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<strong>Vol</strong>. <strong>II</strong>, Issue 5 – May 2013<br />

THE ISSUE: South China Sea Code of Conduct<br />

In the 22 nd ASEAN Summit held on 24-25 April 2013, Southeast Asian leaders “reaffirmed the importance of peace,<br />

stability, <strong>and</strong> maritime security in the region.” The Chairman’s Statement noted that ASEAN would “continue to<br />

work actively with China on the way forward for the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea<br />

(COC) on the basis of consensus”. The statement also noted that all disputes must be resolved in accordance with<br />

the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea <strong>and</strong> stressed on the importance for the need of a legally binding code of<br />

conduct <strong>and</strong> that ASEAN will be pursuing the matter with China. In November 2002, ASEAN <strong>and</strong> China signed the<br />

Declaration on the conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) wherein it was reaffirmed that “the adoption of<br />

a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace <strong>and</strong> stability in the region <strong>and</strong> agree to work,<br />

on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.”<br />

Even after ten years since the DOC was signed, China <strong>and</strong> ASEAN are yet<br />

to develop a formally binding COC in the South China Sea. In July 2011,<br />

ASEAN <strong>and</strong> China agreed on a set of implementation guidelines for the<br />

DOC but have not yet engaged in talks to frame the COC. In July 2012,<br />

China issued a statement stating that “it is willing to work with the ASEAN<br />

countries to discuss formulating the COC when the conditions are ripe”.<br />

Later that month, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers released a statement on<br />

“Six Point Principles on the South China Sea” in which one of the points<br />

was “early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China<br />

Sea”.<br />

Despite the efforts <strong>and</strong> the interests of the ASEAN nations to draw a legally binding COC, it has failed to engage<br />

China in formulating the document. Moreover, ASEAN itself is divided over issues on the South China Sea.<br />

Cambodia a close ally of China pushed for Beijing’s inclusion in the ASEAN discussion which was strongly opposed<br />

<strong>by</strong> the Philippines <strong>and</strong> the Vietnam. The Philippines argue that China should be invited for discussions <strong>and</strong><br />

negotiations once ASEAN has formulated its own COC. Discussion regarding the COC is obstructed <strong>by</strong> the<br />

different approaches adopted <strong>by</strong> China <strong>and</strong> the Philippines <strong>and</strong> Vietnam respectively. During his recent visit to<br />

Indonesia, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has proposed open negotiations with ASEAN to draw up binding<br />

rules of conduct in the South China Sea <strong>and</strong> according to ASEAN Secretary General Le Luong Minh, a special<br />

meeting between ASEAN <strong>and</strong> Chinese foreign ministers will be held in August to discuss the code of conduct issue.<br />

Recent Analyses on the Issue<br />

Ian Storey, “Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic Efforts”, CNAS, 20 March 2013.<br />

Leszek Busszynski, “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, <strong>and</strong> the South China Sea”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, <strong>Vol</strong>.25, No.4, 2003, pp.<br />

343-62.<br />

Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?”, The Asia Pacific Journal,<br />

10 no. 4, August 2012.<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

1


MEDIA WATCH COMMENTARIES REPORT<br />

Chinese officials fill up first<br />

Sansha cruise in disputed seas<br />

ASEAN, Chinese Foreign<br />

Ministers to meet over South<br />

China Sea disputes<br />

South China Sea disputes<br />

dominate first day of ASEAN<br />

summit<br />

ASEAN upbeat on progress on<br />

South China Sea<br />

Eight Chinese vessels enter<br />

Senkaku area<br />

Chinese navy patrols Diaoyu<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s on treaty anniversary<br />

China accuses Japan of ‘making<br />

trouble’ over Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

China points finger at U.S. over<br />

Asia-Pacific tensions<br />

Chinese navy continues highsea<br />

training<br />

Japan, Vietnam to hold maritime<br />

security talks in May<br />

Japan, Taiwan agree on fishing<br />

zone near disputed isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

China to boost maritime<br />

training, says PLA Navy's Jiang<br />

Weilie<br />

India’s interest in the South<br />

China Sea: Freedom of<br />

Navigation<br />

- Darshana M. Baruah<br />

The South China Sea (SCS) is<br />

major Sea Line of Communication<br />

(SLOC) <strong>and</strong> an important trade<br />

route. Conflict in the area concerns<br />

all Asian nations including India.<br />

Though India is not a claimant in<br />

the territorial disputes in the region it<br />

holds an interest in the Freedom of<br />

Navigation (FON). China treats<br />

the SCS as its internal waters which<br />

invariable affects India’s interest.<br />

New Delhi has reiterated its stance<br />

on the “Freedom of Navigation”<br />

underlining the necessity for<br />

uninterrupted access to international<br />

waters. India must st<strong>and</strong> committed<br />

to its rhetoric on the FON <strong>and</strong> to<br />

defend its interests should the need<br />

arise. This in turn would involve<br />

deepening naval cooperation with the<br />

key countries of the ASEAN <strong>and</strong><br />

major powers sharing India’s interest<br />

in defending the principle of FON.<br />

This article looks at India’s primary<br />

interest in the SCS in the context of<br />

growing Chinese assertiveness.<br />

Interaction with Vice Admiral<br />

Scott H. Swift, Comm<strong>and</strong>er,<br />

US 7 th Fleet<br />

The United States is in a unique<br />

situation where it continues to say it<br />

does not take a position in the<br />

territorial disputes in South China<br />

Sea <strong>and</strong> East China Sea, but it has<br />

treaty obligations with Japan<br />

Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Philippines. If<br />

these countries were attacked, the<br />

US would be compelled to invoke the<br />

treaty obligations, Admiral Swift<br />

said during an interaction with<br />

ORF scholars.<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

The section provides a list of recent<br />

publications on the South China<br />

Sea disputes:<br />

ARTICLES<br />

COMMENTARIES<br />

PAPERS<br />

REPORTS<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

2


MEDIA WATCH<br />

Chinese officials fill up first<br />

Sansha cruise in disputed seas<br />

More civil servants than actual<br />

tourists climbed aboard the first<br />

Chinese cruise ship to visit<br />

disputed South China Sea isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

on 28 April. Only 100 of 240<br />

passengers were regular citizens,<br />

the Shanghai<br />

Morning<br />

Post reported on 29 April. The rest<br />

were civil servants from various<br />

government organs in Hainan<br />

province. The debut cruise went to<br />

the Paracel Isl<strong>and</strong>s' Sansha, the<br />

newly established prefecture-level<br />

city created last year to consolidate<br />

China's de facto control. As many<br />

as 100 tourists paid between 7,000<br />

Yuan (HK$8,800) <strong>and</strong> 9,000 Yuan<br />

for the four-day voyage, but stayed<br />

in second-class cabins or lower.<br />

Officials <strong>and</strong> civil servants,<br />

however, were free to choose more<br />

luxurious cabins <strong>and</strong> pay less, the<br />

report said. A price chart obtained<br />

<strong>by</strong> the newspaper also showed that<br />

tourists were charged an extra<br />

3,250 Yuan per person than civil<br />

servants in similar cabins. But the<br />

newspaper said the tourists were<br />

not bothered <strong>by</strong> the unequal<br />

treatment. A Hunan passenger<br />

surnamed Ma said it was worth the<br />

money to experience the “original<br />

beauty” of Sansha. Everyone was<br />

subjected to the same high security<br />

checks during boarding, however.<br />

Passengers went through security<br />

checks twice, taking two hours for<br />

the whole process, the newspaper<br />

said. Plans to allow tourists to visit<br />

the Paracel Isl<strong>and</strong>s are the latest<br />

stage in China’s development of<br />

the territory, which has previously<br />

angered Vietnam <strong>and</strong> caused<br />

concern in Washington. Officials<br />

earlier this month confirmed they<br />

would open up the isl<strong>and</strong>s to<br />

tourism.<br />

Source: South China Morning Post, 29<br />

April 2013<br />

ASEAN, Chinese Foreign<br />

Ministers to meet over South<br />

China Sea disputes<br />

Secretary-General of Association of<br />

South East Asian Nations<br />

(ASEAN) Le Luong Minh said on<br />

29 April that foreign ministers of<br />

ASEAN member countries will<br />

have a meeting with their Chinese<br />

counterpart in Beijing to further<br />

discuss peaceful settlement on<br />

territorial disputes in the South<br />

China Sea. "The meeting between<br />

ASEAN foreign affairs ministers<br />

<strong>and</strong> Chinese foreign affairs minister<br />

has been scheduled in August or<br />

September this year in Beijing,"<br />

Minh told Xinhua on the sidelines<br />

of a media briefing on the results of<br />

the recent high-profile ASEAN<br />

Summit held in B<strong>and</strong>ar Seri<br />

Begawan, Brunei. He said that<br />

during the summit, all ASEAN<br />

members agreed to assign their<br />

foreign ministries to continue to<br />

work actively with China on the<br />

way forward for early conclusion of<br />

a Code of Conduct in the South<br />

China Sea (COC) on the basis of<br />

consensus. In his briefing, Minh<br />

said that ASEAN leaders<br />

reaffirmed the importance of<br />

peace, stability <strong>and</strong> maritime<br />

security in the region. They also<br />

underscored the importance of the<br />

Declaration on the Conduct of<br />

Parties in the South China Sea<br />

(DOC), ASEAN's six-point<br />

Principles on the South China Sea<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Joint Statement of the 10th<br />

