90 percent by sea - Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

high water mark. Indeed, the concept for a ‘group system’ of numerous, cheap, small but
modular, highly capable sloops readily optimised for sea control – across the spectrum of
conflict – may finally neuter the specious ‘constabulary versus warfighting’ debate, 152 enable
more sensible employment of extremely expensive and bespoke capabilities – “buying back”
genuine contingency and readiness - whilst adding significantly to the core requirement of
sea control.
The National Security Strategy recognises that ‘we must use all instruments of national
power to prevent conflict and avert threats beyond our shores’. 153 An opportunity exists to
articulate how the totality of the nation’s seapower can be brought to bear via an integrated
maritime strategy which defines the nation’s requirements of the sea and describes the ways
and means to achieve it, integrating military forces, maritime trade and the tapestry of
domestic maritime activity upon which the nation depends; indeed, it is instructive that the
UK has none whilst emerging economic powers do. Clearly, the RN has a central role, with a
powerful narrative at its core: the maintenance of the international maritime system as both a
peacetime imperative, under the maritime security banner, and an inherent requirement
during warfighting, where the system may be most threatened. With the recognition that ‘our
national security depends on our economic security and vice versa’, 154 the ability to
guarantee the use of the sea for our own purposes and, if necessary, to deny its use to
others – for either commerce or for military purposes, across the spectrum of conflict - should
become the RN’s defining raison d’etre and critical Joint contribution: one which requires the
full spectrum capability of the ‘balanced fleet’ just as much now as always.
152 Ibid., passim
153 National Security Strategy, 9
154 Ibid., 4
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