The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation

DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY 541
TABLE 1 The Spread of Democracy, 1851–2001
SAR
SEM
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Rho 0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗
(4.660) (4.518) (6.812) (6.466)
Lambda 0.082 ∗∗∗ 0.111 ∗∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.046 ∗∗
(4.560) (15.114) (3.296) (2.224)
Lagged Democracy −0.134 ∗∗∗ −0.336 ∗∗∗ −0.142 ∗∗∗ −0.340 ∗∗∗
Level (15.090) (2.093) (15.701) (26.074)
Constant 0.325 ∗∗∗ 0.439 ∗∗∗ 0.677 1.111 ∗∗ 0.341 ∗∗∗ 0.460 ∗∗∗ 0.685 1.126 ∗∗
(5.157) (7.135) (1.164) (2.093) (5.143) (7.002) (1.174) (2.078)
Log-likelihood −7873.617 −7763.512 −7766.457 −7456.674 −7873.817 −7756.204 −7767.091 −7454.800
R-squared 0.001 0.061 0.068 0.225 0.009 0.077 0.068 0.227
Observations 3358 3358 3358 3358 3358 3358 3358 3358
Notes: Dependent variable: change in democracy (t-statistics in parentheses). Spatial weight matrix: first-order contiguity. ∗∗∗ = 1%,
∗∗ = 5%, ∗ = 10%. Variable included but not reported: island dummy in columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 include year and country
fixed effects.
a 0.085-unit larger increase in democracy than j. Itdoes
not matter whether we use the SAR or SEM model, which
deliver nearly identical estimates. If one cut a hole in a
map that contained no countries’ names but instead only
their changes in democracy, he could predict the missing
country’s movement in democracy by taking 8.5% of the
average change in democracy in its geographic neighbors
and adding it to the constant in row four.
In the second column of both panels we control for
countries’ lagged levels of democracy. The coefficient on
lagged democracy is negative and highly significant, suggesting
there has been “democratic convergence” globally
since 1850. More democratic countries experience
smaller increases in democracy over time than less democratic
countries. Further, controlling for lagged democracy
generates similar spatial coefficients to those above
in both models. In the SAR model the spatial coefficient
falls slightly, and in the SEM model it rises slightly. Countries
“catch” between 8 and 11% of the average change in
democracy in their geographic neighbors.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate columns 1 and 2, only
here we include a comprehensive set of year and country
fixed effects. Our year fixed effects control for any features,
such as global business cycles, oil shocks, etc., that
are common across countries but vary across time. Our
country fixed effects control for any permanent differences
across countries that might be important in contributing
to their changes in democracy over time. 7 Column
3 contains our stripped-down specification; column
7 An earlier version of this article used continent dummies to control
for potentially important “geographic effects.” Here, we take a more
comprehensive and informative, albeit admittedly still imperfect,
4 controls for lagged levels of democracy. Including twoway
fixed effects has an important influence on our estimates
of democracy’s spread rate. In both specifications
in both models this spread rate drops significantly. Using
the SAR model, countries “catch” only about 2% of the
average change in democracy in their geographic neighbors.
Using the SEM model, countries “catch” between 1
and 5% of this change. These results are highly significant
but democratic contagion is considerably smaller.
Table 2 considers the same eight specifications for
the sample that covers the years between 1901 and 2001.
The democratic contagion described by the democratic
domino theory is as prominent looking only at the twentieth
century as it is considering the period from 1851
to 2001, and in fact is a bit stronger. Without fixed effects
democracy spreads at a rate of about 11% between
neighbors. When fixed effects are included democracy’s
spread rate again falls, here to about 5%. However, in
the two-way fixed effects specification for the SEM model
that also controls for lagged levels of democracy, democracy’s
spread rate regains its former strength of about
12%. Compared to the estimates from the previous sample,
which extended back to the midnineteenth century,
the estimates in Table 2 suggest that democratic dominoes
have fallen somewhat “harder” in the twentieth century
but that their force has remained modest.
Table 3 considers the period between 1951 and 2001,
which delivers results very similar to those for the period
between 1901 and 2001. In the specifications without
approach to this that controls for country fixed effects, income,
income growth, and lagged democracy.