anniversary of the DOC. "In this<br />

regard, we reaffirmed the collective<br />

commitments under the DOC to<br />

ensuring the peaceful resolution of<br />

dispute in accordance with<br />

universally recognized principles of<br />

international law, including the<br />

1982 United Nations Convention<br />

on the Law of the Sea without<br />

resorting to the threat or use of<br />

force, while exercising self-restraint<br />

in the conduct of activities," Minh<br />

said in the briefing. He added that<br />

ASEAN is looking forward to<br />

continued engagement with China<br />

in implementing the DOC in a full<br />

<strong>and</strong> effective manner, including<br />

through mutually agreed joint<br />

cooperative activities <strong>and</strong> projects.<br />

Source Xinhua, 29 April 2013<br />

South China Sea disputes<br />

dominate first day of ASEAN<br />

summit<br />

Territorial disputes in the South<br />

China Sea dominated the first day<br />

of a meeting of the leaders of the<br />

ASEAN, Philippine President<br />

Benigno Aquino said on 25 April.<br />

"Everybody is interested in having<br />

a peaceful resolution <strong>and</strong> also<br />

invoicing their concern that there<br />

have been increasing sea disputes,"<br />

he told reporters in a briefing at the<br />

Philippine Embassy in the capital<br />

of B<strong>and</strong>ar Seri Begawan. Aquino<br />

said Brunei Sultan Hassanal<br />

Bolkiah, chairman of ASEAN this<br />

year, immediately brought out the<br />

topic of the South China Sea <strong>and</strong><br />

the need to seek peaceful resolution<br />

of the disputes during the start of<br />

the two-day summit on 24 April.<br />

He added that as far as the<br />

Philippines is concerned; a legally<br />

binding code of conduct among<br />

countries with overlapping<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

3


territorial claims in the South China<br />

Sea would greatly ease tensions that<br />

have increased after recurring<br />

confrontations in the area. "There<br />

might be a consensus that we have<br />

to reach that really pushes the<br />

matter forward to really define<br />

everybody’s entitlements <strong>and</strong><br />

obligations," he said.<br />

Source: The Nation, 25 April 2013<br />

ASEAN upbeat on progress on<br />

South China Sea<br />

The ASEAN chair <strong>and</strong> Brunei<br />

leader on 25 April said that<br />

progress has been made during the<br />

ongoing summit of Southeast Asian<br />

leaders to push ahead with talks<br />

with China, bringing renewed<br />

optimism to the South China Sea<br />

issue. Brunei's Sultan Haji Hassanal<br />

Bolkiah told media during the last<br />

day of the 22nd ASEAN Summit<br />

that he was positive of the progress<br />

that has been achieved during talks<br />

between the 10 member states. He<br />

urged communication lines<br />

between the different countries to<br />

be kept open <strong>and</strong> called for<br />

stronger engagement to find a<br />

mutually acceptable solution<br />

between China <strong>and</strong> ASEAN<br />

claimants. "I believe that there are<br />

important practical procedures to<br />

achieve. For example if there is a<br />

storm at sea <strong>and</strong> fishermen shelter<br />

in the disputed waters, such an<br />

event can be misunderstood <strong>and</strong><br />

can cause unnecessary tension," he<br />

said. "Therefore it is important to<br />

establish a practical mechanism to<br />

deal with such instances such as<br />

hot lines between the relevant<br />

countries. It is my intention to<br />

continue discussions on such<br />

points," he added. The Chairman's<br />

Statement released at the summit<br />

also detailed expectations for<br />

continued engagement with China<br />

in implementing the Declaration on<br />

the Conduct of Parties in the South<br />

China Sea (DOC) in a "full <strong>and</strong><br />

effective manner.""We have tasked<br />

our ministers to continue to work<br />

actively with China on the way<br />

forward for the early conclusion of<br />

a Code of Conduct (COC) in the<br />

South China Sea on the basis of<br />

consensus," it added. Indonesia's<br />

Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa<br />

had earlier noted that there is no<br />

date set to launch formal<br />

negotiations between ASEAN <strong>and</strong><br />

China on COC in the disputed<br />

waters. Meanwhile, the ASEAN<br />

Secretary-General Le Luong Minh<br />

said on 25 April the bloc will come<br />

to the negotiating table as a group<br />

in South China Sea talks with<br />

China. "The South China Sea issue<br />

is not just about competing claims;<br />

it's about peace <strong>and</strong> stability in the<br />

region," Le told Xinhua in an<br />

interview on the sidelines of the<br />

summit. "Of course, it should be<br />

resolved among countries involved,<br />

but it also concerns the interest of<br />

other parties, concerns peace <strong>and</strong><br />

stability of the region," he said,<br />

adding, "The South China Sea is an<br />

important sea lane for the region<br />

<strong>and</strong> the world. Maritime security<br />

should be protected. "ASEAN is<br />

always willing <strong>and</strong> open to engage<br />

with China on this issue; we've<br />

already done this at the 19th<br />

ASEAN-China Senior Officials'<br />

Consultations. We've also agreed<br />

with the Chinese side to hold a<br />

ministerial level meeting later this<br />

year," said Le at the summit.<br />

Source: Global Times, 25 April 2013<br />

Eight Chinese vessels enter<br />

Senkaku area<br />

Eight Chinese maritime<br />

surveillance vessels entered<br />

Japanese territorial waters on 24<br />

April around the Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

in the East China Sea, the Japan<br />

Coast Guard said. China’s State<br />

Oceanic Administration said the<br />

vessels were there to monitor the<br />

activity of a flotilla of boats<br />

reportedly carrying members of a<br />

Japanese nationalist group. China<br />

regards the area as its territorial<br />

waters. This incident marks the<br />

highest number of Chinese ships<br />

that have entered the Japanese<br />

waters near the Senkakus since the<br />

Japanese central government<br />

purchased three of the Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

from their Saitama owner last<br />

September, <strong>and</strong> effectively<br />

nationalized the chain, according to<br />

the 11th Regional Coast Guard<br />

Headquarters in Naha, Okinawa<br />

Prefecture. The Foreign Ministry<br />

said it summoned the Chinese<br />

ambassador <strong>and</strong> lodged a protest<br />

over the maritime activity. “It is<br />

extremely regrettable <strong>and</strong><br />

unacceptable that Chinese state<br />

ships continue to engage in<br />

intrusion,” Chief Cabinet Secretary<br />

Yoshihide Suga told a news<br />

conference. “We are protesting<br />

strictly through our diplomatic<br />

channels.” The intrusion came after<br />

around 10 fishing boats carrying<br />

members of a conservative political<br />

group called Ganbare Nippon left<br />

Ishigaki Isl<strong>and</strong> in Okinawa <strong>and</strong><br />

headed toward the Senkakus on 22<br />

April night. China’s State Oceanic<br />

Administration said that after three<br />

of its marine surveillance ships —<br />

the Haijian 51, 23 <strong>and</strong> 46 —<br />

spotted the Japanese boats in the<br />

area of Uotsuri, the largest islet in<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

