indonesian economic decolonization in regional and ... - kitlv

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12 J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post echelons of the companies’ hierarchy. This leads Van de Kerkhof to conclude that it was not so much the attitudes and strategies of Dutch and British firms that caused the differences, but rather the institutional surroundings of the countries and the ideological outlook of political leadership. In Malaysia, full economic decolonization was arguably only achieved when the New Economic Policy was put into effect in the 1970s. A final assessment This may not be the final word on how economic decolonization took place in Indonesia. It is an account among several, focusing on the unique features of the process as it unfolded. The contributions selected for this volume underscore that it was more difficult to achieve economic as opposed to political decolonization. The process was a highly complex one, extending over a considerable period and involving a variety of sometimes conflicting agents and interest groups, with many regional variations. It was not just a matter of one Indonesian side versus one Dutch side, as has so often been portrayed in the literature on the birth of the Indonesian state. A large number of competing groups (military, pragmatic politicians, indigenous businessmen, economic nationalists, radical socialists, communists, peasant organizations and urban workers’ committees) all had a say in the process, and each influenced the legal (and sometimes illegal) transfer of Dutch corporate assets into Indonesian hands in its own way. On the Dutch side, the interests of the large trading corporations on occasion conflicted with the interests of Dutch planters, whereas the political course chosen in the home country increasingly reflected other priorities than those of private Dutch companies remaining in operation in Indonesia. Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese, finally, occupied a very special position in the economy, alternately being lumped together with prime targets of emancipation from colonialism and materially benefitting from the transfer of management of economic resources. Moreover, to complicate matters, economic decolonization was not just a bilateral affair between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Unlike political decolonization, which only involved mother country and former colony, economic decolonization was influenced also by other foreign economic interests in Indonesia, notably American and Japanese investment and trading relations. The international dimension brings us back to the three preconditions that needed to be fulfilled by a newly independent nation in order to fully participate in the worldwide economic boom of the post-war period, that is a well-functioning private business sector, a capable bureaucracy and access to capital and know-how. At first sight, the record appears very disappointing. Capabilities of domestic private business were still insufficient, the state
Indonesian economic decolonization in regional and international perspective 13 administrative apparatus was not renowned for efficiency and cooperation with private capital from the former colonizing power was brutally cut off. Such a record easily lends support to the idea that Indonesia’s long-term economic performance was adversely affected by the way in which economic decolonization was accomplished. For a fuller understanding of the process and its outcome, we also need to take into consideration some of the complexities highlighted in this volume. The colonial legacy shouldered an extraordinary burden on the new nationstate at a time of rapidly rising expectations. Nevertheless, domestic business thrived to an appreciable extent and Indonesia benefitted, at any rate initially, from the boom in world trade with its favourable market prospects for chief export commodities leaving Indonesia. Economic pragmatism of the early and mid-1950s appeared to strike an acceptable balance between nationalist aspirations and the insistence on what is commonly understood as sound management of economic resources. This balance was lost in the late 1950s, when highest priority was given to the political aspirations of gaining full control over the economy at virtually any cost. Even so, the accelerated transfer of management may not necessarily have had an adverse effect on economic performance in the long run. The overall impression of the Sukarno era (1945-1966), including economic decolonization, remains unduly coloured by the near-collapse of the economy and the regime’s cataclysmic conclusion in the mid-1960s. Historians are fond of speculating about the counterfactual, an exercise that may be aided by looking at comparable situations elsewhere. Could economic decolonization have taken the same peaceful course as in for instance Malaysia, India or the Philippines? The answer is probably no, considering the colonial legacy, the struggle for acknowledgement of political independence and the increasing polarization in politics in Indonesia itself during the 1950s. Could the Dutch government and remaining private Dutch enterprises have done more to smooth the process? It is by no means certain that other policies would have made much of a difference. However, the unresolved conflict about western New Guinea did develop into a formidable obstacle to compromises by either side and may arguably have prematurely caused such radical measures as nationalization. At the same time, the Dutch enterprises lost much goodwill because of the meagre achievements in terms of Indonesianisasi, thus becoming easy scapegoats for everything that was going wrong in the explosive situation of acute crisis that prevailed in Indonesia in the late 1950s (Bondan Kanumoyoso 2001).
Page 1 and 2: indonesian economic decolonization
Page 3 and 4: VERHANDELINGEN VAN HET KONINKLIJK I
Page 5 and 6: Contents Abbreviations vii J. Thoma
Page 7 and 8: Abbreviations ALS ANRI AVROS BANAS
Page 9: Abbreviations ix SOEIMEX SPA STII S
Page 12 and 13: 2 J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post
Page 20 and 21: 10 J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Pos
Page 24 and 25: 14 J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Pos

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