Dispute Settlement under COMESA - Paul Roos Gymnasium

Dispute Settlement under 

COMESA 

By 

Felix Maonera 

tralac Working Paper 

No 7 

October 2005

Abstract 

The COMESA Court of Justice, established in 1994 under 

Article 7 of the COMESA Treaty, became operational in 1998. 

The Judges of the Court were appointed at the Third COMESA 

Summit on 30 June 1998 at Kinshasa in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo. The Court was to be temporarily hosted 

within the COMESA Secretariat from 1998, and in March 2003, 

COMESA decided that the seat of the Court be moved to 

Khartoum, in the Republic of Sudan. However, the Court has to 

date remained in Lusaka, Zambia. Although the Court is an 

integral part of the COMESA integration process, little appears 

to be known about it. This paper seeks to give a brief overview 

of the Court, its jurisdiction, and how it works, against the 

background of some cases that it has adjudicated upon.

Table of Contents 

Abbreviations.............................................................................................................. 0 

1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 1 

2 The judges, jurisdiction and the competent parties ............................................. 3 

3 Agents, lawyers, experts and costs ................................................................... 10 

4 Some decided cases ......................................................................................... 13 

5 Some concluding thoughts ................................................................................ 19 

References ............................................................................................................... 21 

List of cases filed, disposed of and pending 22 

www.tralac.org

Abbreviations 

Authority 


PTA 

The Council 

The Court 

The President 

The Treaty 

The supreme policy organ of COMESA, made up of the Heads of 

State and Government 

Common Market for East and Southern Africa 

Preferential Trade Area 

COMESA Council of Ministers 

COMESA Court of Justice 

The Judge who is President of the Court 

Treaty Establishing the Common Market of East and Southern 

Africa, 1994 

0

tralac Working Paper no. 7 

www.tralac.org 

1 Introduction 

The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), a grouping of 

nineteen countries, 1 in 1994 replaced the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which 

had existed from 1981. COMESA was established as an organization of free, 

independent, sovereign states which agreed to cooperate in developing their natural 

and human resources for the good of all their people. Its main focus is on the 

formation of a large economic and trading unit that is capable of overcoming some of 

the barriers that are faced by individual states. 

COMESA has a decision making structure at the head of which is the Authority, the 

supreme policy organ of COMESA, made up of the Heads of State and Government 

of all the member countries; a Council of Ministers responsible for policy making; 

technical committees and a number of other advisory bodies. Several institutions, 

which include a Court of Justice (the Court), have been created to promote subregional 

cooperation and development. Overall co-ordination of the activities of 

COMESA is the responsibility of the Secretariat, based in Lusaka, Zambia. 

The Court was established in 1994 under Article 7 of the COMESA Treaty, and 

became operational in 1998. The Judges of the Court were appointed by the 

Authority during the Third COMESA Summit on 30 June 1998 at Kinshasa in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo. The Registrar of the Court was then appointed by the 

COMESA Council of Ministers (the Council), during its meeting in June 1998, also at 

Kinshasa. The Court was to be temporarily hosted within the COMESA Secretariat 

from 1998. In March 2003, the Authority decided that the seat of the Court should be 

in Khartoum, in the Republic of Sudan, but due to some technical difficulties, the 

Court has to date remained in Lusaka, Zambia. To ensure the independence of the 

Court, Article 9 (2) (c) of the COMESA Treaty provides that the Council shall give 

directions to all subordinate organs of COMESA other than the Court. 

1 As shown on the COMESA website, http://www.comesa.int/countries/, last visited on 27/07/2005, the 

countries are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 

Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and 

Zimbabwe. 

1



In addition to its other responsibilities, the Court took over the responsibilities of three 

other judicial organs that had existed under the PTA. One of these was the PTA 

Tribunal, whose function had been to ensure the proper interpretation of the 

provisions of the PTA Treaty and to adjudicate only in disputes between Member 

States, arising from the interpretation and application of the PTA Treaty. The 

jurisdiction of the Tribunal had been narrow and its ad hoc nature and lack of a 

separate budget were thought to stifle its development. The second PTA judicial 

organ whose responsibility the court took over was the PTA Administrative Appeals 

Board, whose jurisdiction under the PTA Treaty had been to adjudicate in disputes 

between the PTA and its staff, arising from the interpretation and application of the 

Treaty, Staff Rules and Regulations and terms and conditions of contracts of 

employment of the staff. The ad hoc status of the Board, its lack of an independent 

Registry and separate budget, in some instances, adversely affected the functioning 

of this organ. The third judicial organ whose responsibilities were subsumed by the 

Court was the PTA Centre for Commercial Arbitration, which was responsible for 

facilitating international arbitration and the conciliation of private commercial 

disputes. The Centre had been based in Djibouti and had operated under the 

auspices of the PTA Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 

The establishment of the Court was considered a major event in the history of 

COMESA as an organization, and in the development of the COMESA community 

law and jurisprudence. COMESA pursues its aims exclusively through a body of law 

which is independent, separate from and yet superior to national law. The Court of 

Justice, as the judicial organ of the Common Market, is the backbone of that legal 

system. Its Judges are supposed to ensure that the law is not interpreted and applied 

differently in each Member State, and that as a shared legal system, it remains a 

Common Market 2 system that is uniformly applied. 

2 A ‘common market’ can be described as a group of countries that guarantee the free movement of 

goods, services and factors (labour and capital) produced within the group and the removal of all 

tariffs and non-tariff barriers between themselves. The Member countries also agree to levy a common 

external tariff on imports from outside the group. A common market is thus equivalent to, but also goes 

beyond a customs union, by allowing for the free movement of factors among the Members of the 

group. COMESA was notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause on 29 June 1995. 

2



The Registrar is responsible for the day to day administration of the business of the 

Court under the supervision of the Judge President. The Court employs such other 

staff as are required to enable it to perform its functions, and its budget is borne by 

the Member States. The official languages of the Court are English, French and 

Portuguese. 

2 The judges, jurisdiction and the competent parties 

The Court is composed of seven Judges appointed by the Authority, with one of 

these judges appointed as the President of the Court. 3 Upon the request of the court, 

additional judges may be appointed. The President directs the judicial business and 

the administration of the Court and, unless he designates another Judge to do so, 

presides at its hearings and deliberations. The Judges of the Court are chosen from 

among persons of impartiality and independence, who fulfil the conditions required 

for the holding of high judicial office in their respective countries of domicile, or who 

are jurists of recognized competence. No two or more Judges of the Court can at any 

time be nationals of the same country. 