4


the Senkakus, five other ships —<br />

the Haijian 50, 15, 49, 66 <strong>and</strong> 137<br />

— were ordered to alter course <strong>and</strong><br />

converge on the area. Running in<br />

four formations, the eight Chinese<br />

ships monitored the Japanese ships<br />

from different angles, it said in a<br />

statement. Prime Minister Shinzo<br />

Abe vowed to “expel <strong>by</strong> force” any<br />

Chinese l<strong>and</strong>ing on the islets. “We<br />

would take decisive action against<br />

any attempt to enter territorial<br />

waters <strong>and</strong> to l<strong>and</strong>,” Abe told the<br />

Diet in response to questions from<br />

lawmakers. “We would never<br />

allow” a l<strong>and</strong>ing. “It would be<br />

natural for us to expel <strong>by</strong> force (the<br />

Chinese) if they were to make a<br />

l<strong>and</strong>ing,” he said. According to the<br />

11th Regional Coast Guard<br />

Headquarters, Japan’s surveillance<br />

vessels instructed the Chinese ships<br />

to leave after they entered the area<br />

in succession between 7:20 a.m.<br />

<strong>and</strong> 8:25 a.m. Two Chinese fishery<br />

surveillance vessels were also<br />

spotted sailing in the contiguous<br />

zone outside the territorial waters<br />

around the islets, the coast guard<br />

said. Suga said he was not in a<br />

position to know China’s intent but<br />

added he did not believe the ships’<br />

activity had anything to do with<br />

recent visits to war-linked Yasukuni<br />

Shrine in Tokyo <strong>by</strong> some Cabinet<br />

members. Bilateral relations have<br />

been frayed over conflicting claims<br />

to the islets as well as visits to<br />

Yasukuni, which honors 2.5 million<br />

Japanese war dead, including 14<br />

Class-A war criminals.<br />

Source: The Japan Times, 24 April<br />

2013<br />

Chinese navy patrols Diaoyu<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s on treaty anniversary<br />

A Chinese naval fleet patrolled the<br />

waters surrounding the Diaoyu<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s on 17 April, the anniversary<br />

of the signing of an unequal treaty<br />

between China <strong>and</strong> Japan in 1895.<br />

Composed of two warships, the<br />

Lanzhou missile destroyer <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Hengshui missile frigate, the<br />

Chinese People's Liberation Army<br />

Navy fleet crossed the Mayako<br />

Strait on 16 th night <strong>and</strong> arrived at<br />

the waters surrounding the Diaoyu<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s early 17 th morning. The<br />

fleet finished a series of attack <strong>and</strong><br />

defense drills in the west Pacific<br />

area after it sailed out from port.<br />

Zhao Xiaogang, the comm<strong>and</strong>er of<br />

the fleet, which belongs to the<br />

Nanhai Fleet, told a Xinhua<br />

correspondent aboard the Lanzhou<br />

destroyer that the navy's patrol<br />

around the Diaoyu Isl<strong>and</strong>s is<br />

legitimate <strong>and</strong> undisputable, as the<br />

isl<strong>and</strong>s are China's indispensable<br />

territory. The PLA navy patrolled<br />

on the day of historical<br />

significance, as the Treaty of<br />

Shimonoseki between the two<br />

countries was signed on April 17,<br />

1895, following China's defeat in<br />

the first Sino-Japanese War (1894 -<br />

1895). According to the treaty,<br />

China ceded Taiwan <strong>and</strong> its<br />

affiliated isl<strong>and</strong>s to Japan, <strong>and</strong> paid<br />

Japan as a war indemnity the sum<br />

of 200 million Kupingtaels. The<br />

treaty was reversed after Japan's<br />

defeat in World War <strong>II</strong>. Tensions<br />

were raised between the two<br />

neighboring countries over the<br />

isl<strong>and</strong>s after Japan's so-called<br />

"nationalization" of Diaoyu Isl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> part of its affiliated islets last<br />

year, as well as Japanese politicians'<br />

aggressive remarks over Japan-<br />

China ties.<br />

Source: Xinhua, 18 April 2013<br />

China accuses Japan of ‘making<br />

trouble’ over Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

China accused Japan on 16 April of<br />

“making trouble” <strong>by</strong> nationalizing<br />

the Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s. “On the issues<br />

concerning China’s territorial<br />

sovereignty <strong>and</strong> maritime rights <strong>and</strong><br />

interests, some neighbouring<br />

countries are taking actions that<br />

complicate or exacerbate the<br />

situation, <strong>and</strong> Japan is making<br />

trouble over the issue of the<br />

Diaoyu Isl<strong>and</strong>s,” the Chinese<br />

government said in a defense white<br />

paper, the first such report issued<br />

in two years. Diaoyu is the Chinese<br />

name for the disputed <strong>and</strong><br />

uninhabited islets in the East China<br />

Sea. The Japanese government<br />

responded immediately <strong>by</strong><br />

protesting the report through<br />

diplomatic channels, repeating that<br />

there is no territorial dispute<br />

between the two countries because<br />

the islets are Japanese territory.<br />

Bilateral relations have deteriorated<br />

since the central government<br />

purchased some of the islets from a<br />

Saitama businessman last<br />

September. Citing a military-civilian<br />

drill in the East China Sea last<br />

October, the paper says the<br />

People’s Liberation Army Navy has<br />

enhanced capabilities in partnership<br />

with marine surveillance <strong>and</strong><br />

fishery administration departments<br />

to coordinate comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

respond to emergencies in joint<br />

military-civilian operations to<br />

safeguard maritime rights. Titled<br />

“The Diversified Employment of<br />

China’s Armed Forces,” the paper<br />

says the Asia-Pacific region has<br />

become an increasingly significant<br />

stage for world economic<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

5


development <strong>and</strong> strategic<br />

interaction between major powers.<br />

Source: The Japan Times, 17 April<br />

2013<br />

China points finger at US over<br />

Asia-Pacific tensions<br />

China's defense ministry made a<br />

thinly veiled attack on the United<br />

States on 16 April for increasing<br />

tensions in the Asia-Pacific <strong>by</strong><br />

ramping up its military presence<br />

<strong>and</strong> alliances in the region, days<br />

after the top U.S. diplomat visited<br />

Beijing. China is uneasy with what<br />

the United States has called the<br />

"rebalancing" of forces as<br />

Washington winds down the war<br />

in Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> renews its<br />

attention further east. China says<br />

the policy has emboldened Japan,<br />

the Philippines <strong>and</strong> Vietnam in<br />

long st<strong>and</strong>ing territorial disputes<br />

with Beijing. China faces "multiple<br />

<strong>and</strong> complicated security threats"<br />

despite its growing influence, the<br />

Ministry of Defense said in its<br />

annual white paper, adding that the<br />

US strategy meant "profound<br />

changes" for Asia. "There are some<br />

countries which are strengthening<br />

their Asia Pacific military alliances,<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>ing their military presence in<br />

