The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in ... - ISIS Europe

ESR 54 May 2012
The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012
By Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos
In the summer of 2010, a new division was created within the NATO International Staff in order to tackle
what the organisation had recently defined as “Emerging Security Challenges” (ESCs): terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks, piracy, and energy and environmental
security. This European Security Review analyses the European Union’s response to these new types of
threats to security and seeks possible ways to increase cooperation between NATO and the EU. The main
outcomes of the research relate to the shortcomings of EU responses to ESCs in terms of institutional
complexity, insufficient coordination between different actors and policies, lack of political leadership at
the EU level, and fragmented and limited defence budgets. The economic and financial crisis that the EU
currently faces— exerting fierce pressure on Member States and their budgets—provides new momentum
for greater rationalisation and integration of defence spending within the EU. In this context, the NATO
Chicago Summit of the 20-21 May 2012, constitutes a good platform from which the EU-NATO
partnership can be re-evaluated and strengthened by clearly framing the ESCs and defining the
organisations’ respective roles in dealing with them.
Over the course of the past two decades, the understanding and definition of security threats have
undergone a two-fold transformation. First, the evolution of the international security environment has
led to a diversification and decentralisation of security threats, transcending state borders and actors, and
spreading across political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. Second—and consequently—a
major reprioritisation of security threats followed, making non-traditional “hybrid” threats more
conspicuous.
Emerging Security Challenges
The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 and the setting up of a new division within the NATO International
Staff reflect the recent shift in security understanding. Considered to be “Emerging Security Challenges”
(ESCs), a series of “new” threats, ranging from terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), cyber attacks and piracy to energy and environmental security, was placed at the
forefront of NATO’s agenda. 1 Despite being varied in nature, ESCs present some common characteristics.
First of all, although labelled “new”, it is actually their increasing prioritisation as threatening challenges
that is new. Secondly, most of the threats are not of a military nature per se, and are not strictly foreign
nor domestic, political or economic. The issues are hybrid, inter-related and cross-cutting and therefore
cannot be neutralised using only deterrence or the traditional NATO military “toolbox”. Instead, they
require a holistic and comprehensive approach, combining political, diplomatic, economic, military,
technological and scientific initiatives. Thirdly, they do not affect Allies in the same way. Thus, the
traditional structure, policies and strategic culture of NATO as a politico-military defence Alliance
concerned with territorial defence is challenged.
The European Union’s reference document on security matters is the European Security Strategy (ESS) of
December 2003, which exposes the EU’s threat perception and defines strategic objectives in order to
1 Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2010, §§ 7-15:
http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012, by Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos 2
achieve a “secure Europe in a better world”. 2 This document outlines five main security threats:
terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, regional conflict, state failure and organised crime. The ESS was
complemented by the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy which
added some “new” challenges to the original list. The EU’s threat assessment was comparable to NATO’s
Strategic Concept, although the ESS did not focus as much on climate change, cyber security, and piracy.
There is a common understanding between the EU and NATO about the nature of the principal security
challenges of the 21 st century. However, whereas the EU appears to be very focused on regional conflicts
and instability derived from state failure internationally and—most importantly—in its immediate
neighbourhood, NATO, on the other hand, is more preoccupied with transnational and technological
issues such as cyber security and missile defence.
A first explanation of this difference can be found in the European Union’s relation to its neighbourhood;
over the past two decades, the EU has been very involved with its immediate neighbourhood, attempting
to project and spread stability in the wake of the instability of the 1990s. The EU thus has sources of
concern for its external action and foreign policy agenda other than the ESCs.
