TABLE OF CONTENTS - Van Bael & Bellis
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Van Bael & Bellis
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Van Bael & Bellis
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<strong>TABLE</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>CONTENTS</strong><br />
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION<br />
ABOUT THE AUTHORS<br />
INTRODUCTION Developments since the Fourth Edition<br />
1. INSTITUTIONS<br />
§1.1. Summary of institutions<br />
§1.2. The Commission<br />
(1) General<br />
(2) Role of the Commission<br />
(3) Organization of the Commission<br />
(4) Conclusion on the Commission<br />
§1.3. The Council of Ministers<br />
§1.4. The European Parliament<br />
§1.5. The Advisory Committees<br />
§1.6. The Economic and Social Committee<br />
§1.7. The Court of First Instance<br />
§1.8. The Court of Justice<br />
§1.9. The European Ombudsman<br />
§1.10. The competition authorities of the Member States<br />
§1.11. National courts<br />
§1.12. Transparency of information<br />
2. BASIC PRINCIPLES<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
ARTICLE 81: AGREEMENTS AND OTHER CONCERTED ACTIONS THAT ARE<br />
RESTRICTIVE <strong>OF</strong> COMPETITION<br />
§2.1. Introduction<br />
§2.2. Text of the Article<br />
ARTICLE 81(1): THE PROHIBITION <strong>OF</strong> AGREEMENTS AND OTHER CONCERTED<br />
ACTION<br />
§2.3. Conditions of prohibition<br />
§2.4. The meaning of an ‘undertaking’<br />
(1) The entity must be engaged in an economic activity<br />
(2) The legal status of the entity does not matter<br />
§2.5. Agreement or concerted action: requirement of more than one independent<br />
undertaking<br />
(1) Unilateral action excluded<br />
(2) Employee relationships<br />
(3) Agency relationship<br />
(4) Related companies: the ‘economic entity’<br />
(5) Companies related by succession<br />
§2.6. Forms of prohibited conduct<br />
(1) Agreement
(2) Decisions by associations of undertakings<br />
(3) Concerted practices<br />
§2.7. State compulsion<br />
(1) State measures requiring anti-competitive conduct<br />
(2) State measures restricting competition<br />
§2.8. Restriction of competition<br />
(1) Restriction by object or effect<br />
(2) Appreciable restriction of competition<br />
(3) Nature of competition which may be restricted<br />
(4) Ancillary restraints falling outside the scope of Article 81(1)<br />
(5) Does a rule of reason apply to Article 81(1)?<br />
ARTICLE 81(2): THE NULLITY SANCTION<br />
ARTICLE 81(3): EXEMPTION FROM THE PROHIBITION<br />
§2.9. Introduction<br />
§2.10. General principles for the application of Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Exemption only applies for as long as the four relevant conditions are<br />
fulfilled<br />
(2) Hardcore restrictions<br />
(3) Relationship between Article 81(3) and Article 82<br />
§2.11. The four substantive conditions under Article 81(3)<br />
§2.12. Efficiency gains: the contribution to production or distribution or to technical or<br />
economic progress (first condition under Article 81(3))<br />
(1) The efficiencies must create objective, compensatory benefits<br />
(2) Evidentiary burden<br />
(3) Different forms of efficiency gains<br />
§2.13. Consumer welfare: the ‘fair share of the benefits’ criterion (second condition under<br />
Article 81(3))<br />
(1) General principles applying to the passing on of efficiencies<br />
(2) Assessment of pass-on of cost efficiencies<br />
(3) Assessment of pass-on of value in the case of new or improved products<br />
§2.14. Indispensability of the restriction to achieve pro-competitive effects (third condition<br />
under Article 81(3))<br />
(1) Indispensability of the agreement<br />
(2) Indispensability of individual restrictions<br />
§2.15. Preserving effective competition: the ‘elimination of competition’ condition (fourth<br />
condition under Article 81(3))<br />
(1) Residual competition on the market<br />
(2) Actual market conduct<br />
(3) Past competitive interaction<br />
(4) Differentiated products<br />
(5) Potential competition and entry barriers<br />
§2.16. Block exemptions<br />
EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES<br />
§2.17. Introduction<br />
§2.18. The concept of ‘trade’<br />
§2.19. Establishing an effect on trade<br />
(1) Pattern of trade test<br />
(2) Structural test<br />
§2.20. Effect on trade must be appreciable<br />
(1) General principle<br />
(2) The ‘NAAT’ rule<br />
§2.21. Application of the appreciability test to common types of agreements and abuses
(1) Agreements and abuses covering or implemented in several Member States<br />
(2) Agreements and abuses covering a single Member State or only part of one<br />
Member State<br />
(3) Agreements and abuses involving imports and exports with undertakings<br />
located in third countries or involving undertakings located in third countries<br />
ARTICLE 82 AND THE CONCEPT <strong>OF</strong> DOMINANCE<br />
§2.22. Scope of Article 82<br />
§2.23. Definition of a ‘dominant position’<br />
§2.24. Super-dominance<br />
§2.25. Collective dominance<br />
(1) Economic links or connecting factors<br />
(2) Uniform or coordinated conduct<br />
§2.26. Relevant criteria for evaluating dominance<br />
(1) Market share<br />
(2) Dependence<br />
(3) Additional structural factors<br />
(4) Additional behavioural factors<br />
MARKET DEFINITION<br />
§2.27. Introduction: the importance of market definition<br />
§2.28. The Notice on Market Definition<br />
(1) Relevant product market<br />
(2) Relevant geographic market<br />
§2.29. Process of defining the relevant market<br />
§2.30. Application to specific markets<br />
(1) Purchasing markets<br />
(2) Technology markets<br />
(3) Aftermarkets<br />
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION <strong>OF</strong> EC COMPETITION LAW<br />
§2.31. Outline of this section<br />
§2.32. Extraterritorial application of EC competition law<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) The economic entity doctrine<br />
(3) The effects doctrine<br />
(4) The implementation doctrine<br />
(5) Considerations of comity<br />
(6) Conclusion<br />
§2.33. Bilateral relations<br />
(1) EU/US Cooperation<br />
(2) EU/Canada Cooperation<br />
(3) EU/Japan Cooperation<br />
§2.34. Multilateral agreements<br />
(1) International Competition Network<br />
(2) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development<br />
(3) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development<br />
(4) World Trade Organization<br />
§2.35. The widening of the EU<br />
(1) Agreements with the candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia)<br />
and potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro)<br />
