ISIS Europe News In This Issue

A news review of European Security and Defence Policy 

Number 48 February 2010 

In This Issue 

ISIS Europe News 

Page 1 

A Decade for 

Disarmament? 

Page 1 

The 2010 NPT Review 

Conference: Looking to 

a future without 

nuclear weapons? 

Page 3 

NATO Needs to 

Emphasise the 

Centrality of Arms 

Control 

Page 6 

NATO and the EU: 

Cooperation? 

Page 9 

CSDP and EU mission 

updates, table and 

chart, February 2010 

Page 13 

ISIS Europe News 

This edition of European Security Review concentrates on oversight and arms control. In 

particular, there are several anniversaries/international meetings this year of significance, to which 

accountability and assessment of implementation are important. 

This year marks the 10 th anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325, which outlined measures to 

improve the plight of and empower women in peace and security. ISIS has conducted training with 

DCAF on gender and SSR and is undertaking a study for the European Parliament on implementing 

UNSCR 1325 and human rights guidelines in the EU’s external relations. What we need to ensure 

now in the EU on this 10 th anniversary, is solid commitment in the European External Action 

Service to gender – with a concrete realisation of a properly financed gender unit. You can 

subscribe to ISIS’ regular Gender and Security list here. 

It is just over a month since the launch of the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership webportal 

www.csdpmap.eu With over 70,000 hits, it has proved a very popular format of access to EU and 

independent information on CSDP. CSDP MAP now has 21 partners and growing. Subscribe to 

updates from the webportal site. For further information, please contact Giji Gya. 

Our regular CSDP Updates also form part of CSDP MAP, and the February update of ongoing 

CSDP missions – including the proposed EUTM mission in Somalia - are here. 

Finally, we say farewell and good luck to former staff member Filippo Mauri who has taken up a 

traineeship in the Council General Secretariat. We thank Filippo for his excellent work on 

Institutional Reform and Security Governance. 

Other 

EP Updates 

Page 2 

NATO Watch 

Page 12 

CSDP MAP 

Page 19 

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Executive Director 

A Decade for Disarmament? 

During almost four weeks this 

May (3 rd to 28 th ), State Parties 

will gather in New York to 

review implementation of the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for 

the eighth time since its entry 

into force in 1970 and to 

identify further areas for 

progress. Read the article on the 

NPT by ISIS Senior Advisor on 

Nuclear and Disarmament 

Policy – Dr. Ian Davis in this 

issue (p.3). 

Also on the nuclear slant, a 

guest article from Martin 

Butcher of Pugwash looks at 

arms control in a NATO 

framework in its Strategic Concept Review (p.6). ISIS 

and Pugwash will be undertaking several events this 

year on the NPT and ISIS will also assist the annual 

NATO Watch Shadow event in the second semester 

2010. We also look at EU-NATO relations with an 

article (p. 9) outlining the formal and informal 

discussions on cohering capabilities between these two 

bodies. ISIS and DCAF will hold a meeting with 

MEPs and NATO Parliamentary Assemblies on 13 

April, looking at EU-NATO Capabilities. 

Further on the disarmament side, the international 

Convention on Cluster Munitions is set to enter into 

force in August this year after having received 30 

ratifications. Surprisingly, one would think we would 

have learnt after the successful Landmine Ban Treaty, 

but still, many States are to ratify. 

The EU should not forget that these indiscriminate 

weapons are close to home, where cluster munitions 

were used in the August 2008 conflict in Georgia.

From the EU member states, 10 of 27 have ratified so 

far, which (in chronological ratification order) are: 

Ireland, Austria, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg, 

Slovenia, Malta, France, Belgium and Denmark. (Non- 

EU States in Europe that have ratified include Albania, 

Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and 

Norway). 1 

conditional on reciprocal moves by Russia. Second, 

whether unilateral withdrawal would be sought (as 

recommended by the four elder Belgian statesmen) in 

the event that agreement cannot be reached within 

NATO”. The situation was further complicated over 

the weekend by the Dutch government falling and the 

establishment of a caretaker Cabinet until the June 

elections. 

Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe 

ISIS Europe is an independent research and 

advisory organisation providing analysis on 

security, defence and peacebuilding aspects. 

Graphic: www.stopclustermunitions.org 

Belgian news - global zero for nuclear weapons 

Last Friday (19 February), Belgian Prime Minister, 

Yves Leterme (CD&V), announced in Le Soir 2 that 

along with Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 

and Norway, Belgium was taking an initiative in 

favour of a world without nuclear weapons within the 

framework of the review of the NATO Strategic 

Concept in November 2010. The official Belgian 

government statement follows an earlier high-profile 

call by the former head of NATO Willy Claes and 

three other Belgian statesmen (former Prime Ministers 

Jean-Luc Dehaene and Guy Verhofstadt and former 

Foreign Minister Louis Michel) for the withdrawal of 

the European-based US nuclear weapons, which was 

published in a number of Belgian newspapers. In 

addition, the current Presidency of the EU, Spain, 

which will be representing the EU at the NPT, also 

announced its support of global zero with “all its 

might” in the UNGA 2009. 

These statements build on US President Obama’s 

“global zero” leadership and UNSCR 1887, which 

calls for much stronger action on all fronts of the 

nuclear weapons issue, including strengthening the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

(NPT). “This joint Benelux, German and Norwegian 

initiative is another significant step towards removal of 

the remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe”, said 

Dr Ian Davis, Senior Advisor to ISIS Europe. 

However, he added a note of caution, “What is 

seemingly being undertaken is a joint push within 

NATO to reach a common position on withdrawal, but 

what is less clear is first, the extent to which this is 

1 http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_i/i_statessig 

ning.html 

2 La Belgique veut un retrait des armes nucléaires, Le Soir, 

19/02/2010 

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European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe page 2

The 2010 NPT Review Conference: 

Looking to a future without nuclear weapons? 

40 years on, this year sees another meeting reviewing 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT). Ian Davis 

reviews the current state of play regarding the Treaty 

in the light of the new ‘Global Zero’ debate. He argues 

for regime stabilisation and small concrete 

disarmament steps and institutional reforms to help to 

keep the Global Zero process on track. 

Going to Global Zero? 

During almost four weeks this May (3 rd to 28 th ), State 

Parties will gather in New York to review 

implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for the eighth time since 

its entry into force in 1970, and to identify further 

areas for progress. 

While calls for the NPT to be amended or even 

superseded by a new convention or treaty on nuclear 

disarmament may be premature, concrete, achievable 

measures to help strengthen the non-proliferation, 

compliance, and disarmament functions of the NPT are 

likely to be tabled. 

As we approach the 40 th anniversary (on 5 March 

2010) of entry into force of the NPT, this article 

reviews the current state of play regarding the Treaty 

in the light of the new ‘Global Zero’ debate. 2009 in 

particular, was an extraordinary year of commitments 

at the highest levels to the vision of a world free of 

nuclear weapons: from President Barack Obama’s 

Prague speech to the UN Security Council Summit. 

The 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) provides 

a golden opportunity to turn words into action, for 

setting in motion irreversible processes to achieve that 

objective. It is not the only game in town— the NPT is 

part of a network of interlocking treaties, 

organisations, inspections and unilateral, bilateral and 

multilateral arrangements aimed at halting the spread 

of nuclear weapons — but it is the one that, for good 

or ill, continues to form the cornerstone of 

international multilateral commitments to nuclear 

disarmament. 

The article begins by outlining the reasons why the 

NPT should be seen as a success story, but one that 

remains fragile given the differing perspectives that 

shape the views of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and 

Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). It then 

undertakes a brief review of some of the obstacles to 

further progress at the 2010 RevCon, and ends with 

some tentative conclusions as to what might constitute 

as ‘progress’ in May. 

The NPT: a relative success story (but with much 

work still to do) 

The NPT today has the largest number of signatories 

of any arms control agreement, and with only four 

states outside has achieved near-universal 

involvement. This means that almost the entire 

community of nations has voluntarily chosen to sign 

and ratify a treaty of indefinite duration that precludes 

them from acquiring nuclear weapons or assisting 

other countries from doing so. 

To these ends, by and large the NPT has been a 

success. Much of the world is covered by Nuclear 

Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), including nearly the 

entire Southern Hemisphere. With the recent entryinto-force 

of the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty, NWFZs 

now also extend into the Northern Hemisphere and 

include territory on which nuclear weapons used to be 

based. Momentum also resumed in 2009 with the 

ratification on 15 July of the Pelindaba 1 Treaty—the 

African NWFZ (which was signed in signed in 1996 

but only came into effect with the 28 th ratification). 

The NPT has also greatly slowed nuclear proliferation, 

so that to date only one country, North Korea, has 

signed up as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) 

and gone on to acquire a complete nuclear weapons 

capability. Of course, first Israel, then India and 

Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons outside the 

NPT framework. Overall, however, nuclear ‘breakout’ 

has largely been contained and the pace of nuclear 

proliferation remains much less than anticipated. 

Nor is proliferation inevitable or irreversible: since 

1970 more states have given up their ambitions for 

nuclear weapons (including Argentina, Australia, 

Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, 

Libya, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, South Africa, 

South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Ukraine and the 

Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) than have 

acquired them. However, one thing is clear: the status 

quo is unsustainable. Nine countries cannot maintain 

their monopoly of nuclear weapons indefinitely. 