the region <strong>and</strong> frequently make the<br />

situation there tenser," the ministry<br />

said in the 40-page document, in a<br />

clear reference to the United States.<br />

Such moves "do not accord with<br />

the developments of the times <strong>and</strong><br />

are not conducive towards<br />

maintaining regional peace <strong>and</strong><br />

stability", ministry spokesman Yang<br />

Yujun told reporters. The official<br />

People's Liberation Army Daily<br />

went further, saying in a<br />

commentary on 15 April that China<br />

needed to beef up its defenses to<br />

deal with a hostile West bent on<br />

undermining it. "Hostile Western<br />

forces have intensified their<br />

strategy to westernize <strong>and</strong> split<br />

China, <strong>and</strong> employed every<br />

possible means to contain <strong>and</strong><br />

control our country's<br />

development," it said. On 15 April,<br />

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry<br />

defended the re-orientation of U.S.<br />

foreign policy towards Asia as he<br />

ended a trip to the region<br />

dominated <strong>by</strong> concerns about<br />

North Korea's nuclear program.<br />

While China has been angered <strong>by</strong><br />

North Korea's behaviour, including<br />

its third nuclear test in February, it<br />

has also made clear it considers<br />

U.S. displays of force in response<br />

to Pyongyang's behavior to be a<br />

worrisome development.<br />

Source: Reuters, 16 April 2013<br />

Chinese navy continues highsea<br />

training<br />

The "Lanzhou" guided missile<br />

destroyer under the Navy of the<br />

Chinese People's Liberation Army<br />

(PLA) performed a training mission<br />

in the Western Pacific Ocean on 14<br />

April. From their last return to<br />

Sanya after the completion of high<br />

sea training mission on 3 April to<br />

their leaving Sanya for the high sea<br />

training again on 10 April, both the<br />

"Lanzhou" warship <strong>and</strong> the<br />

"Hengshui" warship had only seven<br />

days to rest <strong>and</strong> recuperation. The<br />

continuous high sea training<br />

missions are not only a great test<br />

on the reliability of equipment but<br />

also a tempering on the physical<br />

<strong>and</strong> mental training level for<br />

personnel. Despite time pressure,<br />

everything from logistics supply to<br />

personnel preparation, equipment<br />

support <strong>and</strong> many others was going<br />

orderly <strong>and</strong> smoothly. "Such a<br />

short time of rest <strong>and</strong> recuperation<br />

is not a problem for our logistics<br />

department," said Fan Hai, deputy<br />

captain of the "Lanzhou" warship.<br />

In contrast to the ship service<br />

department, the electromechanical<br />

department seems slightly busier<br />

with managing the main engines of<br />

the ship, the power stations <strong>and</strong> the<br />

sea water desalination equipment.<br />

During the 7 days, they were busy<br />

with various types of mechanical<br />

maintenance. "After the last highsea<br />

training, the overall<br />

performance of equipment is still<br />

excellent," said Qi Yao,<br />

electromechanical chief of the<br />

"Lanzhou" warship.<br />

Source: China Military Online, 16<br />

April 2013<br />

Japan, Vietnam to hold maritime<br />

security talks in May<br />

Japan <strong>and</strong> Vietnam have agreed to<br />

hold maritime security talks in May<br />

in Hanoi to accelerate maritime<br />

cooperation amid China’s<br />

increasing assertiveness in the East<br />

China Sea <strong>and</strong> South China Sea,<br />

government sources said Saturday.<br />

The two nations are expected to<br />

exchange views on Japan’s possible<br />

provision of patrol vessels to<br />

Vietnam during the first-ever<br />

bilateral talks on maritime security,<br />

the sources said. Vietnam has<br />

expressed hope that Japan will<br />

provide patrol boats as part of<br />

Hanoi’s efforts to improve its<br />

maritime security capabilities. The<br />

two sides are expected to confirm<br />

their st<strong>and</strong> against China’s maritime<br />

assertiveness <strong>and</strong> the need for<br />

abiding <strong>by</strong> international law to<br />

ensure maritime security, one of<br />

the sources said. Senior officials<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

6


from Japan’s foreign <strong>and</strong> defense<br />

ministries will take part in the talks,<br />

the sources said. Japan sees<br />

Vietnam “as a strategic partner that<br />

shares common interests,” a senior<br />

Japanese Foreign Ministry official<br />

said. In the talks, Japan is expected<br />

to provide a briefing on China’s<br />

increasing maritime activities<br />

around the Japan-controlled<br />

Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s in the East China<br />

Sea, including occasional entries of<br />

official Chinese ships into Japan’s<br />

territorial waters around the isl<strong>and</strong>s,<br />

which are claimed <strong>by</strong> China, the<br />

sources said. Vietnam is expected<br />

to touch on the dispute with China<br />

over sovereignty of the Paracel <strong>and</strong><br />

Spratly isl<strong>and</strong>s in the South China<br />

Sea.<br />

Source: The Japan Times, 15 April,<br />

2013<br />

Japan, Taiwan agree on fishing<br />

zone near disputed isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

Almost 4 years since their last<br />

fishery talks, Japan <strong>and</strong> Taiwan<br />

have agreed on principle to allow<br />

fishing trawlers in an area inside<br />

Japan’s exclusive economic zone,<br />

near the highly disputed Senkaku<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s. They new agreement will<br />

temporarily put on hold<br />

the ownership claims of both<br />

countries over the isl<strong>and</strong>s in the<br />

East China Sea, which is also being<br />

claimed <strong>by</strong> China. Under this new<br />

agreement, both countries will<br />

consent to designate an area in the<br />

EEZ as jointly managed waters<br />

where reciprocal fishing is<br />

authorized. Before this decision,<br />

the two have had two rounds of<br />

preparatory talks held last<br />

November <strong>and</strong> early March to help<br />

iron out the differences before the<br />

upcoming 17th round of bilateral<br />

talks. The formal talks are now<br />

scheduled for Wednesday at the<br />

earliest, wherein the new deal will<br />

be signed. Both sides agreed to<br />

hasten the process so the policies<br />

can be put into place as soon as<br />

possible. Since fishery talks began<br />

in 1996, Japan <strong>and</strong> Taiwan have<br />

had 16 rounds of successful<br />

negotiations. Talks stalled after<br />

2009 due to the renewed claims<br />

over ownership of the Senkakus,<br />

called Diaoyutais <strong>by</strong> the Taiwanese.<br />

China, calling the isl<strong>and</strong>s Diaoyu,<br />

also claims the resource-rich but<br />

uninhabited isl<strong>and</strong>s as its own,<br />

sorely affecting relations with<br />

Japan. The isl<strong>and</strong>s are currently<br />

under the administration of Japan,<br />

which led to the issues with<br />

Taiwanese fishermen, who consider<br />

the area around the isl<strong>and</strong>s to be<br />

their fishing grounds, but are<br />

constantly chased away <strong>by</strong> the<br />

Japanese Coast Guard. This new<br />

agreement with Japan will protect<br />

the livelihood of the said<br />

fishermen, as well as lead to the<br />

strengthening of bilateral relations<br />

between Japan <strong>and</strong> Taiwan.<br />

Source: The Japan Daily Press, 10<br />

April, 2013<br />

China to boost maritime<br />

training, says PLA Navy's Jiang<br />

Weilie<br />

A top People's Liberation Army<br />

Navy officer says training on the<br />

high seas will become routine for<br />

China's growing fleets but that does<br />

not mean it is changing its defence<br />

policy. Rear Admiral Jiang Weilie,<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>er of the South Sea Fleet,<br />

told Xinhua on the amphibious<br />

assault ship Jinggangshan, which<br />

has been taking part in drills in the<br />

western Pacific for two weeks that<br />

training on the high seas was<br />

common among many countries'<br />

navies. "A developing <strong>and</strong> growing<br />

Chinese navy does not mean<br />

China's near-sea defence policy has<br />

changed," Xinhua quoted Jiang as<br />

saying. "With the help of airborne<br />

early-warning aircraft … we have<br />

explored new ways of training the<br />

navy's aviation force <strong>and</strong> vessels to<br />

co-operate in combat in faraway<br />

seas, with the use of information<br />

technologies," Jiang said. The 57-<br />

year-old said combat training on<br />

the high seas would become<br />

routine for the Chinese navy in the<br />

future. Meanwhile, Liu Cigui , the<br />

chief of the civilian State Oceanic<br />

Administration told the People's<br />

Daily that China will "maintain<br />

regular patrols in the Yellow Sea,<br />

the East China Sea <strong>and</strong> the South<br />

China Sea" to safeguard the<br />

country's territorial sovereignty.<br />

"China's maritime law enforcement<br />

used to be loose <strong>and</strong> inefficient,"<br />

Liu said, praising last month's<br />

restructuring that integrates marine<br />

surveillance, police coastguards,<br />

fishery <strong>and</strong> the customs antismuggling<br />

unit into one maritime<br />

law enforcement agency. Macaubased<br />

military affairs commentator<br />

Antony Wong Dong said Jiang's<br />

remarks were targeted largely at<br />

neighbouring countries that had<br />

territorial disputes with China, such<br />

as Vietnam <strong>and</strong> the Philippines.<br />

Wong said the PLA Navy's<br />

successful training posed a real<br />

threat to those countries. "Jiang's<br />

hidden message is that the navy will<br />

fully back up the Chinese<br />

government <strong>and</strong> show off its real<br />

fighting power in case sovereignty<br />

disputes cannot be settled through<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

7


negotiations," Wong said, adding<br />

that Jiang, who has comm<strong>and</strong>ed<br />

the South Sea Fleet since<br />

November 2010, was trying to<br />

appear to be friendly <strong>by</strong><br />

downplaying the navy's strategic<br />

ambition. The Jinggangshan <strong>and</strong><br />

other warships, including a frigate,<br />

a destroyer <strong>and</strong> a missile frigate,<br />

took part in a live-fire training<br />

exercise in the western Pacific on<br />

14 th April.<br />

Source: South China Morning Post, 2<br />

April, 2013<br />

COMMENTARIES<br />

India’s interest in the South<br />

China Sea: Freedom of<br />

Navigation<br />

- Darshana M. Baruah<br />

The South China Sea (SCS) is major<br />

Sea Line of Communication (SLOC)<br />

<strong>and</strong> an important trade route. Conflict<br />

in the area concerns all Asian nations<br />

including India. Though India is not a<br />

claimant in the territorial disputes in<br />

the region it holds an interest in the<br />

Freedom of Navigation (FON).<br />

China treats the SCS as its internal<br />

waters which invariable affects India’s<br />

interest. New Delhi has reiterated its<br />

stance on the “Freedom of<br />

Navigation” underlining the necessity<br />

for uninterrupted access to<br />

international waters. India must st<strong>and</strong><br />

committed to its rhetoric on the FON<br />

<strong>and</strong> to defend its interests should the<br />

need arise. This in turn would involve<br />

deepening naval cooperation with the<br />

key countries of the ASEAN <strong>and</strong><br />

major powers sharing India’s interest<br />

in defending the principle of FON.<br />

This article looks at India’s primary<br />

interest in the SCS in the context of<br />

growing Chinese assertiveness.<br />

Six nations (China, Vietnam, the<br />

Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei <strong>and</strong><br />