(2) European Economic Area<br />
3. VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION<br />
AGENCY AGREEMENTS<br />
§3.1. Introduction<br />
§3.2. The importance of risk<br />
(1) Risks related to contracts concluded by the agent<br />
(2) Risks related to market-specific investments<br />
§3.3. Level of risk<br />
§3.4. Where the agent has activities outside the agency relationship<br />
§3.5. Restrictions imposed on genuine agents<br />
§3.6. Collusion through agency<br />
SUBCONTRACTING AGREEMENTS<br />
§3.7. Introduction<br />
§3.8. Application of Article 81(1) to exclusivity provisions in subcontracting agreements<br />
§3.9. The Subcontracting Notice<br />
§3.10. Application of Article 81 outside the Subcontracting Notice<br />
DE MINIMIS NOTICE<br />
THE VERTICAL AGREEMENTS BLOCK EXEMPTION<br />
§3.11. Overview<br />
§3.12. The scope of application of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption<br />
(1) Definition of vertical agreements<br />
(2) Partial exclusion: agreements between competing undertakings<br />
(3) Provisions related to intellectual property<br />
(4) Associations of retailers<br />
(5) Relationship with other block exemption regulations<br />
§3.13. Market share test<br />
§3.14. Hardcore restrictions<br />
(1) Resale prices (Article 4(a))<br />
(2) Resale restrictions on the buyer (Article 4(b))<br />
(3) Restrictions on the supplier (Article 4(e))<br />
§3.15. Non-compete obligations<br />
(1) Maximum duration<br />
(2) Post-term restrictions<br />
(3) Selective distribution<br />
§3.16. Withdrawal of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption<br />
(1) Individual agreements<br />
(2) Entire market<br />
PARALLEL TRADE AND TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS<br />
§3.17. Introduction<br />
(1) Intra-brand competition<br />
(2) Market integration<br />
(3) Protection of the parallel trader<br />
§3.18. Forms of territorial restriction<br />
(1) Treatment of unilateral conduct<br />
(2) Interaction of EC competition law with intellectual property rights<br />
§3.19. Direct export restrictions<br />
(1) Within the Community<br />
(2) Outside the Community<br />
§3.20. Other forms of restrictions<br />
(1) Refusals to supply and limitation of supply
(2) Referral policies and pass-over payments<br />
(3) Differential pricing<br />
(4) Product differentiation<br />
(5) Warranty and after-sales service<br />
(6) Monitoring systems<br />
(7) Other schemes<br />
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION<br />
§3.21. Introduction<br />
§3.22. Structure of analysis<br />
§3.23. De Minimis Notice<br />
§3.24. Vertical Agreements Block Exemption<br />
§3.25. Exclusive distribution agreements<br />
(1) The application of Article 81(1)<br />
(2) The application of Article 81(3)<br />
§3.26. Exclusive customer allocation agreements<br />
(1) The application of Article 81(1)<br />
(2) The application of Article 81(3)<br />
§3.27. Exclusive supply agreements<br />
(1) The application of Article 81(1)<br />
(2) The application of Article 81(3)<br />
SELECTIVE DISTRIBUTION<br />
§3.28. Introduction<br />
§3.29. Structure of analysis<br />
§3.30. De Minimis Notice<br />
§3.31. The Vertical Agreements Block Exemption<br />
§3.32. The application of Article 81(1) – the case law<br />
(1) The nature of the product<br />
(2) Qualitative and proportionate criteria<br />
(3) Quantitative criteria<br />
(4) Non-discrimination – admission procedure<br />
(5) The selective distribution system must enhance competition<br />
(6) The structure of the market: cumulative effect<br />
§3.33. The application of Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Individual effect<br />
(2) Cumulative effect<br />
(3) Foreclosure of competition<br />
(4) Exclusivity and territorial restrictions<br />
FRANCHISING<br />
§3.34. Introduction<br />
§3.35. Structure of analysis<br />
§3.36. Combination of franchising with specific forms of distribution<br />
(1) Selective distribution<br />
(2) Exclusive distribution<br />
§3.37. De Minimis Notice<br />
§3.38. The Vertical Agreements Block Exemption<br />
§3.39. Case law and administrative practice concerning franchise agreements<br />
(1) Pronuptia<br />
(2) Administrative practice of the Commission<br />
§3.40. Types of restrictions in franchising agreements<br />
(1) Restrictions necessary to protect the franchisor’s know-how<br />
(2) Restrictions protecting the identity and reputation of the franchise<br />
(3) Location clauses and intra-franchise market sharing
§3.41. Application of Article 81(3) to franchising agreements<br />
NON-COMPETE OBLIGATIONS, QUANTITY FORCING AND TYING<br />
§3.42. Introduction<br />
(1) Non-compete obligations<br />
(2) Quantity forcing<br />
(3) Tying<br />
§3.43. Structure of analysis<br />
§3.44. De Minimis Notice<br />
§3.45. The Vertical Agreements Block Exemption<br />
§3.46. Analysis of non-compete obligations under Article 81(1)<br />
(1) Overview<br />
(2) Establishing the existence of market-wide foreclosure effects<br />
(3) Individual contribution to foreclosure effects<br />
(4) Individual agreements in a network<br />
(5) Objective justifications for non-compete obligations<br />
(6) Use of premises or equipment owned by the supplier<br />
(7) The practical difficulties of measuring foreclosure effects<br />
§3.47. Application of Article 81(1) to tying obligations<br />
§3.48. Application of Article 81(3) to non-compete obligations<br />
(1) Non-compete obligations designed to prevent hold-up problems relating to<br />
investments made by the supplier<br />
(2) Non-compete obligations designed to prevent hold-up problems relating to<br />
the transfer of know-how by the supplier<br />
(3) Non-compete obligations designed to prevent free riding<br />
(4) Non-compete obligations designed to correct capital market imperfections<br />
(5) Use of non-compete obligations to obtain other logistical efficiencies<br />
(6) Non-compete obligations combined with exclusive distribution<br />
(7) Non-compete obligations combined with selective distribution<br />
(8) Use of non-compete obligations in industrial supply agreements<br />
§3.49. Specific issues related to tying<br />
THE MOTOR VEHICLE BLOCK EXEMPTION<br />
§3.50. Introduction<br />
§3.51. Applicability of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption<br />
(1) Vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector<br />
(2) Market share threshold<br />
(3) Intellectual property rights<br />
(4) Agreements between competitors<br />
(5) Agreements concluded by associations<br />
§3.52. Structure of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption<br />
§3.53. De Minimis exception<br />
§3.54. Choice of distribution system<br />
