20131211-2013.12Reports

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PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK Cause: A late sighting by both pilots. Degree of Risk: B. ERC Score 4 : 4. 4 Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC. 3
AIRPROX REPORT No 2013099 Date/Time: 1 Aug 2013 1211Z Position: 5130N 00011W (6nm West London City airport - elevation 19ft) Airspace: London City CTR (Class: D) Reporting Ac Type: RJ1H R44 Reported Ac Operator: CAT Civ Pte Alt/FL: 2000ft 1500ft QNH (1008hPa) QNH Weather: VMC CAVOK VMC CLBC Visibility: >10km >10km Reported Separation: Recorded Separation: 500ft V/400-500m H 500ft V/0.4nm H NK CPA 1211:50 500ft V/0.4nm H Heathrow E’ly CTR Boundary 11:38 11:26 A109 1500ft alt 11:14 11:02 1210:50 Diagram based on radar data RJ1H 2000ft alt LCY RW09 C/L 3 2 1 0 NM PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB THE RJ1H PILOT reports inbound, IFR, to London City airport (LCY). All lights were illuminated and SSR Modes C and S were selected, squawking 5725. During approach to RW09, on an ILS intercept heading 060° at 2000ft, City Radar informed him about “a couple” of helicopters at about the 1 o’clock position. He had visual contact and received a TCAS TA. A few seconds later a TCAS RA ‘monitor VS’ was received. Since he had the helicopters clearly identified and he was flying above VS red indication on TCAS, he continued the approach. About ten seconds later ’clear of conflict’ was received. He reported having received a TCAS RA to ATC, after the aircraft had landed. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’. THE ROBINSON R44 HELICOPTER PILOT reports operating on a VFR flight under the control of Heathrow radar 125.625MHz. The helicopter, coloured predominately blue, had a strobe and navigation lights illuminated. SSR Mode C was selected. ACAS was not carried. He was conducting an aerial filming task approximately 6nm West of LCY. He was flying in accordance with his ATC clearance under a Radar Control service to operate on Helicopter Route H4, with a limit of no further East than London Bridge and no further West than Vauxhall Bridge. At times, he had clearance to operate off-route in the region of Trafalgar Square. His altitude clearance was not above 1500ft on the London QNH. He complied fully with his given clearance and at no time did he exceed any of the geographical limits. He did not believe he had exceeded any of the vertical limits of his clearance. He was given regular traffic information on other helicopters operating on H4, as well as the inbound aircraft to LCY. Either through his own visual scan or regular traffic information, he remained in visual contact with the arriving aircraft as well as other traffic in his operating area. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘None’. Factual Background MATS PART 1 1 states: ‘Separation standards are not prescribed for application by ATC between VFR and IFR flights in Class D airspace’. 1 MATS Part 1, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.3 1
Page 1 and 2: Annex A to UK AIRPROX BOARD: MONTHL
Page 3 and 4: AIRPROX REPORT No 2013075 Date/Time
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Page 11 and 12: e encountered, and what their assoc
Page 13 and 14: Factual Background The weather at C
Page 17 and 18: It was evident to the Board that th
Page 19 and 20: When N of DTY, inbound to HON, the
Page 21 and 22: Figure 3 A high level of thundersto
Page 25 and 26: PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DI
Page 27 and 28: THE WELLESBOURNE FLIGHT INFORMATION
Page 29 and 30: The FISO reported it had been a bus
Page 31 and 32: Following this incident, the Welles
Page 33 and 34: NATS Ltd An Airprox with an object
Page 39 and 40: From To Transcribed Speech Time RAD
Page 41 and 42: Figure 1: DR400 squawk 7034, RJ1H s
Page 43 and 44: PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RIS
Page 45: Factual Background The Cambridge we
Page 49 and 50: Figure 2 At 1216:00, after landing
Page 53 and 54: subsequently became visible at 1501
Page 57 and 58: PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RIS
Page 59 and 60: MATS Part 1 1 states the ATC respon
Page 61 and 62: Figure 4 Summary The Airprox occurr

20131211-2013.12Reports

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