UN Sanctions Reform - The Watson Institute for International Studies

WORKSHOP ON 

UN Sanctions Reform 

16-17 July 2004 

Sponsored by the Governments of 

SWITZERLAND, GERMANY & SWEDEN 

In Cooperation With The 

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT 

WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Workshop on UN Sanctions 16-17 July 2004 

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON UN SANCTIONS 2004 

Table of contents 

Executive summary……………………………………………………………………………..1 

1. Background and Objectives of the Workshop…………………………………………….. .2 

2. Expert Presentations………………………………………………………………………...4 

3. Summary of the Simulation Exercise……………………………………………………….8 

4. Advancing the Targeted Sanctions Agenda and Workshop Evaluation……………………13 

5. List of participants………………………………………………………………………….16 

Attachments: Simulation Exercise Parts 1 and 2


DISCLAIMER 

Those participating in this workshop did so in their individual and not institutional capacity. It 

was understood that views expressed by participants at the workshop were not representative of 

their Governments or organizations. While expert presentations only were recorded for future 

training purposes, Chatham House rules applied to all discussion sessions. 

The information contained in this report is presented as a summary of the discussions that 

occurred, observing this non-attribution policy. Further, the scenario presented during the 

workshop was created solely to engage participants in a discussion of the findings of the 

Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm Processes. The situation presented in the scenario 

exercise is fictional, and any resemblance between them and actual persons, authorities, entities 

or states is coincidental. 

The analysis presented here is the view of the researchers and is not necessarily endorsed by the 

Governments of Switzerland, Germany and Sweden, nor the United Nations Secretariat. 

Thomas J. Biersteker 

Sue E. Eckert 

Peter Romaniuk 

December, 2004 

Targeted Financial Sanctions Project 

Watson Institute for International Studies 

Box 1970 

Brown University 

Providence RI 02912 

Ph 401-863 2809 

Fax 401-863 1270 

Email: tfs@brown.edu 

www.watsoninstitute.org/tfs 

© Watson Institute for International Studies 2004


Executive Summary 

• Following the success of the May 2003 Workshop on UN Sanctions Reform, the 

Governments of Switzerland, Germany and Sweden sponsored the Workshop on UN 

Sanctions, held on 16-17 July 2004, and hosted by the Watson Institute for 

International Studies and Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. The 

workshop was attended by current and incoming members of the UN Security 

Council, and other interested Member States. 

• The objectives of this workshop were twofold: first, to introduce members of the UN 

Security Council – especially new members – to the sanctions reform initiatives 

undertaken in the previous six years (specifically, the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and 

Stockholm Processes), and; second, to reflect upon new developments in the 

application of targeted sanctions. 

• To achieve these objectives, the workshop featured presentations by academic and 

practitioner experts on sanctions. In their presentations, the experts commented that: 

- Subsequent to the sanctions reform processes, ongoing challenges in the design 

and implementation of targeted sanctions remain, e.g. in the development and 

maintenance of target lists, and in the targeting of non-state actors; 

- Targeted sanctions need to be integrated with other strategies if they are to be 

effective in dealing with transnational threats such as organized crime, drug 

trafficking, terrorism, and weapons proliferation; 

- The mandates of on-the-ground sanctions monitors need regularly revision to 

enable them to respond to evolving patterns of sanctions evasion; and 

- Experts serving on panels ought to be encouraged to observe robust 

methodological and evidentiary standards; their reports should be read along with 

other sources is determining further Council action. 

• In addition to the expert presentations, participants engaged in a Simulation Exercise, 

enabling them to apply the tools developed in the sanctions reform processes, and to 

reflect on recent developments in the use targeted sanctions by the Council. In the 

course of group and plenary discussion, participants raised the following ideas: 

- Beyond the sanctions reform processes, further work needs to be done to refine 

the use of targeted sanctions, e.g. enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of 

listing procedures, improving the capacity of Member States and sequencing the 

imposition of sanctions, in order to change the behavior of the target; and 

- More broadly, the role of sanctions in novel circumstances (such as in postconflict 

situations) and in response to different kinds of threats (such as 

transnational threats from non-state actors) needs further thought and discussion. 

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1. Background and Objectives of the Workshop 

Sanctions remain a vital tool of the Security Council in its effort to promote international 

peace and security. Because of the harmful effects of comprehensive sanctions on 

civilian populations, multilateral efforts have been underway since 1998 to refine the 

sanctions instrument to become both more effective against the intended targets and less 

injurious to innocent civilians. The governments of Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden 

have each sponsored a series of expert meetings and reports resulting in 

recommendations for reforms in the design and implementation of targeted sanctions. In 

1998 and 1999, the Swiss Government sponsored the Interlaken Process to explore the 

feasibility of targeted financial sanctions. The German Government hosted the Bonn- 

Berlin Process in 2000 focused on arms embargoes and travel and aviation-related 

sanctions. In 2002, the Stockholm Process gathered experts to address specific issues 

concerning the implementation of targeted sanctions, including recommendations for 

Sanctions Committees and Expert Panels, as well as measures to enhance Member States’ 

capacity to implement sanctions. 1 

While the manuals resulting from each process were disseminated to Security Council 

members upon their release, 2 organizers of the workshop recognized that new members 

of the Council and new staff in UN Missions did not participate in these discussions and 

therefore may not be familiar with these resources for drafting resolutions to impose and 

implement targeted sanctions. 

In May 2003, the first UN workshop on Sanctions Reform was organized at the Watson 

Institute for International Studies at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. 3 

Building on this success, on 16-17 July 2004, the Governments of Switzerland, Germany, 

and Sweden sponsored the second workshop on United Nations Sanctions, again hosted 

by the Watson Institute. The objectives of this workshop were twofold. First, to 

introduce members of the UN Security Council – especially new members – to the 

sanctions reform initiatives undertaken in the previous six years (specifically, the 

Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm Processes), and to provide an opportunity to 

utilize the resulting tools to assist Member States in the design and implementation of 

targeted sanctions. Second, the 2004 workshop explored new developments in the 

application of sanctions, allowing policymakers to reflect upon these innovations. 

To achieve these objectives, the workshop was designed to encourage dialogue and 

interaction among Mission staff, UN Secretariat staff, and sanctions experts, and to 

facilitate an informal exchange helpful for future multilateral sanctioning efforts, should 

they emerge. Participants included each of the fifteen Member States currently on the 

1 

2 

3 

Summaries of the processes are available in: Targeted Financial Sanctions Project (Watson 

Institute), “Background Paper on Targeted Sanctions,” Prepared for the Workshop on UN 

Sanctions, 16-17 July, 2004, available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/project_detail.cfm?id=4 

The Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin Manuals were presented to the Security Council in October 2001. 

The Stockholm Manual was presented to the Security Council in February 2003. 

“Report of the Workshop on UN Sanctions Reform,” Watson Institute for International Studies (2- 

3 May 2003). http://www.watsoninstitute.org/project_detail.cfm?id=4 

2


Security Council, as well as those joining the Council next year and other interested 

States. In addition, UN Secretariat staff and selected experts were invited to participate. 

For a complete list of participants, please see p. XX. 

Location and Format 

In light of previous experience organizing sanctions workshops with UN Missions and 

Secretariat staff, the Watson Institute hosted the meeting in Providence, Rhode Island. 

Approximately a three-hour train ride from New York, the venue provides an “off-site” 

environment conducive to informal exchanges comparable to other UN retreats, and 

permits an intensive, uninterrupted focus on the issues. Given the nature of the workshop, 

and based on feedback from past participants, the day and a half off-site format was 

chosen to maximize benefits and participation. 

The workshop opened with a plenary session featuring presentations by Professor Peter 

Wallensteen of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 

Joseph Stephanides, Director of the Security Council Affairs Division, Department of 

Political Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Alfred Fofie, UNMIL Director of Legal and 

Judiciary Systems Support Division and Alex Vines, Head of the Africa Programme at 

the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London. Their topics included an overview 

of the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm processes; new developments in the 

application of sanctions, including new directions in the use of targeted sanctions; 

sanctions on the ground in Liberia, and the role of expert panels in monitoring sanctions. 

Their presentations are summarized in Part 2 of this report. 

Following the opening plenary session, participants were introduced to the Simulation 

Exercise and divided into three working groups. The first part of the exercise encouraged 

participants to use the three sanctions reform manuals and to draw on components of 

recent UN Security Council resolutions. Participants received a hypothetical scenario 

concerning the fictitious war-torn country of Arcadia. In response, the groups were asked 

to complete a draft resolution, drawing upon the manuals in order to design effective 

targeted sanctions on Arcadian industry and actors. Each group later presented their draft 

resolutions. 