The Judges hold office for a period of five years, and are eligible for re-appointment 

for a further period of five years. They hold office throughout the term of their 

respective appointments unless they resign or die, or are removed from office in 

accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The President of the Court or a Judge 

may not be removed from office except by the Authority for stated misbehaviour, or 

for inability to perform the functions of his office due to infirmity of mind or body. The 

President and the Judges are immune from legal action for any act or omission 

committed in the discharge of their functions under the Treaty. 

A Judge may, at any time, resign from office by letter delivered to the President of the 

Court for transmission to the Chairman of the Authority, and his resignation will take 

effect on the date it has been accepted by the Authority. However, where the term of 

office of a Judge comes to an end, or where a Judge resigns before a decision or 

3 At the time of publishing, it was not possible to ascertain the names of the current and former judges 

and their nationalities 

3



opinion of the Court is delivered with respect to a matter which has been argued 

before the Court of which he was a member, such Judge shall, only for the purpose 

of completing that particular matter, continue to sit as a Judge. The Judge who is the 

President of the Court may at any time resign from office by giving one year's written 

notice to the Chairman of the Authority, but his resignation shall not take effect until 

his successor has been appointed by the Authority and has taken office. 

It is rather curious that a Judge who resigns before a decision or opinion of the Court 

has been delivered with respect to a matter which has been argued before the Court 

of which he was a member, indicating by so resigning that he wishes to take no 

further part in the work of the Court, is still expected to continue sitting as a Judge in 

that matter even just for the purpose of completing that particular matter. While the 

motive for compelling a Judge who has resigned to stay until the case is concluded, 

and in the case of the Judge President, until a replacement is found, is obviously for 

the sake of continuity, the workability of such compulsion is in doubt. It would seem 

that resignation is the clearest way of indicating one's wish to have nothing more to 

do with the work of the Court. Asking a Judge to stay on, most probably against 

his/her will, would not appear to be in the best interests of the Court. It is imaginable 

that a case in which the resigning Judge was participating, could take a while to 

conclude and that finding a replacement for a resigning Judge President could also 

take long. It remains unclear what would happen to a Judge (or Judge President) 

who refuses to stay on as required. 

The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters which may be referred to it 

pursuant to the Treaty 4 , and to hear disputes between the Common Market and its 

employees that arise out of the application and interpretation of the Staff Rules and 

Regulations of the Secretariat or the terms and conditions of employment of the 

4 Article 23 of the Treaty. The articles relating to the Court’s jurisdiction, like any other provision of the 

Treaty, remain binding on COMESA Members for as long as they remain party to the Treaty. In terms 

of Article 191 of the Treaty, any Member State may withdraw from the Common Market upon giving to 

the Secretary-General one year's written notice of its intention to withdraw, and will at the end of such 

year, if such notice is not withdrawn, cease to be a Member State of the Common Market. During the 

period of one year referred to, a Member State wishing to withdraw from the Common Market shall 

nevertheless observe the provisions of the Treaty and shall remain liable for the discharge of its 

obligations under the Treaty. The obligations assumed by the Member States under the Treaty shall, 

to the extent necessary, survive the termination of membership of any Member State. 

4



employees of the Common Market. 5 It also has jurisdiction to determine claims by 

any person against the Common Market or its institutions for acts of their servants or 

employees in the performance of their duties. 6 The Court’s jurisdiction also extends 

to hearing and determining any matter arising from an arbitration clause contained in 

a contract which confers such jurisdiction to which the Common Market or any of its 

institutions is a party, and to any matter arising from a dispute between the Member 

States regarding this Treaty if the dispute is submitted to it under a special 

agreement between the Member States concerned. 7 Except where the jurisdiction is 

conferred on the Court by or under the Treaty, disputes to which the Common Market 

is a party shall not on that ground alone be excluded from the jurisdiction of national 

courts. 8 

COMESA Member States, the COMESA Secretary General, and legal and natural 

persons have locus standi to refer matters to the Court. A Member State that 

considers that another Member State, or the Council, has failed to fulfil an obligation 

under the Treaty or has infringed a provision of the Treaty, may refer the matter to 

the Court for determination. A Member State may also refer for determination by the 

Court, the legality of any act, regulation, directive or decision of the Council on the 

grounds that such act, regulation, directive or decision is ultra vires (that is, goes 

beyond what the Treaty allows), or is unlawful, or is an infringement of the provisions 

of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or amounts to a misuse or 

abuse of power. 9 

The COMESA Secretary General has the power to refer a matter to the Court, 10 but 

in a rather circuitous way. Where the Secretary-General considers that a Member 

State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty, or has infringed a provision of 

the Treaty, he can submit his findings to the Member State concerned to enable that 

Member State to submit its observations on the findings. If the Member State 

5 Article 27 of the Treaty. 

6 Article 27(2) of the Treaty. 





5



concerned does not submit its observations to the Secretary-General within two 

months, or if the observations submitted are unsatisfactory, the Secretary-General 

can refer the matter to the Bureau of the Council (composed of the Chairman, Vice- 

Chairman and Rapporteur) that will decide whether the matter should immediately be 

referred to the Court by the Secretary-General, or be referred to the Council. Where 

a matter has been referred to the Council and the Council fails to resolve the matter, 

the Council can direct the Secretary-General to refer the matter to the Court. 

It would appear that the Secretary General’s decision to refer a matter to the Court is 

not really his decision. The Bureau of the Council is the Secretary General’s first port 

of call if he feels a matter should be brought to the attention of the Court. It is the 

Bureau, not the Secretary General, that shall decide whether the matter should be 

referred to the Council. And it is the Council, not the Secretary General, that will 

direct that the matter be referred to the Court. No time limit is given for the Council, 

which meets only once a year immediately preceding a meeting of the Authority or in 

extraordinary sessions at the request of a Member State supported by at least one 

third of the Member States, to try and resolve the matter. No time limit is given as to 

how soon after failing to resolve the matter the Council shall direct the Secretary 

General to take the matter to the Court. 

Any person who is resident in a Member State may refer for determination by the 

Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of the Council or of a 

Member State on the grounds that such act, directive, decision or regulation is 

unlawful, or is an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty. 11 However, where the 

matter for determination relates to any act, regulation, directive or decision by a 

Member State, such a person will not refer the matter for determination unless he 

has first exhausted local remedies in the national courts, or tribunals, of the Member 

State. It is clear that a person who can refer the case does not have to be a citizen of 

a Member State. Neither does he have to be a resident, or a citizen, of the country he 

is complaining against, since the Treaty states that a person who is resident in a 

Member State may refer for determination by the Court a matter involving a Member 

State. This means that a person who is not even a citizen, but only a resident of any 


6



COMESA Member State, can take a matter involving another Member State, in which 

he does not even reside, to the Court. 

