- Page 1: Federico Etro COMPETITION, INNOVATI
- Page 8 and 9: Preface In 1934 Springer published
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- Page 18 and 19: Contents Preface ..................
- Page 20 and 21: Contents xix 5. Antitrust and Abuse
- Page 22 and 23: 1. Competition, Leadership and Entr
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- Page 26 and 27: 1.1.1 Monopoly and Antitrust Issues
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- Page 36 and 37: 1.2 Increasing Marginal Costs and P
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1.4 A Simple Model of Competition f
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1.4 A Simple Model of Competition f
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1.5 Conclusions 35 or strategic inv
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1.6 Appendix 37 It can be easily ve
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1.6 Appendix 39 barrier would be F
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42 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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44 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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46 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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48 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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50 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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52 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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54 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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56 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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58 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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60 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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62 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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64 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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66 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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68 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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70 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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72 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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78 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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84 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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86 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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88 2. Strategic Commitments and End
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3. Stackelberg Competition and Endo
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3. Stackelberg Competition and Endo
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3.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium 95 ways
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3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium with En
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3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium with En
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3.3 Competition in Quantities, in P
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3.3 Competition in Quantities, in P
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3.3 Competition in Quantities, in P
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3.3 Competition in Quantities, in P
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3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders a
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3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders a
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3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders a
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3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders a
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3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders a
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3.5 Antitrust and Collusion 119 Mor
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3.6 State-Aids and Strategic Export
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3.7 Privatizations 123 if all count
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3.9 Appendix 125 3.9 Appendix Proof
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3.9 Appendix 127 which proves the c
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3.9 Appendix 129 which concludes th
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132 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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134 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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136 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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138 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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140 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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142 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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144 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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146 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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148 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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150 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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152 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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154 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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156 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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158 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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160 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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162 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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164 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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166 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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168 4. Dynamic Competition and Endo
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5. Antitrust and Abuse of Dominance
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5. Antitrust and Abuse of Dominance
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5.1 The Traditional Approaches to A
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5.1 The Traditional Approaches to A
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5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders an
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5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders an
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5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders an
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5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders an
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5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders an
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5.3 A Digression on IPRs Protection
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5.3 A Digression on IPRs Protection
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5.3 A Digression on IPRs Protection
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5.4 Reforming Antitrust 195 3) impr
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5.4 Reforming Antitrust 197 cies. N
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5.4 Reforming Antitrust 199 “the
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5.4 Reforming Antitrust 201 gressiv
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5.4 Reforming Antitrust 203 Finally
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5.5 Conclusions 205 When entry is e
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6. Microsoft Economics After examin
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6.1 The Software Market 209 In the
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6.1 The Software Market 211 operati
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6.1 The Software Market 213 market
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6.1 The Software Market 215 buyers
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6.1 The Software Market 217 top of
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6.2 The Antitrust Cases 219 softwar
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6.2 The Antitrust Cases 221 After t
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6.3 Is Microsoft a Monopolist? 223
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6.3 Is Microsoft a Monopolist? 225
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6.3 Is Microsoft a Monopolist? 227
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6.3 Is Microsoft a Monopolist? 229
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6.4 Bundling 231 theorem”, as lon
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6.4 Bundling 233 To sum up our gene
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6.5 Intellectual Property Rights 23
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6.5 Intellectual Property Rights 23
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6.5 Intellectual Property Rights 23
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6.6 Conclusions 241 we are used to
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244 7. Epilogue exogenous constrain
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246 7. Epilogue which endogenous en
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248 7. Epilogue when entry is endog
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250 7. Epilogue additional control
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252 7. Epilogue 7.2 Implications fo
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254 7. Epilogue firms (which can be
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8. References Abreu, Dilip, 1986, E
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8. References 259 Beath, John, Yann
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8. References 261 Coase, Ronald, 19
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8. References 263 Selected Essays,
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8. References 265 Farrel, Joseph an
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8. References 267 ICC, 2007, Single
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8. References 269 Technological Spe
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8. References 271 Rhee, Ki-Eun, 200
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8. References 273 Tirole, Jean, 200
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Index Abreu, Dilip, 8 Absorptive ca
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Index 277 Diners Club, 224 Dinopoul
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Index 279 Krugman, Paul, 120, 220,
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Index 281 Röller, Lars-Hendrick, 2
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Index 283 Vodafone, 212 von Weizsac