UN Sanctions Reform - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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Workshop on UN Sanctions 16-17 July 2004 signed by both sides in the conflict. A national unity government, including both rebel and former government officials, had been formed, and was charged with preparing the country for elections. However, the Experts referred to evidence that all parties remained susceptible to the illegal extraction of Arcadian resources, and that there was no process to monitor Arcadia’s ex-combatants in this regard. In short, the threat to domestic and regional stability remained, so long as the former fighters now in government were not subject to rigorous oversight, especially in their dealings with the country’s natural resources. The working groups were asked to meet in an informal setting, to develop recommendations for a meeting of the Sanctions Committee that would follow. In response, all of the working groups agreed that the sanctions needed to be modified to reflect the new reality. But they also noted that most of the prohibitions should not be lifted immediately, in order to avoid a rapid increase in resources to former combatants and the (likely) resumption of the conflict. The groups also reached a consensus that the goals of the ongoing sanctions should be to provide all parties with an incentive to participate in the peace process and assure the stability and transparency of the new government. Two groups highlighted the need for any new resolution to include clear benchmarks for the lifting of sanctions, to ensure that all parties would benefit from progress toward peace. Without exception, the groups continued the arms ban until demobilization and disarmament were verified. In addition, each group decided to continue the timber ban until the new government had established transparency in the timber industry and was prepared to invest the profits from timber exports in the best interest of the people of Arcadia. One group granted a Panel of Experts 45 days to craft a certification scheme for Arcadian timber, which would enable the lifting of sanctions upon implementation. Another group called for the establishment of a joint timber commission within the Arcadian government, staffed by UN experts (including from UNMIA), Arcadian government officials, international timber experts, representatives of the international financial institutions, and regional development bodies. Until this commission was operative, this group decided, the Security Council could only allow limited exports from Arcadia, with the proceeds kept in a transparent escrow account to be used for humanitarian purposes. The groups also discussed how best to modify the travel ban. All groups lifted the travel ban for members of the new government, to permit travel on state business and in support of the peace process. However, all groups maintained the travel ban on individuals who continued to impose a threat to the peace process, such as arms dealer Paul Armstrong. Two groups also specifically tasked the Sanctions Committee to update immediately the targeting lists for both travel and financial sanctions to bring them into line with current developments. Both of the groups that imposed aviation bans on AirARMS maintained them without modification. There were two distinct approaches to lifting targeted financial sanctions. One group lifted these measures immediately for all members of the new government, though it maintained them for others (who continued to be listed for the travel ban). This group 11
Workshop on UN Sanctions 16-17 July 2004 reasoned that the difficulty of enforcing the asset freeze in the new political environment made lifting the sanctions the most practical option, and that the return of assets to members of the government would reward them for their participation in the peace process. However, other groups thought that unfreezing these assets immediately could result in instability, e.g. access to financial resources might induce actors to defect from the peace process. These groups preferred not to release the frozen assets of members of the new government for this reason. Still, one of these groups limited the financial ban to those assets acquired in the past, permitting members of the new government to re-enter the financial system as a reward for participation in the peace process. Past funds would be released following democratic elections. Where assets remained frozen, groups debated how to manage these funds. The working groups independently agreed that a mechanism should exist to determine which frozen funds were illegally obtained. Illicit funds were “stolen from the people” and thus should be used for development and reconstruction in Arcadia, participants noted. One suggestion in this regard was that, following investigation, and given the successful completion of democratic elections, such funds could be turned over to the government. The groups also revised the mandate of the UN Mission in Arcadia, to play an effective supporting role in the reconstruction of Arcadia and the enforcement of the ongoing sanctions regime. All three groups extended UNMIA’s mandate to permit searches for materials (such as arms and timber) being traded in violation of the remaining sanctions, and to enable seizure of any illicit materials discovered. In addition, all three groups charged UNMIA with assisting the government with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and other tasks where UN authority and expertise was necessary. One group recast UNMIA as a peacekeeping force throughout the territory of Arcadia. Another group limited UNMIA’s mandate to focus on protecting UN and humanitarian workers in Arcadia, and monitoring Arcadia’s borders. Finally, the groups each developed ways to assist in the reconstruction and development of Arcadia. Each group proposed that the UN host a donor conference, where funds would be raised for reconstruction in Arcadia. In addition, two groups suggested that the UN should look to regional organizations, such as ASEAN and the Asian Development Bank, for leadership in the reconstruction of Arcadia. One group debated whether or not the UN was the best agency to direct the reconstruction of Arcadia when many other organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, usually have more influence in this area. This group concluded that the UN should consider establishing a standing body or agency to coordinate and direct reconstruction efforts. Another group suggested involving international financial institutions to facilitate debt relief. Lastly, one group recommended the establishment of a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to investigate the human rights abuses committed during the conflict and assist with the creation of a sustainable peace in Arcadia. The group suggested that the International Criminal Court could assist in bringing justice to Arcadia. 12
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UN Sanctions Reform - The Watson Institute for International Studies

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