ISIS Europe News In This Issue
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A news review of <strong>Europe</strong>an Security and Defence Policy<br />
Number 48 February 2010<br />
<strong>In</strong> <strong>This</strong> <strong>Issue</strong><br />
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>News</strong><br />
Page 1<br />
A Decade for<br />
Disarmament?<br />
Page 1<br />
The 2010 NPT Review<br />
Conference: Looking to<br />
a future without<br />
nuclear weapons?<br />
Page 3<br />
NATO Needs to<br />
Emphasise the<br />
Centrality of Arms<br />
Control<br />
Page 6<br />
NATO and the EU:<br />
Cooperation?<br />
Page 9<br />
CSDP and EU mission<br />
updates, table and<br />
chart, February 2010<br />
Page 13<br />
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>News</strong><br />
<strong>This</strong> edition of <strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review concentrates on oversight and arms control. <strong>In</strong><br />
particular, there are several anniversaries/international meetings this year of significance, to which<br />
accountability and assessment of implementation are important.<br />
<strong>This</strong> year marks the 10 th anniversary of UNSC Resolution 1325, which outlined measures to<br />
improve the plight of and empower women in peace and security. <strong>ISIS</strong> has conducted training with<br />
DCAF on gender and SSR and is undertaking a study for the <strong>Europe</strong>an Parliament on implementing<br />
UNSCR 1325 and human rights guidelines in the EU’s external relations. What we need to ensure<br />
now in the EU on this 10 th anniversary, is solid commitment in the <strong>Europe</strong>an External Action<br />
Service to gender – with a concrete realisation of a properly financed gender unit. You can<br />
subscribe to <strong>ISIS</strong>’ regular Gender and Security list here.<br />
It is just over a month since the launch of the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership webportal<br />
www.csdpmap.eu With over 70,000 hits, it has proved a very popular format of access to EU and<br />
independent information on CSDP. CSDP MAP now has 21 partners and growing. Subscribe to<br />
updates from the webportal site. For further information, please contact Giji Gya.<br />
Our regular CSDP Updates also form part of CSDP MAP, and the February update of ongoing<br />
CSDP missions – including the proposed EUTM mission in Somalia - are here.<br />
Finally, we say farewell and good luck to former staff member Filippo Mauri who has taken up a<br />
traineeship in the Council General Secretariat. We thank Filippo for his excellent work on<br />
<strong>In</strong>stitutional Reform and Security Governance.<br />
Other<br />
EP Updates<br />
Page 2<br />
NATO Watch<br />
Page 12<br />
CSDP MAP<br />
Page 19<br />
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong><br />
Rue Archimède 50<br />
1000 Brussels<br />
Belgium<br />
Tel: +32 2 230 7446<br />
Fax: +32 2 230 6113<br />
www.isis-europe.org<br />
info@isis-europe.org<br />
ESR is edited by<br />
Giji Gya,<br />
Executive Director<br />
A Decade for Disarmament?<br />
During almost four weeks this<br />
May (3 rd to 28 th ), State Parties<br />
will gather in New York to<br />
review implementation of the<br />
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation<br />
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for<br />
the eighth time since its entry<br />
into force in 1970 and to<br />
identify further areas for<br />
progress. Read the article on the<br />
NPT by <strong>ISIS</strong> Senior Advisor on<br />
Nuclear and Disarmament<br />
Policy – Dr. Ian Davis in this<br />
issue (p.3).<br />
Also on the nuclear slant, a<br />
guest article from Martin<br />
Butcher of Pugwash looks at<br />
arms control in a NATO<br />
framework in its Strategic Concept Review (p.6). <strong>ISIS</strong><br />
and Pugwash will be undertaking several events this<br />
year on the NPT and <strong>ISIS</strong> will also assist the annual<br />
NATO Watch Shadow event in the second semester<br />
2010. We also look at EU-NATO relations with an<br />
article (p. 9) outlining the formal and informal<br />
discussions on cohering capabilities between these two<br />
bodies. <strong>ISIS</strong> and DCAF will hold a meeting with<br />
MEPs and NATO Parliamentary Assemblies on 13<br />
April, looking at EU-NATO Capabilities.<br />
Further on the disarmament side, the international<br />
Convention on Cluster Munitions is set to enter into<br />
force in August this year after having received 30<br />
ratifications. Surprisingly, one would think we would<br />
have learnt after the successful Landmine Ban Treaty,<br />
but still, many States are to ratify.<br />
The EU should not forget that these indiscriminate<br />
weapons are close to home, where cluster munitions<br />
were used in the August 2008 conflict in Georgia.
From the EU member states, 10 of 27 have ratified so<br />
far, which (in chronological ratification order) are:<br />
Ireland, Austria, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg,<br />
Slovenia, Malta, France, Belgium and Denmark. (Non-<br />
EU States in <strong>Europe</strong> that have ratified include Albania,<br />
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and<br />
Norway). 1<br />
conditional on reciprocal moves by Russia. Second,<br />
whether unilateral withdrawal would be sought (as<br />
recommended by the four elder Belgian statesmen) in<br />
the event that agreement cannot be reached within<br />
NATO”. The situation was further complicated over<br />
the weekend by the Dutch government falling and the<br />
establishment of a caretaker Cabinet until the June<br />
elections.<br />
Giji Gya, Executive Director, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong><br />
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> is an independent research and<br />
advisory organisation providing analysis on<br />
security, defence and peacebuilding aspects.<br />
Graphic: www.stopclustermunitions.org<br />
Belgian news - global zero for nuclear weapons<br />
Last Friday (19 February), Belgian Prime Minister,<br />
Yves Leterme (CD&V), announced in Le Soir 2 that<br />
along with Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,<br />
and Norway, Belgium was taking an initiative in<br />
favour of a world without nuclear weapons within the<br />
framework of the review of the NATO Strategic<br />
Concept in November 2010. The official Belgian<br />
government statement follows an earlier high-profile<br />
call by the former head of NATO Willy Claes and<br />
three other Belgian statesmen (former Prime Ministers<br />
Jean-Luc Dehaene and Guy Verhofstadt and former<br />
Foreign Minister Louis Michel) for the withdrawal of<br />
the <strong>Europe</strong>an-based US nuclear weapons, which was<br />
published in a number of Belgian newspapers. <strong>In</strong><br />
addition, the current Presidency of the EU, Spain,<br />
which will be representing the EU at the NPT, also<br />
announced its support of global zero with “all its<br />
might” in the UNGA 2009.<br />
These statements build on US President Obama’s<br />
“global zero” leadership and UNSCR 1887, which<br />
calls for much stronger action on all fronts of the<br />
nuclear weapons issue, including strengthening the<br />
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<br />
(NPT). “<strong>This</strong> joint Benelux, German and Norwegian<br />
initiative is another significant step towards removal of<br />
the remaining US nuclear weapons from <strong>Europe</strong>”, said<br />
Dr Ian Davis, Senior Advisor to <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>.<br />
However, he added a note of caution, “What is<br />
seemingly being undertaken is a joint push within<br />
NATO to reach a common position on withdrawal, but<br />
what is less clear is first, the extent to which this is<br />
1 http://www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pages_i/i_statessig<br />
ning.html<br />
2 La Belgique veut un retrait des armes nucléaires, Le Soir,<br />
19/02/2010<br />
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> knows the EU.<br />
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strategic knowledge, training and advice on EU<br />
Common Security and Defence Policy.<br />
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<strong>Europe</strong>an Parliamentary Updates<br />
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Our Parliamentary Updates for 2010 are<br />
available on our website on at:<br />
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If you are interested in receiving the updates<br />
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<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 2
The 2010 NPT Review Conference:<br />
Looking to a future without nuclear weapons?<br />
40 years on, this year sees another meeting reviewing<br />
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT). Ian Davis<br />
reviews the current state of play regarding the Treaty<br />
in the light of the new ‘Global Zero’ debate. He argues<br />
for regime stabilisation and small concrete<br />
disarmament steps and institutional reforms to help to<br />
keep the Global Zero process on track.<br />
Going to Global Zero?<br />
During almost four weeks this May (3 rd to 28 th ), State<br />
Parties will gather in New York to review<br />
implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation<br />
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for the eighth time since<br />
its entry into force in 1970, and to identify further<br />
areas for progress.<br />
While calls for the NPT to be amended or even<br />
superseded by a new convention or treaty on nuclear<br />
disarmament may be premature, concrete, achievable<br />
measures to help strengthen the non-proliferation,<br />
compliance, and disarmament functions of the NPT are<br />
likely to be tabled.<br />
As we approach the 40 th anniversary (on 5 March<br />
2010) of entry into force of the NPT, this article<br />
reviews the current state of play regarding the Treaty<br />
in the light of the new ‘Global Zero’ debate. 2009 in<br />
particular, was an extraordinary year of commitments<br />
at the highest levels to the vision of a world free of<br />
nuclear weapons: from President Barack Obama’s<br />
Prague speech to the UN Security Council Summit.<br />
The 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) provides<br />
a golden opportunity to turn words into action, for<br />
setting in motion irreversible processes to achieve that<br />
objective. It is not the only game in town— the NPT is<br />
part of a network of interlocking treaties,<br />
organisations, inspections and unilateral, bilateral and<br />
multilateral arrangements aimed at halting the spread<br />
of nuclear weapons — but it is the one that, for good<br />
or ill, continues to form the cornerstone of<br />
international multilateral commitments to nuclear<br />
disarmament.<br />
The article begins by outlining the reasons why the<br />
NPT should be seen as a success story, but one that<br />
remains fragile given the differing perspectives that<br />
shape the views of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and<br />
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). It then<br />
undertakes a brief review of some of the obstacles to<br />
further progress at the 2010 RevCon, and ends with<br />
some tentative conclusions as to what might constitute<br />
as ‘progress’ in May.<br />
The NPT: a relative success story (but with much<br />
work still to do)<br />
The NPT today has the largest number of signatories<br />
of any arms control agreement, and with only four<br />
states outside has achieved near-universal<br />
involvement. <strong>This</strong> means that almost the entire<br />
community of nations has voluntarily chosen to sign<br />
and ratify a treaty of indefinite duration that precludes<br />
them from acquiring nuclear weapons or assisting<br />
other countries from doing so.<br />
To these ends, by and large the NPT has been a<br />
success. Much of the world is covered by Nuclear<br />
Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), including nearly the<br />
entire Southern Hemisphere. With the recent entryinto-force<br />
of the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty, NWFZs<br />
now also extend into the Northern Hemisphere and<br />
include territory on which nuclear weapons used to be<br />
based. Momentum also resumed in 2009 with the<br />
ratification on 15 July of the Pelindaba 1 Treaty—the<br />
African NWFZ (which was signed in signed in 1996<br />
