20131211-2013.12Reports

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for the airspace involved. In the event, 500ft vertical and 0.4nm horizontal separation had been achieved even though there was no specific requirement so to do. The Board members agreed that the Airprox had been reported because of the TCAS RA received by the RJ1H due to the R44’s flight vector. They unanimously agreed that this was a TCAS sighting report. In view of recent similar Airprox being assessed as a Category E (normal procedures, safety standards, and parameters pertained) it was decided that this Airprox should also be similarly categorised . However, irrespective of the benign circumstances surrounding this particular event, the Board were concerned that it should not be considered normal procedure for aircraft being vectored within the LCY CTR to receive TCAS RAs lest pilots become inured to what might become normalised routine behaviour rather than reacting fully to TCAS alerts. A number of members also commented that this type of occurrence could easily occur at other airports within Controlled Airspace and should not be considered unique to LCY, especially with the potential increase in Class D airspace that might be introduced at other regional airports in future. Therefore, in conjunction with Airprox 2013095 and 2013121 (also assessed during this Board), they decided to generate an overarching recommendation that the CAA reviews VFR/SVFR traffic procedures within CAS with respect to RA occurrences in TCAS-equipped aircraft. PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK Cause: Degree of Risk: TCAS sighting report. E ERC Score: 3 1. Recommendation: The CAA reviews VFR/SVFR traffic procedures within CAS with respect to RA occurrences in TCAS equipped aircraft. 3 Although the Event Risk Classification (ERC) trial had been formally terminated for future development at the time of the Board, for data continuity and consistency purposes, Director UKAB and the UKAB Secretariat provided a shadow assessment of ERC. 4
AIRPROX REPORT No 2013101 Date/Time: 2 Aug 2013 1502Z Diagram based on radar data and pilot reports Position: 5405N 00123W (5nm WNW Linton) Airspace: Vale of York AIAA (Class: G) Reporting Ac Type: Tucano T1 Glider Reported Ac Untraced glider Operator: HQ Air (Trg) Unknown Alt/FL: FL40 NK CPA Weather: VMC CLBC NK Visibility: 30km NK Reported Separation: NM 2 1 01:31 A42 01:19 A39 01:07 A35 00:55 A32 00:43 A28 300ft V/0ft H Recorded Separation: NK NK 0 1500:31 A24 Tucanos PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB THE TUCANO PILOT reports leading a 2-aircraft close-formation departure from RAF Linton-on- Ouse (LIN). The black and yellow aircraft had navigation lights and HISLs selected on, as was the lead aircraft’s SSR transponder with Modes A and C. The aircraft was fitted with TCAS I. He was operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Traffic Service from the LIN Departure Controller (DEP), with ‘Glider Ops’ in force 1 . Upon receipt of this service he was immediately informed of three primary radar contacts; two to the south-west of his position and one to the north-west. Determining that the later, being ‘on his nose’, was a greater threat, he asked for an update on its position. He reported being told 'north-east, 1nm, no height', at which point he turned right to try and achieve deconfliction. Shortly after turning, heading 300° at 150kt and climbing through FL40, his wingman became visual with glider traffic as it passed directly beneath them with an estimated vertical separation of 200-300ft. He stated that the glider was at around 4000ft, 4nm west of LIN, and that despite having the radar service and directing all of his spare attention towards lookout, he never achieved visual contact with the glider. He noted that a gliding competition had launched that afternoon from Sutton Bank (hence the 'Glider Ops' decision) and that the task route was largely orientated north-south, with the legs repeatedly crossing the ‘Vale of York MATZs’. He stated that he was concerned that despite taking every reasonable step to try and gain visual contact with the glider, he was still unable to do so. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’. THE GLIDER PILOT: Despite extensive tracing action, the glider pilot could not be located. THE LIN DEP CONTROLLER reports that he was unaware of the incident at the time it happened and was submitting his report as a response to the hazard observation that was submitted. A VFR departure clearance was given to the Tucano formation to take-off during ‘Glider Ops’ at LIN. The subject Tucano pilot spoke with LIN DEP about 5min later. He climbed out, requested a Traffic Service and was identified and given traffic information on 3 non-squawking contacts west and northwest of the airfield all at a range of about 4-5nm with no height information available. As the Tucano pilot continued his departure profile, updated traffic information was passed as he got closer to a PSR contact. The Tucano passed the traffic before going en-route within a few minutes. 1 During which there is a mandatory requirement of at least a Traffic Service whilst on departure, until the aircraft is in an operating area clear of significant glider activity. 1
Page 1 and 2: Annex A to UK AIRPROX BOARD: MONTHL
Page 3 and 4: AIRPROX REPORT No 2013075 Date/Time
Page 5 and 6: Although the microlight aircraft’
Page 9 and 10: At 0836:00 the A319 had passed abea
Page 11 and 12: e encountered, and what their assoc
Page 13 and 14: Factual Background The weather at C
Page 17 and 18: It was evident to the Board that th
Page 19 and 20: When N of DTY, inbound to HON, the
Page 21 and 22: Figure 3 A high level of thundersto
Page 25 and 26: PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD’S DI
Page 27 and 28: THE WELLESBOURNE FLIGHT INFORMATION
Page 29 and 30: The FISO reported it had been a bus
Page 31 and 32: Following this incident, the Welles
Page 33 and 34: NATS Ltd An Airprox with an object
Page 39 and 40: From To Transcribed Speech Time RAD
Page 41 and 42: Figure 1: DR400 squawk 7034, RJ1H s
Page 43 and 44: PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RIS
Page 45 and 46: Factual Background The Cambridge we
Page 49: Figure 2 At 1216:00, after landing
Page 53 and 54: subsequently became visible at 1501
Page 57 and 58: PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RIS
Page 59 and 60: MATS Part 1 1 states the ATC respon
Page 61 and 62: Figure 4 Summary The Airprox occurr

20131211-2013.12Reports

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