(1) Exclusive distribution<br />
(2) Selective distribution<br />
(3) Co-existence of exclusive and selective distribution<br />
§3.55. Non-compete obligations<br />
(1) The definition of a non-compete obligation<br />
(2) Indirect restrictions<br />
(3) Repair activities<br />
(4) Post term non-compete obligations<br />
(5) Leasing activities<br />
§3.56. Sales and purchase targets (including bonuses)<br />
§3.57. Resale price maintenance<br />
§3.58. Market integration
(1) Corresponding motor vehicles<br />
(2) Obligation to provide repair and warranty work<br />
(3) Sales to intermediaries<br />
§3.59. Servicing and repairs within a vehicle manufacturer’s network<br />
(1) Breaking the sales-service link<br />
(2) Authorized after-sales network<br />
(3) Subcontracting of service obligations<br />
§3.60. The supply of spare parts<br />
(1) Purchase restrictions<br />
(2) Rights of manufacturers of original spare parts<br />
(3) Spare parts resellers<br />
§3.61. Independent repairers<br />
(1) Technical information<br />
(2) Supply of spare parts to independent repairers<br />
(3) Routine maintenance<br />
§3.62. General conditions on contractual protection<br />
(1) Right of assignment<br />
(2) Duration and termination of agreements<br />
(3) Dispute resolution<br />
§3.63. Withdrawal of the benefit of the exemption<br />
§3.64. Evaluation of the impact of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption – major changes<br />
expected in 2010<br />
4. HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS: CARTELS<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
APPLICATION <strong>OF</strong> ARTICLE 81(1) TO CARTELS<br />
RESTRICTION <strong>OF</strong> COMPETITION THROUGH CARTELS<br />
§4.1. Pricing practices<br />
(1) Price-fixing agreements<br />
(2) Price discrimination<br />
(3) Ancillary agreements<br />
(4) Parallel pricing behaviour<br />
(5) Cartels and Article 82<br />
§4.2. Market-sharing agreements<br />
(1) Geographical market-sharing<br />
(2) Limitation of production or sources of supply<br />
(3) Limitation or control of investment<br />
(4) Allocation of customers and/or products<br />
(5) Product and geographic market sharing combined<br />
(6) Bid rigging<br />
§4.3. Collective Boycotts<br />
§4.4. Exchange of Information<br />
(1) Application of Article 81(1)<br />
(2) Market structure<br />
(3) Nature of the information exchanged<br />
(4) Exchange of price information<br />
(5) Exchange of information on production and sales<br />
(6) Exchange of information on costs, investments and capacities<br />
(7) Exchange of information on or between distributors<br />
(8) Information exchange between financial institutions concerning the identity<br />
and solvency of their customers<br />
(9) Business-to-business electronic marketplaces
(10) UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange<br />
§4.5. Trade associations, trade fairs and exhibitions, exchanges and auctions<br />
(1) Trade associations<br />
(2) Trade fairs and exhibitions<br />
(3) Exchanges<br />
(4) Auctions<br />
STATE COMPULSION AS A DEFENCE FOR CARTEL ACTIVITY<br />
EXEMPTION <strong>OF</strong> CARTELS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS<br />
§4.6. Introduction<br />
§4.7. Assessment of crisis cartels<br />
(1) Sectoral restructuring agreements<br />
(2) Bilateral restructuring agreements<br />
5. HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS: JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER<br />
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
§5.1. Overview<br />
DEFINITION <strong>OF</strong> HORIZONTAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS AND THE SCOPE <strong>OF</strong><br />
THIS CHAPTER<br />
§5.2. Scope of the Horizontal Guidelines<br />
§5.3. Definition of ‘horizontal’ cooperation agreements<br />
§5.4. The standard of legality: Article 81 or the Merger Regulation<br />
GENERAL OVERVIEW <strong>OF</strong> THE APPLICATION <strong>OF</strong> ARTICLE 81 AND THE<br />
HORIZONTAL GUIDELINES TO JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER HORIZONTAL<br />
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.5. Overview<br />
§5.6. Application of Article 81(1) to joint ventures and other horizontal cooperation<br />
agreements<br />
(1) Appreciable restriction of competition<br />
(2) Likely to affect trade between the Member States<br />
§5.7. Exemption: application of Article 81(3) to horizontal cooperation agreements<br />
(1) Economic benefits<br />
(2) Fair share for consumers<br />
(3) Indispensability<br />
(4) No elimination of competition<br />
INTRODUCTION TO THE REMAINDER <strong>OF</strong> THIS CHAPTER<br />
§5.8. Scope<br />
§5.9. Locating the applicable section of this chapter<br />
§5.10. Centre of gravity test<br />
§5.11. Rules applicable to strategic alliances<br />
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.12. Introduction<br />
§5.13. Article 81(1)<br />
(1) Agreements that generally do not constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(2) Agreements that almost always constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(3) Factors used to determine whether R&D agreements constitute a restriction<br />
or distortion of competition under Article 81(1)
(4) Conclusion<br />
§5.14. R&D Agreements Block Exemption<br />
(1) Prerequisites for the grant of the exemption<br />
(2) Threshold conditions for exemption<br />
(3) Market share threshold and duration of exemption<br />
(4) Hardcore restrictions<br />
(5) Scope of the exemption – ancillary restrictions covered<br />
(6) Withdrawal of the exemption<br />
§5.15. Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Creation of benefits that are passed on to consumers<br />
(2) Indispensability<br />
(3) No elimination of competition<br />
4) Time of the assessment and duration of the individual exemption<br />
JOINT PRODUCTION/SPECIALIZATION AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.16. Introduction<br />
§5.17. Applicable rules for subcontracting agreements<br />
§5.18. Article 81(1)<br />
(1) Agreements that generally do not constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(2) Agreements that almost always constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(3) Factors used to determine whether joint production agreements constitute a<br />
restriction or distortion of competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(4) Conclusion<br />
§5.19. Specialization Agreements Block Exemption<br />
(1) Prerequisites for the grant of the exemption<br />
(2) Market share threshold and duration of exemption<br />
(3) Hardcore restrictions<br />
(4) Scope of the exemption – ancillary restrictions covered<br />
(5) Withdrawal of the exemption<br />
