Multipart thematic paper on multi-stakeholder ... - ISIS Europe

MULTIPART THEMATIC PAPER ON
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS ACTIVE
IN THE FIELD OF GOOD GOVERNANCE,
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Deliverable D.4.1.c
for MULTIPART work package 4c
European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Graz
Wolfgang Benedek
Markus Möstl
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg
Jens Narten
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa
Paolo Binami (consultant contracted by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna),
Valeria Izzi
Kateryna Pishchikova
University of Ljubljana
Petra Roter
Graz, May 2010.
The MULTIPART project is supported by the European Commission under
the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research,
technological development and demonstration activities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 9
A. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 11
MULTIPART’s Research on Democracy, Good Governance, and the Rule of Law ..................... 11
B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................... 13
1. The Concepts of Democracy, Good Governance, and the Rule of Law ..................................... 13
1.1. Good Governance Objectives ............................................................................................................ 14
1.2. Good Governance Tasks ................................................................................................................... 16
1.3. Good Governance Actors .................................................................................................................. 18
1.4. Some Useful Indicators ..................................................................................................................... 18
1.5. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 19
2. MSPs Active in the Area of Democracy, Good Governance, and the Rule of Law ................... 21
2.1. Overview of the Roles, Types and Characteristics of MSPs ............................................................. 21
2.1.1. Area & range .............................................................................................................................. 21
2.1.2. Actors.......................................................................................................................................... 22
2.1.3. Function & quality thereof .......................................................................................................... 22
2.1.4. Institutionalization ...................................................................................................................... 23
2.1.5. Duration ...................................................................................................................................... 23
2.1.6. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 24
2.2. Possible Mechanisms by which MSPs Might Contribute to Peacebuilding & Human Security....... 24
2.2.1. Peacebuilding and conflict reduction .......................................................................................... 25
2.2.2. Human Security – freedom from fear and freedom from want .................................................. 26
2.2.3. Empowerment ............................................................................................................................. 26
2.2.4. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 27
C. THEMATIC RESEARCH CHAPTERS ......................................................................... 29
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 29
1.1. MULTIPART’s Thematic Research ................................................................................................. 29
1.2. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 33
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2. Democracy and Good Governance Promotion. Taking Stock of a Two Decade Effort ............. 34
2.1. Historical Overview of Democracy and Good Governance Promotion in the Post-Cold War Era ... 35
2.2. Democracy: Core Concepts and Theories ......................................................................................... 36
2.3. Main Approaches to Democracy and Good Governance Promotion ................................................ 40
2.4. The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion .................................................................................... 45
2.5. Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................................................... 47
2.6. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 49
3. Core Tasks of Good Governance and Their Impact on Peacebuilding and Human Security ..... 53
3.1. The Good Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Situations: an Overview ....................................... 53
3.2. Rule of Law and the Fight Against Corruption ................................................................................. 56
3.3. Strengthening Local Governments .................................................................................................... 60
3.4. Elections and Citizen Participation ................................................................................................... 62
3.5. Respect for Human Rights ................................................................................................................ 65
3.6. Good Governance Approaches of Different International Organizations ......................................... 69
3.7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 74
3.8. Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 75
4. Approaches and Instruments of Good Governance .................................................................... 80
4.1. Processes of Decentralisation ............................................................................................................ 80
4.1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 80
4.1.2. Decentralisation as a development mantra ................................................................................. 81
4.1.3. Decentralisation in post-conflict settings: evidence from Afghanistan, DRC & Kosovo .......... 83
4.1.4. Decentralisation and post-conflict peacebuilding: conceptualizing the linkages ....................... 86
4.1.5. Conclusions: key implications for MSPs in post-conflict settings ............................................. 88
4.1.6. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 91
4.2. Multi-Sectorial Approach and Involvement of Non-State Actors in Partnerships ............................ 92
4.2.1. Overview: partnerships in post-conflict ...................................................................................... 93
4.2.2. MSPs: potential contribution to democracy, good governance, and the rule of law .................. 94
4.2.3. MSPs for democracy and good governance: a critical view ....................................................... 98
4.2.4. Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 100
D. MSP CASE STUDY ANALYSES .............................................................................. 102
1. Kosovo: The Assembly Support Initiative ............................................................................... 102
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1.1. Introduction to the ASI Case Study ................................................................................................. 104
1.1.1. Note on methodology ............................................................................................................... 104
1.1.2. Brief description of the ASI ...................................................................................................... 104
1.1.3. The context in which ASI operates ........................................................................................... 105
1.1.4. Why ASI was selected as a case study ..................................................................................... 106
1.2. The Formation, Development and Operation of the ASI ................................................................ 107
1.2.1. The formation of ASI ............................................................................................................... 107
1.2.2. Duration of ASI ........................................................................................................................ 109
1.2.3. The geographical range of ASI ................................................................................................. 110
1.2.4. The role of public national actors and public local (sub-national) actors in the ASI ............... 111
1.2.5. The role of international actors involved in the ASI ................................................................ 113
1.2.6. The degree of institutionalisation of the ASI and its duration .................................................. 114
1.2.7. Co-ordination of the ASI .......................................................................................................... 116
1.2.8. Changes in membership in ASI ................................................................................................ 116
1.2.9. Prevailing stakeholders’ interests and potential conflicts ......................................................... 117
1.2.10. Conflict-management within the ASI ..................................................................................... 119
1.2.11. Flow of information in the ASI .............................................................................................. 120
1.2.12. Common budget ..................................................................................................................... 121
1.2.13. Issues downplayed by major actors ........................................................................................ 122
1.2.14. Consideration of gender and ethnic groups in ASI ................................................................. 122
1.2.15. Analytical conclusions ............................................................................................................ 124
1.3. How Participation in the MSP Affected Its Members ..................................................................... 125
1.3.1. Alteration of initial roles/mandates of the ASI actors .............................................................. 125
1.3.2. Local involvement and ownership of the ASI .......................................................................... 127
1.3.3. Benefits the ASI brought to the stakeholders involved ............................................................ 128
1.3.4. Analytical conclusions .............................................................................................................. 128
1.4. Assessment of the External Impacts of the MSP............................................................................. 129
1.4.1. Overall assessment.................................................................................................................... 129
1.4.2. Analytical conclusion ............................................................................................................... 131
1.5. The Significance of International Actors ........................................................................................ 131
1.5.1. Identification, characterisation & outline of the significance of the international actors 131
1.5.2. The role of individual governments .......................................................................................... 132
1.5.3. Types of behaviour in the interaction between international and local stakeholders ............... 132
1.5.4. Analytical conclusions .............................................................................................................. 132
1.6. Overall Conclusions of the ASI Case Study ................................................................................... 133
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1.7. Annexes ........................................................................................................................................... 136
1.7.1. Annex I: List of interviews ....................................................................................................... 136
1.7.2. Annex II: List of ASI activities outside the territory of Kosovo .............................................. 138
1.7.3. Annex III: Text of the ASI admission statement ...................................................................... 140
2. Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Programme ................................................................... 141
2.1. Introduction to the NSP Case Study ................................................................................................ 143
2.1.1. Methodological note ................................................................................................................. 143
2.1.2. Brief description of the NSP ..................................................................................................... 144
2.1.3. The context in which it operates: local governance in Afghanistan ......................................... 145
2.1.4. Why the NSP was selected ....................................................................................................... 148
2.2. The formation, development and operation of the NSP .................................................................. 152
2.2.1. How and why the NSP was formed .......................................................................................... 152
2.2.2 How the NSP developed over time ............................................................................................ 154
2.2.3. How the NSP operated.............................................................................................................. 156
2.3.4. Analytical conclusions .............................................................................................................. 170
2.3. How Participation in the MSP Affected its Members ..................................................................... 170
2.3.1. How and why participation in the MSP affected each of its members ..................................... 170
2.3.2. Development of relationships between MSP members ............................................................ 175
2.3.3. Analytical conclusions .............................................................................................................. 175
2.4. Assessment of the External Impacts of the NSP ............................................................................. 176
2.4.1. Overall discussion ..................................................................................................................... 176
2.4.2. Detailed assessment of the impacts of the NSP in selected issue areas .................................... 176
2.4.3. Analytical conclusions on impacts of the NSP ......................................................................... 179
2.5. The Significance of International Actors ........................................................................................ 179
2.5.1. Relevant international actors for the NSP................................................................................. 179
2.5.2. Assessment of the significance and roles of a few selected international actors ...................... 180
2.5.3. Analytical conclusions .............................................................................................................. 181
2.6. Overall Conclusions of this MSP case study ................................................................................... 181
2.7. Annexes ........................................................................................................................................... 182
2.7.1. Annex I: Methodology .............................................................................................................. 182
2.7.2. Annex II: List of interviews ...................................................................................................... 183
2.7.3. Annex III: Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................................. 184
2.7.4. Annex IV: Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 185
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3. Democratic Republic of Congo: REJUSCO ............................................................................. 189
3.1. Introduction to the MSP Case Study ............................................................................................... 190
3.1.1. Rationale and case-study eligibility .......................................................................................... 190
3.1.2. Methodology and caveats ......................................................................................................... 192
3.2. Formation, Development and Operation of the MSP ...................................................................... 193
3.2.1. Justice and security in post-conflict DRC................................................................................. 193
3.2.2. Ongoing processes of reform of the justice and security systems ............................................ 195
3.2.3. Origins of REJUSCO ................................................................................................................ 198
3.2.4. Aim and objectives of REJUSCO ............................................................................................. 199
3.3. The Nature and Structure of the MSP ............................................................................................. 199
3.3.1. International partners ................................................................................................................ 199
3.3.2. Government partners ................................................................................................................ 201
3.3.3. Civil society .............................................................................................................................. 202
3.3.4. Structure and functioning of the partnership ............................................................................ 203
3.3.5. REJUSCO’s decision-making and management structure ....................................................... 205
3.3.6. Implementation issues .............................................................................................................. 206
3.4. Assessment of the External Impacts of the MSP............................................................................. 207
3.4.1. REJUSCO performance and impact ......................................................................................... 207
3.4.2. Coherence and complementarity .............................................................................................. 209
3.4.3. Sustainability and management of expectations ....................................................................... 211
3.5. Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 211
3.6. Annexes ........................................................................................................................................... 214
3.6.1. Annex I: List of interviews ....................................................................................................... 214
3.6.2. Annex II: Example of Interview Reporting Sheet .................................................................... 215
3.6.3. Annex III: Acronmys ................................................................................................................ 220
3.6.4. Annex IV: Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 221
E. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 226
Research Question 1 ........................................................................................................................... 226
Research Question 2 ........................................................................................................................... 227
Research Question 3 ........................................................................................................................... 229
Research Question 4 ........................................................................................................................... 231
Research Question 5 ........................................................................................................................... 233
Research Question 6 ........................................................................................................................... 234
Research Question 7 ........................................................................................................................... 235
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ANNEX: KEY SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................. 237
Research Question 1 ........................................................................................................................... 237
Research Question 2 ........................................................................................................................... 238
Research Question 3 ........................................................................................................................... 239
Research Question 4 ........................................................................................................................... 240
Research Question 5 ........................................................................................................................... 241
Research Question 6 ........................................................................................................................... 241
Research Question 7 ........................................................................................................................... 241
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The present study was jointly elaborated by researchers of the European Training and Research Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (ETC, Graz), the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH,
Hamburg), the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa) and the University of Ljubljana in the framework of work
package 4c of the MULTIPART research project. The findings of this report are based on a <strong>thematic</strong> desk
research and on three case studies building on interviews conducted in Kosovo (24 interviews), Afghanistan
(19 interviews) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (27 interviews) between July 2009 and February
2010.
The report provides an analysis and evaluation of the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships active in
the field of democratisation, good governance and the rule of law (MSP-DEMs) in post-conflict situations
and aims to improve the understanding of how MSP-DEMs can contribute to peacebuilding and Human
Security in countries that are emerging from armed conflict.
The study finds that (re-)constructing democracy and (re-)establishing good governance and rule of
law in post-war countries is a key challenge for partnerships between international and local stakeholders, as
well as public and civic actors. More specifically, the results of the research show that promoting democracy,
good governance and the rule of law is key for the stabilization of a post-conflict peacebuilding setting and
for laying the foundations for the enjoyment of liberal rights and freedoms. The sharing of responsibilities
among international and local stakeholders on one side, and between public and civic ones on the other, is of
particular importance for MSP-DEM in order to generate an impact on peacebuilding and Human Security.
The report argues that though different donors emphasize different sectors of the good governance
agenda, these organizations are remarkably similar in their activities. The chapters on the <strong>thematic</strong> desk
research illustrate how the core tasks of good governance can be broken down to five concrete tasks, namely
supporting the rule of law, eliminating corruption, strengthening local governments, encouraging citizen
participation in elections and in civil society, and promoting human rights. Yet, it is claimed in this report
that the cornerstone of good governance is its comprehensiveness and multi-sectoriality, meaning that only
by fulfilling all core tasks of good governance in their complexity one can fulfill the objectives of good
governance as a whole in post-conflict societies and thus achieve a holistic transformation of a nation’s
governance in the end.
Further, this report acknowledges that the promotion of democracy and good governance is a
complex phenomenon that varies greatly along a number of dimensions, such as the type of donor and its
strategic concerns, the nature of the recipient state and its importance for the donor, as well as significant
events in global politics. While the report finds that in the area of democracy and good governance
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promotion, a mixed approach that combines elements of “input legitimacy” and “output legitimacy” is
evident, a stronger inclination towards effective government and “output legitimacy” is quite pronounced in
post-conflict settings. Civic actors face the most ambiguity with respect to their role in democracy and good
governance promotion in post-conflict settings. They are believed to be guarantors of democratisation and
key players in ensuring the “input legitimacy”. In practice, however, civic actors are often instrumentalized
towards implementation of social service provision and other donor-defined programmes.
By looking at the way in which MSP-DEMs can affect, and in turn be affected by, decentralization
reforms, the report also reflects on the processes of decentralisation and their implications for MSP-DEM in
post-conflict contexts. It is found that decentralisation leads to a proliferation of the actors that can
potentially be involved in MSP-DEMs. Not only the central government, but also local elected authorities, as
well as other types of actors, such as the civil society, the private sector, or traditional authorities may have a
stake in the process of peacebuilding and furthering Human Security. This makes it more difficult for donors
to decipher the situation and identify appropriate partners, but at the same time it further emphasizes the need
to have an in-depth understanding of roles, responsibilities, and power dynamics.
In the second part of this report, three MSP-DEMs, namely the Assembly Support Initiative (ASI) in
Kosovo, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan, and the Programme d’Appui à la
Restauration de la Justice à l’Est du Congo (REJUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of Congo are analyzed
in separate in-depth case studies. Each case study includes a detailed analysis of compositional and
operational characteristics of each MSP-DEM, an in-depth analysis of the role of the MSPs-DEM for a given
post-conflict society, as well as a more limited discussion of their impact on peacebuilding and Human
Security.
Finally, the overall conclusions regarding the seven key MULTIPART research questions are
summarized at the end of this report.
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A. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPART’s Research on Democracy, Good Governance, and the Rule of
Law
The overall objective of the MULTIPART project is to improve the understanding of how multi-stakeholder
partnerships (MSPs) can contribute to peacebuilding and Human Security in countries that are emerging
from armed conflict, and to clarify policy and programming implications for the EU and its partners.
According to the distribution of tasks within the MULTIPART consortium, work package 4c (WP4c)
investigated in detail MSPs active in the field of democratisation, good governance and rule of law (MSP-
DEM) through a <strong>thematic</strong> research and selected in-depth case studies in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The present <strong>thematic</strong> <strong>paper</strong> is the result of these activities and represents the
final compilation of work done and outputs produced in the framework of MULTIPART work package 4c.
Accordingly, this <strong>thematic</strong> <strong>paper</strong> on WP4c is on the one hand based on a <strong>thematic</strong> desk research and
on the other hand this study builds on case studies based on interviews conducted in Kosovo, Afghanistan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo between July 2009 and February 2010. The European Training and
Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), as coordinator of WP 4c, had the primary
responsibility to compile and complement this <strong>thematic</strong> study. Where whole parts of the study have been
prepared by other researchers of the MULTIPART consortium, the respective names and research
institutions are indicated at the beginning of each chapter or section. The present <strong>thematic</strong> study is structured
as follows.
Chapter B contains the results of the preparatory work and the desk research on MSP-DEM. Thus,
Chapter B first elaborates on the preparatory work resulting in the conceptual framework of this study by
outlining the concepts of democracy, good governance and the rule of law (Section 1), and the initial
overview of the roles, types and characteristics of MSP-DEM as well as an initial outline of possible
mechanisms by which MSPs might contribute to peacebuidling and Human Security (Section 2).
Chapter C presents the results of the in-depth <strong>thematic</strong> desk research. After a short introduction
(Section 1) Chapter C takes stock of two decades effort of democracy and good governance promotion
(Section 2), focuses on the core tasks of good governance and their impact on Human Security and
peacebuilding (Section 3), and discusses approaches and instruments of good governance (Section 4).
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Chapter D presents the results of the case studies done in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. It thus describes the findings of the analysis of the Assembly Support Initiative in
Kosovo (Section 1), the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan (Section 2) and the Appui à la
restauration de la Justice à l’Est du Congo (REJUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which focuses
on REJUSCOs sub-program on the installation of mobile courts (Section 3).
Chapter E discusses the overall conclusions for the main MULTIPART research questions. The
underlying key research questions and secondary research questions developed by the work package 4c team
will be presented in an Annex.
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B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1. The Concepts of Democracy, Good Governance, and the Rule of Law
By Kateryna Pishchikova (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
It is important to highlight that while being distinct policy terms, in their substance and content the concepts
of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law show considerable overlap. Moreover, at times one may
subsume others as sub-categories, as for example, the rule of law that can be seen as one of the specific
objectives of good governance. The specific clustering of these issues also depends on individual donor
preferences. For example, the USAID makes no distinction between democracy and good governance and
talks about “democratic governance”, the World Bank uses predominantly the term “good governance”,
whereas the EU institutions have a more mixed approach.
In general, the terms governance and good governance are increasingly being used in development
literature and practice. Bad governance is being regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our
societies. Major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid and loans on
the condition that reforms that ensure "good governance" are undertaken (UN ESCAP, 2009). Overall, there
is a general consensus among all donors that there are good pragmatic reasons for promoting these
approaches because the EU and other major donors want to know that funding is being used effectively.
This rationale is well captured in the following passage from an address by the former World Bank
President. Good governance is
what helps governments function effectively and achieve economic progress. […] It is
essentially the combination of transparent and accountable institutions, strong skills and
competence, and a fundamental willingness to do the right thing. Those are the things that
enable a government to deliver services to its people efficiently. An independent judiciary, a
free press, and a vibrant civil society are important components of good governance. They
balance the power of governments, and they hold them accountable for delivering better
services, creating jobs, and improving living standards (Wolfowitz, 2006).
Historically, democracy promotion appeared on most donors’ agendas after the end of Cold War that
marked a rise of new ideology and the emergence of new practices in global politics. The recent focus on
good governance and the rule of law in post-conflict reconstruction as well as in development aid is the next
step in this (by now global) process (please see Section 2 of Chapter C for a more detailed overview). While
there is a considerable overlap between programs that deal with democracy and those that promote good
governance, in policy terms the two concepts operate in a different manner. Roughly, the distinction between
the two can be made in the following way.
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Democracy presents a general normative agenda and refers to a number of core “ingredients” that
have to be put in place and whose capacity has to be built, such as genuine and competitive elections and
political processes, increased development of a politically active civil society, free and independent media.
Governance can be seen as an operational concept that describes the process of decision-making and the
process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). For example, how public institutions
conduct public affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the realization of human rights. Good
governance is meant to accomplish these tasks in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with
due regard for the rule of law. It is therefore an operational concept with a strong normative connotation. The
rule of law is one of the core tasks that are listed under the good governance agenda.
1.1. Good Governance Objectives
The objectives listed below are taken from the UN approach; they represent very well the overall normative
aspiration of the good governance agenda and are similar for the majority of big donors.
Participation
Effective participation (i.e. participation whereby actors can affect the decision-making process) by all
individuals and all segments of society, both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance.
Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. This
means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the other
hand.
Human rights
Full protection of human rights, particularly those of ethnic minorities.
Transparency
Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and
regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be
affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that
it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.
Responsiveness
Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable
timeframe.
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Consensus building
There are several actors and as many view points in a given society. Good governance requires mediation of
the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the
whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what
is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This
objective is of particular relevance for post-conflict settings.
Equity and inclusiveness
A society’s well being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not
feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires that all groups, but particularly the most
vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well being.
Effectiveness and efficiency
Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while
making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good
governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment.
Accountability
Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the
private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional
stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are
internal or external to an organization or institution. In general an organization or an institution is
accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced
without transparency and the rule of law.
Order and security
Personal security is paramount to most people. Failure of the courts to protect property rights adequately and
consistently, to facilitate the conduct of essential economic activity or to resolve disputes in a fair and timely
manner can also lead to social unrest and black or gray market activity. It can also result in potentially
violent self-help conduct, seriously undermining public order, safety and security. While the judiciary and
legislature have important roles in preserving order and security, the executive branch has the immediate
responsibility in this area.
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Legitimacy
The perception of law as legitimate and worthy of adherence underpins the rule of law. Rule of law as a basis
for democratic governance includes not only the supremacy of the law, but a democratic basis for law that
makes the law legitimate.
Checks and balances
Separation (or at least independent decision-making, if not complete autonomy) or diversity of governmental
powers provides the checks and balances needed to keep government contained. Checks and balances occur
vertically among the different levels of government as well as horizontally. When functioning appropriately,
regional and local governments can provide a balance to central government authorities. Through monitoring
and oversight, civil society also acts as a critical check on government at all levels.
Fairness
Fairness consists in equal application of the law, procedural fairness, protection of basic human rights and
civil liberties, and access to justice.
All of the objectives listed above are in strong correspondence with the general objectives of peacebuilding
as well as with the three core dimensions of Human Security – freedom from fear, freedom from want, and
empowerment.
1.2. Good Governance Tasks
Elections and citizen participation
Elections – if free and fair – are believed to be an essential basis for sustainable development and a
functioning democracy. Moreover, actions supporting the right to participate in genuine elections can make a
major contribution to peace, security and conflict prevention. Electoral assistance projects and election
observation missions (e.g. by the EU or OECD) is one of the core components of good governance projects
portfolio.
Even if it is necessary step, it cannot be considered a sufficient one. Democracy will take root and
the results of the election will be considered truly legitimate only if transparent and participatory processes
lead up to it. This task is therefore increasingly conceived of as a complex process that should extend in time
much beyond the actual voting and must include various civic groups and engage in different participatory
practices.
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Strengthening local governments
Local governance is key to democratic governance and has become one of the cornerstones of the European
foreign policy. “The need for a participatory decision-making process, the demand for adapting development
strategies to local needs, the requirement to take local knowledge into account, make it necessary to look at
development from a local perspective.” (Binder et al, 2007). This new approach manifests itself in three
interrelated directions that are taken by development and post-conflict reconstruction programmes – support
to local governance, decentralisation, and territorial development (please see Section 4.2. of Chapter C for a
detailed discussion of decentralisation, especially in post-conflict settings).
Rule of law and the fight against corruption
The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and
private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.
(UN Security Council 2004, 4). The report containing this definition further suggests certain characteristics
of the rule of law, including adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
fairness in application, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.
While the rule of law depends heavily upon the performance of the executive and legislative
branches of government and on many non-governmental actors, it is the justice sector that is largely
responsible for making the rule of law operative in society. The justice sector includes two interrelated
components. The framework of laws is comprised of the laws and rules that govern public behaviour,
including the constitution, codes, laws and regulations. Legal frameworks establish and empower justice
sector institutions. They define institutional roles and regulate their behaviour. Institutions and actors then
give life to the law, which only exists on <strong>paper</strong> until institutions and actors put the law into practice.
Many post-conflict situations present unique issues with respect to the framework of laws. There
may be lack of agreement about which framework applies. Also, the pre-existing framework may be
incomplete or may not provide for fundamental rights. Post-conflict interventions may include adopting
previous codes or introducing internationally accepted codes as interim measures while longer-term reforms
are developed.
Post-conflict conditions also present special challenges with respect to rebuilding justice sector
institutions. These institutions may simply be destroyed as a result of violence or civil war. Even if they are
not, they may have little or no capacity to assume basic functions for maintaining order and security. In other
cases, justice sector institutions have little credibility because they were under the control of disbanded
authoritarian regimes and can no longer be relied upon.
17

1.3. Good Governance Actors
Public institutions include: the three branches of government, law enforcement agencies, prisons, regulatory
bodies – at all levels of jurisdiction, from national to local.
Private institutions include: private foundations, private schools, and businesses.
Civic institutions include: civil society organizations (including NGOs), public interest groups, advocacy
organizations, professional associations, customary or religious institutions, and community organizations.
In some countries in addition to the civil society, informal and sometimes illegitimate actors still have a
strong influence on decision-making and implementation, such as warlords or organized crime syndicates.
Particular types of actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that is under
discussion. In rural areas, for example, actors may include influential land lords, associations of peasant
farmers, cooperatives, community organizations, research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions
political parties, the military and so on. In urban areas, these are small-scale entrepreneurs, trade unions,
other employee organizations or professional associations, civil society groups and networks, workers in the
informal sector and so on. At the national level, in addition to the above actors, media, lobbyists,
international donors, multi-national corporations and so on may play a role in decision-making or in
influencing the decision-making process (UN ESCAP, 2009).
1.4. Some Useful Indicators
Free and Fair Elections
Electoral Competition (Vanhanen 2003); Women’s Political Rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2004),
Competitiveness of Participation (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2005), and Democratic Accountability
(ICRG 2006)
Respect for Human Rights
Political Killings, Disappearances, Torture, Political Imprisonment (Cingranelli and Richards 2004),
and Political Terror (Gibney 2004).
Conditions for Civil Society
Restrictions on the Organization of Minorities (Minorities at Risk Project 2004), Freedom of
Assembly, Religious Freedom, Respect for Worker’s Rights, Freedom of Movement, and Respect for
Women’s Economic Rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2004).
18

Free Media
Freedom of the Press (Freedom House 2004b); Freedom of Speech (Cingranelli and Richards 2004),
and Restrictions on Freedom of Expression (Minorities at Risk 2004).
Governance
Perceptions of Corruption (Transparency International 2005); Administrative Corruption; and
Bureaucratic Quality (Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta 1996)
1.5. Bibliography
Binder, Juergen, et al. 2007. Towards an EU approach to democratic local governance, decentralisation and
territorial development, Background Paper. Available from
http://www.delzmb.ec.europa.eu/en/acp_eu/Background%20Paper.pdf.
Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 2004. CIRI Human Rights Project. [cited 2004]. Available
from www.humanrightsdata.com.
Erb, Claude B., Campbell R. Harvey, and Tadas E. Viskanta. 1996. "Political Risk, Economic Risk, and
Financial Risk." Financial Analysts Journal 52 (6):29-46.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION .2001. The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and
Democratization in Third Countries, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, 8 May 2001, COM(2001) 252 final.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2003. Communication on Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and
Democratisation with Mediterranean partners, COM (2003) 294 final, Brussels 21.05.2003.
Freedom House. 2004b. Freedom of the Press 2004 - Survey Methodology. [cited 2004]. Available from
www.freedomhouse.org.
Gibney, Mark. 2004. Political Terror Scale. [cited 2004]. Available from
www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html.
ICRG, International Country Risk Guide. 2006. Political Risk Rating. [cited July 2006]. Available from
http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods.
Minorities at Risk Project. 2004. MAR Data. [cited 2004]. Available from www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/.
Transparency International. 2005. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). [cited 2006].Available from
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
Vanhanen, Tatu. 2003. Measures of Democracy 1810-2002. Finnish Social Science Data Archive, [cited
2004]. Available from http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/.
UN ESCAP, 2009 “What is Good Governance?”
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp, retrieved March 2009.
19

United Nations Security Council. 2004. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post
Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary General, August 23, 2004
Wolfowitz. 2006. “Good Governance and Development: A Time For Action”
20

2. MSPs Active in the Area of Democracy, Good Governance, and the Rule of
Law
2.1. Overview of the Roles, Types and Characteristics of MSPs
By Jens Narten (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg)
A key challenge arising from an increased focus in the recent past on partnership between international and
local stakeholders, as well as public and civic actors, cooperating in countries emerging from violent conflict
has been to reconstruct aspects of democracy building, the (re-)establishment of good governance, and rule
of law as to be found in a number of post-war countries. Such partnerships are intended to provide a stable
foundation for wider peacebuilding efforts and to improve human-security aspects, such a freedom from fear
and essential needs. The present subsection will provide initial desk review based findings on essential
characteristics and roles of multi-stakeholder partnerships in the area of democracy, good governance and
rule of law in postwar countries. Direct reference to MSP-DEM in the country cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo can be found in Chapter D of this document.
According to the guidelines provided by the Final Report on WP 2 and 3, the constituting elements
for describing characteristics and roles of MSP-DEM revert to aspects of applicable <strong>thematic</strong> (sub-)areas and
geographical range, actors and groups of actors involved, operational functions, level and degree of
institutionalization, time scale and the duration of a multi-stakeholder partnership of concern, including its
quality of decision-making and capacity-building processes and outputs (cf. Final Report on WP 2 and 3:
108).
2.1.1. Area & range
Core subject areas of MSP-DEM normally concentrate on operational areas such as democracy support (i.e.
electoral assistance, political party support, parliament & assembly support, citizen participation, etc.); good
governance (i.e. organizational/executive reform, private-public partnerships, community and minority
participation, etc.); and rule of law (i.e. police & justice reform, human and minority rights, accountability &
transparency, etc.).
Due to such principle importance of state centrality within MSP-DEM structures, their geographical
range is usually on the nation-state level, or at maximum, on cross-border activities with a <strong>thematic</strong>ally
rather limited scope (i.e. for exchange of lessons learned or mutual working visits of governmental or
international officials). This finding does not apply to transnational MSPs or networks (i.e. Networks on
Good Governance, or the Inter-parliamentary Union, etc.).
21

2.1.2. Actors
The sector of democracy, good governance and rule of law is regularly dominated by public state actors due
to the central importance of this area for the performance of essential state functions. As a consequence of
that, also MSP-DEM are often dominated by such public actors, i.e. ministries or departments, executive or
public service representatives, parliamentary committees, independent public control or oversight bodies, etc.
The same finding applies to international actors as alternative core actors vis-à-vis local stakeholders.
Moreover, non-state civic or private actors are often hand-picked among elite representatives, or are
otherwise marginalized. Among them, certain stakeholder groups can become actively excluded or bypassed,
or choose themselves to boycott potential MSP-DEM, i.e. along ethnic lines (cf. Baskin 2004: 21;
Pruitt/Thomas 2006: 157).
With the prevailing hierarchical relationship between international and local, and public and civic
stakeholders, by which IGOs, INGOs or governments are regularly defined as policy makers and
major/primary stakeholders, vis-à-vis private or civic stakeholders as secondary ones (cf. Burnell 2007: 105),
MSP-DEM are often limited to formal exchanges processes only. Under these conditions, dominant
stakeholders (international or public) tend to simply unload information to the receiving side of local or civic
and private actors in a one-sided exchange process (cf. Sokolova 2006: 115). This stands in sharp contrast
with the ideal-type intention of MSP-DEM to bring together all major stakeholders with equal opportunities
for communication, representation, participation and decision-making in order to achieve transparency and
accountability between stakeholders and towards the wider public (cf. Hemmati, 2002).
2.1.3. Function & quality thereof
Primary functions of MSP-DEM can include awareness raising, advocacy, public mobilization and
responsiveness (i.e. through citizens councils, town hall meetings, etc.); democratic voice raising and
oversight, accountability/transparency and control (i.e. through steering bodies, oversight committees); law
drafting and authorization (i.e. by co-decision making); active participation, solidarity and representation (i.e.
by consultation and implementation) (cf. Beetham et al. 2008: 23; Burnell 2007: 174). In application of the
“ladder of participation” model (WP 2 and 3: 205; also cf. Arnstein 1969), an MSP-DEM is ideally meant to
unfold functions of essential co-management (cf. Berkes/Preston 1991).
However, in practice local stakeholders vis-à-vis international ones, and civic stakeholders vis-à-vis
public ones, are often disadvantaged with regard to power-sharing and related management aspects of
financial control, agenda-setting and decision-making, evaluation procedures, and overall political influence
(cf. Carlson/Berkes 2003: 11). Most often, the final or intermediate evaluation of existing policies or
programs is not promoted by the beneficiaries of the civil society or local stakeholders, but by international
or public state actors (cf. Burnell 2007: 97).
22

In seeking mutual partnership, MSP-DEM often deviate, however, into attempts of public state
actors, or international stakeholders respectively, to increase the legitimacy of their programmatic and
operational domination over local or civic stakeholders, and to find additional – otherwise too costly –
burden-sharing arrangements with their respective partners (ibid.). In such a case, local or civic stakeholders
usually remain as “silent partners”, by simply sharing in the benefits or risks of the MSP-DEM, but being
nearly uninvolved in its management or decision-making process (cf. Wilcox 1994).
2.1.4. Institutionalization
The level of institutionalization of an MSP-DEM can vary according to its operational scope or the
underlying working culture of its participating stakeholders. There are examples of effective long-term
networking and cooperation between highly independent partner organizations, which established only loose
institutional patterns, i.e. monthly or quarterly coordination meetings on the basis of simple Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) or Terms of References (ToR) (cf. ASI in Annex IFSH Mapping of MSP-DEM).
Other MSP-DEM, in turn, rather rely on a proper institutional embodiment of its core group with
full-fledged steering committees or executive boards at the decision-making level, and implementing sublevel
offices of their regional presences. However, such highly-institutionalized forms may still display
mechanisms of essential civic input (sometimes even proper complaint procedures, i.e. through
Ombudsperson institutions or training networks and related facilities).
What is characterized by such a high level of institutionalization, and what has often begun as initial
MSP-DEM, did then indeed often transform itself into an independent public institution on the basis of a
respective law or another form of legal document, while at the same time keeping hybrid structures and
functional mechanisms of an MSP-DEM.
2.1.5. Duration
Regarding time scale and duration of MSP-DEM, they are usually conceptualized for a longer-term period of
time in order to remedy long-term needs, i.e. anti-corruption programs or local capacity-building efforts.
Depending on their respective operational scope and level of institutionalization, however, also short-term
modes can apply, i.e. in case of electoral assistance, voter outreach campaigns or similar awareness
campaigns, which normally come to an end with the respective elections being held.
However, there is also the phenomenon of an MSP-DEM’s embeddedness into follow-up programs
or programmatic clusters with other MSPs, which will effectively endure the longevity of MSP-DEM. At the
same time, however, the existence of an organizational body, such as a steering committee or executive
secretariat, usually signifies the long-term institutional embodiment of such an MSP-DEM in postwar
countries on concern.
23

2.1.6. Bibliography
Arnstein, S. (1969):. A Ladder of Citizen Participation. In: Journal of the American Planning Association,
vol. 35 (4), pp. 216–224.
Baskin, Mark (2004): Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo. Working <strong>paper</strong>. Stockholm: International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Beetham, D./Carvalho, E/Landman, T./Weir, S. (2008): Assessing the Quality of Democracy. A Practical
Guide. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Berkes, F./Preston, R. (1991): Co-management: the Evolution of the Theory and Practice of Joint
Administration of Living Resources. In: Alternatives, vol. 18 (2), pp. 12–18.
Burnell, P. (2007): Evaluating Democracy Support. Methods and Experiences. Working <strong>paper</strong>. Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Carlson, L./Berkes, F. (2003): Co-management across levels of organization: concepts and methodological
implications. Paper at the International Association for the Study of Common Property Workshop on
“Politics of the Commons: Articulating Development and Strengthening local practices, Chiang Mai, 11-
14 July 2003, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001133/00Lars_Carlsson.pdf.
Hemmati, M. (2002): Multi-stakeholder processes for governance and sustainability. London: Earthscan
Publications Ltd.
Pruitt, B./Thomas, P. (2006): Democratic Dialogue – A Handbook for Practitioners. Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/Canadian International Development
Agency/Organization of American States/United Nations Development Program.
Sokolova, M.: (2006): Advocacy Democracy Modes: Benefits and Limitations. In: Informacijos Mokslai, no.
2006 (37), pp. 110-121.
Wilcox, D. (1994): The Guide to Effective Participation. Brighton, UK: Partnership Books.
2.2. Initial Outline of Possible Mechanisms by which MSPs Might Contribute to
Peacebuilding and Human Security
By Jens Narten (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg)
The sharing of responsibilities, in form of mutual rights and duties among international and local
stakeholders on one side, and between public and civic one on the other, is of particular importance for MSP-
DEM in order to generate a significant impact and outcome on peacebuilding and human-security aspects.
Decentralized approaches to effective input, planning and decision-making processes in MSP-DEM are thus
essential for generating such an impact (cf. Soeftestad 1999: 11); only by pooling their skills, knowledge and
resources, can this objective be achieved (cf. Wilcox, 1994).
24

2.2.1. Peacebuilding and conflict reduction
Promoting democracy, good governance and the rule of law is key for the stabilization of a post-conflict
peacebuilding setting and to lay the foundations for the enjoyment of liberal rights and freedoms, in the sense
of demands for “Institutionalization before Liberalization” (cf. Pouligny 2006: 240-249; Elwert 2002: 28;
Cousens 2001: 11). In doing so, MSP-DEM do therefore provide the foundation on which many other
peacebuilding activities, such as democracy aid, economic reconstruction, and civil reconciliation can build
on. Accordingly, the principle significance of MSP-DEM for peacebuilding efforts can be regarded as high,
while detailed root causes of underlying conflicts are usually very hard to establish and rarely able to be
addressed.
Overall, the usually envisaged level of participatory decision-making in MSP projects and processes,
as well as potential community contribution to the implementation of such projects, can ensure transparency
and can encourage the respective communities to assume collective responsibility for issues and objectives at
stake, i.e. through measures of promoting decentralization and civil co-governance, etc. (cf. Sisk 2001: 23 f.).
On the other hand, the parallel involvement of local authorities as partners and contributors to MSP-DEM
can help to democratize relationships between formal authorities and informal civic or private group
representatives. By the impact of both of these processes, the evolving capacity of local communities can be
enabled to mitigate conflicts over scarce resources, for example, reduce the potential for violence, and help
to strengthen the power of a respective community (cf. Burnell 2007: 205).
However, potential conflict-reduction capacities of MSP-DEM can become reversed by negative
trends or phenomena, which are originally meant to be alleviated by MPS-DEM themselves, i.e. when an
MSP becomes susceptible of corruption or when important decision-making is made behind closed doors
under exclusion of natural stakeholders, which would otherwise be involved (cf. Baskin 2004: 21 f.). In
addition, <strong>thematic</strong> linkage and operational cross-cuts with related peacebuilding dimensions, such as
reconciliation efforts as well as economic and liberal institution- and capacity-building, do naturally increase
the potential impact of MSP-DEM in postwar country settings.
Moreover, the oftentimes prevailing lack of mutual communication and input on equal terms
between international and local, or public and civic actors respectively, as well as one stakeholder’s
domination on others, is usually based on hidden agendas and interest in manipulation during MSP-DEM
processes. In this case, MSP-DEM processes are likely to generate even outcomes of mutual mistrust as well
as to endanger the potential impact of the MPS-DEM on peacebuilding and human-security aspects in the
respective community (cf. Sokolova 2006: 115).
25

2.2.2. Human Security – freedom from fear and freedom from want
In addition, the ideal-type <strong>thematic</strong> and operational focus of an MSP-DEM often relates to aspects of Human
Security, i.e. freedom from fear and freedom from want, in its narrow as well as its wide definition of Human
Security (cf. Krause 2007: 4 f.). In doing so, MSP-DEM can actively contribute with their impact on rule-oflaw
and participatory-civic engagement activities to promoting or even securing foreign and local socioeconomic
investment schemes, which would be hampered in case of legal insecurity, massive corruption, and
lack of a minimum transparency and public accountability (cf. Sisk 2001: 146 ff.), all of which can be
actively supported by MSP-DEM.
Their impact and output could then indirectly materialize in increased working opportunities and
higher rates of income, which in turn reduce the likelihood of social unrest and uprising due to a lower level
of poverty and unemployment. Moreover, by means of civic or public control of state organs, MSP-DEM can
also contribute to increased levels of social trust in newly established state organs by the MSP-DEM’s
potential oversight function to benefit a state’s basic legitimacy and credibility (cf. Trutz von Trotha 2000:
260).
However, in case of a massive selection of hand-picked elite representative as partners for the MSP-
DEM takes place, their potential impact can deviate in form of an increased expert-public knowledge and
input gap. Such processes do then decrease the overall legitimacy of a MSP-DEM at stake, and promote its
fragility and volatility, with massive negative implications for its further impact on Human Security. Such
negative developments are often based on patterns of simplified, distorted and (re-)polarized discourse and
socio-political polarization in the respective community, which potentially triggers social crisis (cf. Thomas
2004; Pruitt/Thomas 2006: 157). However, even the contrary development of involving a wide range of
“ordinary” citizens may also result in massive disadvantage: i.e. dilution of key issues at stake, the risk of
misguided decision-making, an undermined level of coordination and necessary leadership, a politicization
or radicalization of communicative or operational processes, etc. (ibid.: 155; Sisk 2001: 170 f.).
2.2.3. Empowerment
However, most often, the significance of MSP-DEM for direct empowerment of vulnerable people and
communities is rather limited by the central dominant role that public state actors regularly exercise in that
area. Empowering civil-society groups can only be hoped for by building capacities that increase the level of
their knowledge, skills and input quality; as well as by introducing effective mechanisms for equity,
transparency and pluralism in planning and decision-making, or at least significant consultation and effective
intake of citizen opinions and voices (cf. Burnell 2007: 174). In general, MSP-DEM are intended to allow for
a whole range of empowerment steps by enabling active citizenry and vulnerable groups to voice their
concerns and needs, to develop ideas and provide first-hand input and knowledge, to organize themselves
26

and interact with public or international actors, and to contribute to the final implementation of MSP aims
and objectives (cf. Beramendi et. al 2008: 130-142).
Nevertheless, civic or private stakeholders are rarely invited to present their views in such an
effective consultation and co-decision making process. Often limited to formal inquiry or public-opinion
screening, the civic or private stakeholder’s role is frequently reduced to make formal submissions, while
international or governmental actors set the overall agenda; by the doing of which chances to generate
suitable policy options become essentially reduced (cf. Curtain, 2003). In such a case, MSP-DEM finally run
the risk of turning into mere “talking shops”, whenever they have been formed for the mere tokenistic
purpose of posing a superficial sign of action (cf. Mackie, 2000). The impact of an MSP-DEM on
empowerment is, then, rather reduced to serve window-dressing efforts by public state actors and/or their
international counterparts.
Overall, the list of potential problems of involving civic actors in MSP-DEM is a long one. It can
range from a lack of government commitment to allow for essential co-decision-making, to unwillingness of
project officials to give up control over project activities and directions; from a lack of incentives and skills
among project staff to adopt a participatory approach, to limited capacities of local-level organizations and a
general insufficient investment in community capacity-building; from too late consultative processes and
intake of local expertise, to mutual mistrust between government and local-level stakeholders, and so on, and
so forth (cf. Sisk 2001: 168 f.).
2.2.4. Bibliography
Baskin, Mark (2004): Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo. Working <strong>paper</strong>. Stockholm: International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Beramendi, V./Ellis, A./Kaufman, B./et al. (2008): Direct Democracy. The International IDEA Handbook.
Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Burnell, P. (2007): Evaluating Democracy Support. Methods and Experiences. Working <strong>paper</strong>. Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Cousens, E. (2001): ‘Introduction’, in ibid./Kumar, C. (eds), Peacebuilding as Politics. Cultivating Peace in
Fragile Societies, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1-20.
Curtain, R (2003): What Role for Citizens in Developing and Implementing Public Policy? Canberra
Bulletin of Public Administration, 5 June 2003, Part 1.
http://www.apprn.org/pdf/Curtain_CitizenEngagementPart1.pdf.
Elwert, G. (2002): ‘Intervention in Markets of Violence’. Online article at: www.oei.fuberlin.de/en/projekte/cscca/downloads/ge_pub_marketsofviolence.pdf.
27

Krause, Keith (2007): Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda. Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper no. 26, Geneva
Mackie, D. (2000): Dancing while Standing Still. Open source document of PartnershipsOnline UK,
http://www.partnerships.org.uk/articles/still.htm.
Pouligny, B. (2006): Peace Operations Seen from Below: Un Missions and Local People, London: Kumarian
Press.
Pruitt, B./Thomas, P. (2006): Democratic Dialogue – A Handbook for Practitioners. Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/Canadian International Development
Agency/Organization of American States/United Nations Development Program.
Soeftestad, L. (1998): Workshop Report. International Workshop on Community- Based natural Resource
Management (CBNRM), Washington D. C., 10–14 May. Washington/D.C: World Bank,
http://www.cbnrm.net/pdf/soeftes tad_l_001_98wbreport.pdf.
Sisk, T. (2001): Democracy at the Local Level. The International IDEA Handbook on Participation,
Representation, Conflict Management, and Governance, Stockholm: International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Sokolova, M.: (2006): Advocacy Democracy Modes: Benefits and Limitations. In: Informacijos Mokslai, no.
2006 (37), pp. 110-121.
Thomas, P. (2004): Where’s the Public in These Democracies? Dialogue and Deliberation: Mechanisms for
Exercising Civic Engagement. Paper at the International Conference on Mediation, Guatemala City, 2
September 2004.
Trotha, Trutz von (2000), Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der konzentrischen
Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit [The Future Is in Africa. Of State Failure, Concentric
Order and the Rise of Para-Stateness]. In: Leviathan, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 253-279.
Wilcox, D. (1994): The Guide to Effective Participation. Brighton, UK: Partnership Books.
28

C. THEMATIC RESEARCH CHAPTERS
Overall, the aim of the Chapter C is to establish the links between the core dimensions of democracy and
good governance and the focus of MULTIPART research project, which is on multi-stakeholder partnerships
and their role for peacebuilding and Human Security. Rather than just providing an overview of relevant
theoretical or policy debates, each sections aims at making explicit the implications for the study of MSPs in
post-conflict settings. Altogether the chapter aims to provide a framework and an analytical focus that will
guide the analysis of the role of MSPs in the area of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law given
the objectives of peacebuilding and Human Security.
The structure and sequence of sections represents a movement from more general to more specific. It
starts with the examination of the general theoretical and normative basis of good governance, it then looks
at the specific components of the good governance agenda and practice and it concludes with
operationalising good governance in terms of peacebuilding and its objectives.
1. Introduction
By Petra Roter, University of Ljubljana
1.1. MULTIPART’s Thematic Research
The MULTIPART research project is based on the assumption that the issue-area of democracy, good
governance and the rule of law is one of the four essential issue-areas where post-conflict reconstruction
takes place and where success will crucially affect prospects for achieving Human Security and peace in a
society that had been struck by a violent conflict. The strive to achieve democracy and good governance
across the world has been a lengthy endeavour that has only recently been applied to post-conflict situations.
Following the end of the Cold War, democracy and the strengthening of good governance were first
promoted as “both an objective of and a condition for development co-operation” (Santiso, 2001: 154).
Democracy and good governance were thus a twin-concept, used especially by international institutions,
such as the World Bank, in the 1990s to achieve (and stimulate) economic development.
International institutions (and many western governments) made financial and economic aid
conditional upon achieving the necessary standards of good governance and democracy. Both were thus seen
as providing a certain level of regulation and restraint of market sources and private interests (Hirst, 2000:
13). In the field of economic development, as Hirst (2000: 14) explains, good governance has been
advocated by international economic development agencies and western government “as a necessary
29

component of effective economic modernization.” Such a focus on good governance came out of a
realisation that economic action requires an effective political process – i.e. that development is unlikely to
happen without stable regimes, effective administration, the rule of law and a strong civil society. In this
context, democracy is desirable “if [and when] it provides legitimation for good governance.” (ibid.)
Similarly, in post-conflict situations, reconstruction can nowadays hardly be imagined without
democracy and good governance, and the rule of law. 1 In post-conflict settings, like in developmental
situations, democracy and good governance are seen as providing a necessary regulation and restraint of
interests, particularly of the often conflictual interests of parties to the conflict, especially the dominant
community and one or more non-dominant minorities.
Because bad governance “is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within
our societies”, international (financial) institutions condition their aid and loans on a successful completion
of reforms that ensure good governance, and also democracy (ESCAP 2010), or, in the context of the
European Union and its Governance Initiative, on achieving the broad list of elements of ‘democratic
governance’. 2 Democratic governance (whereby, somewhat confusingly, the Commission uses both
‘democratic governance’ and ‘good governance’ interchangeably) includes issues, such as “respect and
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratisation and citizens’ involvement in the
political process, the rule of law and access to justice, gender equality, Human Security, access to
information, management of migration flows, access to basic public services, effective, transparent,
responsive and accountable State institutions, sustainable management of resources and promotion of
sustainable economic growth and social cohesion.” 3 Furthermore, all these issues are interlinked, and
relevant at all levels of governance, from local to national and international. 4
As will be discussed in greater details below, different institutions apply different approaches
towards achieving democracy, good governance and rule of law in different countries – these include less
developed countries, less democratic, and those that had emerged out of violent conflicts. Instruments used
by institutions to stimulate reforms in such countries differ, but, importantly, institutions also differ in terms
of their understandings of the very concepts they seek to promote. The concept of good governance is
particularly ‘problematic’ in this respect.
Among many other institutions that have sought to both promote and first define good governance,
the United National Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific has usefully defined good
governance in terms of eight characteristics, as seen in the picture below. Thus, good governance is
“participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and
inclusive and follows the rule of law” (ESCAP, 2010). In other words, it “assures that corruption is
1 A detailed analysis of the three concepts follows below.
2 Commission of the European Communities. 2009. Supporting Democratic Governance through the Governance Initiative: a
Review and the Way Forward. Commission Staff Working Paper. Brussels, 19.1.2009, SEC(2009) 58 final.
3 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
4 Ibid. p. 4.
30

minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in
society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.” (ibid.)
Source: ESCAP (2010).
According to such an eight-issue-based understanding of good governance, the rule of law is one of
its key characteristics – for good governance “fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially [as well as]
full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities”, whereas impartial enforcement of laws
requires “an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force” (ESCAP, 2010).
The former United Nations Human Rights Commission not only identified, in 2000, five key
characteristics of good governance (namely, transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, and
responsiveness (to the needs of the people)), but it has also established that this “foundation on which good
governance rests” is also “a sine qua non for the promotion of human rights”. 5 The European Commission
similarly perceives good governance in terms in terms of five principles: openness, participation,
accountability, effectiveness and coherence; but sees each of them as “important for establishing more
democratic governance.” 6
In sum, the ‘good’ in governance has therefore been understood both as a process and as its outcome
(Slocum-Bradley and Bradley, 2010: 8), in addition to being defined differently by different institutions.
Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of consensus on the relationship between the three concepts this part of
the MULTIPART research focuses on: democracy, good governance and the rule of law.
All these different definitions, principles and somewhat contending expectations to be met by
individual countries if they are to benefit from international aid therefore require a detailed conceptual
analysis in the context of research on the role of democracy, good governance and rule of law in a post-
5 The role of good governance in the promotion of human rights. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/64. 26 April 2000,
point 1.
6 Commission of the European Communities. 2001. European Governance. A White Paper. Brussels, 25.7.2001. COM(2001) 428
final, p. 10.
31

conflict context. This <strong>thematic</strong> <strong>paper</strong> addresses a number of such issues before it turns to empirical research
of the selected MSPs in the three post-conflict situations (Kosovo, the DR Congo and Afghanistan). The first
part of the <strong>paper</strong> is composed on four sections.
In the subsequent section, titled “Democracy and good governance promotion. Taking stock of a two
decade effort”, Pishichikova first gives a brief historical overview of the rise and institutionalisation of
democracy promotion as one of the cornerstones of world politics. The section then introduces and critically
examines several theories that provide the rationale for democracy and good governance promotion, namely:
good governance and output legitimacy; democracy and input legitimacy; democratization and the transition
paradigm; and democratic peace. The section is intended to highlight the main concepts and arguments that
have had an impact on the operational dimension of democracy and good governance promotion. The section
also maps out the operational dimension by discussing policy approaches and instruments with respect to
three types of actors – public, private, and civic.
This is followed by a section on “Core tasks of good governance and their impact on peace-building
and Human Security” by Möstl. This section looks in detail into the good governance agenda, and first
overviews the particularities of the good governance agenda in post conflict situations, it then spells out the
main functions that are attributed to good governance, and analyses the approach of main donors, notably the
World Bank, the UNDP, the USAID, and the EU to good governance. The section demonstrates that the
tasks of good governance are closely related to the three dimensions of Human Security – freedom from fear,
freedom from want, and empowerment, as well as peace-building. An argument is put forward that “the
cornerstone of good governance is its comprehensiveness and multi-sectoriality. In other words, only by
fulfilling the core tasks of good governance in their complexity one can fulfil the objectives of good
governance as a whole in post-conflict societies. This vision of good governance provides a bridge to the
next subchapter that outlines main approaches used in good governance.”
What follows is an analysis of approaches and instruments of good governance. In this respect, the
section on “Processes of decentralisation” by Izzi aims to reflect on the implications of decentralisation for
MSP in post-conflict contexts, looking at the way in which MSPs can affect, and in turn be affected by,
decentralisation reforms. The latter have been increasingly introduced in countries with all types of regimes
and ideological orientation – including, increasingly, countries emerging from conflict. Furthermore, support
for decentralisation has gained prominence in the policies of bilateral and multilateral donors, not only as a
general prescription for development and good governance, but also as an integral component of postconflict
recovery strategies. However, as Izzi demonstrates, decentralisation – as a development mantra –
raises more questions than it provides answers. She argues that “[i]n order for decentralisation to have a
virtuous effect on people’s life (which is the only ultimate measure of success) it is necessary that reforms
are well designed, consistently implemented, and backed with political will and appropriate resources.”
32

The last <strong>thematic</strong> section on “Multi-sectoral approach and involvement of non-state actors in
partnerships” by Pishchikova seeks to “problematise the notion of multi-stakeholder partnerships in postconflict
reconstruction, especially with respect to promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of
law.” The section first provides a brief overview of the partnership approach to post-conflict reconstruction;
it then looks at potential roles of public, private, and civic actors in MSPs, and examines their possible
impact on the two dimensions of democracy and good governance, namely on the so-called input and output
legitimacy.
1.2. Bibliography
Commission of the European Communities. 2001. European Governance. A White Paper. Brussels,
25.7.2001. COM(2001) 428 final.
Commission of the European Communities. 2009. Supporting Democratic Governance through the
Governance Initiative: a Review and the Way Forward. Commission Staff Working Paper. Brussels,
19.1.2009, SEC(2009) 58 final.
ESCAP (The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific). 2010. What is
Good Governance. Available at:
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (4 March 2010).
Hirst, Paul. 2000. Democracy and Governance. In: Jon Pierre (ed.) Debating Governance. Authority,
Steering, and Democracy, 13–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Santiso, Carlos. 2001. International Co-operation for Democracy and Good Governance: Moving towards a
Second Generation? European Journal of Development Research 13(1): 154-180.
Slocum-Bradley, Nikki and Andrew Bradley. 2010. Is the EU’s Governance ‘Good’?: An Assessment of EU
Governance in Its Partnership with ACP States. UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2010/1.
The role of good governance in the promotion of human rights. Commission on Human Rights resolution
2000/64. 26 April 2000.
33

2. Democracy and Good Governance Promotion. Taking Stock of a Two Decade
Effort
By Kateryna Pishchikova (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
It is widely known that democratic theory is complex and rooted in different philosophical traditions. It is
less often recognised that operational approaches to international democracy promotion are just as complex
and at times contradictory. This chapter aims at providing a broad understanding of theories that provide the
rationale for international democracy promotion. Given the variety of theories and approaches in this field,
we focus on those of direct relevance for the study of multi-stakeholder partnerships in post-conflict settings.
Since the added value of MSPs is believed to be in bringing together different types of actors - public,
private, and civic – and attaining “synergistic effects” through their cooperation (MULTIPART, 2008), we
discuss in detail different roles and specific impacts on democracy and good governance of different types of
actors.
Democracy and good governance are often used interchangeably both in academic literature and in
policy-making. The research group working on “democracy, good governance and the rule of law” within the
MULTIPART project has adopted the following working distinction between the two concepts. The concept
of democracy should be seen as a normative commitment to a certain combination of values, norms, and
institutions to be promoted in a given post-conflict setting. We therefore operationalise this concept as a
number of core “ingredients” (democratic values, norms, and institutions) that have to be put in place. The
notion of good governance, on the other hand, represents the practice 7 and a set of related methods of
promoting those “ingredients”. It is understood as a process of decision-making and implementation that
helps put the relevant institutions in place, build their capacity, and ensure their sustainability. 8 Since the
focus of this <strong>paper</strong> is operational, both concepts are discussed from the perspective democracy and good
governance promotion rather than democratic theory in general.
This chapter proceeds as follows. It first gives a brief historical overview of the rise and
institutionalisation of democracy promotion as one of the cornerstones of world politics. It then introduces
and critically examines several theories that provide the rationale for democracy and good governance
promotion, namely: 1) good governance and output legitimacy, 2) democracy and input legitimacy, 3)
democratization and the transition paradigm, and 4) democratic peace. We do not go into details of each of
these theories, rather we highlight the main concepts and arguments that then, as we show in the subsequent
section, have had an impact on the operational dimension of democracy and good governance promotion.
7 Such process-based understanding of governance is in line with governance theories MULTIPART adopted as the overall
theoretical framework, see MULTIPART, Theoretical Guidance (2008). For governance theories see, for example, (Mayntz, 2003;
Rosenau, 1992; Kooiman, 1993.).
8 Pishchikova, Section 1 of Chapter B in this report.
34