On the following day, participants received an update on the situation in Arcadia. 

Participants were asked to consider how to revise the targeted sanctions in response to 

changes on the ground. The working groups were asked specifically to respond to the 

establishment of a peace agreement by drafting a list of recommendations for revising the 

targeted sanctions regime. These results were presented and discussed later that morning 

when the groups came together for a closing session. A more detailed summary of the 

simulation exercise is provided in Part 3 of this report, and the full text of the scenario is 

provided in the attachments. 

Throughout the workshop, participants generated new ideas about the design and 

deployment of targeted sanctions. Nearly all participants agreed that the workshop 

helped to introduce them to new ways of thinking about sanctions. These contributions, 

3


as well as participants’ evaluations of the organizational aspects of the workshop, are 

summarized in Part 4. 

2. Expert Presentations 

To provide participants with an overview of the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm 

Processes, new directions in targeted sanctions, and a perspective of targeted sanctions 

“on the ground” in Liberia, three presentations were made. 

Peter Wallensteen 

Professor Wallensteen began his comments by emphasizing that sanctions are a primary 

tool the UNSC has at its disposal to ensure international peace and security. While the 

Council increasingly utilizes sanctions to manage crises, a lack of political will to 

continue engagement with nations after the sanctions are lifted remains problematic. 

Professor Wallensteen used the example of Haiti, where successful sanctions in 1994 

were followed by reduced assistance and a lack of international engagement, which led to 

a crisis situation ten years later. The UNSC needs to consider the entire sanctions process 

before committing to a sanctions regime. 

Following brief descriptions of the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm processes, 

Professor Wallensteen discussed some of the key challenges in formulating and 

implementing targeted sanctions. 

Regarding the formulation of targeted sanctions, Professor Wallensteen identified the 

development of target lists (where individuals are targeted) as critical in determining 

sanctions outcomes. Precision is required to ensure that sanctions are effective and do 

not cause any undue harm. Appropriate criteria for listing individuals and entities, and a 

clear process for delisting are important factors in this regard. Other challenges in 

formulating targeted sanctions include unique factors associated with non-state actors and 

commodities. 

Concerning implementation, Professor Wallensteen highlighted the dual necessities of 

political will and capacity on the part of Member States to implement the sanctions fully. 

In addition, there ought to be a reporting mechanism for each sanctions regime, to ensure 

compliance. Playing a supporting role, the Secretariat may require additional resources 

to process all of the information provided in Member State reports. 

The presentation concluded with Professor Wallensteen recalling that sanctions had only 

been used by the Security Council a total of 14 times since the end of the Cold War. In 

this same period, there have been more than 115 armed conflicts. Each crisis needs to be 

carefully evaluated to determine the likely effectiveness of sanctions. Professor 

Wallensteen stated that targeted sanctions were far more credible and functional than the 

sanctions regimes of the past and that even the threat of targeted sanctions was likely to 

be taken seriously by Member States. While sanctions remain a primary tool of the 

Security Council, there needs to be serious consideration of their formulation and 

4


implementation before they are imposed, as well as a sustained commitment to those 

States affected by the sanctions after they are lifted. 

In response to Professor Wallensteen’s comments participants expressed an interest in 

research that identified the kinds of crises for which sanctions would be an appropriate 

response. Participants further queried Professor Wallensteen if targeted sanctions had 

proven more effective when directed at state actors or non-state actors. Professor 

Wallensteen responded by stating that this had not been explored systematically: 

however, it was likely that state actors would be more affected because sanctions are 

designed to alter the political behavior of accountable actors concerned with norms and 

international reputation. In the course of the discussion, participants also noted recent 

work on a new methodology for undertaking humanitarian impact assessments developed 

by the governments of Canada and Switzerland, which promises to be a useful 

component of sanctions monitoring. 

Joseph Stephanides 

Mr. Stephanides began by citing Article 41 of the UN Charter to explain why the UN has 

utilized the tool of economic sanctions. He recalled the need for a credible threat that is 

more compelling than diplomatic pressure but does not entail the use of force to maintain 

peace and security in the world. He reiterated the UN Secretariat’s commitment to 

sanctions regimes and expressed his desire for sanctions to continue to be an effective 

policy instrument in the future. Targeted sanctions, however, cannot accomplish their 

goals if they are not complemented by other approaches and remedies. Therefore, they 

need to be integrated with other strategies, especially those designed to deal with serious 

transnational threats such as organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and weapons 

proliferation. 

Mr. Stephanides acknowledged that sanctions supporting states emerging from conflict 

with transitional governments is indeed a significant development in the evolution of 

sanctions, and recommended that the role of “facilitatative targeted sanctions” be 

explored further. He cautioned against overuse or relying too heavily upon shorthand 

terms, as identifying this trend too closely with facilitation could inadvertently result in 

more traditional uses of the instrument losing credibility. What is new about facilitative 

sanctions is that the purpose and the benchmarks for their lifting are not primarily 

focused on changing the behavior of a target, but rather ensuring that a nascent political 

entity achieves certain goals, thereby preventing the re-ignition of conflict. In addition, 

when the targeted entity has the support of the international community, sanctions are 

more likely to be seen as a means of strengthening rather than weakening 

In his presentation, Mr. Stephanides related recent developments in the use of sanctions, 

including delisting procedures and procedures for granting exemptions from asset 

freezes. Panel of Experts reports are important in verifying progress, and increased 

specificity and selectivity of all types of sanctions are proving helpful. Private sector 

engagement in the sanctions process could also increase the effectiveness of targeted 

sanctions. 

5


Mr. Stephanides closed by reminding the group that “smart sanctions,” even as they 

become more sophisticated, may not be enough to induce compliance and that other 

coercive measures may be needed to complement sanctions regimes. He concluded that 

the threat of sanctions as a form of preventive diplomacy was becoming more and more 

viable, as targeted sanctions regimes continued to experience success. 

Alfred Fofie 

Mr. Fofie’s presentation focused on two main themes: the current role of UNMIL in 

facilitating the monitoring and implementation of sanctions and how UNMIL’s mandate 

could be expanded to further strengthen the sanctions regime. The provisions of UNSCR 

1521 (2003) call for the reinforcement of an arms embargo on Liberia (with exceptions 

for UNMIL), the reimposition of a travel ban for those individuals listed by the Sanctions 

Committee, and the reimposition of sanctions on diamonds and timber. For the Security 

Council to consider lifting the sanctions, the transitional government of Liberia must 

meet certain targets regarding transparency and stability. 

Regarding UNMIL’s current monitoring activities, Mr. Fofie commented that UNMIL 

was continuing to deploy throughout the country, but had found no actionable evidence 

of illegal timber exports, diamond mining or travel ban violations. The monitoring 

activities undertaken by UNMIL are comprised of two parts. First, UNMIL provides 

general support for government efforts to monitor sanctions. Second, UNMIL’s mandate 

includes some specific monitoring tasks. These include assisting the transitional 

government in establishing authority throughout Liberia and ensuring proper use of 

natural resources. The combination of these two activities has allowed UNMIL to limit 

the conditions that have made sanctions busting possible in the past. 

Reflecting on UNMIL’s mandate, Mr. Fofie noted the significant limits to UNMIL’s role 

in the monitoring process. Most of the burden for monitoring is placed on the transitional 

government, which is both ill-equipped to deal with sanctions busting and lacks the 

political will to do so. With regard to travel bans, UNMIL is aware that some listed 

individuals do cross the border. But, as it lacks the appropriate mandate, UNMIL cannot 

stop these individuals from leaving the country. Mr. Fofie further stated that UNMIL has 

been asked to play a role in border control. The borders in West Africa are notoriously 

porous, creating a permissive environment for sanctions evasion. Currently, UNMIL 

lacks the mandate to take action when it observes sanctions busting in progress and must 

rely on the transitional government to respond. 

Mr. Fofie closed by recommending that the UN Security Council empower UNMIL to 

take action when sanctions-busting is observed, possibly through the establishment of a 

joint managing committee (JMC) that would allow UNMIL and the transitional 

government to mutually reinforce each other’s monitoring efforts. 

Alex Vines 

6


Mr. Vines discussed the Panels of Experts that are mandated to report on the effects of 

sanctions in targeted countries. Informed by his personal experience as a panelist, Mr. 

Vines made four main points regarding the effectiveness of Expert Panels and the 

subsequent use of the reports by sanctions committees and the Security Council. 

First, Mr. Vines stressed that political will on the part of Member States is necessary for 

effective Expert Panels. Great care and thought are needed in specifying each panel’s 

mandate, in order for the experts to have clarity about their mission. Further, mandates 

should have some flexibility to account for changes on the ground. 