Other differences between the EU and NATO also stem from the date of drafting of the ESS: less concern
was attached to energy, environment and cyber security in 2003 than in 2010. The launch of the EU’s
European External Action Service (EEAS) in December 2010 and the complexity of the preceding
preparations also contributed to the ESS not being updated. Gradually, cyber space, energy and
environmental security have appeared on the EU agenda as seen through the development of new
initiatives within the EU; in December 2011, European Union High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton stated: “we need to be able to respond to the
complex threats of today; violent crises, cyber-treats; energy security”. 3
Finally and most importantly, the EU and NATO are different types of organisations with different
mandates. NATO has always been a military defence Alliance focusing on the security and defence
dimensions of foreign policy. Although it was created for the purpose of ensuring the existence of a
peaceful and pacified Europe, the European Union was originally not meant to be a strong international
security actor; it may be for this reason that the EU has struggled to define, develop and establish its role
and identity as a foreign policy actor. The EU’s position regarding ESCs reflects these difficulties, which
has led to the low level of coordination, integration, and visibility on these threats.
Addressing the Emerging Security Challenges: NATO and EU approaches
[…] New security challenges are increasingly inter-connected. An offensive cyber weapon, Stuxnet, was
used to disrupt and even destroy parts of Iran's nuclear programme. Narcotics in Afghanistan help
finance the Taliban insurgency in the same way that piracy in Somalia is currently funding the al Shabab
terrorist organisation. […]So, to my mind, it does make eminent sense to have an Emerging Security
Challenges Division in NATO that can deal with the issues separately but also understand how they can
impact on each other.
--Jamie Shea, 26 October 2011 4
2 A secure Europe in a better world - European Security Strategy, 2003:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
3 Speech by High Representative Catherine Ashton, European Parliament in Strasbourg, 13 December 2011:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126896.pdf
4 Q&A with Jamie Shea, 26 October 2011: http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/index/articles/view/Jamie_Shea%27s_Answers_to_Your_Questions
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The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012, by Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos 3
NATO’s method of tackling the question of ESCs has led to a re-shuffling of its structure; in August 2010,
the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) was established within the NATO international staff.
Bringing together various existing fields of expertise into a single division, the ESCD purpose is to
respond to the cross-cutting and inter-related nature of the challenges it is to deal with. This structural
response subsumes two further important changes: an adaptation of NATO’s policy and, more broadly, a
paradigm shift in its strategic culture. Assistant Secretary General for ESCs Ambassador Gábor Iklódy
summarised the situation: “new challenges - new NATO”. 5 In its efforts to tackle ESCs in a
comprehensive and cross-cutting manner, NATO moved away from its reliance on military instruments,
deterrence and “reactive approaches”. The overarching principles dictating the ESCD’s strategy with
regard to the emerging security challenges are prevention, resilience and non-duplication of structures
and capabilities, at international, regional, and national levels. Although the more conventional and more
military threat of WMDs still requires a more traditional approach in the Alliance’s view (defence and
deterrence), it is not considered to be an isolated issue anymore, as its links in particular with terrorism
and cyber security are clear. Thus, the creation of the ESCD, streamlining and coordinating the work of
different centres, highlights the strategic importance that the Alliance attributes to the ESCs, as well as its
in-depth understanding of their inter-related character which calls for the development of holistic and
comprehensive policies. The Alliance’s strategy focuses mainly on consultation, exchange of experience
and collaboration with partners, but also on the need for information and intelligence-sharing. The
ESCD’s work to support NATO’s role as a platform of dialogue and consultation on new security
challenges further illustrates the Alliance’s awareness of the globalised, cross-cutting and non-traditional
nature of the ESCs: ‘If the Alliance wants to remain an effective security provider for its members, it must
become a team player’. 6
The European Union’s response to the ESCs, on the other hand, has been much more fragmented and
disparate. Indeed, while NATO created a new division to increase the visibility and preparedness to
respond to ESCs, the EU was caught up in its institutional complexity, and suffered from a lack of political
leadership, which, in term, led to a lack of coordinated initiatives. Indeed, if the EU’s Security Strategy
did mention ESCs, its record in addressing these threats is less positive. The EU has not been able to
translate its conceptual approach to ESCs into clear policy priorities. It has developed sectorial action
programmes and has adopted resolutions and strategies to tackle each individual challenge listed under
the “ESC” heading, but unlike NATO, it has neither conducted a structural re-shuffling, nor has it
prioritised them. Furthermore, the EU’s role as an international security actor tackling emerging threats is
undefined. Despite the lack of single institutional framework, some EU responses to the ESCs clearly link
and simultaneously tackle several challenges (e.g. terrorism and CBRN risks are highly correlated in EU
responses), but comprehensive approaches lack for other threats. Similarly, there are challenges to which
the EU responds as a leading actor, others where it acts as an enabler—providing a platform for the coordination
of Member States’ policies or information-sharing—and also some where its role is
overshadowed by a Member State’s channels and interests. Strategies and initiatives in the fields of
terrorism and piracy are significant and have led to the development of concrete projects and actions.