Next, the chapter introduces the operational dimension of democracy and good governance promotion by
discussing policy approaches and instruments with respect to three types of actors – public, private, and civic
– their respective roles and impacts. Such actor-based typology is relevant for the study of MSPs as
partnerships composed by different types of actors. In a separate section we summarise the approach to
democracy promotion that characterises the EU foreign policy specifically.
2.1. Short Historical Overview of Democracy and Good Governance Promotion in the Post-
Cold War Era
The current focus of international community on good governance and the rule of law cannot be understood
outside of the general “democratising turn” in world politics that took place after the end of the Cold War.
More specifically, this “turn” has brought to the policy-making realm a whole new set of normative
concepts, such as participation, democracy, and human rights, along with new approaches to development
and more recently, to post-conflict reconstruction.
Good governance first appeared on the agendas of democratic states as well as big international
organizations such as the UN or the OECD at the end of 1980s – beginning of 1990s as part of the discussion
about transforming international development cooperation. It was recognised that structural adjustment
programmes and the so called Washington Consensus that favoured free market and a minimalist state did
not yield the expected results. Moreover, increasing poverty and underdevelopment were attributed to the
deterioration of public sector, its services, infrastructure, and an overall governance crisis. In parallel to these
important changes in development policies, the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of a new global
order that was characterised by the dismantling of the old bi-polar system and proliferation of formerly
communist states that were moving away from an undemocratic regime towards new arrangements that were
to be defined along the way.
Thus, early 1990s were characterised by increased attention to the public sector management and
promotion of effective government, including promotion of the rule of law and the fight against corruption.
In addition to this focus on efficiency and effectiveness of the state, some international organizations, such as
OECD and UNDP, introduced an explicitly political focus on issues such as participation, human rights, and
democratisation, thus, moving towards a broader understanding of good governance as not only effective but
also democratic governance (Howell & Pearce, 2001; Van Rooy, 1998).
Different donors 9 embraced these tendencies in different ways. Back in 1990s the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) described the shift in its programmes to democracy and
civil society promotion as the shift from “supply-side” institutions, such as the judiciary, towards the
“demand side” of political change, thus “placing more emphasis on developing constituencies for change and
9 For overview of EU policies see the last sub-section of this chapter.
35

on the democratic and participatory nature of institutions.” This shift is believed to have been inspired,
among other things, by the Clinton’s administration overall commitment to democracy (Howell & Pearce,
2001: 94). Despite changes of administration, USAID remains the leading democracy promoting donor in
terms of the amount of funds allocated. Compared to other donors – notably the EU – its rhetoric is marked
by explicit commitment to the broad-scale democratisation in third countries. The World Bank, on the other
hand, deals with democratisation and civil society from the perspective of state-market relations that remain
central to the Bank’s programs. This has mostly translated into a change of World Bank-NGO relations from
tension and confrontation to dialogue and cooperation, including, more recently, different MSP
arrangements.
In addition, one cannot overlook increasing globalisation of civil society that resulted in the rise of
strong international advocacy NGOs, such as Oxfam International, International Alert, Amnesty
International, and Human Rights Watch to name just very few. It is believed that civil society actors such as
NGOs are well-positioned to cooperate across borders and to mobilize more effectively for change. 10 Civil
society is said to have a special empowering quality, since it tends to include stakeholders whose voice is
often not heard in “traditional” decision-making: It disrupts old hierarchies and spreads power among more
people and groups. This is what Jessica Mathews has famously called the “power shift” (Mathews, 1997).
Not only are the operations of global civil society believed to be more democratic than those of other actors
on the global scene, there is also a strong expectation of a kind of spill-over effect that would deepen
democracy globally and create new ways in which undemocratic governments or socially irresponsible
corporations can be held accountable. This is what Brecher, Costello, and Smith call a “Lilliput Strategy”:
Even though some social movements and activist groups may be small and powerless, when united by “a
sense of solidarity, a common belief system, and a common program” they can exercise substantial leverage
(Brecher, Costello, & Smith, 2000).
Overall, the tendencies described above are responsible for the prominence acquired by democracy
and good governance issues on agendas of otherwise different actors, both international and domestic.
Moreover, the growing importance of civic and private actors has transformed democracy and good
governance promotion worldwide from the issues of states’ foreign policy to issues of common concern to
different types of actors. The rise of MSPs in this context is a logical next step that consolidates the
developments described above.
2.2. Democracy: Core Concepts and Theories
Democracy and good governance promotion programs described above find their justification in a number of
theories that describe how and why democracy can and should be promoted around the world. In particular,
10 See, for example, the collection of works edited by Florini (Florini, 2000)
36

we shortly introduce the following theories that are important for understanding the involvement of foreign
donors in multi-stakeholder partnerships with respect to democracy and good governance promotion in postconflict
settings, namely, 1. governance and “output” legitimacy; 2. democracy and “input” legitimacy; 3.
democratization and “transition paradigm”; 4. democratic peace.
The first two theories describe a number of changes that affected both domestic and foreign policies
of major democratic states, creating therefore parallel debates on “home” and “overseas” fronts. The overall
shift towards “new forms of governance” has been particularly strong in the European context and implied,
among other things, direct involvement of non-state (both civic and private) actors in policy formulation and
implementation (Heritier, 2003; Mele & Pishchikova, 2009). The other two theories are explicitly about
whether and how democratic states should engage with third states around the world and are based on an
“outward looking” perspective.
Governance and “output” legitimacy
The distinction between “input and output legitimacy” is extremely useful for understanding the difference
between effective government/governance as opposed to democratic government/governance as the ultimate
aim of democracy promotion programs. This distinction, formulated by Scharpf (1999), draws a line between
the efficiency and effectiveness approach that essentially aims at improving public management and
therefore, ensuring the output legitimacy of the state and the approach aimed at promoting human rights and
democratic procedures and therefore, the input legitimacy of the state. With respect to “input legitimacy”,
MSPs have been argued to provide important fora in which all stakeholders discuss problems of common
concern and look for acceptable solutions and in participatory and transparent manner (Hemmati, 2002).
From this perspective, MSPs can contribute to democratising the public sphere and in post-conflict societies
specifically, to building consensus and contributing to reconciliation.
Output legitimacy is associated with improved public management, effective and transparent policymaking,
and efficient service-delivery in the public sector. In particular, these programs are aimed at
improving the quality of government, fighting corruption and eliminating rent-seeking, reforming heavy
bureaucracies, strengthening the judicial system, and ensuring the rule of law. The tasks and activities
associated with this type of good governance promotion are discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this
Chapter in the present report. With respect to these kinds of programs, multi-stakeholder partnerships can
have an instrumental role in as much as they help create effective and efficient policy-making by pooling
together different resources and competencies. Nonetheless, it is important to note that efficiency and
effectiveness of MSPs is a contested issue rather than a given (MULTIPART, 2008).
37

Democracy and “input” legitimacy
Input legitimacy is associated with the improved quality of the political process, i.e., increased citizen
participation, adequate representation of marginalized groups in the society, respect for human rights, free
and fair elections. In other words, it is about ensuring that an open, participatory, and democratic process
precedes the decision-making and that affected people and their preferences are adequately represented.
Using the language of this project one could say that multi-stakeholder partnerships can be one of the means
to ensure input legitimacy in as much as they are meant to involve all the relevant stakeholders in decisionmaking
as well as implementation and sometimes, subsequent evaluation (Hemmati, 2002). If conceived as
an inherently democratic initiative, MSPs can be seen as an aim in itself of democracy promotion.
MSPs are often positioned as advanced forms of participation because they involve non-state actors
not only in decision-finding and decision-making but also in implementation and evaluation. The general
argument as summarized by Fiorino is that “new forms of participation are necessary in a world in which
people increasingly lack control over social decisions that affect them” (Fiorino, 1990: 228). Quoting the
classics of participatory democratic theory one can say that being a citizen first and foremost means
participating in decisions that affect oneself and one’s community (Bachrach, 1967; Pateman, 1970;
Thompson, 1970; Warren, 2001).
Democratization and “transition paradigm”
Historically, the roots of the so-called “transition paradigm” in democracy promotion go as far back as the
1970s and the “no preconditions” argument, which sets forth an optimistic view that democracy can travel
easily and “anyone can do it” (Rustow, 1970). In other words, it assumes that the passage from unexpected
break-ups of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes towards democracy is rather straightforward. After the
end of the Cold War, such thinking took ground with the renewed force. According to the infamous
argument by Francis Fukuyama, after the collapse of communism in different places around the world we
were witnessing “the end of history” in the sense that history itself resolved the biggest twentieth century
dispute about the best political system and capitalist liberal democracy proved to be the only alternative for
the future. This implies that the demise of previous regimes equals (at least the first stage of) democratization
(Fukuyama, 1992). Democracy, it has further been argued, does not need especially favourable conditions,
and “genuine democrats need not precede democracy” (Di Palma, 1993). In other words, democracy is not
brought about from within but is a result of an inevitable turn of history.
This amalgam of ideas about what has to happen after the collapse of a previous totalitarian or
authoritarian regime formed the basis for the so-called “transition paradigm”. 11 The transition paradigm rests
on the key assumption that any country that has been freed from any form of dictatorial rule is moving
towards democracy and, thus, presents a case of a democratizing country or a country “in transition to
11 A term coined by Thomas Carothers. (Carothers, 2002).
38

democracy.” According to Carothers, “in the first half of the 1990s […] numerous policy makers and aid
practitioners reflexively labelled any formerly authoritarian country that was attempting some political
liberalization as a ‘transitional country’” (Carothers, 2002). Transitional countries were perceived as being
on a path towards establishing clearly defined democratic institutions and free market economies. They were
being described and evaluated on the basis of the degree of progress made along these lines. The assumption
was that all it took was the desire to abandon communist legacies and to embrace new democratic and
capitalist ideals. 12 The paradigm postulated a so-called “snowballing” effect amongst democratizing
countries, as a result of which countries could not help but democratize following the examples set by others
(Huntington, 1991).
The “transition paradigm” had a highly prescriptive character: It assumed that a particular condition
of democracy had to be attained by any country. Democratization was seen as evolving according to several
universal stages borrowed from the literature on democratization, such as the break-up of the previous
regime, transition, and consolidation (Diamond, 1994; Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1995). This language
dominated policy documents of various donors during the 1990s; for example, USAID was using “early
transition, mid-transition, and consolidation” as the three stages of democratization according to which aid
recipient countries were classified.
By now, most of these postulates have been either questioned or dismantled altogether. Of particular
relevance for the study that deals with post-conflict settings are the works that describe the emergence of the
so-called “gray zone” countries, i.e., countries whose recent development does not fit into the stages of
democratisation described above, or “hybrid regimes” (Zakaria, 1997). More recently, there is growing
literature on the backlash against democracy or what Larry Diamond has called the “reverse wave” of
democratisation (Burnell & Youngs, 2009).
Despite these criticisms, the “transition paradigm” played an important role in international aid in
that it served as an ideological frame that established a universalistic approach to democracy promotion,
justifying a simple transfer of (ideal) models based on the cultural experience and ideology of donor
countries (Howell & Pearce, 2001). Even though democracy promotion programs of different donors have
become increasingly sophisticated ever since, custom-made context-sensitive approaches are still rare in this
field and the criticisms of an imposition of “one-size-fits-all” programs and schemes remain valid. It remains
to be seen whether the recent vogue of MSP promotion results in yet another universalistic approach or
whether the MSP’s particular nature and modes of operation are a guarantee against the rise of yet another
“transition paradigm”.
12 It is precisely for the reasons described below that some authors reject the term “transition” altogether; for example, Barbara
Einhorn has argued for the term “transformation” to indicate the departure from western notions of a historical progression from state
socialism to liberal democracy, see (Einhorn, 2000).
39

Democratic Peace theories
The so-called democratic peace theories are also very important for understanding the development of
democracy and good governance promotion over the last two decades. Put in few words, these theories
though differing on a number of issues, converge on the core idea that democratic governments have both
normative and strategic reasons for promoting democracy worldwide. This is believed to be a beneficial
enterprise for individual democratic state, international community as a whole, as well as the recipient
societies. This of course is not as clear-cut as it may sound. In fact, a closer look at democratic peace theories
offers more complex insights than those often inferred from the much abused statement that “democracies
don’t go to war”.
Without going into much detail over different strands of democratic peace theories, we will briefly
summarise the rationale behind the content and direction of democracy promotion, especially in post-conflict
settings. The point of departure for these theories is that non-democratic regimes due to their nature are more
likely to cause or sustain war. Investing in democracy promotion is therefore a way to ensure international
security, which is then conducive to international trade and investment and other forms of cooperation. This
seemingly utilitarian argument, however, on a closer look does not really hold. Given the complexity of the
task of democracy promotion, the volatility of the situation in the majority of recipient states, as well as the
fact that the benefits of democracy promotion are indirect and cannot be guaranteed, it becomes clear that a
simple calculation of costs and benefits of democracy promotion can justify it only under certain conditions
(Mueller, 2004; Wolff & Wurm, 2010).
2.3. Main Approaches to Democracy and Good Governance Promotion
The literature on good governance and democracy promotion offers a number of typologies of approaches to
and instruments of democracy promotion by foreign aid donors. 13 In this sub-chapter we offer a typology
based on the type of actor that serves as the main implementer or benefactor of democracy promotion
programmes. Such actor-based approach is in line with our overall focus on multi-stakeholder partnerships,
as we are interested in understanding the specific roles played by different types of actors within each MSP –
be those public, private or civic. Below we offer a brief overview of the roles public, private, and civic actors
played in and for democracy promotion. As it will become clear, civic actors are the most prominent actors
in this field, we therefore expect that they will the strongest position within MSPs whose explicit task is
democracy and good governance promotion.
13 For example, Boerzel suggests one such typology of approaches used in good governance promotion that is based on two
dimensions 1. legitimacy (input vs output) and 2. channel of influence (intergovernmental vs transnational): effective government,
effective governance, democratic government, and democratic governance. She also summarises three types of instruments:
assistance, conditionality, and political dialogue, which correspond to three mechanisms of influence: capacity and institution
building, manipulation of cost-benefit calculations, and social learning and persuasion (Boerzel 2009).
40

Democracy promotion and the state
Richard Youngs (2004) as well as several other authors (Boerzel, 2009; Boerzel, Pamuk, & Stahn, 2009)
suggest that the nature and degree of involvement of donor states with domestic public actors – be those
governments or other public institutions at the national or local level – depend on the degree of statehood and
democracy in a recipient country as well as on the strategic interest the donor has with respect to this
country. According to Youngs (2004), there are three types of relationships between the donor states and
third countries, namely 1) strategic concern, 2) more or less established alliance, and 3) managing
(post)conflict and internal state collapse in a third state. Since the empirical focus of MULTIPART project is
on post-conflict settings, we will briefly discuss the approach that has to do with the third type of
relationships, namely those aimed at managing the conflict in third states. Inspired by the democratic peace
theories, Western governments tend to insist that democracy promotion is essential in conflict states.
In practice, there has been much discussion about just the right balance between the technical aspects
of peacebuilding and its political dimension (Baker, 1996). The European Union has been criticised for not
focusing on democracy and civil society strengthening until well after conflict was resolved. This has been
partly due to poor institutional integration of conflict prevention/resolution and democracy units within big
donors, including the European Commission, where “very little cross-cutting expertise on conflict and
governance had been developed” (Youngs, 2004). More recently, this is being addressed through the
institution of all-inclusive task forces. However, the disjuncture between democracy/good governance
promotion and post-conflict reconstruction is also conditioned by different understandings of key priorities at
different stages of the conflict. It is often believed that comprehensive democratic reform may not be
appropriate in (post-)conflict settings and priority is given to security-enhancing initiatives and direct
political support of certain political personalities or to human rights promotion as opposed to broad
democratic institution-building efforts.
In the DRC, for example, perpetuation of conflict and lack of basic foundations for democratic
development meant that Western states, including the EU itself, followed a personality-focused approach and
concentrated on support for a peace deal between different factions and pragmatic power-sharing (Youngs,
2004). In the Balkans, on the other hand, Western states focused increasingly on basic human rights, within
more flexible institutional parameters seen as suited to conflict containment and on civil society initiatives
pursuing these aims (Bratton, 1997).
Such a pragmatic security-enhancing approach also meant that many donors gave preference to good
government/governance activities promoting what we have described above as “output legitimacy”, rather
than to promoting broad democratisation and “input” legitimacy.
41

Democracy promotion and the market
The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda of the 1990s that later led to the establishment of the
Global Compact has rendered increasingly political what used to be purely economic and trade policies. 14
This global tendency turned private actors into important interlocutors for democracy, human rights, and
good governance promotion. Despite numerous criticisms of big international businesses and MNCs,
especially by the anti-globalist activists, “multinationals’ influence in relation to democracy’s development
in emerging markets is less insidious but also more confused than is habitually suggested” (Youngs, 2004:
86).
In (post-)conflict settings basic security remains the core concern of international businesses. What is
interesting, however, is the growing recognition of links between stability, good governance, respect for
human rights, and democracy. For example, repression of basic human rights is increasingly considered a
cause of conflict and instability, and therefore, a factor for investment risks. Therefore, it is the security
considerations that are said to be at the heart of increasingly political approaches of international businesses
that start promoting respect for human rights, paying greater attention to ethnic tensions (including in
company’s hiring strategies), providing assistance to civil society organisations, addressing the roots of
conflict in inequality, corruption, and repression, supporitng media publicity promoting peace, and so on. 15
This position is not shared by all international businesses, many of whom insist that security and stability are
not necessarily best provided by democratic governance and that in many cases a firm autocratic rule can be
a better guarantor. It is not within the scope of this <strong>paper</strong> to go into this debate. What is important for MSPs
here is that private actors in post-conflict settings are increasingly taking on a political role and are
partnering with civil society and the state towards these goals, thus going beyond narrow efficiency rationale
that characterised public-private partnerships a decade ago.
Democracy promotion and civil society
The involvement of civil society in the so-called “aid industry” has been one of the key developments
inspired by the “democratic turn” discussed above. The rationale for involving civil society has been twofold:
normative-political and instrumental.
From the normative-political perspective, civil society is said to contribute to deepening,
consolidating, 16 and maintaining democracy in a variety of ways. It allows holding state officials accountable
in between elections, stimulates political participation, and increases citizens’ political efficacy and skill as
well as elucidating norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, and accommodation in society. It is widely
14 Here the growing importance of the “stakeholder” concept, i.e. giving a voice to all those who have a “stake”, is an important
component.
15 See for example, International Business Leaders Forum at www.iblf.org.
16 Consolidation has been defined as fixing democratic rules and institutions in such a way that they gain primary influence on the
behaviour of political actors as well as strengthening civil society and letting democratic values and norms penetrate the social fabric
– as argued in (Di Palma, 1990) As a result, democracy becomes “so broadly and profoundly legitimate and so habitually practiced
and observed that it is very unlikely to break down” (Diamond et al., 1995)
42

elieved that civil society actors can foster the legitimacy of governance and “form the base on which a truly
democratic political culture can be built” (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000: 4). It also provides additional
channels of interest expression and pursuit for marginalized groups. In addition, civil society can breed new
political leaders and generally enhance the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and legitimacy of
the political system, granting citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it. Last but not least,
many civil society organizations are explicitly engaged with improving democracy through election
monitoring, human rights campaigns, democratic reform initiatives, and anticorruption action (Diamond et
al., 1995). In other words, there are few things civil society cannot do. This optimistic (over-) investment of
the concept of civil society with the multiple democratic effects it can produce is one of the explanations for
its emergence as a newly discovered missing link in progressive social development. This also explains its
popularity as a foreign policy tool: civil society incorporates a variety of tasks and activities aimed at
different social and political goals without entering the realm of party politics (Pishchikova, 2010).
Civic actors are also a preferred channel for democracy promotion when domestic civic actors need
to be empowered vis-à-vis their own governments in pushing for political reforms (Keck & Sikkink, 1998;
Risse-Kappen, 1995; Schimmelfennig, 2007). This so-called “boomerang effect” is about transnational
coalitions countering violations by particular governments. The “boomerang effect” is a process through
which activists in a particular country link up with their counterparts in other countries through transnational
activist networks in order to put pressure on their governments from the outside. This often happens in
situations when governments are unresponsive to their civil societies and is characteristic of such issue areas
as human rights or the environment (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
From the instrumental perspective, there are practical reasons for the attractiveness of the civil
society concept to many donors, whose aid budgets are now much smaller than during the Cold War period,
such as, for example, the simple cost-effectiveness that it offers. Unlike large-scale industry reorganization,
banking restructuring, or engineering projects, support to NGOs does not require large inputs of capital; this
allows both downsizing and maintaining programs and influence (Howell & Pearce, 2001). For example, US
foreign aid shrank by approximately fifty per cent in real terms from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. “Civil
society assistance made a virtue out of necessity by providing a theoretical justification for the small-scale
assistance dictated by many donor budgets” (Carothers & Ottaway, 2000). Preference for civil society was
also boosted by the general disillusionment with state-led development policies in the so-called Third World
as well as by the shift to New Public Management in some major donors’ domestic politics that shaped in
their turn foreign policy approaches.
Not everything is so rosy in practice, however, as a number of authors were criticizing civil society
involvement by foreign aid already at the end of 1990s. Already at the end of 1990s, several comparative
works highlighted persistent structural failures of civil society promotion programs across very different
contexts (Carothers & Ottaway, 2000; Hann & Dunn, 1996; Howell & Pearce, 2001; Van Rooy, 1998).
43

According to the comparative analysis by Ottaway and Carothers across Eastern Europe, Latin America and
the Middle East, the dependencies of NGOs on their donors in these otherwise very different contexts are so
strong because their survival is predicated on their interaction with the donors and not with fellow-citizens or
institutions. In a more detailed study, Alexander Cooley and James Ron examine three different cases of
transnational assistance 17 to show how dysfunctional organizational behaviour of NGOs is a rational
response to systematic and predictable institutional pressures to which they are subjected, such as
competition for resources, hierarchical relationships, organizational insecurity, and fiscal uncertainty. They
suggest that the increasing bureaucratisation and marketisation of NGO activities generate incentives that
produce dysfunctional outcomes (Cooley, 2000; Cooley & Ron, 2002). In her analysis of Russian NGOs,
Sarah Henderson has reached very similar conclusions. She holds that, despite the funders’ self-proclaimed
moral intentions, they helped institutionalise a vertical and isolated (although well-funded) civic community
based on what she calls “principled clientelism” provoked by “a set of incentives and sanctions that
encourages a separate pattern of behaviour that undermines rather than facilitates civic behaviour”
(Henderson, 2002). Henderson also highlights idiosyncrasies between the donor’s organizational styles and
those of the recipients of assistance and argues that they predetermine the outcomes to a greater extent than
proclaimed agendas and envisioned goals. In addition, the processes described by Cooley and Ron as well as
by Henderson would have been inconceivable without the managerial discourse of “performance”,
“outcomes”, and “efficiency” – that is “output” legitimacy – that dominates civil society involvement
(Pishchikova, 2010).
More recently, the Global War on Terror that has been announced after the September 11 attacks
marked a global political turn. This turn could be defined in terms of increased securitisation of both foreign
and domestic policies of otherwise very different states. According to some scholars it created a climate of
fear and suspicion towards certain types of communities and their organizations and legitimised a number of
undemocratic practices through the “national security threat” argument (Howell, 2006). There is a marked
tendency worldwide towards renewed and systematic repression of civil society in (semi-)authoritarian
states, the most notorious examples being Russia and Central Asian states (Colton & McFaul, 2003). This
tendencies acquired a strong label of the “backlash against civil society”.
Overall, involvement of civil society organisations in democracy and good governance promotion
presents the following dilemma. On the one hand, civil society organizations are seen as a cheap and
effective way to implement donor’s programmes on the ground. On the other hand, civil society is to be
supported for the sake of strengthening democracy and its capacity building becomes an aim in itself. Even
though these two rationales for supporting civil society - as a means towards more effective programme
implementation and as an aim of democratisation – would imply a different approach and require different
17 The three cases are: 1.) economic technical assistance by for-profit corporations operating in Kyrgyzstan under contracts by
Western governments, International Financial Institutions, and the UN; 2.) refugee aid by INGOs in Goma, Democratic Republic of
Congo (former Zaire); and 3.) IO and INGO efforts to protect prisoners of war in Bosnia.
44

programming they tend to be lumped together and depending on the primary goal of a given aid programme,
either one or the other component is seen as a bonus. Much of the development aid, for example, is disbursed
through local NGOs for efficiency and effectiveness reasons as well as in the absence of a well-functioning
state. Nonetheless, the donor rhetoric often attributes a democratising potential to such programmes due to
the mere fact that a certain type of civil society organizations are involved (Pishchikova & Izzi, 2009).
This dilemma seems to be highly pertinent for MSP promotion as well. Should MSPs be promoted
for effectiveness and efficiency reasons or because of their supposed democratic potential? And, depending
on the answer to this question, what the role of civic actors should be within each MSP? If effectiveness and
efficiency are the main concern, there can be a risk of replicating the problems (and failures) that are by now
well-documented as far as civil society involvement is concerned (see above). Moreover, if efficiency and
effectiveness is the main principle on which MSPs should be created and operate, the specific contribution of
civic actors remains vague as many civic actors are not necessarily characterised by particularly efficient and
effective modes of operation. If, on the other hand, the democratising potential of MSPs should be pursued,
MSPs should be relieved of the pressure for effective implementation and acquire more space for promoting
collaborative and participatory practices in their own right. This has important implications for the content of
democracy promotion programs, which end up pursuing purely effectiveness goals (“output” legitimacy) and
exploit little the democratising potential of domestic civil societies.
2.4. The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion
In the course of the 1990s, the EU embarked on a major effort at ‘value export’ that tries to
systematically incorporate the promotion of a specific European version of democracy into
its external relations with the rest of the world. […] Examples of such identity markers in the
human rights area include the opposition to the death penalty and an emphasis on social and
economic rights. As to democracy promotion, the EU appears to distinguish itself from
similar US efforts by focussing more strongly on the formation of political associations
including party systems and civil society (Boerzel & Risse, 2004: 30)
It has been argued that democracy promotion has become an important direction in the EU foreign policy,
even if historically it has been led by the US (Magen, Risse, & McFaul, 2009; Youngs, 2001). This is true
only partially. It would be more correct to say that the EU introduced rather late programs explicitly aimed at
democracy promotion (and labelled as such) and maintains up to date a preference for “good governance”
programs instead. In fact, Boerzel argues that “the concept of good governance emerged in the EU
essentially ‘spilling over’ from the international level, where the concept was first promoted by the World
Bank Group, the OECD, and the UNDP, albeit in very different ways” (for more details on other donor’s
policies see Section 3 of Chapter C in the present report) (Boerzel, 2009: 6).
Until the end of 1980s, the EU development cooperation had been purely focused on trade and other
economic issues. During the 1990s, however, the EU updated its key conventions and agreements in order to
45

include both the effective and the democratic aspect of good governance and to open up towards non-state
actors as interlocutors on development policy (Boerzel 2009).
Alongside with development policy, EU democracy promotion policy is represented in several other
foreign policy pillars, such as the EU Enlargement Policy, its Stabilization and Association Process,
European Neighbourhood Policy, and finally by its recent European Initiative/Instrument for Human Rights
and Democracy 18 (EIDHR). The latter has been designed to create further coherence of approach both in EU
development cooperation and in its regional programmes. It clearly endorses a broad concept of good
governance that includes both administrative-managerial and political-democratic dimensions. The EIDHR is
also particular because unlike other instruments it places a strong emphasis on partnering with actors other
than national governments, i.e. non-governmental and international organisations. Other truly innovative
aspects of the EIDHR include the possibility to support organizations that do not have legal personality
under the national law and the possibility to support actions in favour of human rights defenders (Arnault,
2009). In practical terms, EIDHR tends to spread its resources thin by funding many projects in many
countries (Youngs, 2008), it also gives increasing importance to Commission’s Delegations (Arnault, 2009).
It has been argued that despite a variety of policy instruments through which democracy promotion
is implemented in third countries, it shows a striking conceptual coherence. Namely, according to the
analytical framework proposed by Boerzel (Boerzel et al., 2009), there are four ideal types of good
governance promotion and the EU adopts one (or a combination) of them depending on the conditions of
statehood and democracy existing in the third country (and of course, the leverage the EU can potentially
have in a given country). The first effective government approach corresponds to policies aimed at
increasing the managerial-administrative capacities of states and therefore their “output legitimacy”. The
second effective governance approach pursues the same objectives but deals with non-state actors rather than
with the states exclusively. Likewise, the third and the forth approaches differ according to their primary
interlocutor, i.e. state versus non-state actors, but pursue a common goal of promoting democracy and
improving human rights records. They are labelled democratic government and democratic governance
respectively.
Overall, it has been argued that the EU has been putting “too much emphasis on effectiveness and
too little on legitimacy” (Youngs, 2008: 168). Individual European donors as well tend to fund more work on
human rights than on the political elements of democracy promotion resisting what some have called “a
contamination of human rights work by democracy promotion” (Youngs, 2008: 165).
This seemingly universal toolkit for democracy promotion is distributed unevenly between different
fields of EU foreign policy. The field of development policy (mainly targeting the ACP countries 19 and
therefore of relevance for the MULTIPART DRC case study) is mostly characterised by the effective
18 The initiative changed name from Initiative to Instrument in 2006.
19 African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
46

governance approach. In Africa, European political aid is largely focused on more technical governance
reforms (effective government/governance approaches) (Crawford, 2007). The European Neighbourhood
Policy includes a combination of approaches depending on the target countries (Western NIS, the Caucasus,
and the Mediterranean countries), the degree of statehood and democracy that they demonstrate as well as
their strategic relationship with the EU. Democracy promotion approach changes for the EU enlargement or
accession policy from effective government to democratic government depending on how close a country is
to accession (see also Boerzel, Pamuk, & Stahn, 2008; Boerzel et al., 2009). However, in all ENP countries
assistance is mainly aimed at aligning local governance rules and procedures with those of the EU and
considerable amounts of EU funds are spent on assisting the implementation of commitments under
contractual agreements between the EU and third countries.
Even though seemingly technical and with few overtly political objectives, these programs have
huge political impact. In the words of Richard Youngs, “by requiring specific fiscal, auditing, and legal
reforms of its partner states, the EU at this level is more intrusive than the United States, contrary to the
conventional wisdom” (Youngs, 2008: 166). In fact, unlike the US, the EU aims at supporting
democratisation through integration processes and focuses on reproducing its own model through norm
diffusion and socialisation rather than on supporting initiatives explicitly aimed at democracy building (see
also Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008). In the words of Boerzel and Risse, “the EU is making an explicit
effort to project its own identity of a democratic polity into relations with third countries” (Boerzel & Risse,
2004: 26). It demonstrates an eschewal of purely military security concerns in favour of the economic,
societal, and environmental aspects of security, on the one hand, and requires compliance with its policies by
incentives, capacity-building, and persuasion and learning, on the other. In fact, with respect to donors’
impact Wolfgang Benedek rightly emphasises that despite the diversity of the international donor
community, “the local counterparts still experience it as an aggregate of power, which determines local
agendas and, through mechanisms of conditionality and incentives, imposes its policies on the national
governments” (Benedek, 2009: 14).
2.5. Concluding Remarks
1. This subchapter has shown that democracy and good governance promotion is a complex
phenomenon that varies greatly along a number of dimensions, such as the type of donor and its strategic
concerns, the nature of recipient state and its importance for the donor, and significant events in global
politics.
2. Operationally, it has been shown that major democracy promoters around the world tend to follow
a single cultural and political script across very different countries, in which democracy is to be promoted,
showing little sensitivity for local culture and institutional set-up. Both American and European democracy
47

promotion narratives presume that sooner or later, one way or another, the world can and will be shaped
according to the democratic idea they aspire. Having said that, however, we retain that democracy and good
governance promotion are complex processes that represent a number of (sometimes conflicting) approaches.
These have to be clarified if they are to be usefully translated into the multi-stakeholder partnership tool.
3. Each type of domestic actors – public, private, and civic – has a particular role to play in
democracy promotion, however, a too narrow understanding of the role of either of these actors and poor
coordination of such donors’ efforts can lead to a number of unintended consequences that can be
detrimental for the democracy promotion as a whole. These are likely to be exacerbated if applied to even
more complex arrangements, such as MSPs. The cautionary note, therefore, is on making sure that MSPs are
about positive synergies and not about multiplying existing problems by pooling them together.
4. Involvement of each type of domestic actors – public, private, and civic – has been inspired by a
particular theoretical perspective. Engagement with states has the longest history and can be said to go back
to the times of the Cold War, when states were supported under different strategic alliances. These
relationships have been reinvented in the post-Cold War era, notably on the basis of Democratic Peace
theories and the “transition paradigm”. In the area of democracy and good governance promotion, a mixed
approach that combines elements of “input” and “output” legitimacy is evident. In post-conflict settings
specifically, a stronger inclination towards effective government and “output” legitimacy is quite
pronounced. Private actors as well show a strong preference towards the “output” legitimacy and
effectiveness and efficiency rationale, however, there is a growing interest in democratisation processes and
“input” legitimacy. This latter approach is mostly visible on the “micro” community level through specific
work on community capacity building and support to basic human rights. Civic actors face the most
ambiguity with respect to their role in democracy and good governance promotion, especially in post-conflict
settings. They are believed to be guarantors of democratisation and key players in ensuring the “input”
legitimacy. In practice, however, civic actors are often instrumentalised towards implementation of social
service provision and other donor-defined programmes. In post-conflict settings especially, explicitly
political activities of civil society are perceived as suspicious at best and often mark a point of rupture with
international donors.
When bringing together different types of actors under the multi-stakeholder partnership heading,
donors have to be aware of their different – and sometimes conflicting – roles for democracy and good
governance promotion. It is therefore crucial that the goals and tasks of democracy and good governance
promotion are clarified at the outset and that the roles and contributions of different actors are conducive to
these goals. Please see Section 3 of Chapter C in the present report for a detailed discussion of tasks and
activities that relate to democracy and good governance promotion.
48