Second, Mr. Vines discussed the staffing of the Expert Panels, which he characterized as 

a “prime responsibility of the Secretariat.” Geographic and ethnic factors are important 

considerations when determining the composition of a Panel of Experts. Also, the Panel 

should have both the technical expertise necessary for the mission and reflect the variety 

of perspectives within the UN. Creative tension among individual experts often improves 

the quality of reporting. In addition, Mr. Vines noted that the ad hoc nature of panel 

work should not preclude the recruitment of top experts to serve. Rather, a semipermanent 

capacity is needed to fill panels optimally, utilizing a rotation of individual 

experts among panels. In this way, new experts may be groomed using an understudy 

system. 

Third, regarding the challenges of gathering, using and storing data, Mr. Vines 

recommended that panels observe robust methodological and evidentiary standards. 

(Attaching primary documents as appendices is a useful approach here). The UN ought 

to archive all of the records used in Panel reports, including primary documents and the 

field notes of the Experts. Criteria may be established to permit the release of this 

information to the public. The realities of field work were discussed briefly, with Mr. 

Vines highlighting the amount of misinformation the Experts receive, including from the 

Member States of the Security Council. When working in the field, panels have moral 

authority only, derived from their commitment to independence and transparency. Under 

these conditions, information cannot be purchased. 

Finally, Mr. Vines cautioned that Panel of Expert reports should not be considered the 

final word on the topic. Experts are only a group of people employed to do a job. The 

evidence in the Reports needs to be considered along with other sources, such as NGO 

and press reports, and other country information. 

In response to Mr. Vines’ comments, participants placed Expert Panels in the broader 

context of sanctions enforcement and monitoring. Past approaches were raised in this 

regard. For example, the experience of the Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) in the 

Yugoslavia case is generally regarded positively. However, the use of SAMs in often 

hampered by the lack of resources and political will. Alternatively, the use of private 

sector monitors was regarded as a mixed experience by some. Here, it may be more 

feasible to use private sector experts as panel members. 

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3. Summary of Simulation Exercise 

For much of the workshop, participants were engaged in “learning by doing,” by taking 

part in a simulation exercise. The exercise was planned in two parts, in line with the 

goals of the workshop – familiarization with the three sanctions reform processes and 

reflection upon recent developments in the use of targeted sanctions. Participants were 

briefed on a simulated crisis in the country of Arcadia and, over the course of two days, 

were asked to consider the role of targeted sanctions in responding to that crisis as it 

evolved. To facilitate this, participants were divided into three working groups. Each 

group was assigned a discussion facilitator provided by the Watson Institute’s Targeted 

Sanctions Project. In addition to hard copies of the manuals (which were distributed at 

the workshop), discussions were aided by the use of technology. Specifically, each 

working group space featured a laptop and projector screen, operated by a research 

assistant. On each computer were preliminary copies of the “[Sanctions CD],” currently 

being developed by the Watson Institute. The CD contains the electronic versions of the 

three manuals, copies of the model text developed through each of the processes, as well 

as every Security Council resolution imposing targeted sanctions. 4 By using these tools, 

participants could draft interactively, and debate the text of past resolutions in light of the 

case at hand. Each working group nominated a spokesperson to present the working 

group discussions for a plenary session held at the conclusion of each day. The full text 

of the simulation exercise is provided in Attachments X and XX. The results are 

summarized below. 

Targeted sanctions and the response to violence in Arcadia 

At the commencement of the simulation exercise, participants were presented with a 

fictitious fact situation, involving the collapse of a peace accord and the re-escalation of 

conflict between government and rebel forces in the country of Arcadia (see Attachment 

X). They were informed that Member States of the Security Council were unanimous in 

believing that targeted sanctions were the appropriate response to the violations of human 

rights, and other grave abuses, occurring in the territory of Arcadia. Indeed, participants 

were given a partially drafted resolution (“Resolution 1713 (2006)”) and asked to 

conclude the drafting process by finalizing the operational paragraphs. In doing so, they 

were to decide which kinds of targeted sanctions to impose and how to enact these 

prohibitions, drawing directly upon the three sanctions reform manuals and recent 

Security Council resolutions. 

In response to the drafting exercise, each working group discussed a wide range of issues 

relating to the imposition of targeted sanctions on Arcadia, including the kinds of 

prohibitions to be imposed, the language to be used to craft the prohibitions, the 

challenges of enforcement, potential humanitarian impacts, other possible unintended 

consequences, procedures for listing and delisting, and questions regarding monitoring 

and assessment. Broadly, in completing Resolution 1713, each of the working groups 

utilized a range of targeted sanctions, including aviation and travel bans, a timber 

embargo, and financial assets freeze (NB: under the facts given in the simulation 

4 

For details regarding the distribution of the CD, please email tfs@brown.edu. 

8


exercise, an arms embargo was already in place on combatants within Arcadia). 

However, groups differed in the precise mix of measures to be imposed, citing diverse 

reasons for taking their various approaches. For example, one group shaped the 

imposition of prohibitions such as to maximize pressure on the parties, given their 

unwillingness to enter into a political process. A further group preferred the gradual 

intensification of measures, imposing targeted timber sanctions alone in Resolution 1713, 

and threatening to extend targeted sanctions to other sectors if the target’s behavior did 

not change. 

Recognizing timber as an essential source of revenue for both parties of the conflict, all 

three groups decided to impose timber embargoes. In reaching this decision, each of the 

groups scrutinized the economic, historic, and demographic information on Arcadia; in 

the end, each group was satisfied that the impact on civilians would be limited. As an 

additional safeguard, each of the resolutions that resulted from the working groups called 

for regular assessments of the humanitarian impact of such sanctions. In outlining further 

provisions for implementing the timber ban, however, one group called for tactical 

maritime assistance for enforcing the embargo, as well as the “naming and shaming” of 

corporations involved in the Arcadian timber trade. Two groups modeled their timber 

export bans on recent Security Council resolutions, 1478 (2003) and 1521 (2003). In one 

case, this included specifying a time limit for the embargo (ten-months). After this 

period the embargo would be reviewed, with the potential for extension. Working groups 

also discussed specific enforcement challenges, such as discerning timber originating in 

Arcadia from that harvested in neighboring Warwick. 

In addition to sanctions targeted upon the timber sector, the working groups debated the 

imposition of targeted sanctions on individuals, including travel bans and targeted 

financial sanctions. The approach to listing such individuals differed among working 

groups. Using language from the Interlaken manual, one group compiled an open list of 

targets for both a financial assets freeze and a travel ban. The group’s list included all of 

the principal actors described in the simulation fact situation, and their immediate family 

members. In another group, participants initially suggested targeting all members of the 

government, the rebels, and their respective supporters. But, on reflection, the group 

decided that it would be more feasible to limit the sanctions to senior government and 

rebel leaders, their families, and close associates. This group’s resolution contained an 

annex that listed targeted individuals and extended sanctions to “legal persons owned or 

controlled, directly or indirectly, by targeted individuals and entities listed in Annex A.” 

Their resolution also enabled the Sanctions Committee to add or remove individuals from 

the annex. The final group extended a travel ban and financial sanctions to those 

“obstructing and violating the measures of the peace process,” which included all rebel 

and government leaders involved in the fighting, although family members were not 

explicitly targeted. The matter of whether to target Arcadian President Rutherford 

Simmons drew each group into a lengthy discussion. His role in the scenario was 

ambiguous. While he had a constructive attitude toward peace talks, he lacked the ability 

to control government officials involved in abuses. For this latter reason, all groups 

decided to include Simmons among the government officials identified in any list of 

targeted individuals. Finally, all three groups decided that exemptions to the travel ban 

9


and assets freeze should be granted on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian purposes 

such as health care or participation in peace negotiations. 

Two groups called for an aviation ban on AirARMS, the airline of suspected arms-dealer, 

Paul Armstrong. Drawing on the Bonn-Berlin Manual, one such group decided that all 

states “shall take all measures to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in 

or overfly their territory if that aircraft is owned, leased, controlled or operated on behalf 

of AirARMS.” One group did not impose an aviation ban, instead relying on an assets 

freeze on Paul Armstrong to curtail the illicit activities of AirARMS. 

The groups’ final challenge was to devise methods to monitor and enforce the new 

targeted sanctions regime. Each group suggested engaging regional and international 

organizations and expanding the mandate of the UN Mission in Arcadia (UNMIA) to 

achieve this. In each group, the task of assessing the progress of the peace process and 

maintaining a watching brief on the utility of sanctions was delegated to the Sanctions 

Committee. One group also tasked the Committee with receiving reports on sanctions 

implementation from all member countries, and reporting any violations of the sanctions. 