The Court also has the jurisdiction to hear disputes between COMESA and its 

employees that arise out of the application and interpretation of the Staff Rules and 

Regulations of the Secretariat or the terms and conditions of employment of the 

employees of COMESA. The Court has jurisdiction to determine claims by any 

person against COMESA or its institutions for acts of their servants or employees in 

the performance of their duties. It also has jurisdiction to hear and determine any 

matter, arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract which confers on the 

Court such jurisdiction, and to which COMESA, or any of its institutions, is a party. It 

can also adjudicate upon a dispute between the Member States regarding the Treaty, 

if the dispute is submitted to the Court by an agreement of the Member States 

concerned. 

Except where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by or under the Treaty, disputes 

to which COMESA is a party will not, on that ground alone, be excluded from the 

jurisdiction of Members’ national courts. However, decisions of the Court on the 

interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty will have precedence over decisions of 

national courts. In other words, decisions of national courts that relate to the 

interpretation of any provision of the Treaty will be taken into account only where they 

agree with the decision, if any, arrived at by the Court or where the Court has not 

made any pronouncement on that provision. If the national court’s decision relating to 

the interpretation of any provision of the Treaty does not agree with a decision of the 

Court, then that national court’s decision shall be overridden by that of the Court. 

However, it is recognized that the national courts may find it necessary to make a 

decision relating to the interpretation of a provision of the Treaty. To avoid a situation 

where the national court’s decision could conflict with a decision the Court may 

make, where a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State 

concerning the application or interpretation of the Treaty or the validity of the 

regulations, directives and decisions of COMESA, such court or tribunal is expected, 

if it considers that a ruling on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, 

to request the Court to give a preliminary ruling. 

7



The Court is to consider and determine every case referred to it under the Treaty in 

accordance with the Rules of Court, which regulate the detailed conduct of business 

of the Court such as the organization of the court, the power of the President of the 

court, duties of the registrar, seat, sessions and sittings of the court, quorum and the 

manner in which the Judges conduct their deliberations. The Court’s sessions are 

open to the public, and the Court is expected to deliver its judgments in public 

sessions. But if the Court considers that, in special circumstances, it is not desirable 

that its judgment be delivered in public, the Court may deliver its judgment before the 

parties privately. 

The judgment, subject to the provisions of the Court’s rules as to review, will be final 

and conclusive, and is not open to appeal. 12 An application for revision of a judgment 

may be made to the Court only if it is based upon the discovery of some fact which 

by its nature might have had a decisive influence on the judgment if it had been 

known to the Court at the time the judgment was given, but which in fact, at that time, 

was unknown to both the Court and the party making the application, and which 

could not have been discovered by that party before the judgment was made. A 

revision may also be entertained if there was a mistake or error on the record. The 

Court will deliver only one judgment in respect of every matter before it, which will be 

the judgment of the Court, reached in private by majority verdict. In other words, no 

dissenting opinion from any other Judge can be delivered. 

The proceedings before the Court will be either written or oral, and every party to a 

matter before the Court is to be represented by Counsel appointed by that party. 

There is no provision, in either the Treaty or the Rules of Court, for the rendering of 

assistance to any party involved in the proceedings. It would appear that a party to a 

matter before the Court, who is himself a lawyer or an advocate, still has to be 

represented by Counsel since this requirement is expressed in mandatory terms. A 

Member State, the Secretary-General or a resident of a Member State who is not a 

12 It is not clear what the motivation behind the prohibition of an appeal was. However, it may have been 

the fact that, unlike in the case of domestic courts, the COMESA Court is the court of first instance and 

appeal all in one; in other words, any appeal would have to be heard by the same Court since there is 

no other Court, under the Treaty, higher than the COMESA Court. While it could be envisaged that 

judges different from those that passed the initial judgment could be assigned to hear the appeal, it 

may be that Members did not want a situation whereby the Court system would be clogged by such 

appeals at the expense of new cases. 

8



party to a case before the Court may, with the permission of the Court, also 

participate in that case. However, the participation of that Member State, Secretary 

General or resident, will be limited to the submission of evidence supporting or 

opposing the arguments of a party to the case. 13 

The Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary to meet 

the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. A Member 

State, or the Council, is to take, without delay, 14 the measures required of it to 

implement a judgment of the Court. The Court may prescribe such sanctions or 

penalties as it considers necessary against a party who defaults in implementing the 

decisions of the Court. The execution of a judgment of the Court, which imposes a 

pecuniary obligation on a person, will be governed by the rules of civil procedure in 

force in the Member State in which execution is to take place. Since the rules of civil 

procedure may not be identical in all countries, it is possible that the speed with 

which judgments will be executed in the Members States will differ. 15 

The order for execution, which will be attached to the judgment of the Court, will 

require only the verification of the authenticity of the judgment by the Registrar before 

the party in whose favour execution is to take place can proceed to execution in 

accordance with the rules of civil procedure in force in that Member State. Although 

this is not clearly stated, it would appear that in the event of a dispute over a party’s 

compliance with a Court’s decision, the matter will be referred back to the Court, 

since it is stated that if the Court finds that a party has defaulted in implementing the 

Court's judgment, or otherwise defied it, the Court may impose a financial penalty on 

that party, to be paid to the Court. 16 When a judgment of the Court has been 

complied with, the Registrar will insert a note in the register to that effect against the 

record of the judgment. 17 

13 This does not appear to have happened as yet in practice, from a perusal of the cases decided so far 

and those pending. 

14 It is not clear from the Treaty who determines what constitutes ‘delay.’ Presumably, this will be 

determined by the Court if brought to its attention by the winning party. 

15 It was not possible, at the time of publication, to gather information regarding the enforcement of the 

Court’s rulings in the domestic sphere, i.e. the degree of difficulty, if any, victorious parties have faced 

when attempting to enforce the Court’s judgments. 

16 Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. 