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52

3. Core Tasks of Good Governance and Their Impact on Peacebuilding and
Human Security
By Markus Möstl (European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Graz)
This subchapter looks in detail into the good governance agenda. After a brief overview of the particularities
of the good governance agenda in post conflict situations (Subsection 3.1.), this subchapter spells out the
main functions that are attributed to good governance (Subsections 3.2. to 3.5.). Then, the approach of main
donors, notably the World Bank, the UNDP, the USAID, and the EU will be presented (Subsection 3.6.). As
will be seen, the tasks of good governance are closely related to the three dimensions of Human Security –
freedom from fear, freedom from want, and empowerment, as well as peacebuilding. The chapter concludes
by drawing the links between these different sub-issues and argues that the cornerstone of good governance
is its comprehensiveness and multi-sectoriality (Subsection 3.7.). In other words, only by fulfilling the core
tasks of good governance in their complexity one can fulfil the objectives of good governance as a whole in
post-conflict societies. This vision of good governance provides a bridge to the next subchapter that outlines
main approaches used in good governance.
3.1. The Good Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Situations: an Overview
It is important to recognize that any efforts for the (re)establishment of good governance are confronted with
certain particularities in post-conflict situations. A range of very specific problems exist in the countries
researched in the MULTIPART project, namely Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Afghanistan. 20 Usually, weak or fragile states will be unable to develop practices of good governance on
their own behalf and very specific efforts are needed to (re)establish and uphold good governance in such
settings. Among the broad range of efforts, maintaining the rule of law, eliminating corruption, strengthening
local governments, encouraging citizen participation in elections and in civil society, and promoting human
rights have become fundamental tasks of the good governance agenda in post-conflict circumstances.
These tasks of the good governance agenda do not only aim for core goals such as the democratic
legitimacy and the efficiency of states, but also have to make sure that the (re)building of state structures is
done in a manner, in which potentially existing inter-ethnic problems are duly taken into account. Actively
promoting good governance in post conflict situations thus requires the actors involved to ensure that the
state concerned is serving all its citizens equally and is providing the same services for all parts of the
population in a non-discriminatory manner. International support and activities aiming at the promotion of
good governance therefore also have to be aware of and sensitive to minority issues. Most importantly,
20 Cf. MULTIPART Country Studies on Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Democratic Republic of Congo.
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peacebuilding initiatives aiming at good governance will have to build on the principle of non-discrimination
and will also have to institutionalize protection structures, such as, for example, Ombudsmen.
In order to achieve this impartial approach vis-à-vis all part of the population in a post-conflict
setting, the functioning of the rule of law is essential and thus a core component of the good governance
agenda. At the same time, international actors aiming at promoting the rule of law in a post-conflict situation
will have to take a comprehensive approach, taking into account and dealing with all branches of the
government. This is also where the relevance of the good governance agenda for promoting Human Security
and peacebuilding becomes obvious. If a state, including the judiciary and the administration does not
function properly and based on good governance, Human Security cannot be achieved for all people living in
the respective state. If conflicting parts of the population have to face the fact that the state is (ab)using its
power against parts of the population, this has direct and negative impacts on peacebuilding, and hinders any
confidence building.
Corruption is a pertinent threat under post-conflict circumstances and only government officials,
judges, and police officers who are paid well will be less likely to allow corruption and lax rule of law.
Effective anti-corruption measures and the resulting appropriate investment conditions will also pave the
way for private investments in post-conflict countries.
The promotion of the rule of law and the fight against corruption will usually have to be
accompanied by further tasks of the good governance agenda in post-conflict situations. Strengthening local
governments, encouraging citizen participation in elections and in civil society, and promoting human rights
are thus further core tasks that have to be addressed under such circumstances. The rational behind such a
comprehensive approach is that generally more secure and well-off citizens will be more likely to become
empowered and active participants in their government and the countries’ civil society, and will also be more
likely to hold their government accountable. Citizens and officials leading more secure and happier lives will
be more likely to respect the human rights of others.
These particularities of post conflict situations have be taken into due account by any international
assistance and especially by MSPs, since such partnerships potentially are core actors for implementing the
good governance agenda.
However, it should also be noted that there was, and still is, a good amount of evidence that
economic prosperity is paramount in terms of promoting good governance. A highly-significant relationship
has been shown between the per capita GDP of a country and the quality of its governance; indeed, the
definition of good governance used in the good governance agenda is nearly indistinguishable from the
current governing practices of highly-developed countries (Meisel and Jacques Ould Aoudia, 2007b: 17 et
seq.). In general, a state that is thriving economically will be better able to fulfil its citizens’ material needs
and thus will be able to please the freedom from want dimension of Human Security. A happier,
economically-sound nation will also be less prone to (again) engaging in internal and external conflict, so as
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not to lose hard-earned gains and instead successfully provide for the freedom from fear dimension of
Human Security.
The question is, does economic growth lead to good governance, by generating the conditions in
which good governance can thrive, or does good governance, by making countries more attractive to
investors, lead to economic growth? The answer, most likely, is that economic development and good
governance are mutually reinforcing, and cannot be separated into a straightforward causal mechanism.
Some evidence shows that in general, the tendency is for states to first achieve high economic growth
without developing good governance; only after achieving economic prosperity do these states begin
developing good governance practices (Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2007a:21). This is, of course, not a
universally-accepted conclusion. For instance, a 1998 study by the World Bank, which provided part of the
stimulus for the further development of that organization’s good governance efforts, found a surprising
negative correlation between aid given to countries and their economic development, and determined that
institutions and governance are essential if development aid is to be effective (Dollar and Pritchett, 1998).
Despite the possibility that economic development can be achieved without improved governance,
over the past few decades—and certainly since the early 1990s—a profound evolution has occurred in the
way the international community thinks about good governance. The basis of this evolution has been the
widespread acceptance of the idea that good governance is a necessary prerequisite of sustainable human
development and Human Security, and that successful development efforts must emphasize the need to bring
about good governance alongside the need to foster economic prosperity. Such an understanding does not
ignore the importance of economic growth, but asserts that such economic growth is meaningless, and
perhaps impossible, unless it is accompanied by advances in governance. Economist Amartya Sen has taken
an even stronger approach to the issue, arguing that the rights and freedoms of good governance are an
essential component of development; therefore, if economic progress is not accompanied by advances in
good governance, development has not truly occurred (Sen, 1999). Such findings are also informative for
shaping the good governance agenda in countries in a post-conflict phase.
Regardless of the specific theoretical reasons for promoting it, good governance has become an
important part of the dialogue of international aid, as well as a central component of international
organizations’ activities. Indeed, in examining the good governance agenda, it is important to bear in mind
that although it owes much to the work of theorists and thinkers—indeed, many of the underlying precepts,
such as citizen participation and the rule of law, are centuries old—in practice, the agenda was developed
and shaped in large part by the reality of international assistance and development efforts. Such an
understanding is helpful in explaining the evolution of the idea of good governance, as well as in connecting
the good governance agenda to the development of multi-stakeholder partnerships in post-conflict
reconstruction, since MSPs have developed, in large part, as an innovative way to further international
organizations’ goals.
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Yet it is also important to recognize that, although the formulation of the good governance agenda is
closely tied to development efforts, its principles have evolved into a universal standard for what it means for
a government to be legitimate (Donnelly 1999: 609-611). Maintaining a government that is efficient,
transparent, responsive, inclusive, and accountable has become an imperative for all nations. The precepts of
good governance are now something for all nations to aspire to. They constitute a benchmark to analyze the
extent to which governments serve their citizens and promote Human Security. Yet, these precepts of good
governance could also serve as a benchmark for MSPs. Therefore, it is important and legitimate to ask, what
issues and principles of good governance are also applicable for MSPs. Addressing issues of good
governance within MSPs would primarily mean that there would be a joint and equal ownership of all
stakeholders involved and that these stakeholders could claim transparency and accountability. However, the
main question for the MULTIPART project in this regard remains how issues of good governance can be
addressed by MSPs in post-conflict circumstances. Therefore, an overview is given on the core tasks of the
good governance agenda in the following.
3.2. Rule of Law and the Fight Against Corruption
One of the most obvious links between the good governance agenda and the realities of international
assistance is its emphasis on the fight against corruption. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published
by Transparency International measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and
territories around the world. While Kosovo is not listed on the CPI, it is enlightening that the Democratic
Republic of Congo obtains rank 162, while Afghanistan obtains rank 179, leaving behind it only Somalia
(Transparency International, 2009).
Perhaps the greatest challenge faced by international organizations is that cash-starved, poorlymanaged
nations with a history of violence and bad governance—the countries that are in the greatest need
of aid—have a strong tendency to dispense with aid they are given in ways that do not necessarily promote
the welfare of their citizens. In addition to causing the leakage of funds from programs through bribes and
kickbacks, corruption can minimize the effectiveness of aid by directing funds toward rent-seeking and
capital-intensive projects that might enrich certain sectors of a country but that have no benefit for the vast
majority of the population and are thus not conducive to Human Security (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman,
2000:69).
Therefore, ensuring transparency and accountability in government is one of the foremost concerns
of international organizations in post-conflict reconstruction. The two Council of Europe conventions on
corruption (i.e. the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, STE No. 173 and the Additional Protocol to the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 191 as well as the Civil Law Convention on corruption,
STE No. 174) and the UN Convention against Corruption are examples of international legal efforts to
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counter corruption. The conventions recognise the far-reaching impact of corruption and stress the need to
develop effective measures to promote the prevention, detection and sanctioning of corruption.
Corruption involves the use of power and authority associated with a government position for
purposes that do not benefit the people the government is intended to serve—i.e., for personal gain.
Corruption is a prime example of the principal-agent problem, in which the principal—the people of a
country, or an international organization—invest an agent—the government—with powers, and then have
inadequate information as to how those powers are being used (Azfar, 2007:256). Almost always, corruption
involves behaviour that, if publicly known, would be condemned and become a scandal; because of this, the
heart of anti-corruption efforts involves finding and disseminating information about official acts.
Corruption has a negative impact on all areas of Human Security. Because corruption by definition
serves private, and not public, interests, corrupt acts tend to harm public goods and services, such as
infrastructure, government services and programs, and the environment. Corruption also discourages
economic investment by increasing the cost of doing business within a country—corporations must be
prepared to surrender a portion of their profits in the form of official bribes. Above all, corruption helps to
create a culture in which the citizen feels powerless, constantly at the mercy of police and officials who have
absolute power to abuse them and extort their money.
Corruption is closely related to another element of the good governance agenda: promoting the rule
of law. Stated simply, the concept of rule of law stipulates that all members of a society obey and implement
that society’s laws, without exception, and that the society’s laws are fairly written and worthy of being
obeyed. Theoretically, in a democratic society, in which all laws are either tacitly or explicitly approved by
the people, this means that every single person and group in a society submits himself or herself to the
society’s standards of conduct, and never performs any actions which the society has not endorsed.
Practically, the rule of law means that a country’s police and judicial system—as well as all other areas of
government—obey the laws, enforce the laws, and treat all people equally under the law. As was mentioned
above, this constitutes a particular challenge in post-conflict situations.
There is a debate surrounding how much harm systematic bribes and corruption do to a nation’s
economy. It has been suggested that although corrupt practices such as bribes have a negative economic
effect, a far worse drain to developing economies comes from the absence of the rule of law (Olson, 2000:
2067-2068). People in nations without the rule of law will be much less likely to pursue long-term economic
projects, such as taking out a loan or setting up a business, because of the insecurity caused by the arbitrary
and uneven application of the laws. Stable, predictable, well-enforced laws help to create a climate in which
people feel safer and more empowered to act as they see fit. When ordinary citizens can trust that all parts of
the government—and especially the judicial and police institutions—will judge their acts and those of others
according to the same, unbiased standards, it has an enormously positive impact on their sense of security
and well-being.
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Certainly, the idea of the rule of law is extraordinarily broad in scope. The rule of law encompasses
essentially every activity within a society. Theorists and international organizations have tried to make this
amorphous concept more tangible by delineating a number of characteristics that define a society governed
by the rule of law. They generally distinguish between two definitions of rule of law: “procedural,” in which
the laws are applied fairly and exactly, even if the laws themselves are unjust; and “substantive,” in which
the laws themselves must conform to a basic set of principles. Often, when international organizations
mention the rule of law, they mean it only in its procedural form; issues such as whether or not a country’s
laws are fair and uphold a basic set of standards are relegated to other areas of discussion, such as the
implementation of human rights. The UNDP report Governance for the Future, for instance, states that rule
of law means that “no political authority is superior to the law of the land. Furthermore, people’s rights are
established by law, not by the arbitrary will of rulers, and these rights are protected by independent courts, in
so far as the rule of law is observed.” (UNDP, 2006: 41-42). This is thus solely a procedural, and not a
substantive, definition. Yet there are also groups, such as the UN Security Council, which list adherence to
human rights standards among the necessary attributes of a society governed by the rule of law, which
conforms to a more substantive definition (UN Security Council, 2004:4).
In terms of substantive rule of law, different theorists have suggested different sets of characteristics
that a country’s law must possess in order for the rule of law to be possible, such as, for American theorist
Lon Fuller, being widely publicized, prospective instead of retroactive—i.e. not written to punish people for
past acts—non-contradictory, capable of being obeyed, written clearly, open to easy interpretation, and
relatively stable over time (Fuller, 1977). These attributes do not prescribe any precise substantive content
for law; rather, they set out the form good law should take.
Regarding procedural rule of law, the UN Security Council defines these as necessary attributes of a
nation’s legal system: “supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.” (UN Security Council, 2004:4).
In practice, the implementation of such provisions requires that a country’s judicial system is set up
so as to be transparent in its decisions, free of corruption, and committed to upholding the standards and
principles of the rule of law. In order for this to be achieved, the judicial system must be free of intervention
from either the executive or legislative branches of government, or from any other group, and must be
supported by a well-trained group of judges, lawyers, jurists, and police officers, all committed to the fair
application of laws and the pursuit of justice for all people.
This is a tall order, especially in post-conflict countries, where societal fissures caused by past
conflicts, constantly-changing laws, and the lack of formal judicial institutions make the equal application of
law nearly impossible. Rule-of-law promotion might, indeed, be the most difficult element of good
governance to implement in post-conflict countries, because it requires the willingness of a large number of
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institutions and actors. If one sector of society abandons corruption, arbitrariness, and violence and submits
itself to the rule of law, but other groups do not, than the groups that obey the rule of law will be at a
comparative disadvantage to those that do not in terms of achieving their goals, because they will have
willingly curtailed their range of possible actions. Rule of law will only occur when enough parts of a society
are committed to upholding and enforcing it so that the advantages of lawbreaking are lost. Rule of law
therefore requires a holistic transformation of society, one that involves changes in not just institutions but
also attitudes and ways of thinking among both officials and ordinary citizens. Adding to all of the
difficulties of rule-of law promotion is the fact that no one has a clear idea of what a nation under the rule of
law ought to look like (Carothers 2003: 7). Nor can anyone be certain, given the example of nations like
China, that rule of law is necessary for economic development or even the establishment of democracy
(Carothers 2003: 6).
Yet despite these difficulties, the rule of law remains one of the chief concerns of the good
governance movement in post-conflict setting. It is also emphasized by organizations that give a large
amount of developmental assistance, which want to ensure that their investments in economic development
are not squandered by bad management, corruption, and disrespect for law and institutions. The hope is that,
by focusing on all of the separate elements of the rule of law, such as transparency in government, strong
judicial institutions, and a populace educated about the importance of fairness and justice, the rule of law can
eventually be achieved.
MSPs are an example of a way that international organizations have attempted to minimize the effect
of corruption and the lack of rule of law on their work. In theory, MSPs are a good way of redefining the
principle-agent relationship that normally exists between international organizations, NGOs, and
governments. All groups are actively involved in running the partnership; ideally all groups, therefore, have
access to the same information about how tasks are assigned and funds are distributed. Corruption becomes
harder to conceal, because the information gap between donor and agent is narrowed.
Another theoretical advantage of MSPs is that, unlike most other international efforts, which involve
temporary, ad hoc programs and grants, MSPs are institutionalized to a certain degree. An institutionalized
partnership, unlike an ad hoc program, requires a clearly-defined set of norms, expectations, and
responsibilities in order to function. Institutionalized efforts will be much more effective than a temporary
effort at constraining actors’ activities and keeping them within defined roles, and will therefore help
promote the rule of law, at least in the context of the MSP’s activities.
For MSPs to be successful at eliminating corruption, they must above all have instruments in place to
ensure that information is adequately shared between different partners, and that all partners and actors are
accountable to the regulations and standards of the partnership.
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3.3. Strengthening Local Governments
Up until recently, one of the assumptions concerning international aid was that financial aid should primarily
be distributed to national governments, in the form of grants or loans, and then directed toward various
projects and programs within the country by the national government. This assumption was based upon the
idea that national governments understand best how to improve their own countries, and that as long as they
were given enough aid, national governments would be able to fix all problems themselves. It also accorded
with the notion, that the nation-state holds absolute sovereignty, and that the quality of governance within a
state ultimately depends on the quality of national governance. Most likely, international organizations also
did not want to appear to be meddling too much in a country’s internal affairs—by giving money only to the
national governments, they could avoid any accusations of neo-colonialism.
Yet over the past few decades, large international organizations have increasingly begun directing
money toward programs and NGOs which work toward strengthening and improving local governments.
This shift has occurred primarily for two reasons: first, due to changes in theories about the best ways to
promote effective governance and Human Security; and second, due to the organizations’ desire to bypass
corrupt and ineffective national governments and to give more money to efforts that directly improve
ordinary citizens’ lives.,
This shift towards directing money directly toward programs and NGOs is increasingly accompanied
by the recognition of the principle that donors and partner countries are both accountable for development
results. In this vein, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, prepared by the OECD and adopted, on 2
March 2005, by more than 100 countries, international organizations and civil society organization
underscores these actors’ “mutual accountability” (OECD, 2005). Although the Accra Agenda for Action
represents a further consensus, amongst others also on the increased accountability on both sides (OECD,
2008) the importance of the accountability of development aid continues to be underestimated.
The principle of subsidiarity—the idea that government functions should be performed by as local
an authority as possible unless there is a compelling case for centralisation—and indeed of all efforts to
promote local governance, is that individual citizens are best served by their governments when decisions
affecting them are made by authorities as close to them as possible. Locally-made decisions are based on
better knowledge of what ordinary citizens are facing than national decisions. Furthermore, ordinary citizens
are able to have a greater effect on decisions made locally—they are able to make their opinions known to
legislators and administrators and thereby help craft policies that are closest to their liking and that allow
them to achieve Human Security (Shah and Shah 2006: 4). Since the ultimate goal of good governance is to
ensure the welfare, happiness and not least the personal security of ordinary citizens, the link between
subsidiary and good governance is therefore self-evident, at least in theory.
Indeed, since the 1950s onward, theories have emerged in both economics and political science
favoring the principle of subsidiarity. For instance, according to the principle of fiscal equivalency, the
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marginal benefit and marginal cost of a public good are equal only when the benefit area of a good is
precisely equal to the political jurisdiction which provides it (Shah and Shah 2006:3). If this theory is correct,
then local governments are always more efficient than national governments at providing services which are
confined to a local area, such as garbage collection, utilities, police, and fire protection. National
governments, on the other hand, would be more effective at services which necessarily involve the entire
geographic area of the country, such as defense and environmental protection.
Additionally, the theories suggest that elimination of different levels of jurisdiction for local services
also reduces unnecessary bureaucracy and infighting (Shah and Shah 2006:5). Freed from the meddling of
higher-order bureaucrats, individual local governments can easily implement experimental programs and
services, and thus create a kind of free market in which citizens choose between local governments based on
the quality of their services. This kind of free market of services is impossible if all services are run by a
centralized national authority.
Another reason for the increased focus on local governance, especially among aid organizations, is
that independent and efficient local governments can serve as an effective counterweight to corrupt and
ineffective national governments. Local governments’ budgets are small, meaning that aid provided to local
governments instead of the national government can be more easily tracked and audited to ensure that it ends
up helping ordinary citizens. It is also much easier for NGOs and citizens’ groups to monitor local
governments, and to demand change in the event that local governments are ineffective. And, if local
governments become clean, efficient, and powerful, this puts pressure on national governments to adopt
good governance as well. Because of this, in recent decades the issue of strengthening local governments has
become a fundamental pillar of the good governance agenda of all of the major aid-giving organizations.
The recent emphasis on local governance should not be isolated from another related development:
the increased discussion of the importance of good “international governance.” This discussion recognizes
the fact that many of the actors who influence the daily lives of people around the world are internationally
based—such as NGOs and multinational corporations—and should not be excluded from efforts to promote
good governance. In the same way that national economies have become integrated into the social and
political structures of nations since World War II, the increasingly globalized and interconnected world
economy should become part of a logically-organized framework of international governance, one that
would adhere to the principles of good governance currently applied to nation-states (Dervis, 2005).
Underlying these calls for better local and international governance is a hope that when both, local
and international organizations and national governments aim at providing good governance and services to
citizens, national governments will naturally become better and more efficient at governing, and will limit
their power and authority only to those sectors of governance that are best addressed at a national level. In
other words, instead of the be-all and end-all of international politics, national governments would become
only one link in a chain of authority, based on the principle of subsidiarity that would have as its prime goal
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securing the best and most efficient services possible for citizens. While not exactly a world government—
national governments would not be expected to give up sovereignty—such a transformation would instead be
an attempt to make the current international system of nation-states as effective as possible in terms of
improving citizens’ welfare and in terms of promoting the citizens’ human rights. Whether or not such a
system would truly be the best means of ensuring all people’s welfare—and whether current efforts in postconflict
setting are the best way of bringing such a system about—is an important, and unresolved, question.
This aspect of the good governance agenda is the one that has had the most profound impact on the
development of MSPs. The chief idea behind instituting MSPs is that the best way to achieve a specific
objective within a country—such as strengthening democracy or improving justice sector institutions—is to
involve all relevant levels of governance in forming a concrete partnership aimed at fulfilling that objective.
In doing so, both, the quantity and quality of relevant actors has to be taken into due account.
By combining these different levels of governance—local, national, international, and non-state
actors—MSPs’ activities can be large in scale, benefiting from all of the resources of their larger partners,
while at the same time remaining as close as possible to the people they are intended to help. MSPs are
therefore potentially a prime way of empowering local governments, by guaranteeing that these governments
have the resources they need to accomplish important tasks, while at the same time, at least in theory, giving
them the ability to help decide how those resources are spent, and ensuring that their voices are not drowned
out by those of national governments and international actors. However, only empirical evidence can show,
if this is true in practice.
In practice, the fact that MSPs are often formed between actors with widely different capacities and
authority could mean that the needs of the smallest actors are not considered, and that the decentralization
and local empowerment promised by the MSP is instead replaced with a working relationship in which the
larger actors who provide most of the funding dictate to the smaller partners how the MSP’s activities should
be organized and carried out. In order for an MSP to successfully promote local governance, larger actors
must take to heart the benefits that come with devolving authority and putting decision-making capacity in
the hands of people who know and understand the needs of ordinary citizens. Yet at the same time, while not
dictating to local authorities, larger actors in MSPs must keep an eye out to ensure that the activities of local
actors are consistent with the goals of the partnership. Ideally a balance should be achieved to ensure that the
asymmetry of the different actors within an MSP helps, rather than hinders, the partnership’s capacity to
effect change.
3.4. Elections and Citizen Participation
The rule of law, the fight against corruption, and the strengthening of local governments are all efforts to
improve the supply side of governance. Yet it is undeniable that the demand side of governance is also quite
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important in terms of bringing about good governance and Human Security. While, in theory, it might be
possible for a government to satisfy all of its citizens’ wants without any input from the citizens themselves,
in practice such a government would suffer from asymmetrical information: it would have no way of
knowing at each point in time what its citizens would like of their government. Even the most perfectly run
government would have no way of fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizens, unless the citizens themselves
make their thoughts and needs known to the government. Furthermore, the citizens, who are the direct
beneficiaries of government services, are in the best position to provide feedback to the government in terms
of its effectiveness. Citizens are also in a prime position to monitor their government’s actions—especially at
the local level—and to root out and protest against corruption. These are the reasons why a Human Security
approach aims at empowering vulnerable people and communities by promoting their participation in public
life.
The theoretical benefits of a strong civil society have long been discussed. For instance, in
Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville identified American civil society as the chief reason for the
success of the United States’ democratic experiment (de Tocqueville, 2000). De Tocqueville saw civil
society organizations as a way to mimic the independence and self-assertion of aristocrats within a society
composed of near-equals. By forming into civil society groups, citizens could serve as effective
counterweights to their governments and to the elites who ran them, ensuring that they received the
governance they felt they deserved. Thus, de Tocqueville thought that such civil society organizations were
an essential component of a well-run democracy.
The importance of the role of citizens in bringing about good governance has been reaffirmed in the
good governance agenda. All major aid organizations, including the World Bank, USAID, the EU, and the
UNDF list citizen empowerment among the chief goals of good governance efforts, and all of them support
NGOs and domestic groups that work toward citizen empowerment. Citizen empowerment is seen as a
potential remedy not only for ineffective national and local governments, but also for intra-society strife,
such as the repression of minority views or the favouring of elite classes of citizens over other classes. When
civil society groups are strong, every citizen within a society becomes an actor capable of bringing about
change to their government and ensuring their own Human Security. Through a successful citizen
empowerment a state may ultimately be able to outsource services and draw back to a mere monitoring role.
The World Movement for Democracy has set out a set of basic principles that must be maintained
within a state in order for civil society to flourish and citizens to become empowered. Most importantly,
governments must uphold a set of basic rights necessary for the creation of strong civil society groups,
including the right to form associations, the right to free expression, to right to operate free of state
intervention, the right to communicate and cooperate, and the right to seek resources in order to further their
ends (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the
National Endowment for Democracy, 2008: 4 et seq). Encouraging governments to support these rights gives
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civil society organizations the freedom of action they need to offer an effective counterweight to their
government and to become influential actors within society.
Yet even if governments uphold these rights, it is not clear that a strong civil society would
necessarily result. In societies in which such groups have traditionally been banned or frowned upon, the
creation of a culture in which citizens feel empowered to form associations and lobby their governments
might be a very difficult task. These findings have been confirmed by a number of case studies of countries
from South East Europe (Benedek 2006; Benedek 2010). But especially in societies with strong tribal groups
and organizations, the idea of forming associations that link people from different tribal groups together in
order to work for a common goal might seem completely foreign and culturally insensitive. In order to
promote civil society, aid groups must help to create a culture in which civil society associations are
accepted and looked upon as important and useful. Thus citizen empowerment, as a key element of
promoting Human Security, must involve education as well as organization.
The creation of effective civil society organizations can be a laborious and indirect route to
producing good governance—such organizations can at best only lobby governments to change their ways.
In democracy, however, demand for good governance is already part of the political system; when citizens
vote for their leaders, they are automatically expressing their preferences for the type of governance they
want, and they have a direct impact on the supply of good governance.
The caveat, of course, is that in order for democracy to balance supply and demand for good
governance in this way, elections must be fair and free and leaders must be accountable to the electorate.
These two aspects of good democracy are self-reinforcing: if elections are fair and free, then leaders will
have to be more accountable to citizens in order to win re-election; if leaders are more accountable, citizens
will be encouraged to take part in elections and the elections will be fairer and more transparent.
Similarly, a strong civil society and free and fair elections are also self-reinforcing. Civil society
organizations such as media organizations and watchdog groups are necessary for conducting unbiased
elections. Meanwhile, elections are a simple and easy way for citizens to become active in determining the
quality of their governance, and successful elections can encourage citizen empowerment and involvement in
civil society groups. Because of this, efforts to promote citizen empowerment must be holistic in their
approach.
As with the rule of law, the notion of citizen empowerment is something of a catch-all in terms of
helping to promote good governance. Unlike anti-corruption or local governance efforts, it is difficult to
concretely measure the extent to which citizen empowerment has succeeded. Even if a nation has a large
number of civil society groups, these groups might collectively be ineffective in terms of promoting citizen
interests or encouraging good governance–empowerment as an essential part of Human Security might not
be achieved. On the other hand, societies that might not appear to have a strong civil society, such as triballybased
societies, might be very effective on these fronts. As with the rule of law, the only way to tell if citizen
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empowerment efforts are working is to examine society as a whole, to see if individual citizens are informed
and educated about their government, and to see whether or not citizens feel empowered to form groups,
electioneer, and run for office to try to bring about needed changes.
Because they are often relatively weak, civil society organizations may be the first target of
government elites trying to crack down on unrest and preserve their power. Civil society organizations,
especially those run by outside NGOs, are often seen as the puppets of the international community and
means of achieving neo-colonial rule. According to the World Movement for Democracy, “Semiauthoritarian
governments are developing tools to suppress and silence independent groups, from manifestly
restrictive laws and regulations to quietly burdensome registration and tax requirements.” (International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the National Endowment
for Democracy, 2008:7). The rationale for these actions includes national security, maintaining political
unity, and preventing outside interests from meddling in their affairs (International Center for Not-for-Profit
Law and World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the National Endowment for Democracy, 2008:3).
Because the resulting organizations and movements are so fragile and prone to government intimidation,
citizen empowerment is a difficult area of good governance to promote, but yet an indispensable dimension
of Human Security.
The fragility of citizen groups as compared to the might of their governments is an important
motivation for the development of MSPs. As with local governments, MSPs can be important tools in
helping civil society groups achieve their objectives, by giving small groups access to the funding and
resources of large NGOs and international organizations. These NGOs and international organizations,
which presumably believe in the need for citizen empowerment and which have no vested interest in
preserving the power of the central government or of regional governments, will be much more likely than
those governments to listen to the needs and suggestions of individual citizens and of citizen organizations. If
these MSPs are to be successful in promoting Human Security, they must ensure that they provide a forum
for civil society groups and citizens to voice their concerns and contribute openly and meaningfully to the
MSPs’ activities.
3.5. Respect for Human Rights
Human security and human rights are strictly interlinked, since Human Security bases its policies and actions
on the common values of human rights. Initially, encouraging respect for human rights was not a part of the
good governance agenda. Good governance had as its prime focus governing institutions and actors, and as
long as these institutions and actors served ordinary citizens well and kept them safe from fear, want, and
promoted their personal and economic development, good governance had been achieved. Human rights then
were perceived as a separate issue, something that would go along with good governance and that good
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governance would help promote. A parallel can be seen in the relationships between economic development
and good governance, and between good governance and human rights. In both cases, one was seen as an
eventual bridge to other—the second was seen as a further goal that would only come about once the first
had been achieved.
Yet over the course of its theoretical evolution, good governance has grown to include human rights
as a fundamental element of its agenda. One milestone in this evolution was the 1986 UN Declaration on the
Right of Development, which set out for the first time a fundamental right for all people to “participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” (United Nations General Assembly, 1986). This declaration
linked the separate agendas of development and human rights. Economic development became recognized as
a fundamental right of all people, and human rights became one of the central goals of development.
Since the 1986 Declaration, international organizations have begun to include the promotion of
human rights among the goals of their work. Some, such as the EU, put it at the forefront of their efforts;
others, such as the UNDP, place it among the secondary goals of their programs. The inclusion of human
rights within good governance efforts is a very recent phenomenon, and, given the recent trend, will most
likely become a more and more central component of the good governance agenda as the relationship
between the respect for human rights and the existence of good governance becomes better understood.
There are two distinct approaches to the inclusion of human rights within the good governance
agenda. The first sees promoting human rights as a mechanism of promoting good governance, similar to the
rule of law, local governance, and citizen empowerment. Like strong legal institutions, local governments,
and citizen organizations, a culture of recognition and respect for human rights is a capacity that can be built
up within a country in order to bring about good governance. Elements of the human rights framework—
such as freedom of speech and the press—dovetail into elements of the good governance agenda—for
example, citizen empowerment. Ensuring the right to a fair trial is another example that helps to understand
the importance of ensuring human rights in post-conflict settings. Therefore, spreading awareness of the
importance of human rights among decision-makers as well as ordinary citizens within a country can help
further other good governance goals.
The UNDP’s inclusion of human rights in its work is a good example of this approach. In 1998, the
UNDP drafted its first human rights policy, called Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human
Development. Since then, the UNDP has expanded the role of human rights in its human development
programs, and human rights have become an essential element of its activities (Dervis, 2009:3).
According to Olav Kjorven, the director of the UNDP’s Bureau for Development Policy, “We do not
have a normative or monitoring role with regard to human rights, but respond to demand from programme
countries to build national institutional capacity for implementing human rights. And the demand is there.”
(Kjorven, 2009). The UNDP does not try to impose a human rights agenda on its activities; instead, it works
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with countries who want to improve their human rights standards to include in their development efforts
programs such as strengthening human rights institutions, addressing the concerns of minorities and other
marginalized groups, and helping make national legislation conform to international human rights standards
(Kjorven, 2009). The UNDP tries to be unobtrusive in its efforts, promoting human rights when partner
countries request they do so, but not trying to force them upon member states, keeping the broad goal of
good governance and sustainable human development as the main focus.
The other main approach to the inclusion of human rights within the good governance agenda makes
human rights a core component of the good governance approach. According to this approach, all of the
other aspects of good governance are tools for the promotion of human rights. While the focus of good
governance might be the improvement of institutions, laws, and services, at its core the good governance
agenda is oriented toward the individual, aiming to guarantee to all citizens within every nation a
fundamental standard of security and well-being.
Within this approach, human rights serve as a framework that gathers together all of the disparate
elements of economic development, Human Security, and good governance. As Mary Robinson, former
High Commissioner for Human Rights, has said, “Human rights bring to the development discussion a
unifying set of standards—a common reference for setting objectives and assessing the value of action.”
(UNDP, 1998). All people have a right to economic and personal security; all people have a right to express
themselves and engage in any sort of activism that does not harm others’ rights; all people have a right to
expect good government services, fair judicial processes, and the ability to help select and determine the
policies of their government. This approach has a radical focus on the individual: it is the rights of each
individual that need to be protected and upheld through the promotion of good governance. The health of
institutions and civil society and the goodness of legislation are important only as means of guaranteeing
individuals’ rights.
On a theoretical level, grounding all aspects of sustainable development and good governance in
human rights makes sense, especially if the aim is to promote all of these areas. In terms of their practical
affinities, the human rights framework, as defined in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, necessitates good governance, because qualities of good governance and development, such as
democratic elections, are included within the framework. Establishing good governance and sustainable
development, on the other hand, does not seem to necessarily require encouraging respect for human rights
(Donelly, 1999:609 et seqq). Therefore, human rights, and the related concept of Human Security, provide
aid groups, international organizations, NGOs, states, and everyone else involved in international assistance
with a unified set of goals and a central motivating force for what might seem like disparate, disconnected
efforts.
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One of the pioneers of this approach in recent years has been the European Union. According to the
European Commission’s 2003 Communication on Governance and Development,
Since the early 1990s, a human rights ‘essential element’ clause has been systematically
included in EC agreements with third countries, including trade and co-operation accords
and association agreements. Such clauses stipulate that respect for fundamental human rights
and democratic principles underpins the internal and external policies of the parties and
constitutes an ‘essential element’ of the agreement. In the event of a breach, a range of
measures can be considered, with the provision that their application should respect the
principle of proportionality between the breach and the degree of reaction (Commission of
the European Communities, 2003:8).
The EU takes the normative position that governments which receive its aid must abide by human rights
standards. The leverage of potential EU funding is used in order to help promote human rights, much in the
same way this leverage is used in accession proceedings and the bilateral agreements of the European
Neighbourhood Policy in order to promote certain government behaviours and reforms. Thus the EU
considers human rights to be a basic requirement for states to receive funding.
According to the EC’s 2006 Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on
Development, “The processes of democratic governance based on the universal principles cited above cannot
be imposed from outside. In relations between the partner country and donors, it is vital that ownership of the
reform processes be respected. Only the countries concerned can decide and implement their reforms.”
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006:7). With the “essential element” clauses, the EU sets up
human rights as an inviolable standard, an precondition for economic assistance and government reform, but
then grants governments receiving aid wide flexibility in determining how human rights will be brought
about.
Because respect for human rights is the most recently-established element of the good governance
agenda, it is difficult to tell which of these approaches will become dominant. The differences between the
UNDP and EU approaches might come down to nothing more than the possibility of financial leverage—the
EU is able to impose a human rights standard using its bilateral agreements, whereas the UNDP, which
works as a client of governments, cannot. Yet the hesitation of other organizations such as the World Bank
and USAID to hold countries to the same human rights standards suggests that the difference in the
approaches might be more philosophical than practical, and might be the result of differences in priorities
among the different elements of the good governance agenda. If this is the case, then a unified approach to
including human rights within good governance might take longer to develop.
Aid organizations and international NGOs who help to found MSPs will almost certainly have a
much stronger commitment to the human rights agenda than national or local governments, which sometimes
try to balance concern for human rights with other concerns, such as providing the most efficient services
possible and preserving their power and authority. Yet partly absolute human rights are not negotiable at the
governments’ convenience. Therefore, involving international organizations in the operations and efforts of
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governance will bring about an increased focus on human rights and an increased insistence on following
human rights standards in order to archive Human Security. For these reasons, MSPs can be an ideal way of
linking the human rights agenda and the good governance agenda, and ensuring that they both work in
tandem to ensure the welfare of all people.
If the actors involved in setting up an MSP do not have a high level of commitment to human rights,
on the other hand, then the MSP will most likely not do much to promote human rights and consequently
Human Security. The effectiveness of an MSP in furthering human rights depends foremost on the
willingness of the actors to include human rights within the framework of their good governance efforts. If
one of the actors takes an approach like the EU’s, and places human rights as a centrepiece of all good
governance and development efforts, then human rights will receive a much stronger emphasis in the
partnership’s activities.
3.6. Good Governance Approaches of Different International Organizations
While on the one hand the good governance agenda can be seen as a unified set of standards for the
relationship between a state and its citizens, in reality different organizations emphasize certain elements of
this agenda over others within their efforts, leading to widely different approaches to promoting good
governance. Because of this, good governance can best be thought of as a comprehensive but multi-sectoral
agenda, in which the separate components are focused on individually in order to eventually fulfil the
objectives of good governance as a whole. The multi-sectorality of the good governance agenda can be
examined through a look at the major organizations’ various conceptions of what good governance is and
how it ought to be achieved.
World Bank
Article I of the Articles of Agreement which established the International Development Association of the
World Bank states that the Association’s purpose is “to promote economic development, increase
productivity and thus raise standards of living.” (International Development Association, 1960). Because of
this, the World Bank’s approach to good governance is centred on improving governance as a means of
spurring economic growth. The World Bank’s 1992 definition of governance, which has not been modified
greatly since, says that, “Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a
country's economic and social resources for development.” (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008). The governance of
a country is seen as a conduit by which a country’s resources—human and natural—are directed toward
economic growth. Good governance occurs when these resources are maximized and economic development
results.
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The World Bank refers to the need to end corruption and promote the rule of law as issues of “Public
Sector Governance.” The use of the term “public sector,” as a close counterpart to the “private sector,”
underlines the fact that the Bank’s good governance efforts have economic development as their ultimate
goal. Similarly, efforts to promote a more expansive role for local governments in decision-making are called
“Local Economic Development,” which, as its name indicates, has economic capacity-building as its central
goal (Swinburn et al, 2006).
Even the World Bank’s work to improve citizen empowerment is seen through an economic prism;
according to “Empowerment in Practice”, a guide to citizen empowerment written by World Bank officials,
the World Bank “recognizes that poverty reduction involves understanding and addressing the often complex
processes that limit people’s capacity to make life-changing choices.” (Alsop et al., 2006). These “lifechanging
choices” would seem to include mostly economic decisions, such as taking out a loan or starting a
business, rather than the typical idea of empowerment referred to in the good governance agenda, which
involves social and political participation. The emphasis on individuals’ “life-changing choices” highlights
the economic focus of the Bank’s empowerment efforts—the work of citizen groups and advocacy
organization is not focused on providing single “life-changing choices,” but rather on prolonged, dedicated
efforts by a group of people.
Finally, in the area of human rights, the Bank seems eager to reinforce the idea that while human
rights might be important to development, development is absolutely central to respect for human rights.
Therefore, although human rights should be promoted, they should not take priority over other development
efforts, nor over anti-corruption, transparency, accountability, or judicial reform programs (The World Bank,
1998).
On the whole, the World Bank’s good governance efforts seem to be focused on anti-corruption and
rule of law efforts—the areas of good governance which are most directly related to economic development.
Yet the World Bank, like most international aid organizations, has recently begun to focus more on other
areas of good governance such as local governments, citizen empowerment, and human rights, promoting
these through the lens of economic development.
UNDP
Although the United Nations Development Programme, as its name indicates, was originally formed in order
to oversee and coordinate the UN’s poverty-reduction and development efforts, the UNDP does not have as
economic a focus as the World Bank. Instead of a means to achieving development, for the UNDP good
governance is something that should be promoted in its own right, based on its intrinsic merits. Accordingly,
the promotion of “democratic governance” has become one of the UNDP’s main areas of activity.
One of the chief ideas behind the UNDP’s approach, outlined in its 2006 report Governance for the
Future: Democracy and Development in the Least Developed Countries, is that good governance should be
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“democratized.” This idea is based on two notions: “1) that the freedoms of development are ends in
themselves, over and beyond their instrumental value, and 2) that freedom is the development metric by
which people and governments monitor and assess human progress.” (UNDP, 2006).
This focus on freedom as the fundamental goal of good governance seems to indicate that for the
UNDP, citizen empowerment is the most important aspect of the good governance agenda. “Democratizing”
good governance effectively means giving all citizens the tools to ensure that they receive everything they
expect from their government, their local institutions, and their fellow citizens. It means that each citizen has
the power to watch over their government’s activities and has the capacity to work to change that
government if change is necessary. Under this approach, all of the UNDP’s activities within the different
sectors of good governance—such as eliminating corruption, improving transparency, empowering local
governments, and ensuring free and fair elections—have the ultimate goal of not only giving citizens
adequate services from their government but also training them and empowering them to become good
watchdogs and citizens, to make sure that corruption and bad governance are never again possible.
Despite this ultimate focus, the UNDP’s activities mostly involve so-called “up-stream” initiatives—
that is, programs that do not necessarily involve direct contact with ordinary people, but which aid them in
more indirect ways, such as the implementation of laws or government capacity-building (Winderl 2006:25).
From this it is clear that although the UNDP might see the development of citizen empowerment and
freedom through local efforts as important goals, its primary mode of activity is more involved in creating
the conditions where empowerment and freedom can develop, by working with governments to improve
their services, institutions, and laws. Even though in theory, the UNDP is focused on individuals, in practice
its efforts are aimed at the sectors of the good governance agenda more removed from independent citizen
action. Still, the UNDP, more than any of the other main aid organizations, promotes such active citizen
empowerment as the chief end of its efforts and the measure of its programs’ effectiveness.
USAID
USAID, which is funded by United States taxpayers, understandably does not justify its activities simply in
terms of American generosity. Instead, USAID also highlights the strategic importance of its efforts for US
interests and security. According to the USAID, poorly-governed, failed states produce unhappy,
disillusioned, impoverished citizens, and are therefore breeding grounds for terrorist movements and other
national security threats. In addition, aid can be a powerful tool for securing foreign allies and promoting US
foreign policy interests (United States Agency for International Development 2006:3).
Because of these rationales, it would make sense that the foremost goal of USAID’s good
governance efforts is the improvement and strengthening of national governments in order to pacify internal
tensions and eliminate violence and radicalism. USAID’s funding for the most part goes toward nations who
have a history of violent tensions or radical elements, such as Iraq, Egypt, and Colombia, and not necessarily
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toward nations with a history of poverty or bad governance—although the two types of nations are no doubt
highly correlated (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2004:14). Within these nations, USAID primarily focuses on policies
and programs that help encourage and strengthen democratic government, such as institutional reform,
promoting the rule of law, and eliminating corruption, and seems to devote somewhat less attention to other
aspects of good governance, such as citizen empowerment and human rights, although these areas do form a
substantial part of their efforts (USAID 2006:4-5). USAID must submit all of its programs for budget review
by the US Congress (USAID 2006:15-17) therefore there must presumably be a clear link between USAID
programs and the financial and security interests of the United States. Thus, civil society and local
governance efforts are strongest in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US has taken on a large
amount of responsibility in terms of bringing about democracy and security and promoting a free and
independent civil society (USAID 2006:18-21, 25). It should be noted that the largest contingent of USAID
staff, when separated out by areas of technical expertise, works in democracy and good governance,
underlining the importance of this area in USAID’s efforts (USAID 2006:31).
European Union
With the European Consensus on Development the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
reaffirmed that “development is a central goal by itself; and that sustainable development includes good
governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects.” (European Parliament,
Council and Commission 2006). This EU policy statement constitutes a common vision for development and
reflects the EU's willingness to base its development policies on Europe's democratic values – “respect for
human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, good governance, gender equality,
solidarity, social justice and effective multilateral action, particularly through the UN.” (European
Parliament, Council and Commission 2006).
In general, the EU has sought in its aid efforts to widen the scope of the good governance agenda,
and to move it away from merely focusing on eliminating corruption (Commission of the European
Communities, 2006:5). The 2006 Communication on Governance defines “democratic governance” as a
concept which “affirms the rights of all citizens on the road to sustainable development.” (Commission of the
European Communities, 2006:5). This broad, rights-based approach makes room not only for a very strong
emphasis on human rights, as conventionally defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
subsequent declarations, but also extends the idea of rights to include other aspects of the citizen’s
interactions with his or her government, such as elections, involvement in government processes, rule of law,
transparency and access to information, access to government services, and Human Security (Commission of
the European Communities, 2006:5).
Paradoxically, such an intense focus on the individual might mean that the EU’s approach to good
governance requires a strong need to work with government institutions. Individual freedom, as championed
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y the UNDP, requires only that the government does not place restrictions on its citizens’ activities; beyond
that, it is the responsibility of citizens themselves to take advantage of the opportunities offered to them, and
the responsibility of NGOs to educate them and show them what those opportunities are. A rights-based
approach—especially a rights-based approach which includes rights to expect such things as “effective
institutions” and “sustainable management of natural and energy resources and of the environment”
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5)—necessitates a high level of government involvement
to ensure success. While ordinary citizens might be responsible for upholding each others’ rights, only a
government with coercive power can enforce those rights.
The EU’s overall approach shifts the burden of providing good governance largely onto the nations
to which it gives aid. While the set of rights the EU declares should be granted to all citizens might itself be
arbitrary, the rights, once established, provide an unchanging template for the state’s responsibility to its
citizens. If a state must guarantee that resources are being used effectively for the benefit of its citizens, it
means that it must keep a careful watch over every single resource in the country to ensure that their work
benefits the country’s citizens. Otherwise, it is no longer fully upholding its citizens’ rights.
Since the burden for upholding citizens’ rights is often given to national governments to a
considerable extent, the EU’s responsibility then becomes to hold the national governments to their duty to
protect their citizens’ rights. Although the EU might work with the country to help overcome obstacles in
providing these rights, it does not have to become involved in figuring out how to bring about good
governance; the country takes ownership over its own good governance efforts. As the 2006 Communication
on Governance states, “The European Community supports the processes of democratic governance under a
partnership-based approach, through dialogue with partner countries’ governments and, as a donor, through
its various financial instruments.” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:6).
The EU appears to place less of an emphasis on local governance or citizen empowerment than on
other good governance elements. Local governments might have a role to play in guaranteeing citizens’ right
to effective institutions and services, but the ultimate guarantor of these rights is the national government,
which, in partnership with the EU, must figure out the best way to uphold its citizens’ rights. Despite a lack
of stated emphasis, however, the EU does support programs to improve citizen education and empowerment
and to involve citizens in efforts aimed at keeping their government transparent and well-run, such as
programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina to rejuvenate local governments and to improve citizen influence on
elected authorities (EuropeAid 2007a:57-58). The European Consensus on Development recognizes that the
civil society “including economic and social partners such as trade unions, employers' organisations and the
private sector, NGOs and other non-state actors of partner countries in particular play a vital role as
promoters of democracy, social justice and human rights” and that the EU “will enhance its support for
building capacity of nonstate actors in order to strengthen their voice in the development process and to
advance political, social and economic dialogue.” (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2006:4).
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With a view to supporting the reforms that underpin democratic governance, the European
Commission launched, in 2007, the “Governance Initiative for ACP countries and Africa” and an ENP
“Governance Facility” for countries neighboring the EU. The latter, for instance, is an instrument for
financial assistance to those partner countries from the EU’s neighborhood area, “which are assessed to have
made the most progress in implementing the governance-related objectives of their agreed reform agenda as
set out in their ENP Action Plans (which contain both general and specific commitments on governancerelated
reforms).” 21
The importance of involving a broad range of civil society is also set out in the EU’s development
agreements with individual countries and groups of countries, e.g. in the Cotonou agreement. With the
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) the EU set up a financial instrument that
aims to underpin and complement the EU’s human rights and democratisation policies. Several projects
funded in the framework of the EIDHR explicitly aim at promoting good governance (European
Commission, 2009). In 2007, the Commission launched a new Thematic Programme called “Non-state actors
and local authorities in development,” intended to provide funds to projects initiated by local governments,
civil society groups, and NGOs (EuropeAid, 2009).
Yet the EU’s main focus is still aid to national governments; the amount of aid allocated to
developing countries through the European Development Fund from 2000-2006, 13.5 billion euros (ACP-EC
Council of Ministers, 2006:19) dwarfs the 731 million euros distributed by the EIDHR during the same
period - although both represent very substantial sums (EuropeAid, 2007b). When comparing these figures
one has to bear in mind that large amounts of money cannot easily be channelled through comparatively
small projects and NGOs. Thus the financial support given to states will naturally always make up
comparatively larger sums. Very likely, the EU will increase its focus on local and non-state actors in the
coming years as they become a more and more widely-accepted piece of the good governance agenda.
3.7. Conclusion
One of the most interesting findings of a comparison of different international organizations’
approaches to good governance is that although there are many distinct approaches to good governance,
emphasizing different sectors of the good governance agenda, these organizations are remarkably similar in
their activities. They all provide a mix of aid to national governments, international NGOs, and local NGOs
and governments. They are all, to a certain extent, unified in terms of what properties of government they see
as necessary in order to build strong, accountable, citizen-cantered states. Even though the good governance
agenda might not be fully unified in terms of its approach, it does present a united vision for the future of
national governments and their relationships to their citizens, as well as an important means of ensuring
21 Commission of the European Communities. ”Supporting Democratic Governance through the Governance Initiative: a Review
and the Way Forward.” Commission Staff Working Paper. Brussels, 19.1.2009, SEC(2009) 58 final, p. 5.
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Human Security. The differences in approaches highlights the possibility of multi-sectorality in pursuing the
good governance agenda—having individual projects focus only on specific areas of the agenda, so that all
aspects of good governance are eventually achieved.
The fact that the good governance agenda seems to be able to be broken up so well in different
sectors is important for the development of MSPs. Although the areas of good governance can be divided up,
the best way to achieve good governance in the end is a holistic transformation of a nation’s governance,
starting from the top and encompassing reform in all areas, from rule of law to decentralization of
government to promoting free speech and human rights—in other words, completely reinventing a country’s
culture of governance, where the state will have to prove that it is willing and able to provide equal services
to all parts of the population, and perform all state functions in the light of human rights. A culture of human
rights as well as education for democratic citizenship, human rights and peace will naturally have a crucial
role to play in this regard (Benedek 2009). Although efforts such as MSPs might be able to achieve small,
temporary gains in good governance in certain areas, they will be unable to fully transform society in the
way that proponents of good governance would like—and will be unable to prevent future conflicts from
arising and erasing any Human Security gains that have been made.
Yet, it is also possible that MSPs, because of the limited range of their activities, cannot hope to
address all of the issues of good governance at once. If it is true, as it seems from a survey of the activities of
large international organizations, that the tasks of good governance can be effectively split into its different
sectors, then a large number of MSPs, each promoting a different area of good governance, will be able to
achieve a wholesale transformation of a country’s governance. Only further empirical research can determine
which of these two scenarios is correct.
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4. Approaches and Instruments of Good Governance
As the previous two subchapters have shown, the promotion of democracy and good governance are not
merely new issue areas but a whole new framework that characterises recent initiatives for development and
post-conflict reconstruction. Within this new framework new approaches and instruments have been
developed in order to meet the challenging tasks of good governance. This subchapter focuses on two broad
approaches that are particularly relevant for understanding the operation of MSPs, namely decentralisation
and multi-sectoriality. Decentralisation refers to the changing relationship (transfer of a range of powers,
responsibilities and resources) between the central and sub-national (different levels) institutions, including
public, private, and civic. MSPs by their composition and mode of operation represent particularly promising
mechanisms in the processes of decentralisation. Multi-sectoriality is an approach that is based on nonhierarchical
horizontal coordination mechanisms between actors that represent different sectors – public,
private or civic. MSPs are a classical embodiment of the multi-sectorial approach.
4.1. Processes of Decentralisation
By Valeria Izzi (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
4.1.1. Introduction
Decentralisation is sweeping the world: enthusiasm for the transfer of power and responsibility at the local
level has never been higher. Over the last three decades, decentralisation reforms have been introduced in
countries with all types of regimes and ideological orientation – including, increasingly, countries emerging
from conflict. In 2000, three out of four countries in the world elected at least one tier of sub-national
government (World Bank 2000:126). Support for decentralisation has gained prominence in the policies of
bilateral and multilateral donors, not only as a general prescription for development and good governance,
but also as an integral component of post-conflict recovery strategies.
This trend matters when reflecting on the role of the EU in MSPs, for at least two reasons. First, given
the popularity of decentralisation worldwide, it is highly probable that these reforms will be in place, or
underway, in any country where the EU establishes MSPs. Second, there is an issue of policy coherence: the
EU is committed to promoting local governance in partner countries, and routinely supports decentralisation
reforms as an integral component of its development assistance. It is thus important to ensure that other
forms of engagement are aligned with, and do not unintentionally contradict, this underlying commitment.
The aim of this sub-section is to reflect on the implications of decentralisation for MSP in post-conflict
contexts, looking at the way in which MSPs can affect, and in turn be affected by, decentralisation reforms. 22
22 This <strong>paper</strong> draws significantly on the study The Contribution of Decentralized Governance to Development and Peace in Sub-
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4.1.2. Decentralisation as a development mantra
Decentralisation is high on the agenda of international donors. Since the mid-1990, the European
Commission has supported local governance in various regions of the world: a growing number of Country
and Regional Strategy Papers include decentralisation programmes that are “increasingly sophisticated and
mobilise substantial funding” (European Commission 2007:9), and the Cotonou Agreement 23 opens a wide
range of opportunities to engage local actors in development processes. For the World Bank, decentralisation
reforms are becoming part of standard development conditionality, generally accompanied by direct support
to the implementation of such reforms. Over USD 7.4 billion of Bank’s lending over the period 1990-2007
are estimated to have gone to support decentralisation in client countries (cf World Bank, 2008). The United
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) support to decentralized governance increased more than sixfold
in the decade 1994-2004, encompassing programmes at the national, regional, and global level (UNDP,
2004). Most bilateral donors have similarly expansive portfolios in support to decentralisation and local
governance (OECD, 2004), and decentralisation reforms are now a staple component of Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers. 24
Yet, for all its popularity, there is a great deal that remains unknown about decentralisation. For one
thing, there is no consensus about what decentralisation is. 25 Commonly-used definitions swing between two
extremes: (i) a ‘narrow’ definition of decentralisation, as the transfer of authority and responsibility for
public functions from the central government to sub-national government entities; and (ii) a ‘broad’
definition, which includes not only the redistribution of competencies between the central and the local
government, but also the devolution of functions and authority to private and non-profit actors. Clearly, the
two approaches differ crucially in terms of strategies, risks, and indicators of success.
Decentralisation is also often categorized in ‘political’, ‘administrative’ and ‘fiscal’, as shown in
Table 1.
Table 1 - Types of decentralisation
Political Transfer of political authority to (normally elected) local governments.
Administrative Transfer of functional responsibilities to the local level (e.g. health care services,
operation of schools, building and maintenance of roads, garbage collection).
Fiscal/financial Transfer of financial authority to the local level. It typically involves reducing
conditions on the inter-governmental transfer of resources and giving local
jurisdictions greater authority to generate their own revenue.
Saharan Africa, undertaken by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sub-Saharan Africa
Division) in May 2009.
23 Signed in June 2000 for a period of 20 years, the Cotonou agreement replaced the previous Lomé agreement as the framework for
EU cooperation with the countries of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). For the text of the Cotonou agreement, see
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Cotonou_EN_2006_en.pdf.
24 For a discussion of the linkages between PRSPs and decentralisation reforms, see Farrant and Clarke 2002.
25 For an overview of how different donors and international agencies define decentralisation, see European Commission, 2007.
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But why is decentralisation so popular? In the policy discourse, the imperative of decentralisation is
generally motivated by either or both of two arguments: good governance and poverty reduction. The key
assumption is that more delocalized government structures and processes will mean more effective
‘participation’ and ‘voice’ of citizens at the local level – which, in turn, would “trigger a virtuous circle of
development where political freedoms empower people to force the expansion of social and economic
opportunities, thereby allowing communities to define their own priorities” (Bonfiglioli 2003:70).
A growing body of academic literature disputes these automatic positive linkages, pointing to the
lack of firm, country-based evidence of the beneficial impact of decentralisation. Indeed, this
‘decentralisation hype’ has caused a sort of backlash among political scientists and scholars of areas studies.
Reforms are often criticized for being donor-driven, imposed to recipient countries as an umpteenth
incarnation of conditionality packages, driven more by the buzzword of the day in Northern capitals than by
a throughout understanding of local realities - the latest of many “fashions that prop up and then disappear
after new insights more or less eclipse the former” (Marysse 2005:187).
Part of the problem is that the discourse on decentralisation is frequently approached from a
normative, rather than analytical, perspective. Decentralisation “is often taken as a given, a kind of common
wisdom, rather than one among several different options of structuring a state” (Byrne and Schnyder
2005:2). Critics maintain that virtuous evidence “draws either on examples from single countries and sectors,
or is anecdotal, temporally specific and highly localised, making the task of generalisation impossible [and
therefore] efforts to measure ‘outcomes’, in terms of reduced poverty or improved social indicators, as a
consequence of devolved powers and resources to local governments and increased participation, are
inconclusive and fraught with methodological problems” (Robinson 2003:1).
Perhaps nowhere are the dangers of a virtuous automatism better exemplified than in the relationship
between decentralisation and gender equality. In the international policy discourse, a ‘natural fit’ is often
assumed between decentralisation and women’s empowerment. It is argued that, for women, participating at
the local level can be easier compared to national level politics: eligibility criteria are generally less stringent,
and commitments are easier to conciliate with domestic chores, childcare, and income-generating activities.
Women are deemed to be more interested in local level politics, as the focus on community services is closer
to their everyday life. Local politics is also considered as a springboard (‘the first rung of the ladder’) for
women to gain the skills, experience and self-confidence that would enable them to get involved in higher
levels of politics.
However, the assumption that local level politics is, per se, more conducive to women participation
proves problematic. Local government is deeply embedded in local social structures, which can present
significant barriers to participation. Decentralisation can revitalise local patriarchal values and the very
‘localism’ of local government can serve to obstruct women’s empowerment and participation, as traditional
views on gender roles are generally stronger at the local level than in capital cities. Therefore, specific
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actions are needed to ensure that decentralisation is gender-sensitive and benefits equally women and men,
rather than assuming that this will happen automatically. 26
4.1.3. Decentralisation in post-conflict settings: some evidence from Afghanistan, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Kosovo
In addition to being a crucial component of development policies in ‘stable’ contexts,
decentralisation increasingly is part of peacebuilding packages, as a starting point for the reconstruction of
‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states from the bottom-up. This is part a recognition (some say a belated one) of the
critical role that frameworks, institutions, and processes of local level governance play in the sustainability of
peace. For a long time, local agendas have been insufficiently addressed in theory and practice of conflict
resolution and peacebuilding, considered as either irrelevant or merely a reflection of macro-level power
struggle. According to recent work in international relations and comparative politics, this neglect might
contribute to the fact that such a high number of peace settlement fail to bring about durable and sustainable
peace . .
While it is today widely recognised that decentralisation can play an important role in post-conflict
peacebuilding, implementing these types of reforms in countries emerging from civil war is also full with
challenges and risks. The three country case-studies of the MULTIPART project offer an interesting sample
for observing the complexity of centre-periphery relations in post-conflict settings.
Decentralisation in Afghanistan
The Afghan State has historically been one of the most centralised of the world, coexisting with an extremely
decentralized, traditional society. The 1964 Constitution defined Afghanistan as a unitary state, and local
authorities were merely emanations of the central government. De facto, however, the degree to which the
Kabul government could reach to the village level was always very limited, and local power largely rested in
the hands of tribal leaders. Furthermore, over three decades of war have fundamentally altered state-society
coexistence, and militia commanders have replaced traditional institutions as the main sources of power and
authority at the local level.
The original model for state-building in post-Taliban Afghanistan, emerging from the 2001 Bonn
Conference, sought to re-establish a centralised form of governance, by putting the 1964 Constitution back in
place during the transitional period. According to many observers, this choice was in line with the desire of
most Afghani citizens, who wanted the authority of the central government to be extended to the provinces,
replacing the illegitimate authority of warlords and druglords. In practice, however, the US-led military
action and the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) only managed to
26 It has been argued, for example, that, contrary to common wisdom, women may face more obstacles to political engagement at the
local level than the national level, because of local patriarchal norms. For a review see Byrne and Schnyder 2005.
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consolidate the transitional government’s power in Kabul and its surroundings, while in the rest of the
country armed groups continued to exercise undisputed control. Partly as a way to address the enduing
fragmentation of the country, the international community’s attention for decentralisation grew over time.
The period from the Bonn Conference to the adoption of the Constitution in 2004 was one of intense
debate over which type of state structure would best accommodate the needs and priorities of the Afghani
citizens. Generally speaking, international advisors were more inclined towards a decentralized system,
while Afghan policy-makers and scholars were wary of the centrifugal forces that such a solution might
unleash. In the end, the 2004 Constitution reaffirmed the “unitary and indivisible” character of the Afghan
State. Article 137 provided that, while preserving the principle of centralism, the state “shall delegate certain
authorities to local administration units for the purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social, and
cultural affairs, and increasing the participation of people in the development of the nation”. The rationale
for the constitutional drafters was that Afghan ills depended, in large part, from the contraposition of a weak
center and a “powerful, unaccountable, corrupt and fragmented periphery” (Reynolds 2007:44).
However, the legal and policy frameworks for decentralisation remain vague and undefined.
Afghanistan is today divided in 34 provinces, but at the sub-provincial level the situation is very confused.
There are not even firm figures as to the number of districts and municipalities, with estimates that vary from
Ministry to Ministry. The constitutionally-mandated centralised structure is belied by the reality on the
ground, where many areas are outside the reach of the Kabul government and its Western allies. De facto
states continue to exist in most of the country, controlled by local strongmen, whose power basis is rooted in
military strength and opium trade. The growing Taliban-led insurgency represents the most serious, albeit
not the only, threat to the central government. 27
Decentralization in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Almost four time the size of Afghanistan, and with more than double of the population, the DRC has been
metaphorically compared to a vast doughnut – almost all ‘borderland’, “with populations and productive
resources clustered around its edges and borders and looking outwards while the middle of the territory is
covered with dense rainforest” (Jackson 2006). In a country the size of Western Europe with only 600 km of
paved roads, where the distance between the capital Kinshasa and the border city of Goma is equal to that
between London and Sarajevo, it is impossible to overstate the importance of looking at center-periphery
relations as a key dimension of post-conflict recovery.
During the Mobutu’s regime (1965-1997), the Congolese State was characterized by a strong
concentration of power at the national level. Some mild attempts at decentralisation were made in the 1980s,
without fundamentally changing the situation. Like in the case of Afghanistan, however, the actual control of
the state was extremely weak outside the capital. In the villages, the state did not exist, neither as a provider
27 On decentralization in Afghanistan, see Mullen 2007:75-84, as well as Wilder and Lister 2007:85-101.
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of social services nor as a law enforcer. For the vast majority of the Congolese population living outside
large urban centers, traditional chiefs were the only authorities that they even knew. Similarly to what
happened in Afghanistan, the two Congo wars 28 substantially changed the nature of local power: warlords
and local strongmen substituted local chiefs – or, in some cases, armed militias co-opted local chiefs, or
appointed chiefs loyal to them, fundamentally altering the nature of traditional power.
Unlike what happened in Afghanistan, the 2006 Congolese Constitution established decentralisation
as a key organizing principle of governance. It increased the number of provinces from eleven to twentyfive,
and gave provinces and sub-provincial entities increased political weight and a stronger role in
territorial management, through an extensive series of exclusive and shared competencies. Today,
decentralisation is a priority for all the donors engaged in governance and recovery interventions in the DRC.
In spite of this support, however, the situation continues to be marked by a sharp divergence – if not outright
contradiction - between legal texts and reality on the ground. In the Eastern part of the country, particularly
in the provinces of North and South Kivu, de facto administrative structures controlled by armed groups
persist, unaltered by legal changes, and self-financed by the exploitation of natural resources. 29
Decentralisation in Kosovo
At first sight, and given the small territorial size (10,908 km2), with a population equivalent to that of a
medium-sized European city, the question of decentralisation might seem less relevant in Kosovo, Indeed,
Kosovo is smaller than most individual provinces of Afghanistan and the DRC. In reality, however,
decentralisation is probably the most important political issue for the future of Kosovo, and has become a
byword for ‘minority protection’, as the United Nations and other international actors seek ways to bring the
Kosovar Serb (K-Serb) population back into public life.
From 1999 to 2008, Kosovo has been in a regime of quasi-trusteeship under the framework of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Many of the
Serbs living in Kosovo until 1999 left as the Yugoslav army withdrew, and those who stayed concentrated
north of the Ibar river, as well as in other scattered enclaves. Parallel administrations were created, with the
determinant support of the Belgrade government. As the international community embarked in peace- and
state-building, participation of K-Serbs became a crucial issue for the legitimacy of the new institutions.
It was against this backdrop that the idea of decentralisation was first put on the table - starting with
the UNMIK regulation 2000/45 (“On the self-government of Municipalities in Kosovo”) and continuing with
the 2001 Constitutional Framework. While the nascent local institutions achieved some progress in a number
28 The first Congo War (1996-1997) saw the fall of President Mobutu, replaced by Laurent Kabila, who was supported by Rwanda
and Uganda. The second Congo War (1998-2002) started as Kabila tried to shake himself free of the influence of his political
godfathers in Kigali and Kampala, and is often dubben the “First Africa World War” for the high number of countries involved. The
signing of a peace agreement in 2002 did not end violence in the Eastern part of the country, which continues to be unstable to this
day.
29 On decentralisation in the DRC, see Alemann 2009.
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of areas, the integration of the Serbian minority continued to be a challenge. K-Serbs did not participate in
the municipal and parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2001 (nor in the subsequent electoral rounds of 2004
and 2007) – instead, they organized their own elections in the municipalities that they controlled. Violent
clashes between the two communities in 2004 brought the problem of coexistence back to the forefront of
international attention.
UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s Plan, presented on 2 February 2007, put decentralisation at the
forefront, in order “to address the legitimate concerns of the Kosovo Serb and other Communities that are
not in the majority in Kosovo and their members, encourage and ensure their active participation in public
life” (Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement 2007: Annex 2). The plan included the
expansion of Serb-majority municipalities, along with the creation of new ones, with extended competencies
and the right to create networks among them. It also proposed the transfer of resources to municipalities
through grants, along with the possibility to continue to receive support from Belgrade. Additional
Parliamentary seats were foreseen for K-Serbs, together with double-majority rules to prevent K-Albanians
from imposing their majority on questions of vital interest. Finally, the Plan envisaged special protection
zones and prerogatives for the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. In short, decentralisation was used as
the main tool to guarantee multi-ethicity of Kosovo, and to facilitate future coexistence and equity.
The proposal encountered the opposition of the Albanian majority, not only because it run contrary
to the objective of achieving state ‘functionality’, but also because it was seen as a step towards further
‘enclavisation’ and entrenchment of ethnic divisions. The proposals were also rejected, predictably, by
Belgrade, and, at least initially, by most of the K-Serb population. Following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration
of independence on 17 February 2008, many of the elements of the Plan have made their way into
legislation. However, participation of Serbs to Kosovo’s civilian life remains very low, as demonstrated
recently by the municipal elections in November 2009.
4.1.4. Decentralisation and post-conflict peacebuilding: conceptualizing the linkages
The cases of Kosovo, DRC and Afghanistan show how decentralisation in post-conflict settings should be
understood as an inherently political process, as fraught with risks as it is endowed with possibilities.
Decentralisation can serve as a compromise to maintain the unity of the country while allowing for diversity,
and to share resources and decision-making power among former belligerents (and their constituencies).
However, the three case-studies also call for great caution in trying to apply lessons from decentralisation ‘in
normal circumstances’ to post-conflict settings. After a civil conflict, the legitimacy of the government is
typically low, and social dynamics between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ have been fundamentally altered.
Centrifugal forces unleashed by decentralisation reforms can further weaken the role of the central
government at this critical juncture.
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Finding a context-specific solution is therefore crucial. However, whatever model is selected, postconflict
settings are bound to present serious implementation challenges. The comparison between
Afghanistan and the DRC is illustrative in this regard. With all their differences, there are important parallels
between the two situations. In both cases, there was a strong centralised tradition, along with very traditional,
decentralised societal structures. In both cases, the power of the capital cities never extended on the whole
territory, and local-level authority had long been exercised by traditional authorities Furthermore, in both
cases the war fundamentally changed the form of authority at the local level, substituting traditional leaders
with warlords and other strongmen. And finally, in both cases the ‘central vs. local’ question was a
fundamental theme of political debate during the transition period.
In spite of these similarities, the models ultimately adopted in the two cases differed sharply, to the
point that they can be considered almost at the two extreme ends of the centralisation-decentralisation
continuum. In Afghanistan, the principle of centralism was retained, essentially as an antidote against the
power of local warlords, and the openings to decentralisation were extremely limited; in the DRC, instead,
the Constitution strongly opted for a decentralised system of governance, foreseeing substantial powers and
resources for provinces and sub-provincial entities. In both cases, however, local parallel powers continue to
exist, unaffected by the Constitutional provisions. This is not to suggest that the ‘model’ chosen does not
matter – far from it: a large-based consensus about the model to be adopted is essential. However, in the
short- and medium-term the imperative of re-establishing the authority of the state on the whole territory is
paramount, irrespective of the model.
In societies characterised by ethnic, religious, linguistic and/or cultural diversity, decentralisation can
certainly play a positive role by giving minorities space and voice at the local level. This was the
fundamental intention behind the Ahtisaari Plan in Kosovo. However, this is not without risks, as it can
validate and cement particularism and ‘enclavisation’. In the Balkans, the peacebuilding strategies of the
international community have been particularly criticized for their tendency to ‘territorialize ethnicity’. A
particularly critical observer defined decentralisation as the “new delusions of international conflict
regulations” noting that “decentralisation seems to have become a ‘one size fits all’ device by the
international community to ‘freeze’ ethnic conflicts and to escape their responsibility in dealing with the
sources of the conflict, in effect allowing tensions to brew and potentially making the situation worse…
Decentralisation as exercised in post-ethnic conflict regulation enhances ethnic entrenchment rather than
fostering appeasement through democratisation” (Monteux, 2006: 162-163).
At the macro level, a decentralized structure opens up new opportunities for cooperation, and
different local entities can form mutually beneficial associations and networks. In principle, decentralisation
can also counter-act autonomy movements fighting for secession. Indeed, “the use of economic and political
decentralisation as a means for quelling unrest within regions with separatist aspirations has been both a
common theoretical prescription and a policy strategy for states in the post-Cold War period” (Barron and
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Clark 2006:1). However, this strategy is not necessarily successful, as shown by the fact that secessionist
movements continue to thrive in some decentralized states. Decentralisation can in fact strengthen ethnic,
regional or communal identities vis-à-vis the national identity, de facto reinforcing secessionist claims.
The drawing of borders between local units of government can upset the balance of minorities and
majorities, and the redistribution of power that comes with decentralisation can lead to bring to the surface
latent conflicts, or create new sources of tensions, often worsened by a perception that the central
government is forfeiting its arbitrary role. Decentralisation can cement local ethnic majorities and lead to
local despotism, further worsening the marginalisation of local minorities. Local dominant groups with
‘extreme’ preferences may win the vote and implement policies that harm the well-being of other groups.
This has been expressed as a particular concern in the DRC, where a higher degree of decentralisation might
potentially worsen the situation of the Rwandophone minority (both Hutu and Tutsi), whose Congolese
credentials continue to be disputed although many of them have lived in Congo for generations.
Depending on how it is carried out, decentralisation can either increase or decrease redistribution
between ‘resource-rich’ and ‘resource-poor’ regions, thus widening regional disparities in the provision of
public services, unless balanced by central equalisation schemes. This disparity of resources might also be a
potential source of conflict. In the DRC, for example, the Constitution called for the establishment of an
Equalizing Fund (Caisse National de Pérequation), with the aim of ensuring national solidarity and
redressing the significant development disparities among local authorities. The process of implementing this
provision has been, however, slow and stumbling, and the law that should define the specific organization
and functioning modalities of this body has not yet been adopted. The criteria of allocation among provinces,
in the absence of the Equalization Fund, remain unknown and seemingly arbitrary.
4.1.5. Conclusions: key implications for MSPs in post-conflict settings
As a development mantra, decentralisation raises more questions than it answers. Supporters and critics alike
recognise that the empirical evidence for their claims is flimsy, and discussions on pros and cons remain
largely anecdotic. Reforms to transfer power and responsibilities at the local level are not a panacea – they
are just a possible tool for poverty reduction, good governance and peacebuidling. In order for
decentralisation to have a virtuous effect on people’s life (which is the only ultimate measure of success) it is
necessary that reforms are well designed, consistently implemented, and backed with political will and
appropriate resources. This is often not the case, as the increasing disillusionment of citizens in many parts of
the world shows.
The prospects for MSPs in post-conflict environments are deeply influenced by the distribution of
power between centre and periphery. Given the popularity of decentralisation reforms in developing
countries, it is highly probable that some sort of reform in this sense will be underway in places where the
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EU engages in MSP. This calls for caution and reflection, as MSPs can have an impact (positive or negative)
on these reforms, whether donors are aware of this impact or not.
Decentralisation leads to a proliferation of the actors that can potentially be involved in MSPs: not
only the central government, but also local elected authorities, as well as other types of actors (for example
civil society, private sector, traditional authorities) that may, depending on the context, have a stake in the
process. This makes it more difficult for donors to decipher the situation and identify appropriate partners –
but at the same time it further emphasizes the need to have an in-depth understanding of roles,
responsibilities, and power dynamics.
In post-conflict settings, the influence of donors is typically higher than in ‘normal’ situations.
Donors’ strategies and modus operandi can significantly influence the dialectic between central and local
authorities, and contribute to shaping the overall configuration of the country’s governance system. In spite
of this significant responsibility, donors often enter the scene with relatively little understanding of the
complex realities of power distribution and socio-political realities on the ground. This influence/knowledge
gap bears a significant risk of unintentionally ‘doing harm’ - for example, by sending contradictory
messages, weakening citizens’ trust in the transparency and effectiveness of ongoing reforms, or even
unintentionally reinforcing spoilers vis-à-vis legitimate actors.
The imperative to understand the situation of central/local distribution of power is incumbent upon
all external actors, whether they are directly supporting decentralisation processes or not. To minimize the
risk of ‘doing harm’, it is important for donors to be aware of a number of challenges that typically emerge,
particularly in post-conflict situations.
First, donors should be aware that the situation of decentralisation ‘on <strong>paper</strong>’ often diverges significantly
from the actual situation on the ground. The fact that certain functions and tasks have been formally
decentralised does not necessarily mean that the necessary capacities and resources are actually present at the
local level. Indeed, recent research points to a blatant gap between the responsibilities and tasks assigned to
local government entities (through political and administrative decentralisation) and the means to perform
those roles (related to fiscal decentralisation). In many cases, local authorities have found themselves starved
of the necessary resources for service delivery to citizens.
The availability of financial resources is a critical determinant of whether decentralisation will have
a pro-poor outcome – in other words, it is essential to have a ‘match’ between the functions and funding. The
problem is often that the overall amount of resources devoted to social services decreases at the same time as
the decentralisation process takes place. Indeed, decentralisation is financially attractive to national
governments also because part of the burden of financing social services can be shifted to sub-national units
(Robinson 2003). In other words, often governments decentralise (and are encouraged to decentralise) on the
mistaken assumption that this will serve to ‘save money’. There is no evidence to support this assumption –
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if anything, keeping the level of social services delivered stable, decentralisation may actually increase
expenditures because it leads to increased overhead and a temporary fall in efficiency. This point is
particularly crucial in post-conflict settings, in which service delivery needs not only to be ‘maintained’ or
‘improved’, but (re)constructed altogether.
Second, donors should avoid a rhetorical endorsement of the supposed benefits of decentralisation in terms
of citizens’ empowerment, and rather take a honest look at the actual situation on the ground. Evidence to
date points to a worrisome disillusionment of citizens regarding the ability of local governments to actually
deliver on promises. Decentralisation reforms – and the rhetoric of ownership and participation
accompanying them – have raised expectations of the population above what local governments can
realistically deliver, particularly in terms of service provisions. This frustration can have violent outcomes,
further impeding the process of local development. Donors should therefore avoid building a discourse that
establishes virtuous automatisms, and recognize that decentralisation – while a precious instrument for
achieving the goals of democratic governance, poverty reduction, and peacebuilding – is not substitute for a
range of other interventions, and, most importantly, for political will.
Third, donors should be clear (and explicit) as to what ‘decentralisation’ means for them. By many actors,
the term ‘decentralisation’ is used in a very broad sense, including not only the delegation of power and
responsibility to local level governments, but also the outsourcing of functions and tasks to private and nonprofit
actors. However, the issues raised by privatisation are very different from those raised by
decentralisation in a more narrow sense. Lumping the two together, or considering one to be the necessary
consequence of the other, is analytically incorrect and raises serious operational challenges.
This last point has a particularly strong relevance for MSPs. Actors involved in MSPs find
themselves on the ground, interacting with a wide array of local actors. MSPs typically involve an infusion
of resources in resource-starved environments, which can offer incentives and disincentives for
decentralisation reforms. For example, it might be simpler and more straightforward for donors to interact
primarily with local non-governmental entities. While these choices might be motivated by legitimate
concerns of effectiveness and efficiency, they also run the risk of weakening local authorities, making them
appear increasingly irrelevant in the eyes of common citizens.
Ultimately, in post-conflict settings ‘decentralisation’ might be a misnomer for ‘reconstructing the
state from the bottom-up’. Contrary to ‘normal’ circumstances, there might be very little to decentralise, as
the power, authority, functions and resources might not actually be with the central government in the first
place. In countries like Afghanistan and DRC, ‘decentralisation’ might mean the first actual encounter of part
of the population with the state – and should be planned and implemented accordingly.
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4.1.6. Bibliography
Alemann, C, 2009, “Democratic Republic of Congo”, in The Contribution of Decentralized Governance to
Development and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa - Learning from past experience to enhance future
support, a Report prepared by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna for the Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Pisa/Rome, unpublished draft.
Barron, P and Clark, S, 2006, Decentralizing Inequality? Center-Periphery Relations, Local Governance,
and Conflict in Aceh, World Bank Social Development Papers, No. 39, The World Bank, Washington,
DC.
Bonfiglioli, A, 2003, Empowering the Poor: Local Governance for Poverty Reduction, United Nations
Capital Development Fund.
Byrne, S and Schnyder, M, 2005, Gender and Decentralized Governance, Report for the Swiss Agency of
Development Cooperation.
Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement, 2 February 2007, available at:
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html.
European Commission, 2007, Supporting Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries,
European Commission: EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Brussels.
Farrant, M and Clarke, J, 2002, PRSPs in Decentralized Government Systems, Draft report, DFID, London.
Jackson, S, 2006, “Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from the DR Congo”,
Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 6, No. 3 : 425 – 447.
Marysse, SL, 2005, “Decentralisation Issues in Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)”, in
Marysse SL and Reyntjens F (ed. by), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2004-2005, L’Harmattan,
Paris, pp. 187-208.
Monteux, C.A., 2006, “Decentralisation: The New Delusion of Ethnic Conflict Regulation?”, International
Journal on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 8, no.2:162-163.
Mullen, R.D., “Centralization and Decentralisation: the Importance of Sequencing and Timing”, in
Danspeckgruber, D (ed.), Building State and Security in Afghanistan, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
OECD, 2004, Lessons Learned in Donors’ Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee, Paris.
Reynolds, A, 2007, “Constitutional Engineering and Democratic Stability The Debate Surrounding the
Crafting of Political Institutions in Afghanistan”, in Danspeckgruber, D (ed.), Building State and
Security in Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 44.
Robinson, M, 2003, Participation, Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery, Paper presented at
the workshop on New Approaches on Decentralized Service Delivery, Santiago, 16-20 March.
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Tranchant, JP, 2007, Decentralisation and Ethnic Conflict: the role of empowerment, CERDI- CNRS,
Universite’ d’Auvergne.
UNDP, 2004, Decentralized Governance for Development: A Combined Practice Note on Decentralisation,
Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development, UNDP: Bureau for Development Policy, New York,
NY.
UNDP, 2007, Towards a Local Governance and Development Agenda, DGP-Net E-Discussion:
Consolidated Reply, United Nations Development Programme: Bureau for Development Policy, New
York, NY.
Varennes, Fd, 2003, “Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts: a Comparative Analysis of Contents and
Approaches”, in Darby, J and Mac Ginty, R (eds), Contemporary Peace Making. Conflict, Violence and
Peace Processes, Palgrave Macmillian, London.
Wilder, A and Lister, S, 2007, State-Building at the Subnational Level in Afghanistan: a Missed
Opportunity, in Danspeckgruber, D (ed.), Building State and Security in Afghanistan, Princeton
University Press, Princeton: 85-101.
World Bank, 2000, World Development Report, The World Bank, Washington DC.
World Bank, 2008, Decentralisation in Client Countries: an evaluation of World Bank’s support, 1990-2007,
The World Bank: Independent Evaluation Group, Washington DC.
4.2. Multi-Sectorial Approach and Involvement of Non-State Actors in Partnerships
By Kateryna Pishchikova (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
The aim of this subchapter is to put the multisectorial approach to governance, which is particularly
embodied in multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs), in the context of post-conflict reconstruction processes
and imperatives, especially with respect to promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships by their composition and mode of operation represent particularly promising
mechanisms in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction. First, we give a brief overview of the
partnership approach to post-conflict reconstruction. We then look in greater detail at potential roles that
each type of actor - public, private, and civic - can have in MSPs, at different modalities of interactions
between these actors and at the impact they can have on the two dimensions of democracy and good
governance that have been outlined in Section 2 of Chapter C in the present report (“input” and “output”
legitimacy). We conclude by putting forward a number of relevant critical remarks.
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4.2.1. Overview: partnerships in post-conflict
As highlighted in other MULTIPART documents 30 , during the 1990s one could observe a rise of partnership
approach across the board involving policy-making at different levels and in different geographical contexts
(Martens, 2007; Zammit, 2003). Partnership became a new framework for development aid and later for
post-conflict reconstruction. The need for partnerships is increasingly recognised by more and more actors,
according to a survey conducted by the Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative in 2004 over 90% of
companies surveyed felt that “partnerships between business, government, and civil society would play
either a major role or some role in addressing key development challenges” (World Economic Forum, 2005:
5).
One could also trace this tendency in a number of DAC documents, such as “Development
Partnerships in the New Global Context” written back in 1996. A more recent DAC policy statement “Rising
to the Global Challenge: Partnership for Reducing World Poverty” highlights that “developing countries […]
should integrate economic, social, environmental and governance concerns within a comprehensive approach
to development at the country level. We pledge to help them meet this challenge, in partnership with civil
society, the private sector, and multilateral institutions”(Development Assistance Committee, 2001: 1).
In post-conflict settings, strategic partnerships between government, private sector, and civil society
are seen as critical to successful post-conflict reconstruction and prevention of relapse into violent conflict.
Post-conflict reconstruction is believed to be
beyond the capacity of governments alone […] by its very nature, post conflict
reconstruction measures demand a concerted effort from all concerned to ensure that the
process succeeds. […] other stakeholders such as the private sector and civil society can
complement the weak capacity of a ‘conflict-weary’ state through the unique comparative
advantages that they wield. […] Although government efforts are critical in addressing
post-conflict reconstruction, they are not sufficient in dealing with the challenges
(Committee on Human Development and Civil Society, 2003: 1-2).
The numerous challenges of post-conflict reconstruction entail the need to address both sides of
good governance – efficiency and effectiveness of the governance process (“output legitimacy”) as well as
empowerment, participation, and broad democratisation (“input legitimacy”). On the one hand, rebuilding
credible and effective institutions at all levels – from national to local – is key to addressing such core issues
as repairing infrastructure, delivering basic services, restoration of the economy and disarmament. On the
other hand, government institutions have to regain legitimacy by gaining the trust of all groups, ensuring the
respect for basic human rights, and by creating arenas for fruitful dialogue and partnerships between all
stakeholders in the reconstruction, thus, rebuilding bridges of communication between different groups and
promoting participation in political life. Overall, MSPs can lead to an enabling development context, higher
quality and more sustainable social investment (Warner & Sullivan, 2004). Whether or not, such big
30 See for example, MULTIPART, 2008.
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promises are fulfilled is a highly debated issue. In the last section we address some of the most relevant
criticisms
4.2.2. Multi-stakeholder partnerships: potential contribution to democracy, good governance,
and the rule of law
“When the sum of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” a number of “synergistic rewards” are
believed to have been attained. Such synergistic rewards are claimed to be an added value of multistakeholder
partnerships as opposed to other collaborative or partnership forms (Huxham, 1996). These
synergistic rewards arise from combining different resources, perspectives, and skills of actors that belong to
different sectors in a given society – public, private, or civic (Brinkerhoff, 2002). The main assumption is
that each sector has core competences and resources that can and should be pooled together in order to
resolve important societal issues, especially in resource poor and institutionally weak settings. Each sector is
expected to bring in different competences, aspirations, and styles of behaviour.
Below we provide a brief overview of the comparative advantages of each type of actors involved in
MSPs with respect to promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. Building on the
theoretical framework presented in Section 2 of Chapter C, we discuss the potential role of each type of actor
for 1) ensuring good governance and “output” legitimacy and for 2) democracy, participation, and “input”
legitimacy. For example, businesses are expected to contribute to the creation of goods and services, create
employment opportunities and economic growth, while the state is supposed to create the framework for
ensuring economic, political, and social rights, and civil society is focused on social development and the
creation of opportunities for individual growth, with the provision of support and services for those excluded
from the mainstream (Tennyson, 2004). The expected synergies in MSPs are supposed to create benefits for
each partner. The government can attain increased legitimacy of public office, aligned social policy, and
more visible revenue generation. Businesses, especially international ones, have better risk mitigation, a
social licence to operate, and the general enhancement of corporate reputation (Warner & Sullivan, 2004).
successful, as
In situations of post-conflict it is argued that governments have a key role to play for MSPs to be
it is the state that should provide the broad framework within which all actors must operate
and which will define the general developmental thrusts of the country […] a primary
function of the state is to manage the reconstruction process through national authorities or
mechanisms, and through provincial and/or local channels and security forces. […]
governments have a responsibility to proactively build peace by establishing a political
structure that is transparent, representational, and most importantly, interactive” (Committee
on Human Development and Civil Society, 2003: 6).
Below, we look in greater detail at the interactions between public and private actors as well as at the
involvement of civic actors, both domestic and international ones.
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Public – Private Partnerships
The role that business can play in promoting development is stated eloquently in the following quote from a
recent joint statement by the World Economic Forum signed by CEOs and chairmen of over 40 companies
under the auspices of its Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative:
The opportunity to leverage business activity to create sustainable economic growth has
never been greater. Today, the business community recognises, as never before, the essential
imperative to deliver economic growth that marshals natural resources, spreads the fruits of
the global economy, and contributes to fair and equitable social development (World
Economic Forum, 2008: 6).
Partnerships between the state and business are mostly seen as contributing to good governance and
output legitimacy and their aims can be summarised as contributing to the following functions:
fair and efficient workings of traditional public functions, including setting and enforcing
rules and regulations, delivery of public goods, development of guidelines for the smooth
working of global trade, operating principles for public-private partnerships (PPPs) and
additional means of promoting collaborative solutions to public questions (World Economic
Forum, 2008: 6).
Governments are expected to create enabling regulatory frameworks for private investment and
partnerships, especially by ensuring the rule of law, tackling corruption and cutting down on red tape and
bureaucracy, creating public-private funding mechanisms, engage private sector leaders in policy dialogues
and help them better understand government’s strategic priorities for relevant policy areas by ensuring more
coordinated and consistent messages from different government ministries and bodies.
Even though the number of companies engaged in MSPs remains relatively small, there is evidence
that such partnerships are increasing in number and scope. The benefits for private actors are believed to be,
among other things: investing in a sound and secure operating environment, meeting “host” government’s
requirements, attracting and motivating talented employees, developing new products and services or
entering untapped markets (World Economic Forum, 2005).
Public-private partnerships have been criticised for weakening state regulation and public institutions
as the state gives up on its primary responsibilities such as provision for basic health or education services.
“Historically, progress associated with corporate social and environmental responsibility has been driven, to
a large extent, by state regulation, collective bargaining and civil society activism. Increasing reliance on
voluntary initiatives may be undermining these drivers of corporate responsibility.” (Utting, 2000). There is
also a risk that corporations push too hard on deregulation, privatisation or overall dismantling of public
services skewing thus local priorities towards big business goals and objectives. Moreover, corporations can
be legitimised through partnerships also with respect to those parts of civil society that are not formally
included in a given MSP, such as for example trade unions or critical civic groups (Richter, 2002; Rundall,
2000; Utting, 2000)
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In post-conflict settings, where government institutions are weak or non-existent, questions about the
strength and legitimacy of the government both as a stakeholder and as an authority with regulatory or
facilitating powers are extremely important. Moreover, the explosive growth of MSPs can lead to isolated
solutions, which are poorly coordinated and contribute to institutional weakening of formal governance
structures and hinder comprehensive governance strategies. In such settings, governments can escape
responsibility and MSPs could become replacements rather than complementary processes (Martens, 2007).
NGOs and Private Sector
“NGOs have a monopoly on principles, while companies on profits […] today the focus is increasingly on
the intrinsic links between principles and profits” (INTRAC, 2005). NGOs and the private sector are
increasingly pushed to working together. NGOs worldwide are forced to work with corporations as “the
welfare state is giving way to business welfare” (INTRAC, 2000: 1). On the other hand, businesses are
becoming increasingly aware of the need to contribute to local development in sustainable ways and to
establish dialogues with local communities and civic actors. They also feel strong pressure from big
international NGOs who have been pushing for corporate responsibility for some time now. This is a huge
step forward as historically, the two sectors had a lot of mutual animosity and were believed to have
mutually incompatible goals. Even though a lot of scepticism remains on both sides, they have now
embarked on a new enterprise of sharing expertise, resources, and agendas.
These new partnerships entail a number of risks and benefits for both sides. Nowadays, companies
have to conform to the new stakeholder culture, where public image and reputation count a lot. Consultation
and collaboration with NGOs provide obvious gains in this respect. Nonetheless, there are also risks of
exposure towards historic enemies critical of corporate practices and proficient in aggressive campaigning.
In fact, NGOs have a lot to lose from entering in partnerships with businesses and especially with big
multinationals. NGOs rely tremendously on public trust as it is commonly assumed that their “competitive
advantage” lies in promoting principled ideas and safeguarding moral principles. To maintain credibility and
support, they have to retain a critical position vis-à-vis business actors, even within the same partnership.
Overall, private and civic actors are mostly linked through a funding relationship with rare cases of fuller
engagement towards both internal company identity changes and better dialogue with local communities.
NGOs have to face a number of challenges, such as co-option, adaptation to different working styles,
confrontation with other more militant NGOs, suspicions from the part of the public and supporters, and
depolitisation. Also, businesses have to adapt to different work culture typical of NGOs who tend to be less
structured and have different focuses and time frames. NGOs may also show little sensitivity to
considerations of profitability and economics of business that crucial to businesses (INTRAC, 2000).
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The Role of Civic Actors
Civic actors are believed to be essential for peacebuilding processes. As stated by the Carnegie Commission
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, NGOs have the flexibility, expertise, and commitment to respond rapidly, to
give voice, and to provide essential services and aid and thus, to contribute to the prevention and
transformation of conflict. In other words, there are few things civic organisations cannot do both before and
in the immediate aftermath of a violent conflict.
Specifically peacebuilding roles attributed to civil society include four main areas: 1) dialogue, 2)
diplomacy (track II and III), 3) early warning, and 4) advocacy. Civic organisations are believed to be
capable of offering non-violent avenues for dialogue and for promoting the culture of reconciliation. Civil
society is seen as crucial in track II diplomacy, i.e. informal interaction with influential unofficial actors from
civil society as well as business or local community leaders, and track III diplomacy, i.e. people-to-people
diplomacy oriented towards communities otherwise marginalised from political power centres (Scuola
Superiore Sant'Anna, 2007). Domestic and international NGOs tend to take on different peacebuilding roles,
with domestic ones being crucial for dialogue and early warning due to their local knowledge and presence,
while the international ones are particularly well placed to undertake advocacy and to facilitate diplomacy.
Partnerships between domestic and international NGOs should not be taken for granted and as it has
been shown, represent a number of challenges for those NGOs. No doubt, international NGOs benefit from
increasing the local ownership and outreach of their projects, while the domestic ones receive crucial funding
and capacity-building. Nonetheless, many of these partnerships continue to retain a project rather than a
partner focus, thus, working towards piecemeal interventions rather than strategic long-term partnerships. In
fact, one could think of three types of partnerships between NGOs that can be placed on a continuum from
project- to partner- based ones. The first one is based on a funding-only relationship, in which the role of the
international NGO as a donor prevents equality and power sharing with domestic NGOs and pushes domestic
NGOs to adapt to funding processes at the expense of their locally driven priorities, thus distorting their
accountability (from constituencies to donors). The other two are instead based on capacity-building and
trust and as such, imply longer term relationships and higher commitment between international and
domestic NGOs (INTRAC, 2001).
In post-conflict settings, it is believed that civil society can enhance participation and empowerment
in a conflict-sensitive way, thus contributing to the broad democratisation goals and therefore “input
legitimacy”. The concrete tasks of civic actors corresponding to these goals include: channelling and
dissemination of information; advocating norms, values, and standards; encouraging power-sharing among
competing interests; contributing to good governance; providing the means for interaction and confidencebuilding
across the lines that divide parties in conflict; and encouraging and participating in socio-economic
activities aimed at mitigating disparities (Committee on Human Development and Civil Society, 2003: 5).
Involving civil society in MSPs can be seen as one of the elements for creating the culture of participation
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and dialogue, which is in its turn a precondition for democratising decision-making and including a variety
of voices and interests into the governance process.
As argued in Section 2 of Chapter C of the present report, such roles of civil society aimed at
participation, empowerment, and broad democratisation are often in conflict with its service-delivery roles.
NGOs are now responsible for delivering more relief aid than the United Nations, and are often the only
actors working in situations of extreme danger. Often social service delivery is outsourced to NGOs working
in various partnership forms. Most typically, in contexts where government services are scarce or nonexistent,
NGOs play a dominant role both in the funding and delivery of services. They often seek funding,
identify needs, implement, monitor, and evaluate their programs. In cases when governments do have a more
proactive role in service delivery (a so-called “dual model” of NGO-government partnerships), NGOs tend to
give priority to the communities that are marginalised, thus filling the gaps left by the government. Once the
post-conflict situation is more stable, certain institutional structures can be put in place that render the
partnership between NGOs and government institutions more collaborative (Makuwira, 2006: 112).
In addition, civic organisations have been praised for contributing to the rapid re-establishment of
income earning activities; identification and implementation of quick impact micro-projects; and capacitybuilding
activities that can quickly ensure the re-integration of ex-combatants, refugees, and displaced
persons into their communities (UNECA, 1999). Obviously, this report does not want to argue that civic
actors should not perform these crucial roles but rather we would like to stress, just as we argued elsewhere,
that such activities of civic organisations should be seen as temporary “relief” solutions rather than a
substitute to broad government-led socio-economic reconstruction (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, 2007).
4.2.3. MSPs for democracy and good governance: a critical view
MSPs face a number of challenges both internally as well as in terms of their broader impact. Moreover, a
number of criticisms question the relevance of such endeavours as a whole. Below we address some of the
most relevant critiques.
Problematic role of the donor in partnerships – in developing and post-conflict settings donors are
almost always members of the MSP and in the majority of cases its main initiators. Even though domestic
actors are given the role of partners, donors still maintain a dominant position of power through practices of
selectivity and continued conditionality, which some radical authors labelled as post-colonialism in a new
guise – rendering therefore donor-recipient relations more ambiguous than ever (Mercer, 2003; Slater &
Bell, 2002). Indeed, MSPs pose a number of operational risks, such as loss of autonomy, conflicts of interest,
reputational impact, implementation challenges, implications for the investment of resources and time.
(Tennyson, 2004: 10).
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In fact, the MULTIPART project has initially followed a “sectorial” logic of division between
different types of actors without explicitly acknowledging the role of donors. This has been later amended by
a recognition that it is important to distinguish between international public and domestic public,
international civic and domestic civic, as well as international businesses and domestic private.
One of the recommendations on improving the functioning of MSPs, in fact, gives a clue as to why
donor-driven partnerships manage to attain very few “synergistic rewards”. In his report drawing on the
work of colleagues involved in the IBLF/University of Cambridge Programme for Industry Post-graduate
Certificate in Cross-Sector Partnerships (PCCP) programme, Caplan stresses that cross-sector partnerships
can only overcome the challenges of bringing together very disparate groups with diverging styles and
priorities if the outputs and outcomes of a given initiative are critical to each organization as well as to the
beneficiaries. In his words, “if a ‘business’ case for each partner (more broadly than in strict financial terms)
cannot be made convincingly, then forget it” (Caplan, 2003: 35). However, if indeed the necessary
precautions are taken, we remain optimistic that the common and individual benefits for partnership
engagement should outweigh these concerns.
The partnerships have been criticised as pure rhetoric.
It is argued that the power divide between
international and domestic actors is stronger than any “sectorial” division (or complementarity?) that is
supposed to be a defining characteristic of MSPs. The quote below is exemplary of such critique:
Donors and international NGOs have cherry-picked a handful of elite NGOs which become
further professionalised and disciplined in the process of policy reform, while the majority of
NGOs are excluded due to their perceived “weakness”. Those NGOs that deviate from the
main script also find themselves sidelined. They are unable to act as equal partners in a
governance structure in which power relations are skewed towards an international elite of
development professionals spread across government, donors, IFIs, and international NGOs
(Mercer, 2003: 759).
In general, many scholars are critical of the largely rhetorical and instrumental use of ”partnership”
by international actors - decision-making bodies are constructed in a manner which ensures that the reform
agenda of international agencies remains relatively unchallenged, the notions of “partnership” and ”local
ownership” simultaneously disguise and legitimise the interventions of international agencies in domestic
reform processes, serving to mystify power asymmetry (Crawford, 2003).
Despite its seemingly technical nature, these processes can have profoundly political consequences if
different varieties of partnerships take over the decision-making over issues of common interest, as such
arrangements are populated by non-elected actors and are not necessarily representative of different societal
sectors. Indeed there is a risk that such partnerships can become closed, elitist coalitions.
On a more radical end, critics argue that partnerships are little more than conditionality by another
name or even as some post-structuralist scholars have argued, partnerships work not primarily as direct
domination and imposition, but through promises of incorporation and inclusion, they help produce modern,
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self-disciplined citizens and states by enlisting them as responsible agents in their own development.
(Abrahamsen, 2004)
Even if we want to be less dismissive of MSPs, the central question around their utility as well as
their legitimacy remains. As is evident from our brief overview of partnerships between different actors –
public and private, private and civic, and between different NGOs – there are a number of challenges related
to differing styles and purposes of each partner. Does bringing more types of actors into one partnership such
as an MSP resolve at least some of these problems or does it only aggravate them? MULTIPART project
aims at providing some preliminary insights on these issues.
4.2.4. Bibliography
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1453 - 1467.
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Caplan, K. (2003). The Purist’s Partnership: Debunking the Terminology of Partnerships. Partnership
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Committee on Human Development and Civil Society. (2003, 26-27 May, 2003). Countries emerging from
conflict: Lessons on partnerhips in post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Paper
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Crawford, G. (2003). Partnership or Power? Deconstructing the 'Partnership for Governance Reform' in
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Huxham, C. (1996). Creating Collaborative Advantage: SAGE.
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Jenkins & H. Hakena (Eds.), NGOs and Post-Conflict Recovery: The Leitana Nehan Women’s
Development Agency and Peace Building on Bougainville (pp. 105-124). Canberra: Pacific Press.
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Martens, J. (2007). Multistakeholder Partnerships - Future Models of Multilateralism? Dialogue on
Globalization - Occasional <strong>paper</strong>s, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 29(January).
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for CEOs and Boards: World Economic Forum Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative, Business for
Social Responsibility, AccountAbility, Harvard University, IBLF.
Zammit, A. (2003). Development at Risk. Rethinking UN-Business Partnership. Geneva: South Centre and
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
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D. MSP CASE STUDY ANALYSES
This chapter includes a detailed analysis of compositional and operational characteristics of each case study
MSP-DEM and an in-depth analysis of the role of these MSPs-DEM for a given post-conflict society in
general and a more limited discussion of their impact on peacebuilding and Human Security.
1. Kosovo: The Assembly Support Initiative
By Ana Bojinović Fenko (University of Ljubljana)
The Assembly Support Initiative (ASI)
Description
Actors involved
Public:
Private:
Civic:
International:
The primary purpose of the ASI is to strengthen the capacity of the Kosovo
Assembly, with particular emphasis on building professional skills among
parliamentarians, reinforcing the representative function of the MPs, strengthening
relations between the MPs and their constituencies, promoting transparency and
accountability, and exposing Assembly members to the cumulative experience of
older, more established parliamentary democracies.
Kosovo MPs – individuals,
Kosovo parliamentary groups,
Kosovo Assembly Committees,
Kosovo Assembly Presidency,
Kosovo Assembly Secretariat,
Office of Prime Minister,
occasionally also individual Ministries (e.g. Ministries on Public Services and for
Education, Science and Technology).
none
local NGOs dealing with representation of women, environmental affairs,
monitoring of national and municipal parliamentary processes (The Council for
Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms – CDHRF), drafting laws, balanced
media coverage,
journalists covering Assembly affairs,
people of Kosovo enabled to have contact directly with their MPs,
educational/research communities (KIPRED),
Consortium of Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in the Kosovo Assembly,
occasionally: the Kosovo Law Centre and the Kosovo Institute for Public
Administration
the OSCE (OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly),
the National Democratic Institute – NDI (as an implementing partner of the
USAID),
the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in the form of a project: Support
to the Assembly of Kosovo 2003–05 (Consortium of three Parliaments: FRA,
GER and BEL) and Further Support to the Assembly of Kosovo 2006–08
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Ownership
(Consortium of four Parliaments: FRA, GER, BEL and SLO)
the UNDP,
the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
East-West Parliamentary Practice Project,
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNF),
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
International actors clearly dominate in the ASI.
Investment:
Planning:
Decision making:
Implementation:
Issue area
Geographic range
There is no common budget. ASI activities are based upon individual projects of
each partner. ASI had joined projects but with a separate budget.
Since 2004 three levels of co-operation and input on equal terms between
international and national, as well as civic actors emerged:
sharing of information, division of labour and inter-agency co-operation in needs
assessment.
Nature of the ASI partnership: donors – beneficiaries. The co-ordinator’s main
task is to assure that none of the international donors wanted to impose their own
national parliamentary model on Kosovo Assembly. International actors take into
account social minorities (assist the women caucus in the Assembly) and also give
attention to the role and participation of non-majority (ethnic) communities in the
Assembly.
ASI was formed exclusively on the initiative of international actors, who were
already operating in Kosovo the field of democracy promotion. Its task is coordination
of international donors’ agendas for Kosovo Assembly capacitybuilding
whereby local civic actors are also invited into implementation process
(KIPRED, University professors).
Democratisation, good governance, parliamentary democracy capacity-building
Kosovo. Instruments of implementing the main ASI goal include organisation of
events outside Kosovo territory including co-operation of actors from other
nations, e.g. regional parliamentary conferences, (study) visits to national
parliaments or assemblies of international organizations.
Time scale international co-ordination: October 2001 – December 2008
national co-ordination: January 2009 –
Operation & No Memorandum of Understanding or Terms of Reference.
Institutionalization
Regular meetings
Decision structure
- Daily bilateral contacts.
- Informal/internal weekly information meetings with key-partners.
- Regular bilateral consultations with Members of Presidency, Committee
chairpersons and Assembly Secretariat; co-ordination and avoiding
overlap/clashes with Assembly’s work schedules.
- Monthly co-ordination meetings (ASI Consultative Forum) with all ASI
partners, Assembly and the Office of the Prime Minister; discussion of ongoing
programmes and Assembly needs.
- Two-monthly meetings of ASI partners and country liaison offices in
Prishtinë/Priština on the political aspects of ASI programs.
Informal, consensus based decision-making, no formal rules on agenda-setting,
voting etc. ASI co-ordinator assures effective decision-making and different
partners’ interest co-ordination.
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1.1. Introduction to the ASI Case Study
1.1.1. Note on methodology
This case study report draws on the relatively scarce (almost inexistent) publications on the Assembly
Support Initiative (ASI), available only in one Helsinki Monitor article (published by the ASI co-ordinator)
and in ASI-produced Newsletters (28 issues in the period from 2003 to 2008). For this reason the basic
source of information are mainly 23 interview reports prepared by the MULTIPART field researchers in
Kosovo (mainly Priština) in the period from September 2009 to December 2009 (see Annex).
1.1.2. Brief description of the ASI
The primary purpose of the ASI is to strengthen the capacity of the Kosovo Assembly, with particular
emphasis on building professional skills among parliamentarians, reinforcing the representative function of
the MPs, strengthening relations between the MPs and their constituencies, promoting transparency and
accountability, and exposing Assembly members to the cumulative experience of older, more established
parliamentary democracies. In addition, the programme aims to strengthen co-operation within the Assembly
between representatives of different parties and ethnicities, as well as to reinforce co-operation between the
Kosovo MPs and their European counterparts. The long-term overall goal of the ASI is to make the Kosovo
Assembly a stable, functional and productive legislative assembly, as rapidly as possible, operating in
accordance with the rule of law and on behalf of all communities and citizens equally.
Certain risks deriving from the particularly wide range of stakeholders involved in the ASI were well
addressed by co-ordination. The advantage of so many actors created a multitude of relationships and
knowledge, which is particularly important for a young institution of the Assembly and for individual MPs.
The multitude of relations also provides direct policy and political awareness rising regarding Kosovo and
Western Balkans in foreign parliaments that have been connected to the Kosovo parliament through the
ASI. 31 Having a greater number of actors, however, often made consensus more difficult. Decision-making
of the co-ordination of donors’ assistance to Kosovo Assembly took place within the ASI meetings,
described under title 2.7. Decisions were taken by consensus. On the most important decision regarding the
parliamentary model for Kosovo, the national public actor’s opinion prevailed; the Slovenian parliamentary
model was chosen after careful consideration of many different models as an autonomous decision by the
Kosovo Assembly.
The overall relationship among the ASI stakeholders could be described as donors-beneficiaries.
International donors tried to be partners and developed co-ordination in order to work complementary and
avoid duplication. The added value of the ASI as compared to other democratisation programmes, both
31 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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previously existing and current programmes, in case they exist(ed) cannot be determined. One of the
interviewees, however, notes: ‘All national/local actors in Kosovo and Kosovo as a whole depend on
external financial resources! Most of the population lives in poverty and has difficulties finding a proper job.
Donors do not do much to support this main problem although millions of Euros go into Kosovo each year.
ASI is such a small player is this whole lot.’ 32
1.1.3. The context in which ASI operates
Before ASI was formed, there were common complaints from MPs that they were receiving the same
training from several different donors. Co-ordination was clearly needed. ASI was founded on the initiative
of the OSCE mission (representative) in Kosovo, in October 2001, just after the first Parliamentary elections.
ASI supports the Assembly via conferences and training, workshops with the Committees, technical
assistance to the Presidency, Committee chairpersons and individual MPs, working visits to other countries
and parliaments, training for the legislative staff and interpreters of the Assembly. There are three main
international actors who have been supporting the Kosovo Assembly during under the co-ordination
umbrella of the ASI in order to avoid overlap and competition:
- the OSCE Mission in Kosovo
- National Democratic Institute (NDI) with the support of the USAID, and
- the EU (European Agency for Reconstruction – EAR)-funded Consortium of three/four European
parliaments (French, German, Belgian and later also Slovenian).
The ASI approach is based on a system of regular consultation on specific issues of parliamentary support
without a centralized system of imposed decision-making. As a result, co-ordination of the timing of
workshops and conferences helped to avoided conflicting agendas and also achieve division of labour in the
assistance given to the parliament. It has led to the practice that specific projects provide support to specific
parliamentary committees in agreement with other projects and organizations who give assistance to other
parliamentary committees or Assembly administration. The co-ordination approach sometimes had to cope
with differing partners’ interests, whereby two tensions can be exposed:
a) low initial capability of participation by the beneficiary; by this we mean abilities of need assessment
and management of multiplicity of international donors’ programmes by the Kosovo Assembly and
also civil society,
b) conflicting agendas (and sometimes leading personalities) of USAID supported NDI and EAR
supported European Consortium of three/four parliaments
c) OSCE’ role after Kosovo declaration of independence.
32 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
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As a result of good ASI co-ordination, lead by the OSCE representative Franklin de Vrieze (from October
2001 to December 2008), the parliamentary assistance programs for capacity-building were managed more
successfully than they would have ever been if the Kosovo Assembly was to manage them on their own.
Despite achieving all of its main aims and contributing to democratisation, rule of law and good governance,
through the ASI activities Kosovo Assembly has been slowly developing capability to manage co-ordination
of international donors’ programmes on its own. After declaration of independence in February 2008, the
OSCE has become a neutral stakeholder not recognizing the Kosovo independence. The take-over of the ASI
by beneficiaries has taken place in January 2009, the ASI is now co-ordinated by the Assembly Secretary
and Member of Presidency. Despite general positive assessment of the ASI achievements by all actors
involved in the ASI, they mainly identify this take-over as unsuccessful, resulting in a huge drop of the ASI
activities.
1.1.4. Why ASI was selected as a case study
Selection criteria
- multiplicity (diversity) of stakeholders,
- relevant <strong>thematic</strong> area of operation,
- success of the MSP in terms of directly stated goal (Assembly capacity-building) and long-term
contribution to democracy, rule of law and good governance,
- inability to have its mandate taken-over by the beneficiaries,
- influence of the change of the overall political situation of the beneficiaries’ country, strongly
influencing the context of the ASI international actors’ activities (declaration of independence in
February 2008).
Potential significance
The ASI’s contribution to transparency and encouragement of the national ethnic communities to assume
collective responsibility for parliamentary process was high on the agenda and very successful. Despite the
fact that local actors are not intensely involved in the ASI co-ordination (except KIPRED), collective
responsibility was encouraged to become a common sense principle, especially in the case of the
representation of different ethnic groups. The ASI addressed reconciliation efforts within the principles of
non-majority ethnic group representation in the Assembly and also encouraged the empowerment of social
minorities (e.g. women caucus).
As for the ASI’s contribution to increased levels of social trust in newly established state organs, one
of the greatest improvement regarding the relationships between beneficiaries is the fact that the Secretary
General could remain in his position after the change of political majority in the Assembly, which was one of
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the main objectives of the EAR Project: to disconnect the administration authorities from the political
majority and pave the floor for a neutral and impartial civil service inside the Assembly. 33
Since job-creation was not a directly aimed output of the ASI, its contribution to increased working
opportunities and higher levels of income in Kosovo is low. ASI international actors nevertheless do provide
training seminars and have internship programmes (e.g. OSCE Internship programme for assistance to
Parliamentary groups). 34 The consortium of four parliaments particularly supported the drafting of the
Personnel Regulations (dealing with the work of the administration). As a result, there have been
amendments on legal framework regulating the work of civil servants and more favourable conditions were
foreseen for the workers in the administration of the Kosovo Assembly. 35
1.2. The Formation, Development and Operation of the ASI
1.2.1. The formation of ASI
The ASI was formed on the initiative of Franklin de Vrieze, Head of Department for Democratization in the
OSCE Mission in Kosovo since August 2001. The idea of donor co-ordination originated from the OSCE
mission in Kosovo. 36 De Vrieze became the ASI co-ordinator in October 2001 and performed this function
until December 2008. He explains that at the time of the first Kosovo Parliamentary elections in October
2001 he observed that the international community had put a massive amount of resources and money into
the organization of the elections, but that very few of anything was foreseen for what was to happen after the
elections. The only thing which existed was an UNMIK-led task force in terms of assuring the Parliament’s
premises, but in terms of capacity building actually nothing was foreseen. He has therefore advocated a
strategic decision within the OSCE that we would make a shift from political party support to the afterelections
institutional support for the Parliament. After a number of informal discussions with NDI, who also
had a strong political parties programme and had interest to support the Assembly, they together designed a
programme, advocated it to their respective donors (OSCE and the USAID) and agreed on the OSCE and
USAID leadership. This is how the OSCE and NDI then proposed and organised a five day First Induction
Programme for Parliament and the first Introduction seminar for all newly elected Members of the Kosovo
Parliament which took place for one whole week before the Inaugural Session of the Parliament. 37
The initial meeting where the ASI was created was at this First Induction Seminar. The event was
important substantially (all MSs were literally new) and also politically very sensitive, because it was the
first time since the war of 1999 that Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb political representatives were sitting
around the table at the same time, for a period of five days as representatives of the same (and not parallel)
33 Interview with Hugues de Courtivron.
34 ASI newsletter (2006, no. 25), p. 20; ASI newsletter (2008, no. 31), p. 16.
35 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
36 Interview with Nora Fargasc.
37 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
107