A further group, using language from the Interlaken Manual, called for member states to 

provide support to the Committee towards these ends, for example, by notifying the 

Sanctions Committee of the actions of targeted persons or entities, and forwarding any 

relevant information to the Committee. In addition to the Committee, one group also 

called for the formation of a Sanctions Enforcement Team. 

While a Panel of Experts had been created in a prior resolution, one group expanded it to 

include appointees with experience in the new sanction areas. Further, this group 

directed the Panel to monitor the implementation of sanctions and offer recommendations 

for increasing the enforcement capabilities of Arcadia and its neighbors. In addition, the 

group requested that ECOSOC establish an ad hoc advisory group to assist in coping with 

all aspects of the crisis, including political issues, humanitarian problems, and 

reconstruction. In order to monitor the effects of the sanctions regime (especially 

humanitarian effects), another group requested quarterly reports from the UN Secretary 

General’s office. This group also decided to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts 

and request additional help from neighboring states in deploying Sanctions Assistance 

Missions (SAMs). Finally, members of the final group to present stressed the importance 

of stating that those responsible for the violent atrocities receive no impunity. The group 

discussed the possible role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) or an internationally 

supported fact-finding commission to investigate atrocities including, the deaths of 5,000 

Arcadians and 25 UN workers in a spate of violence in December 2005. 

The role of targeted sanctions in responding to changed facts on the ground 

On the second day of the workshop, participants were informed that 13 months had 

elapsed since the targeted sanctions they designed on the previous day had been imposed. 

On this basis, they were given a revised briefing (see Attachment XX), in the form of an 

Expert Panel Report on developments in Arcadia subsequent to the imposition of targeted 

sanctions. The most important development was the conclusion of a peace agreement, 

10


signed by both sides in the conflict. A national unity government, including both rebel 

and former government officials, had been formed, and was charged with preparing the 

country for elections. However, the Experts referred to evidence that all parties remained 

susceptible to the illegal extraction of Arcadian resources, and that there was no process 

to monitor Arcadia’s ex-combatants in this regard. In short, the threat to domestic and 

regional stability remained, so long as the former fighters now in government were not 

subject to rigorous oversight, especially in their dealings with the country’s natural 

resources. The working groups were asked to meet in an informal setting, to develop 

recommendations for a meeting of the Sanctions Committee that would follow. 

In response, all of the working groups agreed that the sanctions needed to be modified to 

reflect the new reality. But they also noted that most of the prohibitions should not be 

lifted immediately, in order to avoid a rapid increase in resources to former combatants 

and the (likely) resumption of the conflict. The groups also reached a consensus that the 

goals of the ongoing sanctions should be to provide all parties with an incentive to 

participate in the peace process and assure the stability and transparency of the new 

government. Two groups highlighted the need for any new resolution to include clear 

benchmarks for the lifting of sanctions, to ensure that all parties would benefit from 

progress toward peace. 

Without exception, the groups continued the arms ban until demobilization and 

disarmament were verified. In addition, each group decided to continue the timber ban 

until the new government had established transparency in the timber industry and was 

prepared to invest the profits from timber exports in the best interest of the people of 

Arcadia. One group granted a Panel of Experts 45 days to craft a certification scheme for 

Arcadian timber, which would enable the lifting of sanctions upon implementation. 

Another group called for the establishment of a joint timber commission within the 

Arcadian government, staffed by UN experts (including from UNMIA), Arcadian 

government officials, international timber experts, representatives of the international 

financial institutions, and regional development bodies. Until this commission was 

operative, this group decided, the Security Council could only allow limited exports from 

Arcadia, with the proceeds kept in a transparent escrow account to be used for 

humanitarian purposes. 

The groups also discussed how best to modify the travel ban. All groups lifted the travel 

ban for members of the new government, to permit travel on state business and in support 

of the peace process. However, all groups maintained the travel ban on individuals who 

continued to impose a threat to the peace process, such as arms dealer Paul Armstrong. 

Two groups also specifically tasked the Sanctions Committee to update immediately the 

targeting lists for both travel and financial sanctions to bring them into line with current 

developments. Both of the groups that imposed aviation bans on AirARMS maintained 

them without modification. 

There were two distinct approaches to lifting targeted financial sanctions. One group 

lifted these measures immediately for all members of the new government, though it 

maintained them for others (who continued to be listed for the travel ban). This group 

11


reasoned that the difficulty of enforcing the asset freeze in the new political environment 

made lifting the sanctions the most practical option, and that the return of assets to 

members of the government would reward them for their participation in the peace 

process. However, other groups thought that unfreezing these assets immediately could 

result in instability, e.g. access to financial resources might induce actors to defect from 

the peace process. These groups preferred not to release the frozen assets of members of 

the new government for this reason. Still, one of these groups limited the financial ban to 

those assets acquired in the past, permitting members of the new government to re-enter 

the financial system as a reward for participation in the peace process. Past funds would 

be released following democratic elections. 

Where assets remained frozen, groups debated how to manage these funds. The working 

groups independently agreed that a mechanism should exist to determine which frozen 

funds were illegally obtained. Illicit funds were “stolen from the people” and thus should 

be used for development and reconstruction in Arcadia, participants noted. One 

suggestion in this regard was that, following investigation, and given the successful 

completion of democratic elections, such funds could be turned over to the government. 

The groups also revised the mandate of the UN Mission in Arcadia, to play an effective 

supporting role in the reconstruction of Arcadia and the enforcement of the ongoing 

sanctions regime. All three groups extended UNMIA’s mandate to permit searches for 

materials (such as arms and timber) being traded in violation of the remaining sanctions, 

and to enable seizure of any illicit materials discovered. In addition, all three groups 

charged UNMIA with assisting the government with disarmament, demobilization and 

reintegration (DDR) and other tasks where UN authority and expertise was necessary. 

One group recast UNMIA as a peacekeeping force throughout the territory of Arcadia. 

Another group limited UNMIA’s mandate to focus on protecting UN and humanitarian 

workers in Arcadia, and monitoring Arcadia’s borders. 

Finally, the groups each developed ways to assist in the reconstruction and development 

of Arcadia. Each group proposed that the UN host a donor conference, where funds 

would be raised for reconstruction in Arcadia. In addition, two groups suggested that the 

UN should look to regional organizations, such as ASEAN and the Asian Development 

Bank, for leadership in the reconstruction of Arcadia. One group debated whether or not 

the UN was the best agency to direct the reconstruction of Arcadia when many other 

organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, usually have more influence in this area. 

This group concluded that the UN should consider establishing a standing body or agency 

to coordinate and direct reconstruction efforts. Another group suggested involving 

international financial institutions to facilitate debt relief. Lastly, one group 

recommended the establishment of a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to 

investigate the human rights abuses committed during the conflict and assist with the 

creation of a sustainable peace in Arcadia. The group suggested that the International 

Criminal Court could assist in bringing justice to Arcadia. 

12


4. Advancing the Targeted Sanctions Agenda and Workshop Evaluation 

At the conclusion of the workshop, participants were provided the opportunity to give 

feedback on the kinds of issues that would benefit from discussion in possible future 

workshops, in addition to assessing the success of the workshop in achieving the stated 

goals. Through a general plenary discussion and written evaluations, participants’ views 

were sought on the full range of substantive and administrative matters in planning the 

workshop. 

Continuing to advance our understanding of targeted sanctions: 

Substantive ideas for future discussion 

In the course of workshop discussions, and especially in the concluding plenary, 

presenters and participants raised a number of key substantive issues to be addressed in 

moving forward with the targeted sanctions agenda. These may be grouped under two 

headings: 

(1) Building on the sanctions reform processes to refine the targeted sanctions tool 

Participants all acknowledged the utility of the recommendations put forward as part of 

the sanctions reform processes. Indeed, many of the specific findings of the processes 

have been implemented in practice. However, participants also reflected that these 

recommendations are now up to five years old. The interceding period has revealed areas 

in which further refinements to the targeted sanctions tool are needed. For example, the 

effectiveness of current listing and delisting processes could be improved. Specifically, 

there may be a need to evaluate the kinds of information used to justify inclusion on lists, 

and the procedures for delisting. Regarding Expert Panels, there would be some benefit 

in analyzing the capability and utility of including humanitarian assessments in the 

experts’ mandates. Further, questions have emerged regarding the sequencing of 

sanctions measures. To improve leverage over the targets, multiple resolutions could be 

used in imposing different kinds of targeted sanctions (perhaps initiated with targeted 

financial sanctions, which require timely passage and implementation). In these and 

other areas, former targets of sanctions may be a useful source of information about the 

effects of sanctions. 