§5.20. Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Creation of benefits that are passed on to consumers<br />
(2) Indispensability<br />
(3) No elimination of competition<br />
PURCHASING AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.21. Introduction<br />
(1) Definition and scope<br />
(2) Relevant Markets<br />
§5.22. Article 81(1)<br />
(1) Assessment under the Horizontal Guidelines<br />
(2) Assessment under the De Minimis Notice<br />
§5.23. Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Creation of benefits that are passed on to consumers<br />
(2) Indispensability<br />
(3) No elimination of competition<br />
COMMERCIALIZATION AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.24. Introduction and scope<br />
(1) Relationship between the Horizontal Guidelines and the Vertical Agreements<br />
Block Exemption and Vertical Guidelines<br />
(2) ‘Centre of gravity’ test<br />
(3) Relevant markets to be assessed<br />
§5.25. Article 81(1)
(1) Assessment under the Horizontal Guidelines<br />
(2) Assessment under the De Minimis Notice<br />
§5.26. Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Creation of benefits that are passed on to consumers<br />
(2) Indispensability<br />
(3) No elimination of competition<br />
§5.27. Specific types of Commercialization Agreements<br />
(1) Agreements involving the appointment of competitors as distributors<br />
(2) Agreements involving the creation of a joint distribution company without<br />
involving the joint fixing of prices<br />
(3) Agreements involving the joint fixing of prices<br />
(4) Joint tendering<br />
(5) Agreements involving common branding and/or joint advertising<br />
STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.28. Introduction<br />
(1) Definition<br />
(2) Relevant Markets<br />
§5.29. Article 81(1)<br />
(1) Agreements that generally do not constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(2) Agreements that almost always constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(3) Agreements that may constitute a restriction or distortion of competition<br />
under Article 81(1)<br />
§5.30. Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Creation of benefits that are passed on to consumers<br />
(2) Indispensability<br />
(3) No elimination of competition<br />
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS<br />
§5.31. Introduction<br />
(1) Definition<br />
(2) Relevant markets<br />
§5.32. Article 81(1)<br />
(1) Agreements that generally do not constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(2) Agreements that almost always constitute a restriction or distortion of<br />
competition under Article 81(1)<br />
(3) Agreements that may constitute a restriction or distortion of competition<br />
under Article 81(1)<br />
§5.33. Article 81(3)<br />
(1) Creation of benefits that are passed on to consumers<br />
(2) Indispensability<br />
(3) No elimination of competition<br />
6. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
RESTRICTIONS ON ENFORCEMENT <strong>OF</strong> INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS<br />
§6.1. Introduction<br />
§6.2. Articles 81 and 82 as a defence against the enforcement of intellectual property rights<br />
§6.3. The exhaustion principle<br />
§6.4. Trade within the European Economic Area
(1) General principles<br />
(2) Copyright: mechanical rights<br />
(3) Copyright: performing rights<br />
(4) Copyright: rental rights<br />
(5) Copyright: supplementary royalties<br />
(6) Copyright: computer programmes<br />
(7) Trade marks: exhaustion and the Trade Mark Directive<br />
(8) Trade marks: repackaging and parallel trade of trade marked goods<br />
(9) Trade marks: removing labels from trade marked goods<br />
(10) Trade marks: the ‘common ownership’ doctrine and assignment of rights<br />
(11) Patents: exhaustion by licence<br />
(12) Patents: exhaustion despite lack of protection in Member State of export<br />
(13) Patents: compulsory licence in Member State of export<br />
(14) Geographic scope of the exhaustion principle<br />
(15) National legislation contrary to Article 30<br />
§6.5. Imports of pharmaceutical products from the new EU Member States<br />
(1) Exception to the exhaustion rule for certain pharmaceutical products<br />
imported from acceding countries: the ‘Specific Mechanism’<br />
(2) One-month notice requirement for parallel importers<br />
§6.6. Imports from non-EEA countries<br />
(1) Trade marked goods: no international exhaustion of rights<br />
(2) The meaning of ‘consent’ under the exhaustion principle: unequivocal<br />
consent required<br />
(3) The burden of proof with respect to the exhaustion principle: a qualified rule<br />
may be necessary under certain circumstances<br />
(4) The concept of ‘putting on the market’ under the exhaustion principle:<br />
realisation of the economic value of the trade mark as the decisive criterion<br />
(5) Transit of trade marked goods and the exhaustion principle: transit does not<br />
amount to the importation into the Community<br />
(6) Other forms of intellectual property: rule on international exhaustion depends<br />
on whether the Community has adopted harmonizing measures<br />
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER<br />
§6.7. Regulation of patent, know-how, and software copyright licences<br />
§6.8. Categories of licensing agreements<br />
(1) Agreements falling outside Article 81(1), including de minimis agreements<br />
(2) Agreements exempted by the Technology Transfer Block Exemption<br />
(3) Agreements eligible for individual exemption under Article 81(3)<br />
(4) Agreements falling within Article 81(1) that do not qualify for an exemption<br />
§6.9. Application of Article 82<br />
§6.10. Relationship between the Technology Transfer Block Exemption and other block<br />
exemptions<br />
(1) The Technology Transfer Block Exemption and the Vertical Agreements<br />
Block Exemption<br />
(2) The Technology Transfer Block Exemption and the Specialization and R&D<br />
Agreements Block Exemptions<br />
§6.11. The Former Technology Transfer Block Exemption: essential features<br />
§6.12. The Technology Transfer Block Exemption: the current technology transfer regime<br />
(1) Underlying assumptions and principal features of the Technology Transfer<br />
Block Exemption<br />
(2) Scope of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption<br />
(3) The new market share thresholds<br />
(4) Dynamic markets where market shares are not good indicators of market<br />
power<br />
(5) Hardcore restrictions
(6) Excluded restrictions<br />
(7) Withdrawal and non-application of the block exemption<br />
§6.13. Treatment of specific licensing provisions under the Technology Transfer Guidelines<br />