1 http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptanwfz.pdf 


The verification system, centred on the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has over the decades 

strengthened significantly, both in formal procedures, 

and in the acquired collective experience of its 

practitioners. The growing adoption internationally of 

the Model Additional Protocol (AP) is a particularly 

positive development, since it expands the declaration 

a state must make to the IAEA of activities that might 

contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and 

broadens the agency’s right of access to verify the 

declaration. But while more than half of the states 

with safeguards agreements with the IAEA now also 

have APs in force, it is less encouraging that 30 

NNWS parties to the NPT still do not have even 

comprehensive safeguards in place. Moreover, the AP 

is not in force in some key regions, including much of 

the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America. 

The challenges ahead 

Most observers at the 2009 NPT Preparatory 

Committee (PrepCom) regarded the results of this last 

preliminary meeting as largely positive, although that 

assessment had as much to do with the low bar that has 

been set for judging ‘success’ and the dismal failure of 

the 2005 RevCon. While no agreement could be 

reached on substantive recommendations, an agenda 

was adopted for the 2010 RevCon, something that was 

not achieved until the third week of the 2005 RevCon. 

The meeting was also notable for the largely 

professional and collegiate approach of delegations 

and the absence of rancour that had plagued past 

PrepComs. 

However, one of the major challenges at the RevCon 

will be in neutralising or sidelining the handful of 

NWS and NNWS that, on past experience, are likely to 

promote positions that stand no chance of gaining 

consensus. Uncompromising national positions in 

2005, for example, as adopted by the US, France and 

Iran (in relation to past disarmament commitments) 

and Egypt (in relation to the 1995 resolution on the 

Middle East) contributed to the stalemate and had the 

effect of ending all prospects for agreement on 

substantive recommendations. Moreover, the 

wrangling over process and technicalities meant that 

there was little or no debate at the 2005 RevCon on 

vital non-proliferation issues, such as North Korea’s 

nuclear programme and its status under the NPT, or on 

serious nuclear trafficking incidents. 

review of the 'Programme of Action' known as the '13 

practical steps towards global nuclear disarmament' 

agreed in 2000. These clearly achievable confidencebuilding 

measures and commitments were viewed at 

the time as an expression of the 'step-by-step' approach 

favoured by NWS, and as fulfilment of their pledge 

made at the previous 1995 review conference to 

advance nuclear disarmament – a pledge that enabled 

the historic consensus to indefinitely extend the NPT. 

These 13 steps remain central to the debate today 

because the failure to agree a Final Document at the 

2005 RevCon means that they remain the most recent 

multilaterally agreed disarmament framework. 

Consideration of these steps was blocked at the 2005 

RevCon, but it is unlikely that States Parties will allow 

this to continue indefinitely – and nor should they. 

Finding the critical points for progress 

For decades many States Parties have been willing to 

talk about the possibility of a nuclear-weapon free 

world without ever really believing that it is feasible, 

nor take the steps necessary to make it more possible. 

More pressing concerns in the Cold War prevented any 

significant breakthroughs, and the opportunities after 

the Cold War were largely squandered. NWS believed 

it was enough to reduce warhead numbers and wait to 

see what would come next. The ideology supportive of 

a new generation of nuclear weapons that arose within 

Washington in particular (but that also spread to the 

other NWS) was a particular blow to the possibilities 

of progress. 

Under the inspirational leadership of Barack Obama, 

however, a growing group of political leaders and 

mainstream ‘opinion shapers’ has been arguing that the 

current trends will inevitably lead to a world where the 

number of nuclear weapons states may grow to 25-30 

in a few years, the concept of nuclear deterrence has 

little meaning, and the chances of non-state terrorist 

actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons grows 

apace. The historic bargain between the NWS and the 

NNWS to the NPT is now faced with both ‘breakout’ 

and declining legitimacy. 

It can be clearly demonstrated that the need is not only 

overwhelming and urgent, but that actions are practical 

and possible. Some of the dynamics for achieving 

NPT stability at the 2010 RevCon include: 

In the NWS’ camp, both France and China convey the 

view that they are very uncomfortable with the new 

US vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Getting 

these two countries (and the four outside of the NPT) 

to lend their support towards that objective is likely to 

be a major challenge. This situation may be 

exacerbated by the likely calls from NNWS for a 

Shared goal of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World 

(disarmament is the key). The NWS continue to try 

and legitimise their nuclear doctrines on the fraudulent 

grounds that their status is ‘recognised’ under the NPT. 

They know this to be a falsehood yet they blithely 

carry on regardless. This must change. All of the NWS 

should re-affirm their commitment to nuclear 

European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe, page 4

disarmament, and do so in a meaningful way that goes 

beyond paying lip service to Article VI. This might be 

achieved by setting out some initial tangible steps and, 

for those NWS that have not already done so, by 

announcing at the highest political level (president or 

prime minister) that a nuclear weapon-free world is a 

shared goal. 

RevCon and beyond. NNWS within alliances like 

NATO can no longer shelter under the nuclear 

umbrella provided by NWS and maintain the pretence 

that they are in good standing under the NPT. The 

current review of NATO’s Strategic Concept provides 

a golden opportunity for them to revise this outdated 

nuclear posture. 13 

Credible commitments, agreed without coercion. There 

are no shortage of disarmament blueprints and plans, 

including those contained in: the 1995 NPT Principles 

and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 

Disarmament 2 ; the 2000 NPT Practical Steps for 

disarmament 3 ; draft recommendations of the 2009 

NPT PrepCom 4 ; several UN General Assembly 

resolutions; UN Security Council Resolution 1887 5 ; 

the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for 

disarmament 6 ; reports of the WMD (Blix) 

Commission 7 and the International Commission on 

Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament 

(ICNND) 8 ; and proposals of civil society groups, 

campaigns, and initiatives, among them Global Zero 9 , 

the Nuclear Security Project 10 , the Middle Powers 

Initiative 11 and its Article VI Forum launched in the 

wake of the failed 2005 RevCon and the International 

Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 12 . The 

2010 RevCon has an opportunity to work to build 

consensus around a number of the priorities identified. 

In particular, discussion of the legal, technical, 

political and verification framework for the prohibition 

and elimination of nuclear weapons is long overdue 

and consideration should be given to placing the 

concept of a Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC) onto 

the negotiating agenda. 

Supremacy of the NPT. The discriminatory nature of 

the NPT is further reinforced by declaratory statements 

in ‘other’ agreements seemingly taking precedence 

over the NPT, such as the US-UK Mutual Defence 

Agreement and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Until it is 

generally accepted that there are no opt-out clauses 

from the obligations of the NPT to actively pursue 

nuclear disarmament in ‘good faith’, as agreed in the 

final document of the 2000 Review Conference, there 

will remain no prospect of progress at the 2010 

2 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995- 

NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf 

3 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/2000- 

NPT/pdf/FD-Part1and2.pdf 

4 http://npsglobal.org/eng/images/stories/pdf/DraftRecomendations 

080509.pdf 

5 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm 

6 http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/nuc5pnt08.pdf 

7 http://www.wmdcommission.org/ 

8 http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/contents.html 

9 http://www.globalzero.org/ 

10 http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org 

11 http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/ 

12 http://www.icanw.org/ 

Regular review of progress. Visibility is crucial. It is 

vital that the 2010 RevCon undertakes a full review of 

implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document. 

States Parties should not agree to any weakening of the 

disarmament commitments agreed in 2000, but since 

some of the13 steps have been overtaken by events, 

the RevCon should consider establishing an Article VI 

Compliance Committee to review next steps for 

implementing Article VI between now and the 2015 

RevCon and establish a set of criteria for monitoring 

compliance. As a confidence building measure, the 

NWS should provide full and transparent reporting on 

their implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document 

(or any new or modified commitments arising from the 

RevCon in May), including a yearly review and 

‘forward look’ of their disarmament commitments. 

Revitalising US-Russian and NATO-Russian 

cooperation. In some respects, more routine and 

meaningful nuclear non-proliferation cooperation took 

place between the Soviet Union and NATO during the 

Cold War than today. Greater use should be made of 

both the P-5 mechanism and the NATO-Russia 

Council to pursue parallel and coordinated action on 

non-proliferation policy and efforts to counter-nuclear 

terrorism, including improved sharing of information 

regarding illicit nuclear trafficking. If Washington and 

Moscow take seriously their pronouncements about 

combating nuclear terrorism, they should fashion 

greater cooperation in sharing sensitive but vital 

information, especially in providing the Office of 

Nuclear Security at the IAEA with timely forensics 

information about known illicit nuclear trafficking 

incidents. 

Strengthening the Review Process and NPT Institutional 

Reform. The NPT is arguably the weakest of 

the treaties governing ‘weapons of mass destruction’ 

(WMD) in terms of its institutional support. Further 

steps toward disarmament will eventually necessitate 

an institutional framework comparable to other treaty 

regimes governing WMD. At the 2010 RevCon states 

should give serious consideration to Canada’s earlier 

proposals for institutional reform, which could 

increase the quality of NPT deliberations and enable 

13 See also article by Martin Butcher “NATO needs to emphasise 

the centrality of arms control”” in this ESR No. 48, February 2010. 

http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_448_esr48-nato-armscontrol.pdf 


the treaty’s institutions to focus on specific issues and 

respond to developments. 