Malaysia) have competing territorial<br />

claims over areas in the South<br />

China Sea (SCS ). China lays claim<br />

on almost the entire SCS using a<br />

“U-shaped” or a “nine dotted line”<br />

in its map <strong>and</strong> regards the waters as<br />

its territorial sea. Recent tensions in<br />

the area have garnered global<br />

attention on the issue <strong>and</strong> it could<br />

emerge as a military flashpoint.<br />

This in turn has antagonised China,<br />

which has vigorously opposed<br />

internationalisation of the issue.<br />

China has refused any multilateral<br />

approach <strong>and</strong> has urged extra<br />

regional countries to stay out of its<br />

disputes with the neighbours. India,<br />

though a passive observer to the<br />

incidents so far, has its own stakes<br />

in the region. This article looks at<br />

India’s proclaimed interest in the<br />

‘Freedom of Navigation’ (FON) in<br />

the South China Sea. .<br />

The Sea Lines of Communication<br />

(SLOCs) running through the<br />

South China Sea are of vital<br />

importance to all Asian nations<br />

including India. The Indian Navy<br />

has recognised the protection of<br />

the SLOC as one of its missions in<br />

the military role. The Indian<br />

Maritime Doctrine states that “In<br />

view of the nation’s heavy<br />

dependence on the seas for trade,<br />

protection of own SLOCs is an<br />

important mission of the IN”¹.<br />

Political trouble in the South China<br />

Sea inevitably draws India’s<br />

attention as this affects its interest<br />

in the freedom of navigation.<br />

India has always maintained its<br />

st<strong>and</strong> on uninterrupted access to<br />

international waters <strong>and</strong> major<br />

SLOCs. It is in India’s national<br />

interest that the SLOCs in the SCS<br />

remain secure <strong>and</strong> stable given that<br />

55 per cent of India’s trade transits<br />

through this route. India also has<br />

economic assets in Vietnam for<br />

which access to the SCS is vital.<br />

New Delhi’s growing concern<br />

toward maintaining peace <strong>and</strong><br />

stability around SLOCs was voiced<br />

recently at the India-ASEAN<br />

commemorative summit in<br />

December 2012. Prime Minister<br />

Manmohan Singh in his opening<br />

statement at the 2012 Summit<br />

stated that “As maritime nations,<br />

India <strong>and</strong> ASEAN nations should<br />

intensify their engagement for<br />

maritime security <strong>and</strong> safety, for<br />

freedom of navigation <strong>and</strong> for<br />

peaceful settlement of maritime<br />

disputes in accordance with<br />

international law.”<br />

Although the dispute concerns only<br />

6 nations, the fact that the area is in<br />

international waters draws global<br />

attention. Expressing concern,<br />

India’s former External Affairs<br />

Minister, S. M. Krishna stated<br />

India’s position thus: “India<br />

maintains that South China Sea is<br />

the property of the world”.<br />

Krishna’s comment was met with<br />

strong opposition from Beijing. A<br />

commentary published in the Global<br />

Times newspaper opined that calling<br />

the “South China Sea a global<br />

property was a mistake” <strong>and</strong> that<br />

“other countries cannot describe<br />

one country’s territory as global<br />

property”. Beijing has maintained<br />

that FON is fully guaranteed on the<br />

SCS. However, this is in conflict<br />

with Beijing’s actions <strong>and</strong> laws<br />

which treat the SCS as its territorial<br />

waters.<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

8


In accordance with international<br />

law, the limit of the territorial sea is<br />

set at 12 nautical miles². China<br />

claims sovereignty over most of the<br />

isl<strong>and</strong>s in the SCS as its territory.<br />

As such, its adjacent waters up to<br />

12 nautical miles will be considered<br />

as China’s territorial sea. According<br />

to article 6 of China’s 1992<br />

territorial law: “Foreign ships for<br />

non-military purposes shall enjoy<br />

the right of innocent passage<br />

through the territorial sea of the<br />

People's Republic of China in<br />

accordance with the law” <strong>and</strong> that<br />

“Foreign ships for military<br />

purposes shall be subject to<br />

approval <strong>by</strong> the Government of the<br />

People's Republic of China for<br />

entering the territorial sea of the<br />

People's Republic of China.” In<br />

November 2012, it was reported<br />

that China has enabled its police to<br />

board <strong>and</strong> search ships which<br />

illegally enter what China considers<br />

its territory in the disputed waters.<br />

The move was heavily critised <strong>and</strong><br />

caused consternation in the<br />

international community as it<br />

concerned the busy lanes of the<br />

South China Sea. There were two<br />

incidents with Indian vessels in the<br />

South China Sea hinting at Chinese<br />

assertiveness in claiming the SCS as<br />

its internal waters. The first was in<br />

July 2011, when INS Airavat was<br />

contacted on radio saying that it<br />

was “entering Chinese waters”<br />

while sailing on the South China<br />

Sea. Responding to the reports, the<br />

Ministry of External Affairs (India)<br />

released a statement on September<br />

2011 explaining the incident. The<br />

statement read<br />

The Indian Naval vessel,<br />

INS Airavat paid a friendly<br />

visit to Vietnam between 19<br />

to 28 July 2011. On July 22,<br />

INS Airavat sailed from the<br />

Vietnamese port of Nha<br />

Trang towards Hai Phong,<br />

where it was to make a port<br />

call. At a distance of 45<br />

nautical miles from the<br />

Vietnamese coast in the<br />

South China Sea, it was<br />

contacted on open radio<br />

channel <strong>by</strong> a<br />

caller identifying himself as<br />

the "Chinese Navy” stating<br />

that "you are entering<br />

Chinese waters.<br />

The second incident was in June<br />

2012, when the People’s Liberation<br />

Army Navy (PLAN) provided an<br />

unwelcomed escort to the Indian<br />

naval squadron led <strong>by</strong> INS Shivalik<br />

in the waters of the South China<br />

Sea. As reported, “Although the<br />

Indian ships were in international<br />

waters, a Chinese frigate sent a<br />

message "welcoming" the<br />

contingent to the South China Sea<br />

<strong>and</strong> sailed along for the next 12<br />

hours”. Analysing the situation,<br />

strategic expert Dr. C. Raja Mohan<br />

explained: “The message is this:<br />

"nice to see you here, but you are<br />

in our territorial waters <strong>and</strong> within<br />

them there is no right to 'freedom<br />

of navigation' for military vessels.<br />

You are here at our sufferance."<br />

China’s attempt to levy its national<br />

laws on international waters is<br />

alarming to the international<br />

community. It is essential that all<br />

nations’ observer international laws<br />

<strong>and</strong> norms for free passage of<br />

vessels in international waters.<br />

India’s Defence Minister A.K<br />

Antony underlined the need to<br />

abide <strong>by</strong> international laws at the<br />

2012 Shangri-La Dialogue. He<br />

emphasised that “Like individual<br />

freedoms, the fullness of maritime<br />

freedoms can be realised only when<br />

all states, big <strong>and</strong> small, are willing<br />

to abide <strong>by</strong> universally agreed laws<br />

<strong>and</strong> principles”. S.M. Krishna,<br />

India’s then External Affairs<br />

Minister expressed similar views at<br />

the ASEAN Regional Forum<br />

(ARF). Observing the vitality of<br />

SLOCs, the minister stated that<br />

“We have been following<br />

developments in respect to the<br />

South China Sea. As we had stated<br />

earlier, India supports freedom of<br />

navigation <strong>and</strong> access to resources<br />

in accordance with principles of<br />

international law. These principles<br />

should be respected <strong>by</strong> all.”<br />

Tensions in the region have<br />

heightened due to assertive <strong>and</strong><br />

aggressive claims on the disputed<br />

isl<strong>and</strong>s. It is imperative that all<br />

nations follow the norms of<br />

international law to avoid conflict.<br />

India is keen to make its presence<br />

felt in the region <strong>and</strong> is willing to<br />

cooperate with the Southeast Asian<br />

countries to ensure maritime<br />

freedom.<br />

The Indian Navy plans periodic<br />

deployments in the South China<br />

Sea to mark its presence. It also<br />

engages in exercises with the navies<br />

of the Southeast Asian nations.<br />

India’s cooperation with the<br />

Southeast Asian nations is in<br />

keeping with its Look East Policy.<br />

India <strong>and</strong> ASEAN in December<br />

2012 commemorated the 20 th<br />

anniversary of the ASEAN-India<br />

Dialogue Relations. The Summit<br />

saw the adoption of the vision<br />

statement, an important<br />

development in the India-ASEAN<br />

relations. The vision statement<br />

marked India <strong>and</strong> the ASEAN<br />

nations’ commitment to ensure<br />

FON. The statement read “We are<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