but only came into effect with the 28 th ratification).<br />
The NPT has also greatly slowed nuclear proliferation,<br />
so that to date only one country, North Korea, has<br />
signed up as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS)<br />
and gone on to acquire a complete nuclear weapons<br />
capability. Of course, first Israel, then <strong>In</strong>dia and<br />
Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons outside the<br />
NPT framework. Overall, however, nuclear ‘breakout’<br />
has largely been contained and the pace of nuclear<br />
proliferation remains much less than anticipated.<br />
Nor is proliferation inevitable or irreversible: since<br />
1970 more states have given up their ambitions for<br />
nuclear weapons (including Argentina, Australia,<br />
Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, <strong>In</strong>donesia, Italy, Kazakhstan,<br />
Libya, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, South Africa,<br />
South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Ukraine and the<br />
Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) than have<br />
acquired them. However, one thing is clear: the status<br />
quo is unsustainable. Nine countries cannot maintain<br />
their monopoly of nuclear weapons indefinitely.<br />
1 http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptanwfz.pdf<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 3
The verification system, centred on the <strong>In</strong>ternational<br />
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has over the decades<br />
strengthened significantly, both in formal procedures,<br />
and in the acquired collective experience of its<br />
practitioners. The growing adoption internationally of<br />
the Model Additional Protocol (AP) is a particularly<br />
positive development, since it expands the declaration<br />
a state must make to the IAEA of activities that might<br />
contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and<br />
broadens the agency’s right of access to verify the<br />
declaration. But while more than half of the states<br />
with safeguards agreements with the IAEA now also<br />
have APs in force, it is less encouraging that 30<br />
NNWS parties to the NPT still do not have even<br />
comprehensive safeguards in place. Moreover, the AP<br />
is not in force in some key regions, including much of<br />
the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America.<br />
The challenges ahead<br />
Most observers at the 2009 NPT Preparatory<br />
Committee (PrepCom) regarded the results of this last<br />
preliminary meeting as largely positive, although that<br />
assessment had as much to do with the low bar that has<br />
been set for judging ‘success’ and the dismal failure of<br />
the 2005 RevCon. While no agreement could be<br />
reached on substantive recommendations, an agenda<br />
was adopted for the 2010 RevCon, something that was<br />
not achieved until the third week of the 2005 RevCon.<br />
The meeting was also notable for the largely<br />
professional and collegiate approach of delegations<br />
and the absence of rancour that had plagued past<br />
PrepComs.<br />
However, one of the major challenges at the RevCon<br />
will be in neutralising or sidelining the handful of<br />
NWS and NNWS that, on past experience, are likely to<br />
promote positions that stand no chance of gaining<br />
consensus. Uncompromising national positions in<br />
2005, for example, as adopted by the US, France and<br />
Iran (in relation to past disarmament commitments)<br />
and Egypt (in relation to the 1995 resolution on the<br />
Middle East) contributed to the stalemate and had the<br />
effect of ending all prospects for agreement on<br />
substantive recommendations. Moreover, the<br />
wrangling over process and technicalities meant that<br />
there was little or no debate at the 2005 RevCon on<br />
vital non-proliferation issues, such as North Korea’s<br />
nuclear programme and its status under the NPT, or on<br />
serious nuclear trafficking incidents.<br />
review of the 'Programme of Action' known as the '13<br />
practical steps towards global nuclear disarmament'<br />
agreed in 2000. These clearly achievable confidencebuilding<br />
measures and commitments were viewed at<br />
the time as an expression of the 'step-by-step' approach<br />
favoured by NWS, and as fulfilment of their pledge<br />
made at the previous 1995 review conference to<br />
advance nuclear disarmament – a pledge that enabled<br />
the historic consensus to indefinitely extend the NPT.<br />
These 13 steps remain central to the debate today<br />
because the failure to agree a Final Document at the<br />
2005 RevCon means that they remain the most recent<br />
multilaterally agreed disarmament framework.<br />
Consideration of these steps was blocked at the 2005<br />
RevCon, but it is unlikely that States Parties will allow<br />
this to continue indefinitely – and nor should they.<br />
Finding the critical points for progress<br />
For decades many States Parties have been willing to<br />
talk about the possibility of a nuclear-weapon free<br />
world without ever really believing that it is feasible,<br />
nor take the steps necessary to make it more possible.<br />
More pressing concerns in the Cold War prevented any<br />
significant breakthroughs, and the opportunities after<br />
the Cold War were largely squandered. NWS believed<br />
it was enough to reduce warhead numbers and wait to<br />
see what would come next. The ideology supportive of<br />
a new generation of nuclear weapons that arose within<br />
Washington in particular (but that also spread to the<br />
other NWS) was a particular blow to the possibilities<br />
of progress.<br />
Under the inspirational leadership of Barack Obama,<br />
however, a growing group of political leaders and<br />
mainstream ‘opinion shapers’ has been arguing that the<br />
current trends will inevitably lead to a world where the<br />
number of nuclear weapons states may grow to 25-30<br />
in a few years, the concept of nuclear deterrence has<br />
little meaning, and the chances of non-state terrorist<br />
actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons grows<br />
apace. The historic bargain between the NWS and the<br />
NNWS to the NPT is now faced with both ‘breakout’<br />
and declining legitimacy.<br />
It can be clearly demonstrated that the need is not only<br />
overwhelming and urgent, but that actions are practical<br />
and possible. Some of the dynamics for achieving<br />
NPT stability at the 2010 RevCon include:<br />
<strong>In</strong> the NWS’ camp, both France and China convey the<br />
view that they are very uncomfortable with the new<br />
US vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Getting<br />
these two countries (and the four outside of the NPT)<br />
to lend their support towards that objective is likely to<br />
be a major challenge. <strong>This</strong> situation may be<br />
exacerbated by the likely calls from NNWS for a<br />
Shared goal of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World<br />
(disarmament is the key). The NWS continue to try<br />
and legitimise their nuclear doctrines on the fraudulent<br />
grounds that their status is ‘recognised’ under the NPT.<br />
They know this to be a falsehood yet they blithely<br />
carry on regardless. <strong>This</strong> must change. All of the NWS<br />
should re-affirm their commitment to nuclear<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 4
disarmament, and do so in a meaningful way that goes<br />
beyond paying lip service to Article VI. <strong>This</strong> might be<br />
achieved by setting out some initial tangible steps and,<br />
for those NWS that have not already done so, by<br />
announcing at the highest political level (president or<br />
prime minister) that a nuclear weapon-free world is a<br />
shared goal.<br />
RevCon and beyond. NNWS within alliances like<br />
NATO can no longer shelter under the nuclear<br />
umbrella provided by NWS and maintain the pretence<br />
that they are in good standing under the NPT. The<br />
current review of NATO’s Strategic Concept provides<br />
a golden opportunity for them to revise this outdated<br />
nuclear posture. 13<br />
Credible commitments, agreed without coercion. There<br />
are no shortage of disarmament blueprints and plans,<br />
including those contained in: the 1995 NPT Principles<br />
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and<br />
Disarmament 2 ; the 2000 NPT Practical Steps for<br />
disarmament 3 ; draft recommendations of the 2009<br />
NPT PrepCom 4 ; several UN General Assembly<br />
resolutions; UN Security Council Resolution 1887 5 ;<br />
the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for<br />
disarmament 6 ; reports of the WMD (Blix)<br />
Commission 7 and the <strong>In</strong>ternational Commission on<br />
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament<br />
(ICNND) 8 ; and proposals of civil society groups,<br />
campaigns, and initiatives, among them Global Zero 9 ,<br />
the Nuclear Security Project 10 , the Middle Powers<br />
<strong>In</strong>itiative 11 and its Article VI Forum launched in the<br />
wake of the failed 2005 RevCon and the <strong>In</strong>ternational<br />
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 12 . The<br />
2010 RevCon has an opportunity to work to build<br />
consensus around a number of the priorities identified.<br />
<strong>In</strong> particular, discussion of the legal, technical,<br />
political and verification framework for the prohibition<br />
and elimination of nuclear weapons is long overdue<br />
and consideration should be given to placing the<br />
concept of a Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC) onto<br />
the negotiating agenda.<br />
Supremacy of the NPT. The discriminatory nature of<br />
the NPT is further reinforced by declaratory statements<br />
in ‘other’ agreements seemingly taking precedence<br />
over the NPT, such as the US-UK Mutual Defence<br />
Agreement and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Until it is<br />
generally accepted that there are no opt-out clauses<br />
from the obligations of the NPT to actively pursue<br />
nuclear disarmament in ‘good faith’, as agreed in the<br />
final document of the 2000 Review Conference, there<br />
will remain no prospect of progress at the 2010<br />
2 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-<br />
NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf<br />
3 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/2000-<br />
NPT/pdf/FD-Part1and2.pdf<br />
4 http://npsglobal.org/eng/images/stories/pdf/DraftRecomendations<br />
080509.pdf<br />
5 http://www.un.org/<strong>News</strong>/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm<br />
6 http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/nuc5pnt08.pdf<br />
7 http://www.wmdcommission.org/<br />
8 http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/contents.html<br />
9 http://www.globalzero.org/<br />
10 http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org<br />
11 http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/<br />
12 http://www.icanw.org/<br />
Regular review of progress. Visibility is crucial. It is<br />
vital that the 2010 RevCon undertakes a full review of<br />
implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document.<br />
States Parties should not agree to any weakening of the<br />
disarmament commitments agreed in 2000, but since<br />
some of the13 steps have been overtaken by events,<br />
the RevCon should consider establishing an Article VI<br />
Compliance Committee to review next steps for<br />
implementing Article VI between now and the 2015<br />
RevCon and establish a set of criteria for monitoring<br />
compliance. As a confidence building measure, the<br />
NWS should provide full and transparent reporting on<br />
their implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document<br />
(or any new or modified commitments arising from the<br />
RevCon in May), including a yearly review and<br />
‘forward look’ of their disarmament commitments.<br />
Revitalising US-Russian and NATO-Russian<br />
cooperation. <strong>In</strong> some respects, more routine and<br />
meaningful nuclear non-proliferation cooperation took<br />
place between the Soviet Union and NATO during the<br />
Cold War than today. Greater use should be made of<br />
both the P-5 mechanism and the NATO-Russia<br />
Council to pursue parallel and coordinated action on<br />
non-proliferation policy and efforts to counter-nuclear<br />
terrorism, including improved sharing of information<br />