institution. This is why participation of UNMIK police and special units’ protection was crucial; they
provided the security assurances. The UNMIK political office was a very important player in the beginning,
in the sense that they gave their support however mainly only through the OSCE. The success of the
Induction programme gave ASI the credibility and afterwards other actors started to have an interest in
working with the parliament. The initial partners invited them to join this co-operation, whereby the first to
join were Friedrich Ebert and Naumann Stiftung, which had an office and representation in Priština on the
ground and then later on also Konrad Adenauer Stiftung joined. Afterwards, UNDP joined with a very
specific project on IT support and then at a certain moment European Commission also decided that they
wanted to provide support to the Parliament and issued a tender for a consortium of three EU parliaments. In
the very beginning the idea was only to co-ordinate among the international actors and since no Assembly
members were present the ASI meetings took place at the office of the OSCE. Later on, parallel to the
transfer of competences from UNMIK to Kosovo government, the Assembly joined in and the ASI coordination
was gradually transferred to the Assembly and the meetings took place in the Assembly
building. 38 Since the OSCE has been the biggest actor within the ASI (both in terms of budget - OSCE
always had around 600.000€ budget for the Assembly support, and also in terms of staff - they had almost 20
people working just on the Assembly support) there was a kind of self understanding that it is going to be the
OSCE taking the lead on the co-ordination. 39
International actors (OSCE and NDI) shared a joint vision during the formation of the ASI. Other
actors were initially not included but joined later, after the Induction programme. The biggest problem in the
beginning was that different organizations did not agree on supporting political bodies or the administration
of the Assembly. 40 The Assembly Secretary noticed that in the beginning the Assembly was invited more
formally, as part of the courtesy and only later it had developed very correct relationships with the ASI
partners. 41
The selection of the ASI participants was done by the OSCE. There were no other criteria except that
only donor programs which supported the Assembly could attend the ASI. New donors were invited to attend
the meetings of ASI. No negotiation process was needed. 42 The selection approach was to be as inclusive as
possible, so it was not a kind of merit or a kind of privilege to join ASI, but the OSCE wanted to have a coordination
meeting where everybody can come and freely speak for their own project so that everybody had
the opportunity to introduce his organisation to all the others. 43 When actors joined the ASI, it was not clear
whether they were aware of any other similar programmes.
38 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
39 Interview with Nora Fargasc.
40 Interview with Ibrahim Makolli.
41 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
42 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
43 Interview with Nora Fargasc, Interview with Artan Canhasi.
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1.2.2. Duration of ASI
ASI is a programme with a long-term functional focus, i.e. capacity-building of the Kosovo Assembly
members and staff. As for the duration of the ASI, there has not been set a time framework of its activities.
Franklin de Vrieze was the Chair person of the ASI from its beginning in October 2001 until December
2008, and in terms of transfer of competences from international to local administration it was agreed that it
is important that the Assembly itself actually takes over the ASI ownership. This was especially underlined
after the declaration of independence in February 2008. Franklin de Vrieze estimates that his departure from
the position of ASI co-ordinator only marks a second phase of the ASI and not the end of it, when the
Assembly itself starts chairing and becoming the owner of the ASI. 44
Franklin de Vrieze and the Assembly President have well prepared for the ASI second phase, in
terms that they had discussed this for a long time (also with the Secretary General of the Assembly) and for
this purpose during the whole of 2008, they made an arrangement with the Secretary General that they would
be co-chairing the ASI sessions, so that Kosovars were well prepared for the complete handover. During
September 2008 they drafted letters to the President of the Parliament on this issue and identified three
options for continuation of the ASI and the leadership of Parliament itself: a) the first option was that the
Secretary General would be the chair person, b) the second option was that the Secretary General with a
member of the Parliament would be co-chairing, and c) the third option was that a member of the Presidency
would be the co-chair or would be the Chair of the ASI. The President has considered these options and has
been consulting with MPs and in November/December 2009 decided that the Secretary General already cochairing
with de Vrieze would then be the new Chair of the ASI. 45 Ismet Krasniqi the Assembly Secretary
and Xhavit Haliti the member of the Presidency are now co-chairing the ASI meetings. The ASI Newsletter
is not published under this name anymore. It has been joined with the magazine Buletini, and now forms a
common magazine called Kuvendi/Assembly. 46 This way the national ownership is underlined (board and
editor are mainly national). There is still some support coming from the ASI (people still write for the new
magazine and there is also a minor financial support available). 47
However, the takeover is estimated as very difficult as the OSCE realised that the frequency of the
meetings as well as the content of the agenda after December 2008 was not always as intensive as before. 48
One of the areas where potential problems are foreseen is in the Budget Committee. The Assembly Secretary
(who co-ordinates ASI since 2009) reports that different organisations should consult more intensively with
somebody in the Administration before offering final donations in different fields, but often an international
donor has a mandate and cannot change it. In the end she agrees that prior consultation with the Secretary
44 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
45 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
46 Interview with Blerim Vela.
47 Interview with Gjylnaze Syla.
48 Interview with Shpresa Azemi.
109

also on the basis of good professional and personal relations is necessary. 49 EAR does not take part any
more, but UNDP meanwhile joined the club; also KIPRED has a project with the commission for the budget
and finances. As a consequence of not organizing regular meetings within the ASI, problems with coordination
started to appear (NDI started an internship program in the Assembly and realized that UNDP
started the same program, too). These kinds of problems confirm the positive role of the ASI. 50
Some actors assess the OSCE waited too long to give ownership of the ASI to the Assembly and
that most donors are not interested to swiftly transfer responsibilities to the Assembly because they want to
keep the political influence in the work of the Assembly. On the other hand, the Assembly itself would like
to keep the international support in order to push forward certain political goals (independence, support of
third countries). This situation is to stay for the coming years, as long as Kosovo depends on the support of
third countries. 51 Since Franklin de Vrieze is gone, nobody informed Friedrich Ebert Stiftung about any
meetings and they have the impression that ASI is not active anymore. 52
Ismet Krasniqi, Secretary of the Assembly and now the only ASI co-ordinator is aware of the
objections that Assembly was not so active and that it did not take the initiative in its own hands. He explains
it was very hard to take this initiative when the Assembly was in the situation where donors and different
organizations came to it with finalized projects without prior consultation. He agrees that a decrease in the
holding co-ordination meetings can be observed due to him wanting support of the political bodies. As a
result Mr. Xhavit Haliti, member of the Presidency of the Assembly, was appointed as chairman of this coordination
work. But Mr. Haliti was not able to participate in these meetings and activities due of other
obligations and as a result he decided not to be responsible for this task anymore and all responsibilities fell
of Mr. Krasniqi, who claims to have been inviting people in these meetings every four of five weeks but
lastly in July 2009 no one appeared. 53
1.2.3. The geographical range of ASI
This MSP is implemented at the national level since its beneficiaries are Kosovo Assembly and MPs.
Instruments of implementing the main ASI goal include organisation of events outside Kosovo territory
including co-operation of actors from other nations, e.g. regional parliamentary conferences, (study) visits to
national parliaments or assemblies of international organizations. Examples are included in Annex no. 2.
49 Interview with Nora Fargasc.
50 Interview with Rinor Beka.
51 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
52 Interview with Besa Luzha.
53 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
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1.2.4. The role of public national actors and public local (sub-national) actors in the ASI
National actors involved in the ASI programme are: Kosovo MPs – individuals, Kosovo parliamentary
groups, Kosovo Assembly Committees, Kosovo Assembly Presidency, Kosovo Assembly Secretariat, Office
of Prime Minister, occasionally also individual Ministries (e.g. Ministries on Public Services and for
Education, Science and Technology). 54
There was a double role of national actors: a) their level of involvement in the ASI work and
decision making process, and b) their active participation in the reform process. As for a), the Assembly
representatives were regular participants at all ASI meetings and it was the ASI policy to insist on the
engagement of the local actors. As for b), the level of participation of the local actors mainly depended on
the leadership of the Assembly and their attitude toward reforms. E.g.: during the Berisha mandate, the
Assembly undertook some good reform measures which strengthened it as an institution, especially in
relation to the executive branch. 55 The Assembly Presidency emphasizes its effort to increase transparency
and be inclusive by opening Presidency meetings to ASI stakeholders, which was criticized by some MPs.
Advice from international actors was not automatically translated into action but was firstly analyzed by the
Assembly for its relevance to the problems at stake. 56
In the beginning of the ASI, the Kosovo Assembly had problems to fully participate in the ASI coordination.
Despite the OSCE and ASI co-ordinator’s increasing and repeated efforts to enhance cooperation
with the Secretariat (Representatives of the Secretariat were invited and did participate in all ASI
meetings), in 2002 OSCE identified that communication remained insufficient and unsatisfactory for various
reasons. 57 Problems with national public partners were: lack of well selected civil servants, lack of political
54 Two interviewees of the Coordination Secretariat of the Government report that although their office is the main office for liaison
with the Assembly, the information about the ASI is very limited to them. They are aware that the ASI organises visits to other
countries and know that occasionally other offices of the Government (e.g. the Office on Good Governance) might have been invited
by ASI. The Secretariat provides support to the Assembly (informing it on draft laws), but not through the ASI (Interview with Eset
Rama and Nagip Tahiri).
55 Interview with Edmond Efendija.
56 Interview with Kole Berisha.
57 The reasons exposed are: 1. A weekly meeting of the ASI co-ordinators with the Assembly Secretary (in order to discuss various
issues in advance and avoid tensions rather than to meet in crisis circumstances), as repeatedly requested by OSCE officers, have not
been undertaken, although were agreed upon. 2. Lack of clarity whom to address within the Secretariat on various issues and lack of
information flow within the Secretariat. Poor response to e-mails sent. 3. Repeated requests to receive the draft laws, amendments to
draft laws and minutes of plenary sessions (eventually Committees) got late reply, if any. 4. Lack of follow-up on recommendations
and proposals provided by various consultants on improving the work of the Assembly, following a thorough analysis of several
weeks. 5. Incorrect information about not being consulted on specific activities or debriefings of ASI with the Assembly Secretariat
after the workshops. 6. Commonly agreed plans to compose an overview of at the time staff training in order to avoid overlap in
timing with the workshops for Assembly Members (agreed upon at the ASI Consultative Forum in October 2002) were hampered by
difficulties to receive information on ongoing training for staff as organised by the Assembly Secretariat. 7. New incoming donors as
EAR have not been given any information by the Assembly Secretariat on the existence of ASI, its programs or contact persons. This
gave OSCE the impression that one might try to disconnect new donors from the ASI donor co-ordination. 8. Reversing commonly
agreed proceedings and stopping activities. ASI was asked to assist the creation of a provisional Assembly web-site until a joint PISG
web site would be created sometime in 2003. A web-domain name for a provisional web-site had been reserved and the OSCE Public
Information Department started working on it. But in the end of August 2002, the initiative was blocked by the Assembly Secretariat
and donors discouraged since the Secretariat itself restarted the initiative, based on a possible future input by UNDP through its
SPEAK-program (Internal <strong>paper</strong> on ASI upon the request of Head of OSCE Mission to Kosovo prepared by Friedhelm
Frischenschlager, Director Democratization Department. DRAFT 25 October 2002).
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will from the former Assembly President to implement some parts of the reform of the administration,
obstacles to keep a well experienced head of procurement division and obstacles to improve the management
of the Assembly budget. 58 An OSCE representative exposes that national actors’ involvement was low as the
OSCE always tried to get the Assembly Secretary to chair the meetings and the parliament to take over the
Newsletter, but this happened only after 2008. 59
Non-state actors involved in the ASI programme are: 60
- local NGOs dealing with representation of women, environmental affairs, monitoring of national and
municipal parliamentary processes (The Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms –
CDHRF), drafting laws, balanced media coverage,
- journalists covering Assembly affairs,
- people of Kosovo enabled to have contact directly with their MPs,
- educational/research communities (students and professors of the University of Priština, Kosovo
Institute for Policy Research and Development – KIPRED). KIPRED started the project in 2005 with
the OSCE (Department of Democratization), in order to support the Assembly with the
establishment of a (new) Committee on Security. Until September 2007 KIPRED in close cooperation
with the OSCE supported this Committee and became more or less the Secretariat of the
Committee on Security, supporting this Committee in hearings, analysis and position <strong>paper</strong>s, drafting
reports/recommendations. 61
- civil society organizations within the EWPPP programme “Legislatures and Citizens: strengthening
democratic institutions and civil society in the Western Balkans”,
- Consortium of Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in the Kosovo Assembly including BIRN –
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Kosovo,
- The Kosovo Law Centre and the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration were not directly
involved in ASI, but were occasionally included in the ASI newsletter as external organizations
giving a commentary on their activities (professionalism of civil servants). 62
The relationship between civil society and the Assembly has been assessed as very passive. Only
recently civil society raised issues in the Assembly regarding its work. Mostly they demanded to monitor the
58 Interview with Hugues de Courtivron.
59 Interview with an OSCE representative.
60 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 6), pp. 15, 17; ASI newsletter (2003, no. 7), pp. 20, 23; ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), p. 23; ASI
newsletter (2004, no. 10), p. 22; ASI newsletter (2004, no. 12), p. 23; ASI newseltter (2005, no. 16), p. 15.
61 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
62 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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work of the plenary sessions. Kosovo civil society should still work on being a much more serious actor in
the ASI (and generally in Kosovo society). 63
Although private actors were not included on regular basis, there was an event when ASI engaged as
many actors as possible, i.e. the first and second induction programmes for MPs, when a number of technical
workshops took place on the economic policies in Kosovo with the invitation to the Chamber of Commerce,
to give lectures or some specific trainings. 64
1.2.5. The role of international actors involved in the ASI
Main ASI international actors are:
- The OSCE (OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly),
- The National Democratic Institute – NDI (as an implementing partner of the USAID),
- The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in the form of a project: Support to the Assembly
of Kosovo 2003–05 (Consortium of three Parliaments: FRA, GER and BEL) and Further Support to
the Assembly of Kosovo 2006–08 (Consortium of four Parliaments: FRA, GER, BEL and SLO).
Other international actors taking part in the ASI project are: UNDP, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, East-
West Parliamentary Practice Project, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNF), Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung (FES) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. International actors act as co-ordinators, knowledge and
expertise providers and financial supporters (donors) of the ASI programme. They dominate in the
organization, decision-making and implementation of the ASI programme. The ASI international actors’ role
is to: give advice on the basic components of parliamentary process, give advice on procedural questions
(and especially help drafting the Rules of procedure), give technical support to the Committees in the
legislative process, assist to international working visits of Assembly delegations, 65 give attention to the role
and participation of non-majority communities in the Assembly and train Assembly Administration (advise
and train various Assembly Secretariat departments). 66
The FES exposes the importance of international actors with a local office. FES has a local office
with local staff and consequently has more access to the MPs. The local staff know more about the overall
situation and demands. Being aware of cultural topics (e.g., it is better to kindly ask a MP if he/she would be
63 Krasniqui explains an example when KDI was monitoring the Assembly and exposed in the debates organized on the Radio
Television Kosovo that MPs salaries were too high (over 2.000 Euros), which was not true and Krasniqi asked them to come to him
to properly check the data since he would give them the list of the salaries. (Interview with Ismet Krasniqi).
64 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
65 Visits to other parliaments were seen as positive: they provided deputies with new ideas, but also problematic because of the lack
of language skills and the very different situation of the parliaments visited. They were a bit premature, but this view might not be
shared (Interview with But Dedaj). But these contacts should still be improved since they would constitute one way to develop
‘parliamentary diplomacy’ through personal contacts. Especially since Kosovo still does not have the recognition of some states, she
considers it as important for MPs to get these contacts with parliamentarians from other states. Thus, ‘the Assembly’ should be an
instrument to share objective information and get support from other Parliaments (Interview with Gjylnaze Syla).
66 De Vrieze, Franklin. 2004. Program and methodology of three years ASI co-operation. ASI newsletter (no. 13), p. 2. De Vrieze,
Franklin. 2007. OSCE coordinates parliamentary support programmes in Kosovo. Helsinki Monitor no. 1, 2 May. Retrieved by
personal communication.
113

willing to come to a training, then to inform MPs about time/location of a training and simply expect him/her
to come) FES also uses informal lunches to find out about the demands of MPs, while NDI rather proposes
trainings with less input by the MPs. 67 Typical activities implemented by FNF were conferences, seminars
and study visits (to Austrian parliament). The FNF took responsibility with regard to three committees of the
Assembly, i.e. the Committee on Trade and Industry, the Committee on Finance and Economy and the
Budget Committee and also supported the legal staff of the Assembly. The FNF organized around 30
activities between 2001 and 2005, while after that time it was less active because of limited funds.
1.2.6. The degree of institutionalisation of the ASI and its duration
There is no document such as Memorandum of Understanding or Terms of Reference or existing to represent
the legal basis for the functioning of the ASI. Donors had their priorities and goals defined by themselves,
whereby the ASI’s role was to co-ordinate implementation of those mandates. There was no contractual
relationship among them. The only thing which ASI partners have agreed upon is the Admission Statement,
which is the text they drafted and agreed upon and is published in the back of all ASI Newsletters. 68
The ASI approach is based on a system of regular consultation on specific issues of parliamentary
support without a centralized system of imposed decision-making. Co-ordination on the timing of workshops
or conferences helped to avoid conflicting agendas. After some time, a division of labour and inter-agency
co-operation on the assistance given to parliament has been established. It has led to the practice that specific
partners provide support to specific parliamentary committees in agreement with other partners who give
assistance to other committees. Sometimes, the co-ordination included co-operation in the area of needs
assessment. On a number of occasions, partners developed joint recommendations or proposals for reforms
in the Assembly. 69 Decision-making process is based on voting or by identifying a partner which will
implement the agreed activity by consensus. Big donors such as the USAID and the EAR do have stronger
decision-making power. In case there is no agreement with the other partners it happens that individual donor
will continue with its planned programme. 70
67 Interview with Besa Luzha.
68 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze. See Annex 3 for the Admission Statement.
69 The June 2006 "Assembly Standards Plan", the consultations on the issue of open, recorded voting and the 2008 induction program
for the newly elected MPs are examples of the most intensive "merging of resources" between separate organizations and programs
working for the Assembly (de Vrieze, Franklin. 2008. Supporting the work of the Assembly of Kosovo. ASI newsletter no. 31, p. 16–
17).
70 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
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ASI developed five types of consultations: 71
- Daily bilateral contacts.
- Informal/internal weekly information meetings with key-partners, where one representative per
agency updates colleagues from other agencies on the latest developments and working plans. 72
- Regular bilateral consultations with Members of Presidency, Committee chairpersons and Assembly
Secretariat. ASI partners conduct joint meetings with heads of parliamentary groups, members of the
Assembly Presidency or Committee chairpersons. This partnership is one of the guiding principles
throughout joint discussions. The timeline of activities is communicated to the Secretariat and the
Presidency in various phases of its planning and of the development of the programs to ensure close
co-ordination and avoid overlap/clashes with the Assembly’s work schedules. 73
- Monthly co-ordination meetings (ASI Consultative Forum) with all ASI partners, Assembly and the
Office of the Prime Minister; where ASI partner organizations and representatives of the Assembly,
both at the level of the Secretariat and the Office of the President, discuss ongoing programmes and
Assembly needs. 74
- Two-monthly meetings of ASI partners and country liaison offices in Prishtinë/Priština on the
political aspects of ASI programs.
In 2004 three levels of co-operation and input on equal terms between international and national, as well as
civic actors emerged. The interaction amongst ASI organizations can be situated at various levels, depending
upon program priorities, interests, trust and willingness to co-operate: 75
- sharing of information: The first level of interaction is information exchange. All organizations were
part of this level, with different degrees of information sharing. Information sharing is coordinated
not only through meetings but also by a bimonthly ‘ASI Activity Matrix’ and ASI Newsletter,
published in four languages: English, Albanian, Serbian and Turkish. 76
71 de Vrieze, Franklin. 2004. Program and methodology of three years ASI co-operation. ASI newsletter no. 13, p. 2. de Vrieze
Franklin. 2007. OSCE coordinates parliamentary support programmes in Kosovo. Helsinki Monitor no. 1, 2 May. Retrieved by
personal communication.
72 An NDI representative explains that the weekly meetings were regularly attended by the representatives of the Kosovo Assembly
and that was a chance for them to share with the ASI the needs of the Assembly. Most of the ASI partners did their assessments of
the Assembly needs and were present on daily basis in the Assembly (Interview with Edmond Efendija). When there was not
anything new to be reported the meetings were no longer than 2 to 3 minutes. OSCE and particularly Franklin de Vrieze used a
practice of holding informal meetings very often where the biggest decisions in regard to co-ordination were taken (Interview with
Ismet Krasniqi).
73 Internal <strong>paper</strong> on ASI upon the request of Head of OSCE Mission to Kosovo prepared by Friedhelm Frischenschlager, Director
Democratization Department. DRAFT 25 October 2002.
74 Most of the time the need assessment was not coming from the beneficiary, contrary to all major international ASI partners de
Courtivron (EAR) says that very often the beneficiary did not attend the ASI meetings. Either he did not come, or worse, he was not
invited (this point should have been considered as a priority from the very beginning) (Interview with Hugues de Courtivron).
75 de Vrieze, Franklin. 2004. Program and methodology of three years ASI co-operation. ASI newsletter no. 13, p. 2. de Vrieze
Franklin. 2007. OSCE coordinates parliamentary support programmes in Kosovo. Helsinki Monitor no. 1, 2 May. Retrieved by
personal communication.
76 The ASI Newsletter in four languages can be downloaded at: http://www.osce.org/ kosovo/publications.html. More information on
the structure and members of the Assembly of Kosovo can be found at the Assembly website: http://www.assembly-kosova.org.
115

- division of labour: at this second level of interaction complementary activities are developed,
duplication avoided and partners work towards an agreed division of work. 77
- inter-agency co-operation in needs assessment: The third and most intensive form of interaction has
been to develop joint activities, a common approach and a shared programmatic view.
1.2.7. Co-ordination of the ASI
The OSCE acted as the co-ordinator of the ASI and therefore tried to interact with partners at the exposed
three levels and facilitate a comprehensive support program to the Assembly, taking into account that donor
co-ordination needs to build upon the voluntarily engagement of all partners. Inter-agency co-ordination has
served to generate an increased flow of information between different organizations and projects, avoiding
duplication, avoiding overlapping assistance or confusing messages and advice. In addition to advantages for
the organizations and projects, co-ordination also has clear advantages for the beneficiary as it generated
more coherent and qualitative assistance to the Kosovo Assembly. 78
1.2.8. Changes in membership in ASI
Membership of EAR’s Consortium of parliaments changed. The Consortium of four Parliaments was the
successor of a first Consortium made of three parliaments (Belgium, France and Germany) and IIPLD which
implemented the first EAR funded Project. These three parliaments were first selected in 2003 as it seemed
easier for Kosovo to implement a parliamentary organisation based upon the continental culture with a
written law and democratic models, rather than upon the common law system. At the end of this first
program, the conclusion was that there was a need to add a specific expertise with a parliament built from the
former Yugoslavian system and with a very recent experience of transition from this former Yugoslavian
system to a brand new democratic system. IIPLD therefore invited the Slovenian Parliament to join the
Consortium for the second Project since the beginning of 2006, and this was assessed as extremely helpful
for the Project. 79 UNDP joined the ASI in March 2008 by drafting the Resolution for adoption of the
Millennium Declaration and by drafting the White Paper for social inclusion. UNDP does not have a
mandate of Assembly support but furthers development in Kosovo. UNDP and NDI started developing
77 This practice ensures that all Committees obtain a minimum level of support or that two or more partners working with the same
Committee co-ordinate their work. This has worked well even when partners disagreed on an opinion or advice about a draft law to
be given to the Committee. Sometimes, events, workshops or conferences initiated or proposed by one partner became joint events or
co-sponsored by more than one partner (de Vrieze Franklin. 2007. OSCE coordinates parliamentary support programmes in Kosovo.
Helsinki Monitor no. 1, 2 May. Retrieved by personal communication.).
78 de Vrieze Franklin. 2007. OSCE coordinates parliamentary support programmes in Kosovo. Helsinki Monitor no. 1, 2 May.
Retrieved by personal communication.
79 Slovenian experts were immediately able to understand problems to be solved and to advise on the best ways to solve them. The
level of expertise brought by our Slovenians was outstanding and the trust between these experts and their Kosovo counterparts was
instantaneous and very strong, with civil servants as well as Presidency members (Interview with Hugues de Courtivron).
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internship program in the Assembly. 80 The Consortium of Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in the
Kosovo Assembly was formed and joined the ASI in October 2008 and has been invited regularly to ASI
meetings. But since they have daily work and activities, they cannot wait for ASI meetings to inform others
about their plans and activities but they proceed with their work. The main goal of the project is advocacy for
the transparency of the work of the Assembly. Members of this consortium are BIRN, Kosovo Democratic
Institute (KDI) and NDI. KDI is responsible for monitoring the Assembly’s and committees’ work and BIRN
uses this monitoring to advocate for specific issues through public debates on the national TV. NDI is
responsible for technical assistance of the consortium. As part of this project an Advisory Group for
Advocacy which is composed of more than 15 NGO has been established. 81 The Friedrich Naumann Stiftung
(FNS) has been a stakeholder in the ASI from the very beginning, like the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES)
and the Social Democrat Foundation from Germany while the Konrad Adenauer Foundation joined later. 82
1.2.9. Prevailing stakeholders’ interests and potential conflicts
The tension regarding different stakeholders’ interests throughout the years went up and down, but in
essence it was between on the one hand NDI/USAID and on the other hand the European Commission
Consortium of three/four Parliaments. 83 The OSCE was always the one in the middle, which was on the one
hand its role as the co-ordinator. On the ground there was not the feeling that the European Commission
procedures were very slow and that the American procedures were very fast. 84 The differences were rather
conceptual, coming from the background of people in national parliamentary traditions. 85 In one side there
was NDI with its American parliamentary system and in other way there was EAR with its European one.
Even within EAR there have been different practices since it was a consortium of four different European
states (and particularly French and German models or parliamentarism are not similar). Furthermore, NDI
worked on the political bodies, commissions, parliamentary groups etc., while EAR was concentrated in
administration. It is well known that administration of the Assembly should function in accordance with the
needs of the political bodies. And this created problems having administration and political bodies build in
many different models. While all NDI staff was involved in every day work in Kosovo, even many of the
managers were also Kosovars, and followed on daily basis the results of the projects, EAR project had
consultancy nature. Experts came, stayed for 2 to 3 days, sometimes even holding training on the same topic
80 Interview with Nora Sahatçiu.
81 Interview with Jetmir Bakija.
82 Interview with Minre Citahu.
83 Competition between NDI and Consortium of three/four parliaments did not harm the work of the Assembly and projects itself. On
the contrary, the two actors can be seen as complementary. In this sense competition was good since it made them to work harder and
better (Interview with Ibrahim Makolli).
84 Blerim Vela, OSCE, disagrees. He reports that NDI was much stronger because their bureaucracy was more flexible and they had
the support of the American Embassy (office at that time) when they needed it. On the other side EAR due to its complicated
decision-making procedures was slower in reactions. Also the influence of US in the Assembly was much bigger than European
influence (Interview with Blerim Vela).
85 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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as someone else coming from the same projects, but with different attitude creating a kind of confusion
among beneficiaries. There was no follow-up on EAR trainings. NDI had the advantage of being an
American organization, having very flexible bureaucracy, their office in the Office of the Speaker of the
Assembly, and also were flexible in adjusting to the needs coming from the Assembly. However through
ASI many of the huge problems have been resolved and without ASI the conflicts, particularly between NDI
and EAR would have remained very huge. Without ASI and Franklin de Vrieze it would have been very
likely that relationships between NDI and EAR would have been frozen. 86
Cases of disagreements among the ASI partners include: i) an event organised for civil servants at
the same time as another event was already planned by a different actor’s program, ii) A procedure was put
in place by another program in full opposition with the procedure being implemented by Consortium
program (e.g. absence of procedure used for the revision of the Assembly Rules of Procedure in June 2006),
iii) A decision to give a very high priority to the implementation of a specific procedure which in
Consortium’s view should not have been selected as a first priority (e.g. the purchase of a very sophisticated
electronic device to publish the MPs’ votes although the question was not due to a lack of electronic device
but of political decision). iv) The refusal of the team in charge of making the ASI Newsletter to transfer their
know-how to reinforce the Assembly team in charge of making the Assembly Bulletin which led to two
publications dealing with the same content for the same public and limiting the possibility for the Assembly
to improve its own production. v) The decision to make changes on the webpage of the Assembly without
prior consulting the beneficiary or even the company contracted by the Assembly. 87
An issue of heavy debate was whether the Committee meetings should be open to the public or not
during the revision of parliamentary Rules of Procedure. NDI supported open meetings and the Consortium
(mainly the French) advocated certain confidentiality among parliamentarians, in order to have a free
exchange of opinion. After months of debate, a common understanding was reached that the Committee
meetings should be open in principle unless the Chair person decides otherwise and unless it has to do with
issues of security for Kosovo, or when it has to do with privacy issues (a few issues were listed). 88
FES got impression that the EAR Consortium was not much interested in co-ordination of ASI
activities and saw FES’ small projects with low amount of money often having higher impact on Parliament
capacity-building when compared to the more financed Consortiums activities. Translation process in the
Parliament was identified as a major problem. FES proposed that the huge amount of money available to the
86 Interview with Rinor Beka. Edmond Efendija personally felt that the NDI’s partners from the Consortium were not flexible; they
decided that they were the main actor in the ASI and hence had the right to use the ASI as a tool to impose on other partners what
they thought was the best approach. These disagreements have sometimes caused unnecessary delays and consumed time and energy
of the ASI organizations (Interview with Edmond Efendija). On the other hand, NDI tried to duplicate and actually did repeat EAR’s
activities. They have their office to the Speaker of the Assembly (Interview with Shpresa Azemi). EAR and NDI also bilaterally
resolved conflicts and avoided to table the problems/conflicts in the ASI. In case of issues which could not get resolved, the head of
missions of the EAR, USAID, NDI and officers from the US embassy, discuss the matter to resolve this. Mostly at the end problems
got resolved. In general the ASI was a facilitator to discuss problems and resolve problems (Interview with Alfonz B. Lenzte).
87 Interview by Hugues de Courtivron.
88 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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Consortium could be used to set up a professional translation unit, but this idea was not followed. Similarly,
irrational money spending was a case of setting up a demanding LINUX operating system in the Assembly
whereby 80 percent of MPs do not know how to use a computer. 89
NDI came with the impression that they deserve more influence and that people from the Assembly
would rather go to the NDI training, because of the overall perceived importance of America for Kosovo.
MPs reported that the training by NDI was catastrophic and repetitious, but they simply had the feeling that
they could not say no to American trainings. NDI was involved more with high levels in the Assembly
(Presidency and Secretary of the Assembly), while the FES was more concerned with individual committees
(Labour and Social Welfare Committee). Similarly Konrad Adenauer Foundation selected the Education
Committee. This way duplication was avoided. Still some Committees were “left alone”, since nobody
selected them. The FES only rarely organized visits for the Labour and Social Welfare Committee abroad
(maybe once a year), due to the lack of financing. 90
Besides the competition between NDI and EAR, which can be regarded as a worldwide competition
for the primacy, in Kosovo, a kind of competition can be felt also between UNDP and European
Commission. 91
Sometimes tensions occurred due to a clash of personalities. 92 Especially the team leader of the EAR
Consortium could not get well along with the Americans. The role of the ASI co-coordinator was then to
remedy the differences in the informal meetings. 93
1.2.10. Conflict-management within the ASI
Conflicts were managed through the role of the ASI co-ordinator. Co-ordination efforts did not always
proceed smoothly. According to Franklin de Vrieze, for donor co-ordination to be effective, specific
requirements need to be met. Firstly, there needs to be basic trust between individuals and organizations
working together. In Kosovo, this has been quite strong throughout the years, although with the expected ups
and downs. Persons and personalities play an important role in making the ‘chemistry’ work. Secondly, a
common understanding of the interests involved is needed. As the absorbing capacity of a young parliament
to work with different projects is limited, the Assembly of Kosovo also had an interest in receiving one
sound, coherent and qualitative assistance. All agencies and projects working through ASI know that
89 Interview with Besa Luzha.
90 Interview with Besa Luzha.
91 Interview with Nora Sahatçiu.
92 The same conceptual-clash of personalities source of tensions is identified by Nora Fargasc, Artan Canhasi and an OSCE
representative. But she estimates that in the past few years ASI had surprisingly little conceptual differences and managed to find
compromise which she finds the main virtue of ASI (interviews with Nora Fargasc, Artan Canhasi and an OSCE representative).
93 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze. Many interviewees referred to Hugues de Courtivron as the one who did not get along with
other people, representatives of other ASI partners. But Dedaj comments that de Courtivron “former French colonel Huges de
Courtivron is a former French colonel who had been on service in Kosovo before but was not an experienced manager, which created
some problems in practice” (Interview with But Dedaj).
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effective co-ordination requires time. Sometimes this requires deferring one’s own projects in order to
facilitate a common approach and co-ordination. While participating partners need to invest time in
coordination, it has been acknowledged that it is still more time-effective than the time lost through
competition or overlap. Effective co-ordination also requires clarity on the mandate of who is entitled and
who has the trust to facilitate co-ordination. In Kosovo, the OSCE Mission – UNMIK’s Institution Building
Pillar – has been doing this, also because it has gained the trust of the Assembly. 94
Most of the conflicts between partners had more of a personality base than over resources. However,
there were conflicts for the ‘Ear of the President of the Assembly of Kosovo’ (from an advisory point of
view), Presidency members or different bodies such as the Secretary, committees, Assembly staff, etc. In
terms of the approach to be taken, most conflicts were turf conflicts about which organisation supports which
body of the Assembly. There were no conflicts over the resources because there was no common budget. 95
1.2.11. Flow of information in the ASI
The flow of information in the ASI was mostly sufficient, but in case one partner anticipated a disagreement
to the idea/programme/activity in a certain topic with another partner they would keep this information for
themselves. 96 The OSCE chair always arranged and provided proper information to all partners. But not all
partners provided all information themselves. Normally, no partner was left out of the information flow in
case ASI had the information. 97 The flow of information in terms of moderating discussions on co-ordinating
activities was very good. ASI activity matrixes started in a more informal way, when de Vrieze sent out
emails to different partners asking them for their plans. They were yearly plans of ASI partners’ projects
where these actors identified their interests and then co-ordinated them within the ASI meetings. Later it was
decided that matrixes should become more formalized so that everyone could use this tool. Thus, a feeling of
partnership was created among all partners: e.g., even if an activity was completely funded by one partner,
the logo of the ASI was used to indicate that these activities were a result of joint discussions. 98
KIPRED was not fully included in all activities since the international partners until recently were
reluctant to include local NGOs and think tanks. It was mainly included because the support it could offer
was of paramount importance for the Assembly and this was recognized by the OSCE. The Consortium of
four parliaments somehow saw KIPRED as a risk to their projects and never invited KIPRED to any of its
activities in the Assembly or to any co-ordination activities. According to KIPRED the flow of information
between different stakeholders is not sufficient, but it varies depending on different actors. 99
94 de Vrieze Franklin. 2007. OSCE coordinates parliamentary support programmes in Kosovo. Helsinki Monitor no. 1, 2 May.
Retrieved by personal communication.
95 Interview with Artan Canhasi.
96 Interview with Artan Canhasi.
97 Interview with Alfins B. Lenzte.
98 Interview with Besa Luzha.
99 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
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1.2.12. Common budget
There was no common budget. ASI activities were based upon individual projects of each partner. What ASI
did have are joined projects but with a separate budget. For example: ASI did a comprehensive review of the
functioning of the Parliament in 2007 and 2008. The OSCE and the NDI hired consultants and ASI formed a
steering board, a review committee and follow-up mechanisms to implement the recommendations of the
assessments. However, on the budget, knowing the difference of the NDI/USAID financial procedures
compared to the OSCE procedures, the ASI partners decided together that they share the finances for the two
consultants. One consultant concluded a contract with the OSCE and the other concluded a contract with the
NDI, whereby the fee was arranged to be practically similar and terms of references were identical for them
to be able to really work together as a team. The sharing of the costs of this project was common, outlined in
a bilateral Memorandum of understanding between the NDI and the OSCE. 100
In the beginning of ASI, all financial resources were coming from the international donor agencies.
In 2007 and 2008 ASI got some in kind financial contributions also from Kosovo Assembly (renting of the
rooms or providing lunches and dinners) when ASI organized events. ASI did not want to burden the
Parliament’s budget too much. In the beginning, every costs arising from working visits abroad were
financed by international partners. During 2007-08 an arrangement was reached that, if a delegation was
composed of four people, three should be paid by international partners, including then often the minority
Serb member, and the fourth person should be paid by the Assembly. 101
Regarding financial organisation of the ASI, it is important to differentiate between implementing
partners and donor agencies. NDI and the Consortium of four parliaments were implementing partners;
USAID and European Commission, mostly EAR, were the donors. Several times besides co-ordinating
between implementing partners, ASI also had to co-ordinate between donors in a form of a meeting of three
stakeholders: the USAID, the OSCE and the European Commission (there were three or four of these
meetings). The meetings were strategic in terms of presenting long-term planning of each agency and were
followed by consulting on and co-ordinating the agencies’ activities, tenders and projects. 102 Resource
allocation did not affect decision-making and internal politics of the ASI, nor did the dependence on external
finances limit the role/influence of local actors or undermine their credibility. The Kosovo Assembly has
especially been encouraged to decide upon its own parliamentary model. The Assembly President was
decided himself (upon consultation with MPs) how to proceed with ASI co-ordination after the OSCE
mandate ended.
100 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
101 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
102 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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1.2.13. Issues downplayed by major actors
Contrary to general belief of international actors that Kosovo Assembly as beneficiary was downplayed by
international interests and that it was too passive, Assembly itself assesses that it was mainly able to identify
its needs itself through its committees; only about 20 % of the ideas and initiatives came from the outside.
All needs were addressed immediately. 103 One of the MPs strongly disagrees, pointing to a big problem of
Kosovo institutions’ incapability to identify their needs and know what to demand from different donors.
Sometimes Kosovars even thought that they do not need any support or training. 104
In the beginning KIPRED was not seen as a stakeholder (not even by EAR or NDI). Initially,
mentality about the local inability to provide support due to lack of capacities prevailed and locals were still
seen with a bleakly eye, because some local organisations were still closely connected to parties, or certain
families and were therefore not seen as independent. Although KIPRED invited all relevant stakeholders for
their project (e.g., DFIT, sometimes the embassies, ICO, EULEX, EUPT, NDI and the EAR Consortium,
OSCE and partners of OSCE), itself initially was not invited by anyone else. This changed at the end of its
project on Assembly Security Committee when due to the quality of its contributions NDI and the EAR
Consortium invited it for co-operation. KIPRED takes part in the Assembly Secretary General initiated ASI
meetings. 105
Recommendations from the EAR Consortium were not implementable in the Assembly’s context,
although they were of high professional level. The Assembly was not yet capable to implement standards of
work of e.g. the German Parliament. Despite the fact that the Consortium should have been dedicated more
to the administration, 70 % of its recommendations were to the political staff. Only due to constant
intervention from Assembly Secretary, at the end of 2007 this changed 60 % to 40 % in favour of the
administration.
Program Co-ordinator of FES reports that powerful international actors did not downplay weaker
international actors. Suggestions of FES were often accepted by all the partners, when the manner of
coordinating things in a specific way was discussed. 106
1.2.14. Consideration of gender and ethnic groups in planning, decision-making procedures and
implementation of the ASI
International actors participating in ASI take into account social minorities. They assist the women caucus in
the Assembly. For example, NDI has conducted a workshop with female members of the Assembly in
103 Interview with But Dedaj.
104 Interview with Ibrahim Makolli.
105 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
106 Interview with Besa Luzha.
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eviewing, amending and drafting legislation. 107 NDI and OSCE provided help to the Informal Group of
Women Parliamentarians in the Assembly of Kosovo. 108 “It was important that ASI always aimed at having a
good balance between men and women involved (Women Caucus was important in this respect). Thus, by
repeatedly including gender aspects into the ASI work, the ASI has been gender sensitive.” 109 As a result, the
Informal Group of Women has been successful in developing an internal dialogue between the parties in
power and the opposition – a dialogue between women parliamentarians from all communities; this means
that the woman’s position in the Assembly has been enhanced. Up to 2008, they have been successful in
raising topics, such as women employment, education, social conditions etc. Even the women from the
Serbian community understood the strength of the group, and decided to take part and help it to address
social problems, despite the institutional boycotting decision made by their colleagues at that time. 110
International actors also give attention to the role and participation of non-majority (ethnic)
communities in the Assembly. There are many individual examples. 111 The OSCE was especially advocating
equal representation of national minority parliamentary groups in working visits abroad. In the beginning
they had to argue why it is important to have a Serb or a Bosnian MP as a part of delegation; even if it was a
delegation of three or only two MPs, they insisted one is Albanian and one Serb. The opposition-majority
representation here was put aside to assure ethnic minority equality. One sees that now the Kosovo Assembly
itself is picking up this point and has realized that this principle is important. 112 Kosovo Assembly started to
publish information schemes on monitors in the Assembly with announcements of the agenda. It was the
Assembly itself that insisted that information should be in three languages, i.e. Albanian, Serbian and
English; the OSCE did not need to stress the importance of equal representation in this case. 113
107 ASI newsletter (2004, no. 13), p. 7.
108 The Group has able to make permanent communication links with Macedonian and Albanian MPs, but also held contacts with
other Parliaments. In cooperation with the OSCE they organized a Regional Conference in 2007, in which regional women MPs
exchanged their experiences with the Assembly of Kosovo Members. In general, OSCE provided logistical support and international
expertise provided for empowering the role and the position of women parliamentarians in the Kosovar political arena (Interview
with Mrs. Flora Brovina MP, Chairperson of the Informal Group of Women Parliamentarians in the Assembly of Kosovo). She
believes that the Women Parliamentarian Group was established as a predecessor of the Unity Team and exposes the support of the
Swiss Embassy, the American, Swedish, Dutch Embassies, and the Greek Office for their assistance, both in the form of visits made
through their invitation, projects and trainings (ASI newsletter (2008, no. 32), p. 11).
109 Interview with Gjylnaze Syla (a female MP).
110 Interview with Mrs. Flora Brovina MP, Chairperson of the Informal Group of Women Parliamentarians in the Assembly of
Kosovo. ASI newsletter (2008, no. 32), p. 11.
111 Examples: MPs from non-Albanian and non-Serbian Communities established their own parliamentary group. The decision was
taken during a two-day retreat in Brezovica, 14–15 March 2003, with support of the OSCE Democratization Department (ASI
newsletter 2003 (no. 6), p. 14). OSCE and UNHCR launched the tenth joint “Assessment on the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in
Kosovo (10 March 2003) (ASI newsletter 2003 (no. 6), p. 6). In April and May 2003 NDI conducted constituent relations workshops
for elected MPs, municipal assemblies and local party branch leaders of the political parties: LDK, PDK, AAK, Kosovo Serbian
parties, and parties representing smaller ethnic and political communities (ASI newsletter 2003 (no. 6), p. 17). The OSCE met with
relevant Ministers and Committees of the Assembly to encourage them to familiarize themselves with the OSCE/UNHCR “Tenth
Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo.” With these assessments, the OSCE aimed to raise awareness about its
recommendations on how to improve the situation of minority communities throughout Kosovo and to encourage governmental
Ministers and committees to implement respective strategies. Before that OSCE already met with the Prime Minister, and a number
of Ministers (ASI newsletter 2003 (no. 7), p. 15).
112 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
113 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
123

