REPORT OF THE - Archives - Syracuse University

information transmitted to Pan Am on November 18, 1988, had confirmed that physical
search of unaccompanied baggage, among other procedures, was to be "rigorously
applied."
Testifying before the Commission, Mr. Salazar agreed that Pan Am's substitute X-ray
procedure constituted "a violation of noncompliance." Nevertheless, all reference to the
absence of the required passenger/baggage match procedure for interline baggage loaded
on Flight 103 at Frankfurt was deleted from the FAA's official "letter of investigation"
concerning the flight, as a result of comments from a senior official in Mr. Salazar's
office that more specifics were needed. The FAA subsequently emphasized that its civil
penalty letter contained "no allegations that any of the violations contributed to the Flight
103 tragedy."
As to the necessity for a formal FAA exemption permitting the substitute X-ray
procedure, the Commission notes that Pan Am also had not sought or received such an
exemption from the FAA's standard requiring Pan Am to search its service employees at
Frankfurt airport. Pan Am testified it had a "working agreement" with the FAA since at
least April 1986 on this subject. For several years Pan Am did not search its uniformed
maintenance employees at Frankfurt airport but was not cited by the FAA for such a
violation.
Another U.S. carrier with operations at Frankfurt airport did formally request an
exemption from the FAA in October 1988 that would permit X-ray rather than physical
search of unaccompanied baggage in certain circumstances. The FAA denied the request,
but not until April 1989 - four months after Flight 103 had been destroyed, the interline
baggage lapse had been identified and the FAA had tightened its passenger/baggage
requirements.
The FAA provided the Commission with an April 20, 1990 survey of 53 FAA agents who
had inspected Section XV airports during 1988. No inspector recalled a U.S. carrier
substituting X-ray for physical search of unaccompanied baggage or stating it had done
so.
The Commission is not in a position to resolve the direct conflict between sworn
testimony of Pan Am and FAA officials. Nor is it necessary to do so.
Unquestionably, the circumstances surrounding Pan Am's interline baggage procedure at
Frankfurt on December 21, 1988, are of direct, if not critical, importance to the question
of how the bomb could have been placed on Flight 103.
The undisputed facts before the Commission show that passenger/baggage reconciliation
is a bedrock component of any heightened security system; that Pan Am employees
concededly did not follow even the FAA's written reconciliation requirement for interline
baggage at Frankfurt; and that the FAA did not cite Pan Am for failing to follow the
FAA's mandated procedure in that respect for Flight 103.
Finally, given the high level of threat warning in Frankfurt during December 1988,
nothing prevented Pan Am from instituting, or the FAA from imposing, complete
passenger/bag reconciliation just as was done in January 1989.
The systems, both private and public, which allowed the interline baggage gap to
continue, were fundamentally flawed.
Warning Information
Commission staff has reviewed intelligence traffic that, even in retrospect, would appear
to have warned of a possible terrorist act such as Flight 103. The review showed that no