regarding illicit nuclear trafficking. If Washington and<br />
Moscow take seriously their pronouncements about<br />
combating nuclear terrorism, they should fashion<br />
greater cooperation in sharing sensitive but vital<br />
information, especially in providing the Office of<br />
Nuclear Security at the IAEA with timely forensics<br />
information about known illicit nuclear trafficking<br />
incidents.<br />
Strengthening the Review Process and NPT <strong>In</strong>stitutional<br />
Reform. The NPT is arguably the weakest of<br />
the treaties governing ‘weapons of mass destruction’<br />
(WMD) in terms of its institutional support. Further<br />
steps toward disarmament will eventually necessitate<br />
an institutional framework comparable to other treaty<br />
regimes governing WMD. At the 2010 RevCon states<br />
should give serious consideration to Canada’s earlier<br />
proposals for institutional reform, which could<br />
increase the quality of NPT deliberations and enable<br />
13 See also article by Martin Butcher “NATO needs to emphasise<br />
the centrality of arms control”” in this ESR No. 48, February 2010.<br />
http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_448_esr48-nato-armscontrol.pdf<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 5
the treaty’s institutions to focus on specific issues and<br />
respond to developments.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Meeting the high expectations of the NPT RevCon in<br />
2010 will be difficult. The failure of the 2005 RevCon<br />
means that there was no consensus about the status of<br />
the treaty’s implementation, and participants will have<br />
to look back even further to 2000, while<br />
simultaneously looking forward in the light of<br />
subsequent developments, both technological and<br />
political. The RevCon is a crucial component in the<br />
nuclear non-proliferation regime. While an ambitious<br />
substantive outcome seems unlikely, regime<br />
stabilisation and small concrete disarmament steps and<br />
institutional reforms would help to keep the Global<br />
Zero process on track.<br />
Dr. Ian Davis, Senior Advisor - Nuclear and<br />
disarmament policy, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>;<br />
Director, NATO Watch www.natowatch.org<br />
NATO Needs to Emphasise the Centrality of Arms Control<br />
Martin Butcher of Pugwash writes on the nuclear side<br />
of NATO. He argues that the task for NATO leaders is<br />
to rebuild solidarity and reshape the Alliance to face<br />
new missions dictated by the transformed post Cold<br />
War, post 9/11 strategic and security environment.<br />
Further, that the North Atlantic Council should be a<br />
platform for consultation and negotiation of arms<br />
control positions within NATO. Finally, that NATO<br />
should not miss the opportunity to use the review of the<br />
Strategic Concept to greatly enhance the role of arms<br />
control, non-proliferation and disarmament in security<br />
building.<br />
<strong>In</strong>troduction<br />
<strong>This</strong> year, NATO leaders will agree a new Strategic<br />
Concept for the Alliance, a document that will govern<br />
NATO’s approach to its security for a decade or more.<br />
The threat posed to the Alliance by nuclear, biological,<br />
chemical or radiological weapons (WMD) and their<br />
means of delivery has for some years been identified<br />
as a central concern, the strategic concept talks present<br />
an excellent opportunity to consider how NATO<br />
nations can enhance their security through a stronger<br />
reliance on arms control, non-proliferation and<br />
disarmament.<br />
There are emergent threats or potential threats which,<br />
if not dealt with before they mature, could lead to the<br />
establishment of new or revived deterrent relationships<br />
which the Alliance might wish to avoid. There are also<br />
potential threats which would not be susceptible to<br />
deterrence, for example if a radical religious group<br />
were able to obtain a nuclear weapon. While the<br />
Alliance must maintain defences against such a<br />
possibility, it must be asked why NATO has moved<br />
away from threat reduction and prevention to drop to<br />
the extent that it has?<br />
The security of NATO members, and of the wider<br />
world, would be enhanced by engagement with<br />
potential adversaries to allow the reduction and<br />
elimination of potential threats before they grow to a<br />
scale that actually menaces the Alliance. Where nonstate<br />
groups are not amenable to such engagement,<br />
then support for non-proliferation measures which can<br />
deny them the means to use WMD are an essential<br />
component of future strategy. Finally, the Allies<br />
should discuss the extent to which NATO’s nuclear<br />
posture harms the global non-proliferation regime and<br />
acts as a stimulant to threats and potential threats it is<br />
intended to deter.<br />
A new emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation<br />
and disarmament should be debated openly and<br />
widely. It is to be regretted that the preparatory phase<br />
of the Strategic Concept revision process is, for the<br />
most part, happening behind closed doors. 1 There is no<br />
involvement of NATO nation parliaments. Ministers<br />
are not giving a political lead. A Group of Experts<br />
gathers evidence behind closed doors. Even<br />
presentations by academics to the group are not<br />
published. Nuclear issues will be discussed by the<br />
group for barely two hours in formal session. At a time<br />
when NATO’s nuclear deployments and strategy lack<br />
public support and democratic legitimacy, this is not<br />
enough.<br />
For decades, NATO has pursued dual track policies of<br />
deterrence and arms control as a means of managing<br />
nuclear threats. The balance of these polices has<br />
become distorted since the adoption of the last<br />
Strategic Concept in 1999. As they look to the future<br />
role of the Alliance, NATO nations must undertake an<br />
1 See analysis via NATO Watch www.natowatch.org and <strong>ISIS</strong><br />
<strong>Europe</strong> www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=reform<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 6
evaluation of current policy and practice. They must<br />
further engage in a review of their support for arms<br />
control and disarmament as threat reduction and<br />
elimination measures, and revise policy accordingly to<br />
become more effective at building NATO security.<br />
A Lost Decade<br />
During the past decade, NATO gave the appearance of<br />
abandoning any attempt at threat reduction through<br />
arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, in<br />
favour of a purely military response to potential<br />
WMD-armed adversaries. <strong>This</strong> is strange, given the<br />
successful use during the 1980s of multi-lateral<br />
agreements to reduce armaments and the likelihood of<br />
conflict, both nuclear and conventional. At the very<br />
least, the role of non-proliferation has been severely<br />
downgraded. <strong>This</strong> reflected US national policy under<br />
the Bush administration much more than it reflected<br />
the collective view of the Alliance.<br />
At a time when NATO faces no military peer, it would<br />
seem only logical to use this position of strength to<br />
negotiate agreements with neighbours and nearneighbours<br />
that can obviate new WMD threats before<br />
they arise. However, <strong>Europe</strong>an nations submitted to<br />
the Bush administration’s global outlook, and allowed<br />
it to become the policy of the entire Alliance by<br />
default. <strong>This</strong> despite the fact that it is clear that<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an nations did not share the bleak world view<br />
emanating from Washington DC. The <strong>Europe</strong>an<br />
Security Strategy 2 and the Strategy Against the<br />
Proliferation of WMD 3 adopted by the EU places<br />
much more emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to<br />
construct security from WMD threats than is now the<br />
case for NATO – and yet, because of NATO’s<br />
consensus rule <strong>Europe</strong>ans were overridden by the<br />
United States.<br />
A New Promise<br />
That situation has now changed. <strong>Europe</strong>ans are<br />
presented with another challenge – how to give their<br />
support to an administration keen to pursue arms<br />
control measures. President Obama’s team is finalizing<br />
a START follow-on agreement with Russia, and the<br />
President has promised ratification of the<br />
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US President has<br />
given nuclear disarmament a high profile, with his<br />
speech in Prague in April 2009, and the<br />
groundbreaking UN Security Council session in<br />
September 2009.<br />
2 Council of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union “<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Strategy”.<br />
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf<br />
3 Council of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union “EU Strategy against the<br />
Proliferation of WMDs”.<br />
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pd<br />
f<br />
<strong>This</strong> new direction presents <strong>Europe</strong>ans with a<br />
challenge. What can NATO allies do to support this<br />
President in his disarmament policies? And can this<br />
new direction be fully integrated into the new Strategic<br />
Concept, rather than being the Cinderella appendage to<br />
policy that it has become. For even the most<br />
problematic current potential nuclear weapons threats<br />
facing NATO nations are some years away from<br />
becoming real. There is a window, if all NATO nations<br />
would pull together, in which the security of the<br />
Alliance could be enhanced through reducing and<br />
eliminating potential threats.<br />
A Positive Contribution from NATO to the NPT<br />
Review Conference 4<br />
One particular emerging concern within the NPT<br />
review process has been a focus on Negative Security<br />
Assurances. <strong>This</strong> is certain to feature as a major issue<br />
at this year’s Review Conference, and it is one area<br />
where NATO could, if it chose, play a crucial and<br />
positive role. However, nuclear use doctrine must<br />
change. While NATO and some of its member states<br />
continue to allow for the possible use of nuclear<br />
weapons against chemical or biological weapons (and<br />
in the case of the United States even against very large<br />
conventional weapons they describe as WMD), it is<br />
very difficult for NATO members to satisfactorily<br />
respond to the concerns of non-nuclear weapons states<br />
in the NATO periphery and the wider world.<br />
During the 2008 NPT PrepCom the Ukraine made<br />
some concrete proposals to advance the issue. They<br />
noted that:<br />
37. Accordance of the credible security assurances<br />
in the form of an international legally binding<br />
instrument will substantially enhance the nuclear<br />
non-proliferation regime, improve mutual trust<br />
and overall stability.<br />
38. It should also be recognized that problem of<br />
security assurances will exist until purposes of<br />
nuclear disarmament are reached. Moreover,<br />
worth remembering the fact that some of the states<br />
possessing nuclear weapons remain outside of<br />
global regime of nuclear non-proliferation.<br />
And then called for:<br />
39. The 2010 Review Conference should reiterate<br />
its call upon all nuclear weapon states to strictly<br />
adhere to their existing respective pledges and find<br />
4 See also article on the NPT by Ian Davis “The 2010 Non-<br />
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Looking to a future<br />
without nuclear weapons?” in this ESR No. 48, February 2010.<br />
http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_446_esr48-nptrevcon.pdf<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 7
appropriate means to urgently address the security<br />
assurances issue. It may also recommend the UN<br />
General Assembly to adopt resolution, which<br />
would enable convening an <strong>In</strong>ternational<br />
Conference under the auspices of the UN to<br />
discuss the security assurances issue with the<br />
purpose of finding the acceptable solution. 5<br />
NATO is in a position to engage this debate. While<br />
NATO is not a party to the NPT, all its member states<br />
are. They could, as a group, issue a working paper to<br />
