaries to make payments, either through hand-carrying or wire
transfers. In two instances, the end users were falsely declared as a diplomatic
mission in Pyongyang.
103. Dalian Global Unity Shipping Agency was actively involved in eight cases and
suspected of involvement in another case, according to Japanese authorities. As
previously highlighted (see para. 80 of S/2012/422), the vendors were introduced by
end users from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to middlemen from
Dalian Global Unity Shipping Agency, who gave specific instructions about how the
shipments and transactions could evade Japan’s implementation of the luxury goods
ban. Customs officials from China told the Panel that goods in cases covered by the
Panel’s 2012 report were not considered luxury goods. The Panel will continue its
investigations.
40
13-33174