Conclusion 

Meeting the high expectations of the NPT RevCon in 

2010 will be difficult. The failure of the 2005 RevCon 

means that there was no consensus about the status of 

the treaty’s implementation, and participants will have 

to look back even further to 2000, while 

simultaneously looking forward in the light of 

subsequent developments, both technological and 

political. The RevCon is a crucial component in the 

nuclear non-proliferation regime. While an ambitious 

substantive outcome seems unlikely, regime 

stabilisation and small concrete disarmament steps and 

institutional reforms would help to keep the Global 

Zero process on track. 

Dr. Ian Davis, Senior Advisor - Nuclear and 

disarmament policy, ISIS Europe; 

Director, NATO Watch www.natowatch.org 

NATO Needs to Emphasise the Centrality of Arms Control 

Martin Butcher of Pugwash writes on the nuclear side 

of NATO. He argues that the task for NATO leaders is 

to rebuild solidarity and reshape the Alliance to face 

new missions dictated by the transformed post Cold 

War, post 9/11 strategic and security environment. 

Further, that the North Atlantic Council should be a 

platform for consultation and negotiation of arms 

control positions within NATO. Finally, that NATO 

should not miss the opportunity to use the review of the 

Strategic Concept to greatly enhance the role of arms 

control, non-proliferation and disarmament in security 

building. 

Introduction 

This year, NATO leaders will agree a new Strategic 

Concept for the Alliance, a document that will govern 

NATO’s approach to its security for a decade or more. 

The threat posed to the Alliance by nuclear, biological, 

chemical or radiological weapons (WMD) and their 

means of delivery has for some years been identified 

as a central concern, the strategic concept talks present 

an excellent opportunity to consider how NATO 

nations can enhance their security through a stronger 

reliance on arms control, non-proliferation and 

disarmament. 

There are emergent threats or potential threats which, 

if not dealt with before they mature, could lead to the 

establishment of new or revived deterrent relationships 

which the Alliance might wish to avoid. There are also 

potential threats which would not be susceptible to 

deterrence, for example if a radical religious group 

were able to obtain a nuclear weapon. While the 

Alliance must maintain defences against such a 

possibility, it must be asked why NATO has moved 

away from threat reduction and prevention to drop to 

the extent that it has? 

The security of NATO members, and of the wider 

world, would be enhanced by engagement with 

potential adversaries to allow the reduction and 

elimination of potential threats before they grow to a 

scale that actually menaces the Alliance. Where nonstate 

groups are not amenable to such engagement, 

then support for non-proliferation measures which can 

deny them the means to use WMD are an essential 

component of future strategy. Finally, the Allies 

should discuss the extent to which NATO’s nuclear 

posture harms the global non-proliferation regime and 

acts as a stimulant to threats and potential threats it is 

intended to deter. 

A new emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation 

and disarmament should be debated openly and 

widely. It is to be regretted that the preparatory phase 

of the Strategic Concept revision process is, for the 

most part, happening behind closed doors. 1 There is no 

involvement of NATO nation parliaments. Ministers 

are not giving a political lead. A Group of Experts 

gathers evidence behind closed doors. Even 

presentations by academics to the group are not 

published. Nuclear issues will be discussed by the 

group for barely two hours in formal session. At a time 

when NATO’s nuclear deployments and strategy lack 

public support and democratic legitimacy, this is not 

enough. 

For decades, NATO has pursued dual track policies of 

deterrence and arms control as a means of managing 

nuclear threats. The balance of these polices has 

become distorted since the adoption of the last 

Strategic Concept in 1999. As they look to the future 

role of the Alliance, NATO nations must undertake an 

1 See analysis via NATO Watch www.natowatch.org and ISIS 

Europe www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=reform 


evaluation of current policy and practice. They must 

further engage in a review of their support for arms 

control and disarmament as threat reduction and 

elimination measures, and revise policy accordingly to 

become more effective at building NATO security. 

A Lost Decade 

During the past decade, NATO gave the appearance of 

abandoning any attempt at threat reduction through 

arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, in 

favour of a purely military response to potential 

WMD-armed adversaries. This is strange, given the 

successful use during the 1980s of multi-lateral 

agreements to reduce armaments and the likelihood of 

conflict, both nuclear and conventional. At the very 

least, the role of non-proliferation has been severely 

downgraded. This reflected US national policy under 

the Bush administration much more than it reflected 

the collective view of the Alliance. 

At a time when NATO faces no military peer, it would 

seem only logical to use this position of strength to 

negotiate agreements with neighbours and nearneighbours 

that can obviate new WMD threats before 

they arise. However, European nations submitted to 

the Bush administration’s global outlook, and allowed 

it to become the policy of the entire Alliance by 

default. This despite the fact that it is clear that 

European nations did not share the bleak world view 

emanating from Washington DC. The European 

Security Strategy 2 and the Strategy Against the 

Proliferation of WMD 3 adopted by the EU places 

much more emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to 

construct security from WMD threats than is now the 

case for NATO – and yet, because of NATO’s 

consensus rule Europeans were overridden by the 

United States. 

A New Promise 

That situation has now changed. Europeans are 

presented with another challenge – how to give their 

support to an administration keen to pursue arms 

control measures. President Obama’s team is finalizing 

a START follow-on agreement with Russia, and the 

President has promised ratification of the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US President has 

given nuclear disarmament a high profile, with his 

speech in Prague in April 2009, and the 

groundbreaking UN Security Council session in 

September 2009. 

2 Council of the European Union “European Security Strategy”. 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 

3 Council of the European Union “EU Strategy against the 

Proliferation of WMDs”. 

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pd 

f 

This new direction presents Europeans with a 

challenge. What can NATO allies do to support this 

President in his disarmament policies? And can this 

new direction be fully integrated into the new Strategic 

Concept, rather than being the Cinderella appendage to 

policy that it has become. For even the most 

problematic current potential nuclear weapons threats 

facing NATO nations are some years away from 

becoming real. There is a window, if all NATO nations 

would pull together, in which the security of the 

Alliance could be enhanced through reducing and 

eliminating potential threats. 

A Positive Contribution from NATO to the NPT 

Review Conference 4 

One particular emerging concern within the NPT 

review process has been a focus on Negative Security 

Assurances. This is certain to feature as a major issue 

at this year’s Review Conference, and it is one area 

where NATO could, if it chose, play a crucial and 

positive role. However, nuclear use doctrine must 

change. While NATO and some of its member states 

continue to allow for the possible use of nuclear 

weapons against chemical or biological weapons (and 

in the case of the United States even against very large 

conventional weapons they describe as WMD), it is 

very difficult for NATO members to satisfactorily 

respond to the concerns of non-nuclear weapons states 

in the NATO periphery and the wider world. 

During the 2008 NPT PrepCom the Ukraine made 

some concrete proposals to advance the issue. They 

noted that: 

37. Accordance of the credible security assurances 

in the form of an international legally binding 

instrument will substantially enhance the nuclear 

non-proliferation regime, improve mutual trust 

and overall stability. 

38. It should also be recognized that problem of 

security assurances will exist until purposes of 

nuclear disarmament are reached. Moreover, 

worth remembering the fact that some of the states 

possessing nuclear weapons remain outside of 

global regime of nuclear non-proliferation. 

And then called for: 

39. The 2010 Review Conference should reiterate 

its call upon all nuclear weapon states to strictly 

adhere to their existing respective pledges and find 

4 See also article on the NPT by Ian Davis “The 2010 Non- 

Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Looking to a future 

without nuclear weapons?” in this ESR No. 48, February 2010. 

http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_446_esr48-nptrevcon.pdf 


appropriate means to urgently address the security 

assurances issue. It may also recommend the UN 

General Assembly to adopt resolution, which 

would enable convening an International 

Conference under the auspices of the UN to 

discuss the security assurances issue with the 

purpose of finding the acceptable solution. 5 

NATO is in a position to engage this debate. While 

NATO is not a party to the NPT, all its member states 

are. They could, as a group, issue a working paper to 

the NPT Review Conference on how these proposals 

could work in practice, and to address other detailed 

points made by the Ukraine. They could also issue a 

declaration that NATO will never attack a non-nuclear 

weapon state party to the NPT with nuclear weapons, 

and that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to 

deter nuclear attack on the Alliance. This would do 

much to restore confidence in a regime that has been at 

a very low ebb. 

There are other issues within the NPT context where 

NATO’s current position is controversial. 

The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was 

conditioned by non-nuclear weapon states in part on 

the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. 

All NATO nations except the United States have now 

ratified that Treaty, but the US has not. The Bush 

administration went so far as to explore withdrawing 

its signature from the CTBT, although that did not 

happen. The Obama administration has repeatedly said 

it will seek ratification of the Treaty, but a year into 

that administration NATO is still not offering practical 

or even declaratory support for the Treaty, thus 

undermining both the CTBT and faith in the NPT 

itself. It is time for NATO to state that it seeks US 

ratification of the CTBT, and Entry-into-force of that 

Treaty and that it stands ready to provide technical 

assistance to achieve these goals. 