(1) Royalty obligations<br />
(2) Exclusive and sole licensing<br />
(3) Territorial and customer restrictions<br />
(4) Output restrictions<br />
(5) Field of use restrictions<br />
(6) Captive use restrictions<br />
(7) Tying obligations<br />
(8) Non-compete obligations<br />
(9) Exclusive grantbacks of severable improvements and new applications<br />
§6.14. Settlement and non-assertion agreements<br />
(1) General principles<br />
(2) Application of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption to settlement and<br />
non-assertion agreements<br />
(3) Competitive analysis of settlement and non-assertion agreements<br />
(4) Agreements concerning future developments<br />
(5) No-challenge obligations in settlement and non-assertion agreements<br />
§6.15. Technology pools<br />
(1) General principles<br />
(2) Complementary versus substitute technologies comprised in the pool<br />
(3) Essential versus non-essential technologies comprised in the pool<br />
(4) Assessment of individual restraints related to the technology pool<br />
(5) Pool management and institutional arrangements<br />
LICENCES <strong>OF</strong> INDUSTRIAL OR COMMERCIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OTHER THAN<br />
PATENTS, KNOW-HOW, AND ANCILLARY LICENCES<br />
§6.16. Introduction<br />
§6.17. Trade mark licences<br />
(1) General remarks regarding territorial restraints<br />
(2) The Campari case<br />
(3) The Moosehead-Whitbread case<br />
(4) Trade marks under the Technology Transfer Block Exemption<br />
(5) Council Directive 89/104 on the approximation of the laws of the Member<br />
States relating to trade marks<br />
(6) Council Regulation 40/94 on the Community trade mark<br />
§6.18. Copyright licences<br />
(1) Exclusive copyright licences<br />
(2) Field of use restrictions in copyright licences<br />
(3) Other typical restrictive clauses in copyright licensing agreements<br />
(4) Copyright collecting societies<br />
(5) One-stop, multi-territorial copyright licences for online use<br />
(6) Council Directive 91/250 on the legal protection of computer programs<br />
§6.19. Software licensing<br />
§6.20. Licences of plant breeders’ rights<br />
TRADE MARK DELIMITATION AGREEMENTS<br />
§6.21. Introduction<br />
§6.22. Agreements not to use trade marks in certain Member States<br />
§6.23. Unhampered movement of goods bearing the trade mark<br />
7. CONTROL <strong>OF</strong> MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CERTAIN JOINT VENTURES<br />
INTRODUCTION
§7.1. Overview<br />
(1) The genesis of the Merger Regulation<br />
(2) The 1997 amendments<br />
(3) The 2002-2003 merger control review and the 2004 Merger Regulation<br />
(4) Key developments since 2004<br />
JURISDICTION <strong>OF</strong> THE COMMISSION TO REVIEW MERGERS<br />
§7.2. Overview: concentrations with Community dimension<br />
(1) The concept of a concentration<br />
(2) Community dimension<br />
§7.3. Concentrations falling outside the thresholds<br />
§7.4. Exceptions to the one-stop shop principle<br />
(1) Member State protection of legitimate interests<br />
(2) Referrals from the Commission to one or more Member States<br />
(3) Referrals from three or more Member States to the Commission<br />
(4) Referrals by a Member State to the Commission<br />
§7.5. Identifying the entities whose turnover must be considered in assessing ‘Community<br />
dimension’<br />
(1) Identifying the ‘undertakings concerned’ – overview<br />
(2) Undertakings concerned in the case of mergers<br />
(3) Undertakings concerned in the case of acquisitions of sole control<br />
(4) Undertakings concerned in the case of acquisitions of joint control<br />
(5) Undertakings concerned in the case of acquisitions of control by a joint<br />
venture<br />
(6) Undertakings concerned in the case of changes from joint to sole control<br />
(7) Undertakings concerned in the case of de-mergers (break up of companies)<br />
(8) Undertakings concerned in the case of exchange of assets (‘asset swaps’) and<br />
in the context of outsourcing agreements<br />
(9) Undertakings concerned in the case of acquisitions of control by investment<br />
funds<br />
§7.6. The definition of ‘turnover’<br />
(1) Basics of calculating turnover<br />
(2) Net turnover<br />
(3) Group turnover<br />
(4) Treatment of ‘internal’ turnover<br />
§7.7. Geographical allocation of turnover<br />
§7.8. Special rules for financial institutions and insurance undertakings<br />
(1) Credit and other financial institutions<br />
(2) Insurance undertakings<br />
(3) Mixed groups<br />
§7.9. Calculating turnover in the case of acquisition of assets without sales<br />
§7.10. Extraterritorial application of the Merger Regulation<br />
(1) The rule<br />
(2) Case law<br />
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW BY THE COMMISSION<br />
§7.11. Sector-specific organization of merger control<br />
§7.12. Investigative powers<br />
§7.13. Defining the relevant markets<br />
(1) Relevant market definition<br />
(2) Defining relevant markets in practice<br />
§7.14. Test of compatibility with the common market: significant impediment of effective<br />
competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant<br />
position<br />
§7.15. Horizontal mergers: non-coordinated/unilateral effects
(1) Market position/market share<br />
(2) The degree to which the merging firms are close competitors<br />
(3) The degree to which customers may switch suppliers<br />
(4) The likelihood of competitors increasing supply<br />
(5) The ability of the merged entity to hinder expansion by competitors<br />
(6) The elimination of an important competitive force<br />
(7) Potential competition<br />
(8) Barriers to entry<br />
(9) Countervailing buyer power<br />
(10) Efficiency considerations<br />
(11) Failing firm defence<br />
§7.16. Horizontal mergers: coordinated effects/collective dominance<br />
(1) The legal test for coordinated effects/collective dominance<br />
(2) Case law on coordinated effects/collective dominance<br />
§7.17. Vertical mergers<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) Market shares and concentration levels<br />
(3) Non-coordinated/unilateral effects: foreclosure<br />
(4) Coordinated effects<br />
(5) Examples of case law on vertical mergers<br />
§7.18. Conglomerate mergers and portfolio power<br />
(1) Market shares and concentration levels<br />
(2) Non-coordinated/unilateral effects: foreclosure<br />
(3) Coordinated effects<br />
(4) Examples of case law on conglomerate mergers<br />
§7.19. Article 2(4) and 2(5): Coordinative effects of full-function joint ventures<br />
(1) Overview<br />
(2) Substantive assessment under Article 2(4) and 2(5)<br />
(3) Example of case law on coordinative effects of full-function joint ventures:<br />