1.2.15. Analytical conclusions
ASI was formed exclusively on the initiative of international actors, who were already operating in Kosovo
the field of democracy promotion. Its task was co-ordination of international donors’ agendas for Kosovo
Assembly capacity-building. International actors clearly dominate in the ASI. The ASI international actors’
role is to: give advice on the basic components of parliamentary process, give advice on procedural questions
(and especially help drafting the Rules of procedure), give technical support to the Committees in the
legislative process, assist to international working visits of Assembly delegations, 114 give attention to the role
and participation of non-majority communities in the Assembly and train Assembly Administration (advise
and train various Assembly Secretariat departments).
The capability of national actors to take over the ASI programme in the beginning of 2009 was weak
when international ASI co-ordination has ended, and only confirmed the central role that international actors
played in the implementation of this MSP-DEM. The Kosovo Assembly was the beneficiary (national public
actor), whose role in the ASI programme is essential. In terms of parliamentary oversight of the executive,
the role of the Office of Prime Minister and individual Ministries is to co-operate in education programmes
and trainings in the learning process of the functioning of parliamentary democracy. Local public actors
include local communities, city officials. Their role is marginal, supportive and not central. One could claim
that state actors dominate over sub-state actors; but state actors do not dominate the whole ASI as MSP-
DEM. Non-state actors involved in the ASI were representative for the main stakeholders in the field of
democracy, good governance and rule of law. But local NGOs were not able to participate more actively in
supporting Assembly and in being member of ASI, because of the poor funds they had in possession. There
is intention to increase their role in the future in the work of the Assembly. Private actors were not involved
in the ASI. No companies/businesses of local, national or international range have been included in this
MSP-DEM. The aim of the ASI programme does not seem to be appropriate for the inclusion of private
actors.
The nature of the ASI partnership is one of donors and beneficiaries. The co-ordinator’s main task is
to assure that none of the international donors wanted to impose their own national parliamentary model on
Kosovo Assembly. The Kosovars were able to choose their parliamentary model, having explored many
other models, due to no real imposition and no real forcing of any particular model. This is one of the things
which de Vrieze made sure that none of the partners would exclusively ‘stamp’ their national model there. 115
Sharing of responsibilities among international and national stakeholders, and between public, private and
114 Visits to other parliaments were seen as positive: they provided deputies with new ideas, but also problematic because of the lack
of language skills and the very different situation of the parliaments visited. They were a bit premature, but this view might not be
shared (Interview with But Dedaj). But these contacts should still be improved since they would constitute one way to develop
‘parliamentary diplomacy’ through personal contacts. Especially since Kosovo still does not have the recognition of some states, she
considers it as important for MPs to get these contacts with parliamentarians from other states. Thus, ‘the Assembly’ should be an
instrument to share objective information and get support from other Parliaments (Interview with Gjylnaze Syla).
115 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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civic actors was mainly implemented according to their respective roles. ASI international actors’ primarily
role was teaching “how to do the parliamentary democracy”. In the Assembly’s second term their role slowly
started to change to be more consultative. In general, there were international donors (like USAID or the
European Commission) and the implementing partners on the ground, representing these donors (like NDI,
EAR with the Consortium of three/four parliaments). No common mandate was created among them; the
ASI only co-ordinated their activities. Therefore, the distribution of responsibilities might be connected to
the ASI co-ordination task, which was firstly clearly with the international actors and then slowly passed on
also to the beneficiary.
The role of individual types of actors within decision-making structures has not been determined by
power of the actors, nor has it been related to financial burden-sharing. All actors could equally participate
and influence decisions, regardless of their “size”, although most of the co-ordination had to be done among
the biggest three international partners (NDI, Consortium of three/four Parliaments and OSCE). There was
no common budget, so financial resources were not included in the power-play. There were four types of
consultation according to how often they were organised and three levels of communication; sharing of
information, division of labour and inter-agency co-operation in needs assessment.
1.3. How Participation in the MSP Affected Its Members
1.3.1. Alteration of initial roles/mandates of the ASI actors
The general feeling of the partners was that they are to report to their donors and not in the ASI meetings, but
all ASI partners were aware that in case of conflicting advice to the Assembly no advice would be taken at
all which would make their donor unsatisfied. In most cases the ASI partners would proclaim to the donors
that it was them who did a (positive) reform/change in the Assembly with minor help from the other
organisations. 116
An OSCE representative shares a personal view: ‘Having worked in places with no donor coordination
body, ASI exceeded my expectations. It is very easy to get caught in the specifics and details of
the agendas of different actors, but the fact remained that these things were discussed and people knew what
was going on – even if they did not agree.’ 117
The goals of NDI were to use the ASI as a forum to share information and co-ordinate the activities
with other ASI partners, in the common efforts to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Assembly. Coordination
was seen as necessary to prevent duplication of training, organize joint events by merging
financial and human resources, and making sure that there is no overlapping in the dates of the events (i.e.
training, study visits) of different partners. NDI’s understanding of the main functions of the ASI has not
116 Interview with Artan Canhasi.
117 Interview with an OSCE representative.
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changed much. 118 The functioning of the ASI had influence on NDI work, since many times NDI changed
their agenda and projects, or adjusted them in order not to overlap with the projects of other partners. The
ASI Newsletter served to inform the MPs of NDI work and it happened that different MPs and parliamentary
commissions after reading in the ASI Newsletter came to NDI and asked to have similar projects for them. 119
In view of EAR the ASI did facilitate proper planning and co-ordination of the donors and the
beneficiary, which was also the expectation. 120 During the project’s lifetime, the EAR objectives 121 did not
change but as it became more obvious that the first priority was to train the MPs and the Assembly staff to
use the basic technical tools for a well working and a well managed Assembly, the EAR Project put the
highest priority on strengthening the professional capacities and technical skills of the Secretariat.
Hugues de Courtivron says that up to his knowledge, EAR was also the only project involving closely the
beneficiary in the decision-making process; the Assembly President was actually chairing the Consortium
Steering Committee. EAR adapted to the perceived needs of the beneficiary in full co-ordination with ASI.
Moreover, the size and the scope of their project covered most of the topics of the ASI project with exception
of the trainings of the political parties. 122
In the beginning the ASI was very helpful and met FES’ expectations. After seeing prevalence of big
players FES often came to ASI in order to complain about the failures. Co-ordination was very timedemanding.
The content of the programs of the FES did not change due to the involvement in ASI. Only the
timing of trainings was changed. The main benefits of participating was the co-ordination (more effective
use of money/resources/time), but also development of ideas (gaining knowledge). When FES listened to the
programs of others, they developed the idea that they could do a similar program for another target group.
They did not receive any additional funding due to our involvement in ASI, but the resources could be used
more effectively. They specifically tried to co-ordinate themselves with the other two German Foundations
(Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Foundation), since they receive money from the same
budget in Germany, and so a particular interest was avoiding duplication. 123
Thanks to the OSCE, KIPRED engaged in more activities which were beyond the activities initially
planned in its project. 124 Initially KIPRED’s project to support the Committee on Security was planned for
118 Interview with Edmond Efendija.
119 Interview with Rinor Beka.
120 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
121 EAR’s goal was to consolidate a sustainable institutional capacity in the Kosovo Assembly that results in a professional and
effective fulfilment of its constitutional mandate in an independent, participatory and transparent manner and with closer ties with
civil society. This implied: a) To strengthen the professional capacities and technical skills of the Secretariat, its departments,
services and staff. b) To support the MPs and their support services to participate in the legislative processes. c) To assist the
processing of legislation by means of technical assistance and with particular emphasis on harmonization with EU-acquis. d) To
promote a more fluid interaction between the Assembly and the civil society (Interview with Hugues de Courtivron).
122 Interview with Hugues de Courtivron.
123 Interview with Besa Luzha.
124 E.g. OSCE brought the Assembly’s newly established (with leading role of KIPRED) Committee on Security to the NATO
Assembly in Portugal (Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj).
126

six months. Based on the evaluation of the needs of the Committee done jointly with the OSCE, other
stakeholders in ASI and the Committee itself, the project was extended for additional six month. 125
1.3.2. Local involvement and ownership of the ASI
Examples of attempts to invite local actors’ to a more active involvement in the ASI: An attempt for the
OSCE called the Municipal Assembly Support Initiative was made to bring together all the actors which were
involved in the ministries, assemblies, local governments due to initial decentralization, but after a year and a
half this did not pick up and did not work. The mandate was exactly the same as ASI’s but the approach was
different. 126 Until 2009 there has been a kind of selection among civil society and now there are
organizations that have been identified as being strong enough in capacities to support the work of
institutions. There is a will from the side of the Assembly to collaborate with the civil society but some say
that the right model of this collaboration was not found because civil society should change its attitude that
its role is only to monitor and criticize but it should realize that it should build sustainable partnership with
the Assembly in order also to support its work and help building its capacities. 127 The Consortium of
Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in the Kosovo Assembly held contacts and meetings with other ASI
partners after ASI meetings and informal and personal contacts created as result of ASI have proven to be
useful. 128 Equal partnership within the ASI was encouraged; mainly the EU always supports local ownership.
EAR representative believes other donors have this approach to a lesser extent. 129
Sometimes the expertise offered by international partners and Kosovo civil society is not at the level
as it is required. Kosovo civil society unfortunately is lacking a lot of expertise and as a result it sometimes
publicly reacts on laws debated or approved in the Assembly but does not offer the solution or alternatives.
Sometimes they think that they have realized their duty in society, if they have reacted against something. 130
In view of local civil society, the level of local involvement in and ownership of ASI has been very limited.
E.g., in the recent meetings of the ASI only the Secretary of the Assembly and maybe one or two of his staff
are speaking. Most people talk in English and only a few Kosovars are really actively involved. As for the
option of leading the projects in the Kosovo Assembly (e.g. to support the Committee on Public Accounts),
the bids are open and KIPRED applied like any other institution and won the bid because of its experience. 131
The Assembly’s view is that it was able to decide for itself on the different proposals put forward by
international partners, especially regarding the parliamentary model; the Assembly tried to adapt these
models according to its needs. From the Belgium Parliament they have taken their experience in
125 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
126 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
127 Interview with Nora Sahatçiu.
128 Interview with Jetmir Bakija.
129 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
130 Interview with Ibrahim Makolli.
131 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
127

administration, Slovenes have helped in building the library and supported them how to manage the budget.
From France they took the Strategy of the Legislation and also the way they built the presidency of the
parliament and from Germans the model of publication unit, of public relations and of the protocol was
taken. 132
1.3.3. Benefits the ASI brought to the stakeholders involved especially in the light of
empowerment of national and local actors
Benefits of the ASI are mainly assessed as positive. MPs and Assembly Secretariat all report on
improvements of skills and competencies, know-how, capacity-building power, increased knowledge about
democracy, good governance and the rule of law and they generally consider themselves much more capable
of contributing to these principles of democratic societies. They however expose that the need to improve the
knowledge of MPs and of the administration still remains. The ASI has reduced the vulnerabilities of nonmajority
ethnic political parties and women in the Assembly. MPs believe that the ASI projects were
absolutely crucial in improving capacities of MPs and also of the administration. MPs participating in
different seminars and trainings, visiting different Parliaments have gained a lot of knowledge about the role
that the deputies should play in the Assembly and in the political life of a country. Also these projects
introduced very useful practices to the work of Kosovo Assembly as parliamentary questions, parliamentary
hearings, public hearings etc. 133 National and local actors involved in the ASI have not been able to receive
more international funds as a result of their involvement in the ASI. But, KIPRED notes that they have
benefited hugely with regard to experience, similarly to the beneficiary. KIPRED became a stakeholder in
the field of oversight of the security sector and has been empowered hugely. 134
1.3.4. Analytical conclusions
Changes in the role of ASI partners have to do with the changes in the status of Kosovo. E.g. in the
beginning of the ASI, visits to other parliaments were very much learning visits and only later their nature
became more “working visits” and MPs were able to make them political consultation events. 135 The OSCE
used to support the Assembly very much until the declaration of independence. Since then, the Assembly has
had problems in communicating officially with the OSCE since the OSCE does not recognize their logo and
OSCE’s help has decreased because of political problems raised with their neutral status approach. The
OSCE is still involved (not always with Assembly’s own desire) in organizing visits abroad, apart from
132 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
133 Interview with Ardian Gjini.
134 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
135 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
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Albania. 136 Local actors were participatory partners and not merely consultative one. Only KIPRED has cooperated
substantially in the ASI. In general, ASI partners (international and national) assess that civil
society of Kosovo lacks capacity to participate in the oversight of the parliamentary process.
1.4. Assessment of the External Impacts of the MSP
1.4.1. Overall assessment
The external impact of the ASI can be assessed in terms of its impact on the process of democratisation and
improving local good governance in Kosovo. The ASI’s impact on the process of democratisation is fully
successful in terms of:
- capacity-building of MPs, Assembly Committees, political parties,
- capacity-building of the administration (Secretariat, and the Presidency), and also
- building good working relationship between the Assembly and the ministries when drafting
legislation.
Through the ASI co-ordinated projects the capacities of the Assembly to realize its functions have increased;
the capacities in the representative function (the contacts with electorate have been increased), legislative
function and overseeing function (the control of the work of the government). 137 Each year the Assembly
complies with its own rules of procedure more and more. MPs use the tools of democracy ever more in terms
of plenary session and Committee work and are more and more committed to spend most of their time in the
Assembly. In terms of Staff members of the Secretariat helping the MPs and the technical facility of the
Parliament, the biggest problem is still lack of substantial, financial resources. There is a lot of improvement
in technical terms in the Assembly that is always related to international partners (e.g. big screens, computers
and international research databases as OSCE donations). 138 ASI improved the Assembly’s capability to
initiating many hot debates within the Assembly related to the functionality of Kosovo as a democratic
society. But among others there are still many political appointments to the civil staff of the Assembly. 139
NDI dealt with the parliamentary questions and this project is assessed as very successful. Now the
parliamentary questions are part of the agenda whenever the Assembly works. As a result, the opposition
within the Assembly is much more efficient in their role to control the work of the government and demands
more accountability for the work of the Government. Opposition parties are very thankful. Particularly
important was the opening of the constituency offices for communicating with the citizens. 140 One of the
136 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
137 Interview with Rinor Beka.
138 Interview with Nora Fargasc.
139 Interview with Artan Canhasi.
140 As a result the office opened in Priština, received about 250 different requests by citizens, and many have been resolved after
interventions done by the deputies. Also as result of these offices deputies are much closer to their electorate and they are much more
aware about the communities’ needs. As result of these contacts many deputies are very active during the parliamentary session
raising many questions to the government about issues that concerns citizens (Inteview with Rinor Beka).
129

greatest improvement regarding relationships between beneficiaries is the fact that the Secretary General
could remain in his position after the change of political majority in the Assembly, which was one of the
main objectives of EAR Project: to disconnect the administration authorities from the political majority and
pave the way for a neutral and impartial civil service inside the Assembly. 141 It cannot be said that all MPs
received a positive impact by the ASI; some were more open to reforms and co-operation then others. 142 The
ASI had further impacts on: increasing the number of committee inquiries on implementation of legislation,
improving transparency of the Assembly including its budget process. The influence on civil society was
achieved mainly from the side of parliamentary committees and less through a direct work with NGOs. 143
EAR exposes as an achievement their work on compiling the Statute of the Assembly Personnel. 144 Also the
project helped in increasing the contacts between the administration of the Assembly with the Government
and UNMIK. But, it was impossible to convince the Government to participate in the Assembly Presidency
meeting at political level to prepare the Assembly agenda. 145
The impact on the beneficiaries also depends on personalities; if an MP was interested s/he could
have gained a lot of knowledge and experience from the ASI. The Assembly Administration does not regard
itself as permanent employees because of low incomes. They use the Assembly for building their capacities
and as a trampoline to other institutions. So it is very hard to build sustainable capacities in the Assembly’s
administration. There is a lack of capacities in the field of research, of drafting and reviewing laws coming
from the government and in supporting political bodies of the Assembly. Therefore there is a need for deep
and structural reform of the work of the administration of the Assembly. 146
Administration still needs a lot of support. Particularly good lawyers are needed who have
knowledge in working with laws. Also good lectors are needed, people who are professionals in translation
of laws since laws should be published in many languages (Albanian, Serbian, English, Turkish). 147 It is
important that the Assembly has learned how it should determine its needs and how to push for its demands
in front of international donors. Krasniqi assesses that the Assembly could have benefited much more but
could not do so due to its weak capacities. 148
141 Interview with Hugues de Courtivron.
142 Interview with Edmond Efendija.
143 Interview with Edmond Efendija.
144 Among others it had to do with the way how the personnel should be promoted, about extension of the contracts (to have six years
contracts not three years) etc. In the beginning it was not welcomed, but during the second term of our project in 2007 it has been
signed by the Speaker of the Assembly. However, it has not been yet (by the end of 2009) entirely implemented (Interview with
Shpresa Azemi).
145 Interview with Hugues de Courtivron.
146 Interview with Ibrahim Makolli.
147 Interview with Ramë Buja.
148 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
130

1.4.2. Analytical conclusion
The impact of ASI was huge; rather strict donor policies have been broken up or were reduced to some
extent through the ASI, because different actors had to be and were co-ordinated and actors such as OSCE,
EAR and KIPRED brought excellent experts to the Assembly, which could not have been done by the
Assembly alone. 149 Kosovo Assembly administration however still needs huge support in terms of career
orientation of its staff, language skills, research capabilities, drafting and reviewing laws and in supporting
political bodies of the Assembly. Lesson learned is that for administration, it would have been much more
efficient to firstly have only on-job trainings and not so many visits abroad. It is much more useful for
administration to have training conducted at home by international experts and even by own experts from
Kosovo. Only after reaching a kind of acceptable professional level, working visits abroad can be useful
too. 150
1.5. The Significance of International Actors
1.5.1. Introductory identification, characterisation and outline of the significance of the
international actors for the MSP
The membership of international actors in the ASI has been crucial. Local actors are not included in the ASI
co-ordination. National public actors' dependence was extremely high in the beginning and slowly
diminished with the transfer of co-ordination to the Kosovo Assembly. Dominant actors were the OSCE and
the USAID/NDI regarding the foundation of the ASI and since 2003 also EAR – Consortium of three/four
parliaments. The OSCE had two roles: having their own programme on the capacity building which is very
important to the OSCE as well as doing the co-ordination of the ASI. De Vrieze says that sometimes it was
not easy for him to combine both tasks. If he had to choose, the co-ordination role came first and the
implementation of the OSCE programmes sometimes had to wait and that is something which other partners
appreciated a lot. The OSCE as an organization of 56 member states including Americans as well as
Europeans as its members enabled OSCE to mediate and stand in between, trying to resolve possible
differences. 151 The ASI has always been an “OSCE’s child”. Usually the recognition and respect of the
OSCE from other organisations in this area is quite high. 152 The OSCE was seen as a neutral partner also
because it was a part of UNMIK and had the legitimacy of institution-building in Kosovo including the
Assembly of Kosovo. Secondly, on an individual level, its staff was both ‘European’ and ‘American’. And,
finally, OSCE’s legitimacy came from skills of the ASI co-ordinator Franklin de Vrieze. The OSCE was
mainly impartial, but when it did not share the views of other partners, its view was presented by another
149 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
150 Interview with Ismet Krasniqi.
151 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
152 Interview with Nora Fargasc.
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member of the Mission and not by the co-ordinator. During the meetings, the co-ordinator remained
impartial and neutral. 153 EAR observes that the mission of the OSCE in Kosovo was too big and did not
bring the needed change. Also, the different nations (members) of the OSCE used the OSCE for their own
political programs. 154
1.5.2. The role of individual governments
Individual governments were not direct ASI donors, but some were multilaterally indirectly included in the
programmes co-ordinated by the ASI: American, German, French, Belgian, Slovenian and the Dutch
government. The role of EU-supported Consortium governments has changed after the second tender of the
Consortium of four parliaments ended. It turned out that the four Parliaments individually as well as Kosovo
Assembly have interest to continue the co-operation. The Parliaments therefore signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Assembly of Kosovo for bilateral co-operation, stating that these parliaments are
ready to make their expertise available by sending from time to time experts for specific assistance to followup
and help with the recommendations of the Consortium if and when the Kosovo Assembly requests this
assistance. These experts can be called by the Kosovo Assembly according to individual issues and free of
charge. 155
1.5.3. Types of behaviour in the interaction between international and local stakeholders
Representative of KIPRED reports that the chairman of the Assembly Committee asked him to facilitate the
Committee in their tasks as participants in the Transfer of Competences in security from UNMIK to Kosovo
Government and then to EULEX although this task was not foreseen in the project. This was possible due to
a legal statement in the KIPRED’s project agreement that KIPRED was allowed to do any additional tasks
that would support the Committee. In another case, KIPRED managed to invite the General in command of
the KPC to a hearing because it thought this would benefit the Committee, although there was no legal
obligation of this General to follow this invitation. In order for this to work, all questions asked in the
hearing had to be agreed upon with the general beforehand. 156
1.5.4. Analytical conclusions
Lessons learned regarding the EU’s participation in the ASI point to: a) better substantive (knowledge)
support of its parliamentary activities, b) administrative adjustment of parliamentary support activities to
153 Interview with Artan Canhasi.
154 Interview with Alfons B. Lenzte.
155 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
156 Interview with Qemajl Marmullakaj.
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projects with a more long-duration perspective, c) inclusion of the beneficiary (local ownership) and d)
potential co-ordination role of the EU.
1. The EU needs to have its own clear understanding and knowledge of the function of the
Parliament, of the assistance in parliamentary development, and knowledge applicable to the development
world and also efficient quality control in the design of the programs. It is suggested that EU (delegations in
the field) rely more strongly officials in Brussels who are specialists in the field of parliamentary
development. Delegations now cover too vast areas of democratic / good governance from local to central
parliaments to media to rule of law, etc. To reach coherency within the EU itself, a limited number of
contributing nations could meet to identify a common strategy to support a country in a specific area. Once
the general objectives are defined, several countries might decide to send their experts to work with the local
counterparts on specific topics. EU also needs to assure continuity of its presence; since the EAR Consortium
projects have ended European Liaison Committee is in charge of representation in Kosovo but it is not so
visible within the ASI.
2. Assistance in the parliamentary development demands time commitment and not EU-standardised
2-year projects as in other fields of co-operation. Administrative aspects of EU presence need to be more
flexible and also coherent (individual EU member states’ representation vs. EU representation). In this
regard, more financial support is not necessary; actually a more rational budget spending is advised.
3. Beneficiaries should be involved from the planning phase of the project. If the EU (or any donor)
comes with a proposed content of Assembly support, local need-assessment is fruitless and pointless. EU
recommendations also need to be implementable (not only theoretically well established). People who come
to the field need to have proper information about the situation, the reality and the history of Kosovo and
should have experience in working in state institutions or from working in previous programs in Kosovo.
University professors do not contribute much to Assembly capacity-building. Beneficiary’s proactiveness
needs to be achieved/stimulated.
4. The EU is in a prime position to co-ordinate donor activities (especially if main partners are state
actors), if it were the main donor in a particular geographical area. However, hand-over of the co-ordination
of MSP activities needs to be planed and done properly. In this regard the EU should support locals who
could later on take such positions.
1.6. Overall Conclusions of the ASI Case Study
The ASI is a successful MSP which reached its primary and secondary aims and positively affected all
stakeholders. It not only enabled capacities of MPs, political and administrative bodies of the Assembly
itself, but also brought substantial matters like equal ethnic and gender representation on the table and made
them normatively embedded in the parliamentary process. Relations between the Government and the
133

Assembly were not extremely positively impacted by the ASI, but the role of civil society however, is being
exposed at least at the level of awareness-rising if not capability for active participation. The ASI’s main
failure was to face the new situation in Kosovo (declaration of independence) which politically disabled an
active role of the main ASI co-ordination partner (the OSCE) and despite a year-long transition period, the
ASI activities decreased after the Kosovo Assembly itself took over the co-ordination in January 2009.
Successful co-ordination of ASI partners’ activities until then was enabled by:
- highly professional and personally-engaged co-ordination by Mr. Franklin de Vrieze, who was able
to build trust among the major partners with otherwise conflicting agendas,
- the fact that de Vrieze was an OSCE representative, whereby the OSCE included both major
international actors with potentially conflicting agendas, namely the EU and the USA,
- informal structure and open equal partnership-based decision-making procedures,
- inclusion of needs assessment from the part of the beneficiaries, and
- no common budget and consequentially no potential tensions in this respect.
It should also be noted that the beneficiaries of the ASI are not a group of actors with various interests, but a
relatively homogenous actor (Kosovo Assembly). Despite the fact that the Assembly has an administrative
and political function/organisation, this did not affect the diverse interests on the part of the beneficiary. It
did, however, represent an interest-based conflict for two major actors (NDI and the EAR Consortium),
which in the end was well co-ordinated. EAR mainly focused on building capacities of the Assembly
administration and NDI mainly worked with the parliamentary commissions (as did the OSCE) and also
parliamentary groups. Also, Kosovo civil society did not take part in the ASI except for KIPRED (a research
centre), which also diminished possible interest-based rivalry on the side of the beneficiary. The overall
impression of all ASI actors is that the Kosovo Assembly ownership of the ASI was low due to its inability
to assess needs (lack of knowledge, capability) and communicate them (MPs knowledge of languages).
However, the Kosovo Assembly did profit from the ASI immensely in terms of capacity-building. The ASI
approach could be adjusted to other areas with similar needs, but Franklin de Vrieze, assessing from his
current position of the UNDP program manager for the global program of parliamentary development,
observes that parliaments in the world usually do not have the time or luxury to explore so many
parliamentary models and then decide which one suits them best, as did the Kosovo Parliament. 157
The ASI donor co-ordination mechanism increased the efficiency of the international support to the
Kosovo Assembly. This was done by avoiding same or similar support programmes, pooling of resources
and by providing long term planning. 158 ASI’s impact should however not be overestimated in terms that it
changed preferences of international actors involved in this MSP since achieving partners’ preference change
157 Interview with Frankin de Vrieze.
158 Most prominent achievements are: Assembly Standards Plan (2006), Evaluation of the work of the Kosovo Assembly and
recommendations for further development (2008) (Interview with Artan Canhasi).
134

was not ASI’s purpose. The impact of ASI is a better coexistence of international donors in the Assembly
support and definitely achieving some kind of professional trust and credibility among partners. 159 The cooperation
between the Kosovo MPs and their European counterparts has obviously improved. But it is now
up to Kosovo MPs to follow the offers for co-operation which are forwarded to them. 160 The Former
President of the Assembly believes that ASI is still needed for another ten years. 161
Area and range of the ASI MSP concur with the theoretical outlines of the TWP; ASI focus is mainly
on the national area of Kosovo. As for the presupposition on the balance of national actors’ inclusion in the
MSP, ASI has proven to be an ambiguous case; public actors in the ASI do prevail, but they do not downplay
the civic actors (e.g. research centres, universities) in participation of the ASI. However, it is relevant to add
that there is only one strongly included civic actor in the ASI (KIPRED) and in the last year of ASI existence
one other civic actor has joined implementation – Consortium of Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy in
the Kosovo Assembly.
Governance, seen as an operational concept that describes the process of decision-making and the
process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented) can be assessed as the main issue area of
direct and indirect ASI contribution. Contributing to capacity building of individual MPs, parliamentary
committees and Assembly administrative staff’s knowledge and abilities to fully participate in the
democratic process of decision-making strongly improved the quality and main purpose of the parliamentary
democracy as a type of society governance. The ASI has mostly contributed to the following aspects of
transparent and accountable institutions, strong skills and competence, and a fundamental willingness to do
the right thing, which are understood as overall elements of good governance: participation, human rights,
consensus building, equity and inclusiveness and accountability. As democracy refers to a number of core
“ingredients” that have to be put in place and the capacity which has to be built, such as genuine and
competitive elections and political processes, the ASI can mostly be evaluated as a successful MSP ensuring
or even more so enabling initial level of democratic process to be implemented in Kosovo as a society with
non-democratic political tradition. (Ability for) participation has definitely improved on the side of MPs and
civil society as well. However, the capability to take over the process of ASI co-ordination has proven as as a
major deficiency and needs to be further developed.
In terms of post-conflict reconciliation, the ASI has – within the context of good governance –
contributed to understanding and socialisation of general principles of consensus building, equity and
inclusiveness. In the end of the international ASI co-ordination, one can observe full internalisation of the
norm of equal representation of a) women and b) non-majority ethnic groups in the parliamentary process.
159 Interview with Nora Fargasc.
160 Interview with Hugues de Courtivron.
161 Interview with Kole Berisha.
135

1.7. Annexes
1.7.1. Annex I: List of interviews
CODE-
NAME
C/ASI/1 Franklin de
Vrieze
NAME POSITION INSTITUTION TYPE OF
ACTOR
ASI co-ordinator (Oct.
2001– Jan. 2009) and
Head of Central Assembly
and Political Parties
Section of the OSCE
(Aug. 2001–Jan. 2009)
C/ASI/2 Blerim Vela Programme Officer,
Central Assembly and
Political Parties Section,
Democratization
Department, OMiK
ASI co-ordinator
& OSCE
OSCE Mission in
Kosovo
C/ASI/3 Anonymus Anonymus OSCE Mission in
Kosovo
C/ASI/4 Nora Forgacs OSCE representative,
(formerly) Senior Advisor
and Deputy Chief, Central
Assembly Unit of the
OSCE
C/ASI/5 Artan Canhasi formerly OSCE Mission
in Kosovo, National
Programme Officer
C/ASI/6
Shpresa
Azemi
C/ASI/7 Alfons B.
Lentze
C/ASI/8 Hugues de
Courtivron
Project Manager of the
Support to the Assembly
of Kosovo 2003–05 and of
Further Support to the
Assembly of Kosovo
2006–08
senior legal expert in EAR
Consortium of the four
Parliaments (from January
2006 until February 2008)
(formerly) Team Leader
of the EAR-funded Project
“Further Support to the
Assembly of Kosovo” and
representative of IIPLD
(Institut International
OSCE Mission in
Kosovo
OSCE Mission in
Kosovo
European Agency
for Reconstruction
(EAR); Support to
the Assembly of
Kosovo 2003–05
(Consortium of three
Parliaments: FRA,
GER and BEL) and
Further Support to
the Assembly of
Kosovo 2006–08
(Consortium of four
Parliaments: FRA,
GER, BEL and SLO)
European Agency
for Reconstruction
(EAR)
European Agency
for Reconstruction
(EAR)
international
PLACE &
DATE
OF
INTERVIE
W
Ljubljana &
Brussels,
telephone
interview, 8
October 2009
international Priština, 4
September
2009
international Written
interview, 29
September
2009
international Prištna, 14
November
2009
international Written
Interview, 1
December
2009
international Priština, 24
September
2009
international
international
Written
interview, 12
November
2009
Written
interview, 4
November
2009
136

Paris-La Défense),
renamed later IIPEC
(Institut International pour
les Etudes Comparatives)
C/ASI/9 Rinor Beka Senior Program Officer National Democratic
Institute (NDI)
C/ASI/10
Edmond
Efendija
Senior Program Manager,
Legislative Strengthening
Program
C/ASI/11 Jetmir Bakija project manager of the
Consortium
of
Strengthening Civil
Society Advocacy in the
Kosovo Assembly
C/ASI/12 Nora Sahatçiu UNDP Project Manager,
Assembly of Kosovo,
MDG Programme
C/ASI/13
Ismet
Krasniqi
Secretary General of the
Assembly of Kosovo
C/ASI/14 Kole Berisha former President of the
Assembly
C/ASI/15 But Dedaj former head of Cabinet of
president of Kosovo
Assembly (March 2006 to
December 2007)
C/ASI/16 Ramë Buja Head of the Parliamentary
Group of the Democratic
Party of Kosovo
C/ASI/17 Ardian Gjini Head of the Parliamentary
Group of the AAK
(Alliance for the Future of
Kosovo)
C/ASI/18 Gjylnaze Syla Member of the Assembly,
C/ASI/19
C/ASI/20
Ibrahim
Makolli
Eset Rama,
Nagip Tahiri
AAK
Head of the Parliamentary
Group of the AKR (New
Kosovo Alliance) (2007-)
Director of the
Coordination Secretariat
of the Government
Senior Legislation Officer
in the Coordination
Secretariat of the
Government and Liaison
Officer of the Government
with the Assembly of
Kosovo
National Democratic
Institute (NDI)
international Priština, 9
September
2009
international Written
interview, 29
January 2010
civic Priština, 24
September
2009
Consortium of
Strengthening Civil
Society Advocacy in
the Kosovo
Assembly (members
are: BIRN – Balkan
Investigative
Reporting Network
Kosovo, Kosovo
Democratic Institute
and NDI)
UNDP international Priština, 24
September
2009
Kosovo Assembly public Priština, 28
September
2009
Kosovo Assembly public Priština, 27
October 2009
Kosovo Assembly public Priština, 27
October 2009
Parliamentary Group
of the PDK
(Democratic Party of
Kosovo)
Parliamentary group
of the AAK
Parliamentary group
of the AAK
Parliamentary group
of the AKR
Government
Kosovo
of
public Priština, 25
September
2009
public Priština, 9
October
2009
public Priština, 15
October 2009
public Priština, 8
October
2009
public Priština, 14
October 2009
137

C/ASI/21 Qemajl Senior Researcher at KIPRED, The
Marmullakaj KIPRED (involved as Kosovo Institute for
KIPRED representative in
ASI since 2006)
Policy and Research
Development
C/ASI/22 Besa Luzha Program Coordinator Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung
C/ASI/23 Minire Citahu Office Prishtina Friedrich-Naumann-
Foundation
civic Priština, 13
October 2009
international Priština, 14
October 2009
international Priština, 21
October 2009
1.7.2. Annex II: List of ASI activities outside the territory of Kosovo
- Visits of the delegation of all parliamentary groups of the Assembly of Kosovo to the Dutch
Parliament and Assembly within the East-West Foundation’s Parliamentary Practice Project
(EWPPP), funded by the Dutch Foreign Ministry, within the framework of a long-term programme
in support of the Assembly of Kosovo called, “Aspects and techniques of parliamentary democracy”
under the Dutch financial support. 162
- Study visit of a mixed delegation of two Assembly Members and five Secretariat Staff of the
Assembly of Kosovo visited the Belgian House of Representatives and the European Parliament
within the SPEAK project (Support to Parliamentary Electronic Archives in Kosovo), managed by
Inter-Parliamentary Union and UNDP-Kosovo. 163
- Visit of the Press and Public Information Section of the Assembly of Kosovo to Slovenian
parliament, organized by OSCE Central Governance Support and Media Teams. 164
- Visit of a Kosovo Assembly delegation to the Greek Parliament in Athens, facilitated by EWPPP. 165
- Working visit to Sarajevo of the Kosovo Assembly Committee on Labour and Social Welfare,
organised by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) within its regional parliamentary exchange program. 166
- Visit to the Slovenian, Macedonian and Bosnian parliaments by the delegation from the Kosovo
Assembly Committee for Emergency Preparedness, facilitated by the Department of
Democratisation of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. 167
- Study visit to Berlin by members of the parliamentary Committee for Education, Science and
Technology, the Minister for Education, Science and Technology and the Assembly President,
organised within the educational programme of advice and expertise to Kosovo by the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). 168
162 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), p. 9.
163 ASI newsletter (2004, no. 10), pp. 18–19.
164 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), p. 22.
165 ASI newsletter (2005, no. 17), p. 16.
166 ASI newsletter (2004, no. 10), p. 19.
167 ASI newsletter (2006, no. 23), p. 8.
168 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), p. 5.
138

- Study trips to the Assemblée nationale in Paris, the Chambre of Représentants de Belgique in
Brussels and the Deutscher Bundestag in Berlin, organised by EWPPP and EAR. 169
- Working visit of the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the Committee for Budget, Committee
for Trade and Industry and Committee for Finance and Economy of the Kosovo Assembly to
Austrian Parliament, organized by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. 170
- Visits of the Kosovo parliamentary group to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly regional seminar
and New Parliamentarians Programme by guest invitation by NATO Parliamentary Assembly in coorganization
by OSCE mission in Kosovo. 171 Visits of the Kosovo Assembly members to NATO
Parliamentary Assembly have been much facilitated by the OSCE, because the latter “was looking
into the inclusion of Kosovo’s Assembly into parliamentary organizations and inter-parliamentary
events taking into account that this was and somehow still is politically sensitive. This has been a
development from traditional learning and working visits to more representational and inclusive
participation of Kosovo Assembly as members in inter-parliamentary institutions. 172
- OSCE also facilitated and always accompanied Kosovo members of the Parliament to annual visits
to the European Parliament’s working visits to the informal joined working group the European
Parliament-the Assembly of Kosovo. Three of these annual meetings took place before the
independence declaration and they discussed general affairs in Kosovo, but also very much the
development in the Parliament. The fourth one took place after the independence declaration. 173
- A visit to Ljubljana by journalists covering the Kosovo Assembly, to observe RTV Slovenia and its
coverage of the Slovene Parliament, co-organized by Teams on Media Support and Central
Governance Support from the OSCE Department of Democratization. 174
- Participation of the Kosovo Assembly delegation at the regional conference of Parliaments from
South-East Europe with the help of OSCE missions from the region. 175
- Participation of a multi-party delegation composed of members of all political parties – with the
exception of Coalition Povratak (KP) – as well as an equal number of NGO representatives at the
Seminar on Political Schools of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Strasbourg, organized
by the Council of Europe. 176
- Participation of a Kosovo Assembly delegation of all six parliamentary groups in the regional
parliamentary conference with civil society in Thessaloniki on “Legislatures and Citizens: Promoting
EU Standards of Good Governance and Rule of Law at the Domestic and Regional Level”, a
169 ASI newsletter (2005, no. 14), p. 11.
170 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), p. 22.
171 ASI newsletter (2005, no. 17), p. 7; ASI Newsletter (2007, no. 29), p. 16.
172 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
173 Interview with Franklin de Vrieze.
174 ASI newsletter (2004, no. 10), p. 22
175 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), pp. 10–12; ASI newsletter (2005, no. 18), pp. 4–5; ASI newsletter (2006, no. 25), p. 12; ASI
newsletter (2007, no. 28), pp. 10–11.
176 ASI newsletter (2003, no. 9), p. 23.
139

conference organized by the East West Parliamentary Practice Project (EWPPP) and the
participation supported by the OSCE. 177
1.7.3. Annex III: Text of the ASI admission statement
“The Assembly Support Initiative (ASI) is the inter-agency coordination mechanism of democratization
programmes in support of the Assembly of Kosovo, seeking to strengthen and professionalize the Assembly
of Kosovo. The work of ASI focuses on a democratic political culture based upon acknowledge of and
respect for democratic rules of procedure, transparency and accountability to the public, developing and
implementing a legislative agenda, oversight over the Executive, respect for the multi-linguality and
participation in regional and inter-parliamentary contacts. ASI partners work to bring resources together,
share information and coordinate programs while identifying needs in direct interaction with the Assembly.
A regular ASI Newsletter informs a broad domestic and international public on the developments in the
Assembly of Kosovo as well as the ASI support programmes.”
177 ASI newsletter (2005, no. 17), p. 17.
140

2. Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Programme
By Paolo Binami (consultant contracted by Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
The National Solidarity Program (NSP)
Description
The National Solidarity Programme was created by the Government of
Afghanistan to develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan,
manage and monitor their own development projects. NSP promotes a
development paradigm whereby communities are empowered to make
decisions and manage resources during all stages of the project cycle. The
programme lays the foundation for a sustainable form of inclusive local
governance, rural reconstruction, and poverty alleviation. NSP is the largest
community development programme in the history of Afghanistan. Known in
Dari as 'Hambastagi Milli' and in Pashtu as 'Milli Paiwastoon', it is based on
the Afghan traditions of 'Ashar' (i.e. community members working together on
a volunteer basis to improve community infrastructure) and 'Jirga' – councils
comprised of respected members of the community. Islamic values of unity,
equity and justice are also encouraged. (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, n.d., p. 8)
The NSP builds capacity at the community level to enhance the competence of
CDC [Community Development Council] male and female members in terms
of financial management, procurement, technical skills, and transparency. Once
the CDC has been elected, an inclusive and innovative inductive model is
followed to develop a Community Development Plan (CDP). Formulating a
CDP is an exercise that allows the CDC to map out its development
requirements and prioritize them. Subproject proposals are then developed to
apply for funding.
The NSP provides direct Block Grant transfers to a bank account established by
the CDCs to support rehabilitation and development activities planned and
implemented by the elected CDCs. The funding takes the form of Block Grants
which are calculated at US$ 200 per family with an average grant of US$
33,000 and maximum of US$ 60,000 per community. Portions of the Block
Grant are released for procurement and phased implementation of the approved
subproject(s).
Actors involved
NSP has four core programme elements:
- Facilitating elections to establish Community Development Councils;
- Building the capacities of CDC and community members (both men and
women) to identify priority sub-projects, prepare Community Development
Plans, and implement approved sub-projects. This includes developing skills in
participation, consensus-building, accounting, procurement and contract
management, operations and maintenance, and monitoring;
- Providing direct block grant transfers to fund sub-projects;
- Linking CDCs to government agencies , NGOs, and donors to improve
access to services and resources. (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, n.d.)
- Civic: 22'000+ rural communities and their elected CDCs (although they are
141

increasingly assuming the profile of public institutions).
- Seven national NGOs: Afghan Development Association (ADA), Afghanistan
National Re-Construction Coordination (ANCC), Afghan Rehabilitation &
Education Programme (AREP), Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
(CHA), Ghazni Rural Support Programme (GRSP), Partners for Social
Development, Sanayee Development Organization (SDO) as facilitating
partners.
- Public: MRRD, the core NSP structure under MRRD (Management Units of
the provincial, regional and central levels), NSP Steering Committee (an interministerial
committee established to provide advice on overall programme
direction and policies. It is chaired by the Second Vice President of
Afghanistan).
- Private: construction companies implementing the construction and
rehabilitation of schools at district level (DSCRW).
- Int’l civic: 20 international NGOs, such as ACTED, ActionAid, AfghanAid,
AKDN, BRAC, CARE, Concern, DACAAR, FutureGenerations,
Welthungerhilfe (GAA), IRC, Inter Co-operation, MADERA, NPO/RRAA,
Oxfam, PIN, Relief International, SCA, Solidarités, ZOA Refugee Care as
facilitating partners.
- Int’l public: international donors partners include The World
Bank/International Development Association (IDA), European Union (through
EC via ARTF), Government of the United States (through USAID via ARTF),
Government of the United Kingdom (through DFID via ARTF), Government
of Canada (through CIDA via ARTF), Government of Japan (through JSDF via
ARTF), Government of Germany (via ARTF), Government of Sweden (via
ARTF and SIDA), Government of Norway, Government of Denmark,
Government of The Netherlands, Government of Switzerland, Government of
Australia, Government of Finland, Government of Czech Republic,
Government of New Zealand. One public international body, UN-HABITAT,
as facilitating partner.
- Int’l private: British development consultancy firm Maxwell Stamp as
Management Support Consultant (MSC); FLAG as FP
Issue area
Good governance and the rule of law
Geographic range Nation-wide at the community level (with the exception of some districts,
where the security situation has prevented implementation), with primary
coverage limited to rural communities.
Time scale 2003-present (March 2010)
Operation & Although most relationships in the NSP are defined in terms of contractual
institutionalization
Regular meetings
Decision structure
relationships (establishing a hierarchical form of governance), this myriad of
contractual relations and agreements, in the day-to-day management requires
joint planning, decision-making and implementation.
Most relationships are institutionalised through contracts, agreements, and even
– as in the case of the CDCs by-laws – a Presidential decree (although never
ratified by the Parliament). RRD Directors facilitate a weekly meeting with the
NSP provincial unit managers and FP provincial managers to discuss
implementation issues and identify solutions.
142

2.1. Introduction to the NSP Case Study
2.1.1. Methodological note
This case study report draws on the interview reports prepared by the MULTIPART field research team in
Afghanistan (WP5c) and the relatively abundant publications on the National Solidarity Programme (NSP).
MULTIPART internal division of work assigns field research to the country team WP5c while
bibliographical desk research and the write up of the case study itself are allocated to a researcher in Europe
within the framework of, in this case, the <strong>thematic</strong> working group on democracy, good governance, rule of
law (WP 4c).
The budget allocated for the field research allowed the country teams to carry out only a limited
number of field interviews per case study, thus limiting the possibility of collecting new empirical data.
Besides, the division of work between the country and <strong>thematic</strong> teams, combined with budget constraints,
implied that the author of this case study could not travel to the field during the research phase, not even on
the occasion of the presentation of preliminary results of the study to stakeholders during the in-country
roundtable.
The field team interviewed 19 informants in three cities (Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad) and conducted a
focus group with a Community Development Council's members in a rural district of Nangarhar province
during the months from July to November 2009. Out of 19 informants, almost two thirds (11) work for
Facilitating Partners (FP), all NGO managers with the exception of one private company official. While FPs
play an important role connecting the local with the national level of the programme, this skewed selection
of informants inevitably introduces a bias in the perceptions of the internal dynamics of the Multistakeholder
partnership (MSP). This factor has been taken into account and partially controlled for taking
advantage or further comments and feedback from stakeholders following the round-table discussion held in
Kabul on 11 January 2010.
The National Solidarity Programme is a complex partnership of around fifty members at the central
level plus over 22 thousand local rural communities that has been in operation for over six years. Given this
complexity, qualitative research alone – as per the remit of this study and MULTIPART in general – can
illustrate certain aspects of the partnership at a given time, perhaps discern some trends in its evolution.
However, as a general caveat on the delimitation of the epistemological limits of this study, unless otherwise
specified, all the findings presented in this study, despite being each of them grounded either in existing
publications or supported by MULTIPART field research, are at best descriptive, able to sketch a facet of a
complex phenomenon at a given time. They are not meant to be generalized to the whole partnership and
they cannot be generalized.
143

This case study is not a comprehensive evaluation of the whole programme. It rather focuses only on
NSP as a multi-stakeholder partnership in local governance. NSP has many other facets, including the
obvious rural development core component, that are beyond the scope of this case study.
2.1.2. Brief description of the NSP
The National Solidarity Programme is arguably a unique example of multi-stakeholder partnership in the
history of Afghanistan, whereby for the first time the Central government engages countrywide with a vast
array of actors, private and civic, in introducing democratic local governance and community driven
development.
The National Solidarity Programme was created by the Government of Afghanistan to
develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own
development projects. NSP promotes a development paradigm whereby communities are
empowered to make decisions and manage resources during all stages of the project cycle.
The programme lays the foundation for a sustainable form of inclusive local governance,
rural reconstruction, and poverty alleviation. NSP is the largest community development
programme in the history of Afghanistan. Known in Dari as 'Hambastagi Milli' and in Pashtu
as 'Milli Paiwastoon', it is based on the Afghan traditions of 'Ashar' (i.e. community
members working together on a volunteer basis to improve community infrastructure) and
'Jirga' – councils comprised of respected members of the community. Islamic values of
unity, equity and justice are also encouraged. (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, n.d., p. 8)
The NSP builds capacity at the community level to enhance the competence of CDC
[Community Development Council] male and female members in terms of financial
management, procurement, technical skills, and transparency. Once the CDC has been
elected, an inclusive and innovative inductive model is followed to develop a Community
Development Plan (CDP). Formulating a CDP is an exercise that allows the CDC to map out
its development requirements and prioritize them. Subproject proposals are then developed
to apply for funding.
The NSP provides direct Block Grant transfers to a bank account established by the CDCs to
support rehabilitation and development activities planned and implemented by the elected
CDCs. The funding takes the form of Block Grants which are calculated at US$ 200 per
family with an average grant of US$ 33,000 and maximum of US$ 60,000 per community.
Portions of the Block Grant are released for procurement and phased implementation of the
approved subproject(s).
NSP has four core programme elements:
- Facilitating elections to establish Community Development Councils;
- Building the capacities of CDC and community members (both men and women) to
identify priority sub-projects, prepare Community Development Plans, and implement
approved sub-projects. This includes developing skills in participation, consensus-building,
accounting, procurement and contract management, operations and maintenance, and
monitoring;
- Providing direct block grant transfers to fund sub-projects;
- Linking CDCs to government agencies , NGOs, and donors to improve access to services
and resources. (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, n.d.)
144

The NSP is governmental programme under the responsibility of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation &
Development (MRRD). Started in 2003, at the time of writing the programme is entering its third three-year
phase, also called NSP-III. The 22'480 rural communities mobilized until 21 December 2009 and 22'080
community development plans already completed in 359 districts across all of 34 provinces of Afghanistan
are a remarkable success. 178 Still, another estimated 9000 communities, almost one third of the total, have not
been covered yet: half of them for security reasons, the others because of a very low population density,
often combined with extremely poor infrastructure and the lack of other necessary pre-conditions.
The programme's total budget until the end of 2009 (21 December) has surpassed one billion US
dollars (1'162'570'329) of which USD 964'726'620 already spent with the following cost structure: 179
Block grants directly paid to rural communities 71,2 %
Facilitating Partners 18,9 %
Operational, management and other support costs * 8,6 %
District School Rehabilitation and Construction 1,3 %
* Including consultancies, GTZ and Maxwell Stamp contracts, MRRD's own
incremental operational costs.
The NSP, considered as the core ministerial department in Kabul and provincial offices, and including all its
Facilitating Partners has an employee base of approximately 6'000 across the country. 180
2.1.3. The context in which it operates: local governance in Afghanistan
Since 1795 when the city of Kabul became the seat of state power in Afghanistan it has remained the
material embodiment of the central power. Hence, seizing this city means seizing the state. The ability of the
central government (hukumat) in Kabul to exert its power over the countryside has traditionally been tenuous
when compared with European modern nation-states. Local autonomies have traditionally been and continue
to remain strong, especially in the Eastern and South-Eastern tribal belt.
An early western description of the Constitutions of the Afghauns, where 'Afghan' in these early texts
is synonymous with Pathan, Pashtun or Pakhtun, by the British envoy, Montstuart Elphinstone, tries to
identify a model of government. But before analysing the central government, Elphinstone turns to what can
be labelled today as the problem of local governance:
178 From http://www.nspafghanistan.org, accessed on 16 January 2010.
179 NSP monthly report, 21 December 2009, MRRD, Kabul. Following a specific request by the author, the NSP public information
office failed to provide the breakdown of its expenditures by solar year, with the exception of the current SY1388.
180 From http://www.nspafghanistan.org, accessed on 3 February 2010.
145