the NPT Review Conference on how these proposals<br />
could work in practice, and to address other detailed<br />
points made by the Ukraine. They could also issue a<br />
declaration that NATO will never attack a non-nuclear<br />
weapon state party to the NPT with nuclear weapons,<br />
and that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to<br />
deter nuclear attack on the Alliance. <strong>This</strong> would do<br />
much to restore confidence in a regime that has been at<br />
a very low ebb.<br />
There are other issues within the NPT context where<br />
NATO’s current position is controversial.<br />
The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was<br />
conditioned by non-nuclear weapon states in part on<br />
the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban.<br />
All NATO nations except the United States have now<br />
ratified that Treaty, but the US has not. The Bush<br />
administration went so far as to explore withdrawing<br />
its signature from the CTBT, although that did not<br />
happen. The Obama administration has repeatedly said<br />
it will seek ratification of the Treaty, but a year into<br />
that administration NATO is still not offering practical<br />
or even declaratory support for the Treaty, thus<br />
undermining both the CTBT and faith in the NPT<br />
itself. It is time for NATO to state that it seeks US<br />
ratification of the CTBT, and Entry-into-force of that<br />
Treaty and that it stands ready to provide technical<br />
assistance to achieve these goals.<br />
Another area where NATO’s nuclear strategy could be<br />
hurting its defence efforts is the question of tactical<br />
nuclear weapons. <strong>This</strong> is also a hot button issue in the<br />
NPT review process. The German government<br />
initiative of November 2009 to call for the withdrawal<br />
of nuclear weapons from <strong>Europe</strong> opened this debate<br />
wide. They have strong support from many <strong>Europe</strong>an<br />
nations. But others, including the Baltic States, and<br />
with former NATO Secretary General George<br />
Robertson as a spokesman, call for the retention of this<br />
remnant of the Cold War arsenal. The deployment of<br />
US nuclear weapons in NATO <strong>Europe</strong>, and the nuclear<br />
5 Preparing for a Successful Review Conference 2010 2010,<br />
Working paper submitted by Ukraine, NPT PrepCom 2008.<br />
Available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/612/44/PDF/G0861244.pdf?Op<br />
enElement.<br />
sharing programme under which some of these are<br />
allocated for Allied use in time of war is an<br />
impediment to progress. Nuclear sharing also means<br />
that several Allied nations have an ambiguous status as<br />
non-nuclear weapons states. Arms control, requires<br />
sacrifice of some military capability for a gain in net<br />
security. Removal of the US nuclear weapons from<br />
<strong>Europe</strong> would also open the door to discussions on<br />
elimination of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons<br />
held by Russia. All this would significantly strengthen<br />
the NPT, restoring much of the belief of non-nuclear<br />
states in the Treaty that has been lost over the past<br />
decade.<br />
Reinvigorating Arms Control in the Alliance<br />
From this analysis of NATO policy flow some the<br />
following conclusions. The task for NATO leaders is<br />
to rebuild that solidarity and reshape the Alliance to<br />
face new missions dictated by the transformed post<br />
Cold War, post 9/11 strategic and security<br />
environment. NATO must find a way to use its current<br />
experiences to craft a new Strategic Concept based on<br />
the security needs of the 21 st century on which all<br />
members can agree. <strong>This</strong> task is difficult, but not<br />
impossible.<br />
<strong>This</strong> strategic concept should:<br />
• Rely on multi-lateral arms control, nonproliferation<br />
and disarmament as the primary<br />
tools for the reduction and elimination of all<br />
WMD threats and potential threats in the Euro-<br />
Atlantic area;<br />
• Facilitate this through the removal of US nuclear<br />
weapons from <strong>Europe</strong>, the ending of NATO<br />
nuclear sharing, establish the principle that<br />
nuclear weapons should be based on the soil of<br />
the possessor nation;<br />
• All Alliance members should consider how they<br />
can reduce and eventually eliminate the role of<br />
nuclear weapons in national defence policies, and<br />
how enhanced arms control policies could assist<br />
in bringing this to fruition.<br />
Perhaps the most important shift that NATO could<br />
undertake would be the revitalization of the North<br />
Atlantic Council as a venue for consultation and<br />
negotiation of arms control positions with the North<br />
Atlantic Alliance. <strong>This</strong> has worked well for NATO in<br />
the past, and would do so again. Specifically, NATO<br />
could engage in a series of areas that directly affect the<br />
security of all Alliance members. These might include:<br />
• Consultations with the US in the North Atlantic<br />
Council and with Russia in the NATO-Russia<br />
Council on future strategic arms control<br />
negotiations;<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 8
• Discussions in the NATO-Russia Council on<br />
globalizing the <strong>In</strong>termediate-Range Nuclear<br />
Forces Treaty, as well as urgent talks on<br />
reinstating the Conventional Forces <strong>Europe</strong><br />
Treaty;<br />
• Consultations between NATO ministers, and<br />
between NATO and partners in Asia, the Middle<br />
East and the Mediterranean, on arms control<br />
measures to reduce the threat of ballistic missiles;<br />
• Examination of measures to reduce and eliminate<br />
specific WMD threats;<br />
• Consultations on the entry into force of the<br />
CTBT, with a focus on US ratification and<br />
assistance that NATO as an organization can give<br />
to the CTBTO;<br />
• A thorough study of all potential WMD threats to<br />
the Alliance and an analysis of measures that can<br />
be taken to eliminate them through multilateral<br />
negotiations, including concessions that NATO<br />
would need to make to achieve these goals.<br />
Conclusion<br />
NATO nations are currently fortunate that they face<br />
few if any immediate military threats to their security.<br />
Now is the time to act to enhance regional security by<br />
ensuring, through negotiations and the revitalization of<br />
NATO’s role in arms control, that such threats do not<br />
emerge in the near future. NATO can act at the NPT<br />
Review Conference to contribute to a positive<br />
atmosphere in that forum.<br />
It can use its Strategic Concept Review to greatly<br />
enhance the role of arms control, non-proliferation and<br />
disarmament in security building. <strong>This</strong> must be done<br />
openly, with the full engagement of NATO nations and<br />
their publics. What NATO does in this area will be<br />
watched closely by States around the world, and may<br />
well tip the balance either toward a continued trend<br />
toward proliferation or to a promotion of greater<br />
security through confidence building and other<br />
measures.<br />
Martin Butcher is Special Projects Coordinator for<br />
the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World<br />
Affairs, and a consultant analyst on global security<br />
policy. The views expressed in this article are his<br />
own.<br />
He blogs on NATO issues at<br />
http://natomonitor.blogspot.com.<br />
NATO and the EU: Cooperation?<br />
<strong>This</strong> article assesses the current state of affairs of EU-<br />
NATO cooperation in the field of capability<br />
development. While improvements can be made to both<br />
formal and informal cooperation mechanisms in this<br />
field, real progress will not be possible until<br />
underlying strategic differences over the future of<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an security are resolved. <strong>In</strong> the meantime, real<br />
work on avoiding duplication and fostering strategic<br />
coherence is best coordinated through capitals. <strong>ISIS</strong><br />
and DCAF will hold a meeting with MEPs and NATO<br />
Parliamentarians on 13 April in Brussels, looking at<br />
EU-NATO Capabilities.<br />
<strong>In</strong>troduction<br />
Coordination in capability development is often touted<br />
as a success story for NATO-EU relations by both<br />
sides, and many recommendations for improved<br />
relations contain references to this field. However,<br />
complaining of a lack of real coordination and<br />
cooperation in EU-NATO capability development<br />
seems par for the course on both sides of the aisle.<br />
<strong>In</strong>deed, the NATO-EU Capability Group’s meetings<br />
are often said to consist of largely formulaic<br />
information exchange. Such an important area of<br />
NATO-EU relations deserves more attention and<br />
investment of energy from political leadership.<br />
While strategic divergence on the EU side and the<br />
“participation problem” 1 impede real progress in this<br />
area; improvements are possible in the working of the<br />
EU-NATO Capability Group and in informal staff-tostaff<br />
contact. However, as long as there is no<br />
consensus on the EU side regarding the future of<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an security; capability development coherence<br />
is best coordinated at a national-level.<br />
The current debate on improving EU-NATO<br />
cooperation is viewed primarily through three lenses:<br />
1) at the political level, 2) in ongoing operations in<br />
common theatres (Afghanistan, Balkans and off the<br />
coast of East Africa) and 3) in the development of<br />
military and possibly “other” capabilities. Many<br />
would agree that cooperation in this last area is not as<br />
crucial as the ad-hoc cooperation in the field where<br />
lives and large strategic purposes are at stake.<br />
However, the need for a fully inclusive and open<br />
1 The “participation problem” refers to the political and<br />
institutional problems the two organisations face in cooperation.<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 9
dialogue between the organisations regarding their<br />
respective pursuit of the capabilities needed to fulfil<br />
their goals has increased in times of budgetary<br />
pressure.<br />
You say NATO and I say EU<br />
The development of military and other capabilities at<br />
the EU and at NATO answers to different priorities<br />
and follows different methodologies. Thus, an inherent<br />
element of disjunction exists in capability<br />
development. The EU is a broader complex of<br />
institutions with a wider mandate, greater civilian<br />
focus and deeper instruments than those available to<br />
the politico-military Alliance. While EU aspirations on<br />
civilian capabilities in CSDP are better known, its<br />
CSDP aspirations have also required the development<br />
of military capabilities. 2 On the other side, NATO<br />
members are extremely dedicated to ensuring that its<br />
military forces are fully capable of meeting the<br />
challenges of the times. However, the question of<br />
developing civilian capabilities has arisen within<br />
NATO as recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan<br />
have demonstrated the need for capacity and abilities<br />
in the areas of reconstruction and stabilisation. 3 Thus,<br />
while current overlap of capability development is in<br />
the military sphere, there is a risk of future duplication<br />
in non-military capabilities as well.<br />
<strong>In</strong>dividual <strong>Europe</strong>an NATO Allies have a single set of<br />
forces for NATO, EU and national purposes. What is<br />
at question is that these states do not want to be given<br />
separate and inconsistent goals from the organisations<br />
they belong to, and thus have a strong interest in<br />
ensuring that capability development is not pulled in<br />
two directions. Members of both organisations are<br />
faced with a difficult choice: To whom do they commit<br />
available military capabilities?<br />
It seems many are currently committing capabilities to<br />
both organisations; but this is not financially<br />
sustainable in the long run. There was hope that the<br />
NATO and EU defence planning process 4 could be<br />
brought together, but this has encountered obstacles,<br />
including EU fears that its autonomy would be<br />
infringed upon by the Alliance with greater experience<br />
in this area and the “participation problem”, now due<br />