9


committed to strengthening<br />

cooperation to ensure maritime<br />

security <strong>and</strong> freedom of navigation,<br />

<strong>and</strong> safety of sea lanes of<br />

communication for unfettered<br />

movement of trade in accordance<br />

with international law, including<br />

UNCLOS”.<br />

India’s stance in the South China<br />

Sea is clear: there should be no<br />

obstruction of FON in<br />

international waters. Overriding<br />

international norms in these waters<br />

will further escalate the disputes<br />

adversely affecting the FON. New<br />

Delhi must st<strong>and</strong> committed to its<br />

rhetoric on the FON <strong>and</strong> to defend<br />

its interests should the need arise.<br />

This in turn would involve<br />

deepening naval cooperation with<br />

the key countries of the ASEAN<br />

<strong>and</strong> major powers sharing India’s<br />

interest in defending the principle<br />

of FON.<br />

Endnotes:<br />

¹ Indian Navy, Indian Maritime Doctrine<br />

(Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of<br />

Defence (Navy), 2009.<br />

² See Article 3 of the United Nations<br />

Convention on the Law of the Sea<br />

(UNCLOS) on the limit of the territorial<br />

sea.<br />

Darshana M. Baruah is an Editorial<br />

Associate, South China Sea Monitor.<br />

REPORT<br />

Interaction with Vice Admiral<br />

Scott H. Swift, Comm<strong>and</strong>er, US<br />

7 th Fleet<br />

Vice Admiral Swift is Comm<strong>and</strong>er,<br />

US 7 th Fleet. He attended San Diego<br />

State University <strong>and</strong> received his<br />

commission in 1979 through the<br />

Aviation Reserve Officer C<strong>and</strong>idate<br />

Program. He received his Masters<br />

degree from Naval War College,<br />

Newport, R.I. His operational<br />

assignments include Attack Squadron<br />

(VA) 94, VA-97, Carrier Air Wing<br />

11 staff, comm<strong>and</strong> of Strike Fighter<br />

Attack Squadron 97, comm<strong>and</strong>er,<br />

Carrier Air Wing 14, deputy<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>er, Naval Forces, US Central<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>er, Carrier<br />

Strike Group 9. During those tours he<br />

participated in combat operations<br />

Praying Mantis, Southern Watch,<br />

Enduring Freedom <strong>and</strong> Iraqi Freedom.<br />

His shore tour assignments include<br />

VA-122, Naval War College,<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong> of Strike Fighter Weapons<br />

School, Pacific, F/A-18 requirements<br />

officer OPNAV staff, comm<strong>and</strong> of<br />

VFA-122, Office of the Under<br />

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,<br />

Technology <strong>and</strong> Logistics staff <strong>and</strong><br />

Director of Operations, US Pacific<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Vice Admiral Swift has been<br />

recognized as the Comm<strong>and</strong>er, Naval<br />

Air Forces, US Pacific Fleet<br />

L<strong>and</strong>ing Signal Officer of the Year,<br />

presented the Comm<strong>and</strong>er Michael G.<br />

Hoff Award as the US Pacific Fleet<br />

Attack Aviator of the Year, <strong>and</strong> is<br />

entitled to wear the Defense Superior<br />

Service Medal, Legion of Merit,<br />

Bronze Star, Meritorious Service<br />

Medal, Air Medal with Combat V,<br />

along with various other personal,<br />

unit <strong>and</strong> service awards.<br />

The United States is in a unique<br />

situation where it continues to say<br />

it does not take a position in the<br />

territorial disputes in South China<br />

Sea <strong>and</strong> East China Sea, but it has<br />

treaty obligations with Japan<br />

Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Philippines <strong>and</strong> if<br />

these countries were attacked, the<br />

US would be compelled to invoke<br />

the treaty obligations, Vice Admiral<br />

Scott H. Swift, Comm<strong>and</strong>er of the<br />

US 7 th Fleet said during a round<br />

table discussion with ORF scholars<br />

on 4 April 2013. Admiral Swift<br />

shared his views on a wide range of<br />

issues from the US refocus, the<br />

emerging regional dynamics,<br />

China’s rise, North Korea, the<br />

South China Sea, the<br />

Senkakus/Diaoyu disputes to the<br />

emerging flashpoints in the region.<br />

He emphasized that the views he<br />

expressed were his own <strong>and</strong> not<br />

official US, US Department of<br />

Defense, or US Navy positions.<br />

The US “Refocus” towards the<br />

Indo-Pacific Region<br />

Describing the US renewed<br />

engagements with the Indo-Pacific<br />

region, Admiral Swift said the term<br />

“refocus” appropriately captures<br />

the essence of the policy as he sees<br />

this in his engagements throughout<br />

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10


the Indo-Pacific region. He pointed<br />

out that the original term “pivot”<br />

that came out to describe this<br />

refocus did not resonate well within<br />

the US government as it is easy to<br />

pivot towards something as it is<br />

away from something. He also<br />

noted that the term “rebalance”,<br />

which also came to be used, does<br />

not appropriately describes the<br />

policy as it indicates resource<br />

investment. He noted that the US<br />

refocus was about a commitment<br />

from a policy perspective <strong>and</strong> a<br />

sense of doing the right thing <strong>and</strong><br />

the urgency to be focused. He<br />

stressed the point that there was<br />

need for broad dialogue in the<br />

region so as to determine what<br />

actions should be taken. Admiral<br />

Swift, however, clarified that<br />

“refocus” is not a new term.<br />

Admiral Swift observed that the US<br />

refocus is an acknowledgement of<br />

the fact that the US interests in the<br />

Middle-East had allowed its focus<br />

to be overtly distractive away from<br />

the Indo-Pacific region. Agreeing<br />

that the “Indo-Pacific” region is<br />

the epicentre of the global<br />

economy, he noted that the refocus<br />

is an acknowledgment of the<br />

importance of the region. Admiral<br />

Swift noted that the US refocus is<br />

often seen from a military<br />

perspective. However, he pointed<br />

out, the US 7 th Fleet has been in the<br />

Pacific for seventy years <strong>and</strong>,<br />

therefore, it is no new to them.<br />

The Admiral said that the<br />

achievements of the US refocus<br />

remains to be seen. He noted that<br />

even as the focus was clearly in the<br />

Indo-Pacific region, the challenge is<br />

to define the right thing to do. He<br />

pointed out that India is working<br />

through this with its Look East<br />

policy. He also stated that there is<br />

talk about a Russian refocus. He<br />

wondered whether the new<br />

Chinese leadership’s visit to Russia<br />

was just a visit or something more<br />

with the centrality to the Indo-<br />

Pacific region.<br />

The Regional Dynamics<br />

Admiral Swift observed that the<br />

probability of conflict in the region<br />

is very low, but the consequences<br />

would be high. He pointed out that<br />

no one in the region seeks conflict,<br />

but there are some dynamics at play<br />

that need to be kept in mind. He<br />

noted that there is predominance<br />

of very weak governments <strong>and</strong><br />

governance in the region.<br />

He suggested that one source of<br />

instability in the region comes from<br />

leadership changes. He said that<br />

although the resilience of the<br />

Japanese government has increased<br />

with Prime Minister Abe taking<br />

over that role, there is still much to<br />

be seen. He observed that there is<br />

still some uncertainty about the<br />

new government in South Korea<br />

<strong>and</strong> there are new governments in<br />

North Korea <strong>and</strong> China. The<br />

Philippines is going through<br />

elections <strong>and</strong> it goes around the<br />

region, he said. This vector of<br />

instability is there in the region, he<br />

added.<br />

Another major dynamics is<br />

demographics, Admiral Swift<br />

pointed out. From all perspectives,<br />

demographics play heavily, he<br />

noted. From a global perspective,<br />

he said that India <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States are on a firm foundation,<br />

while Japan <strong>and</strong> China are on the<br />

downside of demographic stability.<br />

He observed that there are<br />

questions about China sustaining<br />

itself because of the one-child<br />

policy of the past. The concern is if<br />

it fails to sustain itself economically<br />

as a country from a demographic<br />

perspective what would this mean<br />

from a policy <strong>and</strong> a political<br />

perspective, he questioned. He also<br />

wondered if this will accelerate the<br />

desire to establish the Chinese<br />

position on a global stage.<br />

The other vector he identified is<br />

the economic dynamics. There are<br />

many countries that are struggling<br />

with the global downturn, while<br />

there are new players taking<br />

prominent roles that are unique<br />

such as China, he observed. He<br />

suggested that as an emerging<br />

economic power with global<br />

interests, it is normal to expect that<br />

China would look after those global<br />

interests. There is also the<br />

perception of some countries being<br />

more challenged than others such<br />

as Japan <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />

Another perception is how long<br />

South Korea would be able to<br />

maintain its continued economic<br />

growth. One of the most important<br />

things the US 7 th Fleet Comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />

does is building relationships with<br />

the region to better underst<strong>and</strong><br />

these dynamics, he said.<br />

Admiral Swift observed that<br />

security for security sake has little<br />

value. The <strong>by</strong>-product that<br />

countries should be pursuing from<br />

a security perspective is stability<br />

because the outcome of security is<br />

stability, he pointed out. There is<br />

need to use the military resources<br />

in a smart way, or what Joseph Nye<br />

called “smart power” - the<br />

moulding of soft power <strong>and</strong> hard<br />

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11


power, Admiral Swift noted. He<br />

said this should be the focus from a<br />

military perspective as the military<br />

itself cannot increase stability<br />

because a combined effort is<br />

needed. He opined that<br />

organisations such as the Western<br />

Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)<br />

<strong>and</strong> Association of Southeast Asian<br />

Nations ( ASEAN) have been<br />

making positive impact in the<br />

region in this respect.<br />

He suggested that it is important<br />

for likeminded governments to<br />

embrace the approach to resolving<br />

differences between countries<br />

through adherence to international<br />

norms, st<strong>and</strong>ards, rules <strong>and</strong> laws.<br />

These are mechanisms that are<br />

developed over time <strong>and</strong> have<br />

served well <strong>and</strong> rejected the use of<br />

coercion <strong>and</strong> force in resolving<br />

these differences, he noted.<br />

Emerging Flashpoints in the<br />

Region<br />

He said a trigger could be a<br />

territorial claim or dispute <strong>and</strong><br />

there are many of them throughout<br />

the region. This would be<br />

precipitated <strong>by</strong> the powers with an<br />

interest in a given specific claim, he<br />

opined. He noted that a trigger<br />

could be something along the lines<br />

of what happened between China<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Philippines with the<br />

Scarborough Reef last year where<br />

unintended consequence of a<br />

police action taken against the<br />

fishermen escalated into as<br />

something big. He also said that it<br />

could be along the context of a<br />

misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing, as in the<br />

Senkakus where the Japanese<br />

government felt that it was taking<br />

proactive measures to deescalate<br />

the situation when the Tokyo<br />

Governor wanted to buy the<br />

Senkakus <strong>and</strong> the government said<br />

it would buy the isl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> not<br />

allow an individual to have sway.<br />

This was seen <strong>by</strong> the Chinese as a<br />

nationalisation of the disputed<br />

territory, he observed.<br />

He also noted that it would not be<br />

a specific issue that could be<br />

predictive <strong>and</strong> this, he said, is a<br />

source of concern. Admiral Swift<br />

noted that it is not possible to look<br />

ahead six months <strong>and</strong> predict high<br />

probability of an incident<br />

happening in a given area. He<br />

suggested that where there is no<br />

unanimity on the utilization of<br />

international norms, st<strong>and</strong>ards,<br />

rules <strong>and</strong> laws, there would be<br />

concerns because there is a higher<br />

potential of friction <strong>and</strong> conflict<br />

where two concepts clash, one is<br />

national laws <strong>and</strong> the other is<br />

international laws. This is the<br />

essence of the challenge that the<br />

region faces today, he said.<br />

China: Establishing a New<br />

Equilibrium<br />

Admiral Swift observed that China<br />

is trying to establish a new<br />

equilibrium. He pointed out that<br />

whether China is desirous of the<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards on which the world is<br />

governed today remains to be seen.<br />

Furthermore, he observed that it is<br />

up to the international community<br />

to decide whether an application of<br />

a new rule set is acceptable.<br />

Admiral Swift suggested that a<br />

majority of countries in Asia do not<br />

think that the present international<br />

norms need to be changed, at least<br />

the mechanism <strong>by</strong> which they<br />

operate. He noted that the<br />

Philippines <strong>and</strong> the Japanese do not<br />

feel the need. He observed that as<br />

an emerging power with global<br />

interests China has a say on what<br />

the rule set should be. He also<br />

noted that the rule set changes over<br />

time but that changes should be<br />

made from within the existing<br />

system, <strong>and</strong> this is a challenge that<br />

the world is facing today.<br />

He observed that the world always<br />

seeks a sense of balance <strong>and</strong><br />

equilibrium. Even as China’s effort<br />

to find its way up is<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>able, its rise has<br />

disturbed the balance, he noted.<br />

Admiral Swift suggested that China<br />

is also working through what role<br />

would it play <strong>and</strong> how will it play<br />

that role on the global stage, <strong>and</strong> <strong>by</strong><br />

what rule sets. He observed that<br />

China is trying to establish a new<br />

equilibrium but it is sometimes<br />

against the balance of consensus<br />

from a global perspective. There is<br />

bound to be friction as this<br />

pendulum of equilibrium swings<br />

back <strong>and</strong> forth, he noted. As it<br />

swings back <strong>and</strong> forth there is need<br />

to be mindful not to stop that<br />

pendulum in a specific place<br />

because that is done with military<br />

force, he said. He noted that<br />

military power is disruptive <strong>by</strong><br />

nature <strong>and</strong> it should absolutely be<br />

the last resort. He pointed out that<br />

China <strong>and</strong> the US have much more<br />

in common than competition<br />

though much of the focus is on<br />

those areas where there is<br />

competition.<br />

Admiral Swift suggested that room<br />

would need to be made to<br />

accommodate China <strong>and</strong> that is a<br />

challenge, he said. He also noted<br />

that the world is going through an<br />

adjustment period <strong>and</strong> eventually<br />

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12


there would be an accommodation<br />

made in the context of<br />

international norms, st<strong>and</strong>ards,<br />

rules <strong>and</strong> laws with China.<br />

Admiral Swift rejected the notion<br />

that the world is entering into<br />

another cold war. The Cold War<br />

between the US <strong>and</strong> the erstwhile<br />

Soviet Union was a result of the<br />

great doubt on both sides about<br />

each other’s strength that led to<br />

great uncertainty around the world<br />

about which was more powerful<br />

<strong>and</strong> consequently who would side<br />

with who became a matter of<br />

concern globally, he explained.<br />

That is not the case where the<br />

world is today, he said. Because of<br />

its economic weight, China is a<br />

global power from a policy<br />

perspective, but from a military<br />

perspective, it is a regional power,<br />

he observed. Hence, the<br />

perspective of power is different in<br />

the Cold War context, he added.<br />

The Unpredictable North Korea<br />

Admiral Swift observed that North<br />

Korea is the primary concern today<br />

because it is difficult to predict<br />

exactly what the government in<br />

North Korea is striving for. He<br />

noted that Kim Jong-un’s recent<br />

success of getting a satellite in the<br />

space followed <strong>by</strong> a nuclear test<br />

<strong>and</strong> now the latest ratcheting up of<br />

tensions are of great concern.<br />

Even as Pyongyang is said to be<br />

seeking a dialogue with the United<br />

States, its method of threatening to<br />

generate a discussion is not<br />

acceptable, he pointed out. Admiral<br />

Swift noted that the United States<br />

takes the threat seriously <strong>and</strong> it has<br />

been taking measures to reduce the<br />

risk. He said the US is in a dialogue<br />

with other countries in the region<br />

that are equally concerned about<br />

how destabilizing an open conflict<br />

would create <strong>and</strong> the fact that it<br />

would be the first order<br />

consequences, the second <strong>and</strong> third<br />

order consequences from an<br />

economic perspective. He observed<br />

that the capabilities that some<br />

attribute to North Korea are<br />

somewhat exaggerated, even<br />

though the risk is a serious one.<br />

The danger is the unpredictability<br />

<strong>and</strong> without underst<strong>and</strong>ing the goal<br />

of North Korea, it is difficult to<br />

develop a policy approach that<br />

would deescalate the situation, he<br />

suggested.<br />

Admiral Swift said that all the<br />

rhetoric coming out of North<br />

Korea may be something that is a<br />

cover for something smaller that<br />

might occur in the background <strong>and</strong><br />

needs to pay attention to, he said.<br />

He noted that North Korea would<br />

not utilize international norms,<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards, rules <strong>and</strong> laws to resolve<br />

disputes, given that it is not even<br />

approachable in a dialogue.<br />

South China Sea <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Senkakus/Diaoyu Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

