ISIS Europe News In This Issue

dialogue between the organisations regarding their
respective pursuit of the capabilities needed to fulfil
their goals has increased in times of budgetary
pressure.
You say NATO and I say EU
The development of military and other capabilities at
the EU and at NATO answers to different priorities
and follows different methodologies. Thus, an inherent
element of disjunction exists in capability
development. The EU is a broader complex of
institutions with a wider mandate, greater civilian
focus and deeper instruments than those available to
the politico-military Alliance. While EU aspirations on
civilian capabilities in CSDP are better known, its
CSDP aspirations have also required the development
of military capabilities. 2 On the other side, NATO
members are extremely dedicated to ensuring that its
military forces are fully capable of meeting the
challenges of the times. However, the question of
developing civilian capabilities has arisen within
NATO as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
have demonstrated the need for capacity and abilities
in the areas of reconstruction and stabilisation. 3 Thus,
while current overlap of capability development is in
the military sphere, there is a risk of future duplication
in non-military capabilities as well.
Individual European NATO Allies have a single set of
forces for NATO, EU and national purposes. What is
at question is that these states do not want to be given
separate and inconsistent goals from the organisations
they belong to, and thus have a strong interest in
ensuring that capability development is not pulled in
two directions. Members of both organisations are
faced with a difficult choice: To whom do they commit
available military capabilities?
It seems many are currently committing capabilities to
both organisations; but this is not financially
sustainable in the long run. There was hope that the
NATO and EU defence planning process 4 could be
brought together, but this has encountered obstacles,
including EU fears that its autonomy would be
infringed upon by the Alliance with greater experience
in this area and the “participation problem”, now due
in part to problems posed by Cyprus and Turkey.
2 See also article on EU military capabilities by Johann Herz
“Military Capabilities: A Step Forward in ESDP?” in ESR No. 46,
October 2009. http://www.isiseurope.org/pdf/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf
3 Development of civilian capabilities at NATO promises to be an
uphill battle. The existing Civil Emergency Planning capabilities at
NATO were strongly resisted by France in particular.
4 Defence planning in this context refers to the collective setting of
targets and performance review. This entails close examination of
individual Member States’ programs and budgets.
The EU-NATO Capability Group
Today, formal coordination on capability development
takes place in the aforementioned NATO-EU
Capability Group, which meets approximately every 4
to 6 weeks alternating between NATO HQ and the
Council Justus Lipsius building in Brussels.
Membership of the group comprises NATO Allies and
Non-NATO EU Member States that have a security
agreement with NATO, as insisted upon by Turkey.
Both sides brief on common capability issues, and then
there is time for Q&A and statements, although these
are rare in practice. One potential avenue for
improvement cited by officials on both sides would be
the exchange of briefing content prior to the meetings,
which currently does not occur due to fears that
internal divisions would arise on the EU side. The
make-up of the attendees varies, but the EU is usually
represented by Permanent Representations’
counsellors to the Political-Military Group, the EDA’s
Policy and Plans unit, and the Council Secretariat
CMPD (previously Directorate 8). On the NATO side,
the meetings are attended by Defence Policy and
Planning; the International Military Staff, the Defence
Investment Division and defence counsellors and
advisors from the missions and capitals.
There are usually two or three items on the agenda, but
at times single issue meetings occur (i.e. Maritime
Surveillance during Swedish Presidency). It is these
specific targeted meetings that many find more useful.
The country holding the EU presidency often sets out
to seize the initiative, and improve the effectiveness of
the forum, but often run into the usual political
obstacles. For example, the Czech and Swedish
Presidencies undertook an initiative whereby nations
were represented by their MOD’s policy directors.
Political Pandering - The Participation Problem
The Capability Group is hampered by a growing
reticence on the part of the EU to fully engage without
the participation of all its Member States. A common
lament on the EU side is that formal EU-NATO
frameworks are essentially unbalanced negotiations
between a unified and cohesive Alliance and
individual EU Member States. Additionally, the
absence of a security agreement between NATO and
the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as an
administrative arrangement between Turkey and the
EDA are substantial hindrances.
One EU official expressed the view that Turkey had
been misled and eventually cheated in its desire to
obtain an administrative arrangement with the EDA.
Turkey agreed to the integration of the Western
European Armaments Group (WEAG) into the EDA in
2004, with the tacit understanding that it would be
European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe, page 10