REPORT OF THE - Archives - Syracuse University

The commission's examination of the security program applied by U.S. carriers at foreign
airports revealed that much has been done to strengthen them since December 1988,
especially at high threat airports. However, foreign governments have not imposed
equally stringent requirements on carriers under their jurisdiction, and the U.S. has relied
on weak international standards for foreign carrier security. As a result, there are
significant imbalances. The Commission recommends steps to improve aviation security
internationally and to promote the use of bilateral agreements negotiated by the State
Department as the mechanism to achieve a consistently high level of international
aviation security.
As part of its mandate, the Commission assessed the coordination and evaluation and
dissemination of intelligence information collected. The Commission found that, because
of the government's increased intelligence activities targeted at terrorism and the
increased resources being devoted to intelligence functions by the FAA, the system is
working reasonable well.
The Commission's review showed that no warnings specific to Flight 103 were received
by U.S. intelligence agencies from any source at any time. It also showed that no
information bearing upon the security of civil aviation in general and flights originating
in Frankfurt in particular was received beyond that which was promptly disseminated to
the FAA and, in turn, immediately to U.S. air carriers.
Major recommendations of the Commission, as contained in this report, include;
The United States should pursue a more vigorous counterterrorism policy, particularly
with respect to nations sponsoring terrorists.
Congress should enact legislation to create a position of Assistant Secretary of
Transportation for Security and Intelligence, an appointment with tenure to establish a
measure of independence.
The FAA security division should be elevated within the agency to a position that reports
directly to the Administrator.
Through existing FAA resources, the federal government should manage security at
domestic airports through a system of federal security managers.
The State Department should conduct negotiations with foreign governments to permit
U.S. carriers operating there to carry out FAA-required screening and other security
procedures. Airlines cannot be expected to conduct international negotiations in order to
comply with regulations of their own government.
The FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation should proceed with plans to conduct
an assessment of the security threat at domestic airports.
The FAA should launch a top priority research and development program to produce new
techniques and equipment that will detect small amounts of plastic explosives,
operationally at airports. The program to require U.S. carriers to purchase and deploy the
existing TNA machine should be deferred. However, the Commission expects the FAA to
continue aggressively its new emphasis on upgrading the aviation security system's
human and technical capabilities.
Public notification of threats to civil aviation should be made under certain
circumstances. As a rule, however, such notification must be universal, to avoid any
appearance of favored treatment of certain individuals or groups.
Victims of terrorist actions aimed at the United States Government should qualify for
special financial compensation as victims of acts of aggression against their country.