in part to problems posed by Cyprus and Turkey.<br />
2 See also article on EU military capabilities by Johann Herz<br />
“Military Capabilities: A Step Forward in ESDP?” in ESR No. 46,<br />
October 2009. http://www.isiseurope.org/pdf/2009_artrel_322_esr46-military-capabilities.pdf<br />
3 Development of civilian capabilities at NATO promises to be an<br />
uphill battle. The existing Civil Emergency Planning capabilities at<br />
NATO were strongly resisted by France in particular.<br />
4 Defence planning in this context refers to the collective setting of<br />
targets and performance review. <strong>This</strong> entails close examination of<br />
individual Member States’ programs and budgets.<br />
The EU-NATO Capability Group<br />
Today, formal coordination on capability development<br />
takes place in the aforementioned NATO-EU<br />
Capability Group, which meets approximately every 4<br />
to 6 weeks alternating between NATO HQ and the<br />
Council Justus Lipsius building in Brussels.<br />
Membership of the group comprises NATO Allies and<br />
Non-NATO EU Member States that have a security<br />
agreement with NATO, as insisted upon by Turkey.<br />
Both sides brief on common capability issues, and then<br />
there is time for Q&A and statements, although these<br />
are rare in practice. One potential avenue for<br />
improvement cited by officials on both sides would be<br />
the exchange of briefing content prior to the meetings,<br />
which currently does not occur due to fears that<br />
internal divisions would arise on the EU side. The<br />
make-up of the attendees varies, but the EU is usually<br />
represented by Permanent Representations’<br />
counsellors to the Political-Military Group, the EDA’s<br />
Policy and Plans unit, and the Council Secretariat<br />
CMPD (previously Directorate 8). On the NATO side,<br />
the meetings are attended by Defence Policy and<br />
Planning; the <strong>In</strong>ternational Military Staff, the Defence<br />
<strong>In</strong>vestment Division and defence counsellors and<br />
advisors from the missions and capitals.<br />
There are usually two or three items on the agenda, but<br />
at times single issue meetings occur (i.e. Maritime<br />
Surveillance during Swedish Presidency). It is these<br />
specific targeted meetings that many find more useful.<br />
The country holding the EU presidency often sets out<br />
to seize the initiative, and improve the effectiveness of<br />
the forum, but often run into the usual political<br />
obstacles. For example, the Czech and Swedish<br />
Presidencies undertook an initiative whereby nations<br />
were represented by their MOD’s policy directors.<br />
Political Pandering - The Participation Problem<br />
The Capability Group is hampered by a growing<br />
reticence on the part of the EU to fully engage without<br />
the participation of all its Member States. A common<br />
lament on the EU side is that formal EU-NATO<br />
frameworks are essentially unbalanced negotiations<br />
between a unified and cohesive Alliance and<br />
individual EU Member States. Additionally, the<br />
absence of a security agreement between NATO and<br />
the <strong>Europe</strong>an Defence Agency (EDA), as well as an<br />
administrative arrangement between Turkey and the<br />
EDA are substantial hindrances.<br />
One EU official expressed the view that Turkey had<br />
been misled and eventually cheated in its desire to<br />
obtain an administrative arrangement with the EDA.<br />
Turkey agreed to the integration of the Western<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Armaments Group (WEAG) into the EDA in<br />
2004, with the tacit understanding that it would be<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 10
given an administrative arrangement with the new<br />
agency so as to be able to participate in its work. Even<br />
though Norway, a country in a similar position, was<br />
able to sign an administrative arrangement with the<br />
EDA, Greece called for a security agreement to be<br />
signed between the EU and Turkey as a prerequisite to<br />
Turkey’s participation in EDA programs. While the<br />
Council secretariat’s legal service has not agreed with<br />
this stance, the issue is blocked at the political level<br />
mainly by Cyprus.<br />
<strong>In</strong>formal Contacts<br />
With the formal framework stalled, both organisations<br />
largely rely on EU-NATO staff-to-staff dialogue and<br />
exchange, which works reasonably well. According to<br />
senior officials on both sides, staff-to-staff contact has<br />
been key to the success of recent helicopter initiatives<br />
that aim to increase the number of available<br />
helicopters for operations, particularly in Afghanistan.<br />
One example of this is NATO’s Hip Helicopter Task<br />
Force 5 , which also invites representatives from the<br />
EDA to provide advice and assistance on training.<br />
Related to this program is the UK-French<br />
Multinational Helicopter <strong>In</strong>itiative (MHI), which<br />
supports the financing of helicopter deploymentrelated<br />
activities and whose membership is not<br />
restricted.<br />
<strong>In</strong> addition, the same national experts often attend<br />
working group meetings at the EDA and at NATO, so<br />
coherence-building and information exchange is<br />
fostered. EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis and<br />
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation<br />
General Abrial have had informal contact, including a<br />
visit by Abrial to EDA HQ in mid 2009.<br />
Staff-to-staff contacts also allow the organisations to<br />
better align their priority shortfall areas, so that efforts<br />
to address these shortfalls are more coordinated and<br />
coherent. At his press conference following the recent<br />
informal NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in<br />
Istanbul, Secretary General Rasmussen emphasised the<br />
importance of multinational projects in times of<br />
budgetary pressure, and highlighted medical facilities,<br />
counter-IED technology and heavy-lift helicopters as<br />
three areas that could benefit from closer cooperation<br />
with the EU.<br />
Which Way Forward?<br />
Formal cooperation in the field of capabilities today is<br />
hampered by deep political problems on both sides, so<br />
coordination now largely relies on informal<br />
5 The NATO Hip Helicopter Task Force (HHTF) is responsible for<br />
the development of a multi-national transport helicopter<br />
programme for NATO to help those countries that do not have the<br />
resources to deploy and run a transport helicopter operation on<br />
their own.<br />
mechanisms. <strong>This</strong> informal staff-to-staff contact<br />
should be enhanced as much as possible, especially<br />
between the EDA steering board and ACT. Specific<br />
projects, addressing common shortfalls, should be<br />
undertaken whenever possible, building on the<br />
example of recent helicopter initiatives.<br />
An EU official states that the ideal situation would be<br />
an organisation-to-organisation approach, and that<br />
states which are not members of both organisations<br />
should have the same right of participation as those<br />
who are. However, the utopian vision of all EU<br />
Member States accepting Turkey’s participation in the<br />
EDA and Turkey softening its interpretation of the<br />
inclusiveness of the NATO-EU “agreed framework”<br />
does not seem close to realizing itself. Nevertheless,<br />
the EU should do its utmost to conclude the Turkey-<br />
EDA administrative arrangement.<br />
Concerning the NATO-EU Capability Group, whose<br />
effectiveness is widely questioned, initial<br />
improvements could include the exchange of<br />
presentations prior to the meetings, more emphasis on<br />
single-issue meetings and a continuation of the<br />
Swedish and Czech initiatives of holding the meetings<br />
at the level of policy directors.<br />
Deeper Impediments<br />
As long as deep divergence of opinion exists within<br />
the EU concerning the future of <strong>Europe</strong>an security, all<br />
aspects of the EU-NATO relationship, including<br />
capability development, will suffer. The current<br />
reluctance to address the political question of who<br />
should guarantee <strong>Europe</strong>an security is poisoning the<br />
relationship on all levels. At the level of military<br />
capability development, one camp-largely led by the<br />
UK, remains committed to NATO for the foreseeable<br />
future while another camp, largely led by France,<br />
hopes to see CSDP become more robust, along with<br />
the development of purely <strong>Europe</strong>an military<br />
capabilities that that implies. <strong>In</strong>deed, the planners for<br />
the new CSDP structures of the EU do not hide their<br />
desire for an EU operational headquarters.<br />
Closely tied to their difference of opinion on the future<br />
of <strong>Europe</strong>an security is how closely these two camps<br />
want the EU and NATO to cooperate. The French<br />
camp would prefer cooperation to remain minimal, due<br />
to fears of NATO overwhelming a still immature<br />
CSDP. On the other hand, the UK camp would<br />
welcome closer cooperation, but wishes to see CSDP<br />
remain minimised, with a clear division of tasks<br />
between the two organisations.<br />
Conflict also exists within and between EU Member<br />
ministries. NATO Missions and EU Permanent<br />
Representations compete for influence with capitals<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 11
and representatives of different ministries are given<br />
conflicting directives.<br />
Thus, in this perspective, the EU-NATO Capability<br />
group is largely a compulsory political exercise to<br />
make it appear as if the organisations are sitting at the<br />
same table; neither side can afford to suggest that there<br />
is no cooperation. As one official deplored, “I hate the<br />
EU-NATO Capability Group”. Results of meetings are<br />
marginal are best, but non-papers and<br />
recommendations can still be churned out, even if<br />
useless.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Although the steps outlined above would improve the<br />
working of the NATO-EU Capability Group, and<br />
increase the inclusiveness of EDA programs,<br />
capability cooperation will remain close to nonexistent<br />
if the deeper issue of strategic divergence<br />
among EU Member States is not resolved.<br />
concrete results such as the helicopter initiatives is to<br />
go outside the organisational framework.<br />
Even if the current participation problem were to be<br />
resolved, underlying strategic divergence within the<br />
EU would still impede capability cooperation. The EU<br />
must conclude its internal debate on the future of<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an security if it is to project a cohesive front<br />
that will produce results.<br />
Given political and institutional problems, coherence<br />
in capability development must for the time being be a<br />
national concern. <strong>In</strong>dividual nations must do what they<br />
can to ensure that representatives at EU and NATO<br />
meetings and working groups are given the same<br />
instructions and priorities, so that coherence can be<br />
fostered as much as possible.<br />
By Paul Sturm, Programme Associate, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong><br />
Current initiatives cited as “best practices” are not<br />
concrete examples of formal EU-NATO cooperation in<br />
capability development, but rather multinational<br />
initiatives. <strong>In</strong>deed, the only way to currently achieve<br />
Observatory #6<br />
http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_408_nato_watch_observatory_no_6.pdf<br />
The NATO Watch’s Bi-Monthly Observatory was developed as part of its independent monitoring<br />
service. Its focus is on NATO policy-making and operational activities and the clips are drawn from a<br />
wide range of subscriptions, feeds and alerts covering a substantial part of the major English<br />
language newspapers and other periodicals worldwide.<br />
Subscription is free of charge<br />
Access the subscription page here<br />
NATO Watch conducts independent monitoring and analysis of NATO and aims to increase<br />
transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness and participation<br />
in a progressive reform agenda within NATO.<br />
NATO Watch website<br />
www.natowatch.org<br />
will be launched later this month<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 12
