20131211-2013.12Reports

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The Rules of the Air 2007, Rule 11 states that: (1) ...an aircraft which is being overtaken in the air shall have the right-of-way and the overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending or in horizontal flight, shall keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right. (2) An aircraft which is overtaking another aircraft shall keep out of the way of the other aircraft until that other aircraft has been passed and is clear, notwithstanding any change in the relative positions of the two aircraft”. The Manchester METAR 1120 was: 18010KT 150V220 9999 FEW 018 SCT 028 24/18 Q1008 NO SIG= PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DISCUSSIONS Information available included a report from one of the pilots involved and a radar video recording. The Board were disappointed that the pilot of the Mooney M20 had not responded to several requests to complete an Airprox report. Consequently, it was not possible to determine whether he had ever obtained visual contact with the EV97. However, in view of the weather conditions reported by the EV97 pilot (CAVOK) there was no reason, from a weather perspective, that he should not have been able to see the other aircraft. The Board were mindful of the fact that the sole objective of the UKAB is to assess reported Airprox in the interests of enhancing flight safety; it is not the purpose of the Board to apportion blame or liability even if one pilot chooses not to participate in the process. Although both pilots were equally responsible for collision avoidance in Class G airspace (Rule 8), lacking any further evidence from the Mooney pilot, the Board concluded that the M20, being faster than the EV97, was overtaking the latter aircraft at the time of the Airprox. Therefore, they opined that the M20 pilot had every opportunity to see the EV-97 and should simply have kept out of its way (Rule 11). As a result of this the Board decided that the cause of the Airprox was that the M20 pilot flew close enough to the EV97 to cause its pilot concern. Once the cause had been determined, considerable discussion then took place about whether the risk should be classified as a Category B, C or D. Members decided that, although there was no report from the M20 pilot, and so they could not ascertain what he had or had not seen, there was still sufficient evidence from the radar recordings and the EV97 pilot’s report to render a meaningful finding. If the M20 pilot had not seen the EV-97 then safety margins had been much reduced because the two aircraft had come within 100ft vertically and < 0.1nm. If the M20 pilot had seen the EV-97 then he had flown too close and had disregarded the requirement to pass by on the right of the EV-97, thereby also reducing safety margins below normal. Therefore, in either case, the Board decided that the M20 had passed sufficiently close to the EV97 (recorded as 100ft V and
AIRPROX REPORT No 2013095 Date/Time: 23 Jul 2013 1217Z Position: Airspace: 5126N 00001E (4.7nm SSW London/City Airport) London/City CTA (Class: D/G) Lon FIR Reporting Ac Reported Ac Type: Avro RJ1H Robin DR400 Operator: CAT Civ Pte Alt/FL: 2000ft 1500ft QNH (NK hPa) QNH (NK hPa) Weather: VMC CAVOK VMC CLNC Visibility: NK >10km Reported Separation: Recorded Separation: 100ft V/0.5nm H NK 600ft V/0.6nm H CPA 1217:31 600ft V/0.6nm H A16 A14 A14 A15 DR400 Diagram based on radar data A20 A14 NM 0 1 2 3 A21 17:19 17:07 A23 16:55 A25 1216:43 A26 RJ100 PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB THE RJ1H PILOT reports conducting an approach to London/City airport (LCY). The white and red aircraft had SSR transponder selected on with Modes A, C and S; the aircraft was fitted with TCAS II. The pilot was operating under IFR in VMC with a Radar Control Service from Thames RAD. Whilst downwind for RW09 ILS, 7-8nm south of LCY, heading 280°, at 190kt, and just levelling off at altitude 2000ft, he received a TCAS TA from ‘a small VFR traffic about 700ft below and 0.5nm away’ in his 10 o’clock position. He saw the traffic and identified it as a ‘PA28 type’, low-wing, single-engine lightaircraft. Shortly after, a TCAS RA ‘Monitor Vertical Speed’ was triggered, indicating a ROD of not more than 0fpm. The aircraft autopilot was already levelling off, ‘ALT Captured’ at 2000ft, with a ROD of 300ft decreasing to zero. After the Intruder passed their 9 o’clock position the TCAS advised ‘Clear of Conflict’. He informed Thames RAD of the RA and continued the approach into LCY. A second TCAS TA occurred on final for RW09 at about 7nm caused by traffic about 500ft below. He stated that the TCAS RA had occurred at a busy point in the flight as they were preparing to configure the aircraft for landing. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Medium’. THE DR400 PILOT reports transiting through the LCY ‘zone’. The red and white aircraft had strobes selected on, as was the SSR transponder with Modes A, C and S. The aircraft was fitted with a Traffic Advisory System (TAS). The pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and reported being in receipt of a ‘Radar Service’ from Heathrow RAD 1 . He was tracking around the Heathrow CTR, planning to transit to the north-north-east. He obtained a crossing clearance from Heathrow and, after being instructed to descend from 2000ft to 1500ft in a right-hand orbit, was given clearance by the radar controller to transit the ‘City zone’, initially taking up a heading of 060° at 120kt. He neither saw nor heard a conflict, he was not advised of a conflict by the controller, and his TAS did not generate a warning. He was unaware of an Airprox until advised by the Radar Analysis Cell. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’. 1 He was in receipt of a Basic Service at the time of the Airprox.
Page 1 and 2: Annex A to UK AIRPROX BOARD: MONTHL
Page 3 and 4: AIRPROX REPORT No 2013075 Date/Time
Page 5 and 6: Although the microlight aircraft’
Page 9 and 10: At 0836:00 the A319 had passed abea
Page 11 and 12: e encountered, and what their assoc
Page 13 and 14: Factual Background The weather at C
Page 17 and 18: It was evident to the Board that th
Page 19 and 20: When N of DTY, inbound to HON, the
Page 21 and 22: Figure 3 A high level of thundersto
Page 25 and 26: PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DI
Page 27 and 28: THE WELLESBOURNE FLIGHT INFORMATION
Page 29 and 30: The FISO reported it had been a bus
Page 31 and 32: Following this incident, the Welles
Page 33 and 34: NATS Ltd An Airprox with an object
Page 35: AIRPROX REPORT No 2013092 Date/Time
Page 39 and 40: From To Transcribed Speech Time RAD
Page 41 and 42: Figure 1: DR400 squawk 7034, RJ1H s
Page 43 and 44: PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RIS
Page 45 and 46: Factual Background The Cambridge we
Page 49 and 50: Figure 2 At 1216:00, after landing
Page 53 and 54: subsequently became visible at 1501
Page 57 and 58: PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RIS
Page 59 and 60: MATS Part 1 1 states the ATC respon
Page 61 and 62: Figure 4 Summary The Airprox occurr

20131211-2013.12Reports

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