As each tribe has a government of its own, and constitutes a complete commonwealth within
itself, it may be well to examine the rise and present situation of those commonwealths,
before we proceed to consider them as composing one state, or one confederacy, under a
common sovereign. (Elphinstone, 1819, p. 253)
Although Elphinstone offers an enjoyable reading rich of insights, it is his methodological approach that is
especially relevant even today. As in the present times analytical reports pile up hawking the ultimate
assessment on Afghan society and politics, the following cautionary statement about the risks in developing
an idealized description of the Afghan political system is of particular interest:
The system of government which I have described, is so often deranged by circumstances
like the following, that it is seldom found in full force; and must, therefore, be considered
rather as the model on which all the governments of tribes are formed, than a correct
description of any one of them. There is probably no case where some link is not wanting in
the chain of authorities, which ought to descend from the Khaun to the heads of families. A
clan, khail, or other branch, often becomes independent in all internal affairs, without
throwing off all connection with its superiors; so that it is neither subordinate as a branch of
an Oolooss, nor independent as an Oolooss. (Elphinstone, 1819, p. 260)
With the final caveat against developing an excessive belief to ones own models because there's one
independent variable that's virtually impossible to frame:
But more frequently, the chiefs are neglected, and every subdivision, every quarter, and even
every family, throws off its reverence on its superiors, and acts according to its own interest
or inclination. (Elphinstone, 1819, p. 260)
According to Elphinstone, every subdivision thus acts for itself, or at least this is an always open and actively
sought for possibility. Although this may appear as a very simple formulation, it can help shed some light on
a preliminary understanding of local governance issues in Afghanistan today. There are some analytical
advantages in assuming the subdivision as the main unit of analysis. Departing from Elphinstone's original
context, the concept of subdivision doesn't carry in itself a culturally or historically determined meaning
(unlike clan or tribe or lineage), but can be easily extended to encompass also other social and politically
relevant actors like a militia and its commander, or an extended village community with its elders. The
subdivision is neither a freewheeling peripheral entity, nor an absolute central power. It is a part of a more
complex system, loosely structured in various levels, that exerts influence and sets constraints on the
subdivision itself, while the latter keeps a degree of autonomy and ability to enter into political relationships
with other subdivisions and various level of the system. The subdivision may settle for a temporary
arrangement of subordination and deference. However, as in every equilibrium where institutional
arrangements are prone to be swayed, when the political conditions are ripe, the subdivision can resort to
independent action, 'according to its own interest and inclination'.
In many poor countries such as in Afghanistan, political competition is not based as much on
political ideology or agenda as it is over redistribution of resources. Holding political power means having
political influence and access to government resources.
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The different stages of the state-building enterprise in Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2008) have seen
varying arrangements for two important variables: 1) how the rentier state (Rubin, 1995) obtained resources
from international powers and 2) under what pattern of local power structure these resources allowed some
degree of control over the countryside.
Abdur Rahaman's internal imperialism (Dupree, 1973) epitomizes the modernizing state with a
'strong centralized government' (Hukumat-e mutamarkiz-e qawi) that forcibly suppressed local autonomies of
subdivisions leaving behind a legacy of grudges especially among non-Pashtun nationalities:
from the perspective of both ruler and their subjects (rayat), an official government
appointment at any level was seen as a means of extracting and accumulating wealth from
the people and not one of dispensing the needed services for the 'citizens' (ruaya). Indeed,
state officials in all government institutions, including even village school teachers, who
were always appointed from the various ministries in the capital, Kabul, and almost always
in posts away from their own native territory, were viewed with few exceptions, by most
citizens as outside agents of abuse, corruption and oppression. Therefore, the creation and
perpetuation of feelings of mistrust towards government, and distrust of politics in general,
amongst the great majority of non-Mohammadzai, especially the non-Pushtun aqwam, has
been a crucial legacy of this century-long experience. (Shahrani, 1998, p. 230)
The fractured structure of the Afghan national power harbours a fundamental political conflict between the
centre and the subdivisions that may erupt whenever the local leaders see their power and autonomy
existentially threatened by the centre. This is a fundamentally political conflict largely independent of the
socially modernizing content of the reforms that the central government may be willing to enforce. In a
famous historical example of how King Amanullah's reformist programme failed dramatically in the 1920s:
social change or religious liberalism did not destroy [King] Amanullah so much as his efforts
to create a strong central government. It was this possibility that smelled of death to the tribal
leaders and mullahs, and this classical struggle between centralized power and tribal
separatism was resolved in blood and the downfall of a dynasty. (Poullada, 1973, p. 152)
The following Musahiban dynasty took a more nuanced approach towards the subdivisions, trying to
encapsulate them as much as possible through indirect rule. Nevertheless, the monarchy had to face various
tribal revolts in the 1930-40s (Mangal, Safi, etc) until the capabilities of the national army increased to the
point of achieving a clear tactical superiority over the tribal lashkars. Kabul's indirect rule on the
subdivisions suffers of an intrinsic instability:
While this system allowed a degree of control over the rural communities, there was inbuilt
tension between the administration and the local inhabitants. Enforcement of decisions by
the administration depended on force because the population usually did not see themselves
as objects of the administration (Barfield, 1984: 172-3). (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 4)
Different breeds of centralizers in the recent political history of Afghanistan span from the Khalqis (and to a
slightly lesser extent the Parchamis) to the Islamists like Rabbani and Hekmatiar, to the Taliban, and
eventually the democratic technocrats like Karzai. In fact, 'currently Afghanistan remains one of the most
highly centralised democracies in the world.' (Barakat, 2008, p. 56) All these regimes had to come to terms
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to the fundamental political conflict between centre-periphery and urban-rural as a common feature in
Afghan political history:
The modern history of Afghanistan has been characterized by an ongoing tension between
centre and periphery. The relationship between these two entities has often been cast in
dialectic terms, the rural areas representing the antithesis of the urban setting and its
government institutions. This notion of mutual exclusiveness found its expression in the
juxtaposition of word pairs like hukumat ('government') and yaghistan ('land of insolence'),
as well as sarkar ilaqa ('government area') and ghair ilaqa ('alien territory'). (Noelle, 1997,
p. 162; Noelle-Karimi, 2006)
The fundamental political conflict between centre and subdivisions overlaps with the local patterns of
conflict and cooperation among the subdivisions themselves. These factors shape a common 'Afghan
identity' that is fundamentally based on a shared political culture:
This Afghan identity is based on a common political culture which could be summarized as
follows. ‘Real’ political life is played out at the local level and primary loyalty lies with a
‘solidarity group’, whatever its sociological basis. This function can be fulfilled by any
community, clan, tribe, village etc., composed of an extended network of people who tend to
consider that they are protected by this group affiliation and that they could build on it for
whatever purpose (business relations, political constituency, patronage and clientelism, and
also - during the war - armed resistance). Ethnic identities are important but never prevail
over primordial identities [...] (Roy, 2003, p. 4)
This brief overview of an analytical approach to power structures and local government in Afghanistan (see
also (Lister, 2007, p. 3ff) for further discussion) provides a broad context in which NSP is bound to operate.
The programme,
aiming at creating a link between village institutions on the one hand and the interests of
government ministries and international donors on the other reflect a renewed approach
towards the tapping or moulding of local structures of governance. (Noelle-Karimi, 2006, p.
1)
Therefore the NSP is innovative as it introduces formal democratic institutions at the local level as the precondition
and conduit of development aid. Nevertheless it treads on the historically troubled terrain of
centre-subdivisions relations where the right approach may yield a handsome return in terms of consolidation
of peace and improvements in Human Security. However, the mishandling of centre-subdivisions policies
may trigger a conflict with the potential for unseating a dynasty or destroying a political regime.
2.1.4. Why the NSP was selected
Selection criteria
The NSP is an unprecedented attempt – in geographic scope and concept – at introducing formal democracy
at the local level in Afghanistan. The representation of multiple stakeholders at the central and local level is
built into the programme thus making it particularly attractive as a case study for the MULTIPART research.
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Apart from these general considerations, it matches the criteria established by the MULTIPART
methodological guide.
(1) Minimum of three types of actors, including one public actor
The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development (MRRD), through a core NSP structure, is responsible
for the NSP. It has contracted 28 NGOs (both national and international, and, in fact, including one
international firm, FLAG International) and one UN Agency (UN-Habitat) to work as Facilitating Partners
(FPs) directly with the targeted communities. A Management Support Consultant (MSC) supports the
MRRD with oversight of the NSP Departments of Finance, MIS and technical assistance across other NSP
Departments. The donors include World Bank/IDA, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the
Japanese Social Development Fund, and a number of bilateral donors. For overall advice, the NSP Steering
Committee has been established, as an inter-ministerial committee, chaired by the Second Vice President of
Afghanistan. The targeted communities are organised in elected Community Development Councils, which
are responsible for planning and implementing development projects.
Actors involved in NSP: 181
- Civic: 22'000+ rural communities and their elected CDCs (although they are increasingly assuming the
profile of public institutions).
- Seven national NGOs: Afghan Development Association (ADA), Afghanistan National Re-Construction
Coordination (ANCC), Afghan Rehabilitation & Education Programme (AREP), Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance (CHA), Ghazni Rural Support Programme (GRSP), Partners for Social
Development, Sanayee Development Organization (SDO) as facilitating partners.
- Public: MRRD, the core NSP structure under MRRD (Management Units of the provincial, regional and
central levels), NSP Steering Committee (an inter-ministerial committee established to provide advice on
overall programme direction and policies. It is chaired by the Second Vice President of Afghanistan).
- Private: construction companies implementing the construction and rehabilitation of schools at district level
(DSCRW).
- Int’l civic: 20 international NGOs, such as ACTED, ActionAid, AfghanAid, AKDN, BRAC, CARE,
Concern, DACAAR, FutureGenerations, Welthungerhilfe (GAA), IRC, Inter Co-operation, MADERA,
181 As in http://www.nspafghanistan.org, accessed on 18 December 2009.
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NPO/RRAA, Oxfam, PIN, Relief International, SCA, Solidarités,
partners.
ZOA Refugee Care as facilitating
- Int’l public: international donors partners include The World Bank/International Development Association
(IDA), European Union (through EC via ARTF), Government of the United States (through USAID via
ARTF), Government of the United Kingdom (through DFID via ARTF), Government of Canada (through
CIDA via ARTF), Government of Japan (through JSDF via ARTF), Government of Germany (via ARTF),
Government of Sweden (via ARTF and SIDA), Government of Norway, Government of Denmark,
Government of The Netherlands, Government of Switzerland, Government of Australia, Government of
Finland, Government of Czech Republic, Government of New Zealand. One public international body, UN-
HABITAT, as facilitating partner.
- Int’l private: British development consultancy firm Maxwell Stamp as Management Support Consultant
(MSC); FLAG as FP
NSP actors matrix
Nature
Civic Nat.
Civic
Internat.
Public Nat.
Public
Internat.
Private Nat.
Private
Internat.
Function
Responsible
agency/
management,
oversight
GTZ (2003-
06)
MRRD
(NSP) with
provincial
reps.
Maxwell
Stamp
(2007-2009)
Interministerial
steering
committee
Facilitating
Partner
(29)
ADA,
ANCC, …
(7)
CARE,
DACAAR,
ZOA, BRAC
… (20)
UN-
HABITAT
FLAG
Beneficiary
Rural
communities
and elected
CDCs
(22'080)
Donor
WB (ARTF),
various
official aid
agencies (a
dozen)
Implementing
partner
construction
companies
(DSCRW).
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(2) Planning, decision-making, implementation and minimum degree of institutionalization
Although most relationships in the NSP are defined in terms of contractual relationships (establishing a
hierarchical form of governance), this myriad of contractual relations and agreements, in the day-to-day
management requires joint planning, decision-making and implementation. For example, in addition to
primary contracts between the MRRD and the FP, the FP also signs tripartite agreements with the
participating communities and provincial RRD Directors.
Most relationships are institutionalised through contracts, agreements, and even – as in the case of
the CDCs by-laws – a Presidential decree (although never ratified by the Parliament). RRD Directors
facilitate a weekly meeting with the NSP provincial unit managers and FP provincial managers to discuss
implementation issues and identify solutions.
(3) Geographical focus of activities
Nation-wide at the community level (with the exception of some districts, where the security situation has
prevented implementation), with primary coverage targeting rural communities.
(4) Functionality and longevity
2003-present (March 2010)
(5) Availability of sufficient data and contacts:
http://www.nspafghanistan.org; and many evaluation, reports and articles
Potential significance
The potential significance of a programme like NSP for peace-building can be graphically summarised in a
chart as follows (MULTIPART interview, Kabul):
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Other informants hint at this possible positive feedback especially in areas whose security is not totally
compromised. CDCs try to prevent conflict and keep their area in peace because they know that without
security they cannot be successful in obtaining people participation and therefore in completing their
development projects. (MULTIPART interview, Kabul). Nevertheless, lack of security is a common
widespread concern among NSP local partners. (MULTIPART interview, Herat). Security is the main
implementation problem together with insufficient women participation and delays in payments
(MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad).
According to one FP representative, the presence of traditional figures of authority – mullah, elders,
commanders - inside the CDC would further prevent enmities and conflict in the community, thus keeping
the Taliban and other insurgents out (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
There are signs of a positive potential for NSP to improve security. In a survey of school burnings by
the Taliban during 2006, 'Human Rights Watch observed that schools built by the NSP have less chance of
being destroyed by insurgents than schools built by other aid programs.' (Warner, 2007)
However, if political violence escalates beyond a certain level, NSP cannot operate in the first place.
In fact, as seen from an international donor's perspective, the potential of NSP to contribute to conflict
resolution in the areas where it is most needed is limited. It is exactly in these places that NSP has trouble
establishing and traditional structures are considered more legitimate (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
2.2. The formation, development and operation of the NSP
2.2.1. How and why the NSP was formed
Interviewees and the existing literature highlight several main 'external' and 'internal' factors that ignited NSP
conceptualization and take off:
- a general trend and various experiences in other countries in Community Based/Driven Development
(CDD) (Masefield, 2004), and particularly a World Bank programme to provide block grants to
communities in Indonesia, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) during 1998-2008;
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul) (Warner, 2007) another community driven reconstruction
programme, albeit on a smaller scale, that has been recalled by informants has been implemented in
northern Liberia by IRC in 2006-2007 (MULTIPART interview, Kabul) and was fully evaluated
with a randomized control trial in 2008. (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2008)
- the specific experience gained in CDD at the local level by various NGOs operating in Afghanistan
since the 1990s like, among others, DACAAR, Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN) and
SCA; (Torabi, 2007, p. 7) (Barakat, M. Evans, Strand, & Brown, 2006)
- the specific experience gained in CDD at the local level since 1990s by some Afghan NGO officials
who found themselves in key positions in the new interim administration after the fall of the Taliban
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egime; in particular Anif Atmar as Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development;
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul) (Torabi, 2007, p. 7)
- UN-HABITAT facilitated an Afghan-owned grass-root development action from 1995-2001 with the
establishment of 'community forums'. (Affolter, Sawayz, Noori, & Shrestha, 2006, p. 76)
- the role of Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as both a former WB official and interim minister of finance in
2002-2004; (MULTIPART interview, Kabul)
- the easy availability of financial resources from international donors eager to spend in post-Taliban
Afghanistan matched the nature of a programme that provided donors with reasonable assurances
that their money would reach rural communities and be spent in relevant projects. All in the context
of a post-conflict (the Taliban insurgency was not yet a factor of any significance), rather chaotic
situation where more sophisticated development planning (assuming that this would be desirable at
all) was impossible for lack of data and infrastructure (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
NSP and other similar CDD programmes are peculiar because they introduce from the top a bottom-up
approach to development and governance, while at the same time establishing a comprehensive partnership
between central government and rural communities:
The fact that the central government has engaged the communities in a partnership for
reconstruction and development for the first time in Afghan history has been an empowering
experience. It signals not only a process of democracy introduced "from above", but it may
also foster the emergence of democracy "from below" in a partnership between government
and local communities, where the communities are enabled to establish more legitimate
leadership that can interact with government authorities in a range of different tasks.
(Boesen, 2004, p. 61)
The introduction of new local institutions with a top-down approach can be problematic. For example the
identification of the 'village' as the basic unit of rural settlement is seen as a potentially contentious choice
because it 'reflects the fact that a state apparatus has achieved the penetration, ordering and categorisation of
its territory on a micro level'. (Mielke & Schetter, 2007) On a more operational level, deciding which
villages in the selected districts would receive NSP first, second and third represented a potentially
contentious issue. Some FP decided to open up this decision process to include local power holders.
(Maynard, 2007, p. 7)
To soften the top-down approach of introducing new institutions, the Facilitating Partners mobilised
communities and:
first organized community-wide small-group gatherings where villagers would consult about
their economic, social and organizational community problems. As a result, two proposals
would emerge: one addressing the need and value of regular consultation on village
development needs; and another one to have a smaller group of trustworthy and competent
representatives who could make decisions on behalf of the community. (Affolter et al., 2006,
p. 79)
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Reasons for joining
Different groups of partners give different reasons (and misgivings) for joining the partnership based on their
interests and goals. However, as every functional group has several individual partners that are far from
homogeneous, the following generalizations should be taken with caution.
Facilitating Partners stress that for serious, committed and ambitious NGOs the programme
represents an occasion to extend the scope and impact of their work in rural development. Besides, becoming
an NSP facilitator raises the profile of an NGO vis a vis its peers and potential donors for other projects.
Finally, the programme offers financially attractive, relatively long term (three-years) contracts.
For international donors, as already mentioned, the programme represent a good opportunity to see
aid money reaching the beneficiaries on a wide scale despite the high overheads (Barakat et al., 2006, pp.
18, 122) implied by the establishment of the programme delivery structure at the national and local level
during year one and two.
For the rural communities – an even more heterogeneous group – the programme presents an
obvious and attractive financial incentive, providing cash for badly needed infrastructure projects. Beyond
the direct financial incentive, the programme meets the favour of the rural communities also because it
respects their essential aspiration to autonomy while at the same time allowing them to enter into an
partnership with the central government. The bottom-up approach and institutionalized partnership provide
enough room for keeping a healthy distance from central government arbitrary interference that has plagued
the centre-subdivisions relations in the past.
2.2.2 How the NSP developed over time
Changes in membership
MRRD's own NSP department takes increasing responsibilities over from the international consultants in the
everyday management of the programme after the completion of the first phase. At the end of the first phase
(end of 2006) after a new tender the international consultant changes name, functions and hands. From an
Oversight Consultant (OC) that is deeply involved in the hands on management of the programme, NSP
moves to an MSC that increasingly focuses on finance and procurement. Exit GTZ, enter Maxwell Stamp
Llc as successful bidder and new partner (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
For the period from 08th September 2003 to 07th September 2006, the MRRD had contracted a firm to
serve as the Oversight Consultants (OC) for the entire NSP implementation. The OC thus set up and
managed one HQ, 6 regional and 34 provincial offices for NSP operations. The OC’s role covered financial
management of block grants, community subproject proposal review and approval, management information
system including database, FP management, monitoring and evaluation, public communications, human
resources, training and capacity building etc for NSP.
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When finalizing plans for NSP Phase II, it was decided to reduce the role of the OC and to
increase the national participation and MRRD’s role in NSP implementation and oversight.
Thus, as of 07th September 2006 onwards, the role of the OC was changed to include direct
management of the Finance Department (including Block Grant management) and MIS
Department of the NSP, and the provision of technical assistance (TA) in the form of one
international consultant for the NSP HQ departments of Human Resources Development &
Training (HRD&T), FP Management (FPMD), Quality Assurance (QA), Technical Support
(TS), Public Communications (PC), Technical Support Department (TSD) and Monitoring
and Evaluation (M&E). The NSP senior management was then formed and led by a national
Executive Director as the MRRD representative for NSP. (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development, 2008)
Individual FPs have changed over time as their contracts expired or they were terminated because of poor
performance. International donors supporting NSP vary, especially in intensity of their commitment,
according to the funding they channel through ARTF or through bilateral contributions. After Phase I
informants refer of a critical decrease in interest for the programme among it's rural constituencies because
block grants money was not coming on time (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
Changes in design
Stakeholders in Kabul discuss the possible changes in strategy for the third phase of the programme, building
on data and recommendations contained in the mid-term evaluation. (Barakat et al., 2006)
Started with a first mission in May 2009, the design process for NSP-III is so comprehensive and
thorough with various rounds of consultations that it generates questions among some partners
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul) in Kabul. It should be finalized by June 2010. NSP III is expected to
become quite different from the earlier two phases.
NSP III will focus more on social capital and is likely to have three main purposes: 1) leverage
capital investments already made; 2) reach the remaining 9000 communities still uncovered during phase I
and II; 3) complete the legacy project of phase I and II. The budget foreseen for the new round of blockgrants
– for all communities – is USD424 million (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
The funding gap puts a major constraint to the viable options. Trying to address some shortcomings
identified in NSP-II like the delays in payments and in implementation by FPs, a working group of external
consultants is studying how to streamline the processes. FPs are likely to be selected in an open competition
and given responsibilities at the provincial level, rather than at the district level as before. The selection
criteria should balance qualitative evaluation of the FP performance and quantitative metrics like the
utilization rates of block grants. NSP II should continue its implementation in the villages already mobilized.
NSP III should include another round of block grants. Part of the debate on CDC is about the possibility of
clustering them at some level within the district and one donor is reported to be supporting a pilot project on
clustering in some provinces (including Nangarhar and Bamyan).
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After their successful establishment and primer capacity building, the programme is likely to turn
more attention on the quality of CDCs. The AKDN – FP in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Bamyan, Parwan and
Takhar – has developed a CDC maturity index and have focused on training on governance, conflict
management, exchange visits, CDC visits to other levels of governance, beyond the official NSP
requirements for FPs (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
In order to gain greater political legitimacy in the eyes of political elites, the ‘whole government
approach’ to NSP will continue, as already advocated by the mid-term evaluators and partially implemented
during Phase II. (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 27) Within the ministry itself, MRRD has mandate to integrate NSP
with its other programmes.
A second round of local elections for CDC will be followed by new development plans and block
grants. By NSP rules, CDC representatives – who do not receive any salary nor financial bonus for their
service – have to step down and cannot be re-elected for a second mandate, in order to avoid elite capture.
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
In an interesting development that confirms the potentiality of the institutions created by the
programme, some NGOs do so-called 'NSP+'. They raise additional resources (private, EC, bilateral official
aid, etc) and channel them through NSP/CDC to implement additional projects in the provinces where they
are FP, thus leveraging the existing partnership in a rural community and the institutions already in place.
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul) Under the ‘whole government approach’ other line ministries, also work
through the CDC, as well as UN agencies and other stakeholders.
2.2.3. How the NSP operated
The NSP as a whole is a granular multi-stakeholder partnership. There is an institutionalized partnership at
the national level between the main stakeholders (Government/MRRD, facilitating partners, international
donors). Let's call it briefly centNSP(G,FP,D) or simply centNSP.
This central partnership sets in motion a process that establishes thousands of local multi-stakeholder
partnerships in rural communities. Every local partnership involves the community itself, the elected
Community Development Council that represents it, the Facilitating Partner, local representatives of the
MRRD (usually at provincial level), and the NSP department of MRRD itself that transfers the block grants.
Every localized partnership is shaped by the same institutional mould as spelled out in the NSP Operational
Manual (including CDC bylaws). However, local factors like geography, social structure, ethnicity mix may
influence the formation process of the local-MSP, its development and performance.
Let's call locNSP n the local partnership in community n with all its peculiarities. Like grains of prized
Afghan grape, the various locNSP n look pretty much the same from a convenient distance due to their
common institutional mould, but may differ greatly when observed more carefully.
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The single strongest finding about NSP so far is that local factors have a very high influence on the
outcome of every locNSP n in terms of partnership formation, its development and the impact on
Democratization, Human Security and peacebuilding although not in an obvious or linear way.
A 5-Phase Project Cycle (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, 2009)
The NSP project cycle for each participating community has five phases. These are generally completed
within a two-year period.
Phase I:
The NSP Facilitating Partner (FP) assigned to the province (typically an NGO) contacts the community to
inform them of NSP and start the mobilization process.
Phase II :
The FP facilitates fair and open elections to establish a representative body known as the Community
Development Council. The FP provides training and builds the capacity of the CDC in areas like project
proposal writing, financial management, reporting etc. as needed.
Phase III:
The newly-elected CDC consults with the members of the community to reach consensus on a list of priority
subprojects. These include subprojects that can be carried out independently and those that require NSP or
other outside support. Together, these comprise a Community Development Plan. Selected subproject
proposals are submitted to NSP for funding.
Phase IV:
Upon approval, NSP block grant funds are disbursed to cover the purchase of materials and services. The
CDC undertakes subproject implementation (often through committees) and reports to the community on
progress and use of funds. Programme partners monitor on-going subprojects.
Phase V:
Programme partners assess the technical quality of completed subprojects and document lessons learned.
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Partners' priorities
Different partners/actors emphasize different expected outcomes or areas of relevance of the programme:
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
The Afghan government:
Development
International donors:
Stabilization
Academics:
Governance
Others among both donors and FP agree although conflating 'governance' and 'stabilization' categories:
From the beginning the NSP was about governance. It was never about economic growth or
pro-poor economic growth or poverty reduction or gender inclusion. These objectives have
been parachuted in without any real reflection on how they can be achieved. Some FPs have
the experience to make progress on these issues but others don’t. This clearly puts pressure
on the OC-FP relationship. (NSP FP stakeholder)(Barakat et al., 2006, p. 29)
We want to see NSP move mainly to the governance side… CDCs are a vehicle for local
governance… people have very high expectations and we need to see the creation of
sustainable structures. (NSP donor stakeholder) (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 69)
Relations between partners
(1) At the national level
The high number of partners in the MSP translate in a dense web of interactions. Most of them are shaped by
the institutional make up of the MSP.
Institutional relations include three oversight levels. First, at cabinet level a meeting of ten line
ministries chaired by one of the vice-presidents is in charge of the general oversight of the programme.
Second, at the ministerial level inside MRRD. Third, at the NSP department level. The World Bank is
represented in all the Steering Committee meetings, although in an informal capacity (MULTIPART
interview, Kabul).
The NSP department in particular evaluates FPs and can severe their contracts in case of serious
under-performance (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
Outside of the vertical oversight, there are several coordination meetings among partners at different
levels. World Bank, NSP managers, FP representatives (with international donors invited as well) meet every
month to discuss general coordination and policy issues.
A smaller group of FP representatives – 4 international, 2 national – also meet on a regular base to
discuss common issues and try to shape common positions and feedbacks of facilitating partners towards the
programme's management.
Despite these, mid-term evaluators have found that coordination at the National Level was generally
insufficient after Phase I:
It is observed that the NSP suffers from poor coordination at three different levels: donor
coordination; inter-ministerial coordination; and large-scale development projects. Poor
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donor and inter-ministerial coordination has clearly presented the NSP with some steering
problems. While certain of these problems are self-inflicted (e.g. the inactive coordination
committees and lack of strategic thinking across its key development programmes), others
are the product of its success in bidding for external funding, such as petty inter-ministerial
jealousy resulting in the deliberate engineering of bottle-necks in the delivery process (e.g.
financial disbursement processes). These problems can only be dealt with effectively through
the establishment of a ‘whole government’ approach to the management and delivery of
Phase 2 of the NSP which will require the reform of existing decision structures. (Barakat et
al., 2006, p. 4)
FP – MRRD
With over two dozen FP at any given time, and many more over the years if we count the turnovers, it is
once again impossible to generalize for all FP across six years of programme duration.
From one side, Ministry staff tend to see the NSP as instrumental in introducing a new sense of
'responsibility' of NGOs towards the Ministry and rural communities (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
From the other side, some FP among those interviewed seem to resent what they perceive as a strict
reporting structure.
Both sides seem to agree that some FPs – especially those that were used to work independently
building up their experience in rural development in Afghanistan before NSP (e.g. DACAAR, CARE, UN-
HABITAT) – allegedly advocated intensively for changes in the CDC by-laws, resulting in various revisions
of this document before its final approval in November 2006. An activism that other FPs perceived as a
'bottleneck' slowing down the general programme implementation. (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
Some FPs express frustration also about the frequent revisions of the operational manual, thus
introducing an unwelcome unpredictability in programme implementation (MULTIPART interview,
Jalalabad).
FP – international donors
The often repeated complaint from the FP side refers to frequent delays in payments that put a lot of strain on
the partners working on the field, those that have to face the communities and see their reputation tarnished
(MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad).
One national FP representative voiced an uneasiness about the alleged 'occasional arrogance' of some
international donors (MULTIPART interview, Kabul). Although this aspect was not further elaborated by the
informant, nor substantiated with concrete examples, it is reported here just as a hint of a potential
underlying tension between some national members and the perceived behaviour of some international
members of the partnership.
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National FP – International FP relations.
Beneath general statements of mutually beneficial cooperation, (MULTIPART interview, Herat) some
tension creeps up. Some national NGO managers are critical towards high salaries and administrative
expenditures of international NGOs and see them as 'a problem'. Especially considering that sometimes
national FP allegedly work even better than their international partners (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
At the same time, national NGO managers perceive their international partners as having deeper
financial pockets that shields them from disruptions in the flow of payments from the centre (MULTIPART
interview, Jalalabad).
Despite their higher costs and liquidity, international NGO are seen as too prudent, whereas a small
security incident would lead them to stop their operations while national NGOs are able to work in tougher
conditions (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
Regarding partners' perceptions on the NSP membership, some national NGO representatives rule
out that NSP might be open to the private sector as well. They are confident that only NGOs like themselves
can provide the kind of services required by NSP from FP for the local communities (MULTIPART
interview, Kabul).
CDCs – MRRD
The national conferences of CDCs in August 2005 and November 2007 are very important moments for the
internal dynamic of the partnership. Community representatives have the unique opportunity to talk to each
other, coordinate, discuss and voice their feedback to the national management and whole government. It is
perhaps the first time that democratically elected rural councils gather in Kabul and speak freely to Ministers
about their needs and aspirations.
The old pattern whereby plans were made in the cities and then imposed on the rural communities
without proper surveys, has been reversed. Now development is planned to grow from the rural areas
to the cities.(Barakat et al., 2006, p. 236)
Especially in the second national conference of 2007 the CDC representatives will fully seize the opportunity
approving a resolution that called for a much stronger political role for the rural Councils.
(2) At the local level.
CDC – FP relations
In the 22 thousand communities, the most intense and crucial interaction is between FP and communities –
during the first stage – and with CDCs after these have been elected. FP are the visible face of the
programme showing up in rural communities.
The relationship with the FP was considered from two perspectives by most of the CDCs: the
FPs commitment and ability to form good community relations, and their capacity to
facilitate the Programme. In 9 CDCs these criteria were deemed to have been met. All the
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CDCs visited in Kabul, for example, commented on the commitment and competence of the
FP. However, other CDCs, often working with the same FPs that other CDCs viewed as
highly effective, had some reservations. For example, in Badghis both CDCs were satisfied
with their relations with the FP but one detected that their engineering capability was not
adequate. In Balkh, the men’s CDCs were very satisfied, but the women thought that they
could have done more for them. A further 9 CDCs made this kind of assessment of their FP.
In several of these cases, it seemed that this was as much an indication of the CDC’s
growing knowledge and capacity for management as of deficits in the performance of FPs.
(Barakat et al., 2006, p. 236)
The thin layer of trust in the programme achieved during the mobilization phase was strained and tested
during implementation: some CDC complained about delays and excessive <strong>paper</strong>work: 'at the beginning of
the programme CDCs prepared the proposals and submitted that to the provincial office, the provincial office
sent it to zone offices and then to the centre, this processes took at least 1 year and 8 months' (Barakat et al.,
2006, p. 74). Successive revisions of the operational manual contributed to speed up the process.
CDC – Government relations
Improving relations between the communities and government is both an objective of the
Programme and a necessary condition for the successful functioning of the CDC. The critical
relationship as far as the CDCs are concerned is that with their nearest level of government –
district administration (where it functions) or the provincial government. In one CDC in
Balkh and one in Kabul, both the men’s and women’s CDCs felt that they had good relations
with the district administration. The Kabul women also described contacting the provincial
health authority over staffing of a maternity clinic. However, in two other CDCs in Balkh,
though the men were satisfied with their relations with government, the women thought that
they did not get enough support, though one CDC said relations were improved. Both CDCs
in Paktika characterized their relations with district administration as good.
Five CDCs in Badghis, Balkh, Bamyan and Herat observed that their relations with
government had greatly improved as a result of the NSP. However, in Badghis, they thought
the government should give community relations more attention, and one CDC had made a
complaint to the Minister on his visit to the Province. Similarly, one CDC in Herat and one
CDC in Balkh felt that relations, though good, could be improved by better coordination and
more frequent contact as there was a lot that the communities were prepared to do to support
the government. Relations between the CDC and district administrations in Kundoz,
Nangarhar and Takhar, were clearly poor and characterized by lack of trust and accusations
of lack of recognition, corruption and nepotism. In Kundoz, in particular, this was clearly
creating difficulties for the development of the CDC. In Takhar, apart from lack of trust there
appeared to be very little contact or knowledge even of the DRRD. (Barakat et al., 2006, p.
74)
If improving the relations between CDC and government at the local level is a crucial expected outcome of
the programme, it is a daunting task because the lack of trust in central government is always looming large:
At the beginning the people were thinking that the government won’t spend the money
through CDCs the government just trying to trick us, but today they believe on this program
(MULTIPART interview, Herat).
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The lack of interest and trust often goes both ways. Those not interested in dealing with the CDCs in the first
place are sometimes local government officials.
I should say that it will be better if CDC work independently, because since one year I am
working as treasure in our CDC. […] The District governor holds a separate shora with the
previous Maliks. The district governor doesn't care about us and we do not care about our
district governor, because CDC does not have any link with District. People of the village
elected me to the position (MULTIPART Focus Group report, Jalalabad).
In such a circumstance, if NSP and CDCs are doing what the central government is supposed to do, but
consistently failed to deliver, it is likely that a competition for legitimacy may arise (MULTIPART
interview, Herat).
FP – CDC relations
The NSP institutional network has many levels of oversight, reporting and feedback mechanisms. However,
it could be weak in the lack of financial accountability of FPs towards the communities and CDC they work
with:
The FPs’ sense of accountability and commitment towards local populations has been a
remarkable factor in increasing the overall accountability of the NSP. There is, however, an
exception and a limit to this: the fact that FPs do not see the necessity for any financial
transparency regarding their own budgets. (Torabi, 2007, p. 18)
On the other hand, an NSP official points out that at least potentially 'the local councils can monitor the
NGOs and they have the authority to launch enquiries'. (Ibrahimi, 2006)
Even if the FP is the visible face of the programme in the rural communities, CDC members can be
sophisticated enough to distinguish and discriminate responsibilities at the different levels of the programme:
NSP is really a very useful program but donors and especially the World Bank don't pay
attention to our village, because of delaying [the payment] of instalment of money. FP is not
guilty FP if working very hard with us, FP has done its job, they instructed us and also they
give us good training but money is not in the hand of FP. But one thing is very important for
FP that they should be very active regarding reporting to NSP and donors (MULTIPART
Focus Group report, Jalalabad).
(3) Relations with external stakeholders
CDCs and local power-holders
The formation process of the CDCs is strongly affected by local, ever changing, power structures. CDCs
have to compete with existing figures of authority, both traditional and emerged during the recent decades of
armed conflict that exert political control over the communities and act as intermediaries between the central
government and the population. If the local khans, large landowners and often tribal chiefs, became too
dominant,
the state would endorse lesser players as a way to counter-balance their influence. In these
cases two sets of leaders existed in a village: indigenous leaders with local support and the
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arbab, the leader appointed by state officials. Where possible, the arbabs were usually
literate men with business interests outside the village, such as urban property (Giustozzi,
2009, p. 4 quoting (Barfield, 1984: 172-4))
Kakar summarizes the traditional power-holders at the village level in a useful table (Kakar, 2005, p. 7): 182
Power-holder Other terms Traditional roles
Malik Arbab Karyadar Power broker and representative between
community and central
power/government, communal dispute
resolution and maintenance of communal
property
Mirab Khadadar Controller of communal water canal
system
Khan
Ulema
Zamindar, Beg, Sardar,
Nawab
Mullah, Talib, Qazi, Sufi,
Mukhi, Mukhiyani
Large landowner who controls many
resources in the community along with
providing jobs to labourers and land to
sharecroppers; may also arbitrate conflicts
Religious leaders who lead prayers, give
sermons and have the power of moral
judgement in the community; also
involved in resolving conflicts from point
of view of Shari’ah
Jirga Shura Council that meets only as problems arise
to solve them. Problems range from
disputes to maintenance of communal
property.
Outwardly, the Malik/Arbab represents the needs of the community to government officials
and lobbies for projects needed by the community. Inwardly, the Malik/Arbab is a
community point person for solving community problems. These problems may range from
fixing communal property such as bridges, canals and roads to handling inter-relational
conflicts. In some instances, the Malik/Arbab may call upon the help of the village elders’
shura to resolve a problem. (Kakar, 2005, p. 15)
The armed conflict cycles that started with the jihad against the Soviet invaders and the communist regime in
Kabul changed dramatically the local constellations of power in Afghan society. In particular local military
commanders emerged as new power-holders.
The dependent villagers of Afghanistan smoothly became the armed followers of the new
military leaders, who took up the role, way of life and behaviour of the khans. In part this
pattern was also the result of the dependence of the rural population in many parts of
Afghanistan, which was sometimes economic, but more frequently derived from the fact that
the notables had often been the only link between the village and the external world. In the
new context of the 1980s, the military leaders were better placed to play this role of
intermediary than the old notables. (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 9)
182 The Draft Subnational Governance Policy of 2009 lists among the 'Informal Governance Entities at the village-level [...] Malik,
Arbab, Qaryadar; Khan; Rish-i-safid, Malik-i-gozar, Kalantar; Mirab; Ulema, Mullah; Arbakai; Qumandan and Communities'.
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The competition with and often interference by existing power holders creates difficulties during various
phases of implementation of the NSP, particularly when electing a new Council that may not include all the
community power-holders. Once the CDC has been elected, there are reports of commanders or local
notables attempting at controlling or capturing the process for their own benefit. Quite often incumbent
competitors resort to maligning the NSP on religious grounds.
Yet traditional institutions such as Maliks, jirgas, etc. are networks that sustain meaningful
practices of decision-making that are acceptable and legitimate within a communal
worldview and are significant vehicles for political action. Some FPs have found that
bridging formal institutions with traditional institutions successfully forms communally
acceptable governance institutions at the local level and creates greater 'buy-in' to the NSP
while not diluting the democratic process. (Kakar, 2005, p. 1)
CDC confrontations with existing power structures can become serious:
In one instance, a local commander appeared with armed gunmen at a CDC/community
gathering, demanding the CDC to dissolve and to turn over the NSP block grant money.
Community members and CDC representatives refused to give in. An intense four-hour
argument followed, at the end of which the commander decided to withdraw. (Affolter et al.,
2006, pp. 89, footnote)
This incident shows the importance of negotiation in the decision making process for overcoming
difficulties, a trait of the shared political culture that can be seen as another form of practicing self-reliance,
'solving problems by themselves' (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
When looking at the condition of leadership of the CDCs in their respective community, the midterm
evaluation of NSP found a surprising variety of outcomes from the interplay of the new institutions
being established 'from above' and the pre-existing framework of traditional forms of authority (Elders,
Malik, Khan, Mullah etc) and their evolution during the war years (eg. with the appearance of new forms of
authority like the mujahidin 'commander'). Their findings are summarized in the following table.
Out of 18 CDC surveyed during the mid-term evaluation of NSP (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 70):
Leadership situation of
the CDC (number)
Sole leadership over the
community (8)
Shared leadership with
pre-existing traditional
councils or leaders (8)
Ethnic/geographic background
3 Hazara in Bamyan and Balkh
1 Kunduz
1 Nangarhar
1 Arab in Balkh
2 Kabul
Badghis, Balkh, Nangarhar,
Paktika, Takhar
Traditional figures of
authority and relation with
them
No pre-existing
Existing, occasionally have
to negotiate
Shuradah, disbanded
Included into CDC
Process of negotiation and
cooperation with
Shuras/Elders, with some
individuals belonging to
both authorities. Traditional
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figures retain political
leadership, CDC recognised
for democratic participation
in development. Some CDC
more trusted by villagers,
progressively stepping into
political turf.
Conflictual relation (1) Kunduz CDC authority contested by
a influential individual with
alleged corrupt links with
district administration
Not contested by /
subservient to the
Mullah (1)
Takhar
There are no other
customary authorities to
contest the role of the CDC,
however the CDC
memebers depend from the
mullah for every decision.
Within this extreme variety of outcomes, there seems to be a weak pattern in the formation of CDCs
according to the traditional of war-generated kind of the pre-existing power structure:
Traditional and war-generated institutions reacted to the elections in different ways. They
either interacted or even integrated into the newly born CDCs or interrupted and opposed
them. [...] The NSP was also the target of religious groups who considered elections a
western concept and criticized women’s participation in them. For traditional institutions,
however, things went slightly differently. Most FPs could integrate them without any protest
or criticism from government and donors. Elders and maleks (chiefs) of villages participated
in the mobilization and legitimization of elections in Kabul province during the mobilization
phase. Elders were also the guardians of integrity when it came to financial reporting,
procurement controls and surveillance of the work. (Torabi, 2007, pp. 23-24)
Existing traditional figures of authority are important but should not be seen as acting systematically against
the centrally mandated programme perceived as interfering with local power equilibria. To avoid conflicts on
cultural issues, the CDC election process builds as much as possible on a common ground of traditional
practices and shared culture.
Prior to the elections, community members were asked to discuss character qualities and
competencies considered crucial for CDC membership and a satisfactory CDC job
performance. Usually, social organizers would recite a poem of Sa’di, or a verse from the
Hadith that emphasized the importance of 'good character,' thereby jumpstarting
brainstorming sessions about desirable 'CDC Representative' characteristics. (Affolter et al.,
2006, pp. 81-82)
Moreover, some FP, particularly IRC, an international NGO, intentionally pursued a strategy of engagement
of religious scholars, tribal elders and in general involving all key stakeholders in all critical stages of
decision making and implementation. (Maynard, 2007, p. 5) In these cases the facilitating partner manages
to leverage the existing governance and power structure system of shuras, maliks, mullas, etc. in a positive
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way to: 1) be able to implement NSP's projects and goals 2) benefit the community, empower them, get them
engaged in the process. (Kakar, 2005, pp. 24-26)
CDCs and PRTs
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams were established since 2003 by the US Enduring Freedom Operation
and later replicated by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contributing countries with the
purpose of extending the international security forces control into the provinces providing in principle
security and quick impact reconstruction. Normally a PRT covers a whole province and is under the
command of one ISAF contributing country.
As the PRT incorporate relief aid inside a wider security and counter-insurgency strategy, they have
been criticised by NGOs and development practitioners because they militarise the space of humanitarian
and relief activities that should stay neutral during an armed conflict.
Also questionable are the short-term character of PRT quick-impact projects and their disruptive
effects distorting incentives and priorities of local development processes.
PRTs are often a relevant stakeholders that NSP local partners have to reckon with. Within the MSP
framework of analysis, some PRTs can be classified as international partners, others as international
stakeholders.
A PRT would be an international member of the NSP, albeit indirectly, if it depends from a foreign
government that is a partner to NSP, i.e. is contributing to NSP funding in Kabul. This would be more
relevant for those international donors who are trying to coordinate their development and security policies,
therefore steering their NSP contribution towards the provinces where their troops are deployed and running
the local PRT. In a negative way, with their main commitment in the provinces where their troops are
stationed.
A PRT would be considered an external stakeholder if the foreign troops operating the PRT belong
to a government that is not contributing to NSP or that does not significantly coordinate it's aid and security
policies.
There are many documented examples of interactions between CDCs and PRTs following a great
variety of patterns as common to this multifaceted programme that are impossible to generalize.
In a recurrent scenario, the PRT channel their own funding for projects – additional to the NSP block
grants – through the CDCs seen as established local institutions: (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, pp. 11-12)
[T]he most effective PRTs work in close collaboration with provincial and community
institutions to plan and implement activities. These organizations permit local officials to
serve as the focal point for project initiation, discussion, and approval. Germany has
established a Provincial Development Fund from which local Afghan communities, often
acting through Community Development Councils (CDCs), can apply for financial
assistance for projects. The proposals are then jointly evaluated by an eight-member
committee comprised of provincial-level officials and one representative from each of the
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four German ministries represented in the PRT. These collaborative relationships have been
effective at linking communities with provincial structures, building the capacity and
legitimacy of provincial governments and CDCs, and reinforcing existing initiatives such as
the National Solidarity Program. (Rietjens, Bollen, Khalil, & Wahidi, n.d., pp. 32-33)
The Provincial Development Fund introduced by the German-led PRT generally provide small-scale funding
awards, in the range of €8-10,000. (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, pp. 34-35)
However, instead of a complementary funding that mimics NSP's own institutional mechanisms
(project application, impartial review, etc), sometimes the PRT – out of the better intentions – can interfere
in the NSP processes offering shortcuts like designing projects instead of the CDC, completing the
implementation if NSP or the FP are late. In these situations PRTs overlap and indirectly compete with FPs
that 'must reassess the needs of the community, design another project [...], start everything again
(MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad).
MRRD/NSP vs Other Ministries
NSP's success – and the flow of aid cash coming with it – stirred jealousy and criticism from other ministries
in the Afghan government. (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 4 'petty inter-ministerial jealousy') Critics accused NSP
of being too autonomous and of absorbing a disproportionate amount of the national budget. The Ministry of
finance (MULTIPART interview, Kabul), in charge of channeling funds to all line ministries, at a certain
point deliberately restrained the flow of cash seriously hindering the ability of NSP to timely transfer block
grants to the rural communities. 183
While other cabinet members at some point tried to hinder NSP, the Parliament does not see it as a
'governance' programme. Even more, the NSP's governance potential is seen as a problem or threat by some
political forces at the central level:
The exposed character of the program and its success, however, aroused the jealousy of other
cabinet members. Some in public, but many in private, criticised it. Increased public support
from the cabinet only came when the first National Conference of CDC representatives
gathered in August 2005. The latter had a spiral effect as bottom-up participation helped
increase the accountability and commitment of the Cabinet. It gave a national visibility to the
program and advocated for the development of by-laws to fix the legal status of the CDCs.
However, the legal recognition of CDCs has so far remained an unsolved problem because i)
the roles of the CDC, Provincial Councils and other local institutions are not defined, ii) the
NSP has not yet covered all villages in the country and there are doubts among donors
regarding the sustainability of such an approach and iii) the NSP is not seen as a governance
but rather a reconstruction program by the Parliament. (Torabi, 2007, p. 15)
The difficult cooperation with other ministries has been a constant feature during the six years and two
phases of the NSP so far.
183 MoF was not the only cause of delay in the financial pipeline, more about this under the role of international partners/donors.
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The National Solidarity Programme was first conceived as a five to six year programme
targeting all communities in Afghanistan. Initially, the idea was to make the NSP block
grants part of the recurring budget of the Afghan government so that there would be funding
going to the villages every year. Official NSP documents state that 'the goal of the
government is to establish a system of recurrent transfer of block grants for all village
communities of the country…annual follow-up block grants will be allocated at a lower per
capita rate (than $200 per household) to be determined'. However, at this stage communities
finishing two years of the NSP are being told they will not receive any more NSP funding
and they should look for funding elsewhere to implement other projects in their Community
Development Plan. (Kakar, 2005, p. 36)
The (potential) political role of the CDCs has attracted the attention of researchers (A. Evans & Osmani,
2005, p. 80) (Nixon, 2008a, p. 42ff) and has been another reason of conflict with other departments of the
administration. In this case with the office of the President itself. In the Afghan institutional framework, the
president office is the warden of the centralization of governance that is enshrined in the material
constitution. The President appoints provincial governors and controls their financial resources, while elected
provincial councils have no powers. Local governance used to be a department of the Ministry of Interior,
but after years of dysfunctional performance marred by corruption, also heeding international pressure, the
President brought local governance under his direct control establishing the Independent Directorate for
Local Governance (IDLG). The president office have always been extremely suspicious of any form of local
autonomy that could lead to a relaxation of the centralized governance and potentially to the dreaded federal
partition of the country (one of the declared goals of the 'constitutional opposition' to Karzai, former jehadi
and Northern Alliance notables, plus some former communists gathered under the umbrella of the National
Front).
The provincial governor and district uluswal are not formally members of the NSP. The MRRD
bypasses district and provincial authorities channeling funds directly to CDCs. FPs on the field liaise with
local officials as external stakeholders. The record of district and provincial officials in cooperating with the
programme is extremely mixed. Some 'districts governor recognized CDC as a small department of the
government' (MULTIPART interview, Herat), but in other cases the district governor can support a village
malik in his bid to outflank the CDC (MULTIPART Focus Group report, Jalalabad).
NSP officials take pride viewing the CDCs as the only legitimate and functional democratic
institutions at the local level. Especially more 'mature' CDC had developed capabilities to act independently,
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul) with natural ambitions to take an increasingly relevant political role
beyond drafting and managing development plans for their communities. Smelling in this drift the whiff of
local autonomy – since CDCs heads, unlike all other executive positions at the sub-national level, are not
appointed by the president – IDLG wanted on the contrary to strictly limit CDCs to their 'developmental'
role, while setting up other political institutions that it could control. 184
184 In a communication to the author, a European diplomat referred of Jilani Popal's view of the CDCs in early February 2008 as
exclusively civil society or community organizations, without any political role whatsoever.
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The stalemate lasted for almost a year until a draft of the new Sub-national governance bill released
in February 2009 eventually accepted (MULTIPART interview, Kabul) that CDC would act as political
representations and as channels for nation wide programmes of other line-ministries, (MULTIPART
interview, Kabul) but only until fresh elections for constitutionally-mandated Village Councils – distinct
from CDC – would be held in 2011 (MULTIPART interview, Kabul) (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
2009, p. 15). After 2011, CDCs will be 'at liberty to continue as civil society organizations engaged in
community-driven development' (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2009, p. 15), alongside other villagelevel
governance entities.
Paradoxically, despite fears of the Presidency, the NSP is widely perceived as the 'government's own'
programme – not the NGO's or foreigners' one – thus increasing its legitimacy at the eyes of the rural
population (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
CDC+FP vs Taliban
NSP and 'Taliban' insurgent – whoever they are in their internal or inter-group organization – don't seem to
interact much. Until 2006 the mid-term review recorded references to the Taliban are almost exclusively to
the past, to their previous regime and how life had changed since then (Barakat et al., 2006, pp. 289, passim).
Hardly any informer even named the 'Taliban' while discussing the NSP during MULTIPART WP5c field
research in 2009. From the field interviews it would appear as if the insurgents are not a relevant factor in the
programme implementation.
In the years since 2006, as NSP covered more and more communities in all 34 provinces, the rise in
strength and geographic presence of the insurgency have inevitably brought to an overlap. In fact, once
pressed on in a second round of discussion, a FP manager stated that during several years of work in southeastern
districts of Laghman province, the Taliban though present have never interfered with the programme
nor asked for money. Reportedly it occasionally occurred that individuals issued a 'decree' demanding NSP
work to stop in particular locality on the south-eastern Laghman province, but once FP staff approached the
Taliban commanders active in the area for explications, the latter denied any relation with the interlopers
(MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad).
Other press reports paint less of a rosy picture. In Farah province on one occasion Taliban
commanders reportedly demanded a 40% share of the NSP block-grant that was meant to pay for the
rehabilitation of an irrigation canal in Pushtrod district. Faced with a stronger insurgent presence and
interference and the risk of indirectly funding the enemy the Government stopped payments in the area, thus
slowing down the implementation of the programme (Zerak, 2009). Similar interference and threats have
been reported in other provinces like Ghazni and Parwan (Quqnoos.com, 2008).
The reported different behaviour of the Taliban towards the programme in Farah or Ghazni vs
Laghman should be further investigated and researched. It probably depends on a mix of local factors that, as
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usual, are the most influential variables and make it difficult to generalize. These localized anecdotes seem to
support the often reported perception that NSP needs a minimum level of security as public good in order to
operate – and further consolidate local stability – while it cannot bring security in the first place.
2.3.4. Analytical conclusions
The NSP success can be ascribed to some extent to the nature of partnership it establishes between state and
local communities. In its core, the programme respects the general principle that each subdivision wants to
act by itself. To the extent that the central government does not threaten the existential survival of local selfdetermination,
limiting central interference in local affairs to certain formal requirements – like secret ballots
and women participation – can be accommodated into local practices. Even the inevitable competition
between the newly established institutions and the incumbent power-holders does not have a pre-determined
outcome but is shaped by a variety of local factors.
Although it introduces a bottom-up approach to local development through the introduction of
formal democratic institutions at the village level, the programme introduction followed a top-down planning
that involved only a restricted number of stakeholders, mainly the central government and the World Bank.
Other stakeholders – like civic organizations with field experience in local development – were coopted
later into the programme as facilitating partners based on a service contract public tender. For many of
them it is arguable that they became stakeholders only after joining the programme as facilitating partners
providing specific services as requested by the terms of reference of their contract.
The involvement of major stakeholders at the local level has been one the objective of the first
phases of the programme implementation itself when FPs had to mobilize communities and gain their trust
into joining the programme.
The variety and number of partners represented in the NSP is impressive, but the whole partnership
edifice rests on a relatively narrow base of centralized contract schemes and material incentives. This
imbalance raises questions about the partnership sustainability.
2.3. How Participation in the MSP Affected its Members
2.3.1. How and why participation in the MSP affected each of its members
Given the high number of members of the partnership, the following analysis will focus on selected impact
areas.
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Gender issues in rural communities
The participation of women in local development and CDCs is one of the central aspect of the empowerment
of a specific sub-group of the participating rural community that is widely covered by the existing literature.
It seems that the impact of the programme on this respect has been overall significant. Observing that NSP
requirements for female participation in CDC elections have indeed changed over time, a comprehensive
survey found that 'gender mainstreaming is a process rather than a policy'. Female participation in nationbuilding
has developed and will continue to evolve as the program and the FPs establish relationships and
reputations within the local communities. (Bernard et al., 2008, p. 127)
As already pointed out in other sections of this study, FP's success is often linked with their ability to
foster local support, to present the programme under cultural categories that people understand, including
Islamic principles. This is especially relevant to promote women inclusion and participation where cultural
sensitivities and traditions are suspicious of external interference: 'although many nation-building programs
strive to be culturally sensitive, the NSP FPs use local culture to support the program'. (Bernard et al., 2008,
p. 127)
Women's role and participation has been in general a challenge that FP have tackled with different
approaches. For example
IRC is trying to overcome gender biases by developing specific regional gender programmes
and increasing female staff to 50 percent. IRC is also using the Ulema Council’s Special
Action Committee on Religious Affairs to support the authority and give religious backing to
women’s participation in overcoming cultural norms. Lack of time remains to be a problem
until the Oversight Consultant/MRRD chooses to change the time frame in which the basis
of gender inclusive participation and elections is to take place. DACAAR has set up two
separate CDCs in communities that take turns implementing projects to ensure women’s
decisions are taken into account and that they have access to the same information and funds.
Finally, a five year capacity building plan is being implemented by AfghanAid to address the
lack of women’s leadership experiences, confidence and literacy to prepare a new generation
of female CDC members. (Kakar, 2005, p. 35)
Informants working for facilitating partners refer how at the beginning of their mobilization activities it was
extremely difficult to have access to women. On the outset, male family members would not even share the
names of their wives and daughters with the social workers (MULTIPART interview, Herat). A patient and
culturally inclusive mobilization work, 'good communication', normally managed to overcome initial
difficulties (MULTIPART interview, Kabul). Many CDC like the one in Laghman province facilitated by
PIN are eventually elected as representative councils where two men and two women sit in the executive
body (MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad).
However, where local society and mores are more conservative and gender interaction restricted, a
recurring outcome is the formation of two separate sub-councils, one for women and the other for men.
A community in the Hesarak district of Nangarhar for example chose the dual council solution,
claiming that for them as Pashtun it was unconceivable, 'shameful', to allow women and men to participate in
171

a joint meeting. Interesting the CDC leaders maintain that the segregated CDC was accepted by the
community as the logical and reasonable solution, although it was not followed by the neighbouring villages
that still do not allow women to participate at all (MULTIPART Focus Group report, Jalalabad). The
women's council meet regularly and later refer their deliberations to their relatives of husbands and these in
turn refer to the members of the men's CDC. FP's female staff is training the women's CDC and they are now
implementing their own carpet waving project (MULTIPART Focus Group report, Jalalabad).
doubts:
While this can be seen as an acceptable compromise, researchers and practitioners still express some
The problem with all of these forms of segregated CDCs is that it is still up to the men to
make the final decision since they sign for the money and the bank account is registered to
them. The men can choose to integrate the women’s opinions or not. There is no formal
mechanism that ensures women’s decisions are taken into account and integrated with men’s
decisions. (Kakar, 2005, p. 32)
The quality of facilitation is perhaps one of the most important factors in determining the level of women
participation:
There are barriers to genuine participation of women in both development functions and
governance functions of the CDCs. This participation is less in governance functions than
project selection, and it appears to be very dependent on the quality of facilitation. In the
absence of facilitation, women’s participation will likely suffer at an even faster rate than
overall CDC activity. An exception to this seems to be in a few social protection functions.
(Nixon, 2008a, p. 41)
Both in Herat and Nangarhar, male members of the CDC credit women for their experience in dispute
resolution, despite being illiterate, 185 and see how the women's council can be effective in reducing cases of
arranged marriages between very young girls and old men (MULTIPART interview, Herat).
All the power to the shuras: empowerment and political role of CDCs
The formation through popular participation and a democratic process of over 22 thousand Community
Development Councils able to define local development priorities, design projects and implement them
under democratic scrutiny can be considered as a form of empowerment of the participating communities in
general and, in the best cases, of the marginal groups within them (e.g. women).
Some FP informants stress the relevance of NSP in empowering the members of the community,
enabling them in 'doing things by themselves': defining leadership, taking decisions, planning, implementing,
monitoring. To the extent that the members of the community 'see their power in the CDC', the programme
'is affecting the power of the warlords, commanders, influential people'. The empowerment brings a sense of
ownership among the community members and a commitment to 'protect' the project and achievements that
they see as 'their own' (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
185 The researchers did not have access to the female members of the CDC for interview.
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Informants refer of an anecdotical evidence of this impact of the programme on the empowerment of
local communities comparing them with communities where the NSP has not been implemented. In the
former the capacity of the people has increased and some CDC are able to deal directly with other donors
(MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad).
In some accounts the NSP is all about empowerment of people and communities, encouraging them
to participate in public life and thus taking control of their lives, implementing projects by themselves
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
Some researchers wonder whether the new institution can replace the traditional Shura or how it
compares with it. The most striking difference is the level of institutionalization, whereas the traditional
Shura's membership is relatively open to all men who feel concerned about the issue which has occasioned
the meeting. The Shura is not permanent but is rather convened to discuss a specific issue or conflict. In the
traditional Shura the opinion of elders and experienced men with rhetorical abilities weighs more than what
of young men with technical specialized knowledge. The CDC by contrast is a formal body whose
membership is closed and defined through an electoral process. Young candidates with formal education and
ability to interact with aid agencies have an advantage over traditional opinion leaders. (Boesen, 2004, pp.
42-47)
In principle, the kind of institutionalized empowerment introduced by the NSP contrasts favourably
with the traditional way of accessing resources made available by the central government where power
tended to concentrate in the hands of the local notable – khan, malik, arbab – acting as intermediary between
the community and the central government (MULTIPART interviews, Kabul).
If the CDCs were to replace and institutionalize the old role of local notables as middle-men between
the government and the populace, as some informants argue, (MULTIPART interview, Herat) especially
stressing the transparency of the NSP process, (MULTIPART interview, Jalalabad) it is likely to expect
resistance from those displaced from this role. As usual with programme involving over twenty thousand
different communities, it's impossible to generalize. The chapter on the CDC relations with local powerholders
has shown a great variety of outcomes in the position of leadership assumed by the CDC in the
community.
If the commanders (new Khans or Islamic khans (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 9)) displaced the notables,
khans, arbabs and maliks as intermediaries between communities and the external world in the 1980s, will
CDC took over from commanders? How sustainable are the changes in local governance introduced by NSP
through the empowerment of the CDCs?
Arguably the roots of this uneven shift in local power are shallow, too dependent on the financial incentives
of the resources made available for projects. Still the new community councils in the best case can
consolidate by acting as entry points for other outside actors able to provide more resources and with them
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strengthen the intermediary role of the councils. (Noelle-Karimi in Local Governance and Cross-Border
Relations: Symposium Report, Kunduz, 2006)
But how do CDC themselves see their political role? When given the opportunity to voice their views in
front of the whole national government they did not shy away. During the second National Conference of the
CDCs on 15 November 2007 they took an 'Historical resolution' demanding from the Government of
Afghanistan and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development that:
1. The CDC by-law must be ratified by Parliament as soon as possible in order to be
transformed into a proper law.
2. From today onward, CDCs must be recognized as the official structure linking the
government and the people.
3. All other existing structure at village level must be merged under the authority of the
CDCs and operate according to the CDC rules and regulations as defined in the new by-law.
4. A member of (each?) CDC, preferably the chairperson, should attain membership of their
district council.
5. Local authorities and sectoral development authorities must resolve all their development,
social, and cultural issues through the members of the district council from CDCs who have
attained membership of the district council.
6. CDCs have the responsibility to implement all their activities with high proficiency,
transparency and accountability in accordance with the existing laws of government and the
regulations at village level.
7. The local security personnel must cooperate with CDCs in order to ensure the
implementation of development projects at village level.
8. The local security authorities must put an end to interferences in the activities of CDCs by
self-interested, destructive and unrestrained elements. Such interferences disrupt CDC
activities and demoralize CDC members, discouraging them to carry out their normal
activities.
9. If a member of a CDC violates rules, he should be interrogated by his peers in the CDC
and, if necessary, he should be introduced to the relevant police and judicial authorities, to
avoid any possible damage to the reputation of other CDC members. (Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development, 2007b, p. 47)
It is a full blown assertion of a bottom-up view of democracy where the locally elected Councils 186 reclaim
their fair share of power. Not unsurprisingly, the Arg have not obliged them. As already discussed in above,
there was a long stand-off between IDLG and NSP regarding the political role of the CDCs. A reform of the
state 'from below' following the CDC model would be 'tantamount to a revolution', 187 reverting a 130 years
old tradition of state-making in Afghanistan. In fact the central government has tried to curb if not destroy
any political role for the councils, preferring alternative programmes like the Social Outreach Programme
(2008) where traditional or conflict-produced shura leaders are recognized by the central government and
paid 200 dollars per month in an attempt to re-patrimonialize the shuras, whereas traditional shuras do not
exist anymore but in the East and South-East, a move coherent with what is still a semi-patrimonial state.
186 Unlike the common use in English that retains the original Russian word for council in expressions related to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Russian revolution of 1917, in Dari 'soviet' is always translated literally into shura (noun) or
shuravi (adjective). This does not imply any historical association between the early stages of the 1917 Russian revolution and the
CDCs beyond the homonymy
187 Antonio Giustozzi, presentation at the Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD), Kabul University, 23/4/2008, author's
notes.
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(Giustozzi, 2008, pp. 46, 'The centralisation of the Afghan state is, in other terms, a consequence of its
patrimonial character.')
2.3.2. Development of relationships between MSP members internally and between MSP
members and external stakeholders.
The participation in the MSP contributed to the development of a dense web of relationships between
partners and among partners and external stakeholders. Since these relationships intrinsic to how the
partnership did actually operate and are an important factor that influenced the operation of the partnership
itself, they are described above in Section 2.2.
2.3.3. Analytical conclusions
Selected impact facets on partners:
CDC empowerment:
In the best case scenario are empowered to represent the interests of the weaker constituencies in the local
communities vis-as-vis the central government and international actors; CDCs sideline or bypass traditional
and war generated authorities.
In the worst case scenario, the CDC is either captured by the old elites and functions as a vehicle of
their exclusive interests, or exists only on <strong>paper</strong> and barely functions at all.
CDCs empowered in a vacuum of sub-national governance policies take up political role as the only
democratically legitimized institution that wields some power and manages a budget (apart from the national
branches of government, and non considering the mainly decorative Provincial Councils). CDC's political
role contested by centralizers in Kabul (and their appointees at provincial and district level).
Women's role in participating communities:
- Women's participation is a pre-condition set by the central level. However, a culturally savvy
mobilization approach by Facilitating Partners has generally achieved to defuse a potentially
contentious aspect of the programme.
- Success metrics ranges from full participation of women representatives in the CDC to segregated
female CDC providing token advice through family channels to the male CDC.
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2.4. Assessment of the External Impacts of the NSP
2.4.1. Overall discussion
Methodological issues
Dealing with an MSP that has one and 22-thousand faces, all of them looking alike but still different, we
should perhaps start asking which partnership to assess? Any locNSP n ? or a subset of them? Or the grand
picture about centNSP as seen from Kabul? The central level in itself is important as a multiplier due to its
coordinating role, but in the absence of any impact whatsoever in the rural communities would nullify the
overall endeavour, despite the best efforts of the central public information office. So perhaps we should
look at blend of all of them following a conceptual scheme like:
Impact(NSP) = Impact (centNSP) * ∑ n R n Impact(locNSP n )
where R n is a regional weight coefficient that takes into account the relative size of the n-th community and
network effects with neighbouring communities in the same region?
Any hope to achieve some meaningful knowledge about a such a granular phenomenon should
probably involve some sort of statistical analysis. But this is beyond the methodological remit of the present
research.
An ongoing multi-annual quantitative research has been analysing and surveying extensively 500
villages during the last three years. (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2008) The results – including a full
assessment of the peace-building impact of the programme – are due very soon by the end of 2009 or
beginning of 2010 and they may bring more insights into the actual impact of democratization at the
community level that will be extremely useful for this research.
In the absence of the results of a systematic impact assessment, the mid-term review identifies
quality trends showing that the programme seems to have contributed to improved local governance and
community empowerment. (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 127)
2.4.2. Detailed assessment of the impacts of the NSP in selected issue areas
Among the 11 sets of benefits which the evaluators see as derived from the NSP, the following are
particularly relevant for the purposes of this case study:
1. Increased public perceptions of national solidarity achieved through state-building – e.g.
the creation of new institutional architecture at the central [Oversight Consultant, Da
Afghanistan Bank], provincial [Provincial Office Oversight Consultant], and village (CDCs)
levels;
2. improved state-civil society relations as a consequence of improvements in national
solidarity;
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3. greater awareness of the activities of government as a consequence of the work of the
[Public Communication Unit];
4. the empowerment of rural communities through the establishment of a new legitimate
form of community governance;
5. heightened perceptions of community solidarity achieved through processes of community
governance (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 127)
The following paragraphs will focus on the NSP impact of democratization and good governance and on
conflict resolution.
Democratization and good governance
Democratization as a mean and a goal in itself.
Democracy is a term that may stir controversy and conflict in some rural areas. Some elders or religious
leaders take exception, they consider it a 'non-Muslim' or 'non-traditional' concept and practice
(MULTIPART interview, Kabul). The roots of this suspicion are not necessarily found in the recent
ideological influence from the West. In reported cases, it was rather because of the experience during the
communist regime. In fact, during the previous foreign-led attempt at modernizing state institutions,
'democracy' figured prominently in the regime propaganda and official rhetoric. The ruling party called itself
People's Democratic Party (Hizb-e Democratik-e Khalq) and 'Democratic' was qualifier added to the name of
the new 'revolutionary' state after the 1978 coup (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan). In reported cases, FP
mobilizers could overcome this legitimate suspicion
arguing that democracy would mean a wider
participation by communities in local self-government rather than the opposite as in the strongly centralized
khalqi/parchami regime (MULTIPART interview, Herat).
Some informants see institutionalization from above as a source of empowerment: the 'CDCs have
CDC by-law this by-law give more power to CDC' (MULTIPART interview, Herat).
As the programme spreads formal democratic procedures on an unprecedented scale in the rural
heartlands of the country, it is credited with creating the conditions that are ultimately conducive to improve
the conditions for peace-building and Human Security.
The fact that the central government has engaged the communities in a partnership for
reconstruction and development for the first time in Afghan history has been an empowering
experience. It signals not only a process of democracy introduced 'from above', but it may
also foster the emergence of democracy 'from below' in a partnership between government
and local communities, where the communities are enabled to establish more legitimate
leadership that can interact with government authorities in a range of different tasks.
(Boesen, 2004, p. 61)
NSP promotes democracy by doing it, introducing a wider participation in the election of representatives,
allowing people to chose their elders by themselves (MULTIPART focus group report, Jalalabad).
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Local elections of CDCs have a impact on better governance at village level inasmuch they sideline
'warlords'. Villagers tend to trust more the new bodies and raise their problems with them (MULTIPART
interview, Herat).
The successful completion of projects builds on a sense of ownership: 'These local councils are our
own' – said Mohammad Hassan, a member of the local community development council in the village of
Baghawi, in the northern province of Sar-e-Pul' (Ibrahimi, 2006).
The programme is particularly credited for improving local governance and limiting corruption.
Accountability circles built into the programme produced as an outcome a low degree of corruption, waste
and embezzlement thus having a positive effect on the quality of governance at the local level and beyond,
creating trust in at least one institution.
Corruption in NSP is assessed at 'only 1%' (not clear of what, MULTIPART interview, Kabul),
anyway surprising low for the Afghan standards. (Delesgues & Torabi, 2007)
Compared to other reconstruction programs, there were many positive aspects and
externalities related to NSP accountability. The public exposure of the program made it
known and therefore increased the accountability of executors and implementers.
The government capacity to account for program delivery was increased even though the
reform of the administration remained lagged behind. The MRRD is perceived as one of the
least corrupt institutions despite the big sums of money it handled.
Relative trust has been built between recipients, government and donors. Yet it remains
fragile because people 'cannot understand the game played by donors' when there is
significant waste in other programs. Building the capacity to monitor and hold actors to
account at the very local level and the use of local resources are among many other positive
aspects of the NSP. (Torabi, 2007, p. 26)
The mid-term evaluators surveyed in a comparative way also the leaders of matched communities where the
programme was not implemented.
These communities were found to share many post-war development needs with their CDC
counterparts and to be seeking to meet them, through various forms of traditional and ad hoc
governance. Their discussions of governance were particularly useful in shedding light on
attitudes and expectations that were still evident, as their CDC neighbours negotiated new
forms of governance while seeking to avoid a confrontation with traditional authority and
powerful individuals. (Barakat et al., 2006, p. 75)
Although introduced from the top, the NSP does have a bottom-up approach relevant in particular for the
decentralization of state-revenues collection and management:
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Conflict resolution
CDCs are empowered by law to mediate to solve the arguments and disputes of community members,
provided the parties involved recur voluntarily to the Council. (Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, 2007a, Article 17) 188
Almost all informants refer anecdotical evidence of some local 'peace deals' or resolution of
controversies have been brokered by CDCs (MULTIPART interview, Kabul) (Nixon, 2008b, p. 35)
(MULTIPART interview, Herat) (MULTIPART focus group report, Jalalabad). For example in Ghazni
province the CDC acted a mediator solving a private conflict about the killing of a boy, persuading the
offended family to accept compensation and not seek revenge (MULTIPART interview, Kabul). Informants
reckon that in villages where the NSP is implemented would hold regular meetings about their problems and
play an important role in the resolution of conflicts in the community. On the contrary, people would be
more reluctant to refer their issues to traditional councils because too often the members of the shuras are
'warlords and influential people' (MULTIPART interview, Herat).
2.4.3. Analytical conclusions on impacts of the NSP
Selected impact facets on peace-building and Human Security:
Improved democratic governance at the local level with – and by means of – remarkably low levels of
corruption, in particular:
- Increased public perceptions of national solidarity achieved through state-building at national and
local level;
- Improved state-civil society relations as a consequence of improvements in national solidarity;
- Greater awareness of the activities of government (NSP is seen and the government's own
programme, not 'NGO's' or 'foreigners')
- The empowerment of rural communities through the establishment of a new legitimate form of
community governance;
2.5. The Significance of International Actors
2.5.1. Relevant international actors for the NSP
International actors take part in the MSP mainly as donors, either with bilateral agreements with the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) in general, and MRRD in particular, or
through the ARTF.
188 Although it was signed by the President, the CDC by-law is an administrative regulation that governs the activities of MRRD and
does not bind other ministries.
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Among the international donors, the World Bank stands out because of its role in the initial concept
and design of the programme (see Section 2.2.) and ARTF manager. 189
Besides the WB and other donors, the role of international actors so far has been very important in
the central management of the programme. GTZ acted as Oversight consultant during the first phase.
Maxwell Stamp took over with a more limited mandate during the second phase, but still retaining a strategic
control of the financial management.
2.5.2. Assessment of the significance and roles of a few selected international actors
There is a widespread criticism, especially from the side of FPs, (MULTIPART interviews, Kabul and Herat)
of international donors for the delays in making pledged funds available to NSP. During six years the
programme's cash pipeline has gone dry more than once, particularly during Phase I, disrupting project
implementation – a delay of a few months in agriculture may imply that a whole season is lost – with
subsequent loss of trust and legitimacy.
But NSP, in recent times [2006-07], has been criticized for lethargic implementation. Like in
any multi-stakeholder development programme elsewhere, NSP has been facing obstacles in
implementation primarily due to (1) lack of available funding, (2) lengthy and overlapping
procedures to be followed at various stages of implementation by different stakeholders and
(3) lack of capacities at various levels of implementation. Though the procedural delays and
lack of capacities can be addressed through proper management and training mechanisms
respectively, the delays due to lack of funding can be addressed only through ensuring
greater transparency and accountability of the donors; or actively raising funds from internal
sources, which could be very difficult at this stage in Afghanistan. There are strong
transparency and accountability safeguards put in place to check corruption during the
implementation, however, there is no such mechanism to check the donors’ accountability or
transparency towards their commitments. (ActionAid Afghanistan and ELBAG, 2007, p. 11)
The MRRD is adamant in rejecting this criticism, particularly about the alleged 'lethargic' implementation. 190
The case made in the report quoted above is particularly interesting because rather than simply exposing a
perceived failure it tries to identify its causes and whether there are built-in correcting mechanisms. While a
complex MSP may be prone to implementation delays, if international donors in particular – among other
stakeholders – are hardly accountable towards their commitments, they ultimately hinder the efforts by the
programme managers to improve its implementation performance.
Among the donors, an informant singled out for delays in payments the European Commission that
mandates a second audit on its contributions, thus slowing everybody else down, when ARTF – through
which the EC itself channels its funds – already has all the programme audited (MULTIPART interview,
Kabul). However, these specific claims could not be independently verified and need further investigation.
189 NSP's public information office could not provide, upon request from the author, aggregated figures of individual contributions by
donors.
190 MRRD comments to the draft copy of this <strong>paper</strong>, e-communication, 13/01/2010.
180

