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FMJL Current Transformer Failures - Energy Networks Association

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MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY RISKS FROM EQUIPMENT<br />

RETAINED IN SERVICE WITH AN ABNORMAL CONDITION<br />

Place your chosen<br />

image here. The four<br />

corners must just<br />

cover the arrow tips.<br />

For covers, the three<br />

pictures should be the<br />

same size and in a<br />

straight line.<br />

Gary Thornton, Asset Strategy & Engineering Manager<br />

10:30 – 10:50


What are the Consequences of Equipment Failure?<br />

Willesden QB Failure 2008<br />

Cardiff East <strong>FMJL</strong> Failure 2009<br />

Connahs Quay <strong>FMJL</strong><br />

Failure 2011<br />

Deeside <strong>FMJL</strong> Failure 2009<br />

Indian Queens <strong>FMJL</strong> Failure 2010<br />

3


<strong>FMJL</strong> <strong>Current</strong> <strong>Transformer</strong> <strong>Failures</strong><br />

<strong>FMJL</strong><br />

Type - Bar<br />

Primary<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

<br />

Primary goes through CT on a<br />

straight bar<br />

CT rings arranged around the primary<br />

Secondary leads go to the bottom of<br />

the CT<br />

The CT rings are covered by a copper<br />

tape<br />

Secondary wires go through a metal<br />

pole<br />

Both connected together and earthed at<br />

bottom<br />

<br />

Primary <strong>Current</strong> 2000A down to<br />

Secondary <strong>Current</strong> of 1A. Used for<br />

Protection (measures up to 63,000A<br />

fault current) and Metering<br />

4


<strong>FMJL</strong> / FMVG <strong>Failures</strong> by 2009<br />

2009 - Deeside 400kV <strong>FMJL</strong><br />

2009 - Upper Boat 33kV FMVG<br />

2009 - Cardiff East 275kV <strong>FMJL</strong><br />

1997 - Oldbury 400kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Not established /<br />

breather manufacturing defect<br />

1992 - Littlebrook 132kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Not established /<br />