Another area where NATO’s nuclear strategy could be 

hurting its defence efforts is the question of tactical 

nuclear weapons. This is also a hot button issue in the 

NPT review process. The German government 

initiative of November 2009 to call for the withdrawal 

of nuclear weapons from Europe opened this debate 

wide. They have strong support from many European 

nations. But others, including the Baltic States, and 

with former NATO Secretary General George 

Robertson as a spokesman, call for the retention of this 

remnant of the Cold War arsenal. The deployment of 

US nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, and the nuclear 

5 Preparing for a Successful Review Conference 2010 2010, 

Working paper submitted by Ukraine, NPT PrepCom 2008. 

Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/612/44/PDF/G0861244.pdf?Op 

enElement. 

sharing programme under which some of these are 

allocated for Allied use in time of war is an 

impediment to progress. Nuclear sharing also means 

that several Allied nations have an ambiguous status as 

non-nuclear weapons states. Arms control, requires 

sacrifice of some military capability for a gain in net 

security. Removal of the US nuclear weapons from 

Europe would also open the door to discussions on 

elimination of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons 

held by Russia. All this would significantly strengthen 

the NPT, restoring much of the belief of non-nuclear 

states in the Treaty that has been lost over the past 

decade. 

Reinvigorating Arms Control in the Alliance 

From this analysis of NATO policy flow some the 

following conclusions. The task for NATO leaders is 

to rebuild that solidarity and reshape the Alliance to 

face new missions dictated by the transformed post 

Cold War, post 9/11 strategic and security 

environment. NATO must find a way to use its current 

experiences to craft a new Strategic Concept based on 

the security needs of the 21 st century on which all 

members can agree. This task is difficult, but not 

impossible. 

This strategic concept should: 

• Rely on multi-lateral arms control, nonproliferation 

and disarmament as the primary 

tools for the reduction and elimination of all 

WMD threats and potential threats in the Euro- 

Atlantic area; 

• Facilitate this through the removal of US nuclear 

weapons from Europe, the ending of NATO 

nuclear sharing, establish the principle that 

nuclear weapons should be based on the soil of 

the possessor nation; 

• All Alliance members should consider how they 

can reduce and eventually eliminate the role of 

nuclear weapons in national defence policies, and 

how enhanced arms control policies could assist 

in bringing this to fruition. 

Perhaps the most important shift that NATO could 

undertake would be the revitalization of the North 

Atlantic Council as a venue for consultation and 

negotiation of arms control positions with the North 

Atlantic Alliance. This has worked well for NATO in 

the past, and would do so again. Specifically, NATO 

could engage in a series of areas that directly affect the 

security of all Alliance members. These might include: 

• Consultations with the US in the North Atlantic 

Council and with Russia in the NATO-Russia 

Council on future strategic arms control 

negotiations; 


• Discussions in the NATO-Russia Council on 

globalizing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty, as well as urgent talks on 

reinstating the Conventional Forces Europe 

Treaty; 

• Consultations between NATO ministers, and 

between NATO and partners in Asia, the Middle 

East and the Mediterranean, on arms control 

measures to reduce the threat of ballistic missiles; 

• Examination of measures to reduce and eliminate 

specific WMD threats; 

• Consultations on the entry into force of the 

CTBT, with a focus on US ratification and 

assistance that NATO as an organization can give 

to the CTBTO; 

• A thorough study of all potential WMD threats to 

the Alliance and an analysis of measures that can 

be taken to eliminate them through multilateral 

negotiations, including concessions that NATO 

would need to make to achieve these goals. 

Conclusion 

NATO nations are currently fortunate that they face 

few if any immediate military threats to their security. 

Now is the time to act to enhance regional security by 

ensuring, through negotiations and the revitalization of 

NATO’s role in arms control, that such threats do not 

emerge in the near future. NATO can act at the NPT 

Review Conference to contribute to a positive 

atmosphere in that forum. 

It can use its Strategic Concept Review to greatly 

enhance the role of arms control, non-proliferation and 

disarmament in security building. This must be done 

openly, with the full engagement of NATO nations and 

their publics. What NATO does in this area will be 

watched closely by States around the world, and may 

well tip the balance either toward a continued trend 

toward proliferation or to a promotion of greater 

security through confidence building and other 

measures. 

Martin Butcher is Special Projects Coordinator for 

the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World 

Affairs, and a consultant analyst on global security 

policy. The views expressed in this article are his 

own. 

He blogs on NATO issues at 

http://natomonitor.blogspot.com. 

NATO and the EU: Cooperation? 

This article assesses the current state of affairs of EU- 

NATO cooperation in the field of capability 

development. While improvements can be made to both 

formal and informal cooperation mechanisms in this 

field, real progress will not be possible until 

underlying strategic differences over the future of 

European security are resolved. In the meantime, real 

work on avoiding duplication and fostering strategic 

coherence is best coordinated through capitals. ISIS 

and DCAF will hold a meeting with MEPs and NATO 

Parliamentarians on 13 April in Brussels, looking at 

EU-NATO Capabilities. 

Introduction 

Coordination in capability development is often touted 

as a success story for NATO-EU relations by both 

sides, and many recommendations for improved 

relations contain references to this field. However, 

complaining of a lack of real coordination and 

cooperation in EU-NATO capability development 

seems par for the course on both sides of the aisle. 

Indeed, the NATO-EU Capability Group’s meetings 

are often said to consist of largely formulaic 

information exchange. Such an important area of 

NATO-EU relations deserves more attention and 

investment of energy from political leadership. 

While strategic divergence on the EU side and the 

“participation problem” 1 impede real progress in this 

area; improvements are possible in the working of the 

EU-NATO Capability Group and in informal staff-tostaff 

contact. However, as long as there is no 

consensus on the EU side regarding the future of 

European security; capability development coherence 

is best coordinated at a national-level. 

The current debate on improving EU-NATO 

cooperation is viewed primarily through three lenses: 

1) at the political level, 2) in ongoing operations in 

common theatres (Afghanistan, Balkans and off the 

coast of East Africa) and 3) in the development of 

military and possibly “other” capabilities. Many 

would agree that cooperation in this last area is not as 

crucial as the ad-hoc cooperation in the field where 

lives and large strategic purposes are at stake. 

However, the need for a fully inclusive and open 

1 The “participation problem” refers to the political and 

institutional problems the two organisations face in cooperation. 


dialogue between the organisations regarding their 

respective pursuit of the capabilities needed to fulfil 

their goals has increased in times of budgetary 

pressure. 

You say NATO and I say EU 

The development of military and other capabilities at 

the EU and at NATO answers to different priorities 

and follows different methodologies. Thus, an inherent 

element of disjunction exists in capability 

development. The EU is a broader complex of 

institutions with a wider mandate, greater civilian 

focus and deeper instruments than those available to 

the politico-military Alliance. While EU aspirations on 

civilian capabilities in CSDP are better known, its 

CSDP aspirations have also required the development 

of military capabilities. 2 On the other side, NATO 

members are extremely dedicated to ensuring that its 

military forces are fully capable of meeting the 

challenges of the times. However, the question of 

developing civilian capabilities has arisen within 

NATO as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan 

have demonstrated the need for capacity and abilities 

in the areas of reconstruction and stabilisation. 3 Thus, 

while current overlap of capability development is in 

the military sphere, there is a risk of future duplication 

in non-military capabilities as well. 

Individual European NATO Allies have a single set of 

forces for NATO, EU and national purposes. What is 

at question is that these states do not want to be given 

separate and inconsistent goals from the organisations 

they belong to, and thus have a strong interest in 

ensuring that capability development is not pulled in 

two directions. Members of both organisations are 

faced with a difficult choice: To whom do they commit 

available military capabilities? 

It seems many are currently committing capabilities to 

both organisations; but this is not financially 

sustainable in the long run. There was hope that the 

NATO and EU defence planning process 4 could be 

brought together, but this has encountered obstacles, 

including EU fears that its autonomy would be 

infringed upon by the Alliance with greater experience 

in this area and the “participation problem”, now due 

in part to problems posed by Cyprus and Turkey. 

2 See also article on EU military capabilities by Johann Herz 

“Military Capabilities: A Step Forward in ESDP?” in ESR No. 46, 

October 2009. http://www.isiseurope.org/pdf/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf 

3 Development of civilian capabilities at NATO promises to be an 

uphill battle. The existing Civil Emergency Planning capabilities at 

NATO were strongly resisted by France in particular. 

4 Defence planning in this context refers to the collective setting of 

targets and performance review. This entails close examination of 

individual Member States’ programs and budgets. 

The EU-NATO Capability Group 

Today, formal coordination on capability development 

takes place in the aforementioned NATO-EU 

Capability Group, which meets approximately every 4 

to 6 weeks alternating between NATO HQ and the 

Council Justus Lipsius building in Brussels. 

Membership of the group comprises NATO Allies and 

Non-NATO EU Member States that have a security 

agreement with NATO, as insisted upon by Turkey. 

Both sides brief on common capability issues, and then 

there is time for Q&A and statements, although these 

are rare in practice. One potential avenue for 

improvement cited by officials on both sides would be 

the exchange of briefing content prior to the meetings, 

which currently does not occur due to fears that 

internal divisions would arise on the EU side. The 

make-up of the attendees varies, but the EU is usually 

represented by Permanent Representations’ 

counsellors to the Political-Military Group, the EDA’s 

Policy and Plans unit, and the Council Secretariat 

CMPD (previously Directorate 8). On the NATO side, 

the meetings are attended by Defence Policy and 

Planning; the International Military Staff, the Defence 

Investment Division and defence counsellors and 

advisors from the missions and capitals. 

