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and corruption, but this process has gone slower than expected. The analytical capability of the mission has been hard to put in place, as the refocus of the mission entailed the replacement of personnel. The EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) had worked on the priorities of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to make them as operable as possible. However, it is currently too soon to assess the mission’s work. As in the case of Kosovo, working on corruption and organized crime is a sensitive subject as it might incriminate people within the government. This is in turn might affect the government perception of the mission and result in a lack of cooperation. Add to this the growing frustration from the population and the government toward the international presence in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Civilian EUJUST-LEX Iraq – 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010 On 1 January 2010 EUJUST-LEX took on a new Head of Mission after the retirement of Stephen White. The new Head, a colonel in the Spanish Guardia Civil - Francisco Díaz Alcantud, took up his post in January 2010. The pilot phase of in-land training (involving 18 projects) will be ending in Spring and the PSC will then make an evaluation of training on Iraqi soil and issue recommendations. There is division among Member States on continuing such training, however training in Brussels will continue and the mission is likely to be extended. The positive dimension of in-land training is that the mission can follow up with previous participants who provide their impression on whether the teaching is trickling down in the institutions. Current feedback has been positive, but it still hard to have a correct idea on the matter. The communication of the mission has also improved, notably with an easy access to information on the numbers of trained on the mission website 3 – being : 111 Iraqis have undertaken training courses, 21 have undertaken work experience secondments and 2975 Iraqi Senior Criminal Justice Officials have been trained. EULEX Kosovo – 15 June 2008 to 15 June 2010 The recent developments in Kosovo have underlined that Serbia continues to support the Kosovo Serbs. Even though EULEX and Belgrade has signed the 3 See the EUJUST-LEX Council webpage: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=823&lang=EN Police Protocol Agreement in 2009, suggesting a certain form of understanding between the EU and Serbia, 30 Serbian judges will be sent in the north of Kosovo in order to establish alternative tribunals. EULEX has to make the Serbian authorities understand that dealing with the Kosovo Serbs is not to be done outside of an independent Kosovo context. EULEX must begin work on the sensitive topic of corruption and organized crime. This is likely to be the mission’s most difficult task, as working on the issue is likely to incriminate Kosovar politicians with whom EULEX is working with today. Corruption is widespread in Kosovo and certain politicians are suspected of being directly involved in organized crime. Confronting these issues might reduce Pristina’s support to EULEX, a situation which the EU cannot afford, as legitimacy is of utmost importance in order to achieve its mandate and in turn, stability in the region. Border missions Feature - Georgia EUMM Georgia – 15 September 2008 to 15 September 2010 Following the outbreak of violence between Georgia and Russia on the 7 August 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was established to monitor the implementation of the 12 August and 8 September 2008 ceasefire agreements. The Mission was deemed a success because it successfully managed to stabilize the situation and EUMM was also praised for its rapidity of deployment. However, at first the deployment was deemed problematic as both first and second pillar actors were rushed into the conflict for assessment, planning and establishment of humanitarian and security mechanisms. In addition to the crowded environment, the mission faced practical capability challenges which its capacity to fulfill its mandate. 4 The mission mandate includes the stabilization and normalization of the situation in the conflict zone, to play the role of confidence builder and to gather information. The mission is also charged to ensure the respect of human rights and humanitarian law by all parties. Currently the mission has to deal with an extremely complex situation. Since Russia has recognized the 4 See Fisher S. “EUMM Georgia” in Grevi G., Helly D., Keohane D. (Eds.), European Security and Defence Policy – The First Ten Years”, European Union Institute for Security Studies (Paris 2009), page 386-387 European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe page 16