However, the EU finds it more difficult to formulate responses on challenges such as cyber-defence and
energy security, and its role is extremely limited in other sectors. The salience of the cyber space threat,
for example, has only recently emerged as a strategic domain for the EU, notably with the decision taken
in March 2012 to establish a European Cybercrime Centre within Europol, at the Hague, Netherlands.
Moreover, the EU’s development of a comprehensive, coherent approach to tackle emerging challenges
has to overcome the fact that, unlike NATO, the EU does not have a direct mandate to handle the
defence dimensions of the ESCs. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) still remains the
exclusive competence of the Member States, and the underlying power struggles between institutions
5 Ambassador Gabor Iklody, NATO Lisbon Summit Edition- “New Challenges New NATO”:
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Lisbon-Summit/New-Nato/EN/index.htm
6 Ambassador Gabor Iklody, NATO Lisbon Summit Edition- “New Challenges New NATO”:
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Lisbon-Summit/New-Nato/EN/index.htm
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The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012, by Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos 4
and Member States, particularly as far as the defence industry is concerned, create hurdles for the
development of comprehensive and integrated approaches.
Within the framework of the EU, the Commission, the EEAS, and different Council formations each
address specific aspects of individual ESCs, from their political, economic and social dimensions to their
legal or even normative ones. Indeed, “European capabilities […] remain a complex puzzle of national
and multinational capabilities”. 7 There is, thus, an inherent institutional and functional complexity in the
EU’s action that adds up to the difficulty of defining a coherent and comprehensive strategy for complex
and inter-connected challenges such as the ESCs. The much-required coordination between EU internal
and external security policies and strategies in tackling the ESCs is confronted to the difficulty of
establishing increased interaction between different institutions and actors, with distinct security
mindsets. Although reiterated in the EU’s Internal Security Strategy adopted in February 2010 and in the
Stockholm work programme for 2010-2015, further coordination and involvement of the Justice and
Home Affairs domains and working groups is necessary. This especially applies to the ESCs; there is a
need for the establishment of strong Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) expertise within the EEAS, as well as
deeper engagement of the JHA Council structures in CSDP civilian crisis management missions and in
CFSP working groups. 8 Researchers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
have declared, “the EU’s efforts [in dealing with the ESCs] could be strengthened by close integration of
internal and external security structures, supported by a single institutional framework”. 9 However,
according to Sven Biscop, Director of the Security & Global Governance Programme at Egmont – the
Royal Institute for International Relations (Brussels), the problem is first and foremost political. He
deplores the lack of political leadership which would allow the EU to clearly define its foreign policy
priorities and interests. 10 This equally holds for the importance and priority that it should attach to the
ESCs. If the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) illustrated the European Union’s
efforts to further integrate and coordinate its foreign policy and external action, its structure and activities
to date have failed to define a precise and proactive agenda. Dr. Biscop favours the idea of a new ESS to
support the EEAS. A renewed Security Strategy should, in his opinion, refresh the EU external action
narrative, define the Union’s grand strategy, outlining its objectives, vital interests and priorities for
foreign policy, set an actual detailed policy, and frame the EU’s specific goals and interests as regards its
neighbourhood and its strategic partnerships. 11
Any comprehensive assessment of the EU’s action towards ESCs should mention European shortcomings
related to the fragmentation of defence budgets on the one hand, and to the limited amounts of money