There are usually two or three items on the agenda, but 

at times single issue meetings occur (i.e. Maritime 

Surveillance during Swedish Presidency). It is these 

specific targeted meetings that many find more useful. 

The country holding the EU presidency often sets out 

to seize the initiative, and improve the effectiveness of 

the forum, but often run into the usual political 

obstacles. For example, the Czech and Swedish 

Presidencies undertook an initiative whereby nations 

were represented by their MOD’s policy directors. 

Political Pandering - The Participation Problem 

The Capability Group is hampered by a growing 

reticence on the part of the EU to fully engage without 

the participation of all its Member States. A common 

lament on the EU side is that formal EU-NATO 

frameworks are essentially unbalanced negotiations 

between a unified and cohesive Alliance and 

individual EU Member States. Additionally, the 

absence of a security agreement between NATO and 

the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as an 

administrative arrangement between Turkey and the 

EDA are substantial hindrances. 

One EU official expressed the view that Turkey had 

been misled and eventually cheated in its desire to 

obtain an administrative arrangement with the EDA. 

Turkey agreed to the integration of the Western 

European Armaments Group (WEAG) into the EDA in 

2004, with the tacit understanding that it would be 


given an administrative arrangement with the new 

agency so as to be able to participate in its work. Even 

though Norway, a country in a similar position, was 

able to sign an administrative arrangement with the 

EDA, Greece called for a security agreement to be 

signed between the EU and Turkey as a prerequisite to 

Turkey’s participation in EDA programs. While the 

Council secretariat’s legal service has not agreed with 

this stance, the issue is blocked at the political level 

mainly by Cyprus. 

Informal Contacts 

With the formal framework stalled, both organisations 

largely rely on EU-NATO staff-to-staff dialogue and 

exchange, which works reasonably well. According to 

senior officials on both sides, staff-to-staff contact has 

been key to the success of recent helicopter initiatives 

that aim to increase the number of available 

helicopters for operations, particularly in Afghanistan. 

One example of this is NATO’s Hip Helicopter Task 

Force 5 , which also invites representatives from the 

EDA to provide advice and assistance on training. 

Related to this program is the UK-French 

Multinational Helicopter Initiative (MHI), which 

supports the financing of helicopter deploymentrelated 

activities and whose membership is not 

restricted. 

In addition, the same national experts often attend 

working group meetings at the EDA and at NATO, so 

coherence-building and information exchange is 

fostered. EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis and 

NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation 

General Abrial have had informal contact, including a 

visit by Abrial to EDA HQ in mid 2009. 

Staff-to-staff contacts also allow the organisations to 

better align their priority shortfall areas, so that efforts 

to address these shortfalls are more coordinated and 

coherent. At his press conference following the recent 

informal NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in 

Istanbul, Secretary General Rasmussen emphasised the 

importance of multinational projects in times of 

budgetary pressure, and highlighted medical facilities, 

counter-IED technology and heavy-lift helicopters as 

three areas that could benefit from closer cooperation 

with the EU. 

Which Way Forward? 

Formal cooperation in the field of capabilities today is 

hampered by deep political problems on both sides, so 

coordination now largely relies on informal 

5 The NATO Hip Helicopter Task Force (HHTF) is responsible for 

the development of a multi-national transport helicopter 

programme for NATO to help those countries that do not have the 

resources to deploy and run a transport helicopter operation on 

their own. 

mechanisms. This informal staff-to-staff contact 

should be enhanced as much as possible, especially 

between the EDA steering board and ACT. Specific 

projects, addressing common shortfalls, should be 

undertaken whenever possible, building on the 

example of recent helicopter initiatives. 

An EU official states that the ideal situation would be 

an organisation-to-organisation approach, and that 

states which are not members of both organisations 

should have the same right of participation as those 

who are. However, the utopian vision of all EU 

Member States accepting Turkey’s participation in the 

EDA and Turkey softening its interpretation of the 

inclusiveness of the NATO-EU “agreed framework” 

does not seem close to realizing itself. Nevertheless, 

the EU should do its utmost to conclude the Turkey- 

EDA administrative arrangement. 

Concerning the NATO-EU Capability Group, whose 

effectiveness is widely questioned, initial 

improvements could include the exchange of 

presentations prior to the meetings, more emphasis on 

single-issue meetings and a continuation of the 

Swedish and Czech initiatives of holding the meetings 

at the level of policy directors. 

Deeper Impediments 

As long as deep divergence of opinion exists within 

the EU concerning the future of European security, all 

aspects of the EU-NATO relationship, including 

capability development, will suffer. The current 

reluctance to address the political question of who 

should guarantee European security is poisoning the 

relationship on all levels. At the level of military 

capability development, one camp-largely led by the 

UK, remains committed to NATO for the foreseeable 

future while another camp, largely led by France, 

hopes to see CSDP become more robust, along with 

the development of purely European military 

capabilities that that implies. Indeed, the planners for 

the new CSDP structures of the EU do not hide their 

desire for an EU operational headquarters. 

Closely tied to their difference of opinion on the future 

of European security is how closely these two camps 

want the EU and NATO to cooperate. The French 

camp would prefer cooperation to remain minimal, due 

to fears of NATO overwhelming a still immature 

CSDP. On the other hand, the UK camp would 

welcome closer cooperation, but wishes to see CSDP 

remain minimised, with a clear division of tasks 

between the two organisations. 

Conflict also exists within and between EU Member 

ministries. NATO Missions and EU Permanent 

Representations compete for influence with capitals 


and representatives of different ministries are given 

conflicting directives. 

Thus, in this perspective, the EU-NATO Capability 

group is largely a compulsory political exercise to 

make it appear as if the organisations are sitting at the 

same table; neither side can afford to suggest that there 

is no cooperation. As one official deplored, “I hate the 

EU-NATO Capability Group”. Results of meetings are 

marginal are best, but non-papers and 

recommendations can still be churned out, even if 

useless. 

Conclusion 

Although the steps outlined above would improve the 

working of the NATO-EU Capability Group, and 

increase the inclusiveness of EDA programs, 

capability cooperation will remain close to nonexistent 

if the deeper issue of strategic divergence 

among EU Member States is not resolved. 

concrete results such as the helicopter initiatives is to 

go outside the organisational framework. 

Even if the current participation problem were to be 

resolved, underlying strategic divergence within the 

EU would still impede capability cooperation. The EU 

must conclude its internal debate on the future of 

European security if it is to project a cohesive front 

that will produce results. 

Given political and institutional problems, coherence 

in capability development must for the time being be a 

national concern. Individual nations must do what they 

can to ensure that representatives at EU and NATO 

meetings and working groups are given the same 

instructions and priorities, so that coherence can be 

fostered as much as possible. 

By Paul Sturm, Programme Associate, ISIS Europe 

Current initiatives cited as “best practices” are not 

concrete examples of formal EU-NATO cooperation in 

capability development, but rather multinational 

initiatives. Indeed, the only way to currently achieve 

Observatory #6 

http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_408_nato_watch_observatory_no_6.pdf 

The NATO Watch’s Bi-Monthly Observatory was developed as part of its independent monitoring 

service. Its focus is on NATO policy-making and operational activities and the clips are drawn from a 

wide range of subscriptions, feeds and alerts covering a substantial part of the major English 

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Subscription is free of charge 

Access the subscription page here 

NATO Watch conducts independent monitoring and analysis of NATO and aims to increase 

transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness and participation 

in a progressive reform agenda within NATO. 

NATO Watch website 

www.natowatch.org 

will be launched later this month 


CSDP and EU mission updates – February 2010 

Our regular update of CSDP and EU missions 

introduces the upcoming launch of a new CSDP 

mission. We compile much of our research from firsthand 

sources, giving a unique perspective and update 

on the EU’s CSDP activities. There are currently 14 

active CSDP and EU missions in operation (giving a 

total of six in the Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern 

Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; 

four in Africa). The Foreign Affairs Council 

Conclusion of 25 January set out the upcoming launch 

of the EU Training Mission in Somalia. Please see the 

June 2008 – December 2009 updates for introductions 

to the missions. ISIS updates these charts regularly as 

part of the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership 

www.csdpmap.eu which has been translated to a 

webportal, collating research on CSDP from 21 

partner organisations located throughout Europe. 

Upcoming missions 

EUTM Somalia 

Following the Foreign Affairs Council of the 25 

January 2010, the Member States have accepted the 

establishment of the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in 

Somalia. This comes within a broader EU effort to 

provide support to the Somali Transitional 

Government. The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is 

due to be agreed very soon, but questions on how to 

establish the Command and Control structure for the 

mission remain to be approached. As far as financing 

of the mission is concerned, the funds might come 

from the African Peace Facility of the Commission. 

Spain and France will be the framework nations and 

will contribute the majority of the personnel 

committed to EUTM, which is estimated to be 100 

personnel consisting in majority of Non- 

Commissioned Officers. The mission is said to start on 

the 1 May. 

The EU mission will take place in Uganda where the 

African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISON) is 

already involved in the training of the Somali troops. 

