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The verification system, centred on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has over the decades strengthened significantly, both in formal procedures, and in the acquired collective experience of its practitioners. The growing adoption internationally of the Model Additional Protocol (AP) is a particularly positive development, since it expands the declaration a state must make to the IAEA of activities that might contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and broadens the agency’s right of access to verify the declaration. But while more than half of the states with safeguards agreements with the IAEA now also have APs in force, it is less encouraging that 30 NNWS parties to the NPT still do not have even comprehensive safeguards in place. Moreover, the AP is not in force in some key regions, including much of the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America. The challenges ahead Most observers at the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) regarded the results of this last preliminary meeting as largely positive, although that assessment had as much to do with the low bar that has been set for judging ‘success’ and the dismal failure of the 2005 RevCon. While no agreement could be reached on substantive recommendations, an agenda was adopted for the 2010 RevCon, something that was not achieved until the third week of the 2005 RevCon. The meeting was also notable for the largely professional and collegiate approach of delegations and the absence of rancour that had plagued past PrepComs. However, one of the major challenges at the RevCon will be in neutralising or sidelining the handful of NWS and NNWS that, on past experience, are likely to promote positions that stand no chance of gaining consensus. Uncompromising national positions in 2005, for example, as adopted by the US, France and Iran (in relation to past disarmament commitments) and Egypt (in relation to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East) contributed to the stalemate and had the effect of ending all prospects for agreement on substantive recommendations. Moreover, the wrangling over process and technicalities meant that there was little or no debate at the 2005 RevCon on vital non-proliferation issues, such as North Korea’s nuclear programme and its status under the NPT, or on serious nuclear trafficking incidents. review of the 'Programme of Action' known as the '13 practical steps towards global nuclear disarmament' agreed in 2000. These clearly achievable confidencebuilding measures and commitments were viewed at the time as an expression of the 'step-by-step' approach favoured by NWS, and as fulfilment of their pledge made at the previous 1995 review conference to advance nuclear disarmament – a pledge that enabled the historic consensus to indefinitely extend the NPT. These 13 steps remain central to the debate today because the failure to agree a Final Document at the 2005 RevCon means that they remain the most recent multilaterally agreed disarmament framework. Consideration of these steps was blocked at the 2005 RevCon, but it is unlikely that States Parties will allow this to continue indefinitely – and nor should they. Finding the critical points for progress For decades many States Parties have been willing to talk about the possibility of a nuclear-weapon free world without ever really believing that it is feasible, nor take the steps necessary to make it more possible. More pressing concerns in the Cold War prevented any significant breakthroughs, and the opportunities after the Cold War were largely squandered. NWS believed it was enough to reduce warhead numbers and wait to see what would come next. The ideology supportive of a new generation of nuclear weapons that arose within Washington in particular (but that also spread to the other NWS) was a particular blow to the possibilities of progress. Under the inspirational leadership of Barack Obama, however, a growing group of political leaders and mainstream ‘opinion shapers’ has been arguing that the current trends will inevitably lead to a world where the number of nuclear weapons states may grow to 25-30 in a few years, the concept of nuclear deterrence has little meaning, and the chances of non-state terrorist actors acquiring and using nuclear weapons grows apace. The historic bargain between the NWS and the NNWS to the NPT is now faced with both ‘breakout’ and declining legitimacy. It can be clearly demonstrated that the need is not only overwhelming and urgent, but that actions are practical and possible. Some of the dynamics for achieving NPT stability at the 2010 RevCon include: In the NWS’ camp, both France and China convey the view that they are very uncomfortable with the new US vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Getting these two countries (and the four outside of the NPT) to lend their support towards that objective is likely to be a major challenge. This situation may be exacerbated by the likely calls from NNWS for a Shared goal of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World (disarmament is the key). The NWS continue to try and legitimise their nuclear doctrines on the fraudulent grounds that their status is ‘recognised’ under the NPT. They know this to be a falsehood yet they blithely carry on regardless. This must change. All of the NWS should re-affirm their commitment to nuclear European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe, page 4