17 A perusal of the decided cases indicates that it has taken the Court an average of between 9-12 

months to dispose of a case, which is quite efficient and is comparable for example to the time the 

9



The Court can assume the role of a court of arbitration in any matter arising from an 

arbitration clause contained in a contract to which COMESA, or any of its institutions, 

is a party and which confers jurisdiction on the Court to arbitrate. The Court can also 

arbitrate in a dispute between the Member States regarding the interpretation of the 

Treaty, if the Member States concerned agree to submit such matter to the Court. It 

would appear that in conducting the arbitration, the Court has wide discretion as 

regards what law to apply since it is stated that the Court, sitting as a Court of 

Arbitration, may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. 18 

Unless the parties have agreed upon the place where the arbitration is to be held, 

such place will be determined by the Court, having regard to the circumstances of the 

case. 

Besides making determinations on matters brought before it and sitting as a court of 

arbitration, the Court can give an advisory opinion on questions of law arising from 

the provisions of the Treaty affecting COMESA, at the request of the Authority, the 

Council or a Member State. 19 In the exercise of its advisory function, the Court will be 

governed by the provisions of the Treaty and the Rules of Court relating to the 

resolution of disputes to the extent that the Court considers appropriate. 

3 Agents, lawyers, experts and costs 

Member States, institutions or other eligible parties are to be represented before the 

Court by an agent who is a lawyer entitled to practise before a court of a Member 

State. This requirement is mandatory. The agent may, however, be assisted by an 

adviser or by a lawyer certified to practise before a court of a Member State. Agents 

appearing before the Court enjoy immunity in respect of words spoken or written by 

them concerning the case, or the parties. In particular, their papers and documents 

relating to the proceedings are exempt from both search and seizure. 

WTO dispute settlement system takes (6 months if case is not appealed and 9 months if the case is 

appealed). 

18 Rule 6 of the Rules of Arbitration. 

19 It is not clear from a reading of the Treaty what the status of these advisory opinions is. 

10



In order to qualify for the privileges and immunities, the agents need to produce proof 

of their status. These privileges and immunities are granted exclusively in the 

interests of the proper conduct of proceedings. The Court may waive the privileges 

and immunities where it considers that the proper conduct of proceedings will not be 

hindered by so doing. In addition, any agent whose conduct towards the Court, a 

Judge or the Registrar is incompatible with the dignity of the Court, or who uses his 

rights for purposes other than those for which they are granted, may at any time be 

excluded from the proceedings. 

The Court can appoint one or more experts to report to it on specific issues it wishes 

to determine. The parties to the dispute are expected to give to the expert any 

relevant information or any relevant documents or goods that the expert may require. 

When the Court is sitting as a court of arbitration, it may also order that an expert's 

report be obtained. 

An important aspect of any dispute settlement system is the aspect of costs. The 

amount of costs to be paid may be the determining factor as to whether or not one 

will participate in proceedings before the Court. Parties in a dispute can run up a 

huge bill of costs and the other party usually demands that the other pay all the costs 

associated with the case. The rules and regulations of the Court provide an intricate 

system of how the costs of the participation of the parties in the dispute shall be paid 

at the end of the case. It is important to note that proceedings before the Court are 

free of charge, meaning that nothing has to be paid to the Court or to the judges by 

the participating parties. However, where a party has caused the Court to incur costs 

that could have been avoided, the Court may order that party to refund those costs. 

And where copying or translation work is carried out at the request of a party, the 

costs will be paid for by that party if the Registrar considers those costs excessive. 

The costs that have to be paid and that are ‘recoverable’, relate only to sums payable 

to witnesses and experts, and expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the 

purpose of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and 

the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers. In terms of the regulations of the 

Court, the decision as to costs shall be given in the final judgment or in the order 

which closes the proceedings. The principle as regards matters brought before the 

11



Court is that the unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay the costs if they have 

been applied for by the successful party. If costs are not claimed, the parties will bear 

their own costs. Where there are several unsuccessful parties, the Court will decide 

how the costs are to be shared among them. Where each party succeeds on some 

and fails on other issues in the case, or where the circumstances are exceptional, the 

Court may order that the costs be shared or that the parties bear their own costs. The 

Court may order a party, even if successful, to pay costs, which the Court considers 

that party to have unreasonably caused the opposite party to incur. 

A party who discontinues or withdraws from proceedings shall be ordered to pay the 

costs of the proceedings up to the point of discontinuation, if they have been applied 

for in the other party's pleadings. However, if the party who discontinues or withdraws 

from proceedings makes a request to the Court, the costs could be borne by the 

other party who has not withdrawn, if this appears justified by the conduct of that 

party. Where a case does not proceed to judgment, the costs will be paid at the 

discretion of the Court. Parties may choose to agree as to how the costs will be 

borne by either one of them. Where this happens, the decision as to costs will be in 

accordance with the parties’ agreement. In proceedings between COMESA and its 

employees, COMESA shall bear its own costs. 

When the Court is sitting as a court of arbitration, it will fix the costs of arbitration in 

its award. In such a case, the term 'costs' shall be understood to include the fees of 

the Court to be fixed by the Court itself, the travel and other expenses incurred by the 

Court, the costs of expert advice and of other assistance required by the Court, the 

travel and other expenses of witnesses, to the extent that such expenses are 

approved by the Court, and the costs for legal representation and assistance of the 

successful party, if such costs were claimed during the arbitral proceedings, and only 

to the extent that the Court determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable. 

Where an expert is engaged, the Court may request the parties, or one of them, to 

lodge security for the costs of the expert's report. It is expected that the fees of the 

Court will be reasonable in amount, taking into account the amount in dispute, the 

complexity of the subject matter, the time spent by the Court, and any other relevant 

circumstances of the case. 

12



The costs of arbitration will, in principle, be borne by the unsuccessful party. The 

Court may, however, apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that 

apportionment is reasonable. With respect to the costs of legal representation and 

assistance, the Court may determine which party will bear such costs, or may 

apportion such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is 

reasonable. On its establishment as a court of arbitration, the Court may request 

each party to deposit an equal amount as an advance for the costs, and may request 

supplementary deposits from the parties during the course of the arbitral 

proceedings. If the required deposits are not paid in full within thirty days after the 

receipt of the request, the Court will inform the parties in order that one or another of 

them may make the required payment. If such payment is not made, the Court may 

order the suspension or termination of the arbitral proceedings. 

The bills of costs so far filed have ranged from a high of US$ 463.084, which was 

taxed and allowed at US$145,448, to a low of US$12,277.90, which was taxed and 

allowed at US$7,536.00. 20 Extracts of court documents may be obtained on payment 

of US$2.00 per page. 21 

4 Some decided cases 

At the end of 2003 22 the Court had adjudicated upon 19 cases 23 , either as the Court 

proper or as a court of arbitration. These disputes were brought before the Court by 

Member States, COMESA, and by both natural and legal persons. The cases have 

dealt with a wide range of issues, including questions of the exhaustion of local 

remedies, the Court’s jurisdiction, locus standi and costs. 