The aim of the mission is to support the AU in this 

endeavor and to work in close cooperation with other 

international partners such as the UN, the AU and the 

US. The EU mission will not be directly involved in 

the training of basic troops but will provide training to 

the trainers. 

As mentioned in our previous update, ensuring 

ownership of the trained troops by the Transitional 

Federal Government is crucial and the issue of 

establishing a transparent and accountable chain of 

payment is key. The EU might call for the services of 

PriceWaterhouseCoopers to establish the structure for 

payments. The training might include human rights 

and gender dimensions (and should), but the extent of 

such training remains to be debated. It is of utmost 

importance to not recruit child soldiers, a task which 

will be difficult as there are barely any age 

identification means available. 

Military 

EU NAVFOR Atalanta - 8 December 2008 to 13 

December 2010 

The Maritime Security Center (MSC) which has been 

established to provide protection to merchant ships 

navigating in the operational area has shown positive 

results. Even though the rate of registration to the 

MSC rate is high, there still remains an estimate of 

30% of ships which do not register to the MSC and 

which do not take part in the escort service provided 

by the EU mission. Capabilities are deemed 

satisfactory for the mandate as the objective is not to 

cover and protect entirely the area of operation but to 

provide safety to merchant ships and escort for the 

cargo of the World Food Program. 

As mentioned in previous updates, the pirates have 

proved ability to adapt very quickly to the situation. 

Attacks have been reported at 1000 nautical miles of 

the coast and underline that the pirates have 

significantly extended their area of operation. 

Questions have also been raised of whether the pirates 

might become increasingly violent in reaction to the 

pressure strains created by the EU mission. 

In regards to the legal dimension of incarceration and 

the judgment of captured pirates, HR/VP Ashton has 

announced her willingness to reinforce the current 

agreements established with the Seychelles and Kenya. 

Innovation from the mission on this dimension has 

included taking Kenyan judges on board NAVFOR’s 

ships so that they can directly apply the Kenyan 

judicial procedures as soon as pirates are captured. 

EUFOR Althea - 2 December 2004 to 21 November 

2010 

On 25 January the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to 

extend EUFOR Althea activity with a non-executive 

military training mission. The mission should be seen 

European Security Review no. 48, February 2010 ISIS Europe, page 13

as an extension of the current mission and will provide 

training to the Bosnian armed forces. The number of 

personnel involved training will be of 200 taken from 

the currently deployed troops. 

The Council has also re-affirmed that the EU military 

mission will not lose its executive powers until the 

Office of the High Representative is closed. This is in 

turn linked to the fulfilment of the Bosnian 

Government to meet the five plus two agenda set by 

the Peace Implementation Council. 

Civilian /Military SSR 

EU SSR Guinea Bissau - 12 February 2008 to 30 May 

2010 

The EU mission continues to play its advisory role on 

SSR to the Guinea Bissauen Government. The EU is 

working on all the dimension of the security sector 

namely the police, the armed forces, and the justice 

system. There is positive feedback and a welcoming 

attitude form the President and the government is to 

pass a package of laws including the EU’s 

recommendations. The debate on the mission’s future 

is ongoing and the EU SSR is likely to stay on for 

about a year. The end goal will eventually be to 

transfer SSR activities to other EU and International 

institutions, namely the Commission, the EEAS (when 

established) and the UN. 

EUSEC DR Congo - 1 July 2007 – 30 September 2010 

The EU security sector reform (SSR) work in Congo is 

being realized in a very complicated environment. The 

reforming of the Congolese army is a job to be 

achieved when an army is stationed and not deployed. 

However in the past four years the Congolese army has 

been deployed in the east and the equatorial regions of 

the country. Reform has been effective in some cases 

but there is feeling among the mission’s personnel that 

everything has to be restarted every six months as 

there is a constant change in the Congolese armed 

forces staff. In addition, another condition for 

achieving a successful SSR is for all the dimensions of 

the security sector to be addressed. This includes the 

armed forces, the police, the judicial system and the 

intelligence service. This is not the case in Congo. 

Furthermore, even if there are various other actors 

present on the ground such as the UN and EUPOL 

working on other aspects of the security sector than 

EUSEC, the limitation of the missions’ mandate 

restrains their ability to perform a real comprehensive 

reform of the security sector. This angle of analysis is 

directed at criticising the international missions, but to 

understand the extent of the work that needs to be 

achieved in the DRC. 1 

Furthermore a third condition to achieve a successful 

SSR is a clear will of the host country to undergo 

reform and this is not always the case with the 

Congolese Government. All these three negative 

dimensions therefore help us understand the lack of 

result on SSR in Congo. 

In October/November 2009, the mission supported 

FARDC in processing 20,000 new troops, (integrated 

from ex-rebels of CNDP and armed groups) in the 

Kivus and the three principle integration centres. As 

such, EUSEC is following its programme of 

prioritising the modernisation of the administrative 

procedures and EUSEC can pride itself on concrete 

achievements, especially on the chains of payment 

which has been implemented last year and continues. 

The work done included the provision of ID card to the 

army personnel facilitating payments of salaries. It has 

also successfully separated the chain of payment to the 

chain of commands which was essentially the root 

cause of the problem, as senior military created fake 

soldiers in their register in order to cash in the salary of 

these “ghost soldiers”. 

According to the Head of Mission, EUSEC is also 

engaged in re-establishing a training system whilst 

targeting an overall framework of reform. The main 

project for the mission mandate is to equip a training 

centre in Kitona, which aims to instil morale and allow 

for training in theory and military techniques 

(including infantry and artillery techniques) for 800 

officers. 

Regarding redress of violence against women and 

impunity, EUSEC is also striving to create better 

relations between the Congolese military and civil 

society. The mission has thus deployed detachments 

in five towns: Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, 

Goma and Bukavu. 

Even so, capabilities remain a problem in EUSEC and 

the mission remains understaffed. This is especially 

linked to the fact that all the personnel working in the 

DRC needs to speak French, which therefore restricts 

the number of people who can apply for the job. 

Civilian SSR 

EUPOL RD Congo - 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 

As in the case of EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL is facing 

serious capability shortage problems, there are 

currently 25 people deployed of the 47 pledged. The 

1 See http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_242_esdp&drcgender-report.pdf 


CIVCOM is following up on the work done on the 

force generation process started by the Swedish 

Presidency in order to tackle that problem. 

The Head of Mission decided to deploy two teams of 

prosecutor and gender expert in the east of the country 

in order to fight gender based violence and impunity. 

He deemed it a necessary step for the legitimacy of the 

mission, as it is of utmost importance to fight such a 

large scale problem. 

Work within the “Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la 

Police » continues and the mission is satisfied by the 

legal package soon to be adopted by the Congolese 

Government. 

EUPOL Afghanistan - 30 May 2007 to 30 May 2010 

Following the last call for contribution for the EU 

Police Mission in Afghanistan, the Head of Mission, 

Kai Vittrup, expects the number of mission 

international personnel to rise to 325/350 by the end of 

March. Combined with some 170 local staff, this 

would bring the mission size to up to 520. There is 

also an additional 17.4 million euro for the period 

December 2009 - 30 May 2010. The London 

Conference on Afghanistan on 28 January called for an 

increase of the Afghan police numbers to 139,000. 

This has increased the workload on EUPOL 

significantly, however there is now a good and clear 

division of labour between the EU mission and the 

NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) 

which should facilitate the training process. 

The provision of security to EUPOL’s personnel 

remains a difficult question and a formal agreement 

between EUPOL and NATO will prove hard to 

develop. The more likely to be achieved is a 

memorandum of understanding with the EU mission 

and ISAF. EUPOL will have to continue to rely on 

bilateral agreement with the Member States which 

control Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs). As 

mentioned in our previous update, the lack of security 

provision is the main hindering factor to EUPOL’s 

work as deployment to other provinces, which is a 

necessary condition to adequately fulfil its mandate. 

Security therefore remains one of the main obstacles to 

the mission work. In addition, finding accommodation 

for personnel is already hard for the mission where it is 

currently located and it would be even harder in other 

provinces. As far as equipment is concerned, EUPOL 

urgently needs armoured cars. 

The question of security has been even more central to 

the mission considering the Taliban’s attack of January 

20 which killed two Afghan Police and wounded two. 

The incident put into question the “ring of steel” 

security architecture designed by EUPOL of the 

Afghan capital, which until now, was deemed very 

secure. 

The strategy paper issued on policing by the Minister 

of Interior, Hanif Atmar, has been very helpful for 

EUPOL in order to focus its work and to allow the 

mission to expose and prove its added value. EUPOL 

has the support of the Minister Atmar and is now 

recognized by the US, (which was not the case 

previously) as a crucial player in the police training 

architecture in Afghanistan. Kai Vittrup has proved to 

really turn things around in positive way for EUPOL 

and this has substantially raised the mission’s profile 

among all the security actors in Afghanistan. 

The European Parliament is preparing a report which 

notes the need to strengthen the institutional and 

administrative capacity of the Afghan State, 

particularly to structures beyond that of the police. 

Indeed, judicial strengthening is badly needed, 

particularly when it comes to human rights and 

violation of women. In November 2009, the Council 

included human rights and gender mainstreaming as 

one of the six strategic priorities for EUPOL. 