independence of the breakaway region, the Kremlin denies the access of the mission to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The litigious dimension of the six point agreement is the definition of the territory of Georgia. The EU and the vast majority of the International Community still recognize the breakaway regions as part of Georgia. This is not the case for Russia which has recognized their independence. In here lies the entire problem for EUMM. Thus far the mission has only been able to enter the breakaway region once and for a brief amount of time in the context of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). To counter the lack of accessibility, Ambassador Haven, the Head of Mission of EUMM, has called for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to be used to monitor the breakaway region by air. As the mission cannot implement its mandate in the separatist regions, its role of confidence builder is hindered, but the most alarming feature is that the mission remains unable to investigate the Georgian claims of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia. As part of its confidence builder and stabilization roles, EUMM frequently calls for the use of the IPRM and plays an active role in linked investigations. The IPRM is a mechanism providing for meetings between the concerned parties’ authorities to discuss and solve issues threatening the security and stability in the region. The Georgians however accuse the breakaway region of manipulating the IPRM through falsification of facts and wrongful accusation of Georgian abuse of the ceasefire agreement. 5 The same accusations are flying on both sides and meetings are often skipped by the breakaway representatives. There are therefore doubts growing on the viability of the IPRT. The most recent incident which the mission has been investigating has been the arrest of a South Ossetian man – Mr. Pliev - by the Georgian police. The Georgian authorities claim that Mr. Pliev was carrying an automatic weapon and hand grenades. On the other hand, reports from the South Ossetian administrative authorities stated that Mr. Pliev was abducted by the Georgian Police at his home. 6 As aforementioned, EUMM entered South Ossetia for the first time and has since been working on resolving the issue, working with both sides to liberate Mr Pliev. In addition, the mission has called for the people who cross the administrative border to not be processed through the justice apparatus but rather through the administrative system. 5 Interview with a Georgian Official 6 Hunt K. F. “EU Monitors in South Ossetia Regarding Detention”, Impunity Watch Report, 7 January 2010, Impunity Watch. Available at: http://www.impunitywatch.net/impunity_watch_europe/2010/01/eu -monitors-in-south-ossetia-regarding-detention.html Although EUMM has entered for the first time South Ossetia since its establishment (in work with the Pliev investigation), this should not be seen as sign of opening up of the region. A communiqué was issued by the South Ossetian authorities underlining clearly that the entrance of EUMM in the breakaway region was an “exception” and it would only allow the EU mission to investigate the Pliev case. 7 It is important to underline that the mission can only contribute minimally to the long term stabilization in Georgia. For that, one has to look at the Geneva talks and their development, and as far as the negotiations are concerned, there have been very few positive developments. This in turn raises the question of the resolution of the conflict and also on the exit-strategy of the EU mission. EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova -1 December 2005 to 30 November 2011 Recently the Ukrainian and Moldovan security services met for the third time in order to exchange information and deepen cooperation for fighting illegal migration and the smuggling of goods. This re-affirms both governments will to establish efficient and transparent border control authorities. On 1 December 2009 the mission entered a new phase of exercise (phase 7) after achieving the goals set out by the previous phase. Phase 7 emphasises on capacity building and the past months have been marked by the creation of the “capacity building unit”. The unit provides extensive and specific training to the personnel of the partner countries’ (Ukraine and Moldova) border teams. Activities includes among other, technical training of the use of infra-red cameras. EUBAM issued the Common Border Security Assessment Report, to which the partner countries contributed. This is a positive step forward, as their inclusion will ultimately contribute to building the partner’s ownership of such assessment procedures of their own border control policies. EUBAM continues to work on the Targeted Monitoring Actions (TMA) and the latest launched has been the Pre-arrival Information System (PIS). This procedure is designed to decrease the workload at borders and rendering the check procedure faster by centralising the vetting procedure prior to arrival at the border post. The PIS has been evaluated by the mission, which ascertained that that there are still minor problems on implementation interpretation by the partners. However, the PIS has been received 7 ibid. European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe page 17
Page 1 and 2: A news review of European Security
Page 3 and 4: The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Loo
Page 5 and 6: disarmament, and do so in a meaning
Page 7 and 8: evaluation of current policy and pr
Page 9 and 10: • Discussions in the NATO-Russia
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Page 13 and 14: CSDP and EU mission updates - Febru
Page 15: CIVCOM is following up on the work
Page 19 and 20: CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership w
Page 21: ISIS Europe - chart and table of CS

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