While new questions have arisen regarding the operation of targeted sanctions, others are 

enduring, suggesting that new ways of approaching issues be considered. For example, 

participants observed that the international community is yet to develop mechanisms to 

improve the capacity of Members States to implement targeted sanctions. 

(2) Targeted sanctions in an evolving political context 

Again pointing to the passage of time since the findings of the sanctions reform processes 

were published, participants noted that the broader context in which targeted sanctions 

are implemented has changed, giving rise to a number of novel challenges. For example, 

we have little experience in the role that targeted sanctions ought to play in considering 

13


multilateral approaches to “nation-building.” Often, the conclusion of a sanctions case 

marks the beginning of the nation-building process. In some of these cases, sanctions 

may retain an important role in that process. These links warrant further elaboration. 

Most broadly, the role of the Council and the UN in post-conflict situations requires 

closer examination. 

Importantly, a number of presenter and participants expressed the need to evaluate the 

role of sanctions (as part of broader strategies) in responding to non-state actors that pose 

transnational threats, whether by virtue of their involvement in transnational crime, 

terrorism, trafficking in WMD components, etc. These situations are becoming more 

prevalent (the inclusion of the figure of arms dealer Paul Armstrong pointed to these 

issues). 

Finally, since the conclusion of the sanctions reform processes, the international criminal 

court as come into being. Many participants suggested that the relationship between the 

imposition of sanctions and the new architecture for international justice warrants 

examination. 

Participants’ views on the organization of the workshop 

Twenty-nine participants submitted written evaluations concerning the organization of 

the workshop, answering both open-ended questions as well as rating aspects of the 

workshop on a one-to-ten scale (ten being the highest possible score). 

Overall, participants found the workshop to be valuable. Asked to evaluate how effective 

the workshop was at illuminating key issues, participants responded with an average 

score of 8.8. One participant found the workshop “very interesting and informative. As 

someone working in the field it was an eye-opener.” 

A primary goal of the workshop was to familiarize participants with the three reform 

processes and manuals. While some participants noted that they were “already familiar” 

with the manuals, almost all of the others (23 out of 25) agreed that the conference helped 

them gain more experience with these materials. One participant recommended taking 

the time to review the manuals in “greater detail,” while another felt that it was more 

important “to try to think beyond the existing resolutions on sanctions and to bring fresh 

new ideas to deal with sanctions.” 

Many participants noted that some of the greatest benefits of the workshop were 

“enhanced collegiality,” “interaction with colleagues in informal setting,” and 

“networking” opportunities. Similarly, participants stated that the expert presentations 

were a highlight of the workshop. One attendee wrote that, “It was extremely useful 

having someone like Mr. Alfred Fofie present. He was in a position to brief us on the 

implications of Council decisions for the situation on the ground.” Other attendees 

suggested inviting additional experts from the NGO community to provide further 

insights. 

14


The simulation exercise received a score of 8.3. Regarding the construction of the 

scenario, some participants expressed an interest in role-playing, or structuring the 

discussion in other ways. Suggestions include adding “two opposing sides in the group... 

regardless of one’s position on the hypothesis” or giving participants “mock instructions” 

and asking them to “defend a national position.” However, others praised the workshop 

for fostering an “objective approach ... far from the national background position” and 

stated that the “free and informal discussions allowed people to express their own views.” 

Another characterized the discussions as “frank and open.” 

Describing the value of the workshop for their future planning, participants wrote that it 

provided a “good incentive to for further in-depth involvement in sanctions” and was 

“excellent training for all members of the Security Council.” All participants agreed that 

they would be willing to attend another workshop. 

Regarding the workshop duration, a majority of participants (18 of 29) thought that a 

slightly longer amount of time might be devoted to the workshop. The remainder of 

participants considered the day and a half length of the conference to be satisfactory. 

The background paper and other support materials received a score of 8.6. The Watson 

Institute administrative support, facilities, and the food and accommodations, received 

scores of 9.8, 9.7 and 9.2 respectively. 

Suggestions for future workshops included ensuring that the target audience includes 

those with little or no training on sanctions issues. Further, regarding the simulation 

exercise, participants suggested using an existing resolution (or a past case) as the starting 

point, and integrating regional organizations more effectively. A number of participants 

agreed that simulation briefs (and the manuals themselves) should be mailed in advance 

of the workshop to permit participants a more considered response. Finally, numerous 

participants expressed interest in receiving copies of the “Sanctions CD” used during the 

exercise. 

15


5. List of Participants 

Hafrad Ali 

Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN 

Steve Avedon 

U.S. Department of the Treasury 

Thomas J. Biersteker 

Watson Institute 

Gregor Boventer 

Security Council Affairs Division 

UN Secretariat 

Charles-Henri Brosseau 

Permanent Mission of France to the UN 

Patrick Ang Chuasoto 

Permanent Mission of the Phillipines to the UN 

Javier Colomina 

Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN 

Sue Eckert 


Alfred Fofie 

United Nations Mission in Liberia 

16


Heinrich Haupt 

Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN 

Andrew Hillman 

Permanent Mission of the United States to the UN 

Zhao Jinming 

Permanent Mission of China to the UN 

Karen Johnson 

U.S. Department of State 

Kagyabukama Kiliba 

Permanent Mission of Tanzania to the UN 

Zaheer Laher 

Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN 

Andres Landerretche 

Permanent Mission of Chile to the UN 

Aleksandar Martinovic 



Gerard McGurk 

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the UN 

Gilda Motta Santos-Neves 

Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN 

Roxana Pana 

Permanent Mission of Romania to the UN 

Vassilis Papadopoulos 

Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN 

Robert Pollock 

HM Treasury, Financial Sanctions Unit 

United Kingdom 

Debra Price 

Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN 

Trine Rask Thygesen 

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN 

17


Peter Romaniuk 


Andrea Semadeni 

Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN 

Syed Haider Shah 

Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN 

Harsh Vardhan Shringla 

Permanent Mission of India to the UN 

Joseph Stephanides 



Jay Sutterlin 



Hiroshi Tajima 

Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN 

Joakim Vaverka 

Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN 

Alex Vines 

Africa Programme, Chatham House 

The Royal Institute of International Affairs 

United Kingdom 

Peter Wallensteen 

Department of Peace and Conflict Research 

Uppsala University 

Jean-Francis Zinsou 

Permanent Mission of Benin to the UN 

18


Introduction 

SIMULATION EXERCISE: PART 1 

TARGETED SANCTIONS AND THE RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN ARCADIA 

January, 2006: Beginning two months ago, there has been an alarming increase in the 

number of civilian and combatant casualties resulting from fighting between government 

and rebel forces in the small South East Asian country of Arcadia. Recent media reports 

indicate that the Revolutionary Brotherhood of Liberation (RBL), under rebel leader 

Andries van Dam, has advanced a violent offensive against government forces and 

suspected government sympathizers. In response, crack government troops, under the 

leadership of Rajiv Vohra (son-in-law of long time Arcadian President, Rutherford 

Simmons) have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis by pursuing a “zero tolerance” policy 

towards the rebels. In doing so, many innocent Arcadians have been killed, and many 

more displaced. Atrocities resulting from recent fighting have included the slaughter of 

over 5,000 villagers in a three day period and the violent deaths of 25 observers from the 

UN Mission in Arcadia (UNMIA) stationed nearby (UNMIA was first deployed in 2002 

in support of a now-defunct ceasefire agreement). While neither side has claimed 

responsibility for these fatalities, troops from both sides are known to have been active in 

the village in question. As these incidents attest, conflict has been particularly fierce in 

regions contiguous to the thickly forested rural areas of Arcadia, which have been 

plundered by both sides to capitalize on the lucrative trade in Arcadian timber. 

These events mark the final collapse of “Seekonk Ceasefire Accords” (SCA). Signed in 

2002, the SCA were designed as a prelude to a more comprehensive peace settlement. 

The Security Council commissioned UNMIA to monitor the implementation of the SCA. 

But war soon returned to Arcadia as the RBL used the brief period of peace to regroup 

and rearm. These developments contributed to the radicalization of opinion among 

government circles in the Arcadian capital, Woonsocket, with Vohra and Defense 

Minister Karen Newman gaining the ascendancy over domestic political rivals. Sporadic 

fire fights between government troops and the RBL soon escalated. Noting the return to 

violence, and faced with a regional refugee crisis as rural Arcadians fled their homes, the 

Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of Arcadia (resolution 1648 

(2004), reprinted in full below). With continued fighting, the comprehensive peace 

settlement has failed to materialize. The Member States of the Security Council are 

unanimous that a strong and effective response to these flagrant violations of human 

rights and the neutrality of UN observers is required. 