Given the recent moves of Pakistan to assist in 

training, the Council of the EU is also exploring a 

possible EU SSR assistance mission to Pakistan 

possibly encompassing human rights, rule of law and 

counter-terrorism. 

EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories - 1 January 

2006 to 31 December 2010 

Paul Robert Kernaghan has been replaced by Henrik 

MALMQUIST On 1 January 2010 as Head of Mission 

for EUPOL COPPS. The mission is continuing to 

work on the consolidation between the police sector 

and the justice system. 

In addition, EUPOL COPPS has coordinated trainings 

of 6 Senior Prosecutors and 10 PCP Investigation 

officers on Crime scene and Forensic Evidence. 2 The 

Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad supports the 

mission, but it is now time for the EU to rethink its 

activity and foster more cooperation between the 

CSDP mission and the Commission activity. 

EUPM Bosnia & Herzegovina - 1 January 2003 to 31 

December 2010 

The mission was restructured on 1 January 2010. The 

focus of the mission is now fighting organized crime 

2 

“Training Prosecutors, Palestinian Civil Police Officers in 

Germany”, 19 January 2010, WAFA Palestinian News Agency 

http://english.wafa.ps/?action=detail&id=13633 


and corruption, but this process has gone slower than 

expected. The analytical capability of the mission has 

been hard to put in place, as the refocus of the mission 

entailed the replacement of personnel. The EU’s 

Political and Security Committee (PSC) had worked 

on the priorities of the Concept of Operations 

(CONOPS) to make them as operable as possible. 

However, it is currently too soon to assess the 

mission’s work. 

As in the case of Kosovo, working on corruption and 

organized crime is a sensitive subject as it might 

incriminate people within the government. This is in 

turn might affect the government perception of the 

mission and result in a lack of cooperation. Add to this 

the growing frustration from the population and the 

government toward the international presence in 

Bosnia & Herzegovina. 

Civilian 

EUJUST-LEX Iraq – 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010 

On 1 January 2010 EUJUST-LEX took on a new Head 

of Mission after the retirement of Stephen White. The 

new Head, a colonel in the Spanish Guardia Civil - 

Francisco Díaz Alcantud, took up his post in January 

2010. The pilot phase of in-land training (involving 18 

projects) will be ending in Spring and the PSC will 

then make an evaluation of training on Iraqi soil and 

issue recommendations. There is division among 

Member States on continuing such training, however 

training in Brussels will continue and the mission is 

likely to be extended. 

The positive dimension of in-land training is that the 

mission can follow up with previous participants who 

provide their impression on whether the teaching is 

trickling down in the institutions. Current feedback has 

been positive, but it still hard to have a correct idea on 

the matter. 

The communication of the mission has also improved, 

notably with an easy access to information on the 

numbers of trained on the mission website 3 – being : 

111 Iraqis have undertaken training courses, 21 have 

undertaken work experience secondments and 2975 

Iraqi Senior Criminal Justice Officials have been 

trained. 

EULEX Kosovo – 15 June 2008 to 15 June 2010 

The recent developments in Kosovo have underlined 

that Serbia continues to support the Kosovo Serbs. 

Even though EULEX and Belgrade has signed the 

3 See the EUJUST-LEX Council webpage: 

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=823&lang=EN 

Police Protocol Agreement in 2009, suggesting a 

certain form of understanding between the EU and 

Serbia, 30 Serbian judges will be sent in the north of 

Kosovo in order to establish alternative tribunals. 

EULEX has to make the Serbian authorities 

understand that dealing with the Kosovo Serbs is not to 

be done outside of an independent Kosovo context. 

EULEX must begin work on the sensitive topic of 

corruption and organized crime. This is likely to be the 

mission’s most difficult task, as working on the issue 

is likely to incriminate Kosovar politicians with whom 

EULEX is working with today. Corruption is 

widespread in Kosovo and certain politicians are 

suspected of being directly involved in organized 

crime. Confronting these issues might reduce 

Pristina’s support to EULEX, a situation which the EU 

cannot afford, as legitimacy is of utmost importance in 

order to achieve its mandate and in turn, stability in the 

region. 

Border missions 

Feature - Georgia 

EUMM Georgia – 15 September 2008 to 15 

September 2010 

Following the outbreak of violence between Georgia 

and Russia on the 7 August 2008, the EU Monitoring 

Mission (EUMM) was established to monitor the 

implementation of the 12 August and 8 September 

2008 ceasefire agreements. The Mission was deemed a 

success because it successfully managed to stabilize 

the situation and EUMM was also praised for its 

rapidity of deployment. However, at first the 

deployment was deemed problematic as both first and 

second pillar actors were rushed into the conflict for 

assessment, planning and establishment of 

humanitarian and security mechanisms. In addition to 

the crowded environment, the mission faced practical 

capability challenges which its capacity to fulfill its 

mandate. 4 

The mission mandate includes the stabilization and 

normalization of the situation in the conflict zone, to 

play the role of confidence builder and to gather 

information. The mission is also charged to ensure the 

respect of human rights and humanitarian law by all 

parties. 

Currently the mission has to deal with an extremely 

complex situation. Since Russia has recognized the 

4 See Fisher S. “EUMM Georgia” in Grevi G., Helly D., Keohane 

D. (Eds.), European Security and Defence Policy 

– The First Ten Years”, European Union Institute for Security 

Studies (Paris 2009), page 386-387 


independence of the breakaway region, the Kremlin 

denies the access of the mission to South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. The litigious dimension of the six point 

agreement is the definition of the territory of Georgia. 

The EU and the vast majority of the International 

Community still recognize the breakaway regions as 

part of Georgia. This is not the case for Russia which 

has recognized their independence. In here lies the 

entire problem for EUMM. Thus far the mission has 

only been able to enter the breakaway region once and 

for a brief amount of time in the context of the Incident 

Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). To 

counter the lack of accessibility, Ambassador Haven, 

the Head of Mission of EUMM, has called for 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to be used to 

monitor the breakaway region by air. 

As the mission cannot implement its mandate in the 

separatist regions, its role of confidence builder is 

hindered, but the most alarming feature is that the 

mission remains unable to investigate the Georgian 

claims of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia. 

As part of its confidence builder and stabilization 

roles, EUMM frequently calls for the use of the IPRM 

and plays an active role in linked investigations. The 

IPRM is a mechanism providing for meetings between 

the concerned parties’ authorities to discuss and solve 

issues threatening the security and stability in the 

region. The Georgians however accuse the breakaway 

region of manipulating the IPRM through falsification 

of facts and wrongful accusation of Georgian abuse of 

the ceasefire agreement. 5 The same accusations are 

flying on both sides and meetings are often skipped by 

the breakaway representatives. There are therefore 

doubts growing on the viability of the IPRT. The most 

recent incident which the mission has been 

investigating has been the arrest of a South Ossetian 

man – Mr. Pliev - by the Georgian police. The 

Georgian authorities claim that Mr. Pliev was carrying 

an automatic weapon and hand grenades. On the other 

hand, reports from the South Ossetian administrative 

authorities stated that Mr. Pliev was abducted by the 

Georgian Police at his home. 6 As aforementioned, 

EUMM entered South Ossetia for the first time and has 

since been working on resolving the issue, working 

with both sides to liberate Mr Pliev. In addition, the 

mission has called for the people who cross the 

administrative border to not be processed through the 

justice apparatus but rather through the administrative 

system. 

5 Interview with a Georgian Official 

6 Hunt K. F. “EU Monitors in South Ossetia Regarding 

Detention”, Impunity Watch Report, 7 January 2010, Impunity 

Watch. Available at: 

http://www.impunitywatch.net/impunity_watch_europe/2010/01/eu 

-monitors-in-south-ossetia-regarding-detention.html 

Although EUMM has entered for the first time South 

Ossetia since its establishment (in work with the Pliev 

investigation), this should not be seen as sign of 

opening up of the region. A communiqué was issued 

by the South Ossetian authorities underlining clearly 

that the entrance of EUMM in the breakaway region 

was an “exception” and it would only allow the EU 

mission to investigate the Pliev case. 7 

It is important to underline that the mission can only 

contribute minimally to the long term stabilization in 

Georgia. For that, one has to look at the Geneva talks 

and their development, and as far as the negotiations 

are concerned, there have been very few positive 

developments. This in turn raises the question of the 

resolution of the conflict and also on the exit-strategy 

of the EU mission. 

EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova -1 December 2005 to 30 

November 2011 

Recently the Ukrainian and Moldovan security 

services met for the third time in order to exchange 

information and deepen cooperation for fighting illegal 

migration and the smuggling of goods. This re-affirms 

both governments will to establish efficient and 

transparent border control authorities. 

On 1 December 2009 the mission entered a new phase 

of exercise (phase 7) after achieving the goals set out 

by the previous phase. Phase 7 emphasises on capacity 

building and the past months have been marked by the 

creation of the “capacity building unit”. The unit 

provides extensive and specific training to the 

personnel of the partner countries’ (Ukraine and 

Moldova) border teams. Activities includes among 

other, technical training of the use of infra-red 

cameras. 

EUBAM issued the Common Border Security 

Assessment Report, to which the partner countries 

contributed. This is a positive step forward, as their 

inclusion will ultimately contribute to building the 

partner’s ownership of such assessment procedures of 

their own border control policies. 

