AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S AESTHETICS

INTRODUCTION 9
analysis of the judgment of taste. The analysis of the judgment of taste is thus
placed at the very beginning of his aesthetics, both literally and as a matter of
method.
In this analysis of the judgment of taste, Kant proceeds according to themes
he was very much concerned with in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely the
“logical function of the understanding in judgments” and the so-called “categories,”
or “concepts of pure understanding.” Kant has introduced these categories
of the understanding in the first Critique, and he uses them now as a
guiding thread of analysis in the third Critique. Keeping this in mind of course
makes sense only if in a judgment of taste, which we will see is not a cognitive
judgment, we still find elements, or features, of cognition and understanding that
would justify this type of analysis, i.e. an analysis that is guided by glances back
to the first Critique.
The two main discoveries that Kant makes by analyzing the judgment of taste
in this way are the following: First, there is the so-called “free play of our cognitive
powers,” imagination and understanding. This is a pleasant (or unpleasant)
interplay within or of our mind, with perceptions that we have of something we
see or otherwise perceive through our senses and that we judge to be beautiful
(or ugly). According to Kant, when we look at a painting, it is our imagination
(Einbildungskraft), or “power of imagination,” that intuitively takes up, goes
through, recollects and recalls what we see; and it is our understanding that tries
to grasp and decide what is depicted or what it all means. In aesthetic contemplation
this is primarily enjoyable by itself and not a way of gaining knowledge.
It is a “free play.” (We will explain this notion further in later sections. See, for
example, the last section of chapter 2: “How to Read Section 9.”) Nevertheless,
this play is not without relation to cognition. It is related to what Kant calls “cognition
in general” (Erkenntnis überhaupt).
The second discovery goes deeper. It reveals something that allows us to see
this free play in a wider perspective, as something based on our relationship to
the environment, a relationship not just within our mind, but one between ourselves,
our mind or inner nature, and the outer nature that surrounds us. Kant
here discovers an a priori principle that is new in his philosophical system, an a
priori principle that belongs to our power of judgment. According to Kant, we
base our judgment of taste on some kind of “purposiveness” [Zweckmässigkeit]
of the object in relation to our aesthetic contemplation of it. We simply find the
object suitable for an aesthetic contemplation in the form of a free and joyful play
of our powers of cognition. We cannot exactly point out what it is that accounts
for this purposiveness, or suitability. There is no objective criterion. We have to
give the play a try, so to speak. We have to try the object out. And basically
anybody can do this. Kant’s aesthetics therefore does not stress on connoisseurship
or even favor elitism, and as we shall see later on, Kant even points out some