Lockheed Martin/Boeing/United Launch Alliance JV<br />
§7.20. Ancillary restraints<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) Requirements for restrictions to be considered ancillary<br />
(3) Common types of ancillary restraints as addressed in the Notice on Ancillary<br />
Restraints<br />
THE PROCESS <strong>OF</strong> NOTIFYING A CONCENTRATION TO THE COMMISSION<br />
§7.21. Formalities<br />
§7.22. Timing<br />
§7.23. Completing Form CO<br />
(1) Overview<br />
(2) Information that must be provided in Form CO<br />
(3) Copies that must be provided<br />
(4) Correct and complete information<br />
§7.24. Simplified procedure<br />
§7.25. Pre-notification consultations<br />
§7.26. Suspension requirement<br />
(1) Suspension period<br />
(2) Waiver of suspension requirement<br />
(3) Consequences of contravening the suspension requirement<br />
(4) Consequences of failing to notify and providing incorrect/misleading<br />
information<br />
(5) Abandonment of concentrations<br />
PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW <strong>OF</strong> CONCENTRATIONS AND APPLICABLE DEADLINES
§7.27. First phase timetable<br />
(1) Types of first phase decisions<br />
(2) Publication of notice of prior notification<br />
(3) Communication with Member States in the first phase<br />
(4) Verification, requests for information and investigation in the first phase<br />
(5) Right to be heard in the first phase<br />
(6) Inter-service meetings and ‘peer review panels’ in the first phase<br />
(7) Modification of the concentration, conditions and obligations in the first<br />
phase<br />
(8) Deadline for referral to Member States<br />
(9) Publication of Phase I decisions<br />
(10) Revocation of Phase I decisions<br />
§7.28. Second phase timetable<br />
(1) Requests for information and investigations<br />
(2) Suspension and extension of 90 working day time limit<br />
(3) Statement of Objections<br />
(4) Access to file<br />
(5) Right of reply to Statement of Objections<br />
(6) Oral hearing<br />
(7) ‘Triangular’ or ‘contradictory’ meetings<br />
(8) Commitments and undertakings<br />
(9) Draft decision<br />
(10) Consultation with Advisory Committee<br />
(11) Decisions ending a Phase II investigation<br />
(12) Publication of Phase II decisions<br />
(13) Revocation of Phase II decisions<br />
§7.29. Referrals between the Commission and the Member States<br />
§7.30. Cooperation between the Commission and the Member States<br />
(1) Requirement of cooperation under the Merger Regulation<br />
(2) Requests for information and investigations<br />
(3) Advisory Committee on concentrations<br />
(4) Importance of cooperation<br />
§7.31. International Cooperation<br />
(1) General introduction<br />
(2) EU-US cooperation<br />
(3) EU cooperation with other countries<br />
§7.32. Remedies<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) Structural v. behavioural commitments<br />
(3) Timetable for commitments<br />
(4) Enforceability of commitments<br />
JUDICIAL REVIEW <strong>OF</strong> MERGER DECISIONS<br />
§7.33. Interim relief<br />
(1) Prima facie case<br />
(2) Urgency<br />
(3) Balance of interests<br />
§7.34. Acts subject to review<br />
§7.35. Standing of merging parties<br />
§7.36. Standing of third parties<br />
(1) Direct concern<br />
(2) Individual concern<br />
§7.37. Grounds for review<br />
§7.38. The Court’s accelerated procedure<br />
§ 7.39. Damage claims on the basis of Article 288(2)
8. ABUSE <strong>OF</strong> A DOMINANT POSITION<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
THE CONCEPT <strong>OF</strong> ‘ABUSE’<br />
§8.1. Exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses<br />
§8.2. The object or effect of the behaviour at issue<br />
§8.3. The ‘special responsibility’ of dominant firms<br />
§8.4. The required degree of linkage between the dominated market and the market on<br />
which the abuse occurs<br />
§8.5. The required degree of linkage between the dominant undertaking and the<br />
undertaking which commits the abuse<br />
§8.6. Objective justification<br />
§8.7. Commission’s Guidance on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct<br />
ABUSIVE PRACTICES<br />
§8.8. Pricing practices<br />
(1) Charging excessive prices<br />
(2) Extracting excessively low purchase prices<br />
(3) Price discrimination<br />
(4) Rebate schemes<br />
(5) Predatory pricing<br />
(6) Margin squeezing<br />
§8.9. Refusals to deal<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) Refusal to supply<br />
(3) Refusal to license<br />
(4) Essential facilities<br />
(5) Justifications for refusals to deal<br />
(6) Refusal to purchase<br />
§8.10. Discrimination<br />
(1) Discriminating between nationals or residents of different Member States<br />
(2) Other forms of discrimination<br />
§8.11. Tying<br />
(1) The tying and tied goods are two separate products<br />
(2) The undertaking concerned is dominant in the tying product market<br />
(3) The undertaking does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product<br />
without the tied product<br />
(4) The tie forecloses competition<br />
(5) There is no objective justification<br />
§8.12. Unfair terms and conditions<br />
(1) Tetra Pak (II): abusive contractual requirements<br />
(2) SABAM: copyright management societies requiring assignment of copyright<br />
(3) Alsatel: unilateral price-setting and lease extensions<br />
§8.13. Miscellaneous abuses<br />
(1) Single branding and exclusive purchasing obligations<br />
(2) Abusive use of public procedures and regulations<br />
(3) Restrictions on resales<br />
(4) Abusive licensing practices<br />
(5) Limiting production, markets and technical development<br />
(6) Market-sharing agreements
9. ANTITRUST AND THE STATE<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
§9.1. Structure<br />
§9.2. Preliminary remarks<br />
STATE MEASURES THAT MAY JEOPARDIZE THE ATTAINMENT <strong>OF</strong> THE<br />
COMPETITION LAW OBJECTIVES <strong>OF</strong> THE TREATY<br />
§9.3. Relevant Treaty provisions: Articles 10, 3(1)(g), 81 and 82<br />
§9.4. The INNO/<strong>Van</strong> Eycke line of case law<br />
(1) INNO<br />
(2) <strong>Van</strong> Eycke<br />
(3) “Complicity” cases: State measures that require, favour or reinforce<br />
restrictive agreements<br />
(4) Delegation cases<br />
(5) Sovereign immunity<br />
(6) The duty of national competition authorities to disapply anti-competitive<br />
State measures in breach of Article 10 read in the light of Article 81<br />
(7) Direct effect of Article 10 read in the light of Article 81<br />
STATE MEASURES RELATED TO PUBLIC OR ‘PRIVILEGED’ UNDERTAKINGS<br />
§9.5. Introduction<br />
§9.6. Scope, application and enforcement of Article 86(1)<br />
