indonesian economic decolonization in regional and ... - kitlv

Indonesian economic decolonization in regional and international perspective 11
Indonesia in 1956, more than 80 per cent of the debt had in fact been paid off
(Dick et al. 2002:170-2).
The point of departure in the contribution by Marks is whether
Independence indeed formed a turning point in the long-term economic
growth performance of former colonies. He applies a three-layered analysis,
considering respectively the relationship in general between decolonization
and economic growth, the experiences of selected former colonies in Asia and
developments in the interisland shipping industry in Indonesia shortly after
Independence. He argues that Independence and decolonization had a direct
positive impact on economic growth in India, Malaysia and the Philippines,
whereas the first couple of decades immediately following Independence in
Indonesia failed to produce a significant break with the growth record of the
colonial period. Indonesia remains a ‘special case’, reaffirming the author’s
hypothesis, derived from the international literature, that decolonization and
rapid economic growth are only positively correlated to one another under
specific circumstances.
Economic disruption and political turmoil during the Revolution and the
late 1950s up to the establishment of the New Order government in the mid-
1960s explain why Indonesia became a ‘special case’ in the international comparison
carried out by Marks. He uses data concerning the shipping concern
KPM in the 1950s as evidence of the ‘institutional damage’ which precluded a
positive correlation between decolonization and sustained economic growth.
As a corollary, he ascribes the extreme predicament of the Indonesian economy
in the mid-1960s to the preceding disruption, including the expulsion of
Dutch firms in the late 1950s. In doing so, he presents an alternative view to
the one argued by Lindblad in the same volume, which testifies to the scope
for debate in historical discourse.
The idea is common that the Dutch companies in Indonesia engineered
their own demise by being so ill-prepared to ‘indigenize’ management and
respond adequately to the economic aspirations of the newly independent
nation. This issue is taken up by Jasper van de Kerkhof, in his comparison
of Dutch and British corporate strategies in Indonesia and Malaysia (British
Malaya up to 1957). Neighbouring Malaysia makes an interesting case for
comparison, since it is generally acknowledged that economic decolonization
there proceeded much more smoothly and less detrimental for post-colonial
economic development. Van de Kerkhof’s findings show that great care
should be taken when making such generalizations. British firms in Malaysia
were equally reluctant to vacate their privileged position and ‘indigenize’ top
management.
British and Dutch firms both took active steps to ‘indigenize’ the lower
ranks of their corporation, but they found it equally difficult to appoint
well-educated and capable Malay and Indonesian managers into the higher