disarmament, and do so in a meaningful way that goes beyond paying lip service to Article VI. This might be achieved by setting out some initial tangible steps and, for those NWS that have not already done so, by announcing at the highest political level (president or prime minister) that a nuclear weapon-free world is a shared goal. RevCon and beyond. NNWS within alliances like NATO can no longer shelter under the nuclear umbrella provided by NWS and maintain the pretence that they are in good standing under the NPT. The current review of NATO’s Strategic Concept provides a golden opportunity for them to revise this outdated nuclear posture. 13 Credible commitments, agreed without coercion. There are no shortage of disarmament blueprints and plans, including those contained in: the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 2 ; the 2000 NPT Practical Steps for disarmament 3 ; draft recommendations of the 2009 NPT PrepCom 4 ; several UN General Assembly resolutions; UN Security Council Resolution 1887 5 ; the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for disarmament 6 ; reports of the WMD (Blix) Commission 7 and the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) 8 ; and proposals of civil society groups, campaigns, and initiatives, among them Global Zero 9 , the Nuclear Security Project 10 , the Middle Powers Initiative 11 and its Article VI Forum launched in the wake of the failed 2005 RevCon and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 12 . The 2010 RevCon has an opportunity to work to build consensus around a number of the priorities identified. In particular, discussion of the legal, technical, political and verification framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is long overdue and consideration should be given to placing the concept of a Nuclear Weapon Convention (NWC) onto the negotiating agenda. Supremacy of the NPT. The discriminatory nature of the NPT is further reinforced by declaratory statements in ‘other’ agreements seemingly taking precedence over the NPT, such as the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Until it is generally accepted that there are no opt-out clauses from the obligations of the NPT to actively pursue nuclear disarmament in ‘good faith’, as agreed in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, there will remain no prospect of progress at the 2010 2 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995- NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf 3 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/2000- NPT/pdf/FD-Part1and2.pdf 4 http://npsglobal.org/eng/images/stories/pdf/DraftRecomendations 080509.pdf 5 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm 6 http://www.apc.org.nz/pma/nuc5pnt08.pdf 7 http://www.wmdcommission.org/ 8 http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/contents.html 9 http://www.globalzero.org/ 10 http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org 11 http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/ 12 http://www.icanw.org/ Regular review of progress. Visibility is crucial. It is vital that the 2010 RevCon undertakes a full review of implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document. States Parties should not agree to any weakening of the disarmament commitments agreed in 2000, but since some of the13 steps have been overtaken by events, the RevCon should consider establishing an Article VI Compliance Committee to review next steps for implementing Article VI between now and the 2015 RevCon and establish a set of criteria for monitoring compliance. As a confidence building measure, the NWS should provide full and transparent reporting on their implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document (or any new or modified commitments arising from the RevCon in May), including a yearly review and ‘forward look’ of their disarmament commitments. Revitalising US-Russian and NATO-Russian cooperation. In some respects, more routine and meaningful nuclear non-proliferation cooperation took place between the Soviet Union and NATO during the Cold War than today. Greater use should be made of both the P-5 mechanism and the NATO-Russia Council to pursue parallel and coordinated action on non-proliferation policy and efforts to counter-nuclear terrorism, including improved sharing of information regarding illicit nuclear trafficking. If Washington and Moscow take seriously their pronouncements about combating nuclear terrorism, they should fashion greater cooperation in sharing sensitive but vital information, especially in providing the Office of Nuclear Security at the IAEA with timely forensics information about known illicit nuclear trafficking incidents. Strengthening the Review Process and NPT Institutional Reform. The NPT is arguably the weakest of the treaties governing ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) in terms of its institutional support. Further steps toward disarmament will eventually necessitate an institutional framework comparable to other treaty regimes governing WMD. At the 2010 RevCon states should give serious consideration to Canada’s earlier proposals for institutional reform, which could increase the quality of NPT deliberations and enable 13 See also article by Martin Butcher “NATO needs to emphasise the centrality of arms control”” in this ESR No. 48, February 2010. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_448_esr48-nato-armscontrol.pdf European Security Review no. 48, February 2010, ISIS Europe, page 5
Page 1 and 2: A news review of European Security
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Page 13 and 14: CSDP and EU mission updates - Febru
Page 15 and 16: CIVCOM is following up on the work
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Page 21: ISIS Europe - chart and table of CS

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