Political History of Arcadia 

Arcadia is a small country of just over 3 million people, on the Cumberland Peninsula in 

the Gulf of Thailand in South East Asia (see map below). Arcadia has few religious, 

cultural, and social divisions. Approximately 90% of the country is Christian, while most 

of the remainder practice indigenous beliefs. The Arcadians all speak the national 

language, a local dialect of English. Arcadia is a Member State of the United Nations, as 

are neighboring states. 

19


20


In spite of cultural similarities, rival political factions within Arcadia have maintained 

conflictual relations for most of its history. However, conflict has not always led to 

violence, as opposing groups have exchanged roles of domination and subordination. 

The earliest roots of conflict lie in opposing movements to overthrow or maintain British 

colonial rule. The anti-colonial movement eventually prevailed, as the United Kingdom 

granted independence to Arcadia on 1 January, 1970. Robert Zimmer, leader of the anticolonial 

movement, assumed the office of President in Woonsocket. Although prior to 

independence Robert Zimmer supported a draft constitution for Arcadia, once in power, 

President Zimmer suspended further work on the document and pursued an autocratic 

regime with a hand picked Parliament, rewarding those that had supported his movement 

and its home-grown leftist ideology. 

In the mid 1970s, President Zimmer sought to profit from Cold War rivalry. He turned to 

the Soviet Union to support the implementation of his collectivist policies. Soviet aid to 

Arcadia was maintained for more than a decade, finally ceasing in 1989. However, levels 

of assistance began to decrease in 1985 as Arcadian Economic Minister and Zimmer’s 

presumptive successor, Rutherford Simmons, privately (and later publicly) began 

exploring ways in which to open the Arcadian economy to the West. The growing 

disagreement between Simmons and the aging Zimmer was resolved in 1993 when 

Simmons orchestrated a coup, overthrowing Zimmer. 

On assuming the Presidency, Simmons elaborated a less radical platform. With the 

guidance of the international financial institutions, Simmons undertook the reform of 

both Arcadia’s political and economic systems, launching an “enrichment initiative” to 

encourage international investment in Arcadia and granting large logging concessions to 

multinational corporations. In doing so, Simmons, his family, and his close associates in 

the Woonsocket bureaucracy are known to have benefited personally from their 

investments in these MNCs. But Simmons also endeavored to institutionalize democratic 

processes and in 1995 presided over the nation’s first Presidential and Parliamentary 

elections (in which he was re-elected). 

Simmons’ ascent soon precipitated resistance. In line with historical divisions, the 

elections illuminated a growing rift between supporters of Simmons’s pro-West reforms 

and its opponents in the South. Especially in the province of Tiverton, opposition 

coalesced around Andries van Dam. The van Dam family had been prominent supporters 

of Zimmer and the anti-colonial movement. Building on this legacy, van Dam now 

mobilized the rural poor against Simmons’ reforms, inflaming already tense relations 

between the government and the outlying areas. It was in these areas that local 

economies were most affected by the reforms, as local farmers were once again forced 

into laboring jobs in resource extracting industries, especially in the timber sector. For 

many Tivertonian villagers, this mirrored the experience of their parents, who had been 

similarly displaced following the establishment of the colonial timber companies. 

Van Dam’s anti-Simmons, populist rhetoric precipitated violent confrontations. In 1998, 

van Dam formed the Revolutionary Brotherhood of Liberation, or RBL, which pursued 

21


violence systematically. RBL fighters expanded their territorial control from their 

stronghold in Tiverton; rebel tactics included murder and the burning of villages. 

Simmons’ response was initially minimalist. While he deployed barely enough 

government forces to hold RBL advances, he maintained publicly that overwhelming 

force was not needed and that he was prepared to enter into negotiations with van Dam. 

His commitment to this position attracted many critics. As van Dam repeatedly held out 

the promise of peace talks, pressure on Simmons to increase the use of force against the 

RBL increased and Woonsocket became more radicalized. All the while, the death toll 

on the government and RBL sides mounted and many Arcadians fled to neighboring 

countries (by 2000, some 800,000 Arcadians were resident in camps in Cranston, 

Warwick and Bristol). Recognizing the threat to regional security posed by these 

developments, the Security Council passed an exhortatory resolution in 1999 urging the 

rebels to undertake peace talks with the government. 

By 2002, Simmons’ patience appeared to bear fruit as the progress of RBL stalled. Faced 

with rising battlefield losses, van Dam joined President Simmons in Bristol’s capital, 

Seekonk, to discuss a cease-fire and the initiation of a peace process. The Seekonk 

negotiations initially succeeded in containing RBL controlled territory to Tiverton 

province, and both sides entered into a ceasefire, the “Seekonk Ceasefire Accords.” 

Under pressure from states in the region, Simmons permitted UN monitors to observe the 

implementation of the SCA in RBL-held territory. The Security Council passed a 

resolution in 2002 to deploy 1000 personnel as part of the United Nations Mission in 

Arcadia (UNMIA). 

While the accords yielded a short period of peace, van Dam soon returned to violence. 

The RBL offensive was particularly strong following the hiatus, suggesting that van Dam 

had used the occasion to replenish his supply of troops and armaments. Further, the 

presence of foreign (UN) observers on the ground was reminiscent of colonial rule from 

abroad for many rural Arcadians. As a consequence, van Dam and the RBL won many 

new converts. 

On the government side, Simmons had staked his reputation on the SCA. He now lacked 

credibility in Woonsocket. He informally ceded power over military affairs to a cadre of 

military advisers, many of whom had been critical of his initial approach, in private and 

in public. Chief among these were Karen Newman, the Minister of Defense, and Rajiv 

Vohra, an ambitious young military commander and son-in-law of Simmons, who headed 

a group of elite government forces. In contrast to Simmons’ moderation, Newman and 

Vohra opted for an aggressive military response. They doubled the number of 

government troops deployed in combat and reportedly issued the order to “take no 

prisoners” in retaking towns in RBL-friendly territory. 

Soon, widespread human rights abuses were being reported on both sides and the 

Security Council once again considered the matter. This time, the Council passed 

Resolution 1648 (attached in full, below). Resolution 1648 prohibits the sale of arms to 

all combatants in the territory of Arcadia. It also creates a sanctions committee to 

22


oversee the implementation of the resolution and provides for the creation of a panel of 

experts to explore the political and economic sources of the conflict. 

The Economy of Arcadia 

In recent years the economic chaos caused by the civil war resulted in a lack of GDP 

growth. However, it remains the case that, consistent with trends since colonization, the 

economy of Arcadia is heavily dependent on natural resources. According to the most 

recent estimates, Arcadia exports about $600 million of commodities annually. About 

70.5% of workers are involved in agriculture, mostly small-scale family farms. 10.8% are 

involved with providing services, and 4.5% work in industry. Arcadia’s most common 

exports are timber (which accounts for over 50% of total exports), iron ore, rubber, and 

coffee. Under Simmons, the two largest trading partners have been the United States and 

the European Union. Defense expenditures were 2.9% of GDP in 2002, the last year for 

which figures are available. 

Of particular interest is the role of the timber industry in the Arcadian conflict. Arcadia’s 

largest and most valuable export is tropical hardwood timber. As noted above, the 

Simmons years have been characterized by a general and non-specific suspicion that the 

President, his family and their associates within the Woonsocket bureaucracy have 

benefited personally from government deals to open Arcadian forests up to foreign timber 

companies. Indeed, President Simmons has always been able to marshal the numbers in 

the Arcadian Parliament to avoid an inquiry into a series of deals, over the course of a 

decade, granting large concessions to certain foreign firms. 

Analogously, van Dam has significant covert interests in Tivertonian timber. He has 

reportedly accumulated huge personal wealth, some of which is kept in a variety of 

offshore banks and is used for arms purchases and other RBL expenditures. Members of 

van Dam’s extended family, now dispersed throughout the region and the world, manage 

many of the offshore accounts. Former RBL combatants and sympathizers abroad 

maintain illicit timber and arms networks. Tellingly, van Dam’s cousin John is 

responsible for the security of Port Tiverton, where shipping activities are shrouded in 

secrecy. 

In particular, weapons seized by UNMIA indicate that international commodities trader 

and rogue transportation magnate, Paul Armstrong, may be instrumental in arranging 

shipments of arms to the RBL. Armstrong is thought to have utilized forged 

documentation to purchase arms in Europe and divert them from their stated destination 

to RBL-controlled territory. He operates from Thailand, where his airline, AirARMS, is 

based. AirARMS is believed to have been the carrier for most shipments of illegal 

weapons to RBL. Maritime authorities in neighboring countries have noted an increase 

in the activity of his small fleet of sea vessels in and around the Gulf of Thailand. 