CSDP and EU mission updates – February 2010<br />
Our regular update of CSDP and EU missions<br />
introduces the upcoming launch of a new CSDP<br />
mission. We compile much of our research from firsthand<br />
sources, giving a unique perspective and update<br />
on the EU’s CSDP activities. There are currently 14<br />
active CSDP and EU missions in operation (giving a<br />
total of six in the Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia;<br />
four in Africa). The Foreign Affairs Council<br />
Conclusion of 25 January set out the upcoming launch<br />
of the EU Training Mission in Somalia. Please see the<br />
June 2008 – December 2009 updates for introductions<br />
to the missions. <strong>ISIS</strong> updates these charts regularly as<br />
part of the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership<br />
www.csdpmap.eu which has been translated to a<br />
webportal, collating research on CSDP from 21<br />
partner organisations located throughout <strong>Europe</strong>.<br />
Upcoming missions<br />
EUTM Somalia<br />
Following the Foreign Affairs Council of the 25<br />
January 2010, the Member States have accepted the<br />
establishment of the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in<br />
Somalia. <strong>This</strong> comes within a broader EU effort to<br />
provide support to the Somali Transitional<br />
Government. The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is<br />
due to be agreed very soon, but questions on how to<br />
establish the Command and Control structure for the<br />
mission remain to be approached. As far as financing<br />
of the mission is concerned, the funds might come<br />
from the African Peace Facility of the Commission.<br />
Spain and France will be the framework nations and<br />
will contribute the majority of the personnel<br />
committed to EUTM, which is estimated to be 100<br />
personnel consisting in majority of Non-<br />
Commissioned Officers. The mission is said to start on<br />
the 1 May.<br />
The EU mission will take place in Uganda where the<br />
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISON) is<br />
already involved in the training of the Somali troops.<br />
The aim of the mission is to support the AU in this<br />
endeavor and to work in close cooperation with other<br />
international partners such as the UN, the AU and the<br />
US. The EU mission will not be directly involved in<br />
the training of basic troops but will provide training to<br />
the trainers.<br />
As mentioned in our previous update, ensuring<br />
ownership of the trained troops by the Transitional<br />
Federal Government is crucial and the issue of<br />
establishing a transparent and accountable chain of<br />
payment is key. The EU might call for the services of<br />
PriceWaterhouseCoopers to establish the structure for<br />
payments. The training might include human rights<br />
and gender dimensions (and should), but the extent of<br />
such training remains to be debated. It is of utmost<br />
importance to not recruit child soldiers, a task which<br />
will be difficult as there are barely any age<br />
identification means available.<br />
Military<br />
EU NAVFOR Atalanta - 8 December 2008 to 13<br />
December 2010<br />
The Maritime Security Center (MSC) which has been<br />
established to provide protection to merchant ships<br />
navigating in the operational area has shown positive<br />
results. Even though the rate of registration to the<br />
MSC rate is high, there still remains an estimate of<br />
30% of ships which do not register to the MSC and<br />
which do not take part in the escort service provided<br />
by the EU mission. Capabilities are deemed<br />
satisfactory for the mandate as the objective is not to<br />
cover and protect entirely the area of operation but to<br />
provide safety to merchant ships and escort for the<br />
cargo of the World Food Program.<br />
As mentioned in previous updates, the pirates have<br />
proved ability to adapt very quickly to the situation.<br />
Attacks have been reported at 1000 nautical miles of<br />
the coast and underline that the pirates have<br />
significantly extended their area of operation.<br />
Questions have also been raised of whether the pirates<br />
might become increasingly violent in reaction to the<br />
pressure strains created by the EU mission.<br />
<strong>In</strong> regards to the legal dimension of incarceration and<br />
the judgment of captured pirates, HR/VP Ashton has<br />
announced her willingness to reinforce the current<br />
agreements established with the Seychelles and Kenya.<br />
<strong>In</strong>novation from the mission on this dimension has<br />
included taking Kenyan judges on board NAVFOR’s<br />
ships so that they can directly apply the Kenyan<br />
judicial procedures as soon as pirates are captured.<br />
EUFOR Althea - 2 December 2004 to 21 November<br />
2010<br />
On 25 January the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to<br />
extend EUFOR Althea activity with a non-executive<br />
military training mission. The mission should be seen<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010 <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, page 13
as an extension of the current mission and will provide<br />
training to the Bosnian armed forces. The number of<br />
personnel involved training will be of 200 taken from<br />
the currently deployed troops.<br />
The Council has also re-affirmed that the EU military<br />
mission will not lose its executive powers until the<br />
Office of the High Representative is closed. <strong>This</strong> is in<br />
turn linked to the fulfilment of the Bosnian<br />
Government to meet the five plus two agenda set by<br />
the Peace Implementation Council.<br />
Civilian /Military SSR<br />
EU SSR Guinea Bissau - 12 February 2008 to 30 May<br />
2010<br />
The EU mission continues to play its advisory role on<br />
SSR to the Guinea Bissauen Government. The EU is<br />
working on all the dimension of the security sector<br />
namely the police, the armed forces, and the justice<br />
system. There is positive feedback and a welcoming<br />
attitude form the President and the government is to<br />
pass a package of laws including the EU’s<br />
recommendations. The debate on the mission’s future<br />
is ongoing and the EU SSR is likely to stay on for<br />
about a year. The end goal will eventually be to<br />
transfer SSR activities to other EU and <strong>In</strong>ternational<br />
institutions, namely the Commission, the EEAS (when<br />
established) and the UN.<br />
EUSEC DR Congo - 1 July 2007 – 30 September 2010<br />
The EU security sector reform (SSR) work in Congo is<br />
being realized in a very complicated environment. The<br />
reforming of the Congolese army is a job to be<br />
achieved when an army is stationed and not deployed.<br />
However in the past four years the Congolese army has<br />
been deployed in the east and the equatorial regions of<br />
the country. Reform has been effective in some cases<br />
but there is feeling among the mission’s personnel that<br />
everything has to be restarted every six months as<br />
there is a constant change in the Congolese armed<br />
forces staff. <strong>In</strong> addition, another condition for<br />
achieving a successful SSR is for all the dimensions of<br />
the security sector to be addressed. <strong>This</strong> includes the<br />
armed forces, the police, the judicial system and the<br />
intelligence service. <strong>This</strong> is not the case in Congo.<br />
Furthermore, even if there are various other actors<br />
present on the ground such as the UN and EUPOL<br />
working on other aspects of the security sector than<br />
EUSEC, the limitation of the missions’ mandate<br />
restrains their ability to perform a real comprehensive<br />
reform of the security sector. <strong>This</strong> angle of analysis is<br />
directed at criticising the international missions, but to<br />
understand the extent of the work that needs to be<br />
achieved in the DRC. 1<br />
Furthermore a third condition to achieve a successful<br />
SSR is a clear will of the host country to undergo<br />
reform and this is not always the case with the<br />
Congolese Government. All these three negative<br />
dimensions therefore help us understand the lack of<br />
result on SSR in Congo.<br />
<strong>In</strong> October/November 2009, the mission supported<br />
FARDC in processing 20,000 new troops, (integrated<br />
from ex-rebels of CNDP and armed groups) in the<br />
Kivus and the three principle integration centres. As<br />
such, EUSEC is following its programme of<br />
prioritising the modernisation of the administrative<br />
procedures and EUSEC can pride itself on concrete<br />
achievements, especially on the chains of payment<br />
which has been implemented last year and continues.<br />
The work done included the provision of ID card to the<br />
army personnel facilitating payments of salaries. It has<br />
also successfully separated the chain of payment to the<br />
chain of commands which was essentially the root<br />
cause of the problem, as senior military created fake<br />
soldiers in their register in order to cash in the salary of<br />
these “ghost soldiers”.<br />
According to the Head of Mission, EUSEC is also<br />
engaged in re-establishing a training system whilst<br />
targeting an overall framework of reform. The main<br />
project for the mission mandate is to equip a training<br />
centre in Kitona, which aims to instil morale and allow<br />
for training in theory and military techniques<br />
(including infantry and artillery techniques) for 800<br />
officers.<br />
Regarding redress of violence against women and<br />
impunity, EUSEC is also striving to create better<br />
relations between the Congolese military and civil<br />
society. The mission has thus deployed detachments<br />
in five towns: Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani,<br />
Goma and Bukavu.<br />
Even so, capabilities remain a problem in EUSEC and<br />
the mission remains understaffed. <strong>This</strong> is especially<br />
linked to the fact that all the personnel working in the<br />
DRC needs to speak French, which therefore restricts<br />
the number of people who can apply for the job.<br />
Civilian SSR<br />
EUPOL RD Congo - 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010<br />
As in the case of EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL is facing<br />
serious capability shortage problems, there are<br />
currently 25 people deployed of the 47 pledged. The<br />
1 See http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_242_esdp&drcgender-report.pdf<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 14
CIVCOM is following up on the work done on the<br />
force generation process started by the Swedish<br />
Presidency in order to tackle that problem.<br />
The Head of Mission decided to deploy two teams of<br />
prosecutor and gender expert in the east of the country<br />
in order to fight gender based violence and impunity.<br />
He deemed it a necessary step for the legitimacy of the<br />
mission, as it is of utmost importance to fight such a<br />
large scale problem.<br />
Work within the “Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la<br />
Police » continues and the mission is satisfied by the<br />
legal package soon to be adopted by the Congolese<br />
Government.<br />
EUPOL Afghanistan - 30 May 2007 to 30 May 2010<br />
Following the last call for contribution for the EU<br />
Police Mission in Afghanistan, the Head of Mission,<br />
Kai Vittrup, expects the number of mission<br />
international personnel to rise to 325/350 by the end of<br />
March. Combined with some 170 local staff, this<br />
would bring the mission size to up to 520. There is<br />
also an additional 17.4 million euro for the period<br />
December 2009 - 30 May 2010. The London<br />
Conference on Afghanistan on 28 January called for an<br />
increase of the Afghan police numbers to 139,000.<br />
<strong>This</strong> has increased the workload on EUPOL<br />
significantly, however there is now a good and clear<br />
division of labour between the EU mission and the<br />
NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A)<br />
which should facilitate the training process.<br />
The provision of security to EUPOL’s personnel<br />
remains a difficult question and a formal agreement<br />
between EUPOL and NATO will prove hard to<br />
develop. The more likely to be achieved is a<br />
memorandum of understanding with the EU mission<br />
and ISAF. EUPOL will have to continue to rely on<br />
