REPORT OF THE - Archives - Syracuse University

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determination and passion. We are confident that its recommendations can enhance the security of the traveling public. For this is surely our first and highest responsibility. Sincerely, /s/ Ann McLaughlin Chairman The President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 In compliance with the Executive Order 12686 of August 4, 1989 the undersigned present the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. /s/ Honorable Ann McLaughlin Chairman, District of Columbia /s/ Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato Member, New York /s/ Honorable John Paul Hammerschmidt Member, New York /s/ Honorable Edward Hidalgo Member, Virginia /s/ Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg Member, New Jersey /s/ Honorable James L. Oberstar Member, Minnesota /s/ General Thomas C. Richards, USAF (Ret.) Member, Texas TABLE <strong>OF</strong> CONTENTS Executive Summary Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Pan Am Flight 103 Chapter 3 The Aviation Security System Chapter 4 Research and Development Chapter 5 Intelligence Chapter 6 Aviation Threat Notification - A National Standard Chapter 7 Treatment of the Families of Victims of Terrorism Chapter 8 National Will Final Thoughts Recommendations
Commission Members Commission Staff Appendix A The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 Appendix B Witnesses, Selected Interviews and Resources Appendix C Executive Orders Appendix D Review of Statistical Data with Respect to Pan American Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 Appendix E Acts of Aviation Sabotage Appendix F International Civil Aviation Organization Appendix G Organizational Charts Appendix H Selected Aviation Security Initiatives by the Department of Transportation Executive Summary National will and the moral courage to exercise it are the ultimate means for defeating terrorism. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism recommends a more vigorous U.S. policy that not only pursues and punishes terrorists but also makes state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions. With other nations of the free world, the United States must work to isolate politically, diplomatically and militarily the handful of outlaw nations sponsoring terrorism. These more vigorous policies should include planning and training for preemptive or retaliatory military strides against known terrorist enclaves in nations that harbor them. Where such direct strikes are inappropriate, the Commission recommends a lesser option, including covert operations, to prevent, disrupt or respond to terrorist acts. Rhetoric is no substitute for strong, effective action. The Commission's inquiry also finds that the U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public. This system needs major reform. The Commission found the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency - preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats. The Commission recommends actions designed to change this focus at the FAA. Pan Am's apparent security lapses and FAA's failure to enforce its own regulations followed a pattern that existed for months prior to Flight 103, during the day of the tragedy, and -notably - for nine months thereafter. These are the major findings and conclusions of the Commission, which began its work in mid-November of 1989 and reports to the President on May 15, 1990. The destruction of Pan American World Airways Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, was the reference point for the mission of this Commission. Pursuit of the full story of Flight 103 led the Commission also to a series of conclusions on
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Page 5 and 6: Am 103, every bag carried on an air
Page 7 and 8: there were no passengers from Mosco
Page 9 and 10: The State Department must take majo
Page 11 and 12: The Commission's investigation has
Page 13 and 14: Huebner raised these concerns in Ma
Page 15 and 16: The eighth bulletin detailed events
Page 17 and 18: Those U.S. officials accepted the F
Page 19 and 20: \s\ William C. Kelly Administrative
Page 21 and 22: conduct the initial screening of al
Page 23 and 24: Bags coming in from Frankfurt were
Page 25 and 26: improved baggage reconciliation sys
Page 27 and 28: 14 meeting. He remembered the meeti
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Page 31 and 32: None of the minutes in 1987, howeve
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Page 35 and 36: airports that loaded and dispatched
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Page 39 and 40: In an additional effort to preserve
Page 41 and 42: The Commission discussed security w
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Page 45 and 46: international travel. The thing tha
Page 47 and 48: FAA reports. However, such issues a
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Page 51 and 52: will support or replace it, accordi
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more difficult to implement conting
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employee reportedly brought the wea
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The Congress should require crimina
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weapons at screening points have no
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The Commission recommends that the
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Air cargo also is big business for
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airlines also are truly in a better
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the airlines. It also varies within
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impossible situation. These differe
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Working with the FBI, the FAA must
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To ensure accountability, a clear l
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percentage of Americans flying on U
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explosive compound, are available t
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screen interline and intraline bagg
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The FAA should establish an expert
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terrorists, are technologically sop
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These non-CIA staff members are int
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counterintelligence collected by th
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the FAA ID will send out circulars
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personnel, and this will enable the
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of international terrorism reportin
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task, considering the mass of data
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esponsibility that this difficulty
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determine how many, if any, attacks
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McDonnell Douglas DC10. Approximate
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These three threat advisories were
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"credible." The Commission believes
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coordination between the airlines a
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"Aviation Security," Senate Committ
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The disaster occurred in an English
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following the disaster. In this reg
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The State Department Task Force Han
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Commission believes the families be
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guidance on response to terrorist d
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carriers can be held accountable fo
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sponsor their activities. The pract
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coordinating distribution of the ca
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Early on we were asked a lot of que
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having failed to take any action on
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Historically, terrorism consisted o
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Pursuing terrorists and responding
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This Report represents an important
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The FAA should establish an expert
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Armed Services, to adopt appropriat
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he chairs the Subcommittee on Aviat
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Susan L. Pickrel, Executive Secreta
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Corner, Tracey Jane, 17, Millhouses
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Morgan, Jane Ann, 37, London, Engla
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Williams, Stephanie Leigh, 1, Crown
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Raymond F. Smith Mark A. Sanna Jenn
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Cathy Christianson Chris A. Christi
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Hart Hanstein Capt. Ed Harris Chris
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William Cohen William Colby Walter
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Flight 715 with Pan Am Flight 103,
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Table P-1. Total Passengers Carried
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16 369 290 301 115 17 410 412 198 9
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Table P-4. Passengers Carried, LHR/
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12 95.1 74.0 74.8 13 77.4 47.1 81.3
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22 177.6 173.7 105.3 23 171.4 189.3
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(Philippines) Manila, Philippines T
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who had detonated the bomb (a charg
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insured passenger. 07/08/65 Canadia
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Homemade and crude explosive device
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hole3' x 2' through bottom of fusel
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(Great Britain) 09/06/70. Diverted
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Aircraft landed safely at Rome. 09/
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12/17/73 Pan American World Airways
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entered a steep climb and then went
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forward baggage compartment. 05/21/
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smoke appeared in cabin. Aircraft l
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08/19/83 Syrian Airlines (Syria) Ro
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compartment The aircraft was not da
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of South Africa) area. 12/21/88 Pan
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several others. A bag, which contai
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the Rome and Vienna airport massacr
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Section in the new Aviation Securit
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Elevating standards for x-ray and m
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The FAA has negotiated the placemen
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