20 It was not possible to determine how these costs compare with costs in cases decided by the WTO or 

the ICJ. 

21 According to Habben Nkonkesha, Officer in Charge of the COMESA Court of Justice, in an e-mail 

sent to the writer on 26 July 2005. 

22 The Judges’ contracts expired in June 2003, and the vacuum that followed was only filled in June 

2005 by the appointment of new Judges. 

23 See attached list of cases filed, disposed off and pending, 2005. 

13



In the matter of The Republic of Kenya and Commissioner of Lands v Coastal 

Aquaculture 24 , Coastal Aquaculture, a limited liability company incorporated under 

the Laws of the Republic of Kenya, filed with the Court an application asking the 

Court to stop the Republic of Kenya, its servants, agents or officers from acquiring 

certain of its land, without (among other things) first making provision for the advance 

payment of adequate compensation and payment of damages, complying with the 

relevant provisions of the Constitution of Kenya, and complying fully with the 

provisions of the land acquisition of Kenya. By legal notices issued in November 

1993, the Commissioner of Lands of Kenya had shown an intention to compulsorily 

acquire the land belonging to Coastal Aquaculture, in terms of the power for 

compulsory acquisition of land in Kenya conferred on him by the Constitution. 

Coastal Aquaculture had brought this matter before the courts in Kenya in 1994, and 

the courts had held that the notices of acquisition issued by the Government of 

Kenya were defective and invalid. This judgment had received the full approval of the 

Court of Appeal. However, on 16 June 2000, the Commissioner of Lands published 

further notices indicating the Government’s intention once again to acquire Coastal 

Aquaculture’s same land. The notices were drawn in identical terms to the previous 

Gazette Notices of 1993 which had been declared defective, null and void. 

The Court began by observing that as an organ of the Treaty it had no power outside 

what is bestowed upon it by the Treaty, and noted that Article 19 of the Treaty 

enjoined the Court to 'ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and 

application of this Treaty'. Unless a party is imbued with a legal right to refer matters 

to the Court for adjudication in terms of the Treaty, he has no locus standi to file a 

Reference in the Court, the Court further observed. It noted however, that Coastal 

Aquaculture, being a legal person resident in a Member State, had the requisite locus 

standi to refer proceedings to the Court for determination only if it had exhausted all 

local remedies in the national courts or tribunals of Kenya. 

24 Reference No. 3 of 2001. [JUDGMENT OF 26/4/2002]. The full citation of the Cases decided by the Court begins 

by stating the parties involved, followed by a reference number, the subject matter, what the Court’s decision was 

and then the judgment number. The full citation of the case referred to here would be as follows: 'The Republic of 

Kenya and Commissioner of Lands v Coastal Aquaculture – Reference No. 3 of 2001. Interlocutory Application to 

strike out Reference for want of Locus Standi. The Application was allowed. [JUDGMENT OF 26/4/2002] '. 

14



Indeed, Coastal Aquaculture had filed a civil suit in 1996 in the High Court of Kenya 

at Nairobi, seeking damages purportedly suffered as a result of the prohibited 

attempts by the Government to compulsorily acquire its land. It did not, however, 

prosecute that action to finality in the High Court of Kenya, having withdrawn it just 

before commencing the proceedings in the COMESA Court of Justice. It gave the 

reason for the withdrawal as the ‘unbearable’ situation it found itself in – for which the 

national courts were powerless to provide relief, since the Government, over a period 

of eight years or more, had been unable to follow the simple legal procedures laid 

down in the Land Acquisition Act to their logical conclusion, despite repeated 

guidance from the High Court and the Court of Appeal of Kenya. 

The Court stated that the withdrawal by Coastal Aquaculture of its action for 

damages in a civil suit did not constitute exhaustion by it of the legal remedies in the 

national courts of Kenya. As such, Coastal Aquaculture did not have the locus standi 

to commence a case before the Court. Since under the Kenyan law once the 

responsible Minister certifies that the land is acquired, that acquisition can only be 

withdrawn as a matter of Ministerial discretion, and since a court of law cannot direct 

the Minister to withdraw the acquisition, the Court ruled that the matter of the 

compulsory acquisition of Coastal Aquaculture’s land was still pending in Kenya and 

that, therefore, Coastal Aquaculture could not commence a case before the Court. 

The application by the Government of Kenya to strike out Coastal Aquaculture’s case 

for want of locus standi was allowed, and in the circumstances of the case, the Court 

made no order as to costs. 

As has already been stated, reference of a matter to the Court by legal and natural 

persons is permitted under Article 26 of the Treaty in respect of the legality of any 

act, regulation, directive, or decision of a Member State on the grounds that such act, 

directive, decision or regulation is unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of 

the Treaty. It would have been useful for the Court to explain whether the action by 

the Government of Kenya was unlawful as judged against the laws of Kenya, or 

whether it was an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty. Presumably the Court 

would have addressed this issue if it had found that Coastal Aquaculture had 

exhausted the legal remedies in the national courts of Kenya. 

15



In the case of Ethiopia v Eritrea 25 the Government of Ethiopia sought from the 

Government of Eritrea, among other things, the release of goods belonging to 

Ethiopians detained at the Eritrean Ports of Assab and Massawa. The Government of 

Eritrea objected to the case through a preliminary application on the grounds that this 

was an abuse of the process of the Court, and was not a matter that arose from the 

Treaty, which would entitle the Court to hear the action. By letter, the Government of 

Eritrea sought an adjournment of its preliminary application. On its part, the 

Government of Ethiopia also sought a stay of proceedings citing the fact that prior to 

the service of the notice of hearing of the preliminary application, the Governments of 

Ethiopia and Eritrea had entered into a Peace Agreement under which the dispute 

could be settled. The Government of Eritrea did not oppose the application for the 

stay of proceedings. 

In the circumstances, the Court held that the matter be adjourned sine die, that is, 

indefinitely, thereby leaving the parties to recommence the action as and when they 

thought fit. 26 The costs, the Court said 'will be in the cause', meaning that a 

determination as to costs would only be made when the matter was finalized. 