(1) The concept of an undertaking<br />
(2) Undertakings with special or exclusive rights (‘privileged’ undertakings)<br />
(3) Public undertakings<br />
(4) State measures<br />
§9.7. State measures contrary to the Treaty: background and three strands of case law<br />
(1) Grant of special or exclusive rights acceptable in principle<br />
(2) Grant of special or exclusive rights impermissible in some circumstances<br />
(3) Exemptions from the application of Article 86(1)<br />
§9.8. Article 86(3): the enforcement and legislative powers of the Commission<br />
(1) Broad discretion for the Commission under Article 86(3)<br />
(2) Commission’s power to adopt decisions under Article 86(3) and the right to<br />
appeal<br />
(3) Commission’s power to adopt directives under Article 86(3)<br />
EXEMPTION FROM PROHIBITION IN CASES <strong>OF</strong> UNDERTAKINGS ENTRUSTED<br />
WITH THE OPERATION <strong>OF</strong> SERVICES <strong>OF</strong> GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST<br />
§9.9. Introduction<br />
§9.10. Scope of Article 86(2)<br />
(1) Entrusted undertakings<br />
(2) Services of general economic interest<br />
(3) Revenue-producing monopolies<br />
§9.11. Justification for the non-application of the competition rules<br />
(1) Obstruction of the performance by an entrusted undertaking of its particular<br />
SGEI tasks: necessity and proportionality of the State measure<br />
(2) Application of exemption under Article 86(2) must not affect development of<br />
trade to an extent contrary to the Community interest<br />
§9.12. Compensation for SGEI tasks, Altmark and the ‘Altmark package’<br />
10. PROCEDURE<br />
INTRODUCTION
§10.1. Rules of procedure generally<br />
§10.2. Rules of procedure under Regulation 17<br />
(1) The notification process<br />
(2) Outcome of the notification process<br />
§10.3. Drastic reform of the procedural rules: the Regulation on Procedure<br />
(1) Abolition of the notification and exemption system<br />
(2) Decentralized application of Articles 81 and 82<br />
(3) Concurrent application of Articles 81 and 82 and national competition law<br />
(4) Challenges ahead<br />
§10.4. Impact of fundamental rights on competition enforcement procedure<br />
(1) Fundamental rights and the law of the European Union<br />
(2) Fundamental rights and competition law proceedings<br />
§10.5. Infringement proceedings: overview<br />
INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION<br />
§10.6. Opening of investigation<br />
(1) Complaints<br />
(2) Handling and assessment of complaints by the Commission<br />
(3) Review of the Commission’s handling process of complaints by the European<br />
Ombudsman<br />
(4) Procedural rights of complainants<br />
(5) Other events triggering an investigation<br />
§10.7. Requests for information<br />
(1) Procedure<br />
(2) ‘Necessary’ information<br />
(3) Incorrect information<br />
§10.8. On-the-spot inspections<br />
(1) Subject matter of the inspection<br />
(2) Right of entry<br />
(3) Right to search<br />
(4) Access to electronic documents<br />
(5) Duty to assist<br />
(6) Copies of books and records<br />
(7) Seals<br />
(8) Oral explanations<br />
(9) Assistance from other competition authorities<br />
§10.9. Interviews<br />
§10.10. Sector inquiries<br />
§10.11. Limitations on the Commission’s investigation powers<br />
(1) Proportionality rule<br />
(2) Territorial reach<br />
(3) Legal privilege<br />
(4) Right to privacy<br />
(5) Right to remain silent (or ‘privilege against self-incrimination’)<br />
(6) Use of information – purpose of the inquiry<br />
(7) Professional secrecy<br />
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COMMISSION<br />
§10.12. Main actors in the procedure<br />
(1) The Commission and the parties concerned<br />
(2) The Hearing Officer<br />
(3) Complainants and interested third parties.<br />
§10.13. Initiation of proceedings<br />
§10.14. Statement of Objections<br />
§10.15. Access to the file
(1) The defendants’ right of access to the file<br />
(2) Access to the file under the Transparency Regulation<br />
§10.16. Written and oral comments on the proceedings<br />
(1) Written comments<br />
(2) Oral hearing<br />
(3) The reports of the Hearing Officer<br />
ADOPTION <strong>OF</strong> DECISIONS BY THE COMMISSION<br />
§10.17. Interim measures<br />
(1) Conditions<br />
(2) Procedure<br />
§10.18. Recommendations<br />
§10.19. Advisory Committee<br />
§10.20. Final decision<br />
(1) Possible relief<br />
(2) Formal requirements<br />
(3) Timing – duty to act within a reasonable time<br />
(4) Trustee<br />
§10.21. Findings of inapplicability<br />
§10.22. Withdrawal of a Block Exemption in individual cases<br />
§10.23. Guidance letter<br />
FINES AND PERIODIC PENALTY PAYMENTS<br />
§10.24. Fines for procedural infringements<br />
§10.25. Fines for substantive breaches of competition rules<br />
(1) General legal principles<br />
(2) Legal maximum<br />
(3) Legal criteria: gravity and duration<br />
(4) The Commission Fining Guidelines<br />
(5) Payment<br />
§10.26. Periodic penalty payments<br />
§10.27. Leniency<br />
(1) Immunity from fines<br />
(2) Reduction in fines<br />
(3) Procedure<br />
(4) Leniency and private enforcement<br />
(5) Leniency and groups of companies<br />
(6) Leniency and judicial review<br />
(7) Leniency and international cartels<br />
(8) Entry into force<br />
§10.28. Limitation periods<br />
(1) Imposition of penalties<br />
(2) Enforcement of sanctions<br />
§10.29. Parent/Subsidiary liability<br />
§10.30. Succession<br />
ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES<br />
§10.31. Informal settlements<br />
§10.32. Commitments procedure<br />
(1) Scope of the commitments procedure<br />
(2) Procedural steps<br />
(3) Commitments decisions<br />
(4) Procedural rights<br />
§10.33. Settlement procedure<br />
(1) Scope of the settlement procedure
(2) Procedural steps<br />
(3) ‘Settled’ decision<br />
(4) Procedural rights under the settlement procedure<br />
JUDICIAL REVIEW<br />
§10.34. Jurisdiction<br />
§10.35. Direct actions<br />
(1) Action for annulment<br />
(2) Action for failure to act<br />
(3) Action for damages based on the non-contractual liability of the Community<br />
§10.36. Interim measures<br />
§10.37. Third party intervention<br />
§10.38. Standard of review<br />
§10.39. Preliminary rulings<br />
§10.40. Appeals to the Court of Justice<br />
§10.41. Costs<br />
§10.42. Length of proceedings<br />
11. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT<br />
NATIONAL COURTS<br />
§11.1. Introduction<br />
§11.2. Decentralization process<br />
§11.3. Advantages and disadvantages of procedures before national courts<br />
