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Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust. A Theory of Market ... - Intertic

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1.4 A Simple Model <strong>of</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> for the <strong>Market</strong> 27<br />

Consider now a Stackelberg equilibrium. As already noticed, when the<br />

investment by one firm is increased, the other firms have incentives to invest<br />

less: then in a Stackelberg equilibrium the leader exploits its first mover advantage<br />

by investing more than the followers, so as to reduce their investment<br />

<strong>and</strong> increase its relative probability <strong>of</strong> winning. For instance, in a Stackelberg<br />

duopoly the leader invests z L = V (1 − V )/(1 − 2V 2 ) <strong>and</strong> the follower invests<br />

z = V (1 − V − V 2 )/(1 − 2V 2 ).<br />

In a Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry, as long as the investment<br />

<strong>of</strong> the leader z L is small enough to allow entry <strong>of</strong> at least one firm, the<br />

first order conditions <strong>and</strong> the free entry conditions are:<br />

(1 − z) n−2 (1 − z L )V = z, z(1 − z) n−2 (1 − z L )V = z 2 /2+F<br />

which deliver the same investment choice by each entrant as in the Marshall<br />

equilibrium, z = √ 2F , <strong>and</strong> the number or firms:<br />

h<br />

log (1 − z L )V/ √ i<br />

2F<br />

n(z L )=2+ h<br />

log 1/(1 − √ i<br />

2F )<br />

Putting these two equations together <strong>and</strong> substituting in the pr<strong>of</strong>it function<br />

<strong>of</strong> the leader, we would have:<br />

π L = z L (1 − z) n−1 V − z2 L<br />

2 − F =<br />

= z √ ³<br />

L 2F 1 − √ ´<br />

2F − z2 L<br />

1 − z L 2 − F (1.41)<br />

which has not an interior optimum: indeed, it is always optimal for the leader<br />

to deter entry investing enough. This requires a slightly higher investment<br />

than the one for which thehequilibrium number <strong>of</strong> firms would be n =2.<br />

Since n(z L )=2requires log (1 − z L )V/ √ i<br />

2F =0, we can conclude that the<br />

leader will invest:<br />

√<br />

2F<br />

¯z L =1−<br />

(1.42)<br />

V<br />

which is increasing in the value <strong>of</strong> innovations <strong>and</strong> decreasing in their fixed<br />

cost. Therefore, in a contest with a leader <strong>and</strong> free entry <strong>of</strong> participants, the<br />

leader invests enough to deter investment by the other firms <strong>and</strong> is the only<br />

possible winner <strong>of</strong> the contest.<br />

1.4.1 The Arrow’s Paradox<br />

Until now we investigated a form <strong>of</strong> competition for the market where all firms<br />

were at the same level. Often times, competition for the market is between an

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