Moreover, some bilateral donors tend to earmark funds for the provinces where they have their own
development or security interests in the guise of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (MULTIPART interview,
Kabul).
Delays in payments have affected the credibility of the programme. Provincial pre-allocations could
speed up the process (now strictly centralized) (MULTIPART interview, Kabul).
2.5.3. Analytical conclusions
International donors have entered the NSP as partners and contributed generously, albeit often late.
Despite finding in the NSP an established inclusive partnership that established a relatively efficient
way to channel resources to the critical dual goal of rural development and improvement of local
governance, donors have been reluctant in investing more on the programme.
Even brushing aside for a moment the internal contrasts within the programme itself on the political
role of the CDCs, it seems that at the eyes of many donors the NSP fell into a security trap.
Some of the biggest bilateral donors are also the largest contributors of troops to the ISAF mission.
These countries channel their development aid as a priority to the provinces or districts where their troops are
fighting the insurgency as they recognize that reconstruction and development are part of a successful
counter-insurgency strategy.
Despite its successes, the NSP is not seen as able to pacify insecure areas. On the contrary, the
programme needs security in the first place for the facilitators to successfully mobilize the rural population.
NSP has thrived in the relatively peaceful districts. It could contribute even more to consolidate
security through development and good local governance in the relatively more volatile areas but lacks
further resources. In an infamous conundrum of aid policies in Afghanistan, peaceful districts receive much
less aid than insurgency ridden areas. Fragile successes are starved the resources needed to consolidate.
2.6. Overall Conclusions of this MSP case study
The partnership entailed by the NSP is complex. It involves around four dozens different actors at the
national level only, not to mention the over 22 thousand communities, each of them with their own
stakeholders, elected CDC and local idiosyncrasies.
On the face of this massive scale, the partnership has worked remarkably well, thanks to the
combination of solid institutionalization from above, balanced autonomy for the local subdivisions, culturally
savvy mobilization practices and attractive financial incentives.
The sheer combinatorial possibilities in the relations between thousands of partners over a six year
long working relationship allows for a wide variety of outcomes. In fact, problems in the partnership are not
wanting. These concluding remarks will focus mainly on the international donors.
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There seems to be a sort of time-warp inconsistency in the general commitment of international
donors to the programme, following broadly the lines of a recent summary of post-war reconstruction
approaches (Galtung & Tisné, 2009), complicated by security constraints that are specific to Afghanistan
where the intensity of the armed conflict has escalated since the beginning of the programme. In fact,
Afghanistan is not a post-conflict country and this simple observation should place it out of the
methodological remit of the present research.
International donors committed significant financial resources to the NSP. With 800 million dollars
pledged over six years, these are important amounts for the rural development of a poor country like
Afghanistan, although they are dwarfed by the costs that many NSP partners incur for feeding their military
machine in Afghanistan (over 200 billion dollars since 2001 for the US only). The pledge was followed only
half heartedly by sound aid management practices and the notorious delays in the NSP payment pipeline
significantly damaged the credibility and effectiveness of the programme during Phase I.
At the same time, while the developmental component of the NSP did not encounter significative
political opposition, its governance component – with its implications for the distribution of political power
in the country – stirred a lengthy dispute with the wardens of centralization in Kabul.
Unfortunately, those were the days when development-effective local governance, respectful of the
independence of the subdivisions through democratic means would have been an important factor in winning
the rural population over to the new regime..
When the insurgency escalated and spread from the South and South-East to more and more districts
around the country – not least, inter alia, because predatory centralizers trampled and threatened too many a
subdivision – the counter-insurgency arsenal deployed by NSP international partners discarded the NSP as a
blunt weapon: unable to provide security in volatile areas, able at best to maintain it.
The ongoing armed conflict strains the relationship among NSP partners, especially at the national
level. The security-led agenda makes it more difficult to keep priorities aligned between government, donors,
NGOs and local communities. The successes at the local level, especially the new governance institutions,
are dependent on the sustained flow of resources from the centre. At the moment of writing, a long overdue
reform in sub-national governance is being rolled out, at least where the government writ can be heard. Will
it be able to accommodated the subdivisions?
2.7. Annexes
2.7.1. Annex I: Methodology
This case study report draws on the relatively abundant publications on the National Solidarity Programme
and the interview reports prepared by the MULTIPART field research team in Afghanistan (WP5c). The
field team interviewed 19 informants in three cities (Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad) and conducted a focus group
182

with CDC members in a rural district of Nangarhar province during the months from July to November
2009. Out of 19 informants, almost two thirds (11) work for facilitating partners (FP), all NGO managers
with the exception of one private company official. While FPs play an important role connecting the local
with the national level of the programme, this skewed selection of informants may introduce a bias in the
perceptions of the internal dynamics of the MSP.
2.7.2. Annex II: List of interviews
Codename Name Position Institution Type of actor Place, date
C/NSP/1 Xavier Bardou Head, FP Maxwell Stamp International *
Management
Department
PLC
private
C/NSP/2
Abdullah
Azadzoi
Deputy
Country
Director
and
NSP Manager
C/NSP/3 Qazi Azmat Isa Senior Rural
Development
Specialist
C/NSP/4 Mohd. Tariq
Ismati
C/NSP/5 Ghulam Rasol
Wahid
Executive
Director
Deputy
Operation
Manager
FLAG
International,
LLC
World Bank
International
private
International
public
MRRD/NSP Public *
MRRD/NSP Public *
C/NSP/6 Ghulam Yahya Educational CHA National NGO *
Abassy Manager
C/NSP/7 Najeebullah Head Of NSP DACAAR International *
Rahmani
Civic
C/NSP/8 Mirwais Mayar Regional ANCC National NGO *
manager
C/NSP/9 Bernard de Deputy Head EC
International *
Schrevel of Operations
public
C/NSP/10 Dr.
Mohammad
Zia
Head of NSP SDO National NGO *
C/NSP/11
C/NSP/12
Mohammad
Esehaq Zeerak
Bashir Ahmad
Foonji
Director GRSP National NGO *
Provincial
Manager,
NSP
C/NSP/13 Sadiqi Provincial
Manager,
NSP
C/NSP/14 Nasir Ahmad
Foshanji
Provincial
Manager,
NSP
C/NSP/15 Abdul Raziq Provincial
Manager,
IRC
International
Civic
MRRD/NSP Public *
CHA National NGO *
DACAAR/
Heart
International
Civic
*
*
*
*
183

NSP
C/NSP/16 Zishan Karim World Bank NSP manager International *
public
C/NSP/17 Najibullah PIN NSP manager International *
civic
C/NSP/18 Eng Tariqull BRAC NSP Engineer International *
Islam
civic
C/NSP/19 Abdurahman MRRD Manager, NSP Public *
Ayobi
C/NSP/20 Focus group,
Nangarhar
Local CDC
Department
Head of CDC
and three key
members
Civic
Nangarhar
province
*All the interviews were conducted in the cities of Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad during the months from July to
November 2009.
Management & Oversight (MRRD/NSP, MSC): 5
Donor & ARTF Administrator (WB): 2
Facilitating Partner: 11
Donor: 1
CDC: 1
2.7.3. Annex III: Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACTED
ADA
AKDN
ANCC
AREP
Arg
ARTF
CBD
CDC
CDD
CDP
CHA
DACAAR
DSCRW
Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique Et au Développement
Afghan Development Association
Agha Khan Development Network
Afghanistan National Re-Construction Coordination
Afghan Rehabilitation & Education Programme
The seat of the central state power in Kabul, former king's palace, now presidential
residence
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
Community Based Development
Community Development Council
Community Driven Development
Community Development Plan
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
District Schools Construction and Rehabilitation Window
184

EC
EU
FP
GAA
GRSP
GTZ
HS
IDLG
IRC
ISAF
KDP
MADERA
MIS
MSC
MSP
NGO
NPO/RRAA
NSP
OC
PB
PIN
PRT
SCA
SDO
European Commission
European Union
Facilitating Partner
German Agro-Action
Ghazni Rural Support Programme
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Human Security
Independent Directorate for Local Governance
International Rescue Committee
International Security Assistance Force
Kecamatan Development Program
Mission d'Aide au Développement des Economie Rurales en Afghanistan
Management Information Systems
Management Support Consultant
Multi-Stakeholder Partnership
Non-Governmental Organization
Norwegian project office/Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan
National Solidarity Programme
Oversight Consultant
Peace-building
People In Need
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Swedish Committed for Afghanistan
Partners for Social Development, Sanayee Development Organization
2.7.4. Annex IV: Bibliography
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185

Barakat, S. (2008). Understanding Afghanistan: The Consolidated Findings of a Research Project
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Bernard, C., Jones, S. G., Oliker, O., Quantic Thurston, C., Stearns, B. K., & Cordell, K. (2008). Women and
Nation-Building. RAND Corporation.
Boesen, I. W. (2004). From Subjects to Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Programme.
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Delesgues, L., & Torabi, Y. (2007). Afghan Perceptions of Corruption, a Survey. Retrieved from
http://www.iwaweb.org/AfghanPerceptionofCorruption.pdf
Dupree, L. (1973). Afghanistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Elphinstone, M. (1819). An account of the kingdom of Caubul and its dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and
India, comprising a view of tha Afghaun nation, and a history of the Dooraunee monarchy (Vols. 1-2,
Vol. 1). London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown (Paternoster-row); and J.Murray, Albemarle-
Street.
Evans, A., & Osmani, Y. (2005). Assessing Progress: Update Report on Subnational Administration in
Afghanistan. AREU Working Paper Series (p. 60). Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.
Fearon, J., Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. (2008). CommunityDriven Reconstruction in Lofa County:
Impact Assessment.
Galtung, F., & Tisné, M. (2009). A New Approach to Postwar Reconstruction. Journal of Democracy,
Project MUSE, 20(4).
Giustozzi, A. (2008). An Analytical Narrative On State-Making. Crisis States Programme, Crisis States
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Giustozzi, A. (2009). The eye of the storm: cities in the vortex of Afghanistan’s civil wars. Crisis States
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Ibrahimi, S. Y. (2006, April 26). People Power: Community-based development programme can boast some
remarkable successes, but some say it falls short of its lofty rhetoric. Afghan Recovery Report, (213).
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (2009, May 20). Draft Subnational Governance Policy.

Kakar, P. (2005). Fine Tuning the NSP: Discussions of Problems and Solutions with Facilitating Partners
(AREU Working Paper Series) (p. 51). Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.
Lister, S. (2007). Understanding State-building and Local Government in Afghanistan. Crisis States
Research Centre, Working Paper, 14.
Local Governance and Cross-Border Relations: Symposium Report, Kunduz. (2006). . Kunduz, Afghanistan:
Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung - Center for Development Research - Universität Bonn.
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menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000090341_20041206
105152&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679
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3. Democratic Republic of Congo: REJUSCO
By Valeria Izzi (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna)
Acknowledgements
This case-study was authored by Valeria Izzi, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa, Italy). The field
interviews were conducted by Line Risch, Royal Institute for International Relations EGMONT
(Brussels, Belgium), in collaboration with Primo Rudahigwa, Pole Institute (Goma, DRC). Additional
research, including direct observation of the local courts, was conducted by Primo Rudahigwa. The
Scuola Sant’Anna and EGMONT would like to thank all the individuals and organisations that
contributed their time and inputs to the preparation of the case-study. Particular thanks go to the
REJUSCO coordinator, Marc Dubois, and all the REJUSCO staff.
APPUI À LA RESTAURATION DE LA JUSTICE À L’EST DU CONGO (REJUSCO), SUB-
PROGRAM: INSTALLATION OF “CLINIQUE JURIDIQUE”/MOBILE COURTS in brief
Description
Actors involved
Issue area
Geographic range
The Programme to Support the Restoration of Justice in Eastern DRC
(Programme d’Appui à la Restauration de la Justice à l’Est du Congo,
REJUSCO) is the result of a partnership between the Congolese
Government, the European Commission, and three bilateral donors
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), with the
involvement several Congolese Non Governmental Organisations
(NGOs). 191 The programme, launched in 2007, aims at strengthening the
justice system in three war-affected provinces of the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), with a view to addressing impunity and contributing to
the advancement of the rule of law (See REJUSCO website:
http://www.rejusco.org (accessed on February 14th, 2010).
International: Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, UK, US, EC, Belgium,
IDA
Public: Ministry of Justice
Civil-soc/Private: Local NGO’s. The involvement of civil society is
foreseen mainly in the third component (monitoring and awarenessraising),
where NGOs are sub-contracted for monitoring, reporting and
conducting advocacy on the conditions of prisons
Good governance and the rule of law, access to justice
The MSP is active in the district of Ituri (Bunia), Provinces of North
(Goma) and South Kivu (Bukavu).
Time scale active since September 2006.
Operation &
institutionalization
Regular meetings
Decision structure
Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage). The Steering Committee is
highest level of decision-making body of REJUSCO, supposed to meet at
least every six months, or more often depending on needs, in order to
establish the overall strategy direction of the programme. In particular, the
Steering Committee is tasked to (i) verify and approve the annual
programme; (ii) verify the implementation of the programme; (iii) take the
necessary decisions, including re-orienting the programme when
necessary; and (iv) approve the final report and close the programme. The
191 In the second phase of REJUSCO, Sweden will also be a partner, while Belgium will play a less active role.

Steering Committee is composed of representatives of the following
institutions:
o Ministry of Justice (chair);
o Ministry of Interior;
o Bar Association (Ordre des Avocats);
o Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature;
o European Commission delegation in Kinshasa;
o DFID (Kinshasa office);
o Dutch cooperation (Kinshasa office);
o Belgian cooperation (Kinshasa office);
o CTB (Kinshasa office).
Depending on the agenda of the day, external experts can be invited to
participate in the meetings as resource persons.
Technical Working Committee (Comité Technique de Travail). This
committee is supposed to meet every three months, in order to prepare the
meeting of the Steering Committee, as well as regulating all questions
related to the organisation and functioning of the programme. It is
composed of the four international partners, the REJUSCO Office in
Goma (Unité Gestion Programme), the CTB and one representative of the
Ministry of Justice and/or the CMJ.
Local Coordination Committees (Comités Mixtes de Coordination). In
each of the three programme sites (North Kivu, South Kivu and Bunia),
local committees were envisaged in order to allow the different partners to
be actively engaged in the programme on a regular basis.
3.1. Introduction to the MSP Case Study
The Programme to Support the Restoration of Justice in Eastern DRC (Programme d’Appui à la
Restauration de la Justice à l’Est du Congo, REJUSCO) is the result of a partnership between the
Congolese Government, the European Commission, and three bilateral donors (Belgium, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), with the involvement several Congolese Non Governmental
Organisations (NGOs). 192 The programme, launched in 2007, aims at strengthening the justice system
in three war-affected provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with a view to
addressing impunity and contributing to the advancement of the rule of law. 193
3.1.1. Rationale and case-study eligibility
In the context of the MULTIPART Project, the rationale for choosing REJUSCO as a case-study of
partnership in Good Governance and Rule of Law was threefold:
1. REJUSCO operates in a sector that is crucial for peacebuilding and Human Security in the
DRC. As stated by the UN Secretary General in his 2004 Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
192 In the second phase of REJUSCO, Sweden will also be a partner, while Belgium will play a less active role.
193 See REJUSCO website: http://www.rejusco.org (accessed on February 14th, 2010).
190

the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of
peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for
grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and
the fair administration of justice. At the same time, the heightened vulnerability of minorities,
women, children, prisoners and detainees, displaced persons, refugees and others, which is evident
in all conflict and post-conflict situations, brings an element of urgency to the imperative of
restoration of the rule of law (UN, 2004: 1).
Today, the overwhelming majority of the people in Eastern DRC have no access to the formal justice
system, and the degree of trust in the State’s capacity to provide redress against abuses is extremely
low.
2. REJUSCO is the most high profile and visible intervention in the field of access to justice in
Eastern DRC. While there are several other initiatives with a similar focus, REJUSCO stands out for
the ambition of its objectives, the number of partners involved, the geographical scope of its
intervention, and the size of its budget. Unlike other similar interventions, REJUSCO covers all the
three most war-ravaged provinces of Eastern DRC (North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri 194 ), and its
support for the judicial system covers all aspects of criminal law. For these reasons, since its inception
REJUSCO has raised high (and perhaps unrealistic) expectations for a radical change of the justice
system in Eastern DRC.
3. The partnership arrangements of REJUSCO are composite and multi-layered, involving a
high number of partners and complex implementation arrangements. REJUSCO is therefore
particularly interesting from the perspective of the MULTIPART project as a laboratory of different
actors (national and international, governmental and non-governmental) working together for the
promotion of justice and the rule of law in conflict-affected contexts.
The eligibility of REJUSCO according to the Project’s defining criteria for multi-stakeholder
partnerships (MSPs) is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1 : Eligibility of REJUSCO as a MULTIPART case-study for MSP
Criteria
MULTIPART definition
REJUSCO
(Mele & Pischikova, 2008)
Actors involved There should be at least three types of partners, Government (different
e.g. civil society organizations, businesses, and
public actors. The involvement of at least one
Ministries)
EU
public sector actor is required.
Three bilateral donors
Several NGOs
Subject area Relevant for peacebuilding and Human Security Access to justice
Function
Only functioning MSP are considered. Possible Different functions,
functions: advocacy, financing, implementation, including advocacy,
coordination.
financing, implementation.
Geographical Only national MSP (as opposed to Trans- Eastern provinces of DRC
194 Ituri is currently a district within the Province Orientale, but it is planned that it will be transformed into a full-fledged
province in the context of the ongoing decentralization process.
191

scope National) (North Kivu, South Kivu,
Ituri)
Degree of Minimum degree of institutionalization is a High
institutionalization necessary requirement.
Output
MSPs can deliver 1) practical results (e.g. In principle, both practical
effective reconstruction, service delivery) as well results and democratic
as 2) democratic effects such as empowerment
and participation.
effects
Among the different activities implemented by REJUSCO, this case-study focuses specifically
on the support to mobile courts (audiences foraines). There are several reasons for this choice: the
mobile courts are among the most visible and best-known activities of REJUSCO, and they could be
directly observed during the field research. Furthermore, considering that several other actors are
supporting mobile courts in Eastern DRC, a focus on this specific activity allows for a comparative
analysis of REJUSCO value added vis-à-vis other (non MSP) modalities.
3.1.2. Methodology and caveats
The aim of this <strong>paper</strong> is to provide an analysis of the value added, opportunities and challenges of
carrying out a programme of this nature through a MSP format, compared to more ‘standard’ modalities.
In this sense, the case-study is not intended as an in-depth analysis of the REJUSCO programme per se,
and issues related to implementation and impact will be taken into consideration only as they relate to the
central question of partnership.
The development of the case-study involved a desk review of relevant literature and
documentation, along with two rounds of field research: in the capital city of Kinshasa (August 2009) and
in the Eastern province of North Kivu (October/November 2009). Overall, twenty-seven interviews were
conducted, covering a wide cross-section of Congolese government officials, civil society representatives,
donors, and REJUSCO staff (see Annex 2 for a complete list of organisations consulted). In addition, the
research included direct observation of programme activities, and in particular of the mobile courts
proceedings in the city of Butembo, North Kivu, from 25 to 30 October 2009.
A number of limitations should be noted, mostly deriving from the relatively limited time
available for field research, combined with the challenging conditions in Eastern DRC. In particular,
some key partners were not available for interviews during the period of the field research, including two
of the international partners of REJUSCO (Netherlands and UK). The field research in the East was
limited to the province of North Kivu, where the REJUSCO coordination office is situated, and it was not
possible to observe the programme in South Kivu and Ituri. Some key documents, including notably the
REJUSCO Programme Documents, were not made available for review.
A particular caveat concerns the gender composition of the interview sample. The almost totality
of the individuals consulted were men, with only one Congolese woman (representing a local women’s
NGO) interviewed – partly a consequence of the gender imbalance within the Congolese public
192

administration and political circles. The almost complete absence of women from the interview sample is
recognised as a shortcoming of the case-study.
3.2. Formation, Development and Operation of the MSP
This section starts with an overview of the context within which REJUSCO came into existence,
highlighting the main challenges of the justice and security systems in Eastern DRC. It then moves to
analyse the origins of the REJUSCO programme, summarising its objectives, scope and working
modalities.
3.2.1. Justice and security in post-conflict DRC
Conflicts in the DRC have been characterized by appalling levels of human rights violations. Today, the
country faces the dilemma of reconciling two paramount imperatives: ensuring justice and accountability
for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and promoting peace and reconciliation at the national and
local levels. After a failed attempt to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Davis & Hayner,
2009: 21-23), in 2004, in response to domestic and international pressure, the transitional government
made a self-referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The district of Ituri has been prioritized for
investigation by the ICC, and two trials are currently ongoing. 195
In parallel with the process of transitional justice, the DRC faces the challenge of establishing a
functioning justice system. The combined legacy of colonialism, Mobutu’s authoritarian and patrimonial
regime, and violent conflicts have left the overwhelming majority of Congolese citizens deprived of the
possibility of seeing their rights protected and torts redressed. While the 2006 Constitution contains
important norms to strengthen the role and independence of the judiciary, implementation is proceeding
slowly, when not stalled altogether, and political interference remains pervasive. According to a recentlyreleased
report by International Crisis Group,
today checks and balances barely exist, as the president’s office has curtailed the powers of the
government, parliament and judiciary. Civil liberties are regularly threatened…The regime has
undermined the independence of the judicial branch by running an anti-corruption campaign that is
politically biased (International Crisis Group, 2010: executive summary).
The judicial infrastructure is in disarray: courts and prisons are crumbling down, where they exist at all.
The system suffers from a chronic staff shortage 196 , and magistrates are poorly trained and ill-equipped,
often lacking access to, and knowledge of, basic legal texts. Corruption is rife at all levels – a
195
Those concern Thomas Lubanga, founder and leader of the Hema militia Union of Congolese Patriots, and the joint case of
Germain Katanga and Metheu Ngudjoli Chui, prominent figures of two Lendu militias. An arrest warrant issued against Bosco
Ntaganda, now a senior member of the CNDP, is yet to be executed. The fourth Congolese whose case is in front of the ICC,
Jean-Pierre Bemba, is accused of crimes committed in the Central African Republic.
196 In 2005, a total of 2,053 judges (1,678 civil court judges and 375 military courts judges) were operating in DRC, representing
a ration of one judge for almost 30,000 inhabitants (Global Rights, 2005).
193

consequence of low and irregularly salaries, combined with widespread impunity. 197 The challenges
facing the formal justice system have led to a growing resort to ‘traditional’ or ‘alternative’ methods of
conflict resolution, which are attracting increasing donors’ support (Global Rights, 2005; ILAC, 2009). 198
The treatment of sexual violence is poignantly indicative of the challenges of the justice system.
It is widely documented that rape and other forms of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) have been used
systematically as a weapon of war in the DRC – to such an unprecedented degree that human rights
groups speak of a ‘war within the war’ and of ‘women’s bodies as a battleground’. (Human Rights Watch,
2002; International Alert, 2005; Trenholm et al., 2009). 199 Sexual violence continues to be widespread
after the official end of hostilities, and has increasingly become a wider social phenomenon, not limited to
security forces and rebel groups. The profile of perpetrators expands beyond soldiers and rebels to include
civilians, particularly those in position of power, leading to what has been defined a ‘normalization of
rape’ (HHI, 2010). The prevalent climate of impunity gives perpetrators confidence that they will not be
held accountable for those crimes (UNDP, 2009).
In line with international norms, sexual violence was outlawed in the 2006 Constitution and in the
update of the Criminal Code approved that same year (Global Rights, 2006). However, very few rape
cases actually make it to court – the combined effect of low access to justice for the poor and the
continuing social stigmatization of rape victims. In this situation, out-of-court settlements for sexual
violence are highly encouraged, even by judges themselves. (Davis & Heyner, 2009: 25-26; Global
Rights, 2005). Among judges, ignorance of the law on sexual violence, and even outright rejection of it,
are common (HHI, 2010: 55).
The problems of the justice system cannot be regarded in isolation from the broader situation of
security forces. Far from protecting citizens, the army and the police are today among the greatest sources
of human insecurity in the DRC. Torture, killings and rapes by security personnel are endemic throughout
the country, and reach particularly high levels in the East (HHI, 2010). The police and the army are
marred by endemic corruption; they remain poorly trained, without unified and accountable command
structures, and lack essential equipment and resources (Carlsen, 2009; Moebekk, 2009).
197 The insufficient and irregular payment of salaries to judges is widely quotes as one key reason for corruption in the judiciary.
However, the 2009 mid-term review of the REJUSCO programme notes that the situation has recently improved considerably:
the salaries have substantially increased and the judges interviewed during the review confirmed that they are paid regularly
(Doumulin et al, 2009).
198 Often-quoted advantages of alternative methods of conflict resolution are greater accessibility, lower costs, faster delivery of
rulings, and greater flexibility to adapt to local realities (King et al, 2009). Critics, on the other hand, question the compatibility
of these alternative methods with the rule of law and internationally-recognized human rights, and raise concerns related to the
lack of consistency and predictability (Sterling, 2006; Heise, 2010).
199 Many have seen the ICC trials for DRC as a missed opportunity to send a clear message with regard to the inadmissibility of
sexual violence. While the ICC Statute takes the innovative stance of defining rape and a range of other forms of GBV as war
crimes and crimes against humanity, in its first trials the Court has chosen not to emphasize those aspects: for example, the
militia leader Thomas Lubanga has not been charged for any form of GBV, in spite of the extended documentation linking him to
such crimes (Glassborow, 2008).
194

3.2.2. Ongoing processes of reform of the justice and security systems
In the post-conflict period, three parallel processes of reform were launched for the justice system, the
army and the police. These reforms are all grounded in the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace
Agreement, which “reaffirmed the need for an independent judiciary” (Section V, 3, a), set the conditions
for the creation of a “restructured and integrated national army” (Section VI), and called for the
establishment of an “integrated police force … responsible for ensuring the safety of the government and
the population” (Annex V). The 2006 Constitution further defines the structure, composition and modus
operandi of the justice system (Section 4), the army (Section 6, 1) and the police (Section 6, 2). In all
these areas, however, the pace of reform has been slow and the progress uneven, due, among other
reasons, to the lack of a coordinated and coherent approach, both on the Congolese and on the donors’
side.
Reform of the justice system
In 2003, an in-depth audit of the Congolese justice sector was conducted, with the support of the
European Union and other donors 200 , in order to take stock of the situation of the justice system, and to
suggest avenues of improvement. A report published in May 2004 – and validated through a series of
seminaries in November of the same year – clearly demonstrated the need for radical reform.
In order to address the many issues listed in the audit report, a Joint Justice Committee (Comité
Mixte de la Justice - CMJ) was set up. The CMJ, composed of national and international stakeholders 201 ,
is jointly chaired by the Ministry of Justice and the EC, and provides a forum for discussion, prioritization
and decision-making among national and international stakeholders (ILAC, 2009). In 2007, the CMJ
produced an Action Plan, articulated over a 10-year period, with 11 programmes and a budget of US$150
million. The Action Plan was followed in 2009 by a Roadmap, which takes a shorter timeframe (six
months to one year) and focuses on quick-return, high-visibility activities. Three particularly urgent sets
of actions are identified to fight against impunity and improve the credibility of the justice system: (i)
hiring and training of magistrates; (ii) bringing justice closer to the population (justice de proximité); and
(iii) infrastructural renovation (ILAC, 2009). 202
Reform of the army
The process of reform of the Congolese armed forces, launched with the 2002 Peace Agreement, rests on
two pillars: (i) the restructuring of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
200 Other actors involved in the audit were Belgium, France, United Kingdom, the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and
the United Nations Development Programme.
201
More specifically, the CMJ is composed by the Minister and Vice-Minister of Justice; the Comité de pilotage de la Réforme
des Entreprises Publiques; the National Bar Association; the First President of the Supreme Court of Justice; the First President
of the Haute Cour Militaire; the National Prosecutor; the National Prosecutor of the Military Court; the Secretary-General of
Justice; and a representative of the Permanent Commission on the Reform of Congolese Law. On the international side, members
include representatives of the US Embassy, of the European Commission (co-chair), Belgian Cooperation, British Cooperation;
French Cooperation; Dutch Cooperation; Japanese Cooperation; South African Cooperation; Swedish Cooperation; the United
Nations Development Programme; the UN Human Rights Office; and the MONUC Rule of Law Unit.
202 The list of projects and related document can be found on the website of the Ministry of Justice: http://www.justice.gov.cd.
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(FARDC) with the integration of elements of armed groups signatories of the agreement; and (ii) the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants who are not going to be part of the
new FARDC.
The process of military integration was supported primarily by MONUC, along with a number of
bilateral donors providing funding and technical assistance (including Belgium, the Netherlands, Angola
and South Africa). The European Union was involved through the EUSEC mission, mandated by the EU
Council. 203 The formula initially chosen for the integration went under the name of brassage, and was
supposed to create mixed brigades, with combatants from various proveniences, to be deployed
nationwide. Due to the opposition by some armed groups (particularly from Laurent Nkunda’s Congrès
National pour la Défense du Peuple) this formula soon gave way, de facto, to a watered-down version
known as mixage, which was conducted at the local level only (without re-deployment to other regions)
and left battalions homogenous. As a consequence, today several units that operate under the label
FARDC are, in effect, old rebel formations, with the same composition and the same chain of command
that they had during the war (Clement, 2009). 204
The DDR process was supported mostly through the Multi-Country Demobilization and
Reintegration Program (MDRP) 205 , and, since 2009, by the national DDR programme (Programme
National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion, PNDDR). The process has been proceeding
slowly, complicated by the thorny issue of repatriation of ‘foreign’ combatants 206 .
As it often happens, the ‘reintegration’ component has been the weak link in the DDR chain,
leading to a vicious cycle of demobilisation/remobilisation, or else to the recycling of former combatants
into networks of organised crime or banditry (banditisme).
Reform of the police
Compared with the army, the structure and composition of the police received less attention during the
peace negotiations. The 2002 Peace Agreement merely stated that “an integrated police force shall be
responsible for the security of the Government and population” (annex 5). The Police Nationale
Congolaise (PNC) was created by decree in 2002, bringing together different bodies and forces, including
elements of armed groups that had signed the peace agreements (Davis, 2009: 19).
203 EUSEC constituted the first example of EU’s involvement in security sector reform in third countries. Originally established
in 2005 to support the Congolese authorities in the process of restructing the FARDC, the mission is currently composed of
around 50 military and civilian personnel (as of March 2010. It is based in Kinshasa, with detachments deployed in Bukavu,
Goma, Kisangani and Lubumbashi. See website http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=909&lang=En, accessed on
April 5th, 2010.
204 One example is the 85th FARDC Brigade in Walikale, North Kivu, which is composed exclusively by former Mai-Mai rebels
(Garrett et al., 2009).
205 As of March 2009, the MDRP had been funded for a total of USD 272 million of which USD 150 million from the World
Bank (IDA grants); USD 100 million from a multi-country trust fund, and the USD 22million from the African Development
Bank. The MDRP closed in 2009. The PNDDR is financed by the World Bank (IDA grants) and the African Development Bank.
See website, http://www.mdrp.org/drc.htm, accessed on April 5th, 2010.
206 This refers primarily to the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a predominantly Hutu militia created in
the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Contrary to common perceptions, most of the FDLR combatants today are not
genocidaires themselves, and many are too young to have played any role in the genocide (International Crisis Group, 2005;
2009).
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Several donors moved in to support the police reform, albeit not always in a coherent and
coordinated way. In 2005, the European Union’s Council established the EUPOL Kinshasa Mission, with
the key task to “monitor, mentor and advise on the setting up and the development” of an Integrated
Police Unit in Kinshasa. In 2007, the mission was followed to the EUPOL DRC, deployed with a broader
mandate to assist the DRC authorities with police reform (Morsut, 2009). 207
A mixed reflection group was created in 2005 (Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme et la
Réorganisation de la Police Nationale Congolaise, GMRRR), with the participation of national actors
and MONUC, EUPOL, and representatives of the European Commission and the Angolan, British,
French and South African embassies. The mandate of the group was to evaluate the state of the PNC,
make recommendations for the future, and draft the legal framework for the organisation and functioning
of the police force. A Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP) was set up in 2008, with the
aim of monitoring the police reform process and forming the basis for future donor engagement (Rauch,
2008; Davis, 2009). The Organic Law has been presented to the Parliament in 2009 (International Crisis
Group, 2010: 16). However, due the continuing structural weakness of the PNC, many functions that
would in principle pertain to the police are still fulfilled by the army.
The challenge of coordination
In each of the three areas examined above, the pace of reform was slowed down, and at times blocked
altogether, by a lack of coordination and common understanding at three levels: within the Congolese
government, between the Congolese government and international partners, and among international
actors. At the national level, inter-ministerial collaboration has been very weak, and this has hampered the
possibility of approaching reform of the army, police and justice in a holistic way (Melmot, 2009: 15). On
the other hand, donors, while often calling for more collaboration on the Congolese side, have not always
led by example, often preferring to engage at the bilateral level (International Crisis Group, 2010: 16). At
best, donor coordination has been ‘ad hoc’, on specific issues, and often has lacked altogether, leading to
a “donors’ patchwork” (Clement, 2009: 103). According to some observers, the problem goes beyond a
simple lack of coordination, and amounts to actual competition:
the strong competition between donors and international institutions… hinges on the ability to
influence the Congolese authorities, or indeed the security forces directly… competitive emulation
between the EU and the UN leads to a lack of sincere coordination, encouraging involvement by “lone
riders” seeking influence in Kinshasa and/or within international forums…. The Congolese
government has been seeking to multiply the number of ‘lone riders’. At the start of 2007, it indicated
clearly its preference for bilateralism rather than multilateralism in the field of security…. As a result,
though there have been repeated calls for coordination, in the DRC, military cooperation, and to a
lesser extent police cooperation, actually take place in a highly competitive market. ... The absence of
coordination which marks the Congolese government is hardly different from the pretence of
coordination within the international community, which is always quick to ask the national authorities
to do what it is unable to achieve itself. (Melmot, 2009: 15-16).
The joint committees that have been created to deal with the reform of justice, the army and the
police have, so far, had very little interaction among themselves. They have been supported by different
207 See WEBSITE: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=788&lang=EN, accessed on April 5 th , 2010.
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donors through different processes – or at times, by different departments of the same donor. In the case
of the European Union, for example, justice reform is a responsibility of the Commission, while security
sector reform falls under the Council. This has resulted in a lack of a common approach, particularly
damaging on issues cutting across two fields, such as the judiciary police.
3.2.3. Origins of REJUSCO
Starting in the transition period, the European Union has sponsored two programmes in support of justice
in the DRC, which can be considered as direct precursors of REJUSCO. These are:
- Programme d’Appui à la Justice (PAJ), implemented in 2002-2006 (for a total of € 28 million).
Conceived as an immediate post-conflict programme, the PAJ aimed at normalising the
functioning of the judicial apparatus, through physical rehabilitation (buildings, equipment),
instrumental rehabilitation (publication and distribution of laws and regulations) and distribution
of information to the public. Three evaluations of the PAJ, conducted in 2004, concurred on the
fact that the programme had been too ambitious, with a gap between the objectives and the actual
activities. While the programme was recognized to be very relevant for the context of the DRC,
its impact and sustainability were found to be quite weak. The main achievements of PAJ were
found in the physical reconstruction of courts and prisons (Dessallien et al., 2007).
- EU pilot project to strengthen the justice sector in Ituri, implemented in the period 2003-2006
(for a total budget of € 984,897 208 ). The project, launched shortly after the end of the conflict in
Ituri in late 2003, aimed at supporting the existing capacities in the field of justice in Bunia, the
district capital, to contribute to creating a constructive space for dialogue of different
stakeholders, so that realistic, constructive proposals for reform could emerge. Activities included
construction and rehabilitation of infrastructures, equipment of courts and offices; training of
different judicial actors, including traditional leaders; some limited support to the prison in Bunia
(food and healthcare); and awareness-raising for the population on their rights and obligations.
While the programme never undertook a formal evaluation, it is widely considered as a success
story, and many observers concur that it had a positive impact on the judiciary system in Bunia,
allowing to jump-start the judiciary activities in the district (Dessalien et al, 2007).
Building on these previous experiences, the REJUSCO Programme was formally launched in July
2006 and became effectively operational in May 2007.
208 Initially, the Ituri Justice programme was financed by the European Commission for a total of 585,000 euros through the
Rapid Response Mechanism. The programme has been extended for six months in July 2004 and for an additional 15 months in
January 2005, and the total budget was brought up to Euros 984,897, including additional activities on military justice that were
not initially envisaged.
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3.2.4. Aim and objectives of REJUSCO
REJUSCO has the overall aim to ‘contribute to the strengthening of the judicial capacity in the provinces
of Eastern DRC, with a view to support the establishment of the rule of law’. REJUSCO has three
objectives, corresponding each to a programme component with specific activities (see Table 2):
- Contribute to the strengthening of functional capacities of justice sites in the provinces of Eastern
DRC;
- Contribute to the functioning of justice, to fight impunity and ensure fair and equitable trials;
- Increase the trust of the population towards the justice system, through protection and awarenessraising.
Geographically, REJUSCO is active in the provinces of North and South Kivu and in the district
of Ituri. Its total budget for the period 2006-2012 is of USD 15,6 million.
Components
1. Ensure the functionality of the
justice sites (infrastructures)
2. Ensure the functioning of justice
3. Monitoring and awarenessraising
Table 2: Summary of REJUSCO’s components and main activities
Key activities
Rehabilitation and/or construction of courts and prisons;
Provision of office furniture and equipment.
Support to the judicial and investigative police;
Technical support to jurisdictions (means of transportation,
training)
Support to mobile courts
Support to prison for the improvement of detention conditions
Support to victims (information, assistance and protection)
Awareness-raising of the population (radio broadcast)
Monitoring and reporting on detention facilities and conditions
of prisoners
3.3. The Nature and Structure of the MSP
The REJUSCO programme is articulated as rather complex partnership between the Congolese
government, the four international donors, and civil society. This section starts with an overview of the
various partners, and then moves on to an analysis of the different levels of their relationship within the
REJUSCO framework.
3.3.1. International partners
As shown in Figure 1 below, the four current international partners of REJUSCO are all important donors
to the DRC, and so is Sweden, which will be a partner in the next phase. All their activities are framed
within the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), currently covering the period 2007-2010. 209 Each of
209 Described as a ‘big tent’ or a ‘framework for big ideas’, the CAF brings together 17 international partners (accounting for
85% of aid to the country), and is derived from the priorities articulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy <strong>paper</strong>, namely
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the international partners then has its own strategic document with its own priorities for engagement in
the DRC, as summarized in Table 3.
Figure 1: Main donors to the DRC (2007-2008)
Netherlands
49
Sweden
51
Germany
68
UK
US
EC
Belgium
IDA
0
100
157
165
191
192
200
300
297
ODA (million USD)
Overall
strategy
Individual
strategies
Period
covered
Priority
sectors
Table 3: Summary of key strategies of REJUSCO international partners in the DRC
EC
Belgium UK Netherlands
Country Assistance Framework (2007-2010)
Governance;
Growth;
Social sectors;
HIV/AIDS;
Community dynamics.
Country Strategy Indicative Cooperation Country Plan
Strategic Multi-year Plan
Paper
Programme
2008-2013 2008-2010 2008-2010 2008-2011
Governance
Infrastructures
Health.
Social sectors; Basic
infrastructure;
Agriculture, rural
development and
forestry;
Good governance and
community spirit.
Governance, SSR,
natural resource
management
Health, education,
infrastructures
Community
recovery and
humanitarian
assistance.
About half of the REJUSCO budget is provided by the EC (7.9 million USC), and the rest by Belgium
(3.7 million), the UK (2.9 million) and the Netherlands (1.1 million), as shown in Figure 2.
Security Sector Reform
Fight against sexual
violence
Humanitarian Aid
Governance, Growth, Social Sectors, HIV-AIDS and Community Dynamics. The CAF has been endorsed by the Government,
which used it to develop its own short-term term Priority Action Plan. (UN & World Bank, 2008; DFID, 2008).
200

Figure 2: Contribution of different donors to REJUSCO (million USD)
2,9 EC
1,1
3,7
7,9
Belgium
Netherlands
UK
3.3.2. Government partners
On the Congolese side, the main institutions involved are the Ministry of Justice (identified as
beneficiary, or maitre d’œuvre) ) and the Ministry of Finance (identified as the legal entity in charge of
overseeing the project, or maitre d’ouvrage). While the MSP does not foresee any financial contribution
of the Congolese Government, the Convention de Financement between the European Commission and
the Government of includes some preliminary conditions to be fulfilled by the DRC Government, namely:
- Paying salaries for judges and other staff;
- Putting at the disposal of the project land and/or buildings in every province for the infrastructural
component;
- Putting at the disposal of the project plots of land for the ‘correctional farms’ (fermes
pénitentiaires).
In addition, the Convention Spécifique between Belgium and the DRC Government identifies a series of
(rather standard) obligations for the government to guarantee the good execution of the programme,
including fiscal exemptions for the programme and its personnel, free circulation for the project staff and
partners, and access to relevant documentation. No commitment is foreseen in either convention
regarding the follow-up of the programme.
To date, the involvement of the DRC government in the management of the programme has been
quite weak, as emerged through the field research and confirmed by the findings of the mid-term
evaluation. The relationship between national and international partners seems to have improved with the
Minister of Justice, Mr. Luzolo Bambi Lessa, and the government has stated its intention to be more
active in the next phase of REJUSCO.
In terms of notable exclusions, it should be noted that there is no direct involvement of judges in the
partnerships: in other words, judges are seen merely as beneficiaries of the programme rather than as full-
201

fledged partners. This appears significant particularly in the current climate of tension and mistrust among
the government and the judiciary. 210
3.3.3. Civil society
Civil society development in the DRC is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the last decade, the number
of NGOs has risen exponentially, and their quality varies greatly. This ‘civil society boom’ makes it very
difficult to tell apart the genuinely active organisations with grassroots connection from those that have
been created only as a way to receive funding: the expression ONG mallettes (or ‘briefcase NGO’) has
been coined to indicate those organisations that do not even have an office, but are just a tool to access
resources from international donors.
In REJUSCO, the involvement of civil society is foreseen mainly in the third component
(monitoring and awareness-raising), where NGOs are sub-contracted for monitoring, reporting and
conducting advocacy on the conditions of prisons. A number of criteria are identified for the selection of
partner NGOs, including:
- Legal personality or authorisation to function as a NGOs;
- Actual presence in North Kivu, South Kivu or Ituri;
- Office address and list of members (to avoid the risk of ‘briefcase NGOs’ and ‘one-person
NGOs’);
- At least one legal expert among the NGOs staff;
- Focus of intervention on legal assistance, human rights, child protection, assistance to prisoners
or other similar fields.
NGOs have to present micro-projects, which are evaluated on the basis of their quality and pertinence, for
a maximum amount of USD 5,000. For the first phase of the monitoring (December 2007-March 2008),
eleven local NGOs were selected. The monitoring reports produced by the NGOs are sent to the
REJUSCO office, and payment is disbursed on this basis. During the first phase, three NGOs have been
eliminated for not respecting the contractual engagements. For the second phase of monitoring and
reporting (October – December 2008), additional NGOs have been brought on board.
Two training workshops have been organised in collaboration with the UN Office for Human
Rights, in Bukavu (South Kivu) and Bunia (Ituri) in order to get the NGOs ‘on the same page’ in terms of
monitoring and reporting procedures. 211 These workshops seem to have been particularly appreciated by
the participants, not only as a training event but also as a rare opportunity for exchange, discussion and
peer-to-peer learning.
210 A recent report by the International Crisis Group notes that President Kabila has been using the anti-corruption campaign to
weaken the judiciary. In his speech in the occasion of the anniversary of Congolese independence in 2009, the President accused
the judges to have abused the powers linked to their role, and stated that the judiciary is itself “on the accused bench” in the fight
against corruption (International Crisis Group, 2010: 9).
211 The workshops, lasting three days each, took place in December 2007 in Bukavu and in June 2008 in Bunia. Two additional
evaluation workshops, of the same duration, were organised in July/August 2008. No workshop was organised for North Kivu.
REJUSCO has also produced a Manual on Monitoring and Reporting for the use of NGOs.
202

In spite of the efforts to harmonise the methodology used, the quality of reports varies
significantly, in terms of richness and usefulness of contents, as well as format and style. The impact of
the monitoring also varies, as some NGOs have obtained significantly better results in terms of releasing
of illegally held prisoners. This is a function of the uneven level of capacities among the NGOs, but also
of the different conditions of movement, security and accessibility across Eastern Congo. Some NGOs
have also taken advantage of the monitoring to carry out complementary activities, such as awarenessraising
of prisons’ management and staff.
In addition to local civil society, REJUSCO also sub-contracts one international NGO, La
Benevolencija, to broadcast the radio programme Sheria Ni Dawa (‘Justice is a Remedy’), as part of the
awareness-raising component of the programme.
While REJUSCO is presented as a partnership between the government, international actors and civil
society, de facto the modalities of involvement of NGOs are closer to ‘outsourcing’ rather than
partnership, in that NGOs are contracted by the CTB for specific tasks: they are not included in the
decision-making and management structure of the programme, and there no institutionalised forum where
the contribution of civil society can be tapped into. There is no ‘horizontal line’ or common platform
among CSOs themselves.
Furthermore, sub-contracting to local NGOs has not always been efficient in terms of
costs/benefits. One example is that of the ‘correctional farms’ (fermes penitentiaires), where local NGOs
have been allotted plots of land so that convicts could be employed for farming, thus addressing the
dramatic problem of food scarcity in prisons. The mid-term evaluation found that sub-contracted NGOs
have been over-charging the programme, compared not only to market prices but also to similar work
done by NGOs elsewhere in Eastern DRC. The cost of manpower has been overestimated, and the crop
yields have been very low, even taking into account the occasional looting by armed groups. In
conclusion, “the system, in the form in which it is developed to date, is completely non-efficient from an
economic point of view, disconnected from the economic world and therefore unsustainable” (Dumoulin
et al., 2009: 27 [translation by the author]).
3.3.4. Structure and functioning of the partnership
The REJUSCO programme rests on a complex web of bilateral agreements, as summarised in Table 4 and
visually shown in Figure 3. Like the others development programmes of the Belgian government,
REJUSCO is implemented by the Belgian Technical Cooperation (Cooperation Technique Belge - CTB),
a society created by law in 1998 and in charge of the execution of public services related to development
cooperation. 212 A number of considerations can be made in relation to the structure of the partnership:
- There is no one document signed by all partners regulating the functioning of the partnership;
- Of the four international donors, only the EC and Belgium have signed a direct agreement with
the Congolese counterpart;
212 See website, http://www.btcctb.org/jobs (accessed on April 18th, 2010).
203

- While effectively at the core of the web of partners, the CTB has no direct partnership agreement
with the national counterpart, nor with the main donor of the programme, the EC. A mid-term
evaluation of the REJUSCO programme, carried out in 2007, found that the lack of such direct
relationship had negative repercussions in terms of institutionalisation and national ownership.
- The CTB is the only interface between two of the donors (the UK and the Netherlands) and the
rest of the partners. This means that the Netherlands and the UK are ‘three degree removed’ from
the Congolese Government.
- The CTB is the only link between civil society partners and the rest of REJUSCO. There is no
‘horizontal line’ among CSOs themselves – they interact individually with the programme, each
doing its own job. A common platform of civil society actors is missing.
Table 4: Bilateral partnership agreements
Document Parties Date of signature
Convention de Financement (CF) CE/DRC 17 July 2006
Convention Spécifique (CS) Belgium/DRC 7 December 2006
Service contract
(Convention de mise en oeuvre - CMO)
Memorandum of understanding (MoU)
Arrangement
Belgium/CTB 22 December 2006
CTB/
UK (DFID)
CTB/
Netherlands Development
Cooperation
Date missing
13 February 2007
The mid-term evaluation has noted that sub-optimal effectiveness of these arrangements. As a
consequence, the potential donors of the future REJUSCO programme (including Sweden) and the CMJ
have decided to adopt the format of the ‘delegated cooperation’ (cooperation déléguée), with only one
Convention de Financement for all the donors, managed by a leader (chef de file), using consolidated
procedures.
204

Figure 3: Relations among REJUSCO partners
3.3.5. REJUSCO’s decision-making and management structure
In the design of REJUSCO, three levels of management and decision-making mechanisms were foreseen,
namely:
- Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage). The Steering Committee is highest level of decisionmaking
body of REJUSCO, supposed to meet at least every six months, or more often depending
on needs, in order to establish the overall strategy direction of the programme. In particular, the
Steering Committee is tasked to (i) verify and approve the annual programme; (ii) verify the
implementation of the programme; (iii) take the necessary decisions, including re-orienting the
programme when necessary; and (iv) approve the final report and close the programme. The
Steering Committee is composed of representatives of the following institutions:
o
Ministry of Justice (chair);
o
Ministry of Interior;
o Bar Association (Ordre des Avocats);
o
o
o
o
o
o
Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature;
European Commission delegation in Kinshasa;
DFID (Kinshasa office);
Dutch cooperation (Kinshasa office);
Belgian cooperation (Kinshasa office);
CTB (Kinshasa office).
205