bilateral agreement with the Member States which<br />
control Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs). As<br />
mentioned in our previous update, the lack of security<br />
provision is the main hindering factor to EUPOL’s<br />
work as deployment to other provinces, which is a<br />
necessary condition to adequately fulfil its mandate.<br />
Security therefore remains one of the main obstacles to<br />
the mission work. <strong>In</strong> addition, finding accommodation<br />
for personnel is already hard for the mission where it is<br />
currently located and it would be even harder in other<br />
provinces. As far as equipment is concerned, EUPOL<br />
urgently needs armoured cars.<br />
The question of security has been even more central to<br />
the mission considering the Taliban’s attack of January<br />
20 which killed two Afghan Police and wounded two.<br />
The incident put into question the “ring of steel”<br />
security architecture designed by EUPOL of the<br />
Afghan capital, which until now, was deemed very<br />
secure.<br />
The strategy paper issued on policing by the Minister<br />
of <strong>In</strong>terior, Hanif Atmar, has been very helpful for<br />
EUPOL in order to focus its work and to allow the<br />
mission to expose and prove its added value. EUPOL<br />
has the support of the Minister Atmar and is now<br />
recognized by the US, (which was not the case<br />
previously) as a crucial player in the police training<br />
architecture in Afghanistan. Kai Vittrup has proved to<br />
really turn things around in positive way for EUPOL<br />
and this has substantially raised the mission’s profile<br />
among all the security actors in Afghanistan.<br />
The <strong>Europe</strong>an Parliament is preparing a report which<br />
notes the need to strengthen the institutional and<br />
administrative capacity of the Afghan State,<br />
particularly to structures beyond that of the police.<br />
<strong>In</strong>deed, judicial strengthening is badly needed,<br />
particularly when it comes to human rights and<br />
violation of women. <strong>In</strong> November 2009, the Council<br />
included human rights and gender mainstreaming as<br />
one of the six strategic priorities for EUPOL.<br />
Given the recent moves of Pakistan to assist in<br />
training, the Council of the EU is also exploring a<br />
possible EU SSR assistance mission to Pakistan<br />
possibly encompassing human rights, rule of law and<br />
counter-terrorism.<br />
EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories - 1 January<br />
2006 to 31 December 2010<br />
Paul Robert Kernaghan has been replaced by Henrik<br />
MALMQUIST On 1 January 2010 as Head of Mission<br />
for EUPOL COPPS. The mission is continuing to<br />
work on the consolidation between the police sector<br />
and the justice system.<br />
<strong>In</strong> addition, EUPOL COPPS has coordinated trainings<br />
of 6 Senior Prosecutors and 10 PCP <strong>In</strong>vestigation<br />
officers on Crime scene and Forensic Evidence. 2 The<br />
Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad supports the<br />
mission, but it is now time for the EU to rethink its<br />
activity and foster more cooperation between the<br />
CSDP mission and the Commission activity.<br />
EUPM Bosnia & Herzegovina - 1 January 2003 to 31<br />
December 2010<br />
The mission was restructured on 1 January 2010. The<br />
focus of the mission is now fighting organized crime<br />
2<br />
“Training Prosecutors, Palestinian Civil Police Officers in<br />
Germany”, 19 January 2010, WAFA Palestinian <strong>News</strong> Agency<br />
http://english.wafa.ps/?action=detail&id=13633<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 15
and corruption, but this process has gone slower than<br />
expected. The analytical capability of the mission has<br />
been hard to put in place, as the refocus of the mission<br />
entailed the replacement of personnel. The EU’s<br />
Political and Security Committee (PSC) had worked<br />
on the priorities of the Concept of Operations<br />
(CONOPS) to make them as operable as possible.<br />
However, it is currently too soon to assess the<br />
mission’s work.<br />
As in the case of Kosovo, working on corruption and<br />
organized crime is a sensitive subject as it might<br />
incriminate people within the government. <strong>This</strong> is in<br />
turn might affect the government perception of the<br />
mission and result in a lack of cooperation. Add to this<br />
the growing frustration from the population and the<br />
government toward the international presence in<br />
Bosnia & Herzegovina.<br />
Civilian<br />
EUJUST-LEX Iraq – 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010<br />
On 1 January 2010 EUJUST-LEX took on a new Head<br />
of Mission after the retirement of Stephen White. The<br />
new Head, a colonel in the Spanish Guardia Civil -<br />
Francisco Díaz Alcantud, took up his post in January<br />
2010. The pilot phase of in-land training (involving 18<br />
projects) will be ending in Spring and the PSC will<br />
then make an evaluation of training on Iraqi soil and<br />
issue recommendations. There is division among<br />
Member States on continuing such training, however<br />
training in Brussels will continue and the mission is<br />
likely to be extended.<br />
The positive dimension of in-land training is that the<br />
mission can follow up with previous participants who<br />
provide their impression on whether the teaching is<br />
trickling down in the institutions. Current feedback has<br />
been positive, but it still hard to have a correct idea on<br />
the matter.<br />
The communication of the mission has also improved,<br />
notably with an easy access to information on the<br />
numbers of trained on the mission website 3 – being :<br />
111 Iraqis have undertaken training courses, 21 have<br />
undertaken work experience secondments and 2975<br />
Iraqi Senior Criminal Justice Officials have been<br />
trained.<br />
EULEX Kosovo – 15 June 2008 to 15 June 2010<br />
The recent developments in Kosovo have underlined<br />
that Serbia continues to support the Kosovo Serbs.<br />
Even though EULEX and Belgrade has signed the<br />
3 See the EUJUST-LEX Council webpage:<br />
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=823&lang=EN<br />
Police Protocol Agreement in 2009, suggesting a<br />
certain form of understanding between the EU and<br />
Serbia, 30 Serbian judges will be sent in the north of<br />
Kosovo in order to establish alternative tribunals.<br />
EULEX has to make the Serbian authorities<br />
understand that dealing with the Kosovo Serbs is not to<br />
be done outside of an independent Kosovo context.<br />
EULEX must begin work on the sensitive topic of<br />
corruption and organized crime. <strong>This</strong> is likely to be the<br />
mission’s most difficult task, as working on the issue<br />
is likely to incriminate Kosovar politicians with whom<br />
EULEX is working with today. Corruption is<br />
widespread in Kosovo and certain politicians are<br />
suspected of being directly involved in organized<br />
crime. Confronting these issues might reduce<br />
Pristina’s support to EULEX, a situation which the EU<br />
cannot afford, as legitimacy is of utmost importance in<br />
order to achieve its mandate and in turn, stability in the<br />
region.<br />
Border missions<br />
Feature - Georgia<br />
EUMM Georgia – 15 September 2008 to 15<br />
September 2010<br />
Following the outbreak of violence between Georgia<br />
and Russia on the 7 August 2008, the EU Monitoring<br />
Mission (EUMM) was established to monitor the<br />
implementation of the 12 August and 8 September<br />
2008 ceasefire agreements. The Mission was deemed a<br />
success because it successfully managed to stabilize<br />
the situation and EUMM was also praised for its<br />
rapidity of deployment. However, at first the<br />
deployment was deemed problematic as both first and<br />
second pillar actors were rushed into the conflict for<br />
assessment, planning and establishment of<br />
humanitarian and security mechanisms. <strong>In</strong> addition to<br />
the crowded environment, the mission faced practical<br />
capability challenges which its capacity to fulfill its<br />
mandate. 4<br />
The mission mandate includes the stabilization and<br />
normalization of the situation in the conflict zone, to<br />
play the role of confidence builder and to gather<br />
information. The mission is also charged to ensure the<br />
respect of human rights and humanitarian law by all<br />
parties.<br />
Currently the mission has to deal with an extremely<br />
complex situation. Since Russia has recognized the<br />
4 See Fisher S. “EUMM Georgia” in Grevi G., Helly D., Keohane<br />
D. (Eds.), <strong>Europe</strong>an Security and Defence Policy<br />
– The First Ten Years”, <strong>Europe</strong>an Union <strong>In</strong>stitute for Security<br />
Studies (Paris 2009), page 386-387<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 16
independence of the breakaway region, the Kremlin<br />
denies the access of the mission to South Ossetia and<br />
Abkhazia. The litigious dimension of the six point<br />
agreement is the definition of the territory of Georgia.<br />
The EU and the vast majority of the <strong>In</strong>ternational<br />
Community still recognize the breakaway regions as<br />
part of Georgia. <strong>This</strong> is not the case for Russia which<br />
has recognized their independence. <strong>In</strong> here lies the<br />
entire problem for EUMM. Thus far the mission has<br />
only been able to enter the breakaway region once and<br />
for a brief amount of time in the context of the <strong>In</strong>cident<br />
Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). To<br />
counter the lack of accessibility, Ambassador Haven,<br />
the Head of Mission of EUMM, has called for<br />
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to be used to<br />
monitor the breakaway region by air.<br />
As the mission cannot implement its mandate in the<br />
separatist regions, its role of confidence builder is<br />
hindered, but the most alarming feature is that the<br />
mission remains unable to investigate the Georgian<br />
claims of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia.<br />
As part of its confidence builder and stabilization<br />
roles, EUMM frequently calls for the use of the IPRM<br />
and plays an active role in linked investigations. The<br />
IPRM is a mechanism providing for meetings between<br />
the concerned parties’ authorities to discuss and solve<br />
issues threatening the security and stability in the<br />
region. The Georgians however accuse the breakaway<br />
region of manipulating the IPRM through falsification<br />
of facts and wrongful accusation of Georgian abuse of<br />
the ceasefire agreement. 5 The same accusations are<br />
flying on both sides and meetings are often skipped by<br />
the breakaway representatives. There are therefore<br />
doubts growing on the viability of the IPRT. The most<br />
recent incident which the mission has been<br />
investigating has been the arrest of a South Ossetian<br />
man – Mr. Pliev - by the Georgian police. The<br />
Georgian authorities claim that Mr. Pliev was carrying<br />
an automatic weapon and hand grenades. On the other<br />
hand, reports from the South Ossetian administrative<br />
authorities stated that Mr. Pliev was abducted by the<br />
Georgian Police at his home. 6 As aforementioned,<br />
EUMM entered South Ossetia for the first time and has<br />
since been working on resolving the issue, working<br />
with both sides to liberate Mr Pliev. <strong>In</strong> addition, the<br />
mission has called for the people who cross the<br />
administrative border to not be processed through the<br />
justice apparatus but rather through the administrative<br />
system.<br />
5 <strong>In</strong>terview with a Georgian Official<br />
6 Hunt K. F. “EU Monitors in South Ossetia Regarding<br />
Detention”, Impunity Watch Report, 7 January 2010, Impunity<br />
Watch. Available at:<br />
http://www.impunitywatch.net/impunity_watch_europe/2010/01/eu<br />
-monitors-in-south-ossetia-regarding-detention.html<br />
Although EUMM has entered for the first time South<br />
Ossetia since its establishment (in work with the Pliev<br />
investigation), this should not be seen as sign of<br />
opening up of the region. A communiqué was issued<br />
by the South Ossetian authorities underlining clearly<br />
that the entrance of EUMM in the breakaway region<br />
was an “exception” and it would only allow the EU<br />
mission to investigate the Pliev case. 7<br />