23


Recent findings of the Expert Panel 

Pursuant to resolution 1648(2004), the first Panel of Experts report (completed in June 

2005) provided preliminary findings about the exploitation of natural resources by both 

government and rebel troops for personal enrichment and to fund the conflict. The 

second report (dated December 2005) has just been released. While the research for this 

report was mostly conducted prior to the recent escalation of the conflict, the report 

confirms that: 

• The RBL is harvesting timber in Tiverton in violation of Arcadian domestic law; 

• Timber revenues have been used by the RBL to acquire arms; 

• Armstrong is deeply implicated in both the export of RBL-harvested timber and the 

supply of arms to RBL: his planes and ships have been seen arriving in and departing 

from Tiverton; 

• Even prior to the recent implementation of the “zero tolerance” policy, the brutality of 

government forces, especially those of Rajiv Vohra, matches that of the rebels; 

• The personal interests of Arcadian officials (especially Newman and Vohra) in timber 

exploitation is more widespread than previously acknowledged (although the Panel is 

not able to confirm suspicions regarding Simmons’ involvement); 

• Elements of the Arcadian Armed Forces are harvesting timber outside of Tiverton in 

violation of Arcadian domestic laws; 

• Other, second tier commanders within the Arcadian Armed Forces are being offered 

timber concessions to reward military victories; 

• There is evidence that Newman and Vohra have endeavored to falsify end-user 

certificates and that future partnerships in logging operations have been used in an 

effort to induce cooperation from neighboring states; 

• Arcadian Air Force planes have been increasingly sighted in offshore locations. 

Instructions 

The Member States of the Security Council are unanimous that a strong and effective 

response to these flagrant violations of human rights and the neutrality of UN observers is 

required. Resolution 1713 is to impose targeted sanctions against parties involved in the 

conflict in Arcadia. That resolution is partially drafted (see attached), but a number of 

important issues remain to be decided. You are meeting to complete the drafting. In 

doing so, you may draw upon the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm Process 

manuals and past resolutions of the Security Council. Please address the following 

questions: 

24


• What specific kinds of targeted measures should be imposed? 

• Who precisely should be subject to these sanctions? 

• Under what conditions should exemptions to these prohibitions be permitted? 

• How should sanctions be monitored? 

• What kind of information about Member State implementation is required by the 

Sanctions Committee? 

25


Timeline of events in Arcadia 

1970 • Arcadia achieves independence from the United Kingdom 

• Robert Zimmer becomes first President of Arcadia on an anti-colonial, leftist 

platform. 

1974 • Zimmer successfully courts the Soviet Union to provide aid to Arcadia. 

1985 • Zimmer’s Economic Minister, Rutherford Simmons, begins exploring opportunities 

to open the Arcadian economy to the West. 

1989 • Soviet aid to Arcadia ceases. 

1993 • Rutherford Simmons orchestrates a coup to depose Zimmer. 

• Simmons elaborates wide ranging strategy for political and economic reform. 

1995 • Simmons elected President in Arcadia’s first Presidential ballot: Parliamentary 

elections also held for the first time. 

1998 • Andries van Dam capitalizes on discontent in rural Arcadia (especially the resource 

rich province of Tiverton) to found the Revolutionary Brotherhood of Liberation 

(RBL). 

• The RBL gains territorial control over the province of Tiverton seeks to advance. 

• Displaced Arcadian villagers begin to seek refuge in neighboring countries. 

• Simmons prefers a moderate response, resisting rebel advances and seeking 

negotiations with van Dam. 

1999 • The Security Council passes a resolution exhorting the rebels to negotiate. 

2002 • After years of sometimes intense fighting, van Dam finally agrees to negotiate. He 

and Simmons meet in Seekonk (the capital of Bristol and sign and ceasefire accord. 

• The “Seekonk Ceasefire Accords” are to be monitored by UN observers following 

the passage of a Security Council resolution that creates the UN Mission in Arcadia 

(UNMIA). 

2003 • Following a short period of peace, van Dam’s troops recommence military activity, 

again occupying Tiverton and seeking to advance towards Woonsocket. 

• In response, a cadre of Simmons’ advisers – including Karen Newman (Minister of 

Defense) and Rajiv Vohra (commander of elite forces) – assume decision-making 

power. They pursue an aggressive military response. 

• Reports emerge of widespread human rights abuses by both government and rebel 

forces. 

2004 • The Security Council passes resolution 1648 (2004), imposing an arms embargo on 

the territory of Arcadia, creating a sanctions committee and requesting that a panel of 

experts be formed to monitor the implementation of the embargo and its effects on 

the conflict in Arcadia. 

2005 • Successive expert reports show the extent to which government and rebel forces are 

exploiting the timber resources of Arcadia, for personal gain and to finance the 

rebellion. 

• The most recent reports indicate that both sides are targeting civilians and that 25 

UNMIA observers have been killed in brutal circumstances (although neither side 

has admitted responsibility for this). 

26

Draft 

UNITED 

NATIONS 

S 

Security Council 

Distr. 

GENERAL S/RES/1482 (2002) 

31 Oct. 2004 

ORIGINAL: 

ENGLISH 

RESOLUTION 1648 (2004) 

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5554th meeting, 

on 31 Oct. 2004 

The Security Council 

Recalling its earlier resolutions exhorting the Revolutionary Brotherhood of Liberation 

(RBL) to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict in Arcadia (1999), and creating the 

United Nations Mission in Arcadia (UNMIA) to oversee the implementation of the 

Seekonk Ceasefire Accords (2002), 

Condemning the ongoing violence in Arcadia, especially the killing of civilians, 

Deploring the violation of the Seekonk Ceasefire Accords by the RBL, 

Deploring the abandonment of a peaceful means of resolving the conflict by the 

Government of Arcadia, 

Underscoring that both parties to the conflict are jointly responsible for the refugee and 

humanitarian crisis in the region affecting neighboring states, 

Encouraging all sides to disarm and resume talks towards a ceasefire and peace 

settlement, 

Noting that the situation in Arcadia constitutes a threat to international peace and 

security, 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

27

Draft 

1. Welcomes UNMIA’s readiness to report to the Security Council regularly on the 

movements of armed groups in Arcadia and on information concerning arms supply to 

them and; demands that all parties provide full access to UNMIA observers, including in 

ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings; 

2. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or 

indirect supply, sale or transfer, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their 

flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and any related materiel, and the provision of any 

assistance, advice or training related to military activities, to all armed groups and 

militias operating in the territory of Arcadia; 

3. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 

Committee of the Security Council consisting of all members of the Council (the 

Committee), to undertake the following tasks: 

(a) To seek from all States, and particularly those in the region, information regarding 

the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 2; 

(b) To examine, and to take appropriate action on, information concerning alleged 

violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 and information on alleged arms 

flows, identifying where possible individual and legal entities reported to be engaged in 

such violations, as well as aircraft or other vehicles used; 

(c) To present regular reports to the Council on its work, with its observations and 

recommendations, in particular on the ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the 

measures imposed by paragraph 2; 

4. Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to report to the Committee, within 

sixty days from the date of adoption of this resolution, on the actions they have taken to 

implement the measures imposed by paragraph 2, and authorizes the Committee 

thereafter to request from Member States whatever further information it may consider 

necessary; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to create, within 

thirty days from the date of adoption of this resolution, and for a period expiring on 31 

December 2005, a group of experts consisting of no more than four members (the Group 

of experts), having the necessary skills to perform the following mandate: 

(a) To examine and analyze information gathered by UNMIA in the context of its 

monitoring mandate; 

(b) To gather and analyze all relevant information in Arcadia, countries of the region 

and, as necessary, in other countries, in cooperation with the governments of those 

countries, in relation to flows of arms and related materiel, as well as networks operating 

in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2; 

28

Draft 

(c) To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities 

of States interested, in particular those of the region, to ensure the measures imposed by 

paragraph 2 are effectively implemented; 

(d) To report to the Council in writing before 31 June 2005 and 31 December 2005, 

through the Committee, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2; 

(e) To keep the Committee frequently updated on its activities; 

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 

29

Draft 

UNITED 

NATIONS 

S 

Security Council 

Distr. 