possible insulation design<br />

5 failures (2 pre 2000) & 6 removed from service<br />

following poor oil results<br />

Significant number of failures world wide – 22<br />

5


<strong>FMJL</strong> <strong>Failures</strong><br />

Understanding the Failure Modes<br />

Major insulation failure of toroid or stem insulation due to:-<br />

Materials / Manufacturing Defect (normally ‘burn in’ issue)<br />

Degradation by partial discharge<br />

Degradation due to thermal or moisture or poor quality of oil<br />

High Temperature Operation<br />

HV internal bonding lead connection failure<br />

Loss of Insulation oil<br />

Breather blockage<br />

Open Circuit CT / CT Test Tap<br />

CT on open circuit develops an infinite voltage leading to rapid<br />

insulation breakdown and disruptive failure<br />

6


Progression Mechanism for a Dielectric Failure of the<br />

Insulation in an Oil Impregnated Instrument <strong>Transformer</strong><br />

DGA<br />

FREE GAS<br />

FORMATION<br />

AUDIBLE NOISE<br />

THERMOVISION AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF RFI<br />

FAILURE<br />

CHANGES IN OIL INDICATORS OR PRESSURE GAUGES<br />

RISING<br />

ACETYLENE<br />

DETECTABLE CHANGE IN CAPACITANCE<br />

DETECTABLE RFI<br />

DETECTABLE CHANGE IN TAN DELTA<br />

Gas level rising<br />

LONG TERM<br />

MEDIUM TERM<br />

SHORT TERM<br />

V SHORT<br />

TERM<br />

7


<strong>FMJL</strong> <strong>Failures</strong><br />

How we managed the risk Since 2009<br />

Quantified Risk Assessment based on ALARP principles using historic<br />

failures, number of units, length in service, equipment condition data,<br />

ballistic data, diagnostic data, exposure, and vulnerability<br />

Risk cannot be justified<br />

except in extraordinary<br />

circumstances<br />

Control measures<br />

introduced for the risks in<br />

this region to drive the<br />

residual risk toward the<br />

broadly acceptable region<br />

Level of residual risk<br />

regarded as insignificant<br />

and further effort to<br />

reduce risk is not likely to<br />

be required<br />

8


<strong>FMJL</strong> <strong>Failures</strong><br />

How we managed the risk Since 2009<br />

Unacceptable risk under normal site operating conditions putting public<br />

and staff at risk<br />

2009 - 142 sites affecting 40% of the network<br />

Risk mitigation considerations ERICPD –<br />

Switch Out (remove the hazard)<br />

Risk Management hazard zones (75m)<br />

Physical Barriers (ballistic screening)<br />

Development of PD Trailer and Alarm Pod<br />

2009, 94 Site Specific Risk Assessments undertaken in one week where<br />

RMHZ extended onto public land<br />

Issued ENA, Dangerous Incident Notice (DIN) and Suspension of<br />

Operating Practice (SOP) notice and set up ENA working group to provide<br />

9<br />

an industry response


Overlapping RMHZs – Restricting Access,<br />

Impact of Overdue Maintenance and<br />

Mitigation Measures<br />

All SGTs have RMHZs<br />

applied to <strong>FMJL</strong>s on the HV<br />

In order to replace SGT2<br />

<strong>FMJL</strong>s and outage is<br />

required on SGT1, 2 and<br />

potentially 3 to allow access<br />

to the work area for cranes.<br />

This is not always possible<br />

Steel containers are good<br />

for perimeter protection<br />

but due to phase & earth<br />

clearances can not always<br />

be applied within the<br />

substation<br />

Ballistic Screening takes up a large<br />

footprint requires outages to erect<br />

and cannot always be applied<br />

between circuit bays<br />

Failure to maintain<br />

CB due to <strong>FMJL</strong><br />

RMHZ may incur an<br />

additional 50m<br />

RMHZ until complete<br />

10


Development of PD Trailer and<br />

Alarm Pod<br />

Mobile PD monitoring trailer can be deployed and set up in any position in<br />

the substations using wireless communication and gives:<br />

Directional coverage to indicate location and specific area of PD, i.e.<br />

detection of the first signs of electrical breakdown prior to a fault<br />

Time of flight measurement calculated to give range and direction onto a<br />

2D layout drawing hosted onto a web server for remote access<br />

Alarm pod built with audible (sounding alarm) and visible warning (flashing<br />

lights):<br />

Sends a text alert when activated to selected staff and our <strong>Networks</strong><br />

Operations Centre<br />

11


<strong>FMJL</strong> <strong>Failures</strong><br />

Result of Intensive Forensic Analysis<br />

2011 - Connah’s Quay 400kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Materials /<br />

manufacturing defect<br />

2010 - Indian Queens 132kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Moisture ingress<br />

2009 - Deeside 400kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Test tap circuit failure<br />

2009 - Cardiff East 275kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Moisture ingress<br />

1997 - Oldbury 400kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Not established /<br />

breather manufacturing defect<br />

1992 - Littlebrook 132kV <strong>FMJL</strong> – Not established /<br />

possible insulation design<br />

2009 – Upper Boat 33kV FMVG – Moisture ingress /<br />

manufacturing defect<br />

Overall Conclusion – Remove from the System<br />

12


<strong>FMJL</strong>/VG – Replacement Programme as<br />

at end March 2012<br />

Original population – 467 circuits, 199 circuits removed to date<br />

43% of population<br />

54 circuits removed prior to 11/12<br />

145 circuits removed in 11/12<br />

Aiming to have all <strong>FMJL</strong> and FMVG removed by end 2013/14<br />

13


Summary<br />

Safety of our staff, contractors and the public is our number<br />

“1” priority<br />

Significant number of <strong>FMJL</strong>/VG failures UK and world wide<br />

Forensic Analysis confirms removal of these units the right<br />

course of action<br />

When dealing with assets in an abnormal condition:<br />

Understand potential failure modes and determine cause of<br />

actual failures<br />

Quantify the risks using a quantified risk assessment using<br />

ALARP principles<br />

Use ERICPD Principles to mitigate the risks<br />

Understand and deal with your secondary risks<br />

14


Thank you<br />

Mark Osborne, System Strategy, National Grid

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