It is important to underline that the mission can only<br />
contribute minimally to the long term stabilization in<br />
Georgia. For that, one has to look at the Geneva talks<br />
and their development, and as far as the negotiations<br />
are concerned, there have been very few positive<br />
developments. <strong>This</strong> in turn raises the question of the<br />
resolution of the conflict and also on the exit-strategy<br />
of the EU mission.<br />
EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova -1 December 2005 to 30<br />
November 2011<br />
Recently the Ukrainian and Moldovan security<br />
services met for the third time in order to exchange<br />
information and deepen cooperation for fighting illegal<br />
migration and the smuggling of goods. <strong>This</strong> re-affirms<br />
both governments will to establish efficient and<br />
transparent border control authorities.<br />
On 1 December 2009 the mission entered a new phase<br />
of exercise (phase 7) after achieving the goals set out<br />
by the previous phase. Phase 7 emphasises on capacity<br />
building and the past months have been marked by the<br />
creation of the “capacity building unit”. The unit<br />
provides extensive and specific training to the<br />
personnel of the partner countries’ (Ukraine and<br />
Moldova) border teams. Activities includes among<br />
other, technical training of the use of infra-red<br />
cameras.<br />
EUBAM issued the Common Border Security<br />
Assessment Report, to which the partner countries<br />
contributed. <strong>This</strong> is a positive step forward, as their<br />
inclusion will ultimately contribute to building the<br />
partner’s ownership of such assessment procedures of<br />
their own border control policies.<br />
EUBAM continues to work on the Targeted<br />
Monitoring Actions (TMA) and the latest launched has<br />
been the Pre-arrival <strong>In</strong>formation System (PIS). <strong>This</strong><br />
procedure is designed to decrease the workload at<br />
borders and rendering the check procedure faster by<br />
centralising the vetting procedure prior to arrival at the<br />
border post. The PIS has been evaluated by the<br />
mission, which ascertained that that there are still<br />
minor problems on implementation interpretation by<br />
the partners. However, the PIS has been received<br />
7 ibid.<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 17
positively by both Ukraine and Moldova and has<br />
proved to be very efficient.<br />
EUBAM initiatives on anti-corruption were<br />
agreed with the partner services. These include the<br />
implementation of pilot projects at two<br />
international border crossing points between the<br />
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine aimed at<br />
determination, introduction and monitoring of<br />
effectiveness of local level anti-corruption<br />
measures. Other imminent actions include surveys<br />
on integrity, implementation of a border crossing<br />
satisfaction survey, training on ethics and<br />
corruption, round table discussions for low and<br />
middle level management on the role and tasks of<br />
management in combating internal corruption and<br />
EUBAM involvement in monitoring and advising<br />
on corruption cases related to the Moldova-<br />
Ukraine state border.<br />
Recently the Heads of the Ukrainian and<br />
Moldovan security services and EUBAM met for<br />
the third time in order to review and deepen<br />
cooperation on border security issues. <strong>In</strong>formation<br />
and analytical data exchange has increased<br />
significantly. Joint analytical work on smuggling<br />
and illegal migration are cases in point.<br />
Cooperation with EU member states and<br />
international law enforcement agencies also<br />
increased.<br />
EUBAM has recently issued recommendations<br />
regarding the establishment of law enforcement<br />
procedures to be used by the partners. These<br />
recommendations call for providing step by step<br />
ownership by the partner of powers of interrogation<br />
and investigation as well as the ability of initiating<br />
criminal cases.<br />
EUSR BST Georgia - 1 September 2005 to 28<br />
February 2010<br />
No changes since last update. But as this mission is<br />
linked to the EU Special Representative, EUSR Pierre<br />
Morel, the mission will continue with the offices of the<br />
EUSR.<br />
EUBAM Rafah - 1 January 2006 to 24 May 2010<br />
No changes since last update.<br />
By Johann Herz, Programme Officer with Giji Gya,<br />
Executive Director, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong><br />
To subscribe to <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>’s mailing lists, please go to the “subscribe” on<br />
www.isis-europe.org<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 18
CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership<br />
www.csdpmap.eu<br />
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> established CSDP MAP in 2008, which has been designed to fill a gap and a niche by collating think tank,<br />
research institute, NGO, government and EU institutional work on CSDP into one-place. CSDP MAP now has 21<br />
partners across <strong>Europe</strong> and growing.<br />
CSDP MAP is particularly important with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The CSDP MAP<br />
webportal gives quick access and policy input on :<br />
Outline and chronological timeline of CSDP and EU missions. We see a shift in security and crisis<br />
management towards an increase in civilian crisis management with a human security and peacebuilding focus (12 of<br />
the current 14 CSDP and EU missions are “civilian”). <strong>This</strong> part of CSDP MAP gives direct access to EU documentation<br />
and policy, as well as partner analysis, figures and reports on CSDP missions.<br />
EU structure. One page, all the links. Council, Commission, EP, EU agencies - for anything related to the EU's<br />
External Relations (security and associated).<br />
Country analysis. Partners’ work and research in countries that have an EU mission present are provided, giving<br />
a broad and analytical view - from the perspective of Member States and stakeholders on the ground - as to the country<br />
and regional contexts.<br />
Thematics. <strong>This</strong> aspect of CSDP MAP provides links to research on various thematics involved in CSDP, amongst<br />
them: fragile states; early warning; conflict analysis & prevention; fact finding & assessment; structures & policies;<br />
financing; peacebuilding; sec-dev nexus; mediation; monitoring; R2P; human rights; gender; SSR; DDRRR; piracy;<br />
capacities & capabilities; civmil; lessons identified; oversight; private sector..... <strong>In</strong> particular, links with and coordination<br />
between the global actors involved in security, crisis management and peacebuilding – both internationally (i.e.<br />
synergies with UN and AU work); internally (NGOs and civil society) and transnationally (alliances with the EU and US<br />
through international bodies, as well as coalitions and through NATO).<br />
<strong>In</strong> the next phase of CSDP MAP, we will be developing:<br />
How military and civilian crisis management missions are affecting and perceived by those they are sent to assist.<br />
And whether these missions are actually effective for civilians, with input from the field.<br />
CSDP MAP partners as of February 2010<br />
CICS Bradford University, UK; Clingendael, the Netherlands; CMI, Finland; DCAF, Geneva; ECFR, UK; EGMONT,<br />
Belgium; EPC, Brussels; FRIDE, Spain; Fundacion Alternativas (OPEX), Spain; GRIP, Belgium; ICG, Brussels;<br />
<strong>In</strong>Compass <strong>In</strong>ternational, Madrid; IRIS, France; <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, Belgium; IFSH, Germany; IAI, Italy; Noref, Norway;<br />
SIPRI, Sweden; SWP, Germany; UNIDIR, Geneva; ZIF, Germany.<br />
For more information, please contact csdpmap@isis-europe.org or +32 2 230 7446<br />
Subscribe to updates from www.csdpmap.eu<br />
<strong>Europe</strong>an Security Review no. 48, February 2010, <strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> page 19
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> – chart and table of CSDP and EU missions – February 2010 – www.isis-europe.org<br />
Table 1 – Completed missions: There will be 13 completed CSDP and EU missions as at February 2010 (see below and chart for<br />
further details. Future updates available from www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding).<br />
Region Military Civil-Military<br />
assistance / Military<br />
coord. support<br />
Africa<br />
Balkans/<br />
Caucasus/<br />
East <strong>Europe</strong><br />
Asia<br />
Middle East<br />
- Artemis DRC<br />
- EUFOR RD<br />
Congo<br />
-EUFOR Tchad/RCA<br />
- CONCORDIA<br />
fYR of Macedonia<br />
- Support to AU<br />
AMIS Sudan<br />
- EUNAVCO Somalia<br />
Civil Police<br />
- EUPOL<br />
Kinshasa<br />
- EUPOL<br />
Proxima<br />
(fYR of Macedonia)<br />
- EUPAT<br />
(fYR o Macedonia)<br />
Civil Rule of<br />
Law<br />
- EUJUST<br />
THEMIS<br />
(Georgia)<br />
Civil-<br />
Military<br />
SSR<br />
Civil Border<br />
Civilian<br />
Monitoring<br />
- EUMM<br />
Western<br />
Balkans<br />
- AMM<br />
Monitoring<br />
Mission<br />
Planning<br />
- EUPT<br />
Kosovo<br />
Table 2 – Ongoing missions: As at February 2010, there will be 14 active CSDP and EU missions (6 in the Western Balkans, Caucasus<br />
and Eastern <strong>Europe</strong>; 3 in the Middle East; 1 in Central Asia; 4 in Africa) see below. <strong>In</strong> May, EUTM Somalia will increase the number of<br />
active missions to 15.<br />
Region Military Military<br />
coordination<br />
Africa<br />
Balkans/<br />
Caucasus/<br />
East <strong>Europe</strong><br />
Asia<br />
Middle East<br />
- EU NAVFOR<br />
Somalia<br />
- EUFOR Althea<br />
BiH<br />
support<br />
Civil Police<br />
- EUPOL RD<br />
Congo<br />
Civil Rule of<br />
Law<br />
CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership – portal at www.csdpmap.eu<br />
Civil-Military SSR Civil Border Civilian<br />
Monitoring<br />
- EUSEC RD<br />
Congo<br />
- EU SSR<br />
Guinea-Bissau<br />
-EUTM Somalia<br />
- EUPM BiH - EUSR BST<br />
Georgia<br />
- EULEX Kosovo<br />
- EUPOL<br />
Afghanistan<br />
- EUPOL COPPS<br />
Palestine<br />
- EUJUST-<br />
LEX Iraq<br />
- EUBAM<br />
Ukraine/<br />
Moldova<br />
- EU BAM<br />
Rafah<br />
- EUMM<br />
Georgia<br />
Planning
<strong>ISIS</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> – chart and table of CSDP and EU missions – February 2010 – www.isis-europe.org<br />
Chart of EU and CSDP missions to date, February 2010<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009<br />
2010 2011<br />
j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f f m a m j<br />
Greece Italy Ireland Netherlands Luxembourg<br />
UK<br />
Austria<br />
Finland<br />
Germany<br />
Portugal Slovenia France<br />
Cz Republic<br />
Sweden<br />
Spain<br />
Belgium<br />
Hungary<br />
* EU MM in Former Yugoslavia COMPLETED 31 December 2007<br />
EUPM BiH. Followed on from UN <strong>In</strong>tl Police Task Force in January 2003.<br />
extended to 31 December 2010<br />
CONCORDIA (1)<br />
(2)<br />
EUPOL PROXIMA<br />
suceeded by EUPAT<br />
EUJUST THEMIS Georgia Compl. 14/07/10<br />
EUFOR ALTHEA BiH (3)<br />
extended to 21 November 2010<br />
EUPOL Kinshasa --> suceeded by EUPOL RD Congo<br />
EUSEC RD Congo<br />
extended to 30 September 2010<br />
EUJUST LEX Iraq extended to 30 June 2010<br />
AMIS EU Supporting Action - Sudan COMPLETED 31 December 200<br />
AMM Aceh COMPLETED 15 Dec. 2006<br />
EUSR BST Georgia<br />
ext. 28/02/2010<br />
EU BAM Rafah<br />
ext 24/05/2010<br />
EU BAM Ukraine-Moldova<br />
extended to 30 November 2011<br />
EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories extended to 31 Dec 2010<br />
EUPAT (4)<br />
EUPT Kosovo<br />
(5)<br />
EUFOR RDC (6)<br />
EUPOL RD Congo<br />
extended to 30 June 2010<br />
EUPOL Afghanistan - mandated to 30 May 2010<br />
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Compl.15/03/09<br />
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau extended to 30 May 2010<br />
EULEX Kosovo - mandated to 15 Jun 2010<br />
EU MM Georgia ext. to 14 September 2010<br />
EUNAVCO (7)<br />
EU NAVFOR Somalia ext. to 12 December 2010<br />
EUTM Somalia<br />
j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f m a m j j a s o n d j f f m a m j<br />
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011<br />
CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership – portal at www.csdpmap.eu