EUBAM continues to work on the Targeted 

Monitoring Actions (TMA) and the latest launched has 

been the Pre-arrival Information System (PIS). This 

procedure is designed to decrease the workload at 

borders and rendering the check procedure faster by 

centralising the vetting procedure prior to arrival at the 

border post. The PIS has been evaluated by the 

mission, which ascertained that that there are still 

minor problems on implementation interpretation by 

the partners. However, the PIS has been received 

7 ibid. 


positively by both Ukraine and Moldova and has 

proved to be very efficient. 

EUBAM initiatives on anti-corruption were 

agreed with the partner services. These include the 

implementation of pilot projects at two 

international border crossing points between the 

Republic of Moldova and Ukraine aimed at 

determination, introduction and monitoring of 

effectiveness of local level anti-corruption 

measures. Other imminent actions include surveys 

on integrity, implementation of a border crossing 

satisfaction survey, training on ethics and 

corruption, round table discussions for low and 

middle level management on the role and tasks of 

management in combating internal corruption and 

EUBAM involvement in monitoring and advising 

on corruption cases related to the Moldova- 

Ukraine state border. 

Recently the Heads of the Ukrainian and 

Moldovan security services and EUBAM met for 

the third time in order to review and deepen 

cooperation on border security issues. Information 

and analytical data exchange has increased 

significantly. Joint analytical work on smuggling 

and illegal migration are cases in point. 

Cooperation with EU member states and 

international law enforcement agencies also 

increased. 

EUBAM has recently issued recommendations 

regarding the establishment of law enforcement 

procedures to be used by the partners. These 

recommendations call for providing step by step 

ownership by the partner of powers of interrogation 

and investigation as well as the ability of initiating 

criminal cases. 

EUSR BST Georgia - 1 September 2005 to 28 

February 2010 

No changes since last update. But as this mission is 

linked to the EU Special Representative, EUSR Pierre 

Morel, the mission will continue with the offices of the 

EUSR. 

EUBAM Rafah - 1 January 2006 to 24 May 2010 

No changes since last update. 

By Johann Herz, Programme Officer with Giji Gya, 

Executive Director, ISIS Europe 

To subscribe to ISIS Europe’s mailing lists, please go to the “subscribe” on 

www.isis-europe.org 


CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership 

www.csdpmap.eu 

ISIS Europe established CSDP MAP in 2008, which has been designed to fill a gap and a niche by collating think tank, 

research institute, NGO, government and EU institutional work on CSDP into one-place. CSDP MAP now has 21 

partners across Europe and growing. 

CSDP MAP is particularly important with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The CSDP MAP 

webportal gives quick access and policy input on : 

Outline and chronological timeline of CSDP and EU missions. We see a shift in security and crisis 

management towards an increase in civilian crisis management with a human security and peacebuilding focus (12 of 

the current 14 CSDP and EU missions are “civilian”). This part of CSDP MAP gives direct access to EU documentation 

and policy, as well as partner analysis, figures and reports on CSDP missions. 

EU structure. One page, all the links. Council, Commission, EP, EU agencies - for anything related to the EU's 

External Relations (security and associated). 

Country analysis. Partners’ work and research in countries that have an EU mission present are provided, giving 

a broad and analytical view - from the perspective of Member States and stakeholders on the ground - as to the country 

and regional contexts. 

Thematics. This aspect of CSDP MAP provides links to research on various thematics involved in CSDP, amongst 

them: fragile states; early warning; conflict analysis & prevention; fact finding & assessment; structures & policies; 

financing; peacebuilding; sec-dev nexus; mediation; monitoring; R2P; human rights; gender; SSR; DDRRR; piracy; 

capacities & capabilities; civmil; lessons identified; oversight; private sector..... In particular, links with and coordination 

between the global actors involved in security, crisis management and peacebuilding – both internationally (i.e. 

synergies with UN and AU work); internally (NGOs and civil society) and transnationally (alliances with the EU and US 

through international bodies, as well as coalitions and through NATO). 

In the next phase of CSDP MAP, we will be developing: 

How military and civilian crisis management missions are affecting and perceived by those they are sent to assist. 

And whether these missions are actually effective for civilians, with input from the field. 

CSDP MAP partners as of February 2010 

CICS Bradford University, UK; Clingendael, the Netherlands; CMI, Finland; DCAF, Geneva; ECFR, UK; EGMONT, 

Belgium; EPC, Brussels; FRIDE, Spain; Fundacion Alternativas (OPEX), Spain; GRIP, Belgium; ICG, Brussels; 

InCompass International, Madrid; IRIS, France; ISIS Europe, Belgium; IFSH, Germany; IAI, Italy; Noref, Norway; 

SIPRI, Sweden; SWP, Germany; UNIDIR, Geneva; ZIF, Germany. 

For more information, please contact csdpmap@isis-europe.org or +32 2 230 7446 

Subscribe to updates from www.csdpmap.eu 


ISIS Europe – chart and table of CSDP and EU missions – February 2010 – www.isis-europe.org 

Table 1 – Completed missions: There will be 13 completed CSDP and EU missions as at February 2010 (see below and chart for 

further details. Future updates available from www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding). 

Region Military Civil-Military 

assistance / Military 

coord. support 

Africa 

Balkans/ 

Caucasus/ 

East Europe 

Asia 

Middle East 

- Artemis DRC 

- EUFOR RD 

Congo 

-EUFOR Tchad/RCA 

- CONCORDIA 

fYR of Macedonia 

- Support to AU 

AMIS Sudan 

- EUNAVCO Somalia 

Civil Police 

- EUPOL 

Kinshasa 

- EUPOL 

Proxima 

(fYR of Macedonia) 

- EUPAT 

(fYR o Macedonia) 

Civil Rule of 

Law 

- EUJUST 

THEMIS 

(Georgia) 

Civil- 

Military 

SSR 

Civil Border 

Civilian 

Monitoring 

- EUMM 

Western 

Balkans 

- AMM 

Monitoring 

Mission 

Planning 

- EUPT 

Kosovo 

Table 2 – Ongoing missions: As at February 2010, there will be 14 active CSDP and EU missions (6 in the Western Balkans, Caucasus 

and Eastern Europe; 3 in the Middle East; 1 in Central Asia; 4 in Africa) see below. In May, EUTM Somalia will increase the number of 

active missions to 15. 

Region Military Military 

coordination 

Africa 

Balkans/ 

Caucasus/ 

East Europe 

Asia 

Middle East 

- EU NAVFOR 

Somalia 

- EUFOR Althea 

BiH 

support 

Civil Police 

- EUPOL RD 

Congo 

Civil Rule of 

Law 

CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership – portal at www.csdpmap.eu 

Civil-Military SSR Civil Border Civilian 

Monitoring 

- EUSEC RD 

Congo 

- EU SSR 

Guinea-Bissau 

-EUTM Somalia 

- EUPM BiH - EUSR BST 

Georgia 

- EULEX Kosovo 

- EUPOL 

Afghanistan 

- EUPOL COPPS 

Palestine 

- EUJUST- 

LEX Iraq 

- EUBAM 

Ukraine/ 

Moldova 

- EU BAM 

Rafah 

- EUMM 

Georgia 

Planning

ISIS Europe – chart and table of CSDP and EU missions – February 2010 – www.isis-europe.org 

Chart of EU and CSDP missions to date, February 2010 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

2010 2011 

j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f f m a m j 

Greece Italy Ireland Netherlands Luxembourg 

UK 

Austria 

Finland 

Germany 

Portugal Slovenia France 

Cz Republic 

Sweden 

Spain 

Belgium 

Hungary 

* EU MM in Former Yugoslavia COMPLETED 31 December 2007 

EUPM BiH. Followed on from UN Intl Police Task Force in January 2003. 

extended to 31 December 2010 

CONCORDIA (1) 

(2) 

EUPOL PROXIMA 

suceeded by EUPAT 

EUJUST THEMIS Georgia Compl. 14/07/10 

EUFOR ALTHEA BiH (3) 

extended to 21 November 2010 

EUPOL Kinshasa --> suceeded by EUPOL RD Congo 

EUSEC RD Congo 

extended to 30 September 2010 

EUJUST LEX Iraq extended to 30 June 2010 

AMIS EU Supporting Action - Sudan COMPLETED 31 December 200 

AMM Aceh COMPLETED 15 Dec. 2006 

EUSR BST Georgia 

ext. 28/02/2010 

EU BAM Rafah 

ext 24/05/2010 

EU BAM Ukraine-Moldova 

extended to 30 November 2011 

EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories extended to 31 Dec 2010 

EUPAT (4) 

EUPT Kosovo 

(5) 

EUFOR RDC (6) 

EUPOL RD Congo 

extended to 30 June 2010 

EUPOL Afghanistan - mandated to 30 May 2010 

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Compl.15/03/09 

EU SSR Guinea-Bissau extended to 30 May 2010 

EULEX Kosovo - mandated to 15 Jun 2010 

EU MM Georgia ext. to 14 September 2010 

EUNAVCO (7) 

EU NAVFOR Somalia ext. to 12 December 2010 

EUTM Somalia 

j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f f m a m j 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 

CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership – portal at www.csdpmap.eu

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