spent on military Research and Technology on the other. The ESC heading contains a series of challenges
that require technological innovation and efficiency in order to be effectively tackled. The overall
reduction of defence Research and Technology investment will have significant consequences for the EU’s
ability to move forward with its ongoing projects and to develop future capabilities. In this context, the
EU Council has reiterated the need to strengthen both the role of European Defence Agency and the
Commission’s efforts with regards to Research and Technology, particularly with the new European
Framework Programme for Research and Technology (Horizon 2020). 12 The launch of the “Pooling &
Sharing” (P&S) initiative meant to bridge the EU’s capability gap by coordinating defence budgets with
limited resources in the context of the financial crisis, illustrates the EU’s attempts to address these
shortfalls. Thus, despite putting defence budgets under severe pressure, the economic crisis has,
however, created renewed political momentum on defence cooperation and has given a clear impetus for
7 Sven Biscop, “As the EU said at the NATO Summit”, Security Policy Brief, Egmont Institute for International Relations, Feb. 2012,
n°33, p. 5.
8 Florian Trauner, “The internal-external security nexus: more coherence under Lisbon?”, Occasional Paper, EUISS, March 2011,
n°89
9 Interview with Dr. Ian Anthony and Ms. Lina Grip, Stockholm, 5 May 2012
10 Interview with Sven Biscop, Brussels, 27 April 2012
11 Ibid.
12 Council Conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, 22 & 23 March 2012:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/129162.pdf
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The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012, by Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos 5
the definition, and the increasing rationalisation and efficiency of the European Union as a security actor
dealing with the ESCs.
NATO-EU partnership on the eve of the Chicago Summit: the way forward?
Launched within couple of months of each other, the EU’s initiative on P&S through the “Ghent
Framework” of December 2010 and the “Smart Defence Initiative” (SDI) project announced by NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Munich Security Conference of February 2011 both
illustrate the concept of “doing more with less”. Both initiatives were launched with the purpose of
enhancing defence coordination between Member States in an age of severe financial pressure and
austerity, and—on NATO’s side—with the goal of enabling Europe to better respond to crises in its own
neighbourhood. This convergence in means and purposes could constitute a good starting point for the
reevaluation and strengthening of relations between NATO and the EU.
The NATO Summit of 20-21 May 2012 in Chicago, would be an ideal platform to start the process. Three
themes will dominate the agenda of the Chicago Summit: preparing the transition and the post-2014
commitment of NATO in Afghanistan; ensuring the necessary capabilities to address the challenges of the
21 st century and defending the Allied populations and territories; and reinforcing NATO’s web of partners
around the world. 13
The EU has reasserted its commitment as a security provider in a context of severe financial pressure and
in a changing strategic environment. 14 The P&S initiative is at the centre of the EU’s efforts, and has led
to the development of project proposals by the EDA and the NATO’s Allied Command Transformation,
based on EU defence ministers’ proposals for new cooperative schemes. More concretely, in December
2011, this process led to the EU Member States’ commitment to11 “specific concrete projects”. A 12 th
critical project is currently being prepared by Spain to combat improvised explosive devices.
The Council welcomes Member States' commitments […] in the fields of: Air to Air Refuelling; Smart
Munitions; Aircrew Training; Naval Training and Logistics; European Transport Hubs; Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance including Space Situational Awareness; Medical Support; Military
Satellite Communications, and looks forward to the concrete definition of these projects as soon as
possible, as well as the development of other pooling projects on the basis of existing initiatives, such as:
maritime surveillance, Helicopter Training, Satellite Communication (Procurement Cell).
--Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy, 1 December 2011 15
The US’s interest in merging certain P&S and SDI initiatives reflects the promising nature of the projects
at the transatlantic level. The two parallel initiatives should therefore further evolve into a complementary
approach, whereby NATO and the CSDP would co-exist and mutually reinforce each other. In this
perspective, the Chicago Summit offers a platform for the EU and NATO to discuss, strengthen and
implement their partnership by applying P&S and SDI initiatives to the ESCs. Indeed, each organisation
could add value in the struggle to tackle the emerging global threats; significant progress has already
been made in EU capability development in the field of air-to-air refuelling, medical support, training
(Counter-IED, Helicopter Training Programme, Air Transport Crew, Fast Jet and Naval) and maritime
surveillance. Further development of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Future Military
13 “Preparing for Chicago”, 01 May 2012: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_84287.htm
14 Informal Defence Ministers meeting: towards a sustained policy of military capabilities, 19 April 2012:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/129632.pdf
15 Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy, 01 December 2011:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126504.pdf
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The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012, by Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos 6
Commercial Satellites (SATCOM), Smart Munitions and Naval Logistics will be underway in the
foreseeable future. 16
The question of sovereignty is central to the Member States’ reluctance to further contribute to new
collective capability projects. However, in the context of ESCs, economic austerity and in the run-up to
the Chicago Summit, it has become clear that unless EU Member States act collectively, their lack of
means to address capability shortfalls will only be more pressing. The same holds for transatlantic
relations: a mutual lack of trust could result in duplication, or even competition, and will only lead to
increasing difficulties and shortcomings for both organisations. Thus, if the NATO-EU partnership is to
effectively move forward, the European Union will have to address some problems of its own.
First of all, it will have to overcome Member States’ reluctance to pool and share, by promoting regular
and structured political dialogue between EU Defence Ministers in order to increase transparency and
mutual confidence. This first step would result in a process of reducing redundant national capabilities
and would give renewed impetus for cluster-based pooling. Secondly, a European defence industry
budget should be created to invest in the new collective projects. 17 Thirdly, the Council should also
recognise the necessity for a more sustainable and structured policy on P&S in the long run, as it
encourages the EDA to further develop the concept of “Save and Reinvest”. 18 Finally, the EU and NATO
will need to define an overall strategy that gives new impetus to their partnership. According to Sven
Biscop, a functional division of labour among the two organisations would be the most appropriate
answer. 19 Dr. Biscop favours a solution articulated around the EU-US political nexus—whereby NATO
would act as a technical executive implementator of the partnership— over the sharing of tasks on a
horizontal basis, in which case the cross-cutting character of the issues tackled would not be addressed.
NATO would thus return to its core tasks of territorial defence and global crisis management, and will
therefore play a leading role in mainly “hard security” matters.
Despite recent progress in terms of cooperation and practical dialogue, the NATO-EU nexus has not
reached its full potential. It is, however, already a reality, both in the fields of operational engagement
and capability development, and has lately reached a new level through detail-sharing of operations, and
improved incentives and dialogue in the framework of the P&S, SDI, and Chicago Summit. Regarding
Emerging Security Challenges, it appears that both EU and NATO face major difficulties when attempting
to conceptually frame and define a strategy to tackle the threats. Plans to further institutionalise and
enhance cooperation around these new global challenges are promising; both organisations should jointly
work to identify minimum standards and subsequently determine the nature and scope of their respective
roles in responding to the ESCs.
16 Council Conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, 22 & 23 March 2012:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/129162.pdf
17 Sven Biscop, “As the EU said at the NATO Summit”, Security Policy Brief, Egmont Institute for International Relations, Feb. 2012,
n°33, p. 6.
18 Council Conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, 22 & 23 March 2012:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/129162.pdf
19 Interview with Sven Biscop, Brussels, 27 April 2012.
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