§11.4. Application of EC competition law by national courts<br />
(1) Powers of national courts<br />
(2) Parallel or consecutive application of the EC competition rules by the<br />
Commission and by national courts<br />
(3) Right to damages before national courts<br />
(4) Procedural aspects of enforcement of EC competition law before national<br />
courts<br />
§11.5. Cooperation between national courts and the Commission<br />
(1) Assistance of national courts by the Commission<br />
(2) Assistance of the Commission by national courts<br />
§11.6. Conclusion<br />
ARBITRATION<br />
§11.7. Introduction<br />
§11.8. EC competition law and arbitration: general principles<br />
§11.9. Impact of the Regulation on Procedure on arbitration<br />
12. SPECIAL SECTORS<br />
TELECOMMUNICATIONS<br />
§12.1. Introduction<br />
§12.2. Competition issues arising in the electronic communications sector<br />
(1) Article 81<br />
(2) Application of the Merger Regulation in the electronic communications<br />
sector<br />
(3) Article 82<br />
(4) Sector inquiries<br />
§12.3. Regulatory framework applying to the electronic communications sector<br />
(1) The ‘old’ regulatory framework
(2) The new regulatory framework<br />
(3) Further EU telecommunications reform<br />
(4) Third generation (3G) mobile communications<br />
TRANSPORT<br />
§12.4. Introduction<br />
§12.5. Air transport<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) Market liberalization<br />
(3) Procedural framework for enforcement of competition law in the air transport<br />
sector: overview<br />
(4) Competition priorities in the air transport sector<br />
§12.6. Maritime transport<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) The implementation of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty in the maritime<br />
sector<br />
(3) The Consortia Block Exemption<br />
§12.7. Transport by rail, road and inland waterway<br />
(1) Introduction<br />
(2) Regulation 1017/68<br />
(3) Liberalization in the railway sector<br />
POSTAL SERVICES<br />
§12.8. Introduction<br />
§12.9. Legislative developments in the postal sector<br />
(1) Directive 97/67/EC and amendments<br />
(2) Postal Notice<br />
§12.10. Cases and decisions<br />
(1) Application of competition rules/the scope of the reserved area<br />
(2) Abuse of a dominant position<br />
(3) Price-fixing agreements<br />
(4) Recent developments<br />
ELECTRICITY AND GAS<br />
§12.11. Introduction<br />
(1) Background<br />
(2) History<br />
(3) The institutional framework common to the electricity and gas markets<br />
§12.12. The Electricity Directive (the 2003 regime)<br />
(1) Quantitative liberalization<br />
(2) Qualitative liberalization<br />
(3) Public service objectives<br />
(4) The Third Energy Package (expected to enter into force in 2009)<br />
§12.13. Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-border exchanges of electricity<br />
(1) TSO compensation<br />
(2) Access charges<br />
(3) Provision of information regarding interconnection capacities<br />
(4) Congestion management<br />
(5) New interconnectors and exemptions from TPA obligations<br />
§12.14. Safeguarding security of electricity supply and promoting infra-structure investment<br />
(1) Roles and responsibilities of TSOs and electricity suppliers<br />
(2) Balancing supply and demand<br />
(3) Network investment<br />
(4) Interconnector construction<br />
§12.15. The Gas Directive (the 2003 regime)
(1) Quantitative liberalization<br />
(2) Qualitative liberalization<br />
(3) Public service objectives<br />
(4) New infrastructure and exemptions from TPA obligations<br />
(5) The Third Energy Package (expected to enter into force in 2009)<br />
§12.16. Conditions of access to the gas transmission networks<br />
(1) Access charges<br />
(2) Capacity allocation and congestion management procedures<br />
(3) Balancing and imbalance charges<br />
(4) Secondary markets<br />
§12.17. Safeguarding security of gas supply<br />
(1) Defining national security of gas supply policy<br />
(2) Minimum security of gas supply standards<br />
(3) Commission monitoring and possible intervention<br />
§12.18. Case law and decisional practice<br />
(1) Case law of the Court of Justice<br />
(2) Commission practice<br />
THE INSURANCE SECTOR<br />
§12.19. The applicability of the competition rules to the insurance industry<br />
§12.20. Insurance Block Exemption<br />
(1) Joint calculations, tables and studies of risks<br />
(2) Standard policy conditions and models<br />
(3) Common coverage of certain types of risks<br />
(4) Security devices<br />
(5) Review<br />
§12.21. Insurance intermediaries<br />
§12.22. Business insurance<br />
BANKING<br />
§12.23. Introduction<br />
(1) Application of competition law to banking services<br />
(2) Merger Control<br />
(3) Effect on trade between Member States<br />
(4) The sector inquiry, the Green Paper on Retail Financial Services and the<br />
Single Market Review<br />
§12.24. Application of Article 81 to price agreements<br />
(1) Price agreements concerning services provided by banks to their customers<br />
(2) Price agreements concerning services provided between banks<br />
§12.25. Application of Article 81 to non-price agreements<br />
§12.26. Article 82<br />
COMPETITION POLICY AND SPORTS<br />
§12.27. Introduction<br />
§12.28. Specific characteristics of sport and their implications for competition law<br />
§12.29. Organization of sport<br />
(1) Principle of territoriality<br />
(2) Monopoly of the federations<br />
(3) Rules relating to the ownership of sporting clubs<br />
§12.30. Broadcasting rights<br />
(1) Particularities of sport broadcasting<br />
(2) Relevant market<br />
(3) Exclusivity<br />
(4) Joint selling and purchasing<br />
(5) Organizational rules in the area of broadcasting
§12.31. Other sources of revenues for associations and clubs<br />
(1) Ticketing<br />
(2) Sponsorship agreements and exclusivity granted to providers of equipment<br />
§12.32. Rules relating to players<br />
(1) Movement of players/transfer rights<br />
(2) Rules on players’ agents<br />
(3) Doping<br />
SECTORS SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC TREATY RULES: NUCLEAR, AGRICULTURE<br />
AND DEFENCE<br />
§12.33. Outline of this section<br />
§12.34. Nuclear energy<br />
§12.35. Agriculture<br />
(1) Application of the competition rules to agriculture<br />
(2) Exceptions under the Regulation on Competition in Agricultural Products<br />
(3) Procedure<br />
§12.36. Defence<br />
Annex I BASIC COMPETITION PROVISIONS <strong>OF</strong> THE EC TREATY<br />
Annex II COMMON NAMES USED FOR LEGISLATION, NOTICES, GUIDELINES AND<br />
OTHER COMMISSION DOCUMENTS<br />
Annex III <strong>TABLE</strong> <strong>OF</strong> CASES<br />
INDEX