How to Think About Civilizations - The Watson Institute for ...

asic objects with which a theory or a research agenda operates; this is distinct from a
theory’s philosophical ontology, which pertains to the “hook-up” between the scientific
research and the world that she or he is investigating (Patomäki and Wight 2000:215).
Every theory presumes, even if only implicitly, both a philosophical and a scientific
ontology, and these presumptions act as world-disclosing grounds for subsequent
empirical claims (Habermas 1990:321). Such preconditions for sensible thought and
action within a given research community, which are often part of what John Searle
(1995) calls the “Background” of our dealings with the world, express the shared
presuppositions that members of the research community hold in common—and
precisely because they are shared and presupposed, they don’t have to be discussed
under normal circumstances. But philosophers, and by implication philosophicallyinclined
social scientists, aren’t operating in normal circumstances; the very artificiality
of a philosophical discussion allows the explicit consideration of what might otherwise
remain merely tacit. Ontology, both philosophical and scientific, can thus be
foregrounded in such discussions (Jackson 2008).
“Attributes” and “processes” are aspects of scientific ontology, and set the
parameters for how objects appear in a theory. An attribute-ontology treats objects as
collections of properties, held together at their core by some bare and propertyless
substantial existence, a dispositional “being-that” around which the object’s different
qualities are arranged. Properties that are essential to the object’s existence as the kind
of object that it is—properties close to its core—might be thought of as the object’s
“primary” properties, while other more contingent qualities might be thought of as
How to Think About Civilizations • P. T. Jackson • Page 10