Admiral Swift noted that China<br />

may underst<strong>and</strong> the necessity of<br />

turning to international arbitration<br />

to resolve the territorial issues, if<br />

not value the global norms. With<br />

respect to the Philippines bringing<br />

its claim in Scarborough Reef to<br />

international arbitration, he said,<br />

the Chinese rejection would not<br />

matter as the issue would be<br />

resolved <strong>by</strong> the international<br />

tribunal with or without China’s<br />

participation. He observed that<br />

China’s position has been clear all<br />

along in rejecting multilateral<br />

resolution, but its bilateral<br />

approach to resolving differences is<br />

problematic, he added.<br />

He observed that taking the issue<br />

to an international court empowers<br />

other countries in the region <strong>and</strong><br />

the move itself is a victory, even as<br />

China rejects the outcome. Admiral<br />

Swift made an interesting<br />

observation about what if China<br />

were to win the case in absentia.<br />

This would raise the dilemma<br />

whether it would embrace<br />

international arbitration or not. He<br />

also pointed out that Vietnam may<br />

be interested in pursuing the<br />

Philippines’ way.<br />

On the Senkaku issue, Admiral<br />

Swift noted that Japan is unwilling<br />

to acknowledge that there is a<br />

dispute because from the Japanese<br />

perspective the acknowledgment of<br />

the dispute diminishes the power<br />

of their opposition. He also noted<br />

that China thought that the same<br />

model that proved successful with<br />

Scarborough Reef would gain the<br />

same level of success with the<br />

Senkakus.<br />

Admiral Swift said Taiwan does not<br />

support the Chinese position on<br />

the disputed isl<strong>and</strong>. The Taiwanese<br />

position is that the Chinese claim is<br />

not valid <strong>and</strong> that their claim to the<br />

isl<strong>and</strong> is valid, he added. The great<br />

risk is that if there is no arbitration<br />

<strong>and</strong> dialogue to resolve these<br />

issues, the unfortunate experience<br />

globally is, people turn to force, he<br />

pointed out.<br />

On Japan’s move towards relaxing<br />

some of their laws to govern their<br />

activities of self-defence, Admiral<br />

Swift observed that Tokyo appears<br />

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13


to be heading in that direction.<br />

Even before the Senkakus incident,<br />

there has been an effort made<br />

within the Japanese Diet to relax<br />

some of their laws, he said. He<br />

observed that Japan recognizes that<br />

the world has changed. The move<br />

away from a pacifist approach to<br />

self defence is aimed at allowing<br />

Japan to be a little more proactive<br />

within the region, he noted. Even<br />

as this would raise concerns, only<br />

time would tell its real impact, he<br />

pointed out. He observed that the<br />

US position on Japan’s moves to<br />

relax its laws would be that this is a<br />

decision for the Japanese to make.<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

ARTICLES<br />

Florian Dupuy <strong>and</strong> Pierre-Marie<br />

Dupuy, “A Legal Analysis of<br />

China’s Historic Rights Claim in<br />

the South China Sea”, The American<br />

Journal of International Law, <strong>Vol</strong>.107,<br />

No.1, (January 2013), pp. 124-141.<br />

Vo Si Tuan, John C. Pernetta, <strong>and</strong><br />

Christopher J. Paterson, “Lessons<br />

learned in coastal habitat <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>based<br />

pollution management in the<br />

South China Sea”, Ocean & Coastal<br />

Management, February 2013.<br />

Mohd Aminul Karim, “The South<br />

China Sea Disputes: Is High<br />

Politics Overtaking?” Pacific Focus,<br />

<strong>Vol</strong>ume 28, Issue 1, April 2013, pp.<br />

99-119.<br />

Amitai Etzioni, “Accommodating<br />

China”, Survival: Global Politics <strong>and</strong><br />

Strategy, <strong>Vol</strong>ume 55, Issue 2, 2013,<br />

pp. 45-60.<br />

Ravi A. Balaram, “Case Study: The<br />

Myanmar <strong>and</strong> Bangladesh Maritime<br />

Boundary Dispute in the Bay of<br />

Bengal <strong>and</strong> Its Implications for<br />

South China Sea Claims”, Journal of<br />

Current South East Asian Affairs, <strong>Vol</strong>.<br />

31, No. 3 (2012).<br />

Maximilian Mayer <strong>and</strong><br />

JostWubbeke, “Underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

China’s International Energy<br />

Strategy” The Chinese Journal of<br />

International Politics, 2013.<br />

COMMENTARIES<br />

Li Mingjiang <strong>and</strong> Zhang<br />

Hongzhou, “Restructuring China’s<br />

Maritime Law Enforcement:<br />

Impact on Regional Security”,<br />

RSIS, 1 April 2013.<br />

Anna Morris, “The US Pivot to<br />

Asia: Will the Senkakus be the first<br />

challenge?”, RSIS, 3 April 2013.<br />

Ristian Atri<strong>and</strong>i Supriyanto, “The<br />

US rebalancing to Asia: Indonesia’s<br />

Maritime Dilemma”, RSIS, 24 April<br />

2013.<br />

Euan Graham, “Freedom Arrives:<br />

What next for the LCS?”, RSIS, 24<br />

April 2013.<br />

Benjamin Ho, Kaewkamol<br />

Pitakdumrongkit <strong>and</strong> Sarah Teo,<br />

“ASEAN Unity: From Word to<br />

Deed”, RSIS, 26 April 2013.<br />

Evan Braden Montgomery,<br />

“Returning to the L<strong>and</strong> or Turning<br />

Toward the Sea? India’s Role in<br />

America’s Pivot”, The Diplomat, 28<br />

April 2013.<br />

Robert Farley, “Is China Carelessly<br />

Overextending Itself?”,The<br />

Diplomat, 1 May 2013.<br />

Harry Kazianis, “Senkaku/Diaoyu<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s: A “Core Interest” of<br />

China”, The Diplomat, 29 April 2013<br />

Andy Thomchick, “The U.S. <strong>and</strong><br />

the Philippines: A Vital<br />

Partnership”, The Diplomat, 23 April<br />

2013.<br />

Robert Farley, “East Asia’s Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

Challenge”, The Diplomat, 18 April<br />

2013.<br />

Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN’s<br />

chairmanship in 2013 <strong>and</strong> 2014”,<br />

East Asia Forum, 2 April 2013.<br />

Vignesh Ram, “ASEAN reboots on<br />

South China Sea”, Asia Times<br />

Online, 30 April 2013.<br />

Roberto Tofani, “Ambiguity afloat<br />

in South China Sea”, Asia Times<br />

Online, 24 April 2013.<br />

Roberto Tofani, “Psychological<br />

Warfare in the South China Sea”,<br />

Asia Times Online, 10 April 2013.<br />

PAPERS<br />

China’s Defence White Paper 2012.<br />

Available at<br />

http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/<br />

2013-04/16/content_4442750.htm<br />

Le Hong Hiep, “South China Sea<br />

Disputes Keep Vietnam-China<br />

Relations Cold”, ISEAS, 15 April<br />

2013.<br />

Ian Storey, “Japan’s Growing<br />

Angst over the South China Sea”,<br />

ISEAS, 8 April 2013.<br />

REPORTS<br />

Yun Sun, “Studying the South<br />

China Sea: The Chinese<br />

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14


Perspective”, CNAS, 9 January<br />

2012.<br />

Michael Auslin, “Don’t Forget<br />

About The East China Sea” CNAS,<br />

3 May 2012.<br />

Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Sansha<br />

Garrison: China’s Deliberate<br />

Escalation in the South China Sea”,<br />

CNAS, 5 September 2012.<br />

Dr. Patrick Cronin, “Contested<br />

Waters: Managing Disputes in the<br />

East <strong>and</strong> South China Sea, CNAS,<br />

14 December 2012.<br />

Zachary M. Hosford <strong>and</strong> Ely<br />

Ratner, “The Challenge Of Chinese<br />

Revisionism: The Exp<strong>and</strong>ing Role<br />

of China’s Non-Military Maritime<br />

Vessels”, CNAS, 1 February 2013.<br />

Will Rogers, “Finding Common<br />

Ground: Energy, Security <strong>and</strong><br />

Cooperation in the South China<br />

Sea”, CNAS, 12 February 2013.<br />

Editor: K. Yhome<br />

Editorial Associate: Sadhavi Chauhan<br />

Darshana M. Baruah<br />

Consulting Editor: Isk<strong>and</strong>er Rehman<br />

<strong>Produced</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Published</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>Observer</strong> <strong>Research</strong> <strong>Foundation</strong><br />

15

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