REPORT OF THE - Archives - Syracuse University

counterterrorism policy in general, as detailed in the section on National Will at the end
of the main body of this Report.
The Commission also conducted a thorough examination of certain civil aviation security
requirements, policies and procedures surrounding Flight 103. It is a disturbing story.
The destruction of Flight 103 may well have been preventable. Stricter baggage
reconciliation procedures could have stopped any unaccompanied checked bags from
boarding the flight at Frankfurt. Requiring that all baggage containers be fully secured
would have prevented any tampering that may have occurred with baggage left in a
partially filled, unguarded baggage container that was later loaded on the flight at
Heathrow. Stricter application of passenger screening procedures would have increased
the likelihood of intercepting any unknowing "dupe" or saboteur from checking a bomb
into the plane at either airport.
The international criminal investigation has not yet determined precisely how the device
was loaded onto the plane. Until that occurs and subject to the conclusions reached, the
Commission cannot say with certainty that more rigid application of any particular
procedure actually would have stopped the sabotage of the flight.
This Report contains more than 60 detailed recommendations designed to improve the
civil aviation security system to deter and prevent terrorist attacks. Before new laws are
passed and more regulations are promulgated, existing ones must be fully enforced and
properly carried out. The Commission emphasizes that no amount of governmental
reorganization or technological developments can ever replace the need for well-trained,
highly motivated people to make the security system work.
The Commission salutes the thousands of men and women in the public and private
sectors of the U.S. civil aviation security system. The recommendations in this report are
designed to help them perform their jobs more effectively. The Commission urges
management to face up to the security system failures disclosed by this investigation.
A few facts can be stated with certainty about Pan Am 103. A terrorist element did
succeed in having a bomb placed aboard the aircraft. That bomb blew the aircraft apart at
31,000 feet over Lockerbie, killing 259 persons on the airplane and 11 on the ground.
The criminal investigation has indicated that the bomb was placed in a radio cassette
player and packed in a suitcase loaded into the plane's baggage hold. The Commission,
therefore, was able to concentrate its investigation on security procedures for checked
baggage.
Authorities also believe that the bomb was made of a very small quantity of semtex. a
plastic explosive, and that it probably was placed aboard at Frankfurt, West Germany,
where the flight began.
At the end of an October 1988 inspection of Pan Am's security operations at Frankfurt,
the FAA inspector was troubled by the lack of a tracking system for interline bags
transferring from other airlines and the confused state of passenger screening procedures.
Overall, the inspector wrote, "the system, trying adequately to control approximately
4,500 passengers and 28 flights per day, is being held together only by a very labor
intensive operation and the tenuous threads of luck." Even so, the inspector concluded, "it
appears the minimum [FAA] requirements can and are being met."
Passenger/baggage reconciliation is the bedrock of any heightened civil air security
system. Under current FAA requirements for international flights, implemented since Pan