MPT Grading Materials July 2010 - Oregon State Bar
MPT Grading Materials July 2010 - Oregon State Bar
MPT Grading Materials July 2010 - Oregon State Bar
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Multistate Performance Test<br />
In re Hammond<br />
by fire;<br />
• Hammond owned the business and the building;<br />
• Hammond had insured the building;<br />
• Hammond has inquired about filing an insurance claim,<br />
but has not filed such a claim;<br />
• Hammond was turned down for a bank loan before the<br />
fire, because of his company’s financial condition;<br />
• The Fire Marshal classified the fire as suspicious in<br />
origin;<br />
• The day after the fire, Hammond answered police<br />
questions;<br />
• The next day, Hammond retained Walker, and per her<br />
instructions, referred all further questions to her;<br />
• There is a discrepancy between what Hammond and<br />
Gomez said they were doing the day of the fire;<br />
<strong>Grading</strong> Guidelines<br />
• Here there was a fire, and Hammond hired a lawyer. His<br />
requesting insurance claim forms is just as much the act of<br />
an innocent man who has paid his insurance premiums and<br />
now wants to collect on them under his insurance contract<br />
as it is the act of someone who intends to file a false claim.<br />
• Thus this case is distinguished from Robb, where the<br />
facts tended to show that the attorney was hired “in the<br />
midst of a fraudulent scheme.”<br />
• Accordingly, even under Robb’s lower “some evidence”<br />
standard, the facts do not support any argument that the<br />
crime/fraud exception applies.<br />
• Walker’s memo about the call from Ray Gomez would<br />
be protected only by work-product privilege, because it<br />
is not a communication between Hammond and Walker<br />
(but it would be covered by Rule 1.6).<br />
• Note that the subpoena refers only to Walker’s<br />
communications with Hammond. Thus, on its face, it<br />
would appear not to extend to Walker’s conversation<br />
with Gomez.<br />
• In any event, no matter which standard the court might<br />
apply, and even if the court might end up requiring Walker<br />
to disclose her communications with Hammond about the<br />
fire so as to determine their status as privileged or<br />
nonprivileged, the result would likely be the same: The<br />
court would likely conclude that the communications were<br />
in fact privileged inasmuch as they are presumed to be<br />
such in light of their confidential character and the<br />
presumption is not rebutted by a preponderance of<br />
evidence proving the crime-fraud exception.<br />
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