Depending on the agenda of the day, external experts can be invited to participate in the meetings as
resource persons.
- Technical Working Committee (Comité Technique de Travail). This committee is supposed to
meet every three months, in order to prepare the meeting of the Steering Committee, as well as
regulating all questions related to the organisation and functioning of the programme. It is
composed of the four international partners, the REJUSCO Office in Goma (Unité Gestion
Programme), the CTB and one representative of the Ministry of Justice and/or the CMJ.
- Local Coordination Committees (Comités Mixtes de Coordination). In each of the three
programme sites (North Kivu, South Kivu and Bunia), local committees were envisaged in order
to allow the different partners to be actively engaged in the programme on a regular basis.
The mid-term evaluation and the interviews conducted for this case-study show that the level of
functioning of these mechanisms has been uneven. The Steering Committee has not been playing the
pivotal role foreseen in the design of the programme: only one meeting took place in 2008, apparently for
reasons related to the change of the Minister of Justice. At the time of the mid-term evaluation in 2009,
the internal Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee had not yet been adopted, and the engagement
of the Ministries of Interior and Defence remained virtually non-existent. According to the mid-term
evaluation, the Technical Working Committee had been functioning better, providing a forum to
exchange information and improve communication among the partners.
The day-to-day management of REJUSCO is run by the Unité de Gestion du Programme (UGP) in
Goma (North Kivu), and the three units (cellules) in Goma, Bukavu (South Kivu) and Bunia (Ituri).
3.3.6. Implementation issues
A number of problems with implementation of REJUSCO emerge from the analysis. These include, in
particular:
- Confusion around the role of the CTB. Different actors have contrasting perspective, and this
creates false expectations and, often, frustrations. Many of the informants complained about
CTB’s non-transparent and hierarchical attitude, its lack of partnership approach, as well as the
high overhead charged for its services (10%).
- Overcentralization of management. Several interviewers have remarked that REJUSCO is overly
centralized, at two levels: first in Kinshasa, where most of the partners are based, and then in
Goma, where the UGP is. The CTB is only present in Kinshasa and not in the East, which adds
to the procedural burden. Many argue that a more decentralised approach (giving more decisionmaking
power to the cellules in Bukavu and Bunia) would be beneficial for more effectiveness. It
206

was also remarked that different layers of intermediaries favour corruption and ‘traffic of
influence’.
- Cumbersome system of fund disbursement. Largely a consequence of the previous point, an oftenvoiced
criticism of the REJUSCO programme was the inefficient fund disbursement system. The
EC was particularly criticised for a tendency to micro-manage. Informants have spoken of a
‘double blockage’: first in Kinshasa, where the EC has to approve the disbursement, and then in
Goma, where the UGP is located. There is a strong feeling that the system should be more
decentralized. Local civil society partners also deplore the fact that payments are made through
the Banque Commerciale du Congo: many NGOs are not used to operate through the Bank
system and have no bank accounts. Given the immense challenges of the banking system in
Congo, local partners auspicate that the payment might be done in cash instead.
3.4. Assessment of the External Impacts of the MSP
While it is still early to fully assess the success of REJUSCO in meeting its stated objectives, some
preliminary conclusions can be drawn with regard to the first three years of operation of the programme.
This section starts with a general assessment of the REJUSCO performance, and then looks specifically at
the mobile courts, selected as the focus of this case-study. Then section seeks to assess REJUSCO’s
coherence and complementarity with other actors and ongoing initiatives in the field of justice, as well as
its sustainability for the future.
3.4.1. REJUSCO performance and impact
Any assessment of the performance and impact of REJUSCO should start by remarking the extremely
challenging situation in which operates. Eastern DRC finds itself in a situation that can be described as
‘zero justice’, where the justice system is to be not so much ‘re-constructed’, but rather built from scratch.
In addition, REJUSCO works in a context of continued humanitarian emergency: the post-conflict label
that might be appropriate for other areas of DRC does not apply to the Eastern part of the country, where
periods of ‘no-war no-peace’ alternate with phases of open violence.
There is virtually universal consensus on the fact that the REJUSCO programme is extremely
relevant in the context of Eastern DRC. The informants consulted for this case-study have unanimously
declared that REJUSCO addresses very pressing needs, and many of them suggested that the programme
should be expanded.
In terms of impact, the programme appears to have reached concrete results particularly with
regard to the first component, i.e. the building and rehabilitation of infrastructures, along with the
provision of various forms of material support (computers, office equipment, means of transportation).
Many interviewees credited REJUSCO for having refurbished courts and prisons, made available means
of transportation for prisoners, and constructed women-only sections in correctional facilities, thus
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sensibly reducing the prevalence of rape and sexual harassment. The impact of the third component
(awareness-raising and trust building) appears instead limited: the mid-term review finds that the opinion
of the population vis-à-vis the justice system has not been fundamentally altered by the programme.
Focus: the mobile courts
Over the last few years, mobile courts (or audiences foraines in French) have become an increasingly
common tool for ensuring access to justice, particularly in post-conflict contexts, and are receiving
growing donors’ support. In essence, mobile courts are trials held outside the main site of the tribunal,
generally in areas far away from urban centers that are ill-served by the justice system. In the DRC, the
practice of mobile courts finds its basis in Article 67 of the Code d’organisation et de competence
judiciaire, which states that “if this is estimated to be necessary for the good administration of justice,
courts and tribunals can organize trials in any locality of their area of competence”. (quoted in ASF, 2006:
4 [my translation]). According to a report of the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) on
DRC,
[m]obile courts not only contribute to bringing justice and the state’s presence to the population of
remote areas, but they also help improve the image of the justice system. Firstly, the fact that
magistrates are not in their usual location reduces the risk of corruption and bribery. Secondly, the
mobile courts initiatives are generally organized by international donors, which accompany all the
magistrates and therefore provide some on-site monitoring. Thirdly, all magistrates travel for specific
periods of time and end up rendering their decision on location. Thus claims are addressed quicker
and relatively efficiently. Some mobile courts initiatives have included lawyers and paralegals to
provide legal information to the population in preparation of the visit of the mobile court. (ILAC,
2009: 26-27).
Over the last few years, several organisations have supported mobile courts initiatives in Eastern DRC –
including, among others, Avocats Sans Frontieres and the American Bar Association. While this is
generally considered a successful model of proximity justice (justice de proximité), a number of problems
and challenges have also been remarked in various assessments and lessons learned studies. These
include, in particular:
- Frustrated expectations: the amount of trials that mobile courts can realistically handle is bound
to remain trivial compared to the enormous accumulated caseload of tribunals in Eastern DRC. In
fact, part of the appeal of the mobile courts is their symbolic value: by judging some of the cases
and convicting some of those responsible, mobile courts are expected to restore a sense of justice
in the population at large. However, this can backfire in popular perceptions, leading to
resentments and feelings of injustice.
- ‘Brain drain’ of the judges from ‘normal’ to ‘mobile’ courts. As donors start increasingly
supporting the latter, it becomes more and more profitable for judges to be involved in those
projects, particularly to obtain indemnities for travel (frais de déplacement). Depending on how
these payments are calculated, judges might be motivated to prolong the trials, in order to get
additional daily fees.
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- Low decision/execution ratio. The execution of decisions remains the weakest part of the mobile
courts experience. For example, an assessment of Avocats Sans Frontieres on their own mobile
courts project (2004-2006) notes that out of 707 decisions rendered by the mobile courts, only
204 have actually been executed. In this, the mobile courts suffer from the same flaws and
challenges than the ‘normal’ courts, including the high level of corruption within the police and
the possibility to buy one’s way out of prison.
It seems that the REJUSCO mobile courts initiative suffers from the same challenges that other
actors have experienced in this field. It does not seem that the REJUSCO project has benefitted from
these lessons learned, or significantly used its partnership format in order to overcome them.
Certainly, some of the intended benefits of the mobile courts are difficult to quantify and assess –
particularly the objective of increasing the population’s trust towards the justice system. Many of the
interviewees have remarked that the population has more trust in the justice system as a result of this
activity, and that access to justice for the vulnerable has been expanded. However, it has been observed
that victims are normally not present at the trials, and sometimes not informed that the trials are taking
place.
One aspect that has proved particularly problematic is the payment of ‘performance incentives’
(primes à la performance) to the judges and other staff. The approach adopted is essentially quantitative,
with a certain amount paid to judges for every case they handle. However, quantity is hardly a satisfactory
exclusive criterion for performance, and that many important dimensions are overlooked, such as the
degree to which the mobile courts succeeded in increasing the population’s trust in the justice system, and
the degree to which victims have actually received justice. It could be observed that judges often arrive on
the site with considerable delay, and there seems to be no method in place to deal with non-performing
judges.
In a similar vein, both the fieldwork and the mid-term evaluation pointed to several aspects of
inefficiency with regard to the mobile courts, stressing, in particular, that the payments made to judges
and other staff for travel and lodging are considerably higher than those made by other organisations for
similar projects (for example, these are about double what is paid by ASF in comparable circumstances).
3.4.2. Coherence and complementarity
The mid-term evaluation notes several instances of overlapping between the activities of REJUSCO and
those of other organisations working in the same sector, and calls for greater coordination and more
systematic exchange of information, particularly with regard to the interaction with local counterparts. An
area where the need for coordination is very high is capacity-building. There is a very real risk that the
overlapping of training programme can be overwhelming for judicial actors, and place unrealistic
demands on their time, making them unable to carry out their daily functions. In the end, “the deficit of
rule of law and the specific situation in the East cannot justify the anarchical development of practices”
by international donors (Dumoulin et al., 2009: 47 [my translation]). Similarly, there is a need to
209

harmonise the fees paid to implementing NGOs and the ‘performance premiums’ for judges and judicial
staff.
A ‘missed opportunity’ for close collaboration seems to be the relationship between REJUSCO
and MONUC. 213 Established in 2004 as a small unit to advise on a range of rule of law issues, the
MONUC Rule of Law section has since expanded to support wider security sector reform, including
civilian and military justice and reform of the penitentiary system. The Rule of Law section has adopted a
three-tiered approach to the support to the justice system, including (i) provision of immediate assistance;
(ii) support to DRC authorities in designing mid-term coordinated strategic plans to reform justice subsectors,
such as legislation, military justice, prisons and courts; and (iii) support to short-term
implementation of urgent elements of longer-term reform strategy, including building capacity to
investigate and try cases involving international crimes. 214
The complementarities with REJUSCO are self-evident. During the interviews, representatives of
both MONUC and REJUSCO pointed to several instances of good collaboration (for example, in terms of
logistical support given by MONUC, coordination to avoid duplication in the monitoring of detention
facilities etc). However, most interviewees not affiliated to REJUSCO or MONUC lamented the lack of
systematic cooperation between the two organizations, to different degrees and with different attributions
of responsibility – with some speaking of a ‘conflict of interest’ between the two. While specific instances
of collaboration have been quoted (for example, MONUC representatives intervene as resource persons in
the trainings organised by REJUSCO, and MONUC provides logistical support to several REJUSCO’s
activities), these do not amount to systematic and substantial cooperation, and has been called by one
interviewee as merely ‘pro-forma’ collaboration (‘un semblant de collaboration’).
A key question is whether REJUSCO has been effective in promoting a better integration
between justice reform and security sector reform. As seen above, these processes have been proceeding
in parallel in the DRC, without synergy, and have suffered from lack of coordination and coherent,
unified vision among the donors. As REJUSCO is the main programme in promoting access to justice and
brings together four key donors, it appears well-placed to try to increase this synergy. This, however, does
not seem to have been the case so far. Until very recently, the EUPOL mission was not involved in
REJUSCO, and this created problems in particular with regard to the reform of the judiciary police. The
lack of cooperation mirrored, on the one hand, the divisions among different Congolese Ministries, and,
on the other hand, those within the European Union among the Commission (which supports justice
reform) and the Council (which covers security sector reform). The situation has improved now, and an
agreement between EUPOL and REJUSCO has been concluded.
213 MONUC was created by the Security Council in November 1999. Initially established as a small military liaison team, it was
turned incrementally into a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a broader role. The progressive changes in mandate
went in two main directions: (i) increasing possibility to use force in defence of civilians, and (ii) increasingly expansive statebuilding
functions. The civilian parts of the mission are responsible for protection of human rights, organization of elections,
promoting the rule of law, DDR and public relations.
214 MONUC website: http://monuc.unmissions.org, accessed February 14th, 2010.
210

3.4.3. Sustainability and management of expectations
Strong concerns are expressed in the evaluation regarding the sustainability of REJUSCO. No exit
strategy has been prepared in advance, although discussions are ongoing regarding the aftermath of the
programme. Chances that the programme can continue after the withdrawal of donor funding are basically
non-existent (Dumoulin et al, 2009: 44).
The interviews showed that REJUSCO has a high visibility in Eastern DCR, but, at the same
time, initial hopes are turning into disappointments. While some specific activities are praised (for
example, NGOs have generally appreciated the trainings offered by REJUSCO), there is a pervasive
sense of the programme failing its own promises. Many of the local interviewees have complained that
REJUSCO is not ‘doing enough’ and recommendations invariably included ‘more funds’ and ‘more
activities’. Several examples have been given during the interviews of activities that have been promised
and not carried out (for example, the construction of the Palais de Justice in Goma).
3.5. Conclusions
It is impossible to overestimate the relevance of REJUSCO in the context of Eastern DRC. Establishment
and consolidation of peace and Human Security depend crucially on giving people the means to address
their dispute in a non-violent manner, and to seek judicial redress for the violations of their rights. From
multiple points of view, REJUSCO appears as a well-timed and promising intervention. It is part of a
long-lasting engagement in the field of justice by the EC, which spans almost a decade, and its objectives,
components and activities are well aligned with national priorities, as expressed by the CMJ’s Action
Plan and Roadmap. The involvement of some among the main bilateral donors to the DRC opened many
exciting possibilities of real change.
To date, however, assessment of REJUSCO’s impact is mixed. In a way, REJUSCO has become
a victim of the very high, perhaps unrealistic, expectations it generated, and the emerging disappointment
for its results have turned it into a sort of scapegoat for the ills of the Congolese justice system among
public opinion. A re-alignment of perception and reality is needed: no programme, no matter how
successful, can single-handedly address and resolve the overwhelming challenges of justice in DRC. This
said, however, there is room for improvement of the effectiveness and impact of REJUSCO.
For the purposes of the MULTIPART research, the most pertinent question is whether the MSP
format adopted by REJUSCO has resulted in a significant value-added. Did the partnership modality
make a significant difference in the implementation of REJUSCO? Was REJUSCO better equipped to
deal with the overwhelming challenges of restoring justice in Eastern DRC because it was implemented
through a MSP? Was it, on the contrary, burdened by such partnership modality?
The mid-term evaluation finds that the engagement of different actors in REJUSCO was
beneficial particularly with regard to the increased availability of funds. From an EC perspective, the
participation of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom has allowed for the doubling of the
211

udget. In a situation where donors programmes are often scattered and overlapping, the fact of having
four key donors investing the same programme should not be underestimated, and certainly should come
as a ‘plus’ in the assessment of REJUSCO. At the same time, it should be noted that the simple pooling of
resources does not necessarily imply a partnership in an extensive sense. In fact, the mid-term evaluation
recommends exploring ‘lighter’, less intensive forms of partnership such as a ‘silent partnership’ under
the lead of the European Commission.
Overall, it does not seem that the opportunities offered by a MSP have been exploited in the case
of REJUSCO, and, beyond the doubling of the funds, it is hard to point at any other significant value
added of the MSP format compared to other ‘normal’ programmes. In particular, we were not able to
observe any significant sharing of learning and experiences among the partners; no systematic forum was
put in place to share experiences and address challenging issues as they emerged, and there was no
beneficial ‘division of labour’ among the partners. To the extent to which REJUSCO achieved successes
or significant impact, nothing indicates that those could not have been achieved without the MSP format.
It would be, however, misleading to conclude that the MSP format is not adequate to the context
of Eastern DRC. On the contrary, at least in principle, it seems that many that the challenges encountered
by REJUSCO (and by similar programmes) could have been more effectively addressed through by a
partnership than by individual donors. The reasons why this value added is not present in the case of
REJUSCO has to do with the way the partnership was organised, rather than the notion of partnership per
se. A number of observations can be made at this regard.
1. The label ‘partnership’ refers to different forms of collaboration within REJUSCO. In the
REJUSCO’s documents and presentation materials, the word ‘partnership’ is used quite loosely,
encompassing both the arrangements within REJUSCO and the various forms of collaboration with
external actors. In fact, it can be noted that:
- The four international partners are not linked by one partnership arrangements – in fact, there are
no arrangements linking any one partner to the other directly. The UK and the Netherlands only
have a direct linkage with the CTB, they are three degrees removed from the Congolese
counterparts and four degree removed from the main donor of the partnership, the EC. This, in
itself, seems to defy the notion of MSP. Based on these observations made in the mid-term
evaluation, the REJUSCO partners have recognised the need to adopt a more streamlined
structure for their partnership: in the next phase of the programme, there will be only one
document linking the international partners among each other and with the Congolese
government.
- The position of the Congolese government is not significantly different from that of a beneficiary
in standard development projects. The obligation of the Congolese counterpart, as defined by the
CF and CS, are very formulated in a very ‘standard’ way, and are not specific to the Congolese
context. The fact of renaming the relation as ‘partnership’ does not in itself guarantee a higher
212

degree of involvement, as shown by the very low engagement of the Congolese counterpart
during the first three years of operation of REJUSCO.
- The relationship with the local NGOs is one of sub-contracting rather than a proper ‘partnership’.
NGOs are only involved for specific activities, particularly as part of the third component of the
programme, and have no stake in the programme as a whole – for example, they are not part of
the Steering Committee or the Technical Working Committee.
A lesson that emerges from the REJUSCO programme is the need to better specify the concept of
partnership: using the term too loosely waters down the notion to the point where it ceases to be useful.
2. The implementation modalities of REJUSCO are heavy and cumbersome. The most evident
symptom is the slow process for fund disbursement, which represents a constant grievance of the various
partners of REJUSCO. Less evidently but equally significantly, the implementation modalities are not
such as to encourage flexibility, learning and re-orientation of the programme to respond to changed
circumstances on the ground.
The CTB, which is the hub of the network of partnership, does not have a direct relation with the
Congolese government, and never received a mandate from the formal maitre d’œuvre, i.e. the Ministry
of Finances. It also does not have a direct working relation with the main donor of the programme,
namely the EC.
REJUSCO suffers from an overly centralised management system. While the focus of the
programme is in the East, the core of the programme management remains in Kinshasa, with limited
delegation of authority to the regional office in Goma, and little or none to Bukavu and Bunia. The fact
that the CTB is only based in Kinshasa is a visible sign of this paradox. In having this centralistic
approach, REJUSCO is also out-of-sync with the ongoing decentralisation process in DRC, which is
heavily supported by the REJUSCO partners.
3. The mechanisms of decision-making are under-functioning. The fact that REJUSCO has not
resulted in systematic exchange of information and cross-learning comes at little surprise considering the
absence of functioning fora for this to happen. The Steering Committee has not been meeting irregularly,
and neither have the local coordination committees.
4. There is no exit strategy. In principle, the elaboration of a clear exit strategy would seem to be a
logical value added of implementing such a programme through a partnership format rather than in a
more traditional manner. Having the government on board as a full-fledged partner can serve to ‘prepare’
the follow-up and guarantee sustainability. In this case, however, there was no structured discussion about
the follow-up, and no commitments in this sense were required from the government.
REJUSCO clearly shows that partnership comes with a price tag of more complicated procedures
and risks for misunderstandings. This ‘partnership costs’ need to be counterbalanced by more efforts to
213

streamline procedures, exchange information, and enhance shared learning. This extra-investment is an
essential condition for the MSP to really pay off in terms of impact on peacebuilding and Human
Security. In the absence of such commitment, there is no significant difference between a ‘normal’ and a
‘MSP’ intervention.
3.6. Annexes
3.6.1. Annex I: List of interviews 215
Codename Name Position Institution Type of actor Place, date
C/REJUSCO/1 Anonymous Anonymous Ministry of Public Kinshasa
Justice
11/8/2009
C/REJUSCO/2 Anonymous Anonymous Avocats Sans Nongovernmental/
Kinshasa
Frontières
12/8/2009
International
C/REJUSCO/3 Anonymous Anonymous MONUC Rule
of Law Section
International Kinshasa
12/8/2009
C/REJUSCO/4 Anonymous Anonymous French
Embassy
International Kinshasa
20/8/2009
C/REJUSCO/5 Anonymus Anonymus Belgian
Embassy
International Kinshasa,
date missing
C/REJUSCO/6 Anonymous Anonymous European
Commission
International Kinshasa,
date missing
C/REJUSCO/7 Anonymous Anonymous EUPOL International Kinshasa,
date missing
C/REJUSCO/8 Anonymous Magistrat Tribunal de Public Goma
Grande
1/10/2009
Instance
C/REJUSCO/9 Anonymous Anonymous MONUC International Goma
2/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/10 Marc Dubois Coordinator REJUSCO Goma,
3/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/11 Jentu Maungu Chair Coordination of
Civil Society
Non-
Governmental
Goma,
5/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/12 Anonymous Batonnier Barreau Public Goma,
7/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/13 Thierry Bindu Officer in Clinique
Goma,
charge Juridique
8/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/14 Desiré Balume Military REJUSCO
Goma,
justice officer
21/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/15 Anonymous Anonymous Local
Administration
Public Goma,
22/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/16 Anomymous Anonymous Brigade
Judiciaire
Public Goma,
23/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/17 Roger Rashidi Mayor Local
administration
Public Goma,
23/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/18 Anonymous Anonymous Barreau Public Goma,
25/10/2009
C/REJUSCO/19 Anonymous Magistrats Tribunal de Public Butembo,
Paix
27/10/2009
215 Names are withheld as most of the people interviewed have asked for confidentiality.
214

Department
C/REJUSCO/22 Kopenik Coordinator
Nzanzu for Justice
and Human
Rights
C/REJUSCO/23 Mwami Ndeze Traditional
chief (Bisha)
C/REJUSCO/24 Col. Mputu Auditeur
Militaire
SODEPAP
C/REJUSCO/25 DUBOIS
NAMASHALI
C/REJUSCO/26 Anonymous Anonymous Association des
Femmes
Juristes
C/REJUSCO/27 Ruthachogura Provincial
Minister
C/REJUSCO/20 Anonynmous Anonymous SODEPAP Nongovernmental
C/REJUSCO/21 Katsuva Terya Head of Local
Public
Aluite Urban administration
Management
Non-
Governmental
Butembo,
27/10/2009
Butembo,
28/10/2009
Butembo,
29/10/2009
Local
administration
Public Rutshuru,
30/10/2009
Army
Public Rutshuru,
(FARDC)
30/10/2009
Operationnel
Lawyer Barreau Public Goma,
30/10/2009
Non-
Goma,
Governmental 30/10/2009
Provincial
Ministry
Justice
of
Public
Goma,
3/11/2009
3.6.2. Annex II: Example of Interview Reporting Sheet
REPORTING SHEET – MULTIPART WP4c DRC REJUSCO
ID
a.
b. //
DD/MM/YYYY
c. 1. City
d. 1. Municipality
2. Rural Area, name village
:
: /
INTERVIEWEE DETAILS Fill in according to confidentiality agreement
e. Interviewee Full Name
f. Organization
215

g. Department
h. Programme
i. Title/Position
j. Gender Male
k. Working at this organization since
l. Phone No.
//
DD/MM/YYYY
m. E-mail
0. PART 0 DESCIPTIVES
IF 3 or 4, Provide information:
Documents retrieved [Name doc; date; hardcopy/softcopy; public/confidential]:
See scanned docs
0.1. Actors involved in:
Civic:
Public:
Int’l public:
Int’l private:
0.2. Operational aspects:
Starting date:
Expected final date:
1. Confirmed it is
correct
2. Does not know
3. Incorrect; provided
information without
source:
4. Incorrect; provided
information with
source:
1. Confirmed it is
correct
2. Does not know
3. Incorrect; provided
information without
source:
4. Incorrect; provided
information with
source:
0.3. Institutionalisation: 1. Confirmed it is
correct
2. Does not know
3. Incorrect; provided
information without
source:
4. Incorrect; provided
information with
source:
216

0.4. Coverage:
(e.g., nation-wide, provincial)
0.5. Financial:
Total budget
Annual budget
Investment per stakeholder
0.6. Show interviewee organogram and ask for feedback. Draw feedback directly on
the picture.
1. Confirmed it is
correct
2. Does not know
3. Incorrect; provided
information without
source:
4. Incorrect; provided
information with
source:
1. Confirmed it is
correct
2. Does not know
3. Incorrect; provided
information without
source:
4. Incorrect; provided
information with
source:
1. Confirmed it is
correct
2. Does not know
3. Incorrect; provided
information without
source:
4. Incorrect; provided
information with
source:
1. PART 1. CHARACTERISTICS & TYPES OF MSPs
Three main bullet points:
1.1.
2. PART 2 – POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MSP REGARDING PEACEBUILDING
AND HUMAN SECURITY
Three main bullet points:
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
2.7.
217

2.8.
2.9.
3. PART 3 – FORMATION, EVOLUTION, COMPOSITION AND OPERATION OF
REJUSCO
Six main bullet points:
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
3.5.
3.6.
3.7.
PART 3a –RELATION WITH EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS AND BENEFICIARIES
3.8.
3.9.
3.10.
4. PART 4 – IMPACT OF PARTICIPATION ON STAKEHOLDERS
Six main bullet points:
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
PART 4A –IMPACT ON THE ROLES AND CAPACITIES OF YOUR
ORGANISATION
218

4.5.
4.6.
4.7.
4.8.
4.9.
4.10.
PART 4B - IMPACT ON THE EMPOWERMENT OF YOUR ORGANISATION
4.11.
4.12.
4.13.
4.14.
4.15.
4.16.
PART 4C - IMPACT ON INTERESTS AND VULNERABILITIES OF YOUR
ORGANISATION
4.17.
4.18.
4.19.
4.20.
4.21.
5. PART 5. PEACEBUILDING & HUMAN SECURITY IMPACT ON EXTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS AND POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES
Three main bullet points:
5.1.
219

5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
6. PART 6. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS THAT SUPPORT OR PARTICIPATE
IN REJUSCO
Three main bullet points:
6.1.
7. PART 7. POLICY IMPLICATION FOR AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS ON EU
ROLE]
Three main bullet points:
7.1.
7.2.
8. PART 8. FOLLOW UP
8.1. Are you available for a second
interview regarding some further
follow up questions?
8.2. Explain confidentiality options
and confirm confidentiality
preferences
3.6.3. Annex III: Acronmys
ABA
ASF
CAF
CF
CMJ
American Bar Association
Avocats Sans Frontières
Country Assistance Framework
Convention de Financement
Comité Mixte de la Justice
220

CS
CTB
DAC
DDR
DFID
DRC
EC
EU
FARDC
GBV
ICC
ICP
IDA
ILAC
MONUC
MSP
NGO
ODA
OECD
PAJ
REJUSCO
UGP
UK
US
Convention Spécifique
Coopération Technique Belge
Development Assistance Committee
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
Department for International Development
Democratic Republic of Congo
European Commission
European Union
Forces Armées de la République Democratique du Congo
Gender-Based Violence
International Criminal Court
Indicative Co-operation Programme
International Development Association
International Legal Assistance Consortium
Missions des Nations Unies au Congo
Multi-Stakeholder Partnership
Non Governmental Organisation
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Programme d’Appui à la Justice
Appui a la REstauration de la JUStice à l’est du COngo
Unité de Gestion du Programme
United Kingdom
United States
3.6.4. Annex IV: Bibliography
ASF (2006), Soutien aux audiences foraines. Final activity report for DFID.
Anstey, R (1966). King Leopold’s Legacy: the Congo under Belgian Rule, 1908-1960. London: Oxford
University Press.
Boshoff, H (2007). The Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Process in the DRC, A Never-
Ending Story. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
Carlsen, E (2009). “Ra/pe and War in the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Peace Review, 21(4), 474-483.
Clark, P (2008). Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Uganda. In Waddell N. & P. Clark (Eds.), Courting Conflict: Justice, Peace and the
ICC in Africa (pp. 37-46), London: The Royal African Society.
221

Clement, C (2009). Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past. In Born, H & Schnabel, A
(eds.), Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, Geneva: Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces.
Dahrendorf, N (2007). Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector Reform: the Case
of DR Congo. Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
Dahrendorf, N (2008). MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: the Case of the DRC. In
Hanggi, H & V. Scherrer (Eds.). Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience
from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo (pp.113-168). Geneva: Centre
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
Davis, L (2009). Justice-Sensitive Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
International Alert & International Center for Transitional Justice.
Davis, L & Hayner, P (2009). Difficult Peace, Limited Justice: Ten Years of Peacemaking in the DRC,
New York: International Center for Transitional Justice.
Dessallien, C, de Montgolfier, M & Nachtigal, J (2007). Evaluation de la stratégie de cooperation de la
Commission européenne avec la République démocratique du Congo. Brussels: European
Commission.
DFID (2008). Democratic Republic of Congo Country Plan, 2008-2010. London: DFID.
Dumoulin, V, Lukusa, MP & Tougouri, H (2009). Mission d’évaluation à mi-parcours du programme
REJUSCO, République Démocratique du Congo - Rapport Final. Brussels : European Commission.
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E. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
By Markus Möstl (European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Graz)
The overall aim of work package 4c of the MULTIPART project is to provide an analysis and evaluation
of the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships active in the field of democratisation, good governance and
the rule of law in post-conflict situations. This work package thus aims to improve the understanding of
how MSP-DEMs can contribute to peacebuilding and Human Security in countries that are emerging
from armed conflict. Based on the <strong>thematic</strong> desk research and case studies in Kosovo, Afghanistan and
the DRC, this chapter presents the overall conclusions that address the main research questions of the
MULTIPART project as well as key secondary research questions that have been developed by the WP4c
research team. The list of secondary research questions that has been developed for WP4c is attached to
this report in an annex. It has to be noted though that the relevant empirical evidence gained through the
three case studies was not always sufficient to substantially answer all of the secondary research questions
of WP4c. Where relevant, the present overall conclusions include issues, priorities and recommendations
for the EU that have been raised by the WP4c research.
Research Question 1
What are the characteristics and types of MSPs operating in the field of democracy, good governance and
rule of law in countries emerging from armed conflict?
MSP-DEMs concentrate on a wide range of operational areas, such as strengthening the democratic
institutions (e.g. by building professional skills among parliamentarians), to strengthening the justice
system, with a view to addressing impunity and the advancement of the rule of law especially on the local
level. These main aims of MSP-DEMs are usually accompanied by the intention to increase the trust of
the population towards democratic institutions. The MSP-DEM researched for Afghanistan, the NSP, is a
good example in this regard. This MSP-DEM, in a basic democratic manner, allows people to choose
their elders by themselves, which makes them feel to be a relevant part of the community, which again
increases the confidence towards the newly elected bodies.
The geographic focus of MSP-DEM differs as well and ranges from activities mainly carried out
in the capital city, to efforts in some of the most affected provinces and nation-wide activities with rural
communities as primary target. However, the geographical range of MSP-DEMs is usually confined to
the nation-state level at maximum.
A wide range of actors may be involved in MSP-DEMs, which in some cases leads to a highly
complex partnership structures. Public actors, such as ministries do not necessarily dominate MSP-DEMs
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- on the contrary. In the case of REJUSCO, for example, the position of the Congolese government was
deemed as not significantly different from that of a beneficiary in standard development projects.
Likewise, NGOs are not always considered as fully-fledged partners in MSP-DEMs and run the risk of
being quasi sub-contracted and being allocated only specific tasks (e.g., monitoring, reporting, and
conducting advocacy on the conditions of prisons). NGOs are often not included in the management
structures (if such structures exist at all) or decision making bodies and therefore NGOs are often rather a
way of outsourcing specific tasks and are not considered as “real” part of the MSP-DEM.
The level of institutionalization varies significantly among MSP-DEMs. The ASI case study
showed that MSP-DEMs do not necessarily have to rely on a strict contractual relationship among the
stakeholders involved. This might, however, also be due to the fact that this MSP-DEM’s task was to
coordinate already existing activities or programs that have already been on the participating
stakeholders’ agenda. Contrary to this, the NSP and REJUSCO, rely on numerous and often bilateral
contractual relationships or agreements between the actors involved. They do not build on a single
document signed by all partners that would regulate the functioning of the MSP-DEM. Interestingly
enough, the four international partners involved in REJUSCO are not even linked to each other by any
type of formal partnership arrangements. Setting up formal bodies, such as steering committees, technical
working committees, and local coordination committees does not necessarily provide for a proper forum
for exchanges of information and does not automatically provide the basis for sustainability of the MSP-
DEM’s activities. Still, some empirical evidence from the NSP study points to the finding that a
“centralized authority” or some at least common contract schemes may help MSP-DEMs to become more
sustainable.
MSP-DEMs are usually set up for a longer period of time in order to address long-term needs of
reform and development. The MSP-DEMs under research were set up for at least four years, and it was
found that both, high and low levels of institutionalization might support the long duration of MSP-
DEMs.
Research Question 2
In countries emerging from armed conflict, what is the potential significance of MSPs operating in the
field of democracy, good governance and the rule of law (e.g. what possible mechanisms exist) to impact
on:
a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding;
b. improving vulnerable peoples’ security from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion;
c. alleviating poverty and promoting socio-economic development;
d. empowering vulnerable people and communities and promoting their participation in public life;
Generally, MSP-DEMs have a high significance for peacebuilding and increasing Human Security. The
promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law is key for the stabilization of post-conflict
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countries. Capacity building is among the main aims of MSP-DEMs and thus these types of partnerships
aim to lay the foundations on which other peacebuilding activities may build on. The sharing of
responsibilities in form of mutual rights and duties among international and local stakeholders, as well as
participatory approaches to input, planning and decision-making processes are essential for MSP-DEM to
have an impact on peacebuilding and Human Security. Participatory decision making procedures in MSP-
DEMs may help encouraging the respective communities to assume collective responsibility for building
peace. Local governance, as promoted by some MSP-DEMs, may also lead to more stability, less
conflicts and could be a mechanism to address grievances.
The MSP-DEM’s positive impact on the rule of law and participatory engagement can (indirectly)
promote foreign and local socio-economic investment and thus further the freedom from want dimension
of Human Security. However, MSP-DEMs are difficult to be established in areas where security is needed
most, and thus the potential of MSP-DEMs to contribute to the freedom from fear dimension of Human
Security appears to be limited. Nevertheless, the NSP study carefully points at a positive potential for
improving this dimension of security as well, since schools build by this MSP-DEM were found to have a
lower chance of being destroyed by insurgents than schools built by other aid programs. However, it has
to be acknowledged that as soon as violence escalates, the potential of MSP-DEMs to contribute to the
freedom from fear dimension of Human Security is quickly reduced to a minimum.
The MSP-DEMs potential contribution to empowerment can be regarded as very high. This
finding may be illustrated by the ASI case study, for which the contribution to transparency and
encouragement of the national ethnic communities to assume collective responsibility for parliamentary
processes was high on the agenda. Following this approach, the ASI also contributed to increased levels
of social trust in newly established state organs. The NSP case study shows that MSP-DEMs potentially
introduce very peculiar approaches to support peacebuilding and Human Security that have an added
value for the empowerment of beneficiaries. Most significantly, the NSP introduced from the top a
bottom-up approach to development and governance, while at the same time establishing a
comprehensive partnership between central government and rural communities. A top-down approach
would most likely not have been well accepted by the local level units and therefore village
representatives have been consulted or have even been included in the decision making process. Besides
the 22.000 rural communities, the NSP program involved only a restricted number of stakeholders,
mainly the central government and the World Bank, while other stakeholders, such as civic organizations
with experience in local development we co-opted later into the program. It has been found that exactly
the specific nature of the partnership established between the state and local communities in the NSP is
the core reason for the success of this MSP-DEM. Empowerment was promoted through equalizing the
new government structures (i.e. the so called “Community Development Councils, CDC) with traditional
elites. Indeed, such a combination of institutionalization from above, balanced autonomy for the local
subdivisions, in combination with culturally savvy mobilization practices and attractive financial
incentives may best be provided by partnerships that have a MSP format.
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However, the case study of REJUSCO shows that potentially existing complicated procedures
and risks for misunderstandings within MSP-DEMs need to be counterbalanced by efforts to streamline
procedures, exchange information, and enhance shared learning. These investments are essential
conditions for MSP-DEMs to pay off in terms of peacebuilding and Human Security. In the absence of
such commitment, the value added by MSP-DEMs for the promotion of peacebuilding and Human
Security is limited.
Finally, taking into account that post-conflict countries usually have a long way to go towards
good governance, rule of law and democratization, one should not have too far-reaching expectations
from the MSP-DEMs’ contributions. Likewise, EU engagements in MSP-DEM should therefore avoid
raising too high and perhaps unrealistic expectations by beneficiaries.
Research Question 3
How, in practice, have selected MSPs formed and developed over time, how have they been composed
and how have they operated – both internally and in relation to their external stakeholders and intended
beneficiaries?
MSP-DEMs are formed for a variety of reasons, ranging from an individual’s needs assessment that was
then taken up and further developed into a comprehensive initiative by two international organizations (as
this was the case for the ASI), to initiatives based on special experience gained at local level by key
stakeholders (as this was the case for the NSP). Memberships in MSP-DEMs are not necessarily fixed and
may change over time. ASI, for example, is a very “open” MSP-DEM, where every relevant stakeholder
was able to participate, as no other selection criteria as the aim of supporting the Assembly of Kosovo
was necessary to join the MSP-DEM. Likewise, further interested actors could also join during the
operation of ASI. The NSP study shows that members of the MSP-DEM might also have to leave MSP-
DEMs, either due to their poor performance in the MSP-DEM, or simply because of contract expiration.
The involvement of local governments is often weak in MSP-DEMS, as governments are often
mainly seen as beneficiary, rather than fully fledged partners. Thus, public state actors usually do not
dominate MSP-DEM. Usually international actors are major funders of MSP-DEMs and they tend to take
the leading or even dominating role in the MSP-DEM. Especially when it comes to the distribution of
funds a mediation between national and international stakeholders’ interests is often essential to ensure a
good climate of cooperation free of envy.
Although promoting good governance is an important concern for the EU, the case studies
showed that the EU plays only a minor role in the operating tasks of MSP-DEMs. E.g. in the case of
Kosovo, the EU’s engagement in the ASI was not very visible and it was even difficult to receive relevant
information from the Liasion Office in Prishtina. The fact that the EU is nevertheless a major funder of
MSP-DEMs thus raises the question, if the EU should develop or reinforce its own structures that help to
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implement MSP-DEMs, or if the EU should rather focus on the implementation of projects via member
states’ engagements or via the assistance of NGOs.
A constructive working atmosphere is even more important as there is a strong need to plan and
implement a proper handover from international actors to national representatives for MSPs active in the
areas of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. With the development of the post-conflict
society, international actors ideally should draw back, leaving more and more space for empowered
national actors. Apart from the NSP, these takeovers by national authorities proved to be difficult for the
MSP-DEM under research, as the effectiveness of the MSP-DEMs was reduced after more responsibility
was handed over to local stakeholders. Certainly, various political factors (like, in this case of Kosovo,
the declaration of independence) may contribute to the difficulties to hand over responsibilities to local
stakeholders, but international actors should be well aware of this dilemma and aim to strike a balance
between retaining a central role while exercising a higher degree of control of MSP-DEM activities in an
effective manner, and handing over to locals at the price of reduced effectiveness. Especially international
actors participating in MSP-DEMs are well advised to put more emphasis on the process of planning and
implementing an appropriate and timely handover to local stakeholders from the beginning.
This finding is of particular relevance for the EU. Including the respective (local) government in
MSP-DEMs more as a full-fledged partner could serve to prepare the follow-up phase of MSP-DEMs and
could thus set the scene for more sustainability.
These considerations regarding the proper handover also have strong implications for the overall
sustainability of MSP-DEMs. Without a proper handover to local authorities the sustainability of the
MSP-DEMs investigated in the MULTIPART project has to be questioned. It has been shown, for
example, that accompanied with uncertain funding for the future, the chance of sustainability for
REJUSCO is quasi zero.
For good governance and democracy to work, non-state actors, identity groups and non-elite
representation is crucial. MSP-DEMs potentially provide various empowerment steps by enabling active
citizenry and vulnerable groups to voice their concerns and needs and to develop ideas and provide firsthand
input and knowledge. However, finding the right model of collaboration between international and
local non-state actors proved to be demanding, even when the international actors were trying to apply a
MSP format in partnerships. The role and influence of local actors often remains limited. The aims of
MSP-DEM programs are often not deemed appropriate for the inclusion of private actors and the
participation of local non-state actors remains the exception for MSP-DEMs. Of course, it also has to be
acknowledged that in post-conflict countries, local stakeholders might often be unable to fully perform
the tasks of MSP-DEM stakeholders, and the civil society might lack the capacity to participate, e.g. in
the oversight of the parliamentary process or similar tasks associated with good governance. In practice,
the relationship between civil society and other MSP-DEM stakeholders remains rather passive during the
operation of MSP-DEMs. But as the ASI case study shows, local involvement is possible for MSP-
DEMs, even if - in the view of local civil society - the level of local involvement in and ownership of the
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MSP-DEM has been very limited. The case study of the ASI also shows that international partners may
be reluctant to fully include local NGOs and think tanks in their flow of information and work, but in the
end it was the quality of the input provided by locals that made international stakeholders accept them as
partners and respect their work. Thus, it can be concluded that local expertise is there, but has to be
retrieved.
Involving a large number of stakeholders in MSP-DEMS certainly bears chances, but also entails
risks. On the one hand, a better division of labor and broader operational ranges might result. On the other
hand, consensus finding might become more difficult and an accompanying dilution of the key issues at
stake could undermine the level of coordination and leadership. Although such difficulties could be
addressed by a central coordinating body (as this was done in ASI), it is difficult to generalize results in
this regard.
The interaction between stakeholders in a MSP-DEM may take various forms (e.g., exchange of
information, (in)formal meetings of different bodies at various levels, mere coordination activities),
depending upon program priorities, interests, mutual trust and also willingness to co-operate.
Interestingly, conflicts within MSP-DEMs primarily arose between international actors. A respected
international coordinator, who is also responsible for the resolution of conflicts within the MSP-DEM,
might be very helpful to resolve internal conflicts.
Research Question 4
How has participation in an MSP impacted on the MSP’s members, in relation to their roles, capacities,
empowerment, interests and vulnerabilities relating to:
a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding;
b. security from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion;
c. alleviation of poverty and promotion of socio-economic development;
d. empowerment of vulnerable people and communities and promotion of their participation in public
life?
Furthermore, to what extent, and in what ways, have these impacts depended on the characteristics of the
relevant MSP (e.g. its multi-stakeholder character; its specific membership; its internal procedures,
capacities or decision-making mechanisms; etc)?
Although (primarily international) actors involved in MSP-DEMs often share a joint vision of the MSP-
DEM, different stakeholders joining a MSP-DEM can have different expectations and consequently may
join MSP-DEMs due to different, albeit not necessarily hidden interests. This was, for example, shown by
the REJUSCO case study, where the participating stakeholders emphasized different expected outcomes.
After joining a MSP-DEM the members might only slightly adapt themselves to the functioning, needs
and purposes of the MSP-DEM.
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The understanding of the main functions of MSP-DEMs usually does not change much in the
view of international actors, but the participation in MSP-DEMs can have an influence on the
international actors’ work. Most prominently, the participation in MSP-DEMs potentially increases the
knowledge from the field and the understanding of the local situation for international actors. After
incorporating and consulting local partners in a MSP-DEM, the know-how and the capacity building
powers grow for international actors participating MSP-DEMs. If such inputs are taken seriously, MSP-
DEM might have a bigger impact on the local society, peacebuilding and Human Security, when
compared to other forms of partnership.
The cooperation and interaction within an MSP-DEM might cause a change in the agenda and
role of donors. However, ASI also showed that joining a MSP-DEM does not necessarily lead to an
increased number or scope of projects, since this MSP-DEMs’ activities were mainly focused on
coordination activities in order to avoid overlap of existing support programs for the Kosovo Assembly.
However, although such coordination activities and the resulting interaction within the MSP-DEM led to
a different focus of each or at least some MSP-DEM partners, the agenda of the whole MSP-DEM
remained the same.
MSP-DEMs do not necessarily cause a change in the programs of the local stakeholders, but due
to the involvement in the MSP-DEMs, local stakeholders potentially become more active and are able to
carry out more activities than before. For local authorities and NGOs this might also be due to the
increased availability of funding after joining a MSP-DEM, but it should be noted that national and local
actors involved in MSP-DEM do not necessarily receive more international funds as a result of their
involvement. As shown by the ASI case study, the main task of MSP-DEM may also be coordination
without the distribution of further funds. Therefore, potential financial impacts on local stakeholders
heavily depend on the nature of each MSP-DEM.
However, national and local actors may certainly gain different other benefits, such as knowledge
and experience, through their involvement in MSP-DEMs. The ASI case study shows that MSP-DEMs
are able to improve the skills, competencies, know-how, capacity-building power, knowledge about
democracy, good governance and the rule of law among local actors. Due to the participation in this
MSP-DEM they generally consider themselves as more capable of contributing to these principles of
democratic societies and thus, feel more empowered than before.
It has to be questioned, if the local actors’ ability to influence decisions of institutions is increased
significantly after joining a MSP-DEM – at least it is difficult to generalize findings in this regard. On the
one hand, the NSP case study shows that local structures may potentially become empowered to represent
the interests of weaker constituencies in local communities via-á-vis the central government, but on the
other hand the interests of these weaker constituencies still risk being captured by old elites who do not
want to renounce their power. MSP-DEMs might thus function only as a vehicle for their exclusive
interests. Similarly, it was found for the NSP that in some cases the women’s opinions are credited by
male members of the communities with regard to specific issues only and that generally the women´s
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overall stake in the decision making of the communities still varies. Therefore, negotiations, though
sometimes hard and exhausting, form an indispensible element in decision making processes of MSP-
DEMs.
Finally it should be noted that changes in the roles of MSP-DEM partners do not happen in a
political vacuum and thus they cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration relevant political
factors. E.g. the role of ASI partners, and especially the role of international actors involved in this MSP-
DEM, changed also due to the declaration of independence of Kosovo during the course of the operation
of this MSP-DEM.
Research Question 5
What have been the impacts of selected cases of MSPs on external stakeholders and potential
beneficiaries, in relation to:
a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding;
b. security of vulnerable people and communities from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion;
c. alleviation of poverty and promotion of socio-economic development;
d. empowerment of vulnerable people and communities and promotion of their participation in public life;
Furthermore, to what extent, and in what ways, have these impacts depended on the characteristics of the
relevant MSP (e.g. its multi-stakeholder character; its specific membership; its internal procedures,
capacities or decision-making mechanisms; etc)?
The MSP-DEMs selected for the MULTIPART research had various impacts on external stakeholders
and potential beneficiaries. The ASI had an impact on external stakeholders in terms of a contribution to
the process of democratization and improving local good governance in Kosovo. However, this impact
might not be sustainable in any case. Members of the Assembly’s administration trained by stakeholders
of this program use their positions in the institutions as a trampoline to other – often international –
institutions, where they receive better salaries. Due to this brain-drain, it is very difficult to build
sustainable capacities in the Assembly’s administration and the MSP format of this partnership was
unable to address this issue.
The NSP improved democratic governance at the local level, improved the public perceptions of
national solidarity achieved through state-building at national and local level, improved state-civil society
relations as a consequence of improvements in national solidarity, contributed the greater awareness of
the activities of the government, and empowered rural communities through the establishment of a new
legitimate form of community governance. Furthermore, the rural development and infrastructure projects
contributed also to the freedom from want dimension of Human Security. The comprehensive inclusion of
more than 22.000 rural communities, as this was done by the NSP, could be regarded as a prime approach
to address the difficulties of good governance and institution building in a complex environment like
Afghanistan.
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REJUSCO partly succeeded in the building and rehabilitation of essential infrastructures and
material support, but could not alter the overall population’s perception of the justice system of the DRC.
However, it should be noted that the MSP format could not specifically address the challenges of mobile
courts.
Research Question 6
How has the participation or support of international actors, including the EU, affected the MSPs selected
for case study in this project; in relation to the MSP’s development, operation, sustainability and impacts?
What are the lessons for how the EU and other international actors should support or participate in MSPs?
The EU and many other international actors, such as the World Bank, the UNDP, and USAID, are very
active in promoting good governance, democracy and the rule of law in post-conflict settings. When
designing and implementing programs, projects and MSP-DEMs, each international actor, has its own
understanding of how the fundamental tasks of the good governance agenda, namely maintaining the rule
of law, eliminating corruption, strengthening local governments, encouraging citizen’s participation in
elections and in civil society, and promoting human rights, should be addressed. However, considering
the manifold and demanding difficulties of promoting good governance, democracy and the rule of law in
post-conflict settings – as demonstrated by the case studies – each international actor will only be able to
address a limited range of activities necessary for the overall transformation of a nation’s governance.
Generally, the participation or support of international actors is important, and in many cases
essential for the establishment and operation of MSP-DEMs. The NSP case study shows that the role of
international actors can be crucial in the central management of programs. In fact, international actors
often dominate MSP-DEM and big (mostly international) donors de facto usually have stronger decisionmaking
power than other stakeholders. E.g. although the ASI approach is based on a system of regular
consultation without a centralized system of imposed decision-making, a dominance of international
stakeholders could be observed. The capability of national actors to take over the tasks of MSP-DEMs
proved to be weak and this on the one hand confirmed the central role that international actors may play
in the implementation of MSP-DEM and on the other hand raises issues of a proper handover to locals, as
mentioned above.
Comparatively more powerful international stakeholders do not necessarily downplay weaker
international or other actors involved in MSP-DEMs. The ASI case study shows that the national public
actors’ or other locals’ opinions can prevail in some cases. E.g., the Slovenian parliamentary model was
chosen for the Kosovo Assembly after careful consideration of many different models, through an
autonomous decision by the local stakeholders. Furthermore, specific suggestions for the implementation
of the MSP-DEM by the internationally active Friedrich Ebert Foundation were often accepted by all the
partners of this MSP-DEM.
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The example of ASI also shows that the relations among the different stakeholders of MSP-
DEMs are often relationships of donors and beneficiaries. The MSP format does not alter this relationship
and a specific added value of this MSP-DEM as compared to other democratization programs can hardly
be determined. A similar conclusion may be drawn from the NSP case study, which showed that
international actors often participate in MSP-DEMs mainly as major donors, while their generous
contributions are often late.
Especially international actors with local offices proved to be effective and successful in taking
into consideration the local needs. In the case of ASI, the local staff of international actors knew much
about the overall situation and the demands of the Assembly and was thus also able to raise essential
topics in a manner, which demonstrated cultural awareness. Other international actors seem to have stuck
more to their existing programs in a less flexible manner.
Research Question 7
How can EU (including member states’) policies and programs better support and co-operate with MSPs
in countries emerging from armed conflict in order to promote:
a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding;
b. security of from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion;
c. alleviation of poverty and promotion of socio-economic development;
d. empowerment of vulnerable people and communities and promotion of their participation in public
life?
At the MULTIPART roundtable in Prishtina, John Durance from the UNDP frankly explained some of
the difficulties related to the support of international actors in post-conflict setting: “Dealing with
governments in post conflict situations is extraordinary difficult. These are probably very young
governments with appointments made for a variety of reasons. Government processes are often very
immature, e.g. getting cooperation between ministries is often very difficult. Most of the time, the
priorities of international actors and those of the government will be very different. In the middle of this,
designing and implementing projects is very difficult.”
It has to be acknowledged that assistance to MSPs active in the area of good governance,
democracy and the rule of law demands generous time commitments by international actors. Typical or
standardized two-year projects might not have a valuable or sustainable impact on peacebuilding and
Human Security in this area.
Further, the EU, like any international stakeholders, must understand that MSP-DEMs are not
able to build up a democratic system by using a “cut and paste” system. The EU should be aware that
engaging in MSP-DEM activities in post conflict countries with finalized projects is a wrong strategy, as
these kinds of projects can have undesirable results in the end. The needs of the population will have to be
identified and taken seriously. MSP-DEMs potentially are a type of partnership, where beneficiaries of
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programs supporting good governance, democracy and the rule of law could be involved and heard from
the planning phase to the implementation phase of a project. Bringing more types of actors, and especially
civil society actors and public actors, into MSP-DEMs should be preferred over more exclusionary
approaches.
For the EU, the importance of supporting measures to ensure transparency and accountability of
MSP-DEMs cannot be underestimated. Contrary to initial hypothesis, the MULTIPART case studies
show that the engagement of international organizations in MSP-DEMs generally does not necessarily
lead to more transparency or accountability of MSP-DEMs. However, some empirical evidence points to
the conclusion that occasionally there are some good practices developed by MSP-DEMs. E.g. the public
exposure of the NSP made this program better known publicly and this led to an increased accountability
of the implementing partners. Consequently, the level of corruption within the NSP was reduced to only
about one percent, which is among the lowest rates of corruption in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, building
the capacity to monitor and hold actors to account at the local level is essential for the functioning of
MSP-DEM and should be a primary aim of international actors like the EU. By setting good examples in
this regard, international stakeholders will have to pave the way and support the local and national
authorities, so that they may learn by themselves from the international community.
One of the most important findings from the NSP case study confirmed that security is a
precondition for development in post-conflict countries. Due to this interrelatedness the EU’s
engagements in MSP-DEMs should be embedded in a comprehensive EU approach towards a country or
a region across all relevant EU policy areas including security and development issues. Engaging in
various MSPs dealing with all different types of activities necessary to support countries in a post-conflict
situation could therefore be a viable solution for the EU.
The ASI case study shows that the EU should carefully take measures to assure the coherence and
continuity of its presence in MSP-DEMs. In this case the EAR’s projects ended and the European
Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo became the office in charge of EU representation in Kosovo, but
unfortunately the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo was not really visible or active within
this MSP-DEM. Furthermore, the EU’s presence in MSP-DEMs should be as coherent as possible, and
the EU member states’ individual contributions should be accorded with the EU’s overall contribution to
the largest extent possible. This also implies that in general more financial support might not be
necessary, but a more rational budget spending is advisable.
One single international actor or one MSP-DEM will usually not be able to address the
overwhelming challenges of good governance, democracy and rule of law in post-conflict situations. E.g.
successfully reforming the justice system in DRC cannot be done by the EU or another actor alone. Thus,
coalitions and partnerships will have to be built on international and local level. By forming and
participating in MSP-DEMs the EU can help contributing to positive impacts on peacebuilding and
Human Security.
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ANNEX: KEY SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
By the work package 4c team
The following secondary research questions have been developed for each of the primary MULTIPART
research questions by the work package 4c team.
Research Question 1
What are the characteristics and types of MSPs operating in the field of democracy, good governance and
rule of law in countries emerging from armed conflict?
SRQ regarding the geographical range of MSP-DEM: Is the geographical range of MSP-DEM confined
to the nation-state level?
SRQ regarding the actors of MSP-DEM: What is the role of public national actors (ministries,
departments, executive or public service representatives, parliamentary committees, and independent
public control or oversight bodies) involved in the MSP-DEM? What is the role of international actors
involved in the MSP-DEM? Are private actors involved at all?
SRQ regarding the function of MSP-DEM: Are the non-state actors involved in the MSP-DEM
representative for the main stakeholders in the field of democracy, good governance and rule of law? Do
the partners in a MSP-DEM represent broad grass-roots partners or are they elite partners?
SRQ regarding the institutionalization of MSP-DEM: What is the degree of institutionalization of MSP-
DEM? What degree of institutionalization is foreseen in the legal basis of the MSP-DEM? Does the
degree of institutionalization influence the duration of the MSP-DEM? What other parameters influence
the duration of MSP-DEM? What is the relationship between the level of institutionalization and the
sustainability of MSP-DEM?
SRQ regarding the function and duration of MSP-DEM: What is the functional focus of MSP-DEM? To
what extent does the function of MSP-DEM influence the duration of MSP-DEM? Are they rather shortterm
(function: e.g., assistance to election processes) or are they long term (function: e.g., capacity
building) initiatives? To what extent is the longevity of MSP-DEM prolonged by follow-up programs or
programmatic clusters with other MSPs/MSP-DEM? To what extent do organizational bodies of MSP-
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DEM, such as Steering committees, executive secretariats etc., have an impact on the longevity of MSP-
DEM?
Research Question 2
In countries emerging from armed conflict, what is the potential significance of MSPs operating in the
field of democracy, good governance and the rule of law (e.g. what possible mechanisms exist) to impact
on: a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding; b. improving vulnerable peoples’ security from violence,
crime and illegitimate coercion; c. alleviating poverty and promoting socio-economic development; d.
empowering vulnerable people and communities and promoting their participation in public life;
SRQ regarding the preconditions for a significance of MSP-DEM for peacebuilding and Human Security:
To what extent are responsibilities shared among international and local stakeholders, and to what extent
are they shared between public, private and civic actors?
SRQ regarding the significance and output of MSP-DEM for peacebuilding and conflict reduction: How
and to what extent do MSP-DEM provide the foundations on which other peacebuilding activities
(democracy aid, economic reconstruction, civil reconciliation) can build on? To what extent do
participatory decision making procedures in MSP-DEM projects and processes contribute to transparency
and at the same time encourage the respective communities to assume collective responsibility for issues
and objects at stake? To what extent does the involvement of local authorities as partners and contributors
to MSP-DEM help to improve relationships between formal authorities and informal civic or private
group representatives? To what extent do MSP-DEM have <strong>thematic</strong> linkages and operational cross-cuts
with related peacebuilding and Human Security dimensions, such as reconciliation efforts as well as
economic and liberal institution- and capacity-building efforts? What is the level of communication and
input on equal terms between international and local, as well as public private and civic actors?
SRQ regarding the significance and output of MSP-DEM for Human Security: To what extent does the
MSP-DEM’s output contribute to increased working opportunities and higher levels of income? To what
extent does the MSP-DEM’s output contribute to increased levels of social trust in newly established state
organs? Do MSP-DEM face negative impacts due to the involvement of the particular range of
stakeholders? What is the optimal level of inclusion of different stakeholders?
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SRQ regarding the significance and output of MSP-DEM for empowerment: What consultation and codecision
making processes exist among MSP-DEM partners? What consultation and co-decision making
processes exist with external actors? Do they go beyond formal inquiry or public-opinion screening?
Furthermore, does the project structure allow for essential co-decision making? Are project stakeholders
willing to hand over control over project activities to local-level organizations? Are there incentives and
skills available among project staff to adopt a participatory approach? Do local-level organizations have
sufficient capacities and is there a sufficient investment in community capacity-building. Are consultative
processes established and used timely?
Research Question 3
How, in practice, have selected MSPs formed and developed over time, how have they been composed
and how have they operated – both internally and in relation to their external stakeholders and intended
beneficiaries?
SRQ regarding the formation process of the MSP-DEM: What triggered the formation of the MSP-DEM?
What were the reasons of each partner for joining a MSP-DEM?
SRQ regarding the roles, influences and interests of MSP-DEM members: Have the expectations of
joining the MSP-DEM been fulfilled? To what extent is each actor satisfied with their relation to external
stakeholders? To what extent is each actor satisfied with their relation to the intended beneficiaries? What
is the mode of financial burden-sharing between national and international actors? Did this mode change
over time? What is the distribution of tasks (e.g., financial control, agenda setting and decision making
procedures, planning and evaluation of existing policies and programmes) in the MSP-DEM? Who has
the leading role in a MSP-DEM? What is the distribution of decision making powers (planning, phasing
and evaluation) between the partners of the MSP-DEM? (especially between national and international
actors). Who has the leading role in the MSP-DEM in different phases of the MSP-DEM’s development?
What is in the primary area of interest of the MSP-DEM members and did this focus of the MSP-DEM
members change over time? If yes, why? What triggered this change? Did the terms of composition and
operation of a MSP-DEM impact on the changing of a) the focus of activities and/or b) the beneficiaries
of a MSP-DEM? What form of cooperation does the MSP-DEM have with other actors active in the
MSP-DEM’s area of activity? Who decides to cooperate with such other actors? To what extent does the
MSP-DEM include consultation mechanisms with other stakeholders when preparing its activities? Did
the form of consultation procedures change over time? What triggered these changes? To what extent do
consultation mechanisms have an impact on (the change of) the goals/objectives of the MSP-DEM? What
were the main challenges for the different types of actors (public, private, civic) in a MSP-DEM during its
lifetime and how could these obstacles be overcome?
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Research Question 4
How has participation in an MSP impacted on the MSP’s members, in relation to their roles, capacities,
empowerment, interests and vulnerabilities relating to: a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding; b.
security from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion; c. alleviation of poverty and promotion of socioeconomic
development; d. empowerment of vulnerable people and communities and promotion of their
participation in public life? Furthermore, to what extent, and in what ways, have these impacts depended
on the characteristics of the relevant MSP (e.g. its multi-stakeholder character; its specific membership;
its internal procedures, capacities or decision-making mechanisms; etc)?
SRQ regarding the roles of MSP-DEM members: How and to what extent did the interaction within the
MSP-DEM as a whole or with a specific member of the MSP-DEM influence the role of individual MSP-
DEM partners? How and to what extent did the participation in the MSP influence the
organizational/institutional structure of MSP-DEM partners? What are the positive and negative aspects
for a stakeholder in joining a MSP-DEM? Did the MSP-DEM members’ self perceived independence
change after becoming a member of the MSP-DEM? How and to what extent did it change? To what
extent has the participation of each partner in the MSP-DEM impacted on the MSP-DEM’s influence on
the local society? How has the communication and cooperation within the MSP-DEM influenced the
members’ relation to the other members of the MSP-DEM and other external institutions/organizations?
SRQ regarding the capacities of MSP-DEM members: How and to what extent has the cooperation within
the MSP-DEM influenced the know-how/capacity-building power of each partner? How and to what
extent has the cooperation within the MSP-DEM influenced the members’ knowledge from the
field/understanding of the local situation?
SRQ regarding the empowerment of MSP-DEM members: How and to what extent did the participation
in a MSP-DEM contribute to the capacity building of the different types of MSP-DEM members? How
and to what extent did the mode of funding change for each partner after they became a partner in the
MSP-DEM? How and to what extent did the ability to influence decisions of institutions change since the
MSP-DEM members cooperate within the MSP-DEM? How and to what extent has the membership in
the MSP-DEM influenced the capacity/scope of projects of each MSP-DEM partner (regarding the
number of beneficiaries, budget, activities…)? What other impact on empowerment did the participation
in a MSP-DEM have for each MSP-DEM member?
SRQ regarding the interests of MSP-DEM members: How and to what extent has the cooperation with
other members of the MSP-DEM influenced/changed the agenda/focus/interests of each MSP-DEM
partner?
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SRQ regarding the vulnerabilities of MSP-DEM members: To what extent could the participation in a
MSP-DEM reduce the vulnerabilities of the different types of MSP-DEM partners? What are the
differences for each type of actors?
Research Question 5
What have been the impacts of selected cases of MSPs on external stakeholders and potential
beneficiaries, in relation to: a. conflict reduction and peacebuilding; b. security of vulnerable people and
communities from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion; c. alleviation of poverty and promotion of
socio-economic development; d. empowerment of vulnerable people and communities and promotion of
their participation in public life; Furthermore, to what extent, and in what ways, have these impacts
depended on the characteristics of the relevant MSP (e.g. its multi-stakeholder character; its specific
membership; its internal procedures, capacities or decision-making mechanisms; etc)?
SRQ regarding the impact of MSP-DEM: Did they have any impact at all? What hindered the MSP-DEM
to have an impact on peacebuilding and/or Human Security? What were the obstacles and shortcomings?
Research Question 6
How has the participation or support of international actors, including the EU, affected the MSPs selected
for case study in this project; in relation to the MSP’s development, operation, sustainability and impacts?
What are the lessons for how the EU and other international actors should support or participate in MSPs?
SRQ regarding the participation or support of international actors in MSP-DEM: Why do international
actors decide to set up a new MSP-DEM? Why do international actors decide to facilitate an existing
MSP-DEM? How do international actors see their role in an MSP-DEM? Does the same international
actor follow the operation of MSP-DEM from its beginning to its end? Do some international actors aim
at withdrawing from an MSP-DEM after its initiation, thus leaving the initiative in the hands of local
actors? What was the level of dominance of international actors at the beginning/in the middle/at the end
of the MSP-DEM?
Research Question 7
How can EU (including member states’) policies and programmes better support and co-operate with
MSPs in countries emerging from armed conflict in order to promote: a. conflict reduction and
peacebuilding; b. security of from violence, crime and illegitimate coercion; c. alleviation of poverty and
promotion of socio-economic development; d. empowerment of vulnerable people and communities and
promotion of their participation in public life?
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SRQ regarding the recommendations on policies and programmes: How involved is the EU and its
member states in setting up and facilitating MSPs-DEM? Is their approach different from other
international actors?
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