GENERAL S/RES/1482 (2002) 

XX Jan. 2006 

ORIGINAL: 

ENGLISH 

RESOLUTION 1713 (2006) 

Adopted by the Security Council at its XXXth meeting, 

on XX Jan. 2006 

The Security Council 

Recalling its earlier resolutions exhorting the Revolutionary Brotherhood of Liberation 

(RBL) to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict in Arcadia (1999), and creating the 

United Nations Mission in Arcadia (UNMIA) to oversee the implementation of the 

Seekonk Ceasefire Accords (2002), 

Expressing serious concern that the combatants have taken measures to breach the arms 

embargo on the territory of Arcadia imposed by the Council with resolution 1648 (2004), 

as noted in reports by the Panel of Experts created pursuant to that resolution, 

Condemning the ongoing violence in Arcadia, especially the killing of civilians, 

Strongly condemning the recent increase in fatalities resulting from violence in Arcadia, 

including the targeting of UNMIA personnel, 

Deploring the violation of the Seekonk Ceasefire Accords by the RBL and the 

abandonment of a peaceful means of resolving the conflict by the Government of 

Arcadia, 

Underscoring that both parties to the conflict are jointly responsible for the refugee and 

humanitarian crisis in the region affecting neighboring states, 

30

Draft 

Recognizing the linkages between the exploitation of natural resources, especially timber, 

the illicit trade in such resources, and the fuelling and exacerbation of the conflict in 

Arcadia, 

Demanding that all sides disarm and resume talks towards a ceasefire and peace 

settlement, 

Noting that the situation in Arcadia constitutes a threat to international peace and 

security, 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

A 

1. Reaffirms that the measures imposed in paragraph 2 of resolution 1648 (2004) apply to 

all sales or supply of arms and related materiel destined for any recipient in Arcadia, 

including all non-State actors, such as the RBL, and all militias and armed groups 

associated with the Government of Arcadia; 

2. Strongly encourages all Member States to review existing procedures to implement 

paragraph 2 of resolution 1648 (2004), including customs and border control measures, 

and appropriate penalties for violations of the arms embargo; 

3. Further decides that … OPTIONS FOR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS: 

Prohibitions (Sanctions to be imposed and against whom) 

• financial sanctions (e.g. see Interlaken Manual, pp. 11-18) 

• travel ban (e.g. see Bonn-Berlin Manual, pp. 49-53) 

• aviation ban (e.g. see Bonn-Berlin Manual, pp. 73-75) 

B 

• commodity sanctions (e.g. operative paragraphs of past Security Council resolutions, 

such as resolution 1173 (1998), resolution 1343 (2001), resolution 1478 (2003) and 

resolution 1521 (2003)) 

Exemptions: 

• Exemptions to measures imposed (e.g. see Interlaken Manual, pp. 19-22; Bonn-Berlin 

Manual, pp. 31-32, 55, 76) 

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Draft 

Sanctions Committee: 

• Tasks to the sanctions committee (e.g. see Interlaken Manual, pp. 24-27; Bonn-Berlin 

Manual, pp. 32-34, 55-60, 77-80; Stockholm Manual, pp. 24-26) 

• Member States reporting on their implementation of measures imposed (e.g. see 

Interlaken Manual, pp. 31-32; Bonn-Berlin Manual, pp. 34-36, 60-61, 81-82; 

Stockholm Manual, pp. 130-132) 

Monitoring 

• Mechanism (such as a panel of experts) to assess the impact of sanctions (e.g. see 

Interlaken Manual, pp. 34-38; Stockholm Manual, pp. 38-39, 46-48) 

C 

X. Decides that the measures imposed in sections A and B above are established for 12 

months from the date of adoption of this resolution, unless otherwise decided, and that, at 

the end of this period, the Council will review the position, assess progress towards a 

ceasefire and peace settlement, and decide accordingly whether to continue these 

measures or impose new measures; 

X. Calls upon international, regional, sub-regional, and all other organizations, to act 

strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution and to cooperate fully with the 

Committee established by paragraph X above in the fulfillment of its tasks, including 

supplying such information as may be required by them in pursuance of this resolution; 

X. Stresses the obligation of all States to comply fully with the measures contained in 

sections A and B above and emphasizes that non-compliance with those measures 

constitutes a violation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations; 

X. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 

32

Draft 

SIMULATION EXERCISE: PART 2 

TARGETED SANCTIONS AND THE RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN ARCADIA 

S/2007/29 

Annex 

Letter dated 17 February 2007 from the Chairman of the Panel of 

Experts on Arcadia addressed to the Chairman of the Security 

Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1713 (2006) 

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts on Arcadia, we have the 

honour to enclose the report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with 

Security Council resolution 1713 (2006). 

Panel of Experts on Arcadia 

(signed) John Eng-Wong (Singapore) 

Chairman 

(signed) Erica Suuberg (Finland) 

(signed) Armando Bengochea (Brazil) 

(signed) Omafume Afolobi (Nigeria) 

Summary 

1. Arcadia is a troubled country, but recent developments give cause for optimism. 

Most critically, the All-Encompassing Peace Agreement signed at Newport in 

Warwick (the “Newport Agreement”) represents the foundations upon which the civil 

war in Arcadia can be resolved, and stability, prosperity and good government 

returned to the country. 

2. The signing of the Newport Agreement is a welcome event, especially in so far as it 

establishes the National Unity Government in Arcadia (the “NU Government”), 

comprising members of Revolutionary Brotherhood of Liberation (RBL) and the 

Government of Arcadia. 

3. The Newport Agreement calls for the NU Government to work toward the 

establishment of peace and security before elections tentatively scheduled for late 

next year. The NU Government is led by President Richard Besdine, the consensus 

choice of all parties to the Agreement. President Besdine is widely respected in 

Arcadia for his efforts to bring an end to the civil conflict and his refusal to support 

violent action by either the government or the rebels. Besdine is advised and assisted 

by a dozen Ministers of State, half appointed by the former government and half by 

RBL. 

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4. The successful conclusion of the Newport Agreement follows a long and bitter civil 

war. Conflict in Arcadia, which began in 1998, pitted the forces of Rutherford 

Simmons’ government against the (RBL), led by Andries van Dam. In 2002, the 

warring parties agreed to a cease fire during a meeting in the capital of neighboring 

Bristol. The United Nations Mission in Arcadia (UNMIA) was established to 

monitor the ceasefire. However, the ceasefire quickly broke down, and violence soon 

reached new heights. By December 2003, it became clear that deaths at the hands of 

the warring parties were rising and UNMIA observers were being targeted by 

combatants. 

5. The Security Council responded decisively. With resolution 1713 (2006), the 

Council imposed targeted sanctions on certain parties involved in the conflict in 

Arcadia. These measures had discernable effects in that they succeeded in bringing 

the warring parties to the table to conclude the Newport Agreement. 

6. Though welcome, the Newport Agreement faces significant challenges. While most 

of the principal actors in the civil war have left Arcadia, key members of the NU 

Government have been directly implicated in resource exploitation in order to wage 

conflict, and in sanctions evasion. Across many levels of government, and among 

non-State actors, massive stealing, looting and extraction of pay-offs has been 

ongoing. Further, there remains no process to monitor Arcadia’s main ports, airports 

and border crossings. 

7. For these reasons, the Panel strongly discourages the immediate removal of sanctions 

currently in place. Given that the rationale for sanctions has been to reduce conflict 

and restore order in Arcadia, sanctions should remain in effect until it can be 

demonstrated that their removal will not further conflict. 

8. In making this recommendation, the Panel is mindful of the severity of the 

humanitarian crisis gripping Arcadia. However, while Arcadia needs revenue, under 

current conditions, the lack of transparency and accountability makes it impossible to 

determine whether revenue (e.g. from the timber industry) will be used to further 

conflict. 

9. The Panel recommends that the legal basis of the sanctions be revised and should 

remain in place until: the Government of Arcadia is able to demonstrate transparency 

and accountability to the majority of Arcadians; the refugee crisis is resolved; 

disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants is 

fully complete; the Arcadian forestry sector achieves the standards of good 

governance and; a democratically elected government is in place. 

10. Given the need to bring lasting peace and security to Arcadia, the Panel notes the 

importance of verifying that any such conditions imposed by the Security Council be 

met. 

34

Draft 

Instructions 

In anticipation of a formal sanctions committee meeting to discuss recent developments 

in Arcadia (especially the importance of reinforcing the Newport Agreement), an 

informal group of experts will convene Saturday morning to explore new measures in 

response to the changed situation. The goal of this informal meeting is to develop 

guidance to inform the drafting of the necessary follow-up resolution on the situation in 

Arcadia. The issues to be explored include the following: 

• How should the existing sanctions be adapted to reflect the changed situation on the 

ground? 

• What sanctions should remain? 

• What are the criteria for lifting or suspending any remaining sanctions, and when and 

how should this be done? 

• How should the humanitarian and economic effects of any remaining sanctions, as 

well as their affect on refugee repatriation, be monitored and addressed? (Is there a 

role for UNMIA here?) 

• If the criteria for lifting all sanctions were met, is there an ongoing role for the 

Council in ensuring the return to peace and stability in Arcadia? 

• What other measures (including positive inducements) can be employed to help 

solidify the political developments? 

35

UN Sanctions Reform - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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