In the case of Martin Ogang v Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development 

Bank (PTA Bank) and Dr Michael Gondwe 27 Martin Ogang, who was at one time the 

President of the Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank, sought 

an order for the committal to jail for six months of Michael Gondwe, the then acting 

President of the PTA Bank, and two other persons in the employment of the Bank, 

and for the sequestration of all their properties for being in contempt of the Court in 

that they had disobeyed orders earlier given by the Court. Mr Ogang had earlier filed 

an application seeking orders to suspend and to stop a scheduled meeting of the 

PTA Bank Board of Directors and Board of Governors, and to stop the Board of 

Directors from committing certain other acts. On the same day that the application 

was filed, and without it having been served on the Bank and its acting President, the 

President of the Court had granted the orders sought. 

25 Judgment of 21/3/2001. This remains the only case so far brought by one state against another . 

26 Since a case can be postponed indefinitely, there is no provision in the Rules of Court providing for 

the lapse of a case if parties do not pursue it within a certain period. 

27 Judgment of 27/3/2001. 

16



The Rules of Court 28 provide that an application such as that which had been filed by 

Mr Ogang be served on the opposite party, and that the President prescribe a short 

period within which either party may submit written or oral observations. Even though 

the rules then go on to provide that the President may grant the application even 

before the observations of the opposite party have been submitted, the Court 

observed in this case that this does not exempt the initial mandatory requirement 

(that the application must first be served on the opposite party), from being complied 

with before an application can be granted. The Court reasoned that the only matter 

that could be dispensed with before an application had been granted, was the 

submission of the observations of the opposite party; and it observed that if the 

intention of the rules was that such a drastic remedy as a suspension order could be 

made by the President without the opposite party having been first served with the 

application involved, this would have been clearly spelled out. 

The Court then ruled that it was obvious that the order of the President made in 

favour of Mr Ogang, and the disobedience thereof, which constituted the foundation 

of the case, was contrary to the applicable rules, and was, therefore, a nullity. As 

such, it could not possibly be the basis of the committal for contempt of court and the 

sequestration of property, or other proceeding, against the Bank, Mr Gondwe and the 

other two bank employees. On that ground, the application was dismissed. Since at 

the beginning of the court action the Agents appearing for the Bank and Mr Gondwe 

had refused to take part in the proceedings and 'stalked out of court', the Court made 

no order as to costs. 

In the case of Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA 

Bank) and Dr Michael Gondwe v Martin Ogang 29 the PTA Bank and Dr Michael 

Gondwe challenged the jurisdiction of the COMESA Court to hear an application for a 

suspension order filed by Mr Ogang. By that application, Mr Ogang asked the Court 

for an order suspending the operation of a resolution passed by the Board of 

Directors of the PTA Bank. The PTA Bank argued that, by its Charter, it enjoyed 

certain privileges and immunities from legal proceedings in territories of PTA Member 

28 Sub-rule 1 of Rule 76. 

29 Judgment 29/372001. 

17



States. It contended further that the failure by Mr Ogang to state the law or statute, 

upon which his standing before the Court was established, deprived him of locus 

standi, and disentitled him from any of the remedies he sought, and that the Court 

lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case, or to try the issues raised, as Mr Ogang had 

not pleaded the law or statute upon which the Court’s jurisdiction was founded. 

Regarding the PTA Bank’s argument that it was granted privileges and immunities 

from prosecution by its Charter, the Court observed that the original Charter of the 

PTA Bank had stipulated that cases could be brought against the Bank in the 

territories of the Member States, or elsewhere, in a court of competent jurisdiction. 

But by an amendment subsequently made by its Board of Governors, the PTA Bank 

was granted immunity from every form of legal process. The Court noted that the 

Treaty did not provide 'for the existence of a rogue organ or institution flouting with 

impunity, all the rules of the organization from which it derives birth', and that any 

privileges and immunities that the PTA Bank assumed by an amendment of its 

Charter were ultra vires (went beyond) the Treaty that breathed life into the Bank. 

The Court then recalled the well-known principle of law that an international 

organization cannot confer on itself privileges and immunities to be granted to it by its 

member states. The Court said that the amended Article of the Charter of the PTA 

Bank purporting to confer privileges and immunities upon itself, conferred no 

privileges and immunities that had the force of law within COMESA. As to the locus 

standi of Mr Ogang, the Court said that there were no Rules of the Court that had 

been breached, so Mr Ogang had locus standi in the matter. 

This application was supposed to have been heard on 22 March 2001. The Notice 

stipulating the date and time of hearing of the application had been served on the 

legal representatives of the parties as early as 23 January 2001. However, on the 

day of the hearing, counsel for the PTA Bank applied for a deferment of the 

application on the ground that leading counsel was not available. The Court observed 

that it had a very tight schedule arising from the fact that it is composed of Judges 

from different countries, and considered the omission of leading counsel to appear on 

the scheduled date to argue the application, a slight on the Court. 'It is for counsel to 

wait on the Court and not the Court to wait on counsel', the Court stressed, and 

added that such a situation was unacceptable and one for which the party asking for 

18



deferment had to be ‘mulcted in costs’. Consequently, the PTA Bank was ordered to 

bear the wasted costs of the abortive hearing on 22 March 2001. Since the Court 

was satisfied that the application on both issues was misconceived and without merit, 

it dismissed the application ‘with costs’, meaning that the PTA Bank, besides having 

to meet its own costs, had to meet Mr Ogang’s costs as well. 

In the case of Building Design Enterprise v Common Market for Eastern and 

Southern Africa 30 the Court sat as a court of arbitration. However, the parties to the 

arbitration by means of a letter addressed to the Registrar of the Court intimated that 

they had reached a settlement of their dispute. That being so, the Court ordered that 

the arbitration be removed from the Register of the Court. As regards costs, the 

parties indicated in the same letter that they had reached a mutual agreement 

regarding costs. In the circumstances, the Court ordered that costs would be in terms 

of that mutual agreement. 

5 Some concluding thoughts 

It would appear from the cases decided that the Court has so far functioned as it 

should, and has been able to provide an effective system of judicial safeguards 

where the law has been challenged or applied. The Judges have ensured that the 

law is not interpreted and applied differently in each Member State, and that as a 

shared legal system, the system remains identical, allowing for legal or natural 

persons affected by any act, directive, decision or regulation of the Council or 

Member State, or the unlawful infringement of the provisions of the Treaty, to request 

the Court to determine the legality of such an act, directive, decision or regulation. 

However, a delay in the hearing of cases was experienced when the Judges’ 

contracts expired in June 2003. The vacuum created by the absence of Judges from 

June 2003 to May 2005, was only filled by the appointment of new Judges in June 

2005. 

So far, parties that have brought cases before the Court appear to have had no 

problems as to information gathering and presentation or as regards any aspect of 

30 Application for Arbitration No. 1 of 2002. 

19



bringing or defending a case before the Court. 31 It could be rather limiting, in terms of 

costs, however, that every party to a matter before the Court is to be represented by 

counsel. 

The Court’s jurisdiction is wide enough, able as it is to adjudicate upon disputes to 

which Member States, the Secretary General, residents of Member States (which 

includes individuals and legal persons) may be parties. It is quite progressive that a 

Member State that considers that another Member State, or the Council, has failed to 

fulfil an obligation under the Treaty, or has infringed a provision of the Treaty, can 

refer a case to the Court for determination, or for arbitration. 

One aspect that could disadvantage the development of the Court’s jurisprudence is 

the fact that no dissenting opinion of a Judge is allowed when the Court delivers a 

judgment. The Court can deliver only one judgment, and the conclusions reached by 

the majority of the Judges after final deliberations shall be the decision of the Court. 

Although Judges deliberating in closed session must state their opinion in a case and 

give the reasons for such opinion, they cannot in open Court disagree with the 

judgment, or aspects of it. It is doubtful that judges always agree on every aspect of a 

judgment, and preventing a judge from making his/her dissenting view publicly 

known, and the reasons for that dissent, robs the jurisprudence of some flavour in its 

development. History has shown that dissenting judges’ opinions are a rich 

contribution to the development of jurisprudence and the progressive development of 

any body of law. Sometimes what one judge may say in dissent may gain currency, 

and with time and changing circumstances, become accepted principle. 

While the Treaty states that the Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all 

matters which may be referred to it pursuant to the Treaty, and that decisions of the 

Court on the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty have precedence over 

decisions of national courts, the Treaty does not address the question of what 

happens in the case of trade disputes, where it is possible for parties to bring 

disputes both under the COMESA dispute settlement system and the World Trade 

31 According to Habben Nkonkesha, Officer in Charge of the COMESA Court of Justice, in sentiments 

expressed in an e-mail sent to the writer on 22 July 2005. 

20



Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system. This is possibly one issue on which 

an advisory opinion from the Court could be sought. 

The Members’ conviction on setting up the Court was that the stronger the Court of 

Justice, the stronger the foundation upon which COMESA will develop. The Court 

has been better able to contribute to the process of regional integration as one 

integrated judicial body, rather than the pre-existing three relatively weak and limited 

judicial bodies. However, a need appears for the Court to conduct publicity seminars 

in Member States, which should prove most beneficial to all stake-holders who would 

then gain an insight into the operations of the Court, as little appears to be known 

about it. It can be imagined that while the task entrusted to agents and lawyers 

appointed to handle the process/documents of the Court may appear routine since 

the agents and lawyers are supposed to be competent to handle Court processes in 

their national courts, these lawyers are, by the nature of their jobs, of varied origin 

and practical experience. 

References 

1. Building Design Enterprise v Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 

Application for Arbitration No. 1 of 2002. 

2. COMESA website http://www.comesa.int/index_html/view 

3. Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank) and Dr 

Michael Gondwe v Martin Ogang, Judgment 29/3/2001. 

4. Martin Ogang v Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank 

(PTA Bank) and Dr Michael Gondwe, Judgment 27/3/2001. 

5. The Republic of Kenya and Commissioner of Lands v Coastal Aquaculture, 

Reference No. 3 of 2001. 

6. Treaty Establishing the Common Market of East and Southern Africa of 1994. 

21



List of Cases Filed, Disposed of, and Pending 

DATE 

CAUSE 

PARTIES 

PEND- 

WITHDRAWN 

SETTLED OUT 

DATE OF 

STATUS 

FILED 

NO. 

ING 

OF COURT 

JUDGE- 

MENT 

24/9/1999 1/99 ETHIOPIA 

vERITREA 

- - - 21/3/2001 

Adjourned sine 

die with leave to 

apply 

20/1/2000 1A/2000 MARTIN 

OGANG vPTA 

BANK 

- - - 30/03/2001 

Dismissed 

Withdrawn 

20/1/2000 1B/2000 MARTIN 

- Notice of 

- - 

OGANG vPTA 

discontinuous 

BANK 

Filed on 

19/8/2002 

31/1/2000 1C/2000 MARTIN 

OGANG vPTA 

BANK 

- - - 30/3/2001 

Dismissed 

20/1/2000 1D/2000 MARTIN 

OGANG v 

PTA BANK 

- - - 29/3/2001 

Dismissed 

21/3/2000 1E/2000 MARTIN 

OGANG vPTA 

BANK 

- - - 27/3/2001 

Dismissed 

20/4/2000 1F/2000 MARTIN 

OGANG vPTA 

BANK 

- - - 27/3/2001 

Dismissed 

22



05/3/2001 1/2001 ETHIOPIA v 

ERITREA 

- - - 21/3/2001 

Application for 

stay of 

proceedings in 

Ref. 1/99 

granted with 

leave to apply 

26/6/2001 2/2001 DR KABETA 

MULEYA v 


- - - 23/4/2002 

Applicant 

succeeded on 

the principal 

prayer 

19/7/2001 3 of 001 COASTAL 

AQUACULTU 

RE 

- - - 23/4/2002 

Application 

struck out for 

want of locus 

standi 

v 

THE 

REPUBLIC 

OF KENYA 

27/1/2003 1/2003 KABETA 

MULEYA 

- - - 01/7/2003 

Applicant 

awarded 

damages for libel 

v 

COMESA & 

ERASTUS 

MWENCHA 

05/3/2003 P.A. 

1/2003 

KABETA 

MULEYA 

v 

- - - 03/4/2003 

Second 

Respondent 

struck out from 

the proceedings, 

costs awarded to 


Mwencha 


ERASTUS 

MWENCHA 

16/4/2002 1 of 2002 BUILDING 

DESIGN 

- - Parties 

reached a 

18/10/2002 

Settled out of 

Court, claim 

abandoned 

23



ENTERPRISE 

v 


settlement of 

their dispute 

and the claim 

therein had 

been 

abandoned. 

07/8/2002 3 of 2002 BILIKA 

SIMAMBA 

- - Parties 

reached a 

25/10/2002 

Settled out of 

Court, claim 

abandoned 

v 

settlement of 

their dispute 


and the claim 

therein had 

been 

abandoned. 

13/5/2002 2 of 2002 MARTIN 

OGANG v 

PTA BANK 

Pending 

for 

hearing 

- - - 

Reference 

stayed pending 

compliance with 

an order for 

costs in a 

discontinued 

reference 

25/10/2002 4 of 2002 STANDARD 

CHARTERED 

FINANCIAL 

SERVICES 

(LTD) AND 2 

OTHERS 

v 

THE COURT 

OF APPEAL 

Pending 

for 

hearing 

- - - 

On 20/11/2003 it 

was ordered that 

the Republic of 

Kenya be 

substituted for 

Court of Appeal, 

and that King 

Wollen Mills Ltd 

and Gallot 

Industries be 

made 

Respondents 

before Court. 

The amended 

Reference is 

pending for 

hearing 

OF KENYA 

22/1/2004 4 of 2002 MRS. 

Pending 

- - - 

Pending for 

hearing 

NKURUNZIZA 

for 

AND 4 

hearing 

OTHERS 

24



v 

PTA BANK 

13/1/2003 4 of 2002 STANDARD 

CHARTERD 

FINANCIAL 

Pending 

for 

hearing 

- - - 

Preliminary 

application 

seeking to struck 

out the 

substantive 

reference 

SERVICES 

(LTD) 

v 

Pending 

together with a 

notice of 

objection for lack 

of jurisdiction 

THE 

REPUBLIC 

OF KENYA 

AND 2 

OTHERS 

31/7/2003 2 of 2002 PTA BANK 

v 

MARTIN 

OGANG 

Pending 

for 

hearing 

- - - Preliminary 

application in 

Reference No. 2 

of 2002 filed 

pursuant to the 

Judgment and 

Ruling of costs 

ordered by the 

Court which 

were not paid. 

The Applicant 

may apply to 

have Reference 

No. 2 of 2002 

struck off. 

25



26 

Working Papers 

2002 

US safeguard measures on steel imports: specific implications 

by Niel Joubert & Rian Geldenhuys. 

WP 1/2002, April 

A few reflections on Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol 

by Jan Bohanes 

WP 2/2002, August 

Competition policy in a regional context: a SADC perspective on trade investment & competition issues 

by Trudi Hartzenberg 

WP 3/2002, November 

Rules of Origin and Agriculture: some observations 

by Hilton Zunckel 


2003 

A new anti-dumping regime for South Africa and SACU 

by Stuart Clark & Gerhard Erasmus 

WP 1/2003, May 

Why build capacity in international trade law? 

by Gerhard Erasmus 

WP 2/2003, May 

The regional integration facilitation forum: a simple answer to a complicated issue? 

by Henry Mutai 

WP 3/2003, July 

The WTO GMO dispute 

by Maxine Kennett 

WP 4/2003, July 

WTO accession 

by Maxine Kennett 

WP 5/2003, July 

On the road to Cancun: a development perspective on EU trade policies 

by Faizel Ismail 


GATS: an update on the negotiations and developments of trade in services in SADC 

by Adeline Tibakweitira 


An evaluation of the capitals control debate: is there a case for controlling capital flows in the SACU-US free 

trade agreement? 

by Calvin Manduna 


Non-smokers hooked on tobacco 



Assessing the impact of trade liberalisation: the importance of policy complementarities and policy processes 

in a SADC context 

by Trudi Hartzenberg 

WP 10/2003, October 

An examination of regional trade agreements: a case study of the EC and the East African community 

by Jeremy Everard John Streatfeild 


Reforming the EU sugar regime: will Southern Africa still feature? 

by Daniel Malzbender 


2004 

Complexities and inadequacies relating to certain provision of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 

by Leon Steenkamp 

WP 1/2004, March 

Challenges posed by electronic commerce to the operation and implementation of the General Agreement on 

Trade in Services 

by Leon Steenkamp 


Trade liberalisation and regional integration in SADC: policy synergies assessed in an industrial organisation 

framework 

by Martine Visser and Trudi Hartzenberg 


Tanzania and AGOA: opportunities missed? 

by Eckart Naumann and Linda Mtango 

WP 4/2004, March



Rationale behind agricultural reform negotiations 

by Hilton Zunkel 

WP 5/2004, July 

The impact of US-SACU FTA negotiations on Public Health in Southern Africa 

by Tenu Avafia 


Export Performance of the South African Automotive Industry 

by Mareika Meyn 

WP 7/2004 December 

2005 

Textiles and clothing: Reflections on the sector’s integration into the post-quota environment 

by Eckart Naumann 


Assessing the Causes of Sub-Saharan Africa's Declining Exports and Addressing Supply-Side Constraints 


WP 2/2005, May 

A Few Reflections on Annex VI to the SADC Trade Protocol 

by Jan Bohanes 

WP 3/2005, June 

Tariff Liberalisation Impacts of the EAC Customs Union in Perspective 

by Heinz - Michael Stahl 


Trade facilitation and the WTO: A critical analysis of proposals on trade facilitation and their implications for 

African countries. 

by Gainmore Zanamwe 


An evaluation of the alternatives and possibilities for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to meet the sanitary 

standards for entry into the international trade in animals and animal products 

by Gideon K. Brückner 


Trade Briefs 

2002 

Cost sharing in international dispute settlement: some reflections in the context of SADC 

by Jan Bohanes & Gerhard Erasmus. 

TB 1/2002, July 

Trade dispute between Zambia & Zimbabwe 

by Tapiwa C. Gandidze. 

TB 2/2002, August 

2003 

Non-tariff barriers: the reward of curtailed freedom 


TB 1/2003, February 

The effects of globalization on negotiating tactics 

by Gerhard Erasmus & Lee Padayachee 

TB 2/2003, May 

The US-SACU FTA : implications for wheat trade 


TB 3/2003, June 

Memberships in multiple regional trading arrangements : legal implications for the conduct of trade 

negotiations 

by Henry Mutai 


2004 

Apparel Trade and Quotas: Developments since AGOA’s inception and challenges ahead 


TB 1/2004, March 

Adequately boxing Africa in the debate on domestic support and export subsidies 

by Hilton E Zunckel 

TB 2/2004, July 

Recent changes to the AGOA legislation 



2005 

Trade after Preferences: a New Adjustment Partnership? 

by Ron Sandrey 

TB1/2005, June 

27



TRIPs and Public Health: The Unresolved Debate 

by Tenu Avafia 


Daring to Dispute: Are there shifting trends in African participation in WTO dispute settlement? 



South Africa’s Countervailing Regulations 

by Gustav Brink 

TB4/2005, August 

Trade and competitiveness in African fish exports: Impacts of WTO and EU negotiations and regulation 

by Stefano Ponte, Jesper Raakjær Nielsen, & Liam Campling 

TB5/2005, September 

28

Dispute Settlement